



Re-imagining Security: An Open Defense Primer

By Thomas Matyók, Srečko Zajc and Maj Fritz

Introduction

Global geopolitical challenges are stressing long held concepts of security and defense. The sovereignty and diplomacy promise of Westphalia are regularly challenged. We have entered an era characterized by the militarization of everything¹ in an Age of Perpetual Conflict. Kosovo, Georgia, and Ukraine are three examples of a breach of sovereign borders and the failure of diplomacy to prevent armed conflict. The international security system is increasingly uncertain, and it is now “necessary to think beyond the model of collective defense based on the transatlantic alliance.”² Irrespective of an unstable geopolitical architecture, political and military leaders persist in following outdated approaches to security and defense that were applicable to a world that no longer exists.

Current threats on Europe’s Eastern Flank necessitates that those engaged in Security Studies theory and practice ought to reimagine the role civil and military interaction in facilitating responsive defense mechanisms. Our goal in this paper is to contribute to an open-ended dialogue focusing on the need for Whole-of-Society responses to Human Security. Regrettably, the soundness of an Open Defense strategy can only be known in reverse when we look back on it. The soundness of an Open Defense strategy is as a framework for constructing context specific responses to conflict up, down, and across society before, during, and after armed violence. Open Defense is a mind-set, not a doctrine.

¹ Rosa Brooks, *How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2016.

² Jānis Bērziņš, “Latvia’s Comprehensive Defense Approach,” in *Security Theory and Practice: The Total Defense 21st Century.Com – Building a Resilient society*, eds. Marcin Lason, Maciej Klisz and Leszek Elak (Kraków: Krakowska Akademia, 2022), 228.



Building-out Open-Source Security

In 2012, the NATO Supreme Commander Europe, Admiral James Stavridis, gave a noteworthy TED Talk. The essence of his talk is captured in the words written on the TED site itself: “Imagine a global security driven by collaboration -- among agencies, government, the private sector, and the public. That's not just the distant hope of open-source fans, it's the vision of the former Supreme Commander of NATO, who shares vivid moments from recent military history to explain why security of the future should be built with bridges rather than walls” (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QPiaadMporw>). He was advocating for a new approach, a different way of thinking, a new mindset – Open Source Security.

The challenge we take up in this paper is advancing the narrative regarding how we might further shape and promote Open Defense as a constantly adapting system of individual and collective activities that ensure a resilient and sustainable Human Security ecosystem. In such an environment, individuals participate in contributing to their own individual and collective security by leveraging their knowledge, skills, and abilities in a threats-based approach to defense.

We approach our exploration of Open Defense with intellectual humility. We recognize there are more questions than answers when investigating security and defense issues in constantly shifting geopolitical spaces. Certainly, Human Security is more a concept than a rigid outline dictating behavior. And resilience is more a continuous process than a clearly defined end-state. We also recognize the fluid nature of modern security concerns. In our highly-connected, technologically oriented world where defense concerns include land, maritime, air, cyber, space, and human domains, and where access to information regarding security challenges is measured in milliseconds, civil and military professionals do not have the luxury of reflecting on lessons learned and crafting new policy, doctrine, and strategies to meet new demands. Today, security professionals are obliged to *build the security ship while they are sailing it*. All this, while mis and dis-information move about freely influencing the security narrative. Open Defense is a bridge between 2nd millennium defense thinking and an unknown 3rd millennium future.

An Open Defense mind-set cannot be nailed down. It is a fluid activity that adapts as necessary to rapidly changing environments. Open Defense recognizes the need to respond not only to conventional military dangers, but also hybrid threats and asymmetric warfare. And the combination of all three. Open Defense is the multi-dimensional field upon which security evolves up, down, and across society. Open Defense responds not only to armed violence. It also adapts to meet the demands of threats resulting from climate change, pandemics, and the rise of non-state actors. *There is no Open Defense without an Open Mind.*

Security and defense are multi-vocal questions

We propose that a key piece of the security puzzle is imagining new ways forward. When creativity is absent, it is easy to pursue a strategy of doing more of what we have been doing without regard to the fact that it is not producing the outcomes we desire. We recognize that questions of security and defense are multi-vocal, and that there is no single way to fashion Human Security.

Andriy Yermak, President Volodymyr Zelensky's chief of staff, noted in an Atlantic Council interview that "today's security architecture...is dead." And "those who are not able to grasp it are simply blind."³ The time and space needed for political engagement to develop, and for diplomacy to occur, is shrinking. Our world moves along at hyper-speed. Financial transactions occur within milliseconds through electronic transfers, human rights violations are broadcast across social media in near real-time, and news cycles operate 24/7. These are simply a few examples of how technology has quickened the pace of life. Leaders across society have become obliged to adapt their mindsets to meet these evolving challenges. The Civil-Military mindset however appears to have become ossified. Approaches to security and defense remain matters of bureaucratic coordination among 'experts.' The assumption seems to be that through planning and organization order can be imposed on chaos and events controlled. We challenge this assumption.

Open Defense thinking recognizes the need to move away from a hyphenated view of civil-military activities where the province of each is clearly defined. The unhyphenated *civmil* better communicates an integrated whole-of-security, and defense across society that is needed as war is now conducted "amongst the people" and "political and military developments go hand in hand."⁴ New theories of security and defense in a civmil context should include corporations as well as traditional political and military security actors. We see the influence private corporate actors such as Elon Musk and Jeff Bezos can exert on political and military domains. Multiple agendas are regularly present in corporations as shareholders, board members, and mutual fund traders seek leverage to achieve incongruent goals and objectives that impact the security structure. Corporations must function as part of the security and defense architecture and corporate leaders take on a leadership role in peacekeeping processes.

Corporate leaders can reach out in their dual role as business leader and educator to enhance political engagement to lessen the risks of confrontation among competing state actors and educate emerging leaders in developing regions regarding peace processes that includes peace negotiation, resiliency, and sustainability all within a global environmental context. Corporate leaders can deepen inequality, increase the impacts of natural disasters caused by climate change, as well as replenish natural resources, and develop and supply new products to the public to reinforce individual and collective resilience.

When we mention corporation, we should not be myopic: corporations, in the end, depend on platforms such as Amazon, Alibaba, Google, etc. so the policies guiding their behavior and future need to be addressed for the good of each individual and the communities to which those individuals belong. And one fact that should not be forgotten: the role of a traditional state as

³ Dan Peleschuk, "Zelensky's Chief of Staff: Ukraine Needs 'More Bravery' from NATO," Atlantic Council (blog), March 25, 2022, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/zelenskyys-chief-of-staff-ukraine-needs-more-bravery-from-nato/#:~:text=Today%E2%80%99s%20security%20architecture%2C%20he%20said%2C%20is%20dead.%20%E2%80%9CAnd%20those%20who%20are%20not%20able%20to%20grasp%20it%20are%20simply%20blind.%E2%80%9D>

⁴ Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*, New York: Vintage Books, 2007, xiii.

security and defense provider is on its way to extinction as it is replaced by platforms and corporations. The responsibility for Human Security is shifting from the state to the ‘clouds’ where Gods have been replaced by Big Data, fed with our personal data to become bigger and bigger every day knowing more about us than we know about ourselves. How can we answer with old fashioned models of security and defense? It is essential we develop new approaches that are constantly adapting to a fluid security environment.

First examine, recognize and name, react upon

It is not our purpose in this short paper to critique the entire security structure, nor is it to completely unpack the idea of defense. We aim to add to the Human Security conversation by further examining the concept of Open Defense, an amalgamation of Individual Resilience, Civil Defense, Military Defense, and Comprehensive/Total Defense. Open Defense is the next step in meeting the security needs of the 3rd Millennium. Open Defense recognizes the fluid nature of conflict and the inability of actors to control the infinite number of variables present in multi-domain conflict. Simply put, “security and defense guarantees based on international law, are not sufficient” to ensure a stable and peaceful world.⁵

Practice without theory can turn into action without reflection. Discussion of a theory of defense is necessary for an informed critique of Human Security practice. Are we doing the right things? What are the right things? Are we doing the right things wrongly? How are we evaluating success and failure? These are some of the questions we raise in shaping the development of an Open Defense theory that guides development of a Human Security practice mindset. To begin, we need to know where we stand.

For the purposes of this paper, we refer to security and defense as interdependent activities and outcomes. From our standpoint it is not possible to disassociate them. We also view Comprehensive and Total Defense as two terms that express the same concept.

When using terms, it is useful to ensure definitions communicate the essence of the concept to its finest detail. For Civil Defense, the working definition we use is offered by the Britannica Dictionary (<https://www.britannica.com/dictionary/civil-defense>): *a group of people who are not part of the military but are trained to protect and help people if an enemy attacks their country or if there is a natural disaster (such as a flood or earthquake)*. For our purposes, the Britannica definition has all necessary elements; ‘not part of the military’, they ‘are trained to protect’ ‘if an enemy attack’ or ‘a natural disaster’ occurs.

When discussing Civil Defense, it is important to address the confusion that can develop when speaking of the difference between Civil Defense and Civil Protection. Is it not logical that if defense is performed by trained civilians, we may name it Civil Defense? In a civil-military approach to defense we see civil stakeholders make up half of the defense structure and the military the other half. Following Britannica, does it not make sense to settle on one clear term,

⁵ Marciń Lason, Maciej Klisz, and Leszek Elak, “The Total Defence 21st Century.com – Building a Resilient Society: Introduction,” in *Security Theory and Practice: The Total Defense 21st Century.Com – Building a Resilient society*, eds. Marcin Lason, Maciej Klisz nd Leszek Elak (Kraków: Krakowska Akademia, 2022), 10.

Civil Defense? We view the civil-military calculus as: Human/National Defense = Civil Defense + Military Defense; as simple as $e=mc^2$.

During the Cold War specific approaches to Civil Defense were developed with the goal of protecting and defending populations in case of nuclear attack or war. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 the Cold War was mistakenly declared as history, but as we can observe since the beginning of Putin's era only the Pan-West believed it was over. Clearly, Russia never accepted it as a geopolitical fact. A lethal miscalculation by the West is today multiplied with the increase of authoritarian regimes, with China leading in the field of militarization. Liberal democracy as societal model is not what authoritarians have in mind even when holding free elections – free elections are no guarantee of freedom and liberal democracy anymore. This is the current environment in which we are obligated to fashion new Whole-of-Society approaches to security and defense.

Is the era of states' security past?

Collective, Total, and Comprehensive Defense are not the same, but they have some common elements that link them to the state and government. We have already noted two important changes in approaches to defense. First is that states no longer hold a monopoly on violence, and secondly, states are increasingly waging violence on their own citizens. At issue is whether-or-not the military can be relied upon to protect civilians, provide for their wellbeing, and maintain the peace? Is Protection of Civilians doctrine relevant when war is amongst the people and hybrid threats and asymmetric warfare dominate?

Military Defense is a massive money consuming activity that is not adjusting to the hybrid nature of current and future threats. Military defense doctrine has not made the shift from collective to individual action, from schools to platforms, from doctrines that are obsolete the moment they are published, and from a static understanding of reality to a dynamic 24/7 observation of what is occurring.

Open Defense is a dynamic security mind-set based on the need and responsibility of individuals to protect themselves and their local community. Protection is a mutual reinforcing activity where individual defense is a precondition of collective defense. Transgenerational conflicts, pandemics, and climate change are pushing us in this direction. Are we neglecting the role of a state, government, parliament? Not at all, we are only suggesting that the role of the state should be modified: states and politicians ought to provide funds to train and equip individuals, organize local communities, connect them, digitalize communication, tell the military that they are only a part of human security and defense, important but in a comprehensive open defense they have a role that supports civil society actions. National Defense should be a balanced development of Civil Defense (in a new sense of the meaning) and Military Defense that supports Whole-of-Society defense and security initiatives.

At the end: NATO, EU, and others ought to follow a new open policy. It will be painful for many, but not moving in the direction of Open Defense will be unimaginably far more painful. Following a *war amongst the people* paradigm, hybrid threats and asymmetric warfare dominate

the multi-dimensional conflict space. Hybrid threats and asymmetric warfare also shift citizens from passive objective recipients of security to subjects active in providing their own defense.⁶

The defining characteristic of Open Defense is the inclusion of citizens and informal networks as security actors. Presently, “the relationship between formal institutions and informal social networks is not yet adequately conceptualized.”⁷ Open Defense is part of a Hybrid Security System that recognizes citizens as the end-state users of the security system, not states.⁸ In an Open Defense environment the emphasis is placed on developing and enhancing individual resilience where citizens are at the center.⁹

Open Defense builds on existing forms for securing society against direct, hybrid, and asymmetric threats. Open Defense extends the idea of Common Defense which encompasses all military and non-military actions and resources necessary for defense against threats.¹⁰ Total Defense strategies that rely on Whole-of-Society approaches properly advances the defense narrative. It speaks to the need for all elements of society to engage in resistance actions against an adversary. Warfare today “targets a nation in its totality” requiring that “defense must go beyond the traditional military realm.”¹¹

Total Defense is “based on developing (a) professional society ready to defend the country by all means and using all available resources.”¹² Total Defense can be viewed as a top-down approach to security. This approach assumes a coherent state responsible for commanding and controlling Whole-of-Society responses to external threats. It also assumes security is provided from above and gifted to individuals and communities. Individuals are both providers and

⁶ Ivica Djordjevic and Ozren Dzigurski, “The Hybridization of Security Systems as a Function of the Human Security Concept,” *TEME* 43, no. 6 (2019): 1014.

⁷ Ibid, 1019.

⁸ Ivica Djordjevic and Ozren Dzigurski, “The Hybridization of Security Systems as a Function of the Human Security Concept,” *TEME* 43, no. 6 (2019): 1013-1028.

⁹ Thomas Matyók, Srečko Zajc and Maj Fritz, “Individual Resilience: A Precondition for Open Defense,” *Small Wars Journal*, accessed August 16, 2021. <https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/individual-resilience-precondition-open-defense>

¹⁰ Artur Michalak, “Common Defense – the Past or the Future,” in *Security Theory and Practice: The Total Defense 21st Century.Com – Building a Resilient society*, eds. Marcin Lason, Maciej Klisz and Leszek Elak (Kraków: Krakowska Akademia, 2022), 77.

¹¹ Jānis Bērziņš, “Latvia’s Comprehensive Defense Approach,” 224.

¹² Ibid, 226.

receivers of security. This is made no clearer than when military actors provide and receive security during peacekeeping operations.¹³

Open Defense is not a substitution for existing models

With multiple forms of defense already present as part of the security literature, is another needed? Will another model of defense contribute to better security?

We should move beyond the intellectual limits imposed by notions of Industrial Age warfare and Second Millennium thinking. As hypotheses of security and defense continue to evolve it is important to agree upon some common definitions. The definitions we include here are not meant to be absolute; rather, they are working definitions that frame our analysis of security and defense in a constantly changing conflict milieu.

Of course, different concepts of security and defense have been developed throughout history. Security and defense have always been contingent on their times. An example of change was the shift from Hot War to Cold War at the end of World War Two. The war did not end, it was transformed. Total Defense was replaced by Collective Defense within a NATO context and to a degree by the European Union (EU).

Article Five of the North Atlantic Treaty, or Washington Treaty, (4 April 1949) clearly articulates the Collective Defense concept: an attack upon one, is considered an attack on all. Equally significant is Article Three which obliges the states to develop national security and defense systems that provide them with the capacity to “resist armed attack.” Article Three provides the centerpiece of a Collective Defense approach to security and defense.

The NATO Summit in Warsaw 2016 identified the importance of Seven Baseline requirements. The Baseline Requirements are recognized as important national responsibilities in organizing civilian institutions and individuals to aid themselves and the military when and if necessary. The Baseline Requirements are:

1. Assured continuity of government and critical government services: the ability to make decisions, communicate them and enforce them in a crisis.
2. Resilient energy supplies: back-up plans and power grids, internally and across borders.
3. Ability to deal effectively with uncontrolled movement of people: able to de-conflict these movements from NATO’s military deployments.
4. Resilient food and water resources: ensuring these supplies are safe from disruption or sabotage.

¹³ Yvan Yenda Ilunga and Thomas G. Matyók, “Peace Leadership, Security, and the Role of the Military in Ethnopolitical Conflict,” in *Routledge Handbook of Peacebuilding and Ethnic Conflict*, eds. Jessica Senehi, Imani Michelle Scott, Sean Byrne, and Thomas G. Matyók (London: Routledge, 2022), 141-150.

5. Ability to deal with mass casualties: ensuring that civilian health systems can cope and that sufficient medical supplies are stocked and secure.
6. Resilient civil communications systems: ensuring that telecommunications and cyber networks function even under crisis conditions, with sufficient back-up capacity.
7. Resilient transport systems: ensuring that NATO forces can move across alliance territory rapidly and that civilian services can rely on transportation networks, even in a crisis.¹⁴

Collective Defense is a Sharing Defense. Total Defense is when a state is fully responsible for its security and defense, for example Sweden and Finland have the most developed Total Defense structures. Of course, Russia, China, and many other strong states which do not belong to any military organization maintain similar Total Defense systems. Total Defense structures are expensive to maintain, but at the same time, governments always know what they have. Collective Defense is a bit tricky since all decisions are adopted by consensus. On one side what is fair, on the other may be considered wholly unfair. Consensus driven decisions can be slow to develop in collective defense communities; therefore, the need for states to be able to defend themselves, to hang on, in the early phases of an armed conflict.

In exploring the new concept of Open Defense, we are proposing an alternative way of thinking about security and defense. Seeing security and defense as cascading from above through traditional governmental approaches and evolving bottom-up from individuals and loosely formed local networks. We do not propose substituting one concept for another; rather, we propose viewing security and defense as multi-dimensional where a one-size-fits-all approach is inadequate. Security and defense are developed and maintained at all levels of society, simultaneously. Individual Defense, the right to life, is the primary right of all human beings and the human right on which all others are anchored. As citizens, individuals jointly create Collective and Total Defense arrangements.¹⁵

Advocating only one concept of security and defense is inefficient and unacceptable from a Human Security perspective. Security and defense attend to multiple domains: land, sea, air, space, cyber, and human. The defense tasks are too many and too complex for one security approach alone. Traditional management principles are challenged and often fall short as they attempt to manage pieces and miss the fluid and uncontrollable nature of modern conflict.

When talking about Civil Defense (CD) with members of civil society, it is not uncommon for individuals to connect CD with resistance. Certainly, resistance movements provide a frame for developing approaches to Total Defense. The US Army developed the Resistance Operating Concept (ROC) as a mechanism by which military and resistance forces can create a common

¹⁴ Wolf-Dieter Roepke and Hasit Thankey, “Resilience: The First Line of Defense,” *NATO Review*, (February 27, 2019), <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2019/02/27/resilience-the-first-line-of-defence/index.htm>

¹⁵ Matyók, “Individual Resilience: A Precondition for Open Defense.”

language and way forward.¹⁶ But, the professionalization of resistance forces misses the point of CD as part of civil approaches to security and defense. Following Total Defense thinking linked to the professionalization of resistance can move us backwards to the Age of Industrial Warfare with top-down command-and-control structures that are too slow and cumbersome to counter the fluid nature of modern warfare.

Institutional biases can dominate decision-makers' thinking within elite, bureaucratic structures where a "thought collective" forms leading to a unified "thought style" and "thought world."¹⁷ The existing defense *thought world* can lead to inadequate responses to emerging threats that present themselves in a Gray Zone below the threshold of armed combat such as pandemics, cyber-enhanced mis/dis-information, corruption, etc.

Time to say farewell to linear approaches

Presently, linear approaches to defense dominate. This is an outcome of 2nd Millennium thinking where the focus remains on a Command-and-Control structure. It is an attempt to impose order on an unruly and chaotic security space. The goal today should focus on how to experience the unexpected.

We learned a lot about disaster response following the Hurricane Katrina tragedy along the Gulf Coast of the United States. Much of what was learned applies to humanitarian assistance and disaster response. We posit that a considerable degree of what was learned applies to defense, too. Of significant regard, Katrina caused us to relook our understanding of first responders. Traditionally, fire, police, and emergency management professionals were considered as first-responders to crises. Following Katrina, our thinking has shifted to recognize that individuals who occupy the crisis space are the *de facto* first-responders. Neighbors helping neighbors.¹⁸ This, too, we propose, is the case in defense. Resilient individuals in informal networks create an Open Defense atmosphere where local actors are the *first-defenders*.¹⁹

Humans organize and live their lives at community level. For "human spatial security" it is necessary to prevent, mitigate, and eliminate threats to citizens as well as allow for the organic development of community-centered security and defense that is context specific. In this manner,

¹⁶ Sandor Fabian, "Not Your Grandfather's Resistance: The Unavoidable Truths about Small States' Best Defense against Aggression," *Modern War Institute at West Point*, September 29, 2021, <https://mwi.usma.edu/not-your-grandfathers-resistance-the-unavoidable-truths-about-small-states-best-defense-against-aggression/>

¹⁷ Mary Douglas, *How Institutions Think*, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1986.

¹⁸ Rebecca Solnit, *A Paradise Built in Hell: The Extraordinary Communities that Arise in Disaster*, New York: Penguin Books, 2009.

¹⁹ Matyók, "Individual Resilience: A Precondition for Open Defense."

citizens become active partners in living Open Defense.²⁰ Civil society in Ukraine is referred to as its “secret weapon against Russia.”²¹

Let us repeat: the defining characteristic of Open Defense is the presence of citizens and informal networks as active security actors and stakeholders. Open Defense is part of a Hybrid Security System that recognizes citizens as the end-state users of the security system shifting away from states as the exclusive security domain.²² In an Open Defense environment, the emphasis is placed on developing and increasing individual resilience in preventing, mitigating, and transforming confrontation, conflict, combat. Open Defense is resilient individuals and networks working daily to construct a social fabric at community level that will resist being torn apart in conflict.²³

Long history of different types of resilience

Resilience is the consequence of a robust civil defense environment and has many different appearances, shapes, and models. Resilience is not a new concept though what it has been named has changed over time.

People have regularly prepared ways of protecting themselves and their communities. In Slovenia, visitors can visit many small hilltop churches most of which are surrounded by stone walls for defense against Ottoman raiders. People also constructed a ‘hot telegraph’ system by igniting fires on hilltops to communicate with those on other hills. Many hilltops still carry the names associated with info-fires (Grmada, Eng, Stake). Other historical examples of resiliency include water tanks in Istanbul (then Constantinople) that provided a huge water reserve to assist in the daily lives of citizens. Two elements of resilience are of the utmost importance: real-time information plus the organization of local communities to react systematically to crises.

Throughout history we can find hundreds of examples of how people, societies, and local communities build up their resilience without naming it resilience. One such example: during the Cold War it was obligatory in ex-Yugoslavia (a state prepared for everything possible from West or East but not for its own growing nationalisms) to build shelters in individual and collective houses. There was a standard regarding the number of civilians to be hosted and the basic goods that must be warehoused. It was prohibited to build a house without a shelter being inspected.

²⁰ Andrzej Pieczywok, “Education in the Area of Human Threat,” in *Security Theory and Practice: The Total Defense 21st Century.Com – Building a Resilient society*, eds. Marcin Lasoń, Maciej Klisz and Leszek Elak (Kraków: Krakowska Akademia, 2022), 347-357.

²¹ Jillian Kay Melchior, “Civil Society is Ukraine’s Secret Weapon Against Russia,” *Wall Street Journal*, April 4, 2022, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/civilian-volunteer-ukraines-refugees-work-training-weave-bulletproof-war-russia-invasion-defense-fortification-antitank-11649083101>

²² Ivica Djordjevic and Ozren Dzigurski, “The Hybridization of Security Systems as a Function of the Human Security Concept,” *TEME* 43, no. 6 (2019): 1013-1028.

²³ Thomas Matyók, Srečko Zajc and Maj Fritz, “Individual Resilience: A Precondition for Open Defense,” *Small Wars Journal*, accessed August 16, 2021. <https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/individual-resilience-precondition-open-defense>

(Now the shelters are serving completely different purposes, mostly as garbage holding places.) Another example is a system of voluntary societies like fire workers (in Slovenia out of two million citizens almost 150,000 of them are organized within local societies of fire workers and it is a long-time tradition). National and local Red Cross societies are strong, and we should not forget that societies and clubs of hunters are too, then Scouts and so on. All of them are collective members of Civil Protection and they are a potential base that individually and collectively enhance resilience according to a new reality.

It is not possible to copy-paste specific national solutions, but it is a good opportunity to become familiar with them and get some ideas that can be adjusted to the national environment. Where they do not have such a national structure, they can organize themselves in the future. Pure professionalization of resilience is wrong, and an almost deadly direction to go. Trained and organized within social networks, and state recognized, volunteers are the best human resources for building and sustaining resilience. This is not far away from the Red Cross approach proposed by Henry Dunant.

A single universal model does not exist. Resiliencies resist universalization and can only be similar in different spaces at different times, never the same. What we are searching for is a common way to design an efficient, locally contingent approach to resilience using limited external resources and capitalizing on existing internal capacities. We posit that resilience is not a *thing* to be constructed; rather, it is a living organism. It is part of daily lives and guides peoples' political, economic, and social activities. Via the technological revolution, local citizens are now able to engage in local security and defense problem-solving. Local citizens are no longer required to out-source their security and defense. A local focus on security and defense also brings along new concerns.

Are online defense lessons sufficient?

Solutions to security and defense concerns offered online seem simple, and there are always a variety of choices available. Determining what is best or what is right is an extremely difficult decision. Decisions, fast and slow, regarding security and defense at local levels should be guided by education, training, expert guidance, and common sense.

We know the rules for the past, but not for the present, and we are trying to understand the future. We are unsure of the civilization that has been constructed, but Open Defense is a map of how to navigate the fear, uncertainty, and lack of direction that present themselves. As a sample we can use covid-19 strategies and reactions and the war in Ukraine. Even if we can see some similarities, things are not the same. What does it mean? It is impossible to use the same plans and organized reactions. Responses must be tailored, designed, and guided by an adjusted strategy and tactics. We embrace the chaos. It is in our biochemical DNA to run away from chaos and danger, but this time we must confront ourselves and the first step is to calm down and evaluate what is surrounding us. Courage is not sufficient – knowledge and data are the must.

When speaking and writing about security and defense we should not forget to mention one important circumstance: in the past, before the end of the Cold War, most of the states had legislation that obliged young men after their 18th birthday to engage in obligatory military service, conscription. A large percentage of the population had a basic level of military training

and understanding of defense. Professional militaries put an end to conscription, and the total outsourcing of defense followed. The population was ‘dismissed’ from any lessons on defense and protection. Citizens no longer needed to trouble themselves with security and defense issues, they simply needed to focus on being good consumers. Life would be a fairy tale and the state would provide for everyone’s safety. Wearing the uniform was no longer a sign of patriotism.

The world has changed; however, approaches to security remain anchored to the past where the state dominated security concerns. Maintaining military strength is a challenge as states are unable to meet recruiting goals. The demand for human resources in the military must compete against demands in the greater society. Are cyber threats military concerns alone? Space concerns? Certainly not, they are civmil concerns and recruiting should move beyond civil versus military concerns. They are resilience issues within a security and defense context.

Probably by stubborn habit we constantly look at the target that just went by. We must change our perspective and view how limited human resources are best employed in an Open Defense context where civil and military concerns are fused together. Theoretically, if a state has ten percent of its population under arms (professional, reserve, and territorial) ninety percent of the population is not involved in security and defense concerns. This is a significant disregard of the talent available to defend the state, at large. Can this model continue where defense is outsourced to a shrinking percentage of the population? Is security and defense the responsibility of the state alone? An example of this thinking: One hundred percent of those that are driving cars and motorcycles must have a driving license as all drivers occupy the same space and should be able to contribute to a safe driving environment. Ten percent of the population with a license would not be adequate. But when speaking of Human Security, a small percentage with the knowledge needed is deemed good enough. Our Human Security calculation is completely wrong from the start. We need much a higher percentage of resilient (educated and trained) citizens.

Let’s repeat: presently, linear approaches to defense dominate. This is an outcome of 2nd Millennium thinking where the focus remains on a Command-and-Control structure to enable coordinated operations. It is an attempt to impose order on an unruly and chaotic security space.

Orchestra, symphony and jazz

A symphony orchestra can be used as a metaphor outlining current approaches to defense. Professional musicians (subject matter experts) who have mastered their instruments contribute to the symphonic score by staying within the bounds of the arrangement. String instruments do not play the role designated for percussion. The conductor stands front-and-center providing the command-and-control. The orchestra metaphor provides the image of a set-piece engagement within clearly defined limits.

Open Defense is more like jazz improvisation where musicians, who again have mastered their instruments allow the context to drive the musical outcome. Each musician builds off the unpredictable riff of the others. What appears as a chaotic activity is anything but. It is extemporaneous improvisation exploiting opportunities as they arise. Each musician is playing an individual style trying to give the best of the best, but at the same time integrated into a collective modus.

Rather than try harder to control what is essentially uncontrollable, we suggest doing better at improvising. Allowing the context to drive our ability to rapidly adapt and change. And, to do both at a speed at which an adversary cannot adequately respond.

Moltke spoke of the need for less planning and a greater focus on intent. Civil Military Interaction should be guided by a Collective Intent. Open Defense is an unknown. The unknown cannot be planned, nor can it be coordinated. It can only be adapted to and exploited.

Events in Ukraine demonstrate people's willingness to take up arms, fight, and do all that is necessary to protect themselves, their families, communities, and country. When states fail to provide security, individuals step forward and networks develop. Pictures of men accompanying loved ones to a safe border then returning to the fight provide compelling evidence of people's willingness to protect their homelands and neighbors. The development of new technologies, energy sources, and Artificial Intelligence (AI), etc. may have made daily life a bit easier, but they have done little to change people's desire to live freely, safely, and securely. Comfort alone is not good enough for a meaningful life. Freedom is. Ukraine is resilience in action and the conflict provides a laboratory for the study and advancement of individual resilience and Open Defense in the 3rd Millennium. Open Security is delivered by Open Defense and stands against all possible threats, internal and external, to Human Security. Open Defense is self-organizing and resists formal coordination, command, and control. A way of thinking of Open Defense is as a living organism. Biology, not management, explains Open Defense systems.

Individual citizens and local groups prepared for collective action are taking on critical security roles that were once the domain of state agencies such as the military, police, and emergency healthcare. The gaps left open by overwhelmed state agencies are being filled by volunteers from throughout civil society. We contend that it is this *'invisible army'* that is understudied and only recently appreciated as part of a Total Defense strategy. Total Defense during the Cold War was a systematic combination of military and non-military capabilities, under government command with diversified roles for individuals, local communities, and the state. Nordic states such as Sweden and Finland have similar models. After joining NATO, or entering the European Union, most of the new member states left the model of Total Defense and substituted it with Collective Defense. The emerging global security environment demands a new concept of Total Defense, not the same as the old approach to security; rather, a new model adjusted to evolving dynamic situations where yesterday's answers are inadequate for addressing today's questions. The future will be Open Defense, a combination of Civil Defense and Military Defense.

Integrating a strong self-preservation instinct

People have a strong self-preservation instinct. Individuals form into groups to optimize the attainment of their goals. A spirit of self-preservation and solidarity is particularly noticeable when people find themselves in grave or mortal danger, whether in natural disasters or violent conflicts.

We can see how, throughout history, people have organized and defended themselves in times of danger, and how the resilience of an individual who formed part of a group has manifested itself in the resilience of the group and self-organized community. During the Ottoman Empire,

especially in the 15th and 16th centuries, the Ottoman army made regular incursions into Slovenian territory which at the time was a part of the Habsburg Monarchy.

The Ottomans invaded the territory of today's Slovenia for the first time on 9 October 1408, raiding and plundering the area of Metlika. The incursions lasted for about 200 years. After the Ottomans conquered the Byzantine Empire and Bosnia, their raids on Slovenia, which they entered through Croatia, repeated every year. The purpose of their initial incursions into Slovenia were plundering expeditions; they burned villages, killed people, abducted boys, and turned them into Janissaries (members of the Ottoman army). The people who were strong enough were taken to slavery. The Ottomans stole cattle, crops, and money, and returned home with the loot.

The defense of the Slovenian territory was insufficient. The castles and forts provided shelter only to the nobles and elite circles of people, while the peasants were left entirely to their own devices. During the first incursions, people ran to caves or hid themselves near churches. As the incursions became more frequent, they began building camps. There were churches on steep hills, around which the peasants built walls. Some of them later became castles, e.g., the Pobrežje Castle near the Kolpa river. The people organized guards on hilltops to be warned of impending attacks. When the Ottomans were approaching, a bonfire was lit on the hill from where they were first spotted. Bonfires were then lit one after another on the hills in the interior, warning the people to find shelter.

In centuries past the importance of social resilience was demonstrated by the events preceding Slovenia's declaration of independence in 1991, when numerous preparations were in progress, also in the field of defense. In addition to the military defense of the soon-to-be born country, civil defense was being planned, too.

In early 1991, the Republic Secretariat for People's Defense (minister) appointed coordinators of defense preparations, who synchronized preparations of organizations and local communities in the fields of medical care, broadcasting and regional media, electrical system, republic commodity reserves, rail and road transport, industry, and material and medical supplies for armed forces and population. As instructed by the Republic Secretariat for People's Defense (defense ministry), municipalities placed particular emphasis on planning material and medical supplies for the Territorial Defense and population. During the preparations for Slovenia's independence and the independence process itself, the civil defense was built on new foundations that provided for an internal threat to security. A threat to Slovenia was posed by the former common country, its federal authorities and the Yugoslav People's Army (JLA) rather than an external enemy. Therefore, new defense plans that considered that change were drawn up. A new and priority task was to coordinate resistance

Military and civil defense was organized based on the guidelines from the Presidency of the Republic of Slovenia and a special operational and coordinating authority for emergency situations – the state-level republic coordination group and regional groups that coordinated the work of the Territorial Defense, Police, Civil Defense and Civil Protection. Defense plans provided for measures in all areas where Slovenia was in a more advantageous position than the JLA. In the areas where Slovenia lacked the advantageous position, the defense plans, instead of armed combat, provided for the use of other, especially non-military measures that were going to

be implemented by Civil Defense. The purpose of the latter measures was to neutralize dynamics and firepower of the opponent. They included barricades around military barracks, roadblocks, cutting off the JLA from the infrastructure. Those measures effectively supported the armed combat of the Territorial Defense and Police and stopped the JLA actions. They prevented the JLA from using arms and, on the other side, enabled the Civil Defense to use all available non-military infrastructure. The civil defense measures concerning material and medical supplies for the Territorial Defense, police, and population were of key importance for an effective total defense. Once the civil defense measures were implemented, the JLA was left without non-military and medical supplies, and was able to receive supplies by air only to a limited extent. Slovenia also gained an advantage in the information space, which strengthened its defense and security structures, and disabled the opponent.

The formal defense structures, which were established, coordinated, and led by the leadership of the new state, were joined by both conscripts and volunteers, who were thus integrated into armed formations and other forms of organizational structure responsible for the protection of Slovenia. Today, a similar situation is seen in the case of Ukraine's defense.

Only one half plus one half is full

Citizen volunteers in Ukraine, outside of formal channels, prepared themselves for a possible military invasion by Russia. Since 2014, civilian volunteers created informal networks, logistical routes, financial, and material supply lines that could be actualized when needed to counter threats from the East. That preparation now has individual and self-organized networks of volunteers supporting the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the National Guard, and Territorial Defense units in meeting the threat.²⁴ Civil Defense is one half of Open Defense and military defense provides the other half. Ideally, a State's Defense Strategy will be a fair combination of both. The military alone cannot meet the demands of hybrid and asymmetric warfare. Civil society must be trained and prepared to operate with military forces synchronizing actions and exploiting opportunities. Military forces are employed when and where their strengths are needed. Civil Defense activities supplement the military as needed. Military and civil society occupy the same space and act in concert.

During periods of peace and stability, it is the function of government to provide opportunities for the military and civil society to learn each other's language and approaches to security to prevent misunderstanding and unnecessary competition when conflicts arise. Civil Defense is being trained and prepared to work collaboratively with the military, when necessary, to provide a safe and secure environment for the advance of Human Security.

The war in Ukraine demonstrates how military training, equipment, and command-and-control systems do not necessarily ensure tactical, operational, and strategic advantage. Members of civil society, too, engage in activities to defend themselves and their communities when threatened. Citizens take actions that alter the operational environment often uncoordinated with state activities. People rally to their country. As a country is *imagined* in conflict, people make that

²⁴ Sarah Rainsford, "Ukraine's Shadow Army Resisting Russian Occupation," *BBC News*, July 29, 2022, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62333795>

imagination real. Television interviews are replete with individuals in Ukraine affirming how much they value *their country*. Love of country is a combat multiplier difficult to determine quantitatively and as a result can be left uncalculated. Individuals' love of country and sense of place are not often part of a military calculus. Citizens can be viewed by military actors as obstacles to mission success or as something to be protected. The Protection-of-Civilians construction positions civil actors as observers to a conflict, not participants.

The conflict in Ukraine speaks to civil society's role in contributing to Human Security as well as offering a deeper understanding of the evolution of warfare. From the start, development of Human Security doctrine has suffered from "conceptual ambiguity."²⁵ Our working definition of Human Security is the physical, emotional, and spiritual defense against threats to wellbeing and individual and societal resilience. Defense relies on resilience and resilience relies on defense in an ongoing reciprocal relationship. A society's resilience relies on every single person and his or her ability to respond to, and counter, shocks to themselves and the social structure. Society is the aggregate of individual actions. Our purpose in this brief paper is to speak to what occupies the space between defense and resilience. The *in-betweenness*, the bridge, to Human Security through Open Defense.

Rather than try harder to control what is essentially uncontrollable, we suggest doing better at improvising. Civil-Military Interaction (CMI) has been identified as the 'mind-set' that stakeholders use to guide their actions.²⁶ We propose CMI as more than a mind-set, it is a governing intelligence that guides individual and group actions without an awareness. It is the collective unconscious of Open Defense

We cannot underline enough that each situation, environment, state, local community needs a specific design of Open Defense and what is important is that Civil Defense and Military Defense are supporting each other. We cannot develop only one half of our defense structure – neglecting military or civilian. From history, if we are willing to accept her as a teacher, the combination of civilian resistance, Civil Defense and Military Defense was the most successful approach to security.

A way forward

Let us imagine experts from Civil Defense and Military Defense are sitting around the decision-making table and the need is to share information. A grey cloud appears – the military asks: is it OK to share information, is the information classified and at what level, do others have a 'need to know' and are they security cleared? Time is running, precious time when adversaries are acting.

²⁵ Luke Johns, "A Critical Evaluation of the Concept of Human Security, *E-International Relations*, (July 5, 2014), <https://www.e-ir.info/2014/07/05/a-critical-evaluation-of-the-concept-of-human-security/>

²⁶ Allard-Jan tan Berge, *Best and Bad Practices on Civil-Military Interaction*. The Netherlands: Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence, June 2014. <https://nllp.jallc.nato.int/IKS/Sharing%20Public/Civil-Military%20Interaction%20Best%20and%20Bad%20Practices%20Handbook.pdf>

Information is readily available, and access is made simple by technology. We must say that James Bond should be retired. We have entered the era of Artificial Intelligence, hybrid threats, Big Data, satellite imaging and information shared within a nano-second. Information from the last second is outdated and useless. That is why we need Open Defense as a new way of imagining, preparing, and acting to defend individually and collectively.

We must become Learning Driven – a permanent learning society or organization better prepared through training in local communities by way of a new concept of dynamic *civil* exercises and lessons designed for civilians to understand the needs of modern Civil Defense and for military to understand the needs of a modern military defense. Individual and community responsibilities and competencies need simultaneous engagement at all levels and command-and-control replaced with a coordination body to achieve Unity-of-Aim developing: Information literacy, Situational awareness, Space/Environmental awareness, Civic engagement – network building, Talent inventory, permanently trained Physical and mental condition.



About the Authors

Thomas Matyok (USA) Executive Director of the Joint Civil-Military Interaction Network as well as Senior Lecturer in Conflict Analysis and Resolution at Middle Georgia State University, USA. He is the former Chair and Director of Graduate Studies of the Department of Peace and Conflict Studies at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro. Tom conducts high-impact, policy-relevant studies regarding the strategic environment, its principle strategic challenges, and the relative balance of national and human security ends, ways, and means to contend with them. He also investigates ways of merging design and conflict analysis and resolution methodologies to achieve a multi-dimensional understanding of conflict. Tom was a Fulbright Scholar at the University of Konstanz in Southern Germany researching the role of international student exchanges in strengthening the Trans-Atlantic Partnership using a Peace Studies dual-degree curriculum. He has published and presented on Human Security, WPS, Civil-Military Interaction, Religion and Conflict, Negotiation, and Conflict Analysis and Resolution. He has taught Conflict Analysis and Negotiation at both the U.S. Army and Air War Colleges. Tom is former Director of the U.S. Air Force Negotiation Center.

Srečko Zajc (Slovenia) was in his career journalist, chief editor, manager, secretary general of the national Red Cross society. He joined to the MoD in 2008 and developed the Slovenian civilian contribution to the ISAF. Until September 2019 he served as Director General of the Defense Affairs Directorate. Main subjects: Defense plan, Critical Infrastructure Protection, resilience, civilian support to the military, civil-military cooperation, and interaction. In June 2019, the NATO CCOE awarded him with the CIMIC Award of Excellence. Hi is a member of Interacta Global Network.

Maj Fritz (Slovenia) graduated from Criminal Justice and Security, University of Maribor, Slovenia (1999) and holds a master's degree in European Studies (2008). He has been working for the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Slovenia since 1991. His interests and research include intelligence and security issues, peace operations and military outsourcing. He is a guest lecturer at Faculty of Criminal Justice and Security, lecturing on private security industry and international defense cooperation.

The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany is a German-American partnership and trusted global network promoting common values and advancing collaborative geostrategic solutions. The Marshall Center's mission to educate, engage, and empower security partners to collectively affect regional, transnational, and global challenges is achieved through programs designed to promote peaceful, whole of government approaches to address today's most pressing security challenges. Since its creation in 1992, the Marshall Center's alumni network has grown to include over 15,000 professionals from 157 countries. More information on the Marshall Center can be found online at www.marshallcenter.org.

Marshall Center ***Security Insights*** are short analytical articles that identify, explain, and put into context significant current and emerging defense and security issues. The series is aimed at the needs of political decision makers and others who are looking for concise summaries and analyses of important contemporary security topics. Security Insights are generally authored by Marshall Center faculty and staff.

The articles in the *Security Insights* series reflect the views of the authors and are not necessarily the official policy of the United States, Germany, or any other governments.

