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Welcome to this issue of per ConCORDIAM, in which we address the topic of the “Arab Spring” and the impact of recent events in North Africa and the Middle East on Europe and Eurasia.

Who could have foreseen the ripple effect that followed the self-immolation of a young Tunisian man on Dec. 17, 2010? The recent wave of protests and popular demonstrations against long-standing authoritarian regimes took both academic scholars and governments by surprise. It would have been difficult to predict the rapid changes in North Africa and the Middle East that led to a regime change in some cases and radical constitutional reforms in others. It would seem that these popular movements demanding democratic reform were caused by a confluence of political, demographic and economic factors. Clearly, new social media tools also played a significant role in the demonstrations.

Foreign affairs experts and political analysts will continue to debate the causes and long term consequences for Europe and the world. The “wave of change” in this region inevitably raises questions of legitimacy for authoritarian governments elsewhere. Some experts have drawn parallels that suggest similar scenarios could occur in other parts of the world. Although reliable forecasts are virtually impossible with respect to political change, one trend is clear: Popular desire for government legitimacy and democratic reform remains strong.

These events happening around the Mediterranean Sea have an economic and demographic impact on Europe. The European Union has an opportunity to re-engage the region and increase economic, political and social ties. This could enable it to play a more influential role by supporting democratic institution building and sustainable economic development.

We look forward to your comments on the wave of change in North Africa and the Middle East and your discussion of the lessons that the rest of the world can draw from these events. Your responses will be included in our next two issues: “the consequences of crime and corruption on national security” and “the impact of migration on Europe and Eurasia.” Please contact us at editor@perconcordiam.org

Sincerely,

Keith W. Dayton
Director
Barbara Wither has worked at the Marshall Center since January 2001, first in the Registrar’s Office as a student affairs specialist, then as assistant registrar. She moved to the Alumni Office in 2004, where she has been working with graduates from Southeast Europe. Before moving to Germany, she was the events coordinator for the Bank of England, Agency for Scotland, in Glasgow. She also worked for the British Army Families Federation in Germany and Northern Ireland. She holds a bachelor’s in Russian and German from Ohio University, a master’s in Slavic languages and literature from Ohio State University, and a master’s in communications from Eastern New Mexico University.

Adrian Matei is a Transatlantic Diplomatic Fellow at the U.S. Department of State, currently serving as a regional affairs officer in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Office of Regional and Security Policy Affairs. He has previously served in the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy Unit and the Political Affairs Unit of the Romanian MFA. Mr. Matei holds a master’s in international relations (SNSPA Bucharest, 2006) and in European Economic and Public Affairs (UCD Dublin, 2008). He is a 2006 graduate of the Marshall Center’s Program in Advanced Security Studies.

Heidi E. Lane is associate professor of Strategy and Policy and director of the Greater Middle East Research Group at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. She is currently a research fellow with the International Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, where she is completing research for a book about how counterterrorism programs affect state liberalization in the Middle East. Dr. Lane holds a master’s degree and doctorate in Islamic Studies from the Center for Near Eastern Studies, University of California, Los Angeles, and a bachelor’s from the University of Chicago. She is trained in Arabic, Hebrew and Persian.

Erwan Lannon is professor in European Law at the University of Ghent, Belgium, and a Ph.D. in law from the Université de Rennes I, France. He has worked as an expert for the EuroMeSCo Network and several EU institutions, and as consultant for the United Nations and the Mouvement Européen International. He was a senior associate researcher at the EU Institute for Security Studies. Professor Lannon has published widely on EU’s external relations, including “The EU’s Enlargement and Mediterranean Strategies: A Comparative Analysis” (edited with Marc Maresceau, 2001).

Álvaro de Vasconcelos has been director of the European Union Institute for Security Studies since May 2007. Before that, he co-founded and ran the Institute of Strategic and International Studies in Lisbon from 1981 to 2007, where he launched several networks including the Euro-Latin American Forum and EuroMeSCo. As well as being a regular columnist in the Portuguese and international press, he is author and co-editor of books, articles and reports, notably in the areas of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Euro-Mediterranean relations and on the theme of world order. His publications include “Portugal: A European Story” and “A European Strategy for the Mediterranean.”

Dr. Graeme Herd is head of the International Security Programme at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy. Before moving to Switzerland, he was professor of Civil-Military Relations at the Marshall Center, serving as a seminar leader on the center’s Program in Advanced Security Studies and as deputy director of its prestigious Senior Executive Seminar.

CoNTRIBUT oRS

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Adrian Matei

Heidi E. Lane

Erwan Lannon

Álvaro de Vasconcelos

Dr. Graeme Herd
The uprisings and regime changes across North Africa and the Middle East took much of the world by surprise. This issue of *per Concordiam* focuses on the impact of these events in Europe and Eurasia and the challenging road ahead for countries undergoing a transition to democracy. The events taking place across North Africa raise hope for a better life for millions of people, and an increased respect of human rights and social justice. As is often the case in democratic uprisings, they may also entail, in the short and medium term, upheaval and uncertainty.

This issue leads with a viewpoint article by Heidi Lane, associate professor of the Strategy and Policy Department at the U.S. Naval War College. She looks at systemic causes of the Arab Spring.

Our first feature article, written by Dr. Graeme Herd, head of the International Security Programme at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, takes a critical look at the implications of the Arab Spring for Europe and Eurasia. He examines important similarities and differences between political conditions in the Middle East and North Africa and such conditions in Central Asian countries.

Marshall Center alumnus Adrian Matei argues in “Helping Hands Across the Mediterranean” that it is crucial for Europe and the West to focus on supporting strong, modern and sustainable institutions and not default to supporting powerful rulers. He explains that Europe's approach must be based on the Arab circumstances, though within a Western frame of reference.

In “Building a European-Mediterranean Community,” Álvaro Vasconcelos, director of the European Union Institute for Security Studies, explains that the recent democratic uprisings and their aftermath are an opportunity for the EU to reassess policy in the region. He explains that the EU’s strategy needs to focus more on political and social challenges.

Erwan Lannon, professor of European Law at the University of Ghent and College of Europe, follows up with the article “Making Democracy Work.” He focuses mainly on Egypt and Tunisia, the importance of revising the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy and the significance of implementing specific existing instruments to facilitate reform.

Finally, in “Building Lasting Relationships,” Barbara Wither, a Marshall Center alumni relations specialist, highlights the recently formed Southeast Europe alumni association. This is the first-ever regional association of Marshall Center alumni. Fourteen nations (Albania, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Turkey and Ukraine) were signatories of the Marshall Center Alumni Association for Southeast European Security, or MCAASEES. Its goal is to strengthen and enhance national and regional security through cooperation.

The next issue of *per Concordiam* will examine the impact of crime and corruption on national security, followed by an issue devoted to the implications of migration. We invite you and your associates to submit articles on these themes to enhance discussion of the issues addressed in *per Concordiam*.

We encourage your feedback and look forward to your emails and ongoing dialogue on these important security issues. Please note: Each issue of the magazine is available online at the Marshall Center Web site: http://tinyurl.com/per-concordiam-magazine

— *per Concordiam* editorial staff
On behalf of the staff of the State Drug Control Service, of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan and myself, I would like to express my great appreciation for your important work.

My staff and I have reviewed the last addition of *per Concordiam* covering security issues in Europe. We found the information presented in the magazine very valuable to our everyday analytical work. I hope that in the future the partnership between our organizations continues to grow. Again, thank you for the magazine and for your noble mission.

Very Respectfully,

Col. Damir Sagynbaev
Deputy Chairman
State Drug Control Service
Republic of Kyrgyzstan
Marshall Center Senior Executive Seminar alumnus

I received the latest volume of *per Concordiam* magazine and would like to express my thanks to the Marshall Center staff for their efforts.

Best Regards,

Faridun Asadov
Executive Office of the President
Republic of Tajikistan
Marshall Center PASS alumnus

That is very kind of you to send an English version to me, as well as Russian copies sent to Azerbaijan. Please believe me, people in Azerbaijan really read *per Concordiam* and benefit from the innovations in the civil security area. Thank you in advance.

Best,

Rafig Gurbanzada
Azerbaijani Armed Forces
Marshall Center STACS alumnus

Send feedback via email to: editor@perconcordiam.org

**ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS**

*Per Concordiam* is a moderated journal with the best and brightest submitted articles and papers published each quarter. We welcome articles from readers on security and defense issues in Europe and Eurasia.

First, email your story idea to editor@perconcordiam.org in an outline form or as a short description. If we like the idea, we can offer feedback before you start writing. We accept articles as original contributions. If your article or similar version is under consideration by another publication or was published elsewhere, please tell us when submitting the article. If you have a manuscript to submit but are not sure it’s right for the quarterly, email us to see if we’re interested.

As you’re writing your article, please remember:

- **Offer fresh ideas.** We are looking for articles with a unique perspective from the region. We likely will not publish articles on topics already heavily covered in other security and foreign policy journals.
- **Connect the dots.** We’ll publish an article on a single country if the subject is relevant to the region or the world.
- **Do not assume a U.S. audience.** The vast majority of *per Concordiam* readers are from Europe and Eurasia. We’re less likely to publish articles that cater to a U.S. audience. Our mission is to generate candid discussion of relevant security and defense topics, not to strictly reiterate U.S. foreign policy.
- **Steer clear of technical language.** Not everyone is a specialist in a certain field. Ideas should be accessible to the widest audience.
- **Provide original research or reporting to support your ideas.** And be prepared to document statements. We fact check everything we publish.
- **Copyrights.** Contributors will retain their copyrighted work. However, submitting an article or paper implies the author grants license to *per Concordiam* to publish the work.
- **Bio/photo.** When submitting your article, please include a short biography and a high-resolution digital photo of yourself of at least 300 dots per inch (DPI).

Email manuscripts as Microsoft Word attachments to: editor@perconcordiam.org
The Arab Spring’s Three Foundations

Social media played only a supporting role in North Africa and the Middle East

By Heidi E. Lane, U.S. Naval War College

It has scarcely been a year since the Arab Spring swept across the Middle East and North Africa. Since then, emboldened Tunisians and Egyptians have, through mainly peaceful means, unseated their governments and ousted their respective presidents. Other popular protest movements, which have proven considerably bloodier, have spread in Bahrain, Syria, Yemen and Libya. Many observers were quick to credit social media such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube with providing the tools Arab citizens needed to overcome generations of fear and political apathy. This view, though alluring, is far too simple. Repression and the absence of meaningful political expression, with or without the tools of technology, have been the rule for decades, not the exception. So the question that requires further inquiry is: Why now? Three systemic changes during the past 30 years may reveal some useful answers.

The first change began in the 1980s, when many Middle East and North Africa (MENA) states adopted political and economic liberalization programs, partly as a means of transitioning rentier economies into global free-market economies. Economic restructuring often went hand in hand with bold promises of political reform. Unfortunately, economic liberalization proved difficult, and even the most reform-minded states were either too fast or too slow in making these transitions. In 1992, Algeria’s fast and loose liberalization process...
inadvertently brought Algeria’s Islamic Salvation Front to power through the ballot box. In response, Algeria’s military government aborted the electoral process, reneged on promises of political reform, annulled the election and subsequently swept Algeria into a decade-long civil conflict that left 200,000 dead. Algeria’s experience with reform chastened other MENA states, which concluded that reform was a recipe for their eventual demise. Though some continued to engage in slow and plodding reforms, most reduced liberalization to a mere façade. Not surprisingly, citizens who had embraced their governments’ promises of reform were slowly cured of their optimism.

The second systemic change came with the rapid growth of satellite television, beginning with the debut of Al-Jazeera in 1996. Al-Jazeera was followed in less than a decade by no fewer than 700 satellite stations. Arab governments, along with some Western ones, tried to reduce the appeal of Al-Jazeera first through gentle coercion and then through co-optation. When these efforts failed, many governments opened up access to the media market, thereby flooding the airwaves with hundreds of competing channels and programming. In less than a decade, Arab citizens could choose from a smorgasbord of local and international news, entertainment, and religious programming that exposed them to open debate on issues that previously had only taken place privately behind closed doors. In short, viewers came to expect and demand greater selection and diversity and, to an increasing degree, also demanded more of Arab media as a whole.

The third systemic change arrived in the aftermath of 9/11. Though unintended, the dominance of the Global War on Terrorism led by the United States made it expedient, convenient, and in some cases, necessary to adopt what has been called a new “counterterrorism culture.” Post 9/11 politics placed security before reform and inadvertently justified extension or readoption of heavy-handed and semiauthoritarian practices even in states that had made some progress in moving away from dependence on security apparatuses. Egypt dusted off and repackaged old emergency laws, Bahrain adopted anti-incitement legislation titled “Protecting Society from Terrorist Acts,” and Jordan, a state previously hailed as a model of successful reform, aggressively pursued security threats to the kingdom, including the decision to twice dissolve its parliament. A majority of Arab citizens who were polled in the years after 2004 believed that their governments viewed civil liberties and reform as secondary to promoting counterterrorism, state security and continuation of the status quo. Of the three systemic changes, this period may well have done the most to convince the average citizen that working within the system would yield nothing.

In his 1998 book The Dream Palace of the Arabs, Fouad Ajami described an Arab citizen longing for a noble past and loathing the repressive present, but without the will to imagine, let alone bring about, a better future. Perhaps the Arab Spring has awakened us all from our own lazy sleep. The future strength and integrity of that dream palace rests firmly on the failures and successes of these three systemic changes.

Far left: Egyptian men share news at a café in Cairo during the country’s election in November 2011. An explosion of new media in the Middle East is aiding democratization.

Left: An Egyptian woman votes in Parliamentary elections in Cairo in November 2011. Egyptians flocked to the polls for the first post-revolution election they hope will democratize the country.
WAVE OF CHANGE CREATES EURASIAN RIPPLES
Regime change has rippled across North Africa – first in Tunisia, next in Egypt, then Libya. Its effects have been felt in Yemen and Bahrain and now Syria totters on the brink of implosion. On the eve of the 20th anniversary of the collapse of the Soviet Union, might “revolutionary contagion” once again become a driving dynamic in Eurasia? Throughout 2011, the media and analysts debated the causes, course and possible consequences of the Arab Spring, including the potential of direct spillover into Eurasia. The Arab Spring has also implicitly challenged the viability of existing United States, NATO, Russian and European Union strategic approaches to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), especially the assumptions upon which these approaches rested, and raised the question: What are the implications of such reassessment and recalibrations to European-Eurasian relations?

Arab Spring, Eurasian Winter?

The commonalities between the Arab Spring in the MENA region and conditions on the ground in Eurasia are apparent: Enduring inequalities and dignity deficits continue, long-standing authoritarian republicanism remains in place, intra-regional transnational societal spillover potential is ever-present, and resource distribution and allocation is explained by pre-existing family, clan, tribal, ethnic, religious and gender allegiances and animosities. These commonalities have little resonance in Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, more so in Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan and are most striking in Central Asia. In Central Asia, authoritarian incumbents in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have held power for more than 20 years. Dignity deficits are well attested. Food price hikes and electricity cuts in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are ongoing, and border regimes are opaque. Transparency International, in its most recent “Corruptions Perceptions Index,” ranks Kyrgyzstan 164th, Tajikistan 154th and Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan tied at 172nd out of 178 states surveyed (Kazakhstan is 105th).

However, important differences are apparent between MENA conditions and those in Central Asia. First, the post-Soviet authoritarian equilibrium differs from that in the Arab world. The ruling elites in Central Asia – the “selectrocracies” – are centered on the presidential family, cronies (friends of the leading family) and leaders of business conglomerates. In contrast to the MENA region, the highest ranks within the military and security services are not visible parts of this power nexus. The Egyptian military, for example, holds a symbolic as well as functional role. The army holds status as the core state institution (founded in 1953) and a guardianship function, being at once above politics and the embodiment of the state itself (despite the fact that it supplies presidents). In Egypt, the military, as a classical state structure and institution, was able to stand above the fray, maintain its legitimacy, and intervene for the good of society to “restore order.” In Central Asia the military reflects the state of the region’s infrastructure – it is degraded and crumbling. Defense of the regime remains the role and function of elite military units there. In addition, in accordance with Soviet tradition, militaries are firmly under civilian control. If an Arab Spring scenario did occur in Central Asia,
would indigenous militaries be willing or able to fill the resulting security vacuum?

Second, the notion that revolutionary “contagion” will spread from the MENA region to Eurasia is dismissed by political elites, although the explanations put forward to suggest “immunity” from contagion differ in detail. The general claim is that there is an inherent predisposition and preference for gradualist reform in Central Asia rather than revolution. The burden of history has inoculated Tajikistan, which, based on its 1992-97 civil war, still suffers from revolution fatigue. Rather than being the object of an Arab Spring spillover, President Roza Otunbaeva argued that the Kyrrgyz revolution of April 2010 provided the model that gave impetus to the Arab Spring of early 2011. The massacre in Andijon in Uzbekistan in 2005 and the clashes in Osh and Jalal-Abad in Kyrgyzstan in 2010 demonstrate that what little discontent exists is localized rather than widespread and can remain contained. Leadership change had occurred already in Turkmenistan in 2007, when President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov took power after the death of Saparmurat Niyazov, thus nullifying any Arab Spring scenario. President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan renewed his presidential mandate with “free and fair” elections in 2011.

Lastly, in contrast to the EU, NATO and U.S. strategic approaches to the MENA region, the most powerful regional actors and institutions in Eurasia – the Russian Federation/Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTo) and China/Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) – are conservative and cast normative shadows which strongly support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states. This solidarity is buttressed by both 9/11 and the legitimation of pre-existing anti-radical Islamist narratives, and by their unified understanding of the nature of “Color Revolutions” in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan and their commitment to oppose their export by Western security services in collusion with nongovernmental organizations. Indeed, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev rejected the notion that “Middle East-style scenarios” could occur in Russia and somewhat cryptically reinforced the notion of a conspiracy to destabilize the state: “They prepared such a scenario for us previously. And now they will try to put it into practice. But in any case, they will not succeed.”

The December 4, 2011, Duma elections resulted in United Russia gaining less than 50 percent of the vote (238 out of 450 seats) and street protests in Moscow and St. Petersburg called for fresh elections amid allegations of widespread voter fraud. Senator McCain’s Tweet: “Dear Vlad, The Arab Spring is coming to a neighborhood near you,” as well as the claim by Russian authorities, not least Prime Minister Putin, that US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton “gave a signal” to Russian protesters who “heard this signal and with support of the US State Department began their active work” all served to heighten media analysis of these events in light of the Arab Spring. While such comparisons are premature, at least in terms of the consequences of these protests, a case can be made and sustained which focuses on authoritarian incompetence, a decline of trust in the ruling regime within a rising urban professional class and vibrant 50 million-strong online community. A Russian civil society that demands new political rights and possesses the skill and the will to undermine autocratic rule, has come of age.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPE**

In Europe and Eurasia the reality of armed humanitarian intervention in Libya and growing pressure for external intervention in Syria, as well as regime changes and revolt throughout the region, have focused thinking on crisis management and operational issues: the emergency evacuation of foreign nationals, disclosure/freezing of incumbent assets and sovereign wealth funds, elite travel bans, the recalling of ambassadors, the redrafting of bilateral military-aid conditionality clauses, the imposition of no-fly zones and the threat and deployment of armed humanitarian interventions in the name of “responsibility to protect.” At what point should erstwhile external strategic partners pivot to counter-elites when long-standing incumbent allies become albatrosses, while still ensuring a dignified, orderly transition? How can grassroots activists demanding regime change be supported in Egypt without extending such support to all mass protests? Incumbents, as was the case in Iran with the Green Revolution, use external support for legitimate protest to delegitimize the protest and protesters, labeling them a fifth column. Can this be avoided? How can opposition groups in Syria be supported in their efforts to gain power while avoiding sectarian massacres or external military intervention?

In January 2005, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice characterized six decades of U.S. policy toward the Middle East as having sacrificed liberty on the altar of authoritarian stability but gaining neither. On the one hand, Western strategic interest (regional stability, the continuity of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and access to the Suez Canal and Egyptian airspace) were secured through long-standing strategic partnerships with U.S.-backed autocratic security-providers. On the other hand, Western market-democratic states promoted democratic principles and values (accountability and transparency). Six years later in 2011, the question was urgent: Can there be a prudent blend of power and interests with principle and values, of *realpolitik* and idealism, or do blatant double standards and hypocrisy only serve to delegitimize both? Are Western interests and values now aligned? Portuguese Foreign Minister Luis Amado has cautioned: “Foreign policy is not necessarily only based on principles but also on interests. And in that sense, our foreign policy is no different from that of all those European states which currently face the same type of foreign policy developments. It is absolutely ridiculous to wish to...
Leaders of the Commonwealth of Independent States meet in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, in September 2011. The CIS comprises all the former Soviet republics — with the exception of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, as well as Georgia — many of which have failed to complete the transition to democracy.

develop ties based on the democratic conditions of each country. If that were the case, we would not have ties with many countries with whom we have had ties for decades.”

Is the real choice between having stable MENA states with independent foreign and security policies or weak, fragile authoritarian Western puppet regimes?

Does the Arab Spring signify an epitaph for an age of liberal interventionism, mirroring the global and regional decline of the U.S.? As Jaswant Singh, a former Indian finance, foreign and defense minister, noted: “To ignore the bloodshed in Syria is to give tacit recognition to Iran's regional influence. That lack of resolve invariably diminishes Saudi Arabia's prestige and raises even more questions within the kingdom about the reliability of U.S. protection – hence further eroding America's regional position. The emergence of a more assertive Turkey under Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan asserting itself in the lands of the former Ottoman Empire attests to America's diminished regional prestige.”

Certainly, analysts have noted that the U.S. has recently decided to “lead from behind” through adopting a supportive role (strategic communications, munitions, supplies and intelligence). The Arab Spring demonstrates that “the U.S. will not hesitate to lead 'wars of necessity' in defense of European allies. But it will not take the lead in 'wars of choice' in or around Europe, such as Libya.”

In June 2011, on the eve of his retirement, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates warned that NATO could face “a dim if not dismal” future if military spending shortages and national caveats were not addressed, given that his generation’s “emotional and historical attachment to NATO” is “aging out.” Some were quick to argue that NATO members were no longer much interested in NATO's future. NATO was brain-dead; all that remained was to switch off the life support machine and, after a respectful silence, pronounce the eulogy: “Just look at the NATO-led war in Libya in which only six out of the 28 NATO countries are participating, and only three of those actually attack Libyan targets to enforce the United Nations’ mandate … after a mere 11 weeks of conflict against Libya, the ‘mightiest alliance in the world’ has run out of munitions, does not have enough aircraft to conduct its missions, and seems unable to prevail against a minor military power.”

By September 2011 it was clear that the NATO-led UN-mandated intervention in Libya (“Operation Unified Protector”) had been a success. Through 2011, NATO has focused thinking on crisis management and operational issues, particularly in conjunction with partner states and international organizations, as well as the balance between interests and norms that justify such intervention.

As Philip Gordon has noted following a NATO Berlin Ministerial Meeting in April 2011: “NATO partnerships – allies agreed to enhancements for engaging partners across the globe, and indeed, Libya is a classic example of why NATO needs good mechanisms for partnerships, because we’re actually undertaking a partnership mission as we speak.” The peace building challenge in Libya now under way will likely highlight the mismatch between the kind of internal systemic and structural sources of insecurity facing NATO Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative partner states, and the confidence building measures NATO partnerships are designed to provide. The MENA region is characterized by relative deprivation – the gap between high expectations and diminishing opportunities – and uneven resource distribution. This demands an agenda centered on human and societal security concerns that is
best addressed through broad development policies, an agenda that NATO partnerships do not address. The Arab Spring has highlighted a collective action problem, with splits within and between the Non-Aligned Movement, Arab League, the UN Security Council and the EU. The EU, with 27 national governments, was in disarray over Libya, demonstrating that a pre-emptive humanitarian operation is much harder to legitimize than one after the fact. On March 17, 2011, when the Security Council passed Resolution 1973 on the creation of a no-fly zone over Libya, Germany abstained alongside Russia, China, India and Brazil. The big EU three (France, Germany and UK) were unable to find common cause in a high profile foreign policy challenge: “The vote represented a break with Germany’s foreign policy maxim to never oppose its European partners and the United States.”

Eighteen months after the Lisbon Treaty, which led to the creation of the European External Action Agency (EEAS), it is clear that “a foreign ministry is not a foreign policy, and there is little sign that the EU will devise one anytime soon.”

CHALLENGE TO RUSSIAN MODEL?

Russia, along with other conservative status-quo regimes in Eurasia, consistently emphasizes stability and order at home, and criticizes “humanitarian interventions” abroad. The Arab Spring indirectly questions the viability of Russia’s domestic authoritarian governance model, political transition and power dispensation. This issue has been brought into even sharper relief by Prime Minister Putin’s announcement in late September 2010 that he intends to return to the Kremlin in March 2012. How resilient is the Russian system of authoritarian power and how sustainable current legitimacy narratives? The 1990s represented a lost decade in which the decentralization of power and authority resulted in chaos and anarchy. Vladimir Putin’s social contract provided stability and prosperity (guaranteed by the managerial competence and patriotism of incumbents) within a “sovereign democracy” in return for a continuity of power in Russia. Variants of this narrative sustained authoritarian regimes in the MENA region, as well as those among Russia’s partners in Eurasia today. However, just as with the MENA region, by 2011 this narrative was under serious stress. The Arab Spring does not just raise questions relating to the sustainability of Russia’s internal governance system and structures, but also its role as an international actor, presenting a series of serious challenges to Russian foreign policy interests. Russia’s vital interests are first and foremost identified as stability domestically, then the events in Osh and Jalal-Abad in June 2010. Second, it demonstrates a fear of Arab Spring-type spillovers into Central Asia in 2012. Indeed, in September 2011 CSTO “Tsentr-2011” military exercises were hosted simultaneously by Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. President Medvedev and Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov attended a military exercise in the Chelyabinsk region. The scenario involved “mock terrorists dressed in white Arab robes taking over a school, infantry fighting vehicles advancing, airborne troops conducting a parachute drop, spetsnaz catching insurgents.”

Third, it recognizes that, in the words of Fedor Lukyanov, editor-in-chief of the Russia in Global Politics journal: “In light of the situation in Afghanistan, a viable CSTO is not only necessary for Russia but also for NATO.”

NATO’s humanitarian intervention in Libya raised a set of strategic dilemmas for Russia. Russia did not want to support and justify a humanitarian intervention in Libya, as this would only serve to advance U.S. and European interests as well as reinforce threatening precedents set in Kosovo and Iraq. However, there was significant regional support for the resolution. In addition, the Obama administration was willing to decide the issue of military intervention within the UN Security Council. This was a demonstration of multilateralism, a seeming repudiation of Bush era unilateralism and implicit support for the U.S.-Russia Reset agenda. For all these reasons, a veto from Russia would have sent the wrong strategic signal. Abstention from UNSC Resolution 1973 had the strategic advantage of “placing Russia in a position to benefit from whatever political outcome.”

By contrast and with regards to Syria, Russia (alongside China, India and Brazil) strongly opposed UNSC resolutions condemning violence, sanctions and
A billboard of Uzbekistan’s President Islam Karimov in Andijon in 2005, shortly after hundreds of protesters were killed in a crackdown by security forces.
foreign intervention against Syria and has threatened to veto any such UNSC resolution. Unrest here is considered a purely internal affair. Syria, as Russia’s one remaining strategic partner in the region, buys virtually all its weaponry from Russia and provides naval bases in warm waters. In August 2011 it appeared that Russia had begun to soften its stance and hedge its bets. President Medvedev warned Bashir al Assad to open dialogue with the opposition: “If he cannot do this, he will face a sad fate and at the end of the day we will also have to take some kind of decision.” However, there is a strong feeling in Russia (and China) that UNSCR 1973 should have been vetoed at the time, as NATO exceeded its mandate and has emerged as a strategic winner. This perception reinforces the will to veto an equivalent resolution on Syria were it drafted and presented to the Security Council. An additional factor is that in 2012, Russia and the U.S. have presidential elections which, inevitably, will encourage “toughness” and blame seeking, rather than further accommodation or compromise.

One other set of dilemmas centers on the notion of a dichotomy between “Southern Engagement” and “Eastern Enlargement.” It is not in Russia’s interest to see the MENA region rise in strategic importance for Europe, as this will increase European engagement and influence in this region. NATO’s Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has stressed the need for a “free, democratic and stable” outcome in Libya. He argues that NATO’s core values are “freedom, democracy and human rights” and that the intensification of political dialogue and new partnerships in North Africa are distinct possibilities. Lamberto Zannier, the new secretary-general of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), signaled that democracy promotion in the MENA region will become an OSCE priority, given shared interests in oil, trade, migration and combating terrorism. In May 2011 the EU rejuvenated its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). It announced that the post of EU Special Representative for the Southern Mediterranean would be created, that the European Investment Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development would extend its operations (and funding) to the MENA region, and that the EU would support “deep democracy” efforts. However, might zero-sum logic apply to the EU and Russia? A reinforced European southern engagement will, in an era of financial constraints and Euro-zone crisis (which leaves no opportunity for strategic thinking), result in less time, attention and resources being spent on states in the common neighborhood, which gives Russia more power and influence within its self-declared zone of privileged interest.

CONCLUSIONS

Structural and systemic causal factors common to both MENA and Eurasia are easy to identify, as is the notion in both regions that authoritarianism is the solution to instability, rather than the cause. Ultimately, however, these comparisons are superficial. The post-Soviet authoritarian equilibrium is composed and structured differently from those in the MENA region and this

CSTO leaders meet in Cholpon-Ata, Kyrgyzstan, in 2009. The Russian-led CSTO plays a major role in Central Asian security. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev (2nd from right) with Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko and now deposed Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev.
suggested that should instability and upheaval occur in Eurasia, the unintended disruptive consequences will be equally hard to predict, manage and contain. Damage limitation will be extremely difficult to coordinate.

The Arab Spring has thrown up sharper relief a normative clash between Europe and Eurasia. Clearly, the outcome of the political transformations that are taking place will very much determine the emphasis and stress both Russia and the EU will place on advancing their stated interests and norms. A pragmatic Russia would cooperate where possible with consolidated market-oriented and democratic regimes in the MENA region, though this outcome would have a demonstration effect and impact through former Soviet space, implicitly challenging the normative status quo. A market-democratic outcome would undercut the Russian notion that revolutions that allow for free and fair elections would further encourage the rise of radical Islamist regimes and spread the contagion to Eurasia. In other words, that democracy means instability. Russia's state ideology – Russia as a sovereign democracy – embraces the idea that economic modernization without political liberalization enables stability. A market-democratic MENA region would undercut this understanding.

Should conservative reactionary regimes return to power in the MENA region, Western rhetorical/public support for representative and participatory institutions, structures and processes in the region, rather than elite personalities, will grow, whatever the pragmatic reality in private. For the EU, a market-democratic outcome in the MENA region would reinforce its underlying strategic rationale for engagement with states in its common neighborhood – that is, democratic transformation will occur via trade and economic integration. This notion is embedded to a greater or lesser extent in all EU policy instruments, giving them a degree of strategic unity and coherence. The EU's dilemma is how to foster that market-democratic outcome. For the EU, it remains to be seen whether the Arab Spring has reinforced or destroyed the notion that economic prosperity and political freedom go hand in hand.

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Helping Hands

Across the Mediterranean

BY ADRIAN MATEI, TRANSATLANTIC DIPLOMATIC FELLOW,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Midday on December 17, 2010, a young Tunisian street vendor named Mohamed Bouazizi doused himself with gasoline and set himself alight while standing in the middle of traffic across from the local governor’s office. It was an individual show of frustration and a protest against the constant humiliations and harassments suffered at the hands of the local authorities. His act of absolute despair resonated throughout the Arab world, ultimately igniting what came to be known as the Arab Spring.

One man’s gesture put into motion the most extensive geopolitical shift in Europe’s “southern neighborhood” in more than four decades. Within half a year from Bouazizi’s self-immolation, the longtime presidents of Tunisia and Egypt were deposed, NATO was drawn into a civil war in Libya, Syria’s 40-year-old state of emergency law was repealed and the kings of Jordan and Morocco agreed to advance radical constitutional reforms relinquishing some of their powers. Echoes spread all the way to Yemen and Bahrain, across an arc of crisis encompassing most of the 350 million people of the Arab speaking world.

Europeans must assist democracy and modernization in societies transformed by the Arab Spring.
This page: Tunisians wave flags during a 2011 protest in Ras Jdir to support government change in Libya.

Right: Libyan refugees at the Libya/Tunisia border crossing of Dehiba rally against former leader Moammar Gadhafi in 2011.
The Arab Spring’s implications for European security are framed by two basic questions:
- What are the true nature and effects of these events?
- How should Europe respond to them?

In dealing with the puzzle of what is happening in North Africa one should try to see things as they are, not as one wishes them to be. In this sense, the obvious unknown regarding the current wave of radical political transformations in Europe’s southern neighborhood is whether this is a real change or just a surface scratch. Does a true political vision lurk behind these popular movements or are they just glorified food riots? Either way, by themselves, the resignations of Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia and even the death of Moammar Gadhafi of Libya won’t change the fundamentals of the problems these countries are faced with. Although the official hagiography presented them as omniscient and all-powerful rulers, they, as individuals, were never as potent as they liked to present themselves. Actual power resides with the security, economic and administrative establishment that was lurking in the shadow of the leader’s iconography and was responsible for generating a considerable amount of the despotic inertia. This is why the West should focus now on creating strong, modern and sustainable institutions, not on backing powerful rulers.

In helping to build viable and sustainable democracies, there is a hazard in reading the wrong indicators. Chiefly, there’s a risk that the movements’ current lack of a dominant Islamic political agenda is the result of it already taking over the social and cultural spheres. Thus, the world may witness the establishment of Western-inspired institutional architecture manned by religious fundamentalists. To avoid being deceived by such a facade, an emphasis should be placed not only on electoral processes that are transparent and fair, but also on the establishment of real checks and balances (especially the ones provided by effective rule of law and respect for basic human rights – or “deep democracy” in the words of European Union High Representative Catherine Ashton). The idealists, young democrats and liberals might have made Ben Ali’s and Mubarak’s departures possible, but when it comes to the inner workings of administering the state, they run the danger of being outflanked and marginalized by pragmatists and veterans of the old regime and/or by the fundamentalists.

In this sense, a sign of wishful thinking is illustrated by the recurrent tendency north of the Mediterranean to read signals from the South in accordance with Western ideas and experiences rather than in Arab context and circumstances. Two main examples of this tendency are:
1. taking at face value the new authorities’ discourse on freedom of speech and conscience, representative democracy and women’s rights, and
2. the constant comparison of the Arab Spring with Central and Eastern Europe’s liberation from communism in 1989.

When it comes to the first issue, one must constantly remember that the political vocabulary common to the Western world doesn’t always resonate outside its epistemic community. Others might use the same terminology in form but not in substance. And regarding the comparison to the end of the Cold War, the main resemblance between the current Arab arc of crisis and Central Europe’s 1989 transformation is that both provoked internal confusion and external perplexity. But comparisons don’t really go much further than that. Central European societies were modern and industrialized with strong (although totalitarian and non-legitimate) institutions. More importantly, they were aware of the meanings of democratic administration, free market economics and the rule of law. In fact, most of these countries were among the most advanced societies in the world until the Second World War and the Soviet occupation. In this sense, the European revolutions of 1989 were not so much about advancing toward modernity but rather getting back to normalcy.

Turning to Europe’s reaction to the Arab Spring, while the magnitude and swiftness of the revolutions in North Africa took the world by surprise, the EU and its member states’ reaction came under particular scrutiny. With revolution in its backyard, the Union’s new foreign and security instruments and its commitment to democracy and international justice were put to the test and, so far, they have performed less than perfectly. But with more than just its international credibility at stake, the EU cannot afford to fail.

The barrage of criticism leveled at the EU and its member states started from the very beginning with the appearance that Europeans were totally oblivious to what was happening in their own backyard. Despite claims of traditional relations, privileged contacts and unique expertise, no decision-maker in Europe was aware of the simmering situation across the
Mediterranean Sea. When the demonstrators finally broke
the wall of fear and revolutions started to propagate, the first
reflex north of the Mediterranean was to maintain the status
quo rather than back popular calls for democracy and justice.

By failing to identify and deal with basic regional
problems, the EU regional policy framework was
proven largely irrelevant and particularly unconnected
to the political and economic trends of the southern
neighborhood. More worrisome, the entire Common
Foreign and Security Policy decision-making process and
its instruments (supposedly considerably upgraded after
the Lisbon Treaty entered into force) failed in preventing
the two typical drawbacks of its foreign action: the taking
of initiative by individual states (effectively imposing faits
accomplis on the other EU members) and reliance on the
United States for the “heavy lifting” (i.e. security operations).

For example, on January 29, 2011 – less than two days
before a European ministerial meeting to discuss the
Egyptian revolution – British, French and German leaders
published a joint statement on that precise topic. And in the
case of the Libyan war, Europe’s involvement was carried
out through NATO command structures rather than
those of the EU, and even then with considerable difficulty
(political ones initially, logistical and military ones later
on). In the end, the EU managed to offer only 8 million
euros for a four-month operation to deliver humanitarian
assistance (and this was only to be activated at the special
request of the United Nations Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs). All this threatens to spill over
and affect transatlantic relations as it further exposes the
administration in Washington to criticism for effectively
subsidizing a European security operation, further
emphasizing the burden sharing asymmetry within NATO.

On the positive side, however, the success of Operation
Unified Protector will most likely help boost NATO’s
credibility within its core, raison d’être theater of operation.

With so much at stake, it is paramount for the EU and
its member states to increase their presence and activity in
North Africa and the Middle East. Generally speaking, there
is a need for more structure and coherence in an area where
already there’s a considerable amount of substance but not
a particularly high level of convergence or pragmatism. With
Lisbon now into force for more than two years, it is time to
move on from the EU’s introverted decade of institutional
introspection and turn to the pressing task of making the
EU a relevant global player. And in this sense, improving
security and advancing prosperity in the EU’s immediate
neighborhood should be pursued as one of the main
priorities of its agenda.

Given the current circumstances, it has become critical
for the EU to play a more substantive role in the southern
neighborhood. The window of opportunity represented
by the spirit of the Arab Spring might be rapidly closing.
Actually, the odds are largely against the establishment of
a proper, vigorous Egyptian democracy: The society has
no tradition of individual dissent, separation of state and
religion is taboo, and, aside from the army, the repressive/
intelligence apparatus and the Muslim Brotherhood, there
are no self-standing functioning institutions. Plus, the sheer
geopolitical pressure of its troubled neighborhood will
hardly allow the necessary breather for Egyptian society
to develop its own organic democratic reflexes. But no one
has more experience than Europeans in transitioning to
democracy and rebuilding shattered societies.
For moral and practical reasons, the EU should have a more robust and comprehensive aid package ready to be activated the moment these transitioning societies open up for it. In this context, the imperative is to engage and capture the imagination of the youth, opinion leaders, teachers and academic professionals, small- and medium-sized entrepreneurs and the army and the intelligence community.

In drafting any sensible European policy toward North Africa and the Middle East, one should consider some of the following factors:

First, a too overt European backing for any particular person or movement would compromise them in the eyes of their local supporters. Besides, as any authentic democracy is built on local ownership, foreign support should steer clear of anything interpreted as lecturing and be based instead on the idea of equal partnerships.

Second, demographic factors are important. There has been an exponential increase in Arab populations over the past three generations, and this overall trend continues. As the demographic map around the Mediterranean is rebalanced, its southern shores teem with a growing constituency of young, angry, unemployed individuals with few institutions or community structures to turn to except Islam and/or the tribe.

Third, as the West procrastinates, the prospect grows that opportunistic actors could interfere as a way to externalize their own domestic problems or snipe for geopolitical and economic gain (Russia, China and others).

Fourth, there’s a troubling risk of deprioritizing Europe’s “eastern neighborhood.” These countries share a European outlook, not to mention that their social and economic potential is vastly superior to anything the southern neighborhood could generate in this generation or the next. European engagement in the eastern neighborhood is made even more imperative as presently, in the absence of any other benign outside influence, the region shows a worrying tendency to swing towards authoritarian consolidation, either homegrown (i.e. Belarus) or by incorporation into a “sphere of influence.” Engaging the eastern and southern neighborhoods should not be approached as a zero sum game; more resources need to be allocated to both areas, based on whether individual nations meet the necessary conditions. As comparisons are unavoidable, we need to remember that, on a per capita basis, it is in the South, in the Palestinian territories, that we find the biggest European Neighbourhood Policy beneficiaries.

Fifth, the EU should get more involved in the Middle East peace process. Not only is this the keystone for stability and security in the broader Middle East, but it is also one of the most resonating symbols in Arab politics. A better coordinated engagement with Israel is needed, as it could demonstrate for the wider region how democracies function and cooperate in managing crises. In addition, this would, within Israel, help dispel the argument of it being totally on its own, while at the same time empowering the Israeli secular, western, liberal-democratic camp.

Sixth, one has to avoid using “one size fits all” formulae when dealing with individual countries involved in the Arab Spring. While Tunisia witnessed a largely genuine popular uprising with an economic and social agenda, in Syria most of those challenging the authorities have followed tribal or religious impulses. In fact, in this latter case, apparently a significant part of the population (Christians, Alawis and some of the secular middle class) backs the Assad regime from fear of sectarianism.

Ultimately, a European policy should take into consideration the emerging roles of local actors such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia. In the first case, we might have just passed the point where, when it came to managing the European neighborhood, sidelining or taking Turkey for granted was an option. One must consider whether one wants Turkey as an active partner in defining and advancing Europe’s plans or risk having it compete and promote its own self-serving initiatives. In fact, by forging an autonomous and self-sufficient foreign policy, Turkey has become even more important to Europe than before. When it comes to the strategic debate about Turkey’s role in Europe, behind such terms as “critical choice” and “historical opportunity” lies the basic truth that European procrastination is no longer an option. Stirring up a theological debate about the depth of Turkey’s European orientation risks alienating not just its political establishment but the very demos of what is still the most modern and Western-oriented Muslim society. This in turn would only amplify the feeling in the wider region that the EU is unable or unwilling to become involved in its neighborhood.

When it comes to Saudi Arabia, one might detect a growing sense of frustration and insecurity in Riyadh. From the Saudi perspective, one reading of the Mubarak story is that the West withheld support from an ally and helped create a power vacuum in the Middle East. This in turn might lead them toward unilateralism and confrontation, as the intervention in Bahrain has shown.

Beyond these theoretical debates, the Arab Spring has clearly shown that Arab societies have become, at their grass roots level, more open to Western soft influence and more aware of their immediate neighborhood. The EU response should be to support fully the transformation of the region’s states into democracies and help anchor their societies in modernity, on a case by case basis, under a tailored approach contingent on local ownership. No democracy is perfect, but any democracy is a step in the right direction, away from authoritarianism. □

Information in this article is current as of November 2011. The views expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of State or the U.S. Government.
The democratic uprisings in North Africa call for a radical shift in the European Union’s approach to Euro-Mediterranean relations. These have traditionally been dominated by economic concerns, founded on the misguided belief that globalization will bring well-being for all if southern countries make their economies attractive to foreign investment. The present upheavals, however, clearly demonstrate that politics and social challenges must be brought to the forefront of EU-Mediterranean relations.

The wisdom of the Mediterranean strategy of ignoring political and social dimensions to ensure the good will of authoritarian leaders for the development of concrete (though as yet unrealized) projects is thus called into question. The EU now needs to revise its Mediterranean policy. In order to do so, it needs to build on some good practices of the past and pursue them more consistently.

This should translate, first of all, into prioritizing the citizens’ agenda, which in fact corresponds to the basic principles articulated in the Barcelona Declaration of 1995, in which EU member states and the Southern Mediterranean countries jointly agreed “to develop the rule of law and democracy in their political systems.” This objective was not consistently pursued, however, and this was highlighted in the important debate that took place on both shores of the Mediterranean during preparation of the Barcelona summit of 2005. As was pointed out then, the main conclusion of the overview and evaluation of the first 10 years of the Barcelona Process was that “the causal and sequential link between economic reform and political liberalisation has failed to materialise. If there has been any progress in human development terms, it has been neither uniform nor sufficient to respond to the grave social problems of the region. Economic reforms have largely failed to encourage political reform.”

As a consequence, it was proposed that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership abandon a path that was leading nowhere and concentrate...
on meeting the aims set forth in the founding 1995 declaration, through the implementation of “specific actions designed to create a Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States.” This aspiration was already shared by the civil society of the South and has since been reiterated on many occasions by their representatives.

The European Commission (EC) adopted many of these recommendations in the action program that was approved at the 2005 summit, where it was established that the members of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership would “strive to achieve their mutual commitments” in the implementation of the democratic objectives of Barcelona over the following five years through a number of measures such as “extend[ing] political pluralism and participation by citizens, particularly women and youth, through the active promotion of a fair and competitive political environment, including fair and free elections.”

In virtually all Southern Mediterranean countries, however, this commitment was blatantly ignored. In Egypt, Tunisia and Syria, no progress at all was visible in this domain. Elections in Egypt, Tunisia, Syria and Algeria returned entrenched leaders with more than 90 percent of the vote without real opposition groups or figures being allowed to participate in the electoral process. Libya never signed up for either the Barcelona Process or the Union for the Mediterranean.

A fair and comprehensive assessment of the Barcelona Process still needs to be carried out. It is true that the 2005 Barcelona summit was a diplomatic failure. Mediterranean chiefs of state failed to show up, amid complaints about their lack of ownership of the process and excessive conditionality on the part of the EU. From a democratic perspective, shared by southern civil societies, however, it was a success and the EC followed up on part of the recommendations relating to support for civil society with specific initiatives aimed at strengthening human rights, namely promoting women’s rights and examining ways of reaching out to Islamic political parties. The Neighbourhood Policy sought to adapt to the need to support political reform by granting an “advanced status” to Morocco as a reward for the progress achieved in that country, in particular through its organization of parliamentary elections that were judged to be fair and free, including allowing for the participation of the Islamist Justice and Development Party, even if most constitutional powers remain in the hands of the sovereign.

Unfortunately, in 2008 the EU concluded that the Barcelona Process was a total failure, owing to the fact that it was greeted with an increasing lack of enthusiasm by the leaders of the South, and decided to replace it with the Union for the Mediterranean, co-chaired by France and Egypt. The primary area of concern was no longer the democratic objectives of 1995 but the alliance against political Islam, the fight against terrorism and control of immigration. The democratic objective and political conditionality were sidelined in favor of a number of concrete projects, including de-pollution of
the Mediterranean Sea, promoting the production and use of renewable energy, and business cooperation.

Clearly, the following recommendation contained in an EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) report published before the 2008 Summit of the Union for the Mediterranean was not heeded: “The abandoning of political reform incentives and positive conditionality in the name of realpolitik and avoidance of the main socio-economic and political issues within the Mediterranean region is to be avoided as well, as is also the marginalization of civil societies there. Positive conditionality in the ENP (European Neighbourhood Policy) should emphasise respect for the international rule of law and evolution towards democratic governance.”

STRENGTHENING DEMOCRATIC FORCES

In the current phase of dramatic transition, it is imperative that the EU fully support the democratic aspirations of the citizens of the Mediterranean, bearing in mind at all times that democratic processes are national in nature and that, in spite of the “domino effect,” each transition process is different and unique. As this EUISS report shows, differing attitudes to civic and political rights characterize four groups of countries and four different subsets of issues that must be urgently addressed by the EU:

**Egypt and Tunisia** – the democratic transition states, where the plurality of the political party system is still quite weak and, in the case of Egypt, the military has taken control of the transition process and has not yet made clear what steps will be taken to transfer power to elected civilian bodies.

**Morocco and Jordan** – the liberal monarchies, where free, competitive elections now take place, and there is a certain degree of openness in relation to freedom of expression and of association, but power is fundamentally still in the hands of the monarchs.

**Lebanon** – a weak liberal state, and a divided and occupied **Palestine**, where the free, democratic elections have yet to be implemented, hindered by sectarian divisions and war that have made the emergence of fully democratic processes quite difficult. In Palestine, it is impossible to build a fully fledged democratic system in the absence of sovereignty and the current context of occupation and blockade, but the aspiration was clearly expressed in the free and fair elections held in January 2006.

**Libya and Syria** – the dictatorships, and **Algeria**, where no real democratic progress has yet been made. Grave abuses of fundamental rights are commonplace. The military have been in power in Algeria for decades. In Libya and Syria presidents have been nominated for life and dynasties established. (Though the ouster of Libya’s President Moammar Gadhafi in 2011 altered that equation). The media is tightly controlled and all expression of dissent is brutally suppressed. Algeria is more complex, with a very weak, but at least existing, political party system. The country is still marked by the trauma of the civil war of the 1990s.
Wearing the new Libyan flag, a woman joins a cheering crowd in Martyr’s Square in Tripoli, Libya, to celebrate a change of government in the North African country ruled for decades by Moammar Gadhafi.
Right now Tunisia and Egypt need to be the EU’s main priority in the southern neighborhood. The EU should aim to contribute to consolidate the results of the peoples’ revolutions that have taken place in these countries, namely through constitutional reforms, promoting civilian control of the security forces and encouraging the development of a political party system, as well as supporting civil society organizations.

In its dealings with these countries in the throes of transition, the EU needs to move from the priority that it has traditionally and rightly given to nongovernmental organizations to focusing on consolidation of new democratic actors. For example, it should be active in funding training courses in local institutions. Particular attention must be given to security sector reform, specifically with regard to the police, namely by leading and supporting initiatives in training on human rights and justice, as well as dealing with the critical questions related to the civilian control of the military.

The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights should be activated in this regard. The EU should assume a leadership role with regard to the provision of international financial support to Tunisia and, to a certain extent, Egypt, given that both countries face a grave economic and social situation, as a result of the financial and food crises, but also from damage that their respective economies have suffered during the uprisings. There is a real risk of destabilization in this critical transition phase if the economic and social crisis is not overcome. In this context, an international donors’ conference co-organized with transitional authorities would be invaluable.

**A COMMUNITY OF DEMOCRACIES BY 2020?**

The current conditions of transformation are favorable to a rethink of the long-term objectives of the EU’s Mediterranean policy and a revision of the Neighbourhood Policy. Most importantly, the Union for the Mediterranean must be reconstructed. In both cases, priority should be given to establishing coherence between political reforms and economic and social policies with the goal of creating, before the end of the decade, a Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States, thus fulfilling the objectives announced in 1995 in Barcelona.

Such a Euro-Mediterranean community would validate the citizens and their aspirations as central actors. This should include extending all the freedoms of the European single market to the members of this community, including, in time, freedom of the movement of people.

A new generation of association agreements should be signed with those countries of the South willing to subscribe to the objective of such a democratic community. Such agreements might include a democratic clause inspired by the EU enlargement experience. A democratic clause should seem natural if one bears in mind that even the British Commonwealth includes such a clause.

A Euro-Mediterranean community of democracies would be an important factor for peace and would enormously facilitate dealing with crisis in the region, in particular in relation to the Israeli-Palestine conflict. Membership should be extended to the Israelis and Palestinians only on condition that a two-state solution is well on track.

This community would certainly find a lot of support in the post-Huntington Arab world. This is not a utopian dream, but an ambition whose chances of success are much more viable in the circumstances currently prevailing in the southern Mediterranean. Were the EU to announce its commitment to this goal, it would represent an important incentive for the democratic processes in the region, in particular in the Maghreb, where the EU is seen as a major partner.

Right now the notion of a Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States would readily find support in the transitional democracies and possibly the liberal monarchies. Furthermore, this goal would garner enormous support among civil society movements all over the southern Mediterranean. If the EU were to announce its ambition to work to that end with like-minded southern partners, it would be a way for it to restore credibility with Arab public opinion. It would show that European leaders have heard the call for freedom and democracy that is coming from their neighbors, who in spite of all the disappointments of the past still look to Europe with hope and believe in the ideals that the Union affirms as its own.

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The European Union has a crucial role to play in the coming weeks and months in order to consolidate the transition to democracy in Tunisia and Egypt, as well as in other Arab Mediterranean countries such as Libya and hopefully Syria in the near future.

A commitment to promoting reform lies at the very heart of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The EU is thus equipped to activate a number of existing instruments designed to facilitate reforms. In 2002, the EU member states made clear that the ENP aimed at promoting "democratic and economic reforms in its neighborhood."\(^1\)

The European Commission also indicated in 2003 that "in return for concrete progress demonstrating shared values and effective implementation of political, economic and institutional reforms ... the EU’s neighbourhood should benefit from the prospect of closer economic integration with the EU."\(^2\) In 2011, the strategy has been reoriented by two important joint communications of the European Commission and the high representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy.

**Partnership for democracy and prosperity**

The joint communication of the European Commission and the high representative on a “Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean”\(^3\) was adopted on March 8, 2011, and one titled “A New Response to the Changing Neighborhood”\(^4\) on May 25, 2011. Both have refocused the ENP on the support for democratic transition.

In the long term, the new partnership in the Southern Mediterranean is to be built on:

- democratic transformation and institution-building (fundamental freedoms, constitutional reforms, reform of the judiciary, fight against corruption);
- a stronger partnership with the people (civil society, people-to-people actions, youth);
- sustainable and inclusive growth and economic development (small- and medium-sized enterprises, vocational/educational training, health, education systems, poorer regions),

whereas the second Communication on the ENP as a whole (East and South) aims for:

- greater support to partners engaged in building deep democracy;
- support for inclusive economic development;
- strengthening of the two regional dimensions of the European Neighbourhood Policy (Eastern Partnership and the Southern Mediterranean);
- mechanisms and instruments fit to deliver these objectives.

The two communications are of course complementary, the first one being a direct reaction to the 2011 events in Tunisia, Egypt and...
Tunisian women show their inked fingers after voting in Ettadhamen, a working class part of Tunis, on October 23, 2011. Voter turnout in Tunisia’s first-ever democratic election was high.
Libya, whereas the second, on the revision of the ENP, was planned since the launching of the ENP in 2002/2003 and encompasses Eastern Europe and the Southern Mediterranean.

All in all, the strategy has been refocused on “democratic transition” in the Southern Mediterranean. A reinforced “differentiated approach” is also expected as the new partnership will be based on “concrete progress” regarding “democracy, human rights, social justice, good governance and the rule of law.”

The focus will be more on “democratic transformation” rather than on the broader “political reforms” mentioned by the communications of 2003 and 2004. The main new instruments are to be found in the field of the support to civil society. Indeed, a Civil Society Facility will be created alongside the establishment of a European Endowment for Democracy to “help political parties, non-registered NGOs and trade unions and other social partners.”

The main issue today is the lack of new EU funding. This will remain so until the end of the negotiations regarding the future EU financial perspectives. Everything is thus about refocusing and reorienting the funds available within the framework of the current financial envelope, or aid package, of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI).

The Spring programme

The Spring programme (Support to Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth) adopted on September 27, 2011, therefore aims to respond to the “pressing socio-economic challenges that partner countries of the southern Mediterranean region are facing and to support them in their transition to democracy” on the basis of the current financial envelope. Thus, the introduction of the “more for more” principle, meaning that “the more a country progresses in its democratic reforms and institutional building, the more support it can expect from the Spring programme.” A total of 65 million euros were committed in 2011 and 285 million euros in 2012 for a grand total of 350 million
euros from the ENPI.\textsuperscript{5} Other sources of financing, such as the resources of the European Investment Bank, are therefore crucial.\textsuperscript{6}

**Observing and assisting elections**

Catherine Ashton and Štefan Füle indicated that the EU was ready to provide immediate assistance to prepare and organize the electoral processes in Tunisia\textsuperscript{7} and Egypt.\textsuperscript{8} An impressive EU electoral observation mission was created for the Tunisian elections,\textsuperscript{9} whereas Egypt was more reluctant to accept such supervision.\textsuperscript{10}

The attitude adopted by the EU after Hamas’ electoral victory in the Gaza Strip in 2006 was generally not well perceived in the Arab world. For instance, many observers accused the EU of using a double standard. Whatever the results of the elections will be, as long as the latter will be transparent and democratic, the EU and its member states will have to respect the will of the people.

**Tunisia’s “privileged partnership”**

It will be also important to put the issue of Tunisia’s privileged partnership on the table quickly. This is of major importance as it will give a clear sign not only to the Tunisians, but also to the international community, that the EU is ready to support and accompany Tunisia on its way to democracy. Of course, such a privileged partnership should be dependent upon the achievement of a successful democratic transition.

As far as the content of such a privileged partnership is concerned, it would be advisable to take into account the lessons of the advanced status previously granted to Morocco. Up until now, this advanced status has been considered, on the one hand, as being a positive political sign of a strategic choice made by the kingdom, while on the other hand, as lacking in real substance when compared to the ENP. It could therefore be proposed that the privileged partnership is considered as a road map for concluding a new enhanced neighborhood agreement on the basis of Article 8 of the Lisbon Treaty.

An Egyptian girl hands out leaflets outside a polling station in Cairo during the country’s first democratically open election, in late 2011.
New neighborhood agreements
The member states stressed in the European Council conclusions of February 4, 2011, that they were “committed to a new partnership involving more effective support in the future.” A new agreement, i.e., a new legally binding contractual relationship signed and ratified with a new democratically elected Tunisian government and parliament, would certainly be an effective way of showcasing EU support.

In this way, there is a need to conclude a new neighborhood agreement with Tunisia in order to:

- reinforce the provisions of the political chapter (political dialogue notably);
- include a number of new provisions (rule of law, cooperation in judicial matters, organized crime, fight against racism and xenophobia, etc.);
- take stock of the fact that Tunisia completed the tariff dismantling process and is now willing to conclude an agreement for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area.

The only other Arab Mediterranean country with which it would be feasible, from a technical point of view, to conclude a new agreement in the near future is Morocco. However, clear commitment to consolidate political reforms should be considered as a precondition.

The Union for the Mediterranean
Obviously, the Union for the Mediterranean in its restrictive sense (i.e., taking into account the new institutions and the six regional programs) does not seem, contrary to the ENP, to be the best instrument to accompany political reforms. First of all, most of the multilateral meetings have been postponed or canceled, including the summit. Second, the co-president, former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, has been deposed and no longer has legitimacy. Third, the six programs do not have a proper political dimension. However, the development of regional programs regarding small- and medium-sized enterprises and large-scale infrastructure projects could certainly be of great help to consolidate transition processes. In any case, there is a need to reflect on the future of the Union for the Mediterranean.

Conclusion
One should also not forget that the strategy to be adopted vis-à-vis Tunisia and Egypt could become a model for other countries of the region where democratic aspirations of the people are as huge as they are legitimate. On the one hand, it is important for the EU to react quickly with appropriate means. On the other hand, it is crucial to consolidate a transition to real and effective democracy. One of the worst scenarios would be to see the emergence of a new “soft authoritarian regime.”

The more a country progresses in its democratic reforms and institutional building, the more support it can expect from the Spring programme.

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The two key issues in the near term will be the implementation of the constitutional reforms in Egypt and Tunisia. In this regard, dialogue with all components of civil society and with all the actors of the Tunisian and Egyptian political scenes is of crucial importance. A number of EU member states possess considerable expertise in the field of democratic transition and this should be used to help our partners. For the EU, it is time to invest in reforms that should lead to full democracy.

This article is a revised and updated version of an article that appeared in “ISS Report No. 9 - The Arab Democratic Wave,” published by the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/the-arab-democratic-wave-how-the-eu-can-seize-the-moment/

3. European Commission and High Representative, Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean, COM(2011)209 final, Brussels, 8 March 2011.
6. The contribution of the European Investment Bank in support of the transition to democracy will amount for Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco and Jordan US$ 7.5bn in the form of loans by the end of 2013. European Investment Bank, “Marseille G-8 meeting: the EIB strengthens its support for the transition to democracy in the Mediterranean,” 10 September 2011, 2011-129-EN.
Southeast Europe alumni representatives and neighboring countries met June 13-17, 2011, at the Marshall Center in Garmisch, Germany, with the goal of strengthening and enhancing national and regional security through cooperation. Participating countries included Albania, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Turkey and Ukraine.

Alumni leaders of the 14 nations signed the first-ever charter creating the Marshall Center Alumni Association for Southeast European Security (MCAASEES). Members developed this idea over the past year, taking their cue from a May 2010 workshop titled “Building Marshall Center Association Capacity for Regional Cooperation in Southeast Europe.” The representatives at this event agreed that an association could contribute to creating an atmosphere of trust, improve neighborly relations and enhance stability in their region. During the year, using the Marshall Center’s graduate portal as a collaborative tool, they presented various proposals as to how such an association should look, how it should operate and what its goals would be. The June 2011 workshop was a culmination of hard work by the individual association members. The charter was signed by all the members. Included as part of the charter are seven specific goals dealing with such themes as cooperation, protection, dialogue and good governance. Although not a legally binding document, it is intended to establish guidelines as alumni strive to meet these goals. Each association will continue with a separate agenda each year, but the regional relationship will support and share in these efforts as well as encourage regional activities that hopefully will act as a model for other kinds of regional cooperation at the government level.

This process began with a regional conference in October 2011 in Zagreb, Croatia, that addressed the future of Afghanistan and the contribution that Southeast Europe countries can make with a follow-up conference in Podgorica, Montenegro, on this same theme in January 2012. Both conferences were assisted by alumni as organizers and participants. In-country alumni events will include alumni from the region, when possible, to share their expertise and experience. A regional newsletter is planned in which alumni can address important issues and exchange information. A rotating presidency will oversee association activities, with Montenegro chairing the first presidency and Macedonia holding the vice presidency.

In a region where political tensions still exist, such an initiative by Marshall Center alumni is no small achievement. It speaks to their willingness to look forward to and work for a better future, not just for their individual countries, but as part of Southeast Europe and the greater European community.
Analyzing the Arab Spring

A Marshall Center seminar discusses the uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East

By Jason Tudor, public affairs officer, Marshall Center

The Senior Executive Seminar about the Arab Spring at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies ended January 26, 2012, with 96 participants dissecting the revolutions in North Africa and the Middle East.

The nine-day event drew 47 nations together, including a handful of participants and lecturers from those regions affected by the change. Two of the Department of Defense’s Regional Cooperation Centers, the Marshall Center and the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESA), conducted the seminar.

Marshall Center officials said the goal was to “understand root causes, facilitate policymaker options that support shared goals of regional stability and peace, and build networks that will continue to solve current and future security challenges.”

Guest speaker Magda Kandil of Egypt said the event shined a spotlight on the democratic transformation ongoing in the Arab world. “It puts the issues closer to the participants,” said Kandil, the executive director and director of research of the Egyptian Center for Economic Studies. “It’s very important to give them firsthand information about what’s going on. It’s also very important from the country’s point of view. We want the international community to realize how difficult the process of transformation has been.”

After closing remarks from Jeffrey D. Feltman, U.S. assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs, Marshall Center Director Keith Dayton gave participants high marks for “grappling with one of the most fundamental questions of our decade.” He discussed the role that social media played in advancing the topic; how flourishing democracies must honor human rights; and how outside powers like the ones at the seminar should act. “We need to give room to the Arab peoples and give them time to find their own way,” Dayton said.

Eastern European participants brought their own revolutionary tales to the event. The Arab Spring represents region-wide change of historic proportions. In this respect, it is similar to the events of 1989 in Eastern Europe, Marshall Center officials noted.

“There are major differences, however. Arab Spring uprisings sought to change their own governments rather than throw off an outside power. As the initial euphoria subsided, it became clear that there was not a strong consensus about the way ahead,” said Marine Col. Philip Lark, deputy director of the Senior Executive Seminar at the Marshall Center.

Parliamentarian Marianne Mikko of Estonia contributed a story about her country’s struggle against Soviet power. “We have something which is valuable to this discourse,” said Mikko, who also serves as the vice chair of the European Union Affairs Committee. “Though we’re very far in distance, it doesn’t mean that Estonia doesn’t care about democratization. We can shake hands with our Arab friends and colleagues, contribute, and perhaps tell them how to avoid mistakes.”

NESA Center faculty member and career Egyptian diplomat Karim Haggag served as a facilitator for the event. “This is new. A lot of the issues we are discussing are new to people from the Arab world. It’s the interaction between participants that really helped shed light on what is a difficult issue,” he said.

As the 96 participants added themselves to a network of more than 14,000 regional center alumni across the globe, they heard Dayton close the event on a high note. “Spring is a season of hope; all things seem possible. We leave this seminar with hope tempered by realism and knowing that we are all strong when we work together.”
In early January 2011, Slim Amamou, part of a new generation of tech-savvy Tunisians, found himself sleep deprived in a government holding cell, accused of supporting the overthrow of President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali. A week later, the Tunisian blogger and online activist found himself taking the oath of office as the country’s interim Minister for Youth and Sport. The world media was quick to highlight the role played by social networking websites in ousting Ben Ali, going as far as to dub the uprising a “Twitter Revolution,” named for the popular social networking website.
Amamou resigned the post several months later, but his temporary elevation from online irritant to government insider lent credence to the theory that social media, delivered via computers and cellphones, have been a force for liberalization in the Arab world. Across North Africa and the Middle East, websites such as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube have allowed protesters to bypass traditional “gatekeepers” such as government-run media and build alliances with like-minded reformers. In Egypt, leading up to President Hosni Mubarak’s resignation in February 2011, protestors congregated by the hundreds of thousands on Facebook pages lionizing victims of Mubarak’s secret police. Iranians used Twitter to update foreign journalists about developments during the so-called “green revolution” of 2009, circumventing a news blackout imposed by the government.

“The arrival of social media doesn’t suddenly remove all previous forms of coordination. It’s an addition to the landscape, not a replacement for it,” said Clay Shirkey, a “new media” scholar and author based at New York University. “What social media does is it allows groups of people to know what other people are thinking in the country at a much wider scale, at much lower cost.”

But experts caution that Internet activism, a tool favored in the Middle East mostly by educated urban elites, is no panacea. The tendency for protestors to “socialize” at a few big-name websites like Facebook or YouTube has also made it easier for authoritarian regimes to jam, manipulate or otherwise disrupt those sites. When loose networks of semi-anonymous government critics assemble on a relatively easy-to-track website, it can actually expedite government repression. What’s more, Internet connectivity remains small in many of these reform-minded societies. For example, Facebook users represent only 4.5 percent of the admittedly large Egyptian population.

“Triumphalism about recent events in the Middle East is premature. The contest is still in its early stages, and the new age of Internet-driven democratization will endure only if we learn to counter the sophisticated measures now being developed to quash it,” Belarusian-born media expert Evgeny Morozov said in a February 2011 article in The Wall Street Journal. Morozov added: “It wasn’t the Internet that destroyed Mr. Mubarak – it was Mr. Mubarak’s ignorance of the Internet that destroyed Mr. Mubarak.”

Others are more optimistic about the prospects for using social media to hasten political reform. They cite the well-known example of the Philippines, where millions of protestors summoned mostly by cellphone text messaging rallied to oust President Joseph Estrada.
“It wasn’t the Internet that destroyed Mr. Mubarak – it was Mr. Mubarak’s ignorance of the Internet that destroyed Mr. Mubarak.”

— Evgeny Morozov, media expert

suicide which sparked the protests, and then in multiplying those protests. An estimated 18% of the Tunisian population is on Facebook, and the dictator neglected to block it in time,” columnist Timothy Garton Ashe said in a January 2011 edition of the Guardian.

Social media carved out a similar role during the Egyptian protests. After the police were accused of murdering an innocent man named Khaled Said, a Facebook page titled “We are all Khaled Said” attracted hundreds of thousands of followers, some of whom spilled into the streets in early 2011. Computers and cellphones also played a part in subsequent protests in Bahrain, Yemen and Syria. Even when protests are more modest, they can sometimes motivate governments to act. In Russia, Alexei Dymovsky, a police major in Novorossiysk, presented a YouTube message to Prime Minister Vladimir Putin in 2009 asking for help in tackling police corruption. Within days, the video had drawn more than 400,000 viewers. Dymovsky was initially arrested, but his online plea reportedly led to the firing of several Russian Interior Ministry officials.

“What is being witnessed, especially in Egypt, is the perfect storm of social media revolution,” Alexander Klimburg of the Austrian Institute for International Affairs said in an early 2011 edition of Defense News. “Facebook, YouTube and Twitter have combined together with standard media, such as TV network Al Jazeera, and cross-border crowd dynamics to create a perfect feedback loop.”

But media analysts like Morozov fear authoritarian regimes will absorb the lessons from Tunisia and the Philippines and fine tune their repressive machinery to prevent similar online outbreaks. When a Buddhist-led protest broke out in Burma in 2007, the country’s leaders not only severed Internet service but hired roving thugs to beat up people carrying cellphones near the scene of the demonstrations. In its failed effort to contain the uprising in early 2011, Egyptian authorities pressured the country’s five Internet service providers, or ISPs, to shut down voluntarily, causing a huge traffic drop-off in a single day. To overcome the government’s attempted security crackdown, Google offered Egyptians a “speak to tweet” platform that converted voicemail to Twitter text.

In the spring of 2011, Libya’s government, facing a civil war it would ultimately lose, throttled down the nation’s only ISP, effectively
blocking usage for the rebellious masses but preserving online capacity for government officials. Syria at one point loosened controls on Facebook, acting as if it were a concession to government protestors, though many suspect the Assad government's motive was to spy on the opposition more effectively, Morozov said. Iran has the reputation of having the most intensive apparatus to squash social media. “They have learned their lesson from the 2009 uprising and have developed the most comprehensive Internet control strategy in the Middle East, setting up dedicated units of “cyber-police” and experimenting with advanced Internet surveillance techniques that may even allow them to detect dissidents who are using anti-censorship tools,” Morozov said.

Even in the most successful cases, social media played more of a publicizing rather than an organizing role, experts concede. In Tunisia, for example, the Internet often served as an electronic bulletin board for decisions made “off-line.” Others caution against drawing too many conclusions from a technology that is a means to an end, not an end in itself. They recall hype from the late 1980s that dubbed the fall of the Soviet Empire a “fax machine revolution.” Who today credits fax machines with dismantling the Eastern Bloc? In the end, experts insist the social media is only as good as the people who use it. That was the message of the December 2010 report “Political Change in the Digital Age” published by the School for Advanced International Studies in the U.S. In the case of Amamou and his colleagues in Tunisia, Internet activism led to a burst of freedom. In places like Burma, repression gained the upper hand.

“Conditions that contribute to success are likely determined not by the given technological tool,” the report concluded, “but by human skill and facility in using the networks that are being mobilized.” □
Antti-Terror Detectives

Programs Share Evidence Collected in Afghanistan and Iraq with Interpol

By per Concordiam Staff
Two groundbreaking intelligence-sharing programs are helping to identify, arrest and imprison extremists through evidence collected from the battlefields of Afghanistan and Iraq. Projects Vennlig and Hamah were started by United States European Command to share U.S. Department of Defense information in partnership with Interpol, a consortium to which all but two countries in Europe and Central Asia belong.

Morocco, Italy, Belgium, Turkey, Spain, France and Romania are just a few of the 90 Interpol member nations that have benefited from these programs. Phone numbers, receipts, computer passwords, cellphones, bank account numbers, maps – what the military calls “pocket litter” or “DOMEX” (Document and Media Exploitation) – are collected from detainees by coalition ground troops and shared with participating Interpol members. The programs, which have been called the “cornerstone of counterterrorism efforts,” have distributed thousands of pieces of evidence, leading to the arrest of terrorists and exposing foreign fighter networks.

Projects Vennlig and Hamah serve the same function but in different locations. Vennlig, Finnish for “friendship,” began in Iraq in 2005, whereas, Hamah, the Arab word meaning “protect,” is the name of the Afghan version of the program started in 2008. The programs exploit information seized by coalition ground troops after extremists are killed or captured. Identity cards, photographs, computer CDs, phone numbers, passports, associations, operational plans, emails and rosters have all been found. Once the information is translated and declassified, it’s routed to the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S National Central Bureau and the Interpol General Secretariat. Interpol member states receive the evidence next. Information flows both ways to facilitate comprehensive information sharing, which is vital to the process because it allows agencies to benefit from each other’s knowledge. Over 1,800 insurgent-related phone numbers in 45 countries worldwide and 1,300 investigative leads on foreign fighter extremists from Europe, the Middle East and Africa have been stored. Global sharing of evidence and information is a key element in identifying foreign support and curbing criminal activity.

In 2007, one of Vennlig’s biggest triumphs was the discovery of a mammoth cache of documents in an al-Qaida safe house in the city of Sinjar, Iraq, near the Syrian border. U.S. and coalition forces turned up nearly 700 foreign fighter profiles during the raid. These profiles, known as the Sinjar records, provided a bounty of identifying information on foreign fighters operating in Iraq, including birthdates, nationalities, recruiters, routes into Iraq and psychological profiles. The records revealed that the largest number of fighters, 40 percent, were from Saudi Arabia. However, intelligence officials were surprised to learn that much less populated Libya contributed the second highest number of fighters, at 18 percent.

“No previous study has indicated that more than 4 percent of fighters were Libyan,” West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center pointed out after analyzing the Sinjar records in 2007. Additionally, the records suggested that fighters from Libya and Morocco were more likely to become suicide bombers than fighters from other countries. This treasure trove of data has been useful in identifying extremists worldwide by tracking and linking them to subsequent crimes and associations, providing them little or no anonymity.

Vennlig’s sister program, Hamah, provided the paper trail that helped convict 31 radical religious group members planning to overthrow the government of Azerbaijan. After killing the group’s leader, Azer Misirkhanov, in Afghanistan, International Security Assistance Force troops recovered phone numbers, photos and, most notably, a scrap of paper with names and Western Union account information, which revealed a terrorist financial network. The documents seized were instrumental in the conviction of 31 extremists in Baku, Azerbaijan.
“Until this glaring and serious void in the world’s anti-terror efforts is filled, no country can consider itself secure from criminals and terrorists who are essentially being given the opportunity to travel internationally, elude detection and to engage in future terrorist activity.”

— Ronald K. Noble, Interpol Secretary-General

Misirkhanov was the mastermind of several terror attacks leading up to the 2008 Afghan presidential election, instigator in a plot to blow up the Baku-Novorossiysk oil pipeline, and leader of a radical religious group in Azerbaijan. The Misirkhanov case also illustrates the significance of two-way information sharing between Vennlig/Hamah and Interpol. The Interpol “red notice,” a request from a country for a provisional arrest and extradition of a wanted person, served a vital role as it helped intelligence officials identify Misirkhanov as one of the casualties in that battle.

Hamah has yet to reach Vennlig’s level of success. A U.S. European Command intelligence official told *per Concordiam* in April 2011: “We haven’t hit the Sinjar jackpot yet [in Afghanistan]. We just haven’t found that data yet.”

Despite the tens of billions of dollars spent each year on Afghanistan operations and reconstruction, the Allies have not “adequately trained or equipped authorities on ways to take, store and share ‘strong identifying information,’ ” Interpol told the AP in April 2011. Interpol chief Ronald Noble warned that the absence of identifying data on prisoners allows them to move across international borders undetected and “until this glaring and serious void in the world’s anti-terror efforts is filled, no country can consider itself secure from criminals and terrorists who are essentially being given the opportunity to travel internationally, elude detection and to engage in future terrorist activity.”

The acquisition of pocket litter has proven to be a priceless tool for Vennlig and Hamah. Intelligence analysts attest that examination of this information is an important tool for confirming or disproving a suspect’s account of his whereabouts and actions. Items retrieved from ter-
terrorists have helped convict them in court. A 2007 Wall Street Journal article recounts a raid in Rawah, Iraq, in June 2003, during which Soldiers captured pocket litter that led to the arrest of two suspected extremists. After being sentenced to 15 years for laundering money, both defendants admitted that items captured in the raid, and calls to Syria documented on their cellphone, sealed their conviction.

More recently, pocket litter was recovered from Osama bin Laden upon his death in May 2011. The litter included 500 euros and two telephone numbers that reportedly were sewn into bin Laden’s clothing. These types of clues can be priceless to counterterrorism efforts. Some news reports speculate the litter found on bin Laden could lead officials to al-Qaida second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri.

An intelligence official cautions that the projects “provide leads and are not evidence or a case.” However small, these clues gathered from the battlefield help create a big picture, and can produce significant results. The collaboration between coalition ground forces and intelligence experts can help tighten the net around extremists. “You can’t fight terrorism from the (European Union) only, or the United States, or with your allies. Al-Qaida operates internationally. You have to fight it worldwide,” Interpol’s Noble told USA Today in 2007. □
Preserving the Eurozone
Europe works to solve Greek debt crisis

By per Concordiam Staff
Photos by Agence France-Presse

Two years into an economic recovery from one of the worst recessions of the postwar era, the European Union continues to search for solutions to the debt crisis that plagues some of its members. Following the announcement in October 2011 that Greece would be allowed to engage in an “orderly” default on its government debts, EU leaders strove to prevent such an event from causing widespread harm to economies across the continent. The crisis has sparked protests in Greece, and some against austerity measures have turned violent. In Germany and other richer EU member states, popular sentiment remains set against enlarging taxpayer-funded bailouts, forcing national leaders to find creative ways to stabilize their economies.
Amid the frenzy of street protests and emergency meetings by central bankers and government officials, some economists have called the future of the euro into question. Progress towards a more politically and economically integrated EU could also be at stake. As austerity measures are incorporated, defense spending has been targeted across Europe by budget cutters in both richer and poorer countries, leading to concerns that Europe's already tightfisted military spending will be insufficient to meet current and future obligations.

**How it started**
The 2008 financial crisis is commonly viewed as the beginning of serious troubles for Greece and the European Monetary Union, commonly referred to as the “eurozone.” Many observers, however, see the origins of the crisis in the creation of the euro itself. “The monetary union is a fair-weather construct, as a number of economists said from the beginning,” *Der Spiegel* reported in June 2011. The magazine also pointed out that Nobel laureate economist Milton Friedman predicted that the euro wouldn't survive the first crisis and said in 2002, “Euroland will collapse in five to 15 years.”

The core of the problem, economists say, is that the euro project cobbled together widely divergent economies unable to agree on spending, saving and taxation. According to *The Telegraph,* “monetary union itself can only flourish on the basis of a high degree of political and fiscal integration. One interest rate and one exchange rate cannot possibly fit all the members of a group of nations with widely different industrial and financial strengths, tax regimes and political cultures.”

Richer countries need stable monetary policy, while poorer countries need more flexibility in order to encourage economic growth. The European Central Bank (ECB) set uniform interest rates across the zone while fiscal policy remained under the control of each government, hampering coordination between fiscal and monetary policies. The euro was essentially a political project, according to *Der Spiegel,* intended to embed reunified Germany into Europe, and it relied on hopes that “the underlying problem of the euro’s design would resolve itself.”

But low ECB interest rates increased the flow of money in weaker eurozone countries like Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Spain. That easy money was designed to spur growth and alleviate economic imbalances. While there was growth, the easy availability of credit caused real estate bubbles in Ireland and Spain while, as *Der Spiegel* puts it, “Greeks and Portuguese were able to live shamelessly beyond their means,” borrowing to cover their consumption. When the recession hit, the housing bubbles burst, tax revenues dropped and social payments increased. The party was suddenly over.

According to *Der Spiegel,* the Greeks “were forced to admit that their debts were much higher than they had ever disclosed before.”

**Risks abound**
When Greece formally defaults on its bonds – the securities sold to investors to help finance public spending – some fear it could pull other overextended eurozone counties into default. Portugal, which already received a bailout, is in particular danger. Like Greece, the cheap euro masked declining competitiveness in Portugal and the financial crisis left it overextended, without access to normal lines of...
credit. Ireland, another bailout recipient, and Spain also indulged during the boom years and remain at risk if the economic recovery stalls. Investors have also questioned if Italy, possessing one of the world’s largest economies, should also be grouped within the group of “sick” economies. The sheer number of ailing economies has forced European leaders to search for a unified path out of the quagmire of debt. Clearly, there are no easy choices, nor cheap ones. As of October 2011, EU members had revealed plans for a controlled default of Greek debt to a more manageable level. Private holders of Greek bonds, which most conspicuously include European banks, would have to write off at least 50 percent of their investment in the Aegean nation. At the same time, in an attempt to bolster investor confidence in places like Italy, EU officials proposed using taxpayer money to insure part of the value of government bonds in case of default.

Bailout proposals have run into opposition both in Germany and Greece. Germans, who pay higher taxes and work longer, are resentful that they are being asked to bail out the “spendthrift” Greeks once again. Throughout much of 2011, a majority of Germans opposed more aid to Greece. German Chancellor Angela Merkel criticized Greece and other heavily indebted countries for their early retirement ages and extensive vacation time, saying, “We can’t have a currency where some get lots of vacation time and others very little.” Meanwhile, the Greeks are angry about the austerity measures demanded by the European Central Banks and the International Monetary Fund to receive aid. Some Greeks view the demands as a “new economic colonialism.” Unions and students have rioted, and a 2011 poll showed that 30 percent of Greeks wanted to leave the eurozone immediately.

In response to domestic pressures, Germany has demanded that private investors share the pain with the EU taxpayers, resulting in the 50 percent voluntary “haircut” demanded of Greek bond holders. But some fear even such a controlled default could
trigger further crisis in places like Portugal and Ireland if their bonds are viewed as too risky to attract investors. Another option would be to leave Greece (and potentially others) to their own devices. Such an option is unlikely. Countries recognize that a refusal of further aid would almost certainly result in rapid insolvency and carry heavy risks that the “contagion” could spread.

The remaining options are the partial dissolution of the eurozone, or the transition of the eurozone into a transfer union, with the richer countries providing permanent subsidies to the poorer. Since creation of a transfer union would require EU members to hand over much of their sovereignty to Brussels, dissolution of the eurozone is something an increasing number of economists see as a foregone conclusion. One scenario has Greece and other weaker economies leaving the euro and reintroducing domestic currencies. Despite the perils of this approach, it would provide monetary flexibility, allowing countries to devalue their currencies and improve their balance of trade.

Eurozone spending cuts are necessary to manage debt. But security experts worry budget cutters could sacrifice too much of their nations’ militaries in the name of austerity. As Europe and its NATO partners face a new generation of threats and expanded responsibilities, including battling pirates and global terror networks, European governments are cutting their already lean militaries. Pooling of resources can counter some capacity loss, but excessive cuts could leave Europe militarily irrelevant and its interests unprotected.

End of the eurozone?
The eurozone, as currently constructed, is under threat. The Telegraph says: “The unthinkable idea that the eurozone might break up is now being thought. And the version of break up gathering ground in people’s minds is not that the poor, indebted countries would fall out, but that Germany would rise up like Gulliver, snap the insubstantial euro-ropes tied round its body, and walk away.” The newspaper also noted that Borsenews, a German stock market website, began “pricing shares in Deutschmarks as well as euros.”

In a June 2011 report, the United Kingdom’s Centre for Economics and Business Research predicted the “break up” of the eurozone by 2013, saying that Southern European countries would have no choice but to withdraw, or face economic stagnation. The centre projects low growth rates and poor competitiveness for Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy, but thinks Ireland has a chance to get its financial house in order and remain in the monetary union.

The eurozone debt crisis also has the potential to turn Europe in the other direction, towards more complete economic and political integration. In June 2011, former ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet proposed creating a central finance ministry with substantial control over national budgets. Supporters of increased European integration admit the idea has little chance in the current political climate but argue that stronger EU governance is preferable to the breakup of the current monetary union.

Europe and the eurozone are at a crossroads, faced by the first serious crisis since the common currency entered circulation in 2002. It is still to be seen if the euro will survive the crisis in its current form or shrink to being the currency of the stronger, core European economies.

The currency’s detractors are growing and many would rather see the euro go away than surrender sovereign taxing and spending authority to a centralized EU treasury. But euro supporters argue that it must be saved despite the costs.

As Der Spiegel said: “The euro, created with the aim of permanently uniting Europe, has become the greatest threat to the continent’s future. A collapse of the monetary union would set Europe back by decades, dealing it a blow from which it might never recover.”

Mario Monti, appointed prime minister of Italy in late 2011, has promised to stabilize his country’s economy.
The transformation of cellphones into powerful hand-held computers has revolutionized telecommunications, but has also produced security loopholes ripe for exploitation by criminals and extremists. Al-Qaida’s formation of “mobile detachments” to spread jihadist recruitment videos via cellphones is just the start of it. Terror financiers have found it easier to transfer and launder money by simply punching a password into a cellphone keyboard. These all-purpose smartphones are also susceptible to hacking and tapping with the use of fraudulent cellphone applications or illicit receivers that can intercept calls within a certain radius.

It’s all part of a process that Nigel Stanley, a widely quoted information technology security expert from England, describes as a “relentless cycle of new attacks and new innovations.” The intimacy of such hand-held devices gives bad actors a chance to strike at a victim’s vulnerable points anytime and anyplace. And for those liable to abuse it, inexpensive mobile phone technology can generate a large return for a small investment.

“Your smart/mobile phone certainly is a highly personal gadget, which is rarely shared – unlike family household computers,” the terror-tracking website Jihadica.com wrote in March 2011. “The content on your mobile phone has a more private nature and allows you to quickly navigate and read through the jihadist materials without anyone noticing. The downside for jihadis, however, is an upside for the police, as the sympathizers are inspired to store incriminating content on their personal phones.”

Triggering improvised explosive devices with cellphones, typically the disposable variety, has been a mainstay in the terrorist and criminal arsenal. But attacks can be much more subtle than that. Edward Gibson, a former FBI agent who provided IT security to the U.S. Embassy in London, said phone “apps,” some downloaded innocently from Chinese sources, can turn cellphones into covert bugging devices. IT professionals have demonstrated how a makeshift base station, consisting of a $1,000 laptop computer and switchboard, can intercept cellphone signals from a particular radius without the caller’s knowledge. Up to now, many of the targets have been corporate executives, but the vulnerability extends to government officials as well. Stanley pointed out that both U.S. President Barack Obama and British Prime Minister David Cameron are wedded to their hand-held devices.

A 2010 survey of 107 U.S. senior executives revealed that 61 percent reported monthly corporate security breaches due mainly to cellphone mishandling. Ponemon Institute, the firm that conducted the study, also investigated the prevalence of lost laptop computers. Ponemon learned in 2008 that business travelers in the U.S. and Europe lost 15,648 laptops a week, the leader in Europe being London’s Heathrow Airport, with about 900 laptops lost weekly.

“A majority of business travelers say that their laptops contain confidential or sensitive information. However, most of these travelers admit they do not take steps to protect or secure the information contained on their laptop,” Ponemon wrote, noting that Italian, Spanish and U.S. computer owners were the least security conscious.

Cellphones also disappear by the millions, though exact worldwide numbers are hard to come by. A 2005 government survey estimated the annual number of stolen cellphones in Great Britain at 700,000, many of which found their way to 46 foreign countries, the Independent reported. Even when the phones were...
deactivated by their former owners, many still contained reams of personal data vulnerable to exploitation. To tackle the problem, Britain created a National Mobile Phone Crime Unit in 2003.

Gibson complained that corporate and government leaders, smitten with social media and other communications innovations, have lulled themselves into a false sense of security. People wouldn’t tolerate an armed robber stealing millions from a bank vault, but they disregard larger thefts online. Criminals prey unceasingly on the public using domain names set up with phony names and addresses. Offshore servers, including one near the southeast coast of England on a concrete platform beyond the territorial reach of the British government, are available for use by law breakers. Cellphone signals are becoming easier to track using GPS, and a user’s whereabouts easier to pinpoint using aerial mapping programs such as Google Earth. It’s no time for people to grow complacent about cellphone and computer threats, Gibson warned during a speech at the London Counter Terror Expo in April 2011. “Technology has made us ‘yes people,’ ” he said.

Recruitment tools sent via cellphones include jihadist how-to handbooks, religious literature and “snuff films” showing terrorists committing killings.

Jihadists have made inroads using these latest tools. Security experts reported that the Arab-language “Ansar Al-Mujahideen Forum” has been distributing jihadist mobile phone software since late 2009. It’s part of al-Qaida’s “mobile detachment” dedicated to reaching sympathizers within the broad Muslim public. Recruitment tools sent via cellphones include jihadist how-to handbooks, religious literature and “snuff films” showing terrorists committing killings. Sometimes the approach is less explicit. An Islamic dating subculture in which young men and women court each other clandestinely by cellphone provides an arena for exploitation, security experts say. “In some Arab countries, due to the harsh enforced segregation of the sexes, communicating and setting up ‘secret dates’ has mainly turned to the use of modern technology. AQ [al-Qaida] in its never-ending endeavor is also always keen to capitalize on newest technology,” Jihadica.com wrote.

Terror financiers have adopted the practice of transferring money by cellphone, a method popular in much of rural Asia and Africa, where automated teller machines are scarce. Marrying that technology to the traditionally secretive Islamic money-lending system called hawala can make for a potent weapon. “Concerns have been raised about possible misuse of mobile technologies for criminal purposes,” according to “Integrity in Mobile Phone Financial Services,” a World Bank report. “Mobile phones are used by billions of people around the world to communicate, including criminals and terrorists. New mobile financial services may be susceptible.”

Experts insist cyber defense must widen its scope to take in new, sophisticated cellphones. The era of the smartphone means powerful computers now fit in a user’s palm, for good or evil. Users in Europe and Central Asia must take care, lest their personal portable devices be infected and turned against them, just as desktop computers are prone to attacks by viruses and malware. “Mobile phone jihad is a reality,” Stanley said. “But the good news is there’s a bunch of countermeasures to put in place.”
Europe grapples with North African Refugees

Unrest in North Africa forces Europe to debate changes to immigration policy

By per Concordiam Staff
Displaying his identity documents, Lajnaf explained that his wife Zaineb was pregnant and unable to obtain a visa to join him in France, where he worked. And Tunisia, which had recently undergone a wrenching change of government, no longer felt safe for the couple. “I took a risk and saw death at sea,” Lajnaf told a Euronews video crew in March 2011.

African refugees by the tens of thousands have flooded into Europe, escaping across the Mediterranean from North Africa and generating a refugee crisis that threatens passport-free movement provided by the Schengen agreement. While the Arab Spring brings hope of democratic reform and increased freedoms to the peoples of largely authoritarian North Africa, it has also brought economic upheaval and social unrest, prompting multitudes to brave the dangerous sea-crossing in search of both safety and jobs in Europe. EU members have struggled to find a common position on how to deal with the inflow.

Human wave, humanitarian crisis
Lampedusa, dubbed the “door to Europe,” is a tiny island of 5,000 inhabitants whose main industries are fishing and tourism. It lies just 113 kilometers (70 miles) off the Tunisian coast, closer to Africa than the rest of Europe. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), an intergovernmental organization that promotes humane and orderly migration, more than 21,000 refugees had arrived in Lampedusa by mid-July 2011.

The shore is littered with capsized boats, shipwrecks, blankets and children’s toys. Though hit hardest by the refugee crisis, Italy is not alone. Because accurate data is lacking, estimates of the total number of migrants are hard to come by, but it is certain that tens of thousands have landed elsewhere along Europe’s Mediterranean coast, including France, Spain, Greece, Malta and Cyprus.

Thousands more are feared lost at sea. According to the United Nations, 1,400 people drowned at sea over one week in May 2011, trying to escape unrest in Libya. Some survivors say they were forced into boats at night by supporters of former Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi, a phenomenon backed up by U.N. reports. When NATO began bombing Libya in enforcement of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973, Gadhafi pledged to use migration as a weapon, saying he would “unleash an unprecedented wave of illegal migration” on Europe.

European leaders worry about the continent’s ability to absorb this new wave of immigrants. According to The New York Times, “the surge comes at a time when Europe is increasingly divided over immigration, with right-wing parties gaining traction.” But the flow of desperate migrants is expected to continue as new governments in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia struggle to stabilize their societies. “We’re sitting on a ticking time bomb,” Massimo Russo, head of the regional Sicilian Health Authority, told Euronews in March 2011. Frontex, the EU border-control agency, has predicted movements of as many as 1.5 million people before the situation in North Africa stabilizes.

Promise of a better life
Most of the early arrivals, in the first months of 2011, were Tunisians escaping unrest and searching for economic opportunity in Europe. However, as spring moved into summer, a growing majority of migrants were sub-Saharan Africans arriving via Libya and Tunisia. Many had been guest workers in Libya. The IOM estimates that 500,000 to 1.5 million...
sub-Saharan migrants can be sent back to their home countries. According to Newsweek, more than half of the Tunisian migrants were deported to Tunisia after the new government reached an agreement with Italy in April 2011 to curb economic migration.

France’s ruling party attributes most of the migration to economics. Jean-François Copé, current president of the Union for a Popular Movement group in the French National Assembly, said that France cannot afford to take in North Africans looking for jobs, according to an April 2011 Associated Press article. Unemployment in France is nearly 10 percent and government debt is more than half of its gross domestic product.

Who is responsible?
The refugee crisis has precipitated disagreement – and some angry words – among EU members. Italian government officials suggest Italy should not have to bear the brunt of the cost of accepting these recent immigrants just because it is geographically closest to the source. They contend that this surge affects the entire EU since immigrants are traversing borders and moving across Europe, and the EU as a whole should share the burden. Some news reports support that contention. “It does not interest us. It’s just a stopover. We want to go to France but they don’t want us there,” a refugee said in a March 2011 Press Europe article.

In April 2011, Italy issued six-month residency permits to 8,000 immigrants, allowing them free movement through the EU. This caused France to re-establish border control with Italy, threatening the Schengen agreement’s guarantee of passport-free travel. France even suspended train travel between the two countries for a day in April to stop a refugee train from crossing the border. Under Schengen rules, border checks can only be established under “grave threat to public order or security.” French President Nicolas Sarkozy and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi jointly wrote a letter to the European Commission calling for the suspension of Schengen in large refugee situations.

Denmark re-established border spot checks from Germany and Sweden in July 2011, despite being 1,500 miles from Libya. The EC warned Denmark in May 2011 that it risked Schengen membership by its unilateral decision to initiate permanent border checks. Denmark says the move is intended to stop smuggling and illegal economic immigration and argues that it has only “intensified spot checks” by customs officers, a practice allowed under Schengen. The move sparked tensions with Germany, as German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle warned that border checks would be bad for freedom in Europe.
Frontex has responded to the surge of migrants into Italy by deploying operation “Hermes,” which assists the Italian authorities with naval and aerial border surveillance and managing North African migrants, particularly Tunisians, arriving in Lampedusa. “Frontex is closely monitoring the developments of North Africa and stands ready to assist the Member States operationally, if requested. We are also cautiously developing additional operational responses for potential rapid deployment throughout the Mediterranean if needed,” Frontex executive director Ilkka Laitinen said in a March 2011 press release. Greece is receiving assistance from Frontex in Evros, the district that abuts Turkey that has become the main entry point for illegal immigrants into the EU. Greece has gone as far as to build a trench along its border with Turkey, the Deutsche Welle reported. Built primarily to relieve flood waters from the Evros River, it is also intended to stem the flow of illegal migrants.

The recent influx of migrants from North Africa has also called attention to the varying asylum policies among EU member states. EU home affairs commissioner Cecilia Malmström has proposed the creation of a common asylum policy, asserting that asylum seekers face the same procedures regardless of which EU state they first enter. “The European Union must stand up for its values and provide protection for those coming here to seek refuge from persecution and conflict. This is why we must respect our commitment to establish a common European asylum system by 2012,” Malmström said in a June 2011 statement to EU interior ministers. Discussions to revise such regulations go back to 2008.

**Opportunity out of crisis?**

There may be a silver lining to the influx of refugees. Some of the would-be immigrants have skills demanded by European employers, but can’t find good jobs in the stagnant economies at home. As Giui Nicolini, director of Legambiente Lampedusa, a group working to help migrants passing through their island, said: “Europe needs this workforce. Why do these people need to risk their lives at sea? Why not regulate [immigration] flows in a consistent way to fill the needs of our continent?”

Ultimately, the solution to the refugee crisis lies at the source, in North Africa. Only by building societies with sustainable economic growth and inclusive political and social opportunities – societies based on freedom and democratic principles – can the people of North Africa complete what the Arab Spring started.

In helping them to reach those goals, Europe simultaneously helps to control immigration flows and protect its borders. As Malmström said in February 2011: “The Tunisian people are demanding democracy as well as economic and social development. Tackling these issues would decrease irregular immigration.” The sentiment is relevant to Libya, Egypt and other countries on Europe’s doorstep where people hope to build free and prosperous societies. □
Nuclear Power Persistence

Despite troubles in Japan, Eastern Europe needs to lessen reliance on fossil fuels for electricity

By per Concordiam Staff

A growing appetite for clean, reliable energy has persuaded most Eastern European governments to abandon their aversion to nuclear power, stemming from the 1986 Chernobyl disaster. Countries from Poland and Lithuania to Romania and Bulgaria, many of which generate electricity from coal and fickle supplies of Russian gas, are not only updating old nuclear power plants but also constructing new reactors. A nuclear revival promises these countries a steady supply of domestic energy that meets European Union clean-air requirements and reduces the role of fossil fuels.

Japan’s struggle to contain a radiation leak at a nuclear plant following the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami has somewhat tarnished the image of nuclear energy, but few deny, least of all the Japanese themselves, that the world needs nuclear as part of its energy blend. “In Europe and across the world, more and more voices can be heard about the renaissance of nuclear energy,” said Zygimantas Vaiciunas of the Lithuanian Energy Ministry in Lithuania in the World magazine.

Cleanliness is key. Poland gets more than 90 percent of its electricity from burning lignite, a particularly sooty type of soft coal, but its Eastern European neighbors are similarly reliant on hydrocarbons for power generation. Since much of that supply comes from Russia, which occasionally used oil and gas exports as a geopolitical pressure point, nuclear power appears to be the best bet for ending that dependency.

Lithuania, for example, shut down its archaic Soviet-era Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant in 2009. The plant supplied three quarters of the nation’s electricity. The closure made Lithuania more reliant on Russian gas, a situation it hopes to remedy by building new reactors that would also supply Baltic neighbors Latvia and Estonia.

Farther south in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, old Soviet-style reactors that the EU considers unsafe are being decommissioned, to be replaced by modern nuclear plants using French, American and Japanese technology. Bulgaria, too, is set on replacing old nuclear power plants closed by the EU with a modern one in the town of Belene on the Romanian border. Until the old plant closed, Bulgaria had exported electricity to its neighbors. Even oil-and-gas-rich Azerbaijan has proposed adopting nuclear energy for power generation. Kazakhstan, which possesses some of the world’s largest deposits of uranium, has discussed a similar move.

In its 2010 Nuclear Technology Review, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported new construction on 12 civilian reactors worldwide, the largest number since the Chernobyl accident in 1986 in Ukraine, then part of the Soviet Union. The IAEA suggested that the growth stemmed from nuclear’s good safety record combined with instability in the availability of competing fuels. “Concerns persisted about global warming, energy supply security, and high and volatile fossil fuel prices. All studies still projected persistent energy demand growth in the medium and long term,” the report said.

Nevertheless, the expansion of electricity-by-nuclear-fission inevitably invites comparisons to Chernobyl, the widely-reported Soviet nuclear tragedy that killed hundreds of people when a reactor containment system failed and spewed radioactive dust into the sky. Fears generated by Chernobyl have contributed to halting nuclear plant construction in Germany and shutting down Italy’s program entirely.

Italy is the only major industrial power in the world without a nuclear plant, helping make it the largest net importer of electricity in the world. As a result, Italy’s electric rates are 45 percent above the EU average, according to the World Nuclear Association, a trade group representing the atomic energy field. Ukraine, despite shutting down Chernobyl, still gets nearly half of its electricity from nuclear.

Japan’s difficulties stemming a near-disaster at its Fukushima Daiichi power plant in the spring of 2011 provided more fodder for critics of nuclear energy. The German government reacted by
promising to shut down the country’s 17 nuclear reactors by 2022. These anti-nuclear sentiments drew a scalding response from former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who wrote a March 2011 article in the magazine Bild that declared the moves “over-hasty” and predicted it would lead Germany down a “dead end.” Kohl wrote, “As long as there is no credible, competitive and eco-friendly alternative to nuclear energy, there will also be no global phase-out of nuclear energy.”

Poland wants to avoid its neighbors’ nuclear aversion as it charts a future less dependent on coal. After the Russian-Ukrainian gas standoff in 2009, Poland fast-tracked development of two nuclear plants. Polska Grupa Energetyczna, the country’s largest power company, will likely build the first plant on the Baltic Sea north of Gdansk, the intended site of a never-built Soviet reactor in the 1980s.

A new law passed in February 2011 formalized Poland’s commitment to nuclear power. The country’s goal is to get at least 10 percent of its electricity from nuclear energy by 2030 and reduce coal’s share of power generation to 60 percent. It must do so to meet EU pollution requirements. Poland is seeking foreign partners to assist with the technology and also help defer costs that could exceed 20 billion euros. Belarus and Russia have proposed transmitting electricity to Poland – some of it nuclear generated – but Polish leaders suggest that would ultimately undermine rather than increase energy independence.

The Baltic States share similar concerns. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, which remain linked to the old Soviet power network, asked the EU for help in ending their isolation from the main European energy grid. Nuclear energy could be a large part of that strategy. Even after the Fukushima Daiichi disaster, Russia announced plans to manufacture relatively inexpensive ship-borne “floating nuclear power plants” for installation in remote areas like the Arctic. Each could power up to 200,000 homes, Jane’s Intelligence Review reported in August 2011.

“Germany and Italy have made this choice, but many other European countries have not reversed their nuclear policies,” European Commission energy spokeswoman Marlene Holzner said in a May 2011 Wall Street Journal article. “In the long run, you will still see nuclear and it will be part of the energy mix.”

The European “green” movement, which focuses its energy production hopes on windmills and solar panels, remains an obstacle to developing nuclear
Though wind and solar power remain expensive and reliant on the whims of weather, green supporters view them as the best way for Europe to cut greenhouse gases blamed for global warming.

Such thinking provoked criticism from French President Nicholas Sarkozy, who in a March 2010 speech in Paris trumpeted his support for peaceful nuclear energy. Sarkozy expressed chagrin that financing agencies such as the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) have tended to shun nuclear power. The EBRD, for example, has clamored for the closure of old nuclear reactors in Eastern Europe over the protests of some national governments. More than anything else, the vast expense of nuclear power plants can sidetrack construction. “I can't understand why nuclear power is ostracized by international finance,” Sarkozy announced before representatives of dozens of nations. “It’s the stuff of scandal.”

Despite the cost of the myriad safety features that go into building nuclear reactors, few doubt that such plants will play a role in helping Eastern Europe cut emissions and enhance energy security, opined Petr Zavodsky, head of nuclear construction for the Czech Republic’s largest electric utility, in a 2010 Bloomberg Business News article. “Nuclear plants are the most profitable sources of energy in the long term,” Zavodsky said. “We want to be more independent.”

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**Percentage of electricity supplied by NUCLEAR GENERATION in select countries (as of 2009)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Nuclear Generation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>49%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Source: International Atomic Energy Agency*
Seeking Unity in Bosnia
Political obstinance stalls progress in EU membership

By per Concordiam Staff

More than 16 years after the Bosnian war ended with the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, Bosnia and Herzegovina remains a fragile and restless entity, threatened by political instability and lingering ethnic mistrust. Disunity among the region’s Serb, Muslim and Croat population carries the potential for conflict that could spread across the entire region, High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina Valentin Inzko told the United Nations Security Council in May 2011.
The most recent crisis occurred in April 2011, when Bosnian Serb leaders proposed a referendum to reject the authority of the multiethnic Bosnian state court and other federal institutions and laws. Suddenly, the future of Bosnia's relationship with the rest of Europe was clouded with uncertainty. *European Voice* called the referendum request “the deepest crisis since the Dayton peace agreement.” Diplomatic pressure by the European Union persuaded Republika Srpska (RS) President Milorad Dodik to cancel the referendum, but the incident highlighted the deteriorating political situation in a country that had slipped from the radar of many Europeans.

**Crisis averted, not resolved**

While an immediate crisis was averted, the political future of Bosnia remains ambiguous. Squabbling political parties still hadn’t formed a government more than eight months after elections in October 2010, and some Bosnian Croats were again agitating for the creation of a third ethnic enclave akin to the largely autonomous, Serb-controlled RS.

The International Crisis Group (ICG), a nongovernmental organization focused on conflict prevention and resolution, lamented in a 2011 report: “There is no broadly respected authority in the country, only regional or partisan champions.” Official corruption and organized crime are endemic, and the same nationalist parties that led Bosnia into war in 1992 remain powerful and popular with their ethnic constituencies, diplomats say.

The situation had deteriorated to the point that the *Financial Times* could say in 2011 that “Mr. Dodik’s calls for breaking up [Bosnia], along with Bosniak (Bosnian Muslims) calls to stamp out Serb autonomy, have started to appear routine.”

Further muddying the waters – and feeding fears of Serb and Croat nationalists – are indications of increasing religious radicalization in the traditionally moderate and secular Bosnian Muslim community. In June 2010, six Bosnian Muslims planted a bomb in a police station in the town of Bugojno, killing one officer. According to the Bosnian news site ISA Intel, the attacks were the work of a new sect that follows the radical Takfiri ideology and openly advocates violent jihad. “There are strong indications that the Bosnian Wahhabi movement has been taken over by more radical forces,” the article said. In an ironic kinship with Serb leader Dodik, the Wahhabi terrorists refused to recognize the authority of Bosnia’s state court.

**Dissatisfying status quo**

As the world has focused increasingly on international terrorism, Afghanistan, Iraq and the Arab Spring, memories of the bloody ethnic wars in the Balkans...
have receded. Although Bosnia has been relatively quiet, problems still fester. Despite hopes that the promise of EU membership would promote reconciliation and reform, the political system struggles to function properly and remains under the supervision of the Office of the High Representative (OHR).

Neighboring Croatia, which also lapsed into interethnic warfare with the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, will join the EU in 2013. And now that Serbia, following the May 2011 arrest of Bosnian Serb war crimes suspect Ratko Mladić, could soon win candidate status, Bosnia remains the only former Yugoslav republic without a path to EU membership. “Progress on much-needed economic reforms, or towards European Union membership, has ground to a halt,” The Economist wrote.

The Dayton Accords ended bloodshed in Bosnia but created an unwieldy and inefficient system of government. According to David Chandler, writing in the International Journal of Peace Studies, the multiple and overlapping layers of Bosnian government create embedded inefficiencies. The reliance on “external institutions” has decreased the accountability of elected leaders. The constitution established by Dayton created a weak federal government and two generally autonomous entities, the mainly ethnic Serb RS and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), forged from the on-again-off-again wartime alliance between Muslims and Croats.

The OHR, the primary “external institution” in question, was established by the international community after Dayton to guide political reconciliation and build democratic institutions in Bosnia. The OHR was vested with the power to cancel laws and remove elected political leaders deemed corrupt or obstructionist. The proposed Bosnian Serb referendum at the center of the recent crisis was in reaction to laws and institutions established under OHR authority. The original plan was to close the OHR in 2008, but its mission has been extended until at least 2012.

Dayton’s goal was to end the war while providing the basic structure on which to build a unified, multiethnic state. But the treaty has inadvertently cemented ethnic and political separations formed by the war. Though provisions granting wide autonomy were necessary to gain buy-in from the warring parties, framers hoped that time would lead to reconciliation, integration and interethnic trust necessary to establish a functioning and sovereign central government free. Many hoped that the promise of EU membership would restrain petty nationalist rivalries, but it hasn’t been enough.

Further complicating the situation is a parallel crisis in the FBiH. Bosniak-Croat ethnic riots in Herzegovina and violent demonstrations in Sarajevo followed a heated football match in April 2010. After the 2010 FBiH elections, Croat nationalist parties refused to form a government with the Social Democratic Party (the only nominally multiethnic party), which won the most votes. In addition, the FBiH is broke and badly in need of structural reforms. According to the ICG, reforms have been neglected “because of belief that statewide constitutional reform would solve most of its problems.” Bosnian Croat leader Martin Raguz told The Economist that the Dayton constitution “has hit a brick wall,” and he called for new elections.

Different visions
Bosnia’s three ethnic constituencies have divergent views on the type of state they want, including differing interpretations of Dayton and which powers it grants to the entities versus the central government. There are also conflicting and sometimes inaccurate perceptions of the motives and ambitions of the other groups, perceptions formed by history, war, fear and prejudice and exploited by nationalist politicians. According to the ICG, “wartime political loyalties still largely apply. Most Bosniaks supported the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as the sole legitimate and multi-ethnic authority,” but most Croats and Serbs “viewed it as a Bosniak entity that did not represent them.”

Bosniaks, the largest ethnic group though not a majority, favor a multiethnic republic with a strong central government within Bosnia’s...
current borders. Bosniak nationalists led the drive for Bosnian independence from Yugoslavia and represented Bosnia at the Dayton peace talks.

Bosnian Serbs make up about 25 percent of the population, and the RS comprises 49 percent of the territory. Most Bosnian Serbs opposed Bosnian independence from Serb-dominated Yugoslavia. Serb nationalists, led by war-crimes suspects Radovan Karadžić and Mladic, used military force and ethnic cleansing to break “historically Serbian territory” away from Bosnia and remain part of Yugoslavia. While the Serbs were more or less coerced into signing the Dayton Accords, they now view it as a guarantor of their autonomy from Bosniak rule.

Nationalist Bosnian Croat leaders supported Bosnia’s independence from Yugoslavia, but mostly because they felt that prying territory away from a weak Bosnian state was preferable to grappling with a stronger Yugoslavia. The Croats broke their alliance with the Bosniaks a few months into the war but later reconciled with Muslims, under Western pressure, to fight Serbs. Most Bosnian Croats support separating from the FBiH and forming their own autonomous region along the lines of the RS.

There have been several attempts at the substantive reform necessary to move Bosnia toward its place in the European family of nations, but most have largely failed, including a Western brokered package of constitutional reform in 2006.

Question of reform
Those who wish Bosnia and Herzegovina to succeed as an integrated, multiethnic state realize the country needs a new constitution, preferably one that reflects the common democratic principles of its people, rather than the wishes of international negotiators. Without some kind of ethnic consensus, the economic and political reforms necessary to join the EU are difficult to achieve.

As former Slovenian President Milan Kučan told the ICG: “The war itself never really ended; it was only interrupted by the Dayton peace agreement.” European integration may help resolve Bosnia’s interethnic disputes and rivalries, but the level of cooperation needed to achieve European standards of government, rule of law and human rights required to enter the EU have yet to be reached by Bosnia’s fractious political leadership.
The Responsibility to Protect

By Gareth Evans, Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 2008; 348 pages
Reviewed by CAPT Ioannis Chapsos, Hellenic Navy, Marshall Center alumnus

In 2000, under the vigorous endorsement of former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan and as an initiative of the Canadian government, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was launched.

It's assignment was to re-examine all the legal, moral, operational and political factors forming the “humanitarian debate” and place its findings in a concluding report. A new doctrine stemming from the report was released in 2001, transforming the hitherto “right to intervene” into the “responsibility to protect” (R2P). Eventually, the report broadened the debate even further in terms of international law and practice.

Gareth Evans, president of the International Crisis Group, was chairman of the above-mentioned commission. Thus, his book *The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All* is of particular significance and could be viewed as a primary source for all security and international relations studies.

After providing a historical background from the Peace of Westphalia to the 1990s through the prism of humanitarianism, the first part of the book provides all of the proceedings from the configuration of the ICISS and the genesis of the 90-page report that established the R2P doctrine. It moves on to the 2005 World Summit, when the UN General Assembly finally adopted a modified document that announced the “responsibility of the state to protect its own populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”

The author also cites five critical points that distinguish the new dogma from older doctrines, emphasizing especially the “responsibility to prevent” as the nub of the concept. It proposes the application of political, diplomatic, legal and economic measures in the earliest possible stages, reserving coercive action as a last alternative. He also stresses that in order to maintain its effectiveness, R2P doesn't refer to all forms of global security challenges such as pandemics, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and climate change.

The second part of the book is dedicated to the operational concept of the doctrine, stressing anew the prioritization of prevention and the international community’s commitment to assist states with that objective and its responsibility to react decisively under the UN Chapters VI, VII (on a case-by-case basis) and Chapter VIII if the state fails. And if all preventive measures fail, military intervention is permitted. But even in terms of authorizing military action, if the UN Security Council fails to act because of a veto, the concerned state can approach the UN General Assembly, then a regional organisation, coalitions of the willing, and individual and adjacent countries.

Much of the report is devoted to the “responsibility to rebuild” as the second center of gravity of the dogma. The key role of the UN, regional organisations, state and nonstate actors is analysed, providing suggestions on how to build political capabilities and foster civil-military cooperation for the cause. Additionally, political will can't be disregarded, since it remains the mobilizing force for the genesis, application and evolution of the doctrine.

It might have been interesting if the author had outlined the objections and reactions from various UN member states during the summit, especially regarding
the (ultimately unsuccessful) efforts to establish a threshold for the use of military force in humanitarian interventions.

The spectrum of R2P is explicitly limited, dealing solely with crimes against humanity perpetrated with the use of force. For this reason, the doctrine was questioned from the very beginning. In May 2008, the Cyclone Nargis killed more than 130,000 people, causing a humanitarian emergency in Burma. When its military regime rejected humanitarian assistance from the international community, the French foreign minister proposed that the UNSC authorize an R2P delivery of assistance without the consent of Burma’s government, asserting that leaving people without assistance in such a crisis amounted to a crime against humanity. China rejected the suggestion and claimed that R2P doesn’t refer to natural disasters. UK representatives agreed. The delivery was finally permitted through diplomatic pressure.

The incident could be juxtaposed with the case of Zimbabwe. During the 2008 “elections campaign,” Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe prohibited food and medicine distribution from aid agencies, with the excuse that they were strengthening his political opponents. This was another way of perpetrating a crime against humanity through noncoercive means. There was no R2P intervention, not even a suggestion of such a thing. Crimes against humanity are defined by the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), including all “inhuman acts intentionally causing great suffering.” Thus, the question remains: Who has the “responsibility to protect” people from such crimes, perpetrated against them in the manner of Burma’s and Zimbabwe’s leaders? Unfortunately, the ICC is not the answer, given that the U.S. administration since 2003 has signed bilateral agreements with dozens of countries for not handing each other’s nationals to the ICC.

It is evident that R2P’s umbrella doesn’t cover the whole globe. Building peace using double standards is against the fundamental principles of the doctrine. Regional organizations also have a key role to play in the R2P doctrine, guarding against the potential in ability of the UN to act. Some scholars view R2P with scepticism and mistrust, deeming it another rhetorical declaration for human rights promotion aimed at serving vital national interests by establishing a “right to punish.” Looking toward the future through an optimistic lens, one wishes that R2P will not be transformed into another “license to kill” or “right to punish” for the big powers, since it will be an unnecessary doctrine given an existing political will to intervene. It’s time to trigger civil-military initiatives and convert Thucydides’ popular phrase into “the strong do what they must so that the weak not suffer what they too often will.”

The Responsibility to Protect
Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All

Gareth Evans
Resident Courses
Democratia per fidem et concordiam
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