Embracing civil-military cooperation

Concordiam
Journal of European Security and Defense Issues

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  Militaries come to the rescue

- POLICE PARTNERSHIPS
  Combating crime in the Balkans

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Welcome to per Concordiam

It is with great enthusiasm that I present the fourth issue of per Concordiam, the quarterly journal of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. This issue continues our efforts to address current defense and security policy issues of the utmost concern in Europe and Eurasia. In this issue, we explore the very relevant theme of how civil-military partnerships are being developed to address emerging security concerns.

Today, nations increasingly recognize the need to combine military and civilian capabilities and resources comprehensively to solve security challenges. The complexity and diversity of current security threats demand that states work on better organization and coordination within the interagency process at the national level. The challenge of implementing a comprehensive approach involves rethinking the roles and missions of both military and civilian instruments of national power in ways that combine organizational strengths, optimize resourcing, and build interagency cooperative processes to ensure strong partnerships.

The ongoing global discussion on how to best implement a “whole of government” approach varies greatly as with any emerging concept. In an effort to explore some of these ideas, per Concordiam offers several articles with innovative approaches. The feature articles in this issue focus on the challenges facing the European Union and the United States implementing a comprehensive strategy and some of the difficulties European nations are having developing security forces focused on performing homeland security tasks and supporting civil security missions.

I hope you are inspired by the articles in per Concordiam, and respond to us with your analysis and comments. The next two themes of per Concordiam are the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the need for greater cyber security. Your contributions on these topics will allow us to continue the productive exchange of information on the pressing defense and security issues we face. Please contact us at editor@perconcordiam.org

Sincerely,

Keith W. Dayton
Director

Col. Alexey Telichkin is the training and development coordinator of the United Nations Mission in Liberia. From 2006 to 2009, he was the senior police advisor to the U.N. Observer Mission in Georgia and was head of the International Law Enforcement Training Department at Kharkov National University of Internal Affairs from 2001 to 2006. He is the author of the book Peacekeeping Policing: Participation of International Police in Peace Operations and Robust Peacekeeping: The Army and Police in Peace Operations. He holds a law degree and is a 2004 graduate of the Marshall Center.

Petro Kanana is Chief Specialist, Directorate of Defence and Security Policy, for the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. Before he retired as a colonel from the Ukrainian Army, he served as Deputy Head of the Directorate for political and security issues for Euro-Atlantic Integration. He has a master’s degree from the National Academy in Ukraine and is a 2004 graduate of the Marshall Center’s Program in Advanced Security Studies.

Cristian Ionus heads the External Funds Unit within the Ministry for Administration and Interior in Romania. He is working on his doctorate in international law at State University in Chisinau, Moldova. His duties include international law-related negotiations and international funding specific to police cooperation, as well as public safety reforms and strategies.

Dr. John L. Clarke is a professor of leadership, management, and defense planning at the Marshall Center. Clarke, who enjoyed a military career of more than a quarter century, is an expert on the role of military forces in homeland security and homeland defense issues. Most recently, he published the book Armies in Homeland Security: American and European Perspectives. He has published articles on defense and security issues that have appeared in EuroFuture, Defense News, Magazine der Bundeswehr and Journal of Homeland Security. He is a frequent contributor on German and Austrian radio and television. Clarke holds a doktorat from the University of Salzburg, Austria, a brevet from the Ecole Supérieure de Guerre in Paris, a master’s degree from the University of Southern California and a bachelor’s degree from Norwich University.

Lt. Col. Darrell Driver is strategic planner with Headquarters, Department of the U.S. Army. He was a 2009 Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Office of International Affairs and the Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. He is a former strategist at the Marshall Center. His publications include book chapters and articles on civil military relations and security policy, as well as the book Sparta in Babylon: Case Studies in the Public Philosophy of Soldiers and Civilians. He holds a doctorate from Syracuse University in New York.
Welcome to the fourth issue of *per Concordiam*. The overarching theme of this issue is political and military partnerships. Today in Europe, the whole-of-government or interagency approach to solving security issues is almost universally accepted. Increasing partnerships between military and civilian organizations to combat terrorism and merging military and civilian staffs into coordination centers are daunting tasks on both sides of the Atlantic, as emphasized by our contributors in this issue.

In this time of increasing strain on national budgets, government leaders are exploring better ways to gain efficiencies within existing organizations. This comprehensive approach to solving security concerns has led to heady discussions among governments, militaries, security organizations and academics about the best ways to maximize interagency cooperation.

In Dr. Darrell Driver’s essay “Purity Versus Pragmatism,” he points out the competing positions of modern militaries in integrating civil-military efforts more thoroughly. Dr. Driver compares the challenges facing the European Union and United States in implementing a comprehensive approach to combining civilian and military capabilities. He uses these two widely varying examples — a collection of nations and an individual nation — to demonstrate the military purist and military pragmatist arguments on how to integrate militaries into nontraditional military missions and hybrid civil-military structures, without losing critical military capabilities.

Col. Alexey Telichkin and Petro Kanana explain Ukrainian civil-military partnership in the article “Ukraine’s Military Model.” The authors write about how the constitution restricts the armed forces to countering external military threats and limits the military’s role to supporting government agencies inside the Ukraine. Other forces, such as Civil Defense Troops, Internal Troops and rapid reaction police, have been established to respond to security and civil emergencies inside the country.

Marshall Center professor Dr. John Clarke discusses the difficulties that European nations are having in developing security forces that will perform homeland security tasks and support civil authorities in response to natural disasters. Politicians have looked to the military to carry out these critical operations and coordinate with civilian security institutions more closely. He highlights the Italian political-military partnership as one positive example. Italy has a military tradition of cooperation with civilian institutions and laws that are well-established to allow interaction. He details historical examples of how Italian armed forces’ capabilities supported civilian authorities in extraordinary or emergency cases.

Mr. Cristian Ionus writes in “Progress in Police Cooperation” about how police and civilian cooperation in Southeastern Europe has increased because of the establishment of the Regional Center for Combating Trans-border Crime. He describes the challenges in stopping crime in the Balkans, the nuances of cooperation among the many nations and the future of cooperative security operations in the region.

The next two issues of *per Concordiam* will focus on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and how cyber security is impacting Eurasia. Submissions on these themes from Marshall Center alumni, security and government leaders, and scholars with an interest in defense and security issues in Europe and Eurasia are encouraged. The editorial staff looks forward to your contributions and recommendations, which will ensure relevant issues are addressed in *per Concordiam*.

We seek your feedback and welcome your dialogue on important security issues. This journal is available online on the Marshall Center website:
http://tinyurl.com/per-concordiam-magazine

— *per Concordiam* editorial staff
Thanks very much for the first issue of *per Concordiam*. It is very interesting and there are useful articles. I recommended it to my friends. I used different articles in the seminars we had at the Armenian General Staff. I wish you success in your work, and wish to receive future issues.

Col. Varden Hovhannisyan, Armenian Armed Forces, alumni of George C. Marshall Center, graduate of PASS and PTSS

Several days ago I received the *per Concordiam* free inaugural issue. I read it and found [some] interesting articles which I think will help me in my future career development and scientific studies. I would like to express my gratitude for the great honor to have the magazine and to read all the publications included as I truly believe they are very important for the future development of the world.

Lt. Col. Petko Petkov, Bulgarian Air Force, alumni of George C. Marshall Center, graduate of PASS

I just had the pleasure of reading your first edition of *per Concordiam* and was very much impressed with the graphics, photos, timely content, and varied sources of opinions and thoughts. Great job!

Alumni of George C. Marshall Center, attended Senior Executive Seminar

I just printed out the first two editions. This looks like a really great journal. Great layouts, excellent spread of authors from throughout Europe and great illustrations. The other key attribute that I really appreciate is that the journal is covering topics that barely get a mention over here [United States of America] in the regular press as you can appreciate... I like to see these types of topics covered. The inclusion of the article on Emergency Management by Col. Sapon is a great example of how others from all parts of the world have much to contribute on many subjects. Nicely done!

Editor-in-Chief of a security journal


This contest is open to current students and Marshall Center alumni. The essay should identify the paramount task to be accomplished as NATO moves toward 2020. Contest participants should discuss the challenges and opportunities that lie ahead for NATO and its partners as the organization adapts to an evolving and complex world, identifying the critical task to be addressed to ensure success.

Through its policies and actions, NATO has sought to forge itself a zone of security, peace and relative prosperity in a world that is more tumultuous and uncertain than it was in 1999, when the previous Strategic Concept was adopted. The Alliance seeks to remain a cornerstone of stability in the Euro-Atlantic region through fostering political cohesion, commitment to mutual defense and wide-ranging capabilities. Over the past two decades, NATO has successfully integrated 12 new members from Central and Eastern Europe, developed vital new partnerships, and taken on a number of missions that contribute daily to its own security and that of the world.

OFFICIAL RULES

- **Eligibility**: Entrants must be current students or alumni of the Marshall Center.
- **Format**: Entries must be presented in the format of a persuasive essay (Associated Press style), between 1,000 and 3,000 words using a 12-point font with double spacing, and include notes and bibliography (not included in the word count).
- **Topic**: Security Challenges for 2020: What Will NATO Do?
- **Research**: Please cite library resources, Web URLs with access dates and interviews with professionals. Please use the notes and bibliography style of citation in the Chicago Manual of Style.
- **Entries**: Must be submitted to editor@perconcordiam.org and must be received by 17:00 CET on May 1, 2011.
- **Evaluation Procedure**: Three winning essays will be selected on the following criteria: originality and creativity; logical presentation of language, civility, accuracy, brevity and clarity.
- **Articles**: Entries must be original contributions. If your article or similar version is under consideration by another publication, or was published elsewhere, tell us when submitting the article to us. If you have a manuscript to submit but are not sure it’s right for the quarterly, e-mail us to ask if we’re interested.
- **E-mail manuscripts as Microsoft Word attachments to: editor@perconcordiam.org**
Building Strategic Connections
Early investment pays future dividends

Adm. James Stavridis, Commander of U.S. European Command

George C. Marshall, U.S. Secretary of State from 1947 to 1949, was a visionary when it came to understanding the necessity for a “whole of society” approach to solving complex security challenges. In his famous speech to the graduating class at Harvard University in June 1947, Marshall proclaimed the purpose of the European Recovery Plan “should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist.”

With these few words, Marshall highlighted the direct linkages between economic prosperity and political and social security. Details of the State Department-sponsored European Recovery Plan, which later became known as the Marshall Plan, specified coordinated interaction between disparate parts of government, including political, military and economic, with the goal of social improvement and the reconstruction of war-torn Europe. The Marshall Plan was a major mechanism that began healing the “European family,” and its legacy is instructive for today’s challenges and the need for political-military partnership.

Marshall is perhaps the ultimate embodiment of political-military partnership because he personally served at senior levels on both sides of that partnership.

The Marshall Plan offers important lessons for today’s policymakers. Many of the challenges faced in today’s globalized world also require something beyond a “whole of government” approach, namely a “whole of society” response that unites national and local governments, international governing bodies, nongovernmental organizations, private organizations and academia, not just in purpose and resolve but, more importantly, in capabilities that complement one another.

Military operations cover the entire spectrum from peace and stability operations to war, but nonmilitary activities also take place across this spectrum and beyond. Regardless of the exact circumstances and desired outcome, whether event- or interest-driven, there will always be a varied mix of required capabilities across the full spectrum of possibilities to achieve overall goals.

Rarely can one organization tackle complex scenarios alone because it usually lacks some requisite expertise, capability or capacity in personnel, resources or logistics — which means some part of the goal set will be deficient and not achieve comprehensive effect. Rather, each entity relies on others, to differing degrees, to assist in realizing an all-inclusive end state.

If history teaches us anything, it is the need to embrace partners from across government, throughout the international community and even in the private sector. In the face of the broad scope of possible scenarios, our efforts must be appropriately tailored with a response capability that capitalizes on each organization’s core competencies and becomes “Stronger Together” when partnered with complementary capabilities.

Therefore, the key is to ensure partnerships, or strategic connections, are actively and purposefully cultivated and stabilized.
long before an urgent need arises. Over time, these initial connections will forge stronger bonds between the actors and translate into increased capacity.

The strategic connection of people, organizations and resources is valuable at multiple levels. In the building process, it fosters communication and dialogue that leads to better cooperation, trust and preparedness. In time of need, pre-established connections avoid squandering critical time to determine organizational competencies when that time could be better focused on the urgencies of the event. In essence, the time for building partnerships is now, before a response is required.

In many instances, responders must react with speed and agility, and discovery learning is poor practice when urgency is a premium. After a crisis begins, it is simply too late to establish connections and begin interacting and planning with partners. Great ideas and capabilities developed or discovered too late are of little value. Therefore, we need to capture promising ideas and innovative technologies, expand linkages, and do the weighty thinking, planning and exercising together today, so we can work together better tomorrow.

These connections allow disparate organizations to come together, share ideas, build trust, gain appreciation for each other’s capabilities and foresee the power of working together with resolve. Effective strategic connections must align in purpose and with great consideration for the differing, but complementary, capabilities each organization offers. There must be considerable effort devoted to gaining an appreciation for each entity’s resident capabilities and limitations and its ability to deliver those capabilities in a synergistic all-inclusive manner that is more powerful than the individual parts.

It is important to note that militaries, though very capable and generally agile, are seldom the only organizations designed to respond to events, especially on the lower end of the scale of military operations. For instance, in the aftermath of the recent flooding in Pakistan, relief supplies, medical and veterinary professionals, and engineers flowed from government and nongovernmental agencies to succor victims and restore critical infrastructure. However, to get those supplies and people to remote areas cut off from transportation networks required the unique equipment, personnel and training resident in militaries. The swiftness with which this occurred was due in large part to strategic connections made prior to the floods. It also spotlights the soundness of early investment in strategic connections between political and military partners and their nongovernmental colleagues—all made in the spirit of the Marshall Plan.

The Marshall Plan was a thoughtful and well-executed enterprise whose lessons still reverberate and serve as a beacon of light guiding us to maintain and enhance security in a globalized world through political-military partnerships. It remains a strong example of how the weight of effort across the range of “whole of society” responses is dynamic and requires the core expertise of many players in order to achieve comprehensive effects in a world fraught with encroachments to peace and prosperity. □

"Many of the challenges faced in today’s globalized world also require something beyond a “whole of government” approach, namely a “whole of society” response that unites national and local governments, international governing bodies, nongovernmental organizations, private organizations and academia, not just in purpose and resolve but, more importantly, in capabilities that complement one another."

1 As described by Winston Churchill in his postwar speech to the academic youth in Zurich, Switzerland, on September 19, 1946.
Reader feedback is important to *per Concordiam*. The magazine editorial staff obtains feedback through various methods, including surveys and interviews. Our staff conducted a survey over several weeks in the winter of 2009 using in-person interviews at the Marshall Center and online surveys. The information collected in those surveys will be used to develop and refine *per Concordiam* to provide the most relevant and useful content possible.

Individual interviews were conducted with 30 students in attendance at the center. Additionally, 900 alumni completed an online survey. These surveys asked about a variety of topics relating to the presentation and content of *per Concordiam*. Interviewees and survey respondents were from throughout Eurasia, representing all branches of government.

When asked about their interest in certain topics, respondents rated topics related to regional influence most highly. Forty-seven percent of the respondents rated this topic as “highly” interesting. The topic of corruption was rated second, with 37 percent of respondents indicating high interest in the topic. Respondents also indicated a high interest in economics and organized crime.

*Per Concordiam* magazine is a format for fostering collaborative relationships among partner nations in Europe and Eurasia. Accordingly, we are interested in our readers’ views on areas of potential collaboration. Respondents identified several important areas for collaboration, including economic development, information technology development, information sharing, strategic security issues, international crime and terrorism, education, social and political issues, border conflicts and minority/immigrant integration.

It was also apparent that the respondents have a nuanced and integrative view of defense issues. Respondents typically identified and showed concern for the links between poor governance, corruption, trans-regional crime and terrorism. Additionally, a majority of respondents expressed concern about vulnerability to terrorist acts within their countries. The majority of respondents across all regions reported that their nations were actively taking steps to counter violent extremist recruiting, funding and propaganda.

In the spirit of collaboration, publishing contributions from our readers is an important aspect of developing *per Concordiam*. The findings of this survey and future surveys will help the editorial staff of *per Concordiam* develop content that is appropriate and interesting to readers. Among those who responded to the survey, the majority (67.4 percent) indicated that they would be willing to submit content for inclusion in the magazine. In other words, 490 audience members have already agreed in principle to submit magazine content. Similarly, 56 percent of respondents indicated a willingness to be interviewed by magazine staff. Respondents that reported they would not be willing to contribute often noted that a lack of time, expertise or authorization from a superior would most likely prevent them from actively participating. The *per Concordiam* staff will carefully review and consider all reader submissions and work with the authors to develop content that is relevant and professional. The *per Concordiam* staff strongly encourages and welcomes reader submissions for publication in the magazine.
900 alumni completed an online survey

67.4% of respondents indicated that they would be willing to submit content for the magazine. In other words, 490 audience members have already agreed in principle to submit content.

56% of respondents indicated a willingness to be interviewed by magazine staff.

Topics per Concordiam readers find “highly interesting”

- Regional Influence: 47%
- Corruption: 37%
- Economics, Organized Crime, Other: 16%
A Hungarian police officer guards a street covered in toxic red sludge in Devecser, Hungary, in October 2010. The disaster sparked cooperation between the police and the military.
ne would be hard pressed to find a discussion involving Western defense institutions, missions and concepts that does not use terms such as "comprehensive approach" and "whole-of-government" to identify the need for a more thorough integration of civilian and military aspects of security. Indeed, the belief that security requires a more thorough combination of defense, diplomacy and development functions has grown into a kind of grand Western consensus. The European Union’s steps to craft a more integrated security architecture, NATO’s support for a more comprehensive approach in its latest strategic concept, and the U.S. efforts to forge more integrated reconstruction and stabilization capacity are three highly visible examples of a search for the right relationship between military and civilian security instruments. It is a search that has become a kind of holy grail for the Euro-Atlantic security community.

Like the legendary grail search, however, institutionalizing a more holistic and integrated mix of such a diverse range of military, police, economic development, governance building, and rule-of-law planning and operational capacities has proven elusive. Below the surface of a growing agreement on the importance of comprehensive approaches and integrated civil-military solutions, strong disagreement remains over the civil-military roles, responsibilities and relationships required to make this more holistic vision of security a functioning reality. Two of the most visible examples of this dilemma can be seen in the ongoing efforts to forge more comprehensive security approaches in the U.S. and EU. These efforts, of course, are divergent — one involves an individual state with well-developed national security institutions; the other involves a collection of states attempting to forge new and unique security structures. Nevertheless, the two projects serve to demonstrate the basic problem underlying all such civil-military integration: the degree to which it is possible for modern militaries to focus more broadly on nontraditional military missions and integrate more thoroughly in hybrid civil-military structures without losing their essential and critical military attributes. It is a dilemma defined by two competing positions: military purists arguing for a military that focuses on traditional combat functions and maintains clear functional distinction from civilian security practitioners versus military pragmatists, who concede a role for military forces in nontraditional security and development, and accept a good deal of integration with civilian practitioners in these areas. The inability in both the U.S. and the EU to reconcile these two conflicting positions has remained a principal obstacle to the continued development and adoption of a more complete comprehensive-approach model. Until such reconciliation — or at least a satisfactory balance — can be achieved, purists on both sides of the Atlantic will continue to stall the march toward more integrative civil-military concepts and structures.

A LONG-STANDING DEBATE

Though the comprehensive-approach aspirations that have caused tensions in many contemporary civil-military relations may be novel, the debate between purist and pragmatist conceptions of civil-military organization and purpose is long-standing. The purist view, initially and most comprehensively articulated in 1957 by Samuel Huntington,1 argues for a clear separation between military and civilian functional domains as a means of ensuring military effectiveness, on the one hand, and civilian control of the military, on the other. The separation is especially necessary in liberal democracies, where values and decision-making are highly antithetical to the exigencies of privation, danger and uncertainty faced in combat. Only discipline and the cultivation of a core set of mission-supportive military values could provide a foundation that military professionals would need to be successful in this environment. Any detraction from this focus, any attempt to integrate civilian and military domains, would dilute military effectiveness. Thus, when civilians grant military professionals the independent autonomy to cultivate their profession according to the dictates of combat, civilian leaders can expect in return both an effective military instrument and one so singularly steeped in the classic conservatism of military values that it would not be capable of effectively vying for power in a liberal democracy.2 In this way, Huntington argued, separation and distinction breed effectiveness and obedience.

The pragmatist perspective, best outlined in Morris Janowitz’s 1960 rejoinder to Huntington,3 contends that the modern security environment has made the circumscription of military functions to traditional combat tasks impossible. Moreover, militaries, like other national instruments, should be rationally focused on an ultimate political objective and rendering service to the nation based on context and need rather than overly defined boundaries. Janowitz and the pragmatists had drawn dramatically different lessons from the conditions of the Cold War. The specter of nuclear holocaust, rather than emphasize
the necessity of a military readiness, had significantly curtailed the likelihood of major conflict. In its place were numerous smaller, nontraditional conflicts and policing actions that required militaries to be prepared for a broader array of constabulary functions. As Janowitz argued, this new constabulary force was “continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force and viable international relations rather than [traditional military] victory.” This meant that civilian political control would not be achieved through a Huntington-style bargain in which military autonomy in a distinct sphere of expertise was exchanged for uncompromising loyalty to ends-focused civilian direction. Instead, civilian control would be assured when civilians and military professionals possessed a deep degree of understanding for the roles, responsibilities, commitments and obligations of the other. As Janowitz described it, the military officer “is amenable to civilian political control because he recognizes that civilians appreciate and understand the tasks and responsibilities of the constabulary force.”

Thus, rather than define the boundaries of the military domain in terms of what militaries do, namely waging traditional combat, pragmatists define the military domain in terms of the unique service role that militaries play in society and the dangerous conditions within which that role is performed. What ensures civilian control of the military is not separation but a thorough embrace of shared societal values, mutual understanding and common democratic commitment. Though one can find traces of this debate across a variety of examples, the focus here will be on two recent cases in which rhetoric for more comprehensive civil-military integration has brought competing visions of civil-military organization into stark relief.

THE EU APPROACH

European Security and Defense Policy, or ESDP, renamed the Common Security and Defense Policy by the Lisbon Treaty, is an interesting case for its attempt to construct wholly new security structures expressly focused on delivering a unique civil-military capability, with integrated security, rule of law, policing, civilian administration and civilian protection functions. The EU would have an added advantage in being able to construct these comprehensive-approach-focused security institutions from whole cloth. There were no pre-existing institutions that would have to be bent toward more integrative designs. As argued by Javier Solana, former EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, this “distinctive civil-military approach to crisis management ... was ahead of its time when conceived.” Nevertheless, this hybrid focus would also serve only to highlight the split between purist and pragmatist perspectives. Moreover, unlike such internal civil-military debates in the U.S. and elsewhere, the purist-pragmatist split in the EU would take on the additional difficulty of playing in a multi-state environment in which purist and pragmatist methods of civil-military organization became increasingly identified with competing national interests.

Born from a 1998 compromise between Britain and France, ESDP would be defined by two competing visions of how to make ambitious comprehensive-approach aspirations an institutional and operational reality. In one vision, that of France, ESDP would need a relatively autonomous operational capacity for the military instrument and a standing operational headquarters that could provide command and control to deployed forces. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, remained unconvinced of the need to build such an autonomous military structure. If the logic of ESDP was as a crisis management and prevention tool, requiring a balance of civilian and military competencies, there was no need to construct a military capability distinct from the other aspects of the institution. For Britain, an independent military operational headquarters was unnecessary in an organization focused on delivering integrated security. A clear split developed between more purist models of military organization and function, championed by France, and more pragmatist-inspired models, promoted by the U.K.

There are a number of possible reasons for this persistent disagreement. The most apparent is the political split between Britain and France over the role of ESDP regarding NATO. France saw ESDP as an opportunity to gain European independence and strategic flexibility from NATO. Without a military instrument capable of performing independent traditional defense tasks, such flexibility would be dramatically limited. This limitation informed France’s desire to develop a standing operational headquarters, without which ESDP would have to rely either on individual member states or NATO to forward deploy any sizable security force. Nevertheless, Britain recognized an independent EU military capability as a duplication of and direct challenge to the defense responsibilities of NATO. Demanding the integration of civil-military instruments in line with ESDP’s stated comprehensive-approach purpose. In this explanation, a simple political contest between Britain and France explained the disagreement over how to make ESDP operational. Luis Simon of the EU Institute for Security Studies described the disagreement this way: “It’s the politics, stupid.”

In other explanations, however, the disagreement was not simply a matter of national interests and political positioning. Instead, Britain and France based their positions on clear distinctions in each country’s historically and socially generated view of the civil-military relationship. According to Per M. Norheim-Martinsen, the British position of a more thorough civil-military integration is best explained by a security culture that has long embraced close ministerial cooperation. Nevertheless, “the E.U.’s civil-military organization [came …] to resemble the French ‘Huntingtonian’ system of strict separation, and its fairly conservative approach to civil-military coordination in general.” Given the French constabulary tradition, the country isn’t completely resistant to holistic or comprehensive security solutions. For France, political interests, constabulary history and civil-military proclivities contribute to the view that, rather than
civilian-military integration, a “strong and autonomous military instrument is crucial for an effective comprehensive approach to crisis management.” Thus, the emerging question has been whether to pursue a comprehensive approach through civil-military integration or the selective application of each instrument’s unique capabilities within separate spheres of responsibility. At the heart of this dilemma is Huntington’s argument that a strong military and an autonomous military are invariably linked, making civil-military integration irreconcilable with traditional military effectiveness and unacceptable for those states whose defense insecurities and national interests require the latter.

Whatever the explanation, the disagreement created a schizophrenic ESDP institutional design that has failed to either realize or reject the competing visions of military autonomy and civil-military integration. Though the Nice European Council Meeting of 2000 set to create structures that would “ensure synergy between the civilian and military aspects of crisis management,” there was no formal civilian-military relationship or coordinating mechanism created below the very senior level of the Political Security Committee. This relative segregation of the military and civilian aspects of ESDP was further exacerbated by the clear and decisive resource advantages of the military component over its civilian counterpart. Below the PSC level in the defense directorate, for instance, the European Union Military Committee was supported by a European Union Military Staff consisting of 140 experienced planners. By contrast, the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, or CIVCOM, initially enjoyed no such staff support.

The organizational history of ESDP, from Nice forward, has been one of iterative political negotiation and compromise to correct these dual faults of institutional segregation and civil-military resource disparity. For instance, the Swedish presidency in 2001 added a police unit to staff and plan civilian police missions. Nevertheless, this unit included only eight officers and was attached to the Council Secretariat, where its relationship with CIVCOM remained uncertain. In response to poor support for the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a 20-person civilian support section was added in 2003, but this was a small step compared with the planning capability that existed on the military side. Finally, in 2003, the U.K., Italy and the Netherlands, on the one hand, and France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg, on the other, brokered a compromise on the debate over a standing operational military headquarters. The negotiated solution was the establishment of a civilian-military operations cell within the EU Military Staff. France got improved planning, command and control, while Britain ensured the cell bore the title “civ-mil” and resided in the military staff. This integration with the military staff meant that it was quickly dominated by the military and largely isolated from the civilian staff in the Council Secretariat.

Significant improvements in civilian planning and staffing capacity did not begin in earnest until 2007. In that year, the addition of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability gave the civilian side of ESDP a measure of parity in staffing and planning resources. Movement toward a more thorough integration of the civilian and military components began a year later, when, in December 2008, the European Council agreed with Solana’s recommendation to unite ESDP civilian and military structures below the PSC level in the form of the new Crisis Management Planning Directorate. Ratification of the Lisbon Treaty followed in 2009. The treaty sought to meld foreign policy by uniting EU Council and EU Commission efforts under a common High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Previous divisions had created an ambiguous line between security, which was controlled by the council, and development, which was the purview of the commission. Nevertheless, in part because the Lisbon Treaty has also directed a continued level of independence for the development function, plans to unite these structures remain a topic for further political negotiation.

Thus, far from being the immediate comprehensive solution for which many had hoped, ESDP was plagued by a persistent inability to define to everyone’s satisfaction the civil-military roles and relationships at the heart of the project. National disagreements over how to organize the delivery of civilian and military functions reflected a purist-pragmatist split over the degree to which military autonomy, mission distinction and institutional separation should be maintained in an age of more multifaceted threats and challenges. These questions and disputes have not been unique to ESDP.
**THE U.S. APPROACH**

Within the U.S., this question of civil-military integration is closely wedded to the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Early in these conflicts, observers were quick to criticize the U.S. for an overly purist approach to the military’s role in mixed competency missions such as those found in reconstruction and stabilization efforts. Writing about the 2003 invasion of Iraq and its aftermath, Robert Egnell found that the civil-military separation principles in the U.S. Army generally resulted in a force not well-suited, or particularly inclined, to integrate with civilian reconstruction and development efforts in the stability and support phase of the operation. Conversely, the British military forces, though not as effective as the Americans in the initial combat phases of the invasion, were able to draw on more pragmatist traditions of civilian-military cooperation and constabulary duties to provide for a more seamless transition from combat to stability and support.

Though this purist penchant for a military focused on exclusively military objectives has been viewed by some as an integral part of American strategic culture, the ongoing conflicts in both Iraq and Afghanistan have wrought major changes in this perspective among U.S. security practitioners. In 2005, National Security Presidential Directive 44 named the Secretary of State, through the newly formed Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, as the lead entity for integrating U.S. government efforts in the stability and reconstruction domain. This is accompanied by an ongoing effort to establish a 4,200-person Civilian Response Corps covering fields such as rule of law, agriculture, governance and economic development. If the U.S. State Department was taking steps to shore up its stability and reconstruction capacity, the Defense Department entered this effort at a full sprint. Some of the more visible efforts included the establishment of a directive elevating stability operations to a level on par with traditional combat operations; the publication of new doctrines in counterinsurgency and stability operations that emphasized political and developmental aspects of these missions; and securing new funding to aid the developmental activities of military commanders. On the one hand, the pace of change and capability development was impressive for a typically slow-to-move security establishment. On the other hand, the convert’s zeal by which the U.S. security community has embraced comprehensive-approach ideals has not resulted in any broad consensus on some of the most pressing and inveterate questions at the civil-military interface.

As the U.S. military has moved to adopt a more pragmatist interpretation of providing national security, this has prompted worries that the purist-pragmatist pendulum had swung too far. Indeed, by 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates and key members of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee worried publicly about the potential of a “creeping militarization” of U.S. foreign policy, as the Defense Department was increasingly asked to broaden its role to include economic development, policing and nation building. At the same time, military observers began to fear that the more expansive mission-set of the U.S. military was undermining traditional combat effectiveness, especially of ground forces. For instance, U.S. Army Col. Gian Gentile has worried “that fighting as a core competency [of the U.S. Army] has been eclipsed in importance and primacy by the function of nation building” and that the U.S. was courting “strategic peril as a result.”
In both the EU and U.S. examples, military institutions and their security-sector civilian overseers and colleagues have remained unable to arrive at an acceptable consensus on the purist-pragmatist question. Multifaceted, nontraditional challenges, from stability and support missions to countering transnational threats, have created a groundswell of efforts to forge more comprehensive civil-military approaches to security. However, the issue of how to forge a fuller civil-military partnership without compromising civilian control of security policy or undermining military effectiveness has emerged as a primary dilemma. Purists on both sides of the Atlantic argue for clearer separation of military and civilian responsibilities and a narrower defense focus for militaries, while pragmatists maintain that the scope and scale of security challenges make such separation unachievable and even irresponsible.

The basic tension framing the debate is the fundamental difference in threat perception between the two sides. Just as original purists rejected the notion that the threat of nuclear holocaust forestalled the possibility of conventional combat in the Cold War, today’s purists, like many international affairs realists, dismiss the idea that globalization and interdependence have dramatically reduced the prospect of conventional military conflict. Continuing to see traditional defense capabilities as an essential power projection tool and a necessary hedge against potential military threats, purists in both the EU and the U.S. have fought hard to keep defense capacity from being watered down by hybridization and civilianization. Contemporary pragmatists, of course, disagree with this threat assessment, arguing it is best to prepare defense and security institutions for the most likely challenges visible today. These challenges include failed states, international terrorism and crime, trafficking, mass migration, climate change and other nontraditional drivers of conflict that might require “hybrid defense” and well-synchronized civilian institutions.

Though in the Euro-Atlantic sphere, it has been fashionable to equate the U.S. with one position — the purist — and Europeans with the other position — the pragmatist — recent debates in both the U.S. and Europe reveal a more complicated picture. Indeed, as one begins to weigh the likelihood and potential consequences of future threats compared with forms of civil-military organization and capacities that might best account for them, it is more likely true that security actors in the U.S. and Europe find themselves serving both purist and pragmatist roles. This much more confused and complicated picture makes it even more unlikely that this enduring disagreement has a decisive resolution.

With no clear victor in sight, the most promising solution might be to look for ways in which both perspectives and organizational forms can be accommodated simultaneously. Given declining defense budgets, this will be difficult. However, if solutions like collective security, burden sharing and niche specialization can be brought to this require-

4. Janowitz, 418.
5. Janowitz, 440.
12. Presidency Conclusions: Nice European Council Meeting, Annex VI.
15. For more on the challenges associated with this division of responsibility, see Christopher Hillion and Ramesh Vessel, "Competence Distribution in EU External Relations after ECOVAS Clarification or Continued Fuzziness," Common Market Law Review, 46 (2009), 551-566.
17. According to Eliot Cohen, for instance, the American military’s embrace of strict civilian-military separation was a part of the Vietnam legacy, one in which the war became a symbol of the perks associated with civilian meddling in the business of war-making: Eliot Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime, (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 2002).
21. Although it is important to note that Morris Janowitz himself never argued for military hybridization. For Janowitz, the increasing overlap between military and civilian activities did not supplant the uniqueness of the military’s role to perform these activities under conditions of extreme danger directed in service to the state.
22. The most recent French Defense white paper emphasizes the need for a strategy to leverage limited resources to account for a fuller-spectrum of traditional and nontraditional threats. Défense et Sécurité nationale, Le Livre Blanc, (Odile Jacob: La Documentation Francaise, June 2008).
Military rescue experts from Turkey (orange) and Grèce (blue) participate in a joint disaster relief drill simulating an earthquake in Athens in 2008.
The increase in terrorist attacks and natural disasters has expanded the requirements on security forces throughout Europe. States have been hard-pressed to develop and equip security forces that can perform the multitude of tasks required to maintain a high level of homeland defense, while standing ready to respond to natural and manmade catastrophes. At a time of severe budget limitations, political leaders often seek creative ways to leverage existing organizations to do new things. In many instances, European leaders have looked to their armed forces to carry out key tasks. 

This article examines the range of domestic tasks to which military forces in many European countries have been assigned and highlights some observations on operational trends and the impacts they may have on armed forces and their public image. It is, perhaps, understandable that decision-makers turn to the military. Military forces bring many assets to these challenges: They are well-organized, trained, mobile, well-equipped — and available. In many countries, there is a well-established tradition in using military forces to support civil authorities, particularly law enforcement, a tradition that includes a broad range of homeland security and civil support tasks. It is not unusual to find military forces conducting tasks that are only remotely related to their assigned combat missions.

Moreover, the guiding principle that military forces must bring a unique capability to the task has been overshadowed by the fact of sheer availability and the perception that they are a free good: In many instances, armed forces are not reimbursed for the costs they incur while deployed domestically. The public perception is often that Soldiers are sitting in their barracks waiting for something to do, which is hardly the case with professional armies today. The guiding principle that military forces should be used only when civil services are unable to deal with a situation has, in some instances, been replaced by a predilection to employ armies as a first resort.

EUROPE’S MILITARY IN ACTION

European states have a rich history of employing military forces in domestic emergencies. Each country has a different tradition, each has different national security organizations and strategies, and each has different perceptions of the threats and challenges to its domestic security. Each nation approaches these challenges differently, reflecting its unique history and the status of the armed forces in that state. For example, given its history, Germany takes a fundamentally different approach to this issue than does France.

The European tradition of employing armed forces domestically is well established. European militaries have acted with great frequency in a broad range of functions in response to crises and other events when called upon by national authorities. Whether the requirement is securing borders, supporting law enforcement or providing disaster relief, the armies of Europe have responded and acquitted themselves well in nearly all instances.

In the domestic context, there are essentially two mission sets: homeland defense and civil support. Homeland defense is the traditional task of defending the population, infrastructure and sovereignty of a nation against threats arising from outside of the state. This may involve tasks such as border defense (as differentiated from border security), air defense, and defense of maritime approaches.

Most military forces in Western Europe were designed to defend the homeland in the event of a Warsaw Pact attack; their organization and equipment bear witness to this. For example, Germany had large numbers of armored forces and great numbers of reserve forces; both have nearly disappeared in the post–Cold War period. The forces that remain were mostly restructured for deployments abroad in peace-support operations. In addition, their numbers have dwindled. Most European countries have active force establishments that are a fraction of their Cold War strength, which prompts the question: Is homeland defense still a core mission?
Besides homeland defense, European military forces are heavily involved in the second homeland mission, civil support. Civil support tasks are those undertaken in support of civil authority, with responsibility and overall command remaining with that civil authority. These tasks include assistance to local authorities in the event of disasters, and support to law enforcement authorities for select missions. They may also include actions taken by the military to restore law, order and stability in the aftermath of a catastrophe or an insurrection. Such operations may involve both active and reserve forces as well as some specialized capabilities, such as airborne radar for border surveillance. In every event, the key is that civilians remain in control.

Each state in Europe has a different tradition in this regard. The most notable example of employing armed forces domestically is the United Kingdom, with its deployment in Northern Ireland. This massive deployment, which continues today on a much smaller scale, is singular in that it represented a deployment of the army in a domestic counterinsurgency role, unique in the postwar European experience.

Other states have also experienced significant deployments of armed forces within their borders, ranging from border security tasks (Italy, 1960 and 1995; Austria 1995-present) to providing essential services during labor unrest (firefighting in the U.K., 2002; replacing striking transit workers in France, 1988) to providing security against organized criminal groups (Italy, 1992). The protection and security of key installations, such as government buildings, may also fall to military forces, along with assisting with security at major events, such as the Olympic Games (Greece, 2004) and G-8 summits (Italy, 2009).

European armed forces have frequently been called into action for disaster relief and humanitarian actions — during floods, for example (Germany, 1995 and 2002; Austria, 2006). Similar employments are the nearly annual deployments of French and Greek armed forces to assist in fighting forest fires and avalanche rescue support (Austria, 1999) and rescuing illegal immigrants at sea (Italy, Spain, France and Malta).

**LEGAL CONSTRAINTS**

The employment of armed forces in a domestic emergency can be controversial — and it has constraints, particularly legal ones. Very few constitutions in Europe specifically authorize armies to carry out law enforcement tasks. Very few European countries have explicit bars (such as the Posse Comitatus Act in the United States) to armed forces carrying out, for example, law enforcement operations. In many countries, such as the U.K., longstanding political and legal customs determine the armies’ employment. Some, such as Italy, have laws that specifically authorize Soldiers to carry out police functions. Others, such as France, embed the authority to call out the army in the president as commander in chief for both domestic and foreign emergencies. And there are cases like Germany, whose history resulted in a constitution with many barriers to the domestic employment of armed forces.

As a rule, most legal considerations involve constitutional authorization for the employment of Soldiers to act in two sets of circumstances: disaster relief and riot control. Beyond such instances, some countries, such as Italy, have instituted laws or decrees that allow a broader range of employment.

Most legal constructions are unable to anticipate the range of challenges that decision-makers face, and thus the laws must be artfully interpreted to allow the use of armed forces. And there may be circumstances so overwhelming, or dire, that forces are called out despite legal encumbrances. In these instances, the public perception may dictate what, if any, legal action may be taken against those who decide to use the army. But these instances are rare: For example, no U.S. president has ever been called to task for using the U.S. Army in spite of the posse comitatus restrictions.

**HOMELAND SECURITY FORCES**

European countries have a wide variety of military and paramilitary forces available to support civil authorities. These may range from conscript infantry units to highly trained special operations forces. Despite the post–Cold War drawdown, which resulted in a much-diminished active and reserve force structure in many states, significant numbers of troops remain, many of which are not eligible for overseas deployment because of national legislation.

These active forces, principally army ground forces, represent the bulk of forces available to decision-makers in a crisis. Assuming they are not currently deployed or preparing for imminent deployment, they are able to respond to a call for assistance. However, there is an opportunity cost involved, in that these forces, when deployed domestically, are not able to carry out their homeland defense tasks or prepare for other contingencies.
Unlike the U.S., where the principal military forces available to political leaders is the National Guard (a reserve military formation), most European countries lack substantial reserve forces, and those that are available require long lead times for mobilization. Thus, active forces become the only option.

In addition to conventional military units, many countries possess paramilitary police units, such as France’s Gendarmerie and Italy’s Carabinieri, which are well-suited for many homeland security tasks, particularly civil support missions. They are usually highly mobile, well-trained and equipped and, perhaps more important, well-versed in law enforcement and public security roles. They are also quite large: In France and Italy, for example, they rival the active army forces in size.6

**THE ITALIAN EXAMPLE**

Italy has a long history of engaging its military forces in domestic emergencies. The relative ease with which successive Italian governments have turned to the military to carry out safety and security tasks makes Italy an ideal case study for determining the extent to which European governments may see military forces as acceptable substitutes for properly constituted security forces. Italian governments have not hesitated to use Soldiers to carry out domestic security tasks and, in some cases, endow those Soldiers with special police functions and powers.7

Italian armed forces have participated in a broad range of civil support operations since the end of World War II, ranging from protecting key facilities and critical infrastructure to providing relief in natural catastrophes. Since 1992, but particularly since 2001, the Italian armed forces’ role has expanded significantly, and the Italian military now undertakes a greater range of domestic security tasks than any other European country.

Italy does not use the homeland security concept per se, but rather employs a concept known as presence and surveillance. This has three operational domains: territorial defense, disaster relief and territorial control. The first two correspond to the U.S. concept of homeland defense and civil support, but the third, territorial control, has no exact U.S. equivalent. Many of the Italian military’s postwar domestic operations have been conducted under this rubric, which envisions Italian military forces conducting law enforcement–like activities.

Italian law envisages the military as a full partner in many kinds of domestic contingencies. Under the law that established the agency for civilian protection (225/92), the armed forces are designated as the operational branch of the national civil protection service. While this organization is primarily concerned with coordinating Italy’s response to disasters, it has become increasingly involved in working with security organizations to enhance public security.

This history includes the stationing of thousands of Italian Soldiers in the South Tirol in the 1960s in response to the separatist terror campaign designed to restore that territory to Austria. These Soldiers carried out missions to protect critical infrastructure, such as power lines, and helped seal the border with Austria to prevent cross-border infiltration. Soldiers performed similar functions in the 1970s throughout Italy to secure facilities such as rail infrastructure against possible attacks by the Brigade Rosse, or Red Brigades, terrorist group.

Likewise, Italian Army units have been active in disaster relief in earthquake-prone regions of Italy. Most notable was the Vajont Dam disaster in 1963, in which over 3,000 people died, and the earthquake in Friuli in 1976, which killed 1,000 and left more than 150,000 homeless.

In 1992, acting in response to the murders of two Italian prosecutors fighting the Mafia in Sicily, the Italian government decided to reinforce the law enforcement presence by deploying nearly 10,000 Soldiers to Sicily in an operation called Vespri Siciliani. This operation employed Soldiers throughout Sicily to conduct territorial control operations, including surveillance, patrols, checkpoints and infrastructure security. The operation concluded in 1998. Over six years, the army checked nearly 1 million people and 665,000 vehicles and arrested 1,225. During this time, all 19 brigades of the Italian Army were deployed to Sicily on a 60-day rotational cycle. During this operation, the average strength of the army in Sicily was about 6,000.

Significantly, for this operation, Soldiers were designated “public security agents” by act of Parliament, entrusting them with law enforcement powers, including the authority to detain and arrest suspects. This enabled army units to act independently of police and Carabinieri units. At the same time, it required significant training for Soldiers to carry out police functions, particularly with regard to the use of force. Italian law contemplates three categories for law enforcement agents: full police authority, public security agency, and a reduced public security function. Soldiers employed in Vespri Siciliani enjoyed public security agency authority.

Also in 1992, the Italian government commenced Operation Forza Paris, a similar operation of lesser scale in Sardinia, where Italian Army units operated in the rugged central portion of the island. This operation, which lasted about two months and involved up to 5,000 Soldiers, was designed to demonstrate the government’s will to maintain control over its territory, particularly rugged areas that might today be called ungoverned spaces. It was also designed to reduce the freedom of action of local criminal groups.

During Forza Paris, Italian Army units conducted military training operations in the central portion of the island, including live fire training and forced marches. Unlike the forces in Vespri Siciliani, these troops did not have special police powers. Rather, these operations were designed to demonstrate presence and discourage crime. Besides combat training, military engineers carried out operations such as road repair and water purification.

Later in the decade, as the violence in the Balkans continued to grow, Italian military units were pressed into service in support of the Guardia di Finanza’s mission of
securities of Italy’s external borders. These efforts included Operation Testuggine, an Army operation to control illegal immigration along the land border with Slovenia, and Operation Salento, a similar effort to control illegal maritime immigration along Italy’s southeast coast. Testuggine involved an average presence of 4,000 Soldiers; Salento averaged 650. Both operations involved endowing Soldiers with limited police powers, enabling them to stop and arrest suspects.

With the end of the decade and the advent of the War on Terror, the tasks given to the military continued to grow. In October 2001, the army commenced Operation Domino. Involving up to 4,000 Soldiers, it was designed to provide protection for 150 installations considered to be critical infrastructure and the possible target of terrorist attacks, a list that included airports, railway stations, water treatment plants, power generation facilities and telecommunications sites. It also included increased security for foreign, mainly U.S., military bases in Italy. In contrast with other operations, the military did not possess special powers and thus could not, on its own, stop and arrest suspects. Rather, it was required to have police officers (either state or Carabinieri) accompany army patrols to do this. The operational tempo of Domino was reduced after 2006, but some facilities still enjoy enhanced protection.

In the latter part of the decade, the tempo and demands increased again. Besides operations designed to support police operations (such as the assignment of 2,500 military personnel to provide general security and emergency medical care at the 2006 Turin Winter Olympics and to provide external security for the G-8 meeting in 2009), Italian military units have been assigned an ever-widening set of tasks.

In response to a perception that the overall security situation in major Italian cities had deteriorated, Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s regime once again turned to the military, this time to increase security in Italy’s urban streets. Operation Strade Sicure (Secure Streets) commenced in May 2008 by decree, later authorized by law number 125 of July 24, 2008. This operation was designed to support police and Carabinieri units by increasing the presence of security forces on Italian streets. Specific tasks include the external security of immigration centers in 16 provinces (using about 1,000 Soldiers); the security of 52 sensitive locations in Rome, Milan and Naples (mostly embassies and consulates, using 750 Soldiers); and joint police-Army patrols in nine cities (1,500 Soldiers); as well as a command and control and logistics element of about 300 Soldiers.

These Soldiers have some law enforcement powers, limited to stopping and searching suspect individuals, who must immediately be turned over to law enforcement authorities, hence the joint patrols. These patrols are found in high-traffic areas, such as bus and train stations, as well as major tourist areas (for example, the Foro Romano in Rome). In the first year of operation, this operation resulted in searches of nearly 300,000 people and 150,000 vehicles.

The second major operation launched in 2008 was Strade Pulite (Clean Streets). Italy has a long history of organized labor action, including refusal of sanitation workers to remove garbage. In response to the growing mountains of refuse in the streets of Campania province, centered on Naples, Prime Minister Berlusconi authorized the province to call upon the armed forces to remove the waste. This authority was later reinforced by law 125/09, which identified waste treatment sites as “areas of national strategic interest.”

This operation not only included efforts to relocate the refuse to waste storage and treatment sites, but also the security of those same sites. Because of local political resistance to establishing these sites around Naples, it became necessary to guard the garbage. Another aspect is the need to inspect the waste for contaminated materials, particularly radioactive materials. The operation involved an average of 700 Soldiers daily, and resulted in the removal of nearly 40,000 tons of refuse and the inspection of over 110,000 trucks.

Lastly, on April 6, 2009, a major earthquake struck the Abruzzi region near the city of L’Aquila, resulting in 300 deaths and 1,500 injuries, as well as vast damage to property. This earthquake created an urgent need for disaster relief operations. The armed forces deployed over 1,300 troops and large numbers of vehicles and helicopters to the region to assist in direct support of the Civil Protection Agency.

The Italian reaction to most of these operations has been uniformly positive. The population has generally concurred with the decision to deploy Soldiers to carry out these non-military tasks; indeed, on occasion, there have been demonstrations in favor of more armed forces involvement, as the armed forces are now seen in Italy as an organization that gets things done. The political benefit to those leaders responsible for ordering the military to undertake these tasks does not go unnoticed.

Perhaps surprisingly, the military also takes a very favorable view of these operations. While many senior officers recognize the cost involved in deploying Soldiers on these missions, they often voice support for them. This can be attributed to three factors:

- These operations are believed to enhance the image of the military in Italy, where the armed forces have historically not generally been viewed as highly competent. As in many countries, the armed forces are often viewed as inactive, since the general public does not view training as real work. Frequently, the military is thought to be sitting in its barracks, waiting for something to do. This stereotype, while inaccurate, is often reinforced by the Soldiers themselves, when asked to recount how they spend their time. As a consequence, the public fails to appreciate the importance of a force-in-being and comes to appreciate the military when it carries out operations. This is particularly true in Italy, which has had a conscript military and has many other security organizations (police, Carabinieri, Guardia Di Finanza, etc.) with which the military must compete for public funding.

- The senior military leadership views these operations as a form of training. For example, the deployments to Sicily and Sardinia in the early 1990s were the first
time the modern Italian military really had to deploy ground forces, which until then were principally concentrated in the northeast corner of Italy. The Italian military learned a great deal about deployments, and was put to good use when Italy deployed forces to the Balkans in the mid-1990s. Likewise, as many of these operations resembled stability and reconstruction duties carried out in peace-keeping missions, leaders viewed these operations as excellent training for deployments. In particular, they note the ability to operate in urban terrain in close contact with civilian populations, as well as skills gained by patrolling and conducting checkpoint operations.

- Senior leaders acknowledge that, in a constrained budget environment, these operations can provide a useful source of funding, which can be used to train personnel and units for other operations. The Italian military lacks sufficient funding to carry out training for its full range of tasks, and through participation in these operations, it receives additional funding that may be used for this purpose.

Thus, it is no surprise that these operations are viewed favorably by the public and government. It is therefore reasonable to anticipate that the government will continue to look to the military to provide a growing range of support to law enforcement, as well as civil support operations of increased scope. But it is also reasonable to ask whether these operations are best carried out by the military, or whether it would be more efficient to further develop the capabilities of other organizations, such as the Carabinieri, to conduct them.

THE TASK AHEAD

Given the expansion of tasks for armies at home, the question remains how to anticipate what missions may lie in the offing. Given the complexity and dimension of the challenges confronting governments today, the likelihood grows that armed forces may be called upon. From a terrorist attack using a weapon of mass destruction to managing the consequences of climate change, there is a long list of potential tasks for military forces at home.

In particular, the military’s unique capabilities will continue to loom large in decision-makers’ minds as they face these challenges. In many instances, there is no other organization that can deal with the consequences of a radiological dispersion device or a chemical or nuclear attack. The military also has a range of capabilities to deal with pandemic disease — capabilities not present in many public health services.

Further, it is likely that national authorities may ask military forces to deal with the consequences of climate change, such as increased storm activity or rising water levels. Storms or other climatic events may occur with such magnitude as to quickly overwhelm the capabilities of local and provincial authorities.

In responding to events of such magnitude, the issue of using force may arise. In the event of a pandemic disease outbreak or employment of a dirty bomb, authorities may decide on quarantine, and it may fall to the military to enforce such a measure. In this case, what instructions should be given to Soldiers to enforce the quarantine? The employment of deadly force against a nation’s own citizens is a decision of monumental importance, with unknown consequences.

In this regard it is instructive to note the proposal of the Conservative Party of the U.K., which promised, if elected, to establish a Homeland Military Command. It would be composed of several thousand members of the British military and available to decision-makers to employ in the event that police forces are unable to contain a situation similar to events in Mumbai, India, in 2008. In this capacity, these military forces would be authorized to employ deadly force.5

In evaluating whether to employ armed forces, authorities must temper their enthusiasm with an understanding that there are tasks for which the military is ill-suited or inappropriate. Foremost among these is infrastructure construction. While army engineers are perfectly capable of constructing roads, bridges and dams, these tasks are best left to other entities, particularly private ones. Such is also the case with providing essential services: Driving buses, collecting trash and replacing firefighters in cities, while perhaps necessary, ought not to be missions of choice for armies.

As national decision-makers consider what armies should do, they ought to be guided by some principles, foremost among them the concept that militaries should be called upon when all other organizations have fallen short. Armies should be called upon when they possess capabilities that are unique and not just because they are available. The employment of Soldiers in these operations should be limited in duration, paid for with monies outside the defense budget, and controlled by civilian at all times, if possible. Lastly, it should be evident that asking Soldiers to carry out these tasks means they are not available to perform their primary missions, including national defense. While Soldiers stand ready to execute their orders, it is incumbent on leaders not to look to these forces and their unique capabilities in the first instance. After all, no other organization can fulfill their function: the security of the nation. □

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1. Unless otherwise indicated, the terms army, armed forces and military forces are used interchangeably to denote the regular armed forces of a state, including land, sea and air forces but not paramilitary police forces, coast guards or reserve formations.
4. The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 prohibits the Army from participating in domestic law enforcement activities. Executive orders have extended this prohibition to the Navy and Air Force as well. See “The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878,” USDOJ & Government Watch.
7. Information in this section is from briefings provided by the Italian Armed Forces Staff and the Italian Army Staff.

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Why is police cooperation important? Why should it make a difference in the Balkans? These questions, together with the issue of the political willingness of authorities to cooperate, can help build the legal foundation for police cooperation in Southeastern Europe.

Police cooperation, which takes in the issues of freedom, security and justice, constitutes one of the main aims of the European Union. As stated in Article 29 of the Treaty on European Union: “The aim of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters is to ensure a high level of safety for EU citizens by promoting and strengthening speedy and efficient cooperation between police and judicial authorities ... its aim is to prevent and combat racism and xenophobia and also organized crime, in particular terrorism, trafficking in human beings, crimes against children, drug trafficking, arms trafficking, corruption and fraud.”

Police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters takes the form of cooperation between national police forces, customs services and judiciaries. The structural emergence of European institutions and agencies and actual police cooperation among member states are based on international agreements rather than on the acquis communautaire — the legal framework of the EU. Those agreements include the Europol Convention, the Schengen Agreements, the Dublin Convention for determining the responsibility for examining an asylum application, the Prüm Treaty, and other intergovernmental treaties for combating serious crime and terrorism. These types of treaties allow the exchange of operational data with relevant provisions on personal data protection, while the acquis communautaire mainly applies to financing the cooperation. In this article, police cooperation is defined as the international exchange of relevant operational intelligence to achieve police goals, especially related to combating transnational crime in all of its guises.

This international exchange of information is used by international police cooperation organizations such as Interpol and Europol. While collecting police information shared voluntarily by member states, those agencies analyze the data to provide finished intelligence. Other forms of police cooperation are based on intergovernmental agreements between states. They include the office in Oradea at the Romanian-Hungarian border permanently staffed by representatives of Italy, Germany, Austria, Romania and France. Cooperation also comes in the form of regional organizations dealing with policing and customs, including the Regional Center for Combating Transborder Crime in Bucharest. The means for exchanging information include technical support, the use of databases, data analysis and threat assessments and personnel sharing, such as the use of liaison officers and multinational task forces.

The Balkans, known as the “Pulver-Fass Europas” — or the Powder Keg of
Police from Bosnia and Herzegovina patrol the streets after a prison break in Ustikolina in 2009. The escape called forth police cooperation across the region.
Europe — is made up of overlapping regions. So it is very difficult to use common definitions, because today there are more political arrangements than anyone could have foreseen 20 years ago. And defining which countries make up Southeastern Europe isn't always consistent, though the following countries are generally mentioned: Albania, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Greece, Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Moldova, Romania, Hungary, Slovenia, Serbia and Turkey.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The region presents several historical challenges that make police cooperation difficult. Historical friction points include past wars in the Balkans, growing pains in newly independent countries, potential points of crisis, and new challenges to security. First are the ongoing frozen conflicts including those between Albania and Serbia over Kosovo, and Turkey and Greece over Cyprus, just to list a few.

Second, it will take at least a generation to overcome the issues related to four armed conflicts after the split of Yugoslavia. The relations between Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia are slowly normalizing. The international community was strongly engaged through the Dayton Agreement, the Royaumont Initiative, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, and the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance. But such commitments did not totally succeed in building institutions and processes generally required in postwar societies. The presence of limited peacekeeping troops in Bosnia and Kosovo underlines the difficulty of regional cooperation. As the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina used to say, “It is not a matter of failure, it is a matter of frustration” because it will take these societies at least a generation to recover from such issues as “the slow path of refugee returns to minority areas.”

Third, concerning potential points of crisis, the international presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo prevented the further outbreak of mass killings or ethnic cleansing. When the international community withdraws forces from these two areas, violence could flare again. Bosnia’s problem is how to build a state containing two entities, three nations and three religions. Similar issues surround ethnic Albanians in the territories of Montenegro, Kosovo, Greece, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia.

Fourth, the problem of refugees in the region, as well as in the EU states, remains on the agenda of international meetings, affecting election strategies in developed countries, especially in these times of economic crisis. It is obvious that the economic situation in Greece will not bring more stability, but could be used to inflame resentments based on ethnicity or religion.

Finally, the most difficult issues are the new threats or challenges to security. The geo-strategic situation of the region highly influences the development of new security threats. Consider the region’s three religions, six new states, tens of thousands of refugees, territorial disputes and political instability. The Balkan wars not only brought disturbance into the region, but also organized crime. Criminal organizations gained influence by controlling main trafficking routes for people, drugs and weapons. The armed conflict not only brought sorrow for the population and headaches for the politicians, but also left another legacy: state-supported smuggling, meant to avoid international sanctions, created illicit markets in oil, cigarettes, drugs and weapons.

Why is so much attention paid to the history of this region? Because it shows the obstacles that police encounter when they try to coordinate among countries. The historical background of the region is important for two more reasons. First, in the case of police cooperation, a legal base is necessary. If states do not recognize themselves as being states, it is hard to speak about common approaches. Second, criminal entities
with suspected links to political organizations are much harder for the police to investigate.

Another issue is the presence of NATO troops in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The complexity of police coordination is exemplified by the killing of Croatian journalist Ivo Pukanić with a bomb in Zagreb in 2008. Serbian criminals arranged the killing with the help of Montenegrin criminals paid for by Croatians. The case was solved after public pressure forced cooperation among law enforcement authorities and led to an improvement in relations between Balkan states. This example shows that authorities are more likely to work together when criminals are not connected to political disputes.

THE SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN COOPERATIVE INITIATIVE

In December 1996, former Ambassador Richard Schifter of the U.S. Delegation in Geneva got personally involved in the launch of the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative, or SECI. The "final points" of the Common EU–U.S. Understanding stated: "The purpose of SECI is to enhance regional stability through the development of economic and environmental cooperation throughout the region, in particular by involving the private sector in these activities." The institutional development of the SECI in the following 10 years proved to be another attempt to develop economic and environmental issues in Southeastern Europe. Initially, the partner states were Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Moldova, Serbia, Slovenia, Romania and Turkey. The director of the SECI Center is Gürbüz Bahadir of Turkey. Besides the member states, the SECI Center meetings are also attended by two permanent advisors, from Interpol and the WCO, as well observer countries and organizations. Observers include Austria, Azerbaijan, the Czech Republic, Georgia, Germany, Israel, Japan, Poland, Slovakia, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United Nations. Italy and the U.S. maintain permanent representation at the SECI Center.

Two representatives from each country (one police officer and one customs officer) work as liaison officers at the center.

Figures for 2001-2009 confirm that the SECI Center is the most important information exchange unit in Southeastern Europe. In 2001, there were only 315 exchanges of information; in 2005, there were 4,053; and in 2008, 9,196. In 2009, the information exchanges rose to 9,577. There is also a corresponding rise in joint investigations, from 4 in 2001 to 12 in 2005 and 39 in 2008. In this regard, one can observe a huge rate of success registered on an operational level by the participating authorities. One explanation could be an increase in trust between participating officers and background authorities and the supporting role of permanent representatives and observer countries (especially officers from Austria, Italy and Germany deployed to Bucharest). The increased need of countries in the region to improve instruments for combating organized crime, as a part of their serious commitment to join Euro-Atlantic structures, could also represent an important motivation. The SECI Center's use of task forces represents its main success in international police cooperation. It has created eight task forces, each one coordinated by a member state with particular interest in one issue.

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Romania was a common country of origin for human trafficking in the 1990s. The center followed up with a task force on Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling, proving that the issue wasn’t just a diplomatic concern for the U.S. and the EU but also a concern for Romania. The best example of success is Operation Mirage. In three years, from 2002 to 2004, the operation had the participation of 12 countries, proving the power of engagement and coordination. The primary aims and objectives of the operation were the identification of victims of trafficking and apprehension of criminal traffickers. Officers gathered intelligence and targeted human trafficking organizations that recruit, transport and exploit women and children in the region and beyond. Law enforcement authorities (police and prosecutors) and related nongovernmental organizations from the following SECI member countries took part in the operation: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Greece, Hungary, Moldova, Romania, Serbia, Montenegro and Slovenia. Ukraine, the U.S. and the International Organization for Migration participated as SECI observers. The results were outstanding.

A more recent example is Operation Tara (2008-2009), a program targeting human traffickers that was represented by eight countries. The perfect coordination and confidentiality brought results during one action in March 2009 when seven people were arrested in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Another 46 were arrested in Croatia, and weapons seized included guns and hand grenades. Thirteen other suspects were picked up in Slovenia, and two in Austria. The second phase, in July 2009, led to further success: 12 were arrested in Bosnia, where the haul included 1,460 kilograms of cocaine. Another 14 were arrested in Serbia and 4 in Slovenia.

Aside from the human trafficking task force, others were created to deal with drug trafficking, fraud and smuggling, financial and computer crime, stolen vehicles, container security and environmental crimes.

Police cooperation may lead to tremendous success through the use of information exchange with a single point of contact. Agents from different countries come together and are ensured a certain degree of confidentiality. This includes cooperation with Europol, the European police agency. At a certain point, the missions of the SECI Center and Europol will overlap, at least when it comes to threat assessment and criminal analysis. This will raise questions of legitimacy for now-certain EU member states and SECI member states (Greece, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Hungary and Romania) and possible EU member states (Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania and, perhaps, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina). Expanded EU membership will transform the SECI Center into an almost internal organ of the EU. The EU financed one project for developing a new legal framework to allow closer cooperation between Europol and the SECI. The new agreement was signed in Thessaloniki, Greece, on December 10, 2009, by all thirteen member states of the SECI Center at the 31st meeting of the Joint Cooperative Committee.

The Convention of the Southeast European Law Enforcement Center, or SELEC, is the pinnacle of police cooperation agreements. It deals with creating databases to keep track of police activity. It defines and updates issues related to personal data protection and creates a data protection officer and a joint supervision body. The aim of the convention is to establish operations that mutually benefit SELEC and Europol. This is also the reason the EU is beginning to finance the further development of SELEC. To come into force, the convention still has to be approved by each signatory partner acting in accordance with national laws.

**THE FUTURE OF POLICE COOPERATION IN SOUTHEAST EUROPE**

It is not easy for some states to adjust to integration into the EU. The Europeanization process changes political and institutional realities. And these realities impact police cooperation, by building up a modern structure of policing, reforming intelligence collection and signing agreements with member states on the issues of combating serious crime, transborder crime and terrorism. Police training and career development are also affected. In the long term, border control among EU member states is abolished. The states of Southeastern Europe have to prove full commitment to the goals of the European Union. This process takes time, and the experts from the EU Commission offer the best expertise to help states achieve political stability, the first of the three Copenhagen Criteria for EU accession.

Police cooperation is not possible without a strong dedicated government to perform it. State building will continue for all of the nations, together or separate, with the added commitment to Europeanization. This is the way to build political support in these countries to develop reliable institutions for effective international police cooperation on issues such as organized crime. The Regional Center for Combating Trans-border Crime is one example of an operational support
organizations such as the EU may. However, this will depend on the factor of the SELEC, with this European police force, following by others, in Central Asia for example, will allow a coordinated European way of police operations. The Europol involvement of the SELEC — will allow a safe and secure area in the Balkans, after the war in Bosnia Herzegovina, conceived by the US with a comprehensive conflict prevention strategy of the international community, aimed at strengthening the efforts of the countries of South Eastern Europe in fostering peace, democracy, respect for human rights and economic prosperity. The Stability Pact provided a framework to stimulate regional cooperation and expedite integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures. The Pact’s secretariat, located in Brussels, was organized into three units each dealing with an issue area: Working Table I focusing on democratisation and human rights, Working Table II focusing on economic reconstruction, cooperation and development matters and Working Table III with security issues – see http://www.stability pact.org/ read on May 12, 2010

5. Treaty between Belgium, Spain, Nederlands, Germany, Luxemburg, Austria and France for the trans border cooperation, especially in the fields of combating terrorism, cross border crime and illegal migration, signed in Pozsony, on May 22, 2005;
10. The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, also known as the Dayton Agreement, Dayton Accords, Paris Protocol or Dayton-Paris Agreement, is the peace agreement reached at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base near Dayton, Ohio in November 1995, and formally signed in Paris on December 14, 1995. These accords put an end to the three and a half year long war in Bosnia, one of the armed conflicts in the former Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. Some articles erroneously refer to the agreement as the Treaty of Dayton, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dayton_Agreement, read on May 12 2010;
11. The European Initiative to ensure security in the South Eastern European region, as a strong European engagement for the building up of Balkans security, as a part of democratization and Euro-Atlantic perspective. Frank Cass Publishers, London 2002;
12. The SECI / South East European Cooperative Initiative represents the process of a common will of the signatory parts of the Dayton Agreement to cooperate together in order to create a safe and secure area in the Balkans, after the war in Bosnia Herzegovina, conceived by the US with full participation of the EU. Main area of interest were border crossing facilitation, infrastructure development, combating cross-border crime and corruption, energy and environment. See also, Busek, Erhard, 10 Years Southeast European Cooperative Initiative, Springer Verlag, Wien, 2006 p 2;
13. The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe was launched in 1999 as the first comprehensive conflict prevention strategy of the international community, aimed at strengthening the efforts of the countries of South Eastern Europe in fostering peace, democracy, respect for human rights and economic prosperity. The Stability Pact provided a framework to stimulate regional cooperation and expedite integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures. The Pact’s secretariat, located in Brussels, was organized into three units each dealing with an issue area: Working Table I focusing on democratisation and human rights, Working Table II focusing on economic reconstruction, cooperation and development matters and Working Table III with security issues – see http://www.stabilitypact.org/ read on May 12, 2010
14. http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/enlargement/ongoing_enlarge ment/e05020_en.htm - The Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) is the Community’s financial instrument for the pre-accession process for the period 2007-2013. Assistance is provided on the basis of the European Partnerships of the potential candidate countries and the Accession Partnerships of the candidate countries, which means the Western Balkan countries and Turkey. The IPA is intended as a flexible instrument and therefore provides assistance which depends on the progress made by the beneficiary countries and their needs as shown in the Commission’s evaluations and annual strategy papers, read on May 12, 2010;
15. Press Conferences - Transcript of the farewell press conference by the High Representative, Carlos Westendorp, published on http://www.ohri.int/print/content_adsl-5823, read on May 13, 2010;
16. methods and techniques of processing passengers and cargo; the successful application of enforcement aids and techniques; enforcement actions that might be useful; new methods of committing offences, See SECI Agreement.
17. SECI CENTER - Annual Report 2008 – 10 years for the best examples of police and customs cooperation;
19. Operational results concerning victims of trafficking:
 - 20,629 controlled places, such as night clubs, discobars, restaurants, border crossing points and other places were checked all over the region, especially those related to which previous intelligence had been obtained.
 - 11,170 identified persons; these persons were found in places such as the above mentioned, and they have been checked regarding their identity, the legal status in the respective country as well as the presence at the controlled places.
 - 463 identified victims of trafficking; from the information received by the law enforcement authorities through international information exchange channels and domestic sources and as a result of the action on the ground during the operation (11,170 checked persons), 463 women were victims of trafficking.
 - 2,175 cases in which administrative measures were applied (fees, interdictions, temporary imprisonment, expelling).
 - 65 victims assisted by IOM and NGOs pursuant to their special request or agreement in this sense:
 - 62 repatriated persons.
Operational results concerning traffickers:
 - 595 traffickers identified - representing the number of persons identified as being involved in activities of trafficking in human beings as organizers, recruiters, transporters, hosts and pimps;
 - 319 cases for which criminal procedures were undertaken – the police investigations were followed by 319 criminal procedures initiated during the operational period; the investigations continued in most of these cases even after the operation ended, with the purpose of identifying and charging all the accomplices and members of human trafficking organized criminal networks.
 - 207 charged traffickers – from the total number of 595 traffickers identified, 207 were charged during or after the operational period, under the specific provisions of the respective national legislation.
The main trafficking routes employed in the region as reported by the participating countries are the following:
1. Ukraine – Moldova – Romania – Serbia and Montenegro
2. Ukraine – Moldova – Romania – Bulgaria – Turkey - Greece
3. Serbia and Montenegro – Bosnia and Herzegovina – Croatia - Slovenia
Ukrainian guards patrol the Ukrainian-Slovak border near the city of Chop in June 2009.
As a result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the East-West confrontation, NATO countries have transformed from major potential external threats to Ukraine into potential allies. Do threats to an independent Ukraine exist at all? How do the Ukrainian Armed Forces support civil authorities to counter these threats? Legislation adopted over the course of several years, including the National Security Strategy (1997), “On the Fundamentals of the National Security” law (2003), and Military Doctrine (2004), addressed these questions.

The “On the Fundamentals of the National Security” law assumes that potential threats to Ukraine may lie in a variety of spheres such as international, state security, military, border security, internal political, economic, social, humanitarian, technological, ecological and informational. The nature of threats are defined by the historical experience of Ukraine, which suffered through two world wars, a great number of revolts, revolutions, civil wars and other civil disturbances, as well as natural and technological disasters. The threats may be divided into military or non-military, outer and domestic.

Ukraine’s national security is provided by a number of actors, including the country’s armed forces, the so-called “other military formations,” and paramilitary forces that constitute the military organization of the state. The primary mission of the armed forces is to counter outside military threats by defending state borders, protecting Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, repulsing armed aggression, and protecting air and underwater space (Article 1, “On the Armed Forces” law). If necessary, the armed forces may assist other agencies to counter outside, non-military threats, such as protecting the state border and maritime economic zone. Strict legal restrictions constrain the armed forces when dealing with domestic threats; their activities in this field are mainly limited to providing aid for disasters and combating terrorism.

The primary mission of the “other military formations” (e.g. border troops, civil defense troops, internal troops, and some others whose total strength exceeds 120,000 men compared with approximately 245,000 of the armed forces) is to tackle specific non-military, mainly domestic threats. These include illegal migration, terrorism, public disturbances and vital infrastructure protection that requires large amounts of manpower and equipment.

Historical precedents
Though Ukraine, as a member-republic within the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) until 1991, did not have its own armed forces, it played an important role in the military policy of the Soviet Union. The Ukrainians...
formed a considerable part of the officer corps with three military districts on the territory of the republic and the main bases of the Black Sea Fleet located in Ukraine. In addition, the major heavy machinery plants of Ukraine were oriented toward military needs, producing tanks, missiles, aircraft and other military hardware. The republic was also home to some of the best military colleges in the Soviet Union.

On August 24, 1991, the Parliament placed all military units located on the territory of Ukraine under its own command, henceforth setting up the Department of Defense, and started building the armed forces of Ukraine and major paramilitary agencies. “Afghanistan” and “August Putsch” syndromes determined the basics of the armed forces build-up program. These basics included: restriction of the armed forces mission to protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine; distribution of national security protection functions among different military forces and law enforcement agencies; a ban on the armed forces involvement in unconstitutional political affairs; a special procedure for sending military forces abroad; and the prohibition of foreign military bases on the territory of the country. Numerous terrorist acts in neighboring Russia, caused by the war in Chechnya and the events of September 11, 2001, made the Ukrainian public regard terrorism as one of the major potential threats to the country, resulting in the adoption of the “On Combating Terrorism” law in 2003 and corresponding changes in the national security strategy.

Legal authority
The regulation of employment of the armed forces in domestic operations may be represented as a three-tiered system. The first level is formed by the Constitution of Ukraine (1996), which laid the groundwork for the operation of the armed forces and determined Ukraine’s defense, the protection of its sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability (Article 17) to be the mission of the armed forces. It prohibits the use of the armed forces to limit the rights and freedoms of the citizen, overthrow the constitutional order, or remove or hamper the state authority bodies (Articles 17, 64). The second level consists of the legal acts that specifically regulate the functioning of the armed forces and other military formations. The third level comprises the legal acts that indirectly regulate matters related to the armed forces. Since 1991, the Ukrainian Armed Forces legal support policy has had three goals: 1) to provide each aspect of military-related activity with a corresponding legal basis; 2) to distribute the main national security functions among the different state agencies; and 3) to prevent a potential intervention by the armed forces into the political life of the society. In particular, the legislation has confirmed the armed forces as the lead agency in the sphere of the defense of the country; the civil defense troops as the lead actor in the sphere of countering natural and technological disasters; and the security service as the lead agency in combating terrorism, etc.

Types of forces providing national security
The national security of Ukraine is provided by the armed forces, military, paramilitary and specialized military forces. Currently, the Armed Forces of Ukraine consist of land forces (51 percent of manpower), air force (32 percent), and navy (6 percent). In peacetime, the armed forces perform a number of tasks to counter non-military outside threats, namely the air force and air defense provide protection of
Ukraine’s airspace, while the navy is responsible for the protection of underwater space. These branches are also responsible for protection from potential terrorist attacks from air and sea. The land forces, especially the engineer units, may be employed to counter natural or technological disasters.

According to current military doctrine, the armed forces should be transformed to meet modern potential threats. Future armed forces will consist of three major components: the advanced defense force, including the joint rapid reaction force; the main defense force; and the strategic reserve.

Since 2002, the military police (their official name is the Military Service of Law and Order) have functioned within the armed forces. The law “On the Military Service of and Order within the Armed Forces” (2002) serves as its legal basis. The mission of the military police is to provide law, order and discipline among servicemen; protect military property; and counter sabotage and terrorist attacks against defense critical infrastructure. In cases of martial law or states of emergency, the military police have the additional tasks of providing law and order within their zones of responsibility (e.g., curfews) and combating terrorist activities directed at the assets of military infrastructure. Even though they are members of the armed forces, the military police share the same rules of engagement as the civilian police.

The military/paramilitary law-enforcement forces include security service, border troops and internal troops. The internal troops (50,000 men) represent a paramilitary police force (some authors regard them as “other military force”), that act on the basis of the law “On the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Interior.” Their main tasks are protecting and defending critical state infrastructure, overseeing prisons, convoying special cargoes, combating crime, protecting diplomatic missions, etc. A list of the national critical infrastructure assets to be protected and defended by internal troops is determined by the government. The troops are organized into formations of two major types: protection units and motorized police units. Their armament and structure are comparable to the army light infantry. The internal troops report to the Minister of Interior.

The Ministry of Interior, within the structure of its regional departments, has numerous rapid reaction police units, which, as a rule, are well-trained and equipped, and as a result, rather effective in combating public disorder, riots, organized crime and terrorist activities. Similar units are available at other ministries (e.g., the Ministry of Justice).

Also within the Ministry of Interior is the state protection service, whose mission is to provide protection for important assets including state authority bodies, TV and radio stations, archives, museums, urban infrastructure, and, most important, railway and highway bridges. The legal basis of the department is the statute “On the State Protection Service of the Ministry of Interior” (1993). In addition, the Department of State Guard, reporting directly to the president, provides protection to the highest dignitaries.

The civil defense troops are an example of a specialized military force whose mission, based on the laws “On the Civil Defense” and “On the Civil Defense Troops,” is to defend the population in case of natural or technological disasters. Their responsibilities include forest and peat fires; rendering assistance to populations affected by disaster; evacuations; and radiation, chemical and biological reconnaissance. They also provide explosives and ordinance demolition work in the interest of the civilian authorities. These troops possess all of the necessary means, including their own air
force, to tackle these disasters. Being military by nature, they are a component of the civilian Ministry of Emergencies. In accordance with the president’s decree of December 13, 2003, the troops are being transformed from a military force into a civilian operational and rescue civil defense service. By the end of 2005, the strength of the force increased from 10,218 to 72,418.

**Domestic counterterrorism**
The state policy on combating terrorism is determined primarily by the law “On Combating Terrorism” (2003). The organization to combat terrorism is based on the principle of a distribution of the corresponding responsibilities among a number of actors: the security service as the lead agency (Article 4, “On Combating Terrorism”); the ministries of interior, defense, and emergencies; the State Border Committee; the State Department for Execution of Punishment, and the State Protection Department. The list of auxiliary agencies (which are engaged if needed) includes: the ministries of foreign affairs, health, energy and fuel, industrial policy, finance, transport, environmental protection and agrarian policy; the State Customs Service; and the State Tax Administration.

The security service collects intelligence, conducts electronic warfare, coordinates the efforts of the antiterrorist combat actors, investigates terrorism and provides protection for Ukrainian overseas facilities and their personnel. The Ministry of Interior fights terrorism through prevention, detection and investigation, and supports anti-terrorist operations with personnel and equipment. The Ministry of Defense provides protection from terrorist attacks on assets of the armed forces; preparation and employment of the ground forces, air force, air defense force and navy in case of a terrorist attack from air or sea; and participation in an antiterrorist operation directed at military assets. The Chechen war, however, showed that sometimes law enforcement agencies need heavy weapons (e.g. tanks, helicopters), which the armed forces possess. The Ministry of Emergencies provides 1) protection for the population and sovereign territory from technological terrorism related contingencies, 2) liquidation of the effects of these contingencies and 3) training for the population in such kinds of situations. The State Border Committee prevents Ukrainian border trespassing by terrorists, illegal carrying of weapons, explosives, poisons and nuclear material that can be used for terrorism, and provides protection of sea traffic within territorial waters during an anti-terrorist operation. The State Department for Execution of Punishment counters terrorist activities at correctional facilities. The State Protection Department counters terrorist threats aimed at VIPs or facilities under their protection.

The coordination of actors is provided by the interagency coordination commission within the security service-led antiterrorist center, which consists of the head of the commission, deputy ministers of emergency and interior, deputy head of the general staff, deputy head of the state penitentiary department, commander of the...
Military assistance to civil authority
The area where military and civilians cooperate effectively is disaster relief. In the cases of large-scale disasters, the components of military organization of the state, including armed forces, other military formations, and law enforcement agencies, may be employed, though the civil defense troops are the lead actor. According to “On Civil Defense in Ukraine,” each citizen of the country has the right to be protected from the consequences of accidents, catastrophes, fires and natural disasters. The state as guarantor of this right creates the system of civil defense, which aims at protecting the population from the dangerous consequences of accidents and technological, ecological, natural and military catastrophes. The forces of civil defense consist of troops, specialized and paramilitary formations. Civil defense troops perform tasks related to the prevention and handling of consequences of technological and natural emergencies. In 2003, there were 2,376 cases when troops were called for assistance. Specialized formations are created in order to carry out specific tasks related to radiation and chemical threats, earthquake-caused large scale destruction, gas/oil field emergencies, and preventing and restoring works (inside and outside of the country). Paramilitary formations of civil defense are created in the regions, districts, on the enterprises, in establishments and organizations regardless of their ownership form and subordination. According to Article 1 of the law “On the Armed Forces and Article 9 of “On the Defense,” armed forces may be employed in handling natural and technological emergencies based on conditions determined by the corresponding president’s decree. (In practice, armed forces units more often are deployed by orders of their commanders, including the minister of defense.) The state civil defense system may function in three modes: 1) normal mode — when the industrial, radiation, chemical, biological situation is regarded as standard; 2) advanced readiness mode — when the industrial, radiation, chemical, biological situation has worsened; 3) emergency mode — in case of natural or technological disaster.

Military support to law enforcement
The negative experience of employment of the Soviet military in ethnic conflict management operations in the late 1980s had a number of consequences.

Military assistance in civil disturbances
Previously, armed forces were episodically engaged in civil disturbances; these are now entrusted to internal troops or paramilitary police forces. Since 1991, all main law enforcement agencies (the Ministry of Interior, Security Service, State Protection Service, State Penitentiary Department, etc.) have created paramilitary rapid reaction forces to support their activities. The civilian police now have effective criminal intelligence bodies to provide surveillance over organized crime, drugs, weapons and human trafficking.

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**Unifying Europe’s Airspace**

Volcano-related flight cancellations accelerate Single European Sky plan

Europe’s air traffic management system is under harsh scrutiny for its lack of cohesiveness during the unexpected shutdown of airspace over much of northern Europe in April 2010, as an ash cloud drifted from Iceland’s Eyjafjallajökull volcano. The unprecedented closure of European airspace cost airlines and related businesses more than 2.5 billion euros (about $3.15 billion). As a remedy, the European Union agreed to fast-track the long-awaited Single European Sky (SES) program, with plans for implementation by 2012.
The SES program will unify European airspace, simplify and standardize flight rules and routes, and install a comprehensive computer system to standardize communications. The goal is to consolidate the airspaces of 27 countries into nine regional blocks that could share air traffic control systems and governance. By merging the airspace, pilots can fly more direct routes, decreasing fuel costs and pollution.

The SES program would overhaul an air traffic management system that has remained unchanged since the 1960s and has contributed to flight congestion. A unified system would boost airspace capacity and improve air safety for both civilian and military flights. In the case of the volcano crisis, which disrupted flights worldwide, a single European sky “would not have solved the problem, but would have enabled a more nimble response,” EU transport commissioner Siim Kallas said.

A disjointed shutdown

After the eruption in April, the London Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre reported an impending threat of ash clouds to relevant civil aviation authorities. Because volcanic ash contains silica, which damage aircraft engines, authorities within each airspace had to determine whether flying was permissible.

As a result, on April 16, 2010, about 16,000 of Europe’s 28,000 daily scheduled passenger flights were cancelled. A day later, 16,000 of 22,000 flights were cancelled. By April 21, about 95,000 flights had been grounded, according to the BBC. These disruptions continued into May, affecting air travel in the United Kingdom and Ireland on May 4 and 5, and in Spain, Portugal, northern Italy, Austria and southern Germany on May 9. Irish and British airspace closed again May 16 and reopened May 17. The closures stranded millions of passengers. Weary travelers scrambled for ferry
Concordiam

Taxis and trains were overwhelmed. Virgin Holiday Cruises said telephones rang incessantly, as marooned airline customers inquired about trans-Atlantic fares to New York.

With large parts of European airspace closed, the impact spread around the world. According to estimates by the International Air Transport Association, the closures paralyzed 29 percent of all global flights. Over the weekend of April 17 and 18 alone, airlines lost €634 million (about $800 million) in revenue. The Association of European Airlines estimated total losses at nearly €794 million (about $1 billion).

Creating a “single sky”

Under the SES program, crisis management will be better coordinated and integrated. The partner nations would agree to share information, combine networks, protect airspace, share staff and implement joint security policies against possible threats, according to a document called the Single European Sky Air Traffic Management Research. However, Luc Tytgat, the European Commission official in charge of SES, said in April 2010 that member states will retain the power to close national airspace for security and defense.

The United States and the EU reached a similar agreement in June 2010 to make skies “seamless” between Europe and North America. “Harmonization is the key to the future of air travel over the North Atlantic,” said U.S. Federal Aviation Administration Chief Operating Officer Hank Krakowski, who signed a deal with Daniel Calleja, the European Commission’s director for air transport. “This agreement allows us to work together to give the airlines a seamless transition between our airspaces.”

A consistent standard

EU transport ministers are expected to appoint Eurocontrol as the new performance-reviewing body that oversees air traffic controllers. It would have authority to measure efficiency by a single standard. Eurocontrol, founded in 1960 and funded by member nations and airline fees, would manage Europe’s first unified network of international air lanes.

Many welcome the change. During the volcano crisis, the EU and Eurocontrol tried to reopen the skies on April 19 after feeling pressure from airlines that contended they were losing €198 million (about $250 million) a day. Airlines flew test flights to measure ash, declaring the flights problem-free. These companies say European regulators overreacted and demanded they establish internationally recognized standards of determining when volcanic ash harms aircraft engines. As Steven Verhagen, vice president of the Dutch pilots union, said on April 18: “We are asking the authorities to really have a good look at the situation because 100 percent safety does not exist. It’s easy to close down airspace because then it’s perfectly safe, but at some time you have to resume flights.”

Andrew Haines, head of Britain’s Civil Aviation Authority, defended the decision to close airspaces, saying aircraft manufacturers did not provide information regarding safe levels of ash. As signs of ash diminished, airspace reopened gradually over Europe, but airlines continue to ponder whether they could have flown safely all along.

Single European Sky has been under discussion for two decades, and some are frustrated that the program has not progressed quickly enough. In a June 2010 meeting, the International Air Transport Association and EU
The Single European Sky program proposes integration of airspace across borders through nine functional airspace blocks. Sectors and routes currently adhere to national borders rather than follow direct routes, incurring additional expense as aircraft pass from one navigation service to another.

Transport ministers vented these frustrations. “We have been waiting decades for Europe to unite its skies. The volcano resulted in tiny promises of incremental progress on some elements of the SES. As the transport ministers are not able to take leadership on this issue, I call on heads of state to end the decades of embarrassment caused by this European failure and set a date for the transport ministers to deliver the 5 billion euro savings that a real SES will bring,” said Giovanni Bisignani, IATA’s director general and chief executive.

Not everyone favors the idea of a single sky. Integrating airspace may cost jobs among air traffic controllers. French controllers went on strike in July 2010 to protest SES, forcing mass cancellation of flights. If untangling airspace makes flying across Europe more efficient, the number of people employed as flight attendants and baggage handlers could also decline.

**Disruptions at all levels**

But few dispute the need for change. Civilian air travelers were not the only people affected by the volcano crisis. NATO flights evacuating ill and wounded soldiers that normally went to Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany were re-routed on April 19, the U.S. Department of Defense said.

Some countries were hit harder than others. Norway was forced to relocate its ambulances and medical personnel, and the Norwegian government reported total closure of its airspace. It grounded 21 search-and-rescue and medical aircraft. Oil companies couldn’t fly personnel to platforms in the North Sea, forcing existing crews to stay on duty. In Poland, the flight disruptions upset the funeral of President Lech Kaczyński, who died in an unrelated plane crash just before the airspace shutdowns. Without the ability to fly, some foreign dignitaries could not attend the memorial services.

Going forward, most EU officials view the SES as an immense, groundbreaking enterprise necessary to handle the growing demands of air travel in Europe, where the number of flights is expected to double between 1997 and 2020. Bisignani, head of the International Air Transport Association, applauded the decision to fast-track airspace integration. “The volcanic ash crisis that paralyzed European air transport for nearly a week made it crystal clear that the Single European Sky is a critical missing link in Europe’s infrastructure,” he said.
Partnering Against Violence
Tackling extremism requires cooperation

The extraordinary and deadly events of the past decade have drawn the world’s attention to the threat of terrorism. To combat violent extremist organizations, it is essential to develop strategic partnerships globally and regionally. Most recently, the European Union and the United States reached an agreement to increase cooperation, collaboration and information sharing in the fight against this threat. Through this first U.S.-EU Seminar on Preventing Violent Extremism, held in Brussels in June 2010, the partners agreed to a joint strategy to confront “a serious threat posed by violent extremists who have become radicalized and have turned to terrorist means.” The joint strategy reflects the seminar’s conclusion that homegrown terrorism “is a transnational challenge that calls for an international response.”

Europe is increasingly concerned with the radicalization of its youth. The United Kingdom in particular faces challenges in the battle against homegrown Islamic radicalization. The Daily Telegraph reports that the U.K. may be home to more Islamic extremists than any other Western country. As British citizens, they may travel visa-free throughout the EU and to the U.S. Most British Muslims are of Pakistani descent, and according to The New Republic, could access terrorist training camps in the tribal belt along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

In Germany, home to a large number of Muslim immigrants, the threat of Islamic extremism seems to be growing. Authorities have stopped several attacks plotted by homegrown terrorist cells. Also, several of the 9/11 suicide bombers, including leader Mohammed Atta, came from a cell in Hamburg where, according to The Independent, the “9/11 attacks on the United States were secretly conceived and planned.” In October 2009, German intelligence agents broke up another terrorist cell in Hamburg, which reportedly used the mosque frequented by Atta and his cohorts as a meeting place.

The U.K. and Germany are not alone. The Netherlands Interior Ministry published a 2004 report titled “From Fatwa to Jihad” examining the radicalization of a portion of the country’s Muslim population of 1 million. France, also home to a substantial Muslim population, is striving to improve integration while respecting religious freedom.

Since 2001, the EU, Russia and the U.S. have stepped up cooperation to defeat international terrorist networks. The European Commission developed an action plan to fight terrorism in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, according to the Justice and Home Affairs Ministry website. The plan defines “a common concept...
British police conduct an investigation in Liverpool, following the April 2009 arrests of 12 people in an anti-terror operation. Motivated by these and other events, the U.S. and the EU held their first seminar on violent extremism in June 2010.
German security officials lead three terrorist suspects to Karlsruhe's federal court in September 2007. Prosecutors accused the men of planning "imminent" attacks on Frankfurt airport and the U.S. military base in Ramstein. German law enforcement agencies have successfully disrupted terrorist cells since 2001.

of terrorist offenses" and establishes legal frameworks and facilitates counterterrorism cooperation and information sharing within the EU and with partner nations, specifically the U.S., Russia and countries on the EU's periphery. The plan places particular importance on supporting the United Nations and adhering to the U.N.'s conventions and resolutions.

The United Nations also has a role to "enhance national, regional and international efforts to counter terrorism," according to the U.N. Global Terrorism Strategy, adopted by the General Assembly in September 2006. Included in the strategy are measures to address the conditions that encourage radicalization and extremism by promoting justice, tolerance, economic and social development, human rights and good governance. The U.N. strategy document is significant because it is the first time that all member nations "have agreed to a common strategic approach to fight terrorism." The U.N. serves as a facilitator to increased international collaboration against terrorist networks.

Close cooperation with the U.S. remains important for the EU. According to the European Commission website, six "groundbreaking" agreements have been signed with the United States, including "two police cooperation agreements between Europol and U.S. law enforcement authorities, two agreements on judicial criminal cooperation regarding extradition and mutual legal assistance, an agreement on the transfer of passenger data and an agreement on container security."
Joint statements from the EU and Russia—“Common Spaces of External Security” and “Freedom, Security and Justice”—focus on terrorism and strengthening cooperation between Europol and Russian law enforcement.

Recognizing the global nature of terrorist networks, Russia, which faces domestic Islamist-led insurgencies in its North Caucasus republics of Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia, has also strengthened cooperation with NATO and the U.S., partnering in the war against al-Qaeda and Taliban extremists in Afghanistan. Russia provides transit routes for military supplies and shares counterterrorism information.

Links between terrorist groups, organized crime and narcotics trafficking are of high importance to Russian leaders. The Independent reports that the country’s heroin addiction rate has reached “epidemic proportions” and Russia’s anti-drug agency reports that Russia consumes more heroin than any other nation. According to a paper by Mikhail Troitskiy written for the Kennan Institute, Russia sees room for improved cooperation on NATO drug-interdiction efforts in Afghanistan. Secretary General Nikolai Bordyuzha of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization has emphasized that NATO and CSTO have essentially the same main tasks: combating terrorism and drug trafficking.

In June 2010, the presidents of the U.S. and Russia released a joint statement on counterterrorism cooperation promising to build on an “already robust partnership.” The statement points to the close work on the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the U.S.-Russia Counterterrorism Working Group, or CTWG, which was established following the 9/11 attacks. According to the U.S. State Department: “Through the CTWG, the United States and Russia are working together to combat terrorism and other international threats by focusing on several important areas including Afghanistan, counter-narcotics, United Nations designations of terrorists and terrorist financiers, terrorism finance, intelligence sharing, law enforcement, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS), and transportation security.” The CTWG boasts many accomplishments, including agreements on joint border security training for Afghanistan and Central Asian countries, terror financing interdiction, nuclear forensics and reducing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The joint presidential statement also announced U.S. recognition of the “Caucasus Emirate”—Islamic separatists from the Russian North Caucasus—as a specially designated terrorist organization. By working together, Russia and the West weaken extremist networks and improve security in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

In the end, success in the international campaign against extremism will depend on cooperation between security and intelligence forces of many national and transnational organizations. Unified efforts to improve information sharing, monitor extremist activities and inhibit the spread of extremist recruiting propaganda are fundamental to effective counterterrorism. Accordingly, the EU and U.S. are planning a second violent extremism seminar, in mid-2011.
Beijing to London by Rail

China proposes transcontinental train network

China is championing an ambitious high-speed rail network that would transport passengers from London to Beijing in just two days at top speeds of 320 kilometers per hour. The multinational plan to integrate Eurasia with bullet trains is among the most far-reaching rail projects since the Russians built the Trans-Siberian Railroad and the British envisioned locomotives running between Cairo and Capetown.

Ultimately costing billions of euros, the project would entail the construction of three lines. The first would potentially connect southern China with Singapore via Vietnam, Thailand and Malaysia. A second would originate in northern China, pass through Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and possibly end in India. The third would start in China’s northeast and head north through Russia and Kazakhstan, ultimately reaching Western Europe.

Routes have yet to be finalized, but the goal is to increase international mobility by joining the mostly disconnected Asian and European rail systems. A construction timeline proposes completing the project as early as 2020. “We will use government money and bank loans, but the railways may also raise financing from the private sector and also from the host countries,” said Wang Mengshu of China’s Academy of Engineering, as quoted by EUobserver.com.

In the eyes of industry experts, China’s advancements in high-speed rail, including the 394-kilometer-per-hour (245-mph) Harmony Express bullet train, connecting Wuhan and Guangzhou, lend credibility to the Beijing-to-London proposal. Germany’s Siemens, France’s Alstom, Canada’s Bombardier and Japan’s Kawasaki all supplied engineering technology for the Harmony project, according to Germany’s Der Spiegel magazine. If neighboring countries lack money to contribute to the project, the Chinese are floating creative financing ideas, including accepting raw materials such as oil, gas and timber as payment. “We would actually prefer the other countries to pay in natural resources rather than make their own capital investment,” Wang told the South China Morning Post in March 2010.

Historical precedent
This is not the first idea of its kind – it took Czarist Russia one-quarter century to build the Trans-Siberian Railroad, which upon completion during World War I linked St. Petersburg and Vladivostok. The never-completed Cape Town-to-Cairo railway was supposed to connect Egypt and South Africa in the 19th century, but failed for lack of funds.
The high-speed train China launched in 2009 transports passengers 1,067 kilometers between Wuhan and Guangzhou in less than three hours.
The French hatched a rival plan to link Senegal and Djibouti. The proposal died when the British intercepted a French expedition searching for a route across Ethiopia. The Portuguese drew a map documenting Portugal’s claim to a route between Angola and Mozambique, today Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi. Territorial disputes with Great Britain then thwarted Portugal’s ambition to connect the lands by rail.

In 1865, Belgian businessman George Nagelmackers envisioned “a train that would span a continent, running on a continuous ribbon of metal for more than 1500 miles.” It was the original idea for the Orient Express, whose first 80-hour excursion from Paris to Constantinople took place in 1883. Passengers relaxed in plush compartments complete with beds and sinks, waited on by stewards serving tea and brandy. The Orient Express survived two world wars but ceased to operate in December 2009. The name vanished from European railway timetables, a victim of high-speed trains and cut-rate airlines, according to the United Kingdom’s Guardian newspaper.

**Creative financing**

The Chinese are eager to deal with potential partners on this high-speed railway project. China offered to fund the Burmese line in exchange for rights to the country’s rich reserves of lithium, a metal widely used in batteries, the European Rail Industry website reported. The country is also reportedly negotiating financing with Iran, Pakistan and India, countries already proposing to supply natural gas to China. In exchange for railway finance, China would receive additional timber, minerals, oil and gas and the means to transport them, raising questions about China’s motives. The Transport Politic, an
online news site, questions whether the rail expansion is a “reasonable foreign investment on the part of China, or is it an attempt to take control of the economies of poor countries.” China maintains that the original idea for the transcontinental railway originated with other countries eager to enlist China’s experience and technology.

Safety is key

Even after the project is paid for, keeping passengers safe would be a complex task. Rail travelers are not immune to violence, and over the past couple of years, extremists have bombed trains in London and Madrid, derailed Russia’s Nevsky Express, and attempted to derail a TGV high-speed train between Lyon and Paris by planting explosives. However, considering the vulnerabilities of rail travel — unpatrolled tracks and stations packed with passengers untroubled by strict security searches — terrorist attacks happen less frequently than one might expect. Between 1998 and 2003, rail attacks killed 431 people. Though more numerous and deadly than those on airports or airplanes, rail attacks have not resulted in as many deaths as those on buses and related infrastructure such as ticket offices and depots, according to “Terrorism and Rail Security,” an international report by the Rand Corporation. Rand emphasized that methods used to secure airplanes — passenger profiling, screening, metal detectors, bomb-sniffing dogs and armed guards — are impractical for passenger trains because of the additional costs and travel delays. Rail passengers expect fast and inexpensive service.

Terrorists generally choose targets that carry symbolic value or generate substantial public reaction. “The Moscow bombings served to remind us just how vulnerable rail networks are to terrorist attack,” the website railway-technology.com noted in June 2010. In an attempt to balance security with convenience, rail companies have taken precautions to prevent attacks. Although not all rail security policies are made public, among those implemented are: removing trash containers that could hide bombs, increasing the presence of security officers, adopting video surveillance in and around stations, randomly inspecting baggage, and encouraging riders to report suspicious activity. Some security analysts argue that the best preventative is a focus on counterterrorism and intelligence collection. “Ensuring anything like 100 percent protection against terrorist attack is not a viable option,” said Adrian Dwyer, the British Transport Police’s counter-terrorism risk advisor.

Additional hurdles

Safety isn’t China’s only obstacle to overcome in building the London-to-Beijing route. Once the difficulty of financing is settled, differing visa requirements among the nations on the route could hinder travel. Railroad track widths need to be standardized. High-speed rail lines are three times more expensive to build than regular ones, and different countries continue to use different track sizes. Vietnam has agreed to change its standard gauge, according to the U.K’s Daily Telegraph, and Kyrgyzstan continues to use a narrower gauge than China. Track renovation and gauge change negotiations are under way with other countries. “The availability of good infrastructure is pivotal to the growth of trade between nations,” Michael Clusecker, director-general of the Association of European Rail Industry, said in an EUobserver article in March 2010. But the same article asserts that the low cost of maritime transport makes rail hard to justify in many cases.

The proposed route conspicuously avoids Afghanistan. The country possesses only two short lines, near its northern border with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, although China is considering indirect links through Tajikistan and Pakistan. Those links could expand with the growth of stability in Afghanistan. A report published by the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program in May 2010 recommends that NATO “reconnect Afghanistan with both East and West, opening to citizens the local, regional and continental global markets.”

Whether China can overcome the immense challenges it faces with a project of this magnitude is uncertain, but few dispute that opening up previously isolated regions and linking the economies of Asia and Europe by rail is beneficial. “We foresee that in the coming decades, hundreds of millions of people will migrate to the western regions [of China], where land is empty and resources untapped,” Wang told the South China Morning Post. “With the fast, convenient transport of high speed trains, people will set up mines, factories and business centers in the west. They will trade with Central Asian and Eastern European countries.” □
European leaders view diversification of oil and gas supplies as crucial in establishing energy security. According to European Union data, 60 percent of EU natural gas is imported. Among Western and Central European nations, only Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands are net gas exporters. Data from the EU’s Eurostat indicate that about one-third of EU gas imports were supplied by Russia in 2009. However, dependency on Russian gas has dropped substantially from 2007, when it constituted 41 percent of the EU’s gas imports. Germany received 40 percent of its gas from Russia, while Hungary got 75 percent and Poland 72 percent. Ukraine has little or no domestic gas production and is almost totally dependent on Russia.

However, large potential European shale gas reserves have emerged as a point of optimism. The EU website euractiv.com reports that geological studies indicate "shale gas is presumed to exist in Germany, Poland, Sweden, France, Austria, Hungary and the UK," as well as in current gas producers Denmark and the Netherlands. Non-EU countries Ukraine and Norway also have potentially significant shale gas reserves. Polish leaders, whose country has the most promising shale formations, are optimistic that its shale gas plays will transform it into a net gas exporter, from a country that currently imports 75 percent of its domestic requirement. The Polish Ministry of Economy cites projected shale gas reserves of 1.5 trillion to 3 trillion cubic meters, enough for European nations forced to buy natural gas from unpredictable foreign suppliers, revolutionary new technologies for extracting gas from shale deposits could rearrange the economic, political and diplomatic landscape. Not only would these new supplies transform world energy markets in Europe’s favor, but the discoveries could end the dominance of such producers as Russia’s Gazprom, which made headlines in 2005 and 2009 by interrupting gas shipments through Ukrainian pipelines in the dead of winter.
to supply Poland for more than 200 years at current consumption levels.

**New extraction methods**

Shale gas has only recently been considered a viable option for large-scale exploration and extraction. As noted by Roderick Kieferpütz of the Centre for European Policy Studies, or CEPS, most major energy companies doubted the value of shale gas because of the difficulties — and associated costs — of extracting the gas from rock formations in which it is trapped. Gases and liquids move poorly through compact shale rock. Large-scale shale gas extraction became more feasible with the development of two new drilling techniques: horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing, known in the industry as “fracking.” The process involves drilling down to the gas-rich shale layers and then drilling horizontally to create seams in the rock. Fracking fluid — a mixture of water, sand and various chemicals — is forced into the seams at high pressure, cracking the rock and releasing the trapped gas.

These technologies were developed by American “wildcat” operators, smaller energy companies that stepped into the vacuum created by a lack of interest from the larger companies. Kieferpütz pointed out that continual experimentation and adaptation have improved drilling techniques, reduced costs and created a level of flexibility that is crucial when dealing with the varied geology of shale formations. Shale gas extraction has become so cost effective in North America that the volume of gas production in the U.S. has increased, even as gas prices dropped 67 percent during the international economic downturn.

On the strength of North American shale gas production, the IEA reported that the U.S. passed Russia in 2009 to become the world’s largest gas producer, even though the number of operating wells decreased. In a short period, the U.S. could go from importing gas to exporting it. “The ripple effects of the U.S. ‘shale gale’ are already being felt abroad,” Kieferpütz said in a June 2010 report for CEPS. “With U.S. markets awash with natural gas and prices plummeting to around $4/mBtu [million British thermal units], LNG [liquefied natural gas] tankers have been rerouted to more lucrative markets in Europe, upsetting the status quo with Gazprom losing market share.” In fact, European spot market gas prices were down almost 60 percent in the summer of 2009 from those set in Gazprom’s long-term contracts. The combination of lower priced alternatives and reduced demand from the economic downturn resulted in a 50 billion-cubic-meter decrease in European gas imports from Russia.

Gazprom now faces two troublesome prospects: recouping losses for undelivered gas estimated at $2.5 billion under the terms of “take-or-pay” contracts and potential decoupling of gas prices from high oil prices. North American shale gas production is already contributing to decoupling. Plentiful supplies of gas, cheaply priced relative to oil, are establishing what could soon be a world market with a single, low price. The decoupling of oil and gas prices reduces profits for all gas-exporting nations, especially Russia, whose pipeline delivery system is not as flexible as liquefied natural gas shipped in tankers.

Although Europe’s emergent shale gas industry offers hope that it may, at least partially, replicate the American shale gas sensation, politics, demography, geology and the environment could intervene. GeoForschungsZentrum, Germany’s research center for Earth sciences, is coordinating geological research. The project, called GASH, consists of an “expert task force drawn from research institutions, geological surveys, universities and consultants,” including members from Germany, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Denmark, Austria and the United States, according to the project’s website.
According to GASH's introductory documents, Europe's shale gas, tucked away in deeper, smaller pockets, is harder to reach. That could add to the cost of European gas production. GASH is studying gas concentrations and rock properties ahead of exploratory drilling with the goal of improving efficiency.

**Environmental effects**

The potential for environmental harm from shale gas extraction is still being debated, but evidence suggests the impact could be substantial. Fracking fluid is overwhelmingly composed of water but includes sand and chemicals. The exact formulas vary depending on the makeup of each shale formation. “The top secret solutions used in hydro-fracking are highly toxic. The contamination of local water wells and underground aquifers — although much of the drilling occurs far below the water table — remains a concern,” the Swiss International Relations and Security Network reported.

There are also questions about how to dispose of the fluid after it is extracted from the wellheads. Leaks from waste containment ponds on drill sites have caused localized contamination. Energy companies insist the dangers are overstated and the incidence of environmental contamination are rare. Another concern is where to find water for hydraulic fracturing in environments where water is scarce. However, in terms of air quality, the use of cleaner-burning, carbon-efficient natural gas could reduce pollution in nations, such as Poland, that rely on coal for power.

In more densely populated and highly regulated Europe, the costs of meeting regulatory requirements will be greater, and many promising shale gas sites may be blocked to drilling. Many property owners in the U.S. profited handsomely by selling mineral rights, but in many EU countries those rights are owned by the state, “which leaves local residents with all of the trouble and few of the benefits,” Kefferpütz said. Europe will also have to overcome substantial equipment shortages, according to a report in the *Financial Times*. The U.S. has thousands of gas-drilling rigs and an experienced work force, whereas in the EU, there are only about 50 rigs, resulting in a shortage that requires partnerships with major foreign energy companies with experience in North American gas fields.
**Gas breeds independence**

However, successful exploitation of European shale gas reserves could drastically improve energy security and revolutionize relationships between EU countries and traditional gas-supplying nations. EU nations currently consume almost 550 billion cubic meters annually. “Europe could have as much as 14 trillion cubic meters,” reports *Business New Europe*, enough to meet current demand for 25 years.

European policy choices regarding Russia and Middle Eastern energy producers such as Iran, Saudi Arabia and Algeria are based on the reality of European dependence on energy supplied by those nations. Excluding recent shale gas discoveries, more than half the world’s natural gas resources are concentrated in Russia, Iran and Qatar.

The international community’s attempts to stop Iran’s nuclear program through diplomacy and sanctions have suffered from the recognition that many nations depend on Iran’s oil and gas. Russia has also demonstrated a willingness to use energy as a foreign relations bargaining chip, shutting off gas supplies to Belarus in 2004 and again in June 2010, as well as Ukraine in 2005 and 2009. The Russo-Ukrainian gas crises extended to all of Europe as 80 percent of Russian gas exports to Europe flow through Ukrainian pipelines. Although Gazprom claimed the stoppages were due to payment disputes, EU analysts said Russia was using energy as a cudgel to prevent the pro-Western government of Viktor Yushchenko from establishing closer relations with the EU and NATO. The new pro-Russian Ukrainian government of Viktor Yanukovych recently negotiated discounts on Russian natural gas. The price: Ukraine extended the lease on Russia’s Crimean naval base by an additional 25 years.

European energy security could improve relations between Russia and Ukraine and other countries dependent on Russian gas. Regarding the often-strained Russo-Polish relations, Jane’s Intelligence Review speculates that “the possible end to the supplier-client relationship could actually help reduce bilateral tensions between the two states,” as a more cooperative approach takes hold.

Greater energy independence for Europe could also improve Russia’s political system. Russia’s dependence on energy earnings has inhibited economic modernization and political reform, Anders Åslund of the Peterson Institute for International Economics wrote in an opinion piece for the *Moscow Times*. Huge energy profits improved the standard of living for Russia’s middle class, blunting the appetite for political rights. At the same time, those profits fed a culture of corruption and legal nihilism and “revived the old Soviet schizophrenia between inferiority complex and megalomania.” Åslund sees signs that Russia will emerge from the global financial crisis with a focus on economic modernization and better relations with Europe and the West.

It will take time before Europe realizes the full potential of its shale gas reserves. For example, Poland’s first exploratory well, in the southeastern town of Markowola, was first drilled in April 2010. According to estimates in *Business New Europe*, exploratory drilling could last up to four years, with no appreciable impact on natural gas supplies until at least 2020. Results, however, have been encouraging. If European shale gas production is partly as prolific as in North America, Europe will gain much-improved energy security. Greater energy independence would contribute to political and economic independence for Poland, Ukraine, and other Central and Eastern European countries that are currently vulnerable to the whims of international energy policy. 

Rem Vyakhiriev, president of Russia’s Gazprom company, applauds workers finishing the Polish section of a gas pipeline that links Russia with Western Europe. Polish businessman Aleksander Gudzowaty, right, whose company is involved in the construction, joined Vyakhiriev for the ceremony.
Unmasking Terrorism

Religious and government leaders put a damper on al-Qaida and Taliban recruitment

After more than a decade of using religion to justify terrorist attacks, al-Qaida is facing a growing number of Muslims who consider its philosophy, motivations and membership to be disreputable. Many Islamic experts argue that these extremists represent a movement that tarnishes what they consider to be a virtuous religion. Scholars contend that al-Qaida and Taliban recruiters play not just on religious naïveté and faulty religious convictions, but on basic desires among young men for rough camaraderie and financial gain. In the case of the Taliban, raw financial calculation has come increasingly into play, as radical Muslim leaders entice recruits with pay far in excess of that offered by the Afghan Army. For opponents of al-Qaida and the Taliban, drawing attention to these less-than-pious motivations could be just as important as conventional counterterrorism.
Islamic leaders can provide much of the material needed to toxify the al-Qaida brand. Sheikh Muhammad Sayed Tantawi, grand sheikh of Al-Azhar University in Cairo for 14 years before his death in March 2010, was one of the most prominent and respected moderate voices in the Sunni Muslim world. He denounced attacks on civilian targets and called extremism anti-Islamic. As head of Sunni Islam’s most prestigious theological institute, Tantawi’s opinions and fatwa wield tremendous moral influence and are widely respected. Tantawi called suicide bombers “enemies of Islam” and spoke out against the use of the word “jihad” by extremist groups, noting vast differences in its interpretation. “It is not appropriate to link Islam to terrorism and destruction,” Tantawi told Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Tajik Service in October 2009. “Terrorism means destroying lives of peaceful people, and all religions and humanity condemn it.”

**Terrorist recruitment**

Understanding why one joins an extremist group is an important step in counter-recruitment. According to an international report by the Rand Corporation titled “Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment,” psychological vulnerabilities conducive to terrorist recruitment include a high level of distress or dissatisfaction, cultural disillusionment, lack of inner belief or a value system, a dysfunctional family system, and dependent personality tendencies.

Recognizing extremist group recruitment methods and countering them with effective communication strategies may also hinder al-Qaida’s growth. An August 2008 Centre for European Policy Studies article, “Al Qaeda in the...
Encouraging defections

West as a Youth Movement: The Power of a Narrative," described al-Qaida’s use of a powerful narrative. It can be broken into four parts: an appeal to the [Ummah], the worldwide Muslim community; a call to individuals to become heroes; enlistment of religion; and initiating recruits to fight against the global order. “With respect to these four dimensions of the narrative, it is clear that Al Qaeda would not have such an impact without the amplification effect of the media,” the report stated.

The CEPS report also recommended downplaying al-Qaida as a religious organization, magnifying the group’s failures and exposing the radicals as losers with no future rather than all-powerful freedom fighters. Additionally, efforts to advance democracy, promote freedom of speech, and reduce poverty and corruption could help reduce the number of recruits.

In July 2010, al-Qaida attempted to expand recruiting beyond its traditional borders with an online magazine called Inspire. “Make a Bomb in your Kitchen of Your Mom” and “Sending and Receiving Encrypted Messages” were two articles that appeared. The online publication initially had technical troubles, and only three pages of the 67-page magazine were readable, with the remainder showing only garbled text, the United Kingdom’s Guardian reported. “This new magazine is clearly intended for the aspiring jihadist in the U.S. or U.K. who may be the next Fort Hood murderer or Times Square bomber,” said Brian Riedel, current scholar at the Brookings Institute. Internet propaganda has worked in the past with at least two Americans, Bryant Neal Vinas and Najibullah Zazi. Both are admitted al-Qaida terrorists who connected with the group while in New York and then traveled to Pakistan for terrorist training.

Economics also can play a part in one’s decision to join violent Islamic extremists. Taliban fighters are paid $10 a day, according to Britain’s Telegraph newspaper, compared with $4 a day for Afghan police officers. “The
so-called ‘$10 Taliban’ are said to fight for a day rate because they need the money and have ‘nothing else to do,’ ” the Telegraph reported. The article suggested some Taliban militants aren’t hard-core Islamic militants but unemployed men with few opportunities.

“Reconcilable” Taliban commanders are being approached in hopes that they will take the offer, according to the Guardian. Gen. Richard Barrons, head of the NATO team working to reintegrate former insurgents, said in a Telegraph article in January 2010 that he expected to see Taliban commanders take senior positions within President Hamid Karzai’s administration in the future. Most jobs for former Taliban fighters, the Telegraph says, are expected to be in security services, as part of local militias.

In addition to this initiative, Heinz Fromm of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Germany’s domestic intelligence agency, announced in June 2010 the launch of a telephone hotline for militant Islamists who want to leave extremist groups, according to Der Spiegel magazine. Multilingual specialists will be available to counsel in Turkish, Arabic or German, Fromm said. Interior Minister Thomas de Maiziere described the program as a “valuable preventative effort.”

In 2009, Germany saw a 5 percent rise in radical Islamist group supporters and members from the previous year. Some of these recruits were young Germans newly converted to Islam. De Maiziere attributed this phenomenon to feelings of loss, insecurity and inferiority during puberty, which can make young converts susceptible to radical Islamic groups.

New anti-terror voices
A growing trend of young Islamic televangelists in Saudi Arabia and the Middle East may help this demographic escape the grasp of extremists. Young imams such as Ahmad al-Shugairi, Amr Khaled and Moez Masoud appeal to a young audience, estranged from politics and traditional religion, yet eager for religious identity. Shugairi mixes deep religious commitment with trendy, playful humor. Conveying a moderate message, they say, is the best way to fight Islamic extremism.

Masoud, a 29-year-old Egyptian Muslim televangelist preacher purports that Islam does not justify terrorism. “There is nothing inherent in Islam that would justify terrorism, and that it is completely anti-ethical to the teachings of its tradition...” Masoud said in a March 2008 debate hosted by The Doha Debates, a public forum for dialogue and freedom of speech in Qatar. Masoud’s mission has taken on great importance as terrorists misinterpret what he considers to be a peaceful faith. “It scares me,” the Telegraph reported Masoud saying in February 2008. “It scares me because you can build so much and they just tear it down so quickly. But we can get over it. I really believe that.”

Khaled, another Egyptian Muslim televangelist, takes on Osama bin Laden. “Bin Laden is saying he is talking on behalf of Muslims,” Khaled said in an Islamonline article. “Who asked him to talk on behalf of us? Nobody. But now I’m talking on behalf of millions. They asked me to carry their voice to the world. So please, please listen to these people. Right now the extremists are a minority, but if you don’t do anything, they will be a majority.”

In the end, extremism is fought on many grounds. An article titled “Letter from Afghanistan: Al-Qaeda is a corruption of Islam,” published by the Middle Eastern Kabul Press in February 2010 says: “Despite the hard facts of al-Qaeda and the Taliban’s criminal actions in Islamic countries and elsewhere, some people are ignoring that these are terrorist organizations — corruptions of Islam — and should not be seen as representative of the Muslim faith.”

“It is not appropriate to link Islam to terrorism and destruction. Terrorism means destroying lives of peaceful people, and all religions and humanity condemn it.”

– Sheikh Muhammad Sayed Tantawi
Crackdown on the Kurdistan Workers’ Party
EU nations work with Turkey to disrupt terror group

Turkey’s long-simmering conflict with Kurdish separatists has flared up again with the resumption of bombings and reprisals, but the European Union recommitted itself to reducing outside support for the Kurdish radicals.

The EU, like the United States, has long labeled the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, a terrorist organization. Separatists espousing Marxist-Leninist principles founded the PKK in the 1970s. They have demanded autonomy for Turkey’s estimated 12 million Kurds, an Iranian-speaking people who also live across the Turkish border in Iraq, Syria and Iran. The group also operates under the aliases Kurdish Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK) and Kongra-Gel (KGK).

The year 2010 marked a watershed in which the PKK, the topic of years of Turkish-EU diplomacy, lost a large piece of its European support network.

With a Kurdish population 500,000 strong — Europe’s largest — Germany made headlines with a June 2010 crackdown on social clubs and media outlets accused of affiliations with the PKK. Germany revoked licenses for Kurdish television station Roj TV and a related company called Viko Fernseh Produktion, complementing those efforts with raids on Kurdish organizations in Bremen, Hannover, Berlin and other cities. As reported in Der Spiegel, German intelligence was acting on evidence of an “illegal body of officials actively engaging in conspiracy.”

Similar raids occurred in Denmark and Belgium, with Roj TV as the focus of investigations aimed at confirming links to the PKK and its political wing, Kongra-Gel. According to the Danish newspaper Berlingske Tidende, Kurdish Swede Ibrahim Ayaz, a...
former bodyguard of imprisoned PKK founder Abdullah Öcalan, owns the Copenhagen branch of Roj TV.

The May 2010 raids in Belgium involved 300 police officers and tax inspectors fanning out across 25 locations to detain Kurds suspected of involvement in terrorism, counterfeiting and racketeering, Deutsche Presse-Agentur news agency reported. Just a day earlier, France had charged nine Kurds with recruiting militants for the PKK. Italy and Romania conducted raids of their own. “This action by Belgium, following ... Italy and France, carries a very strong message to groups and organizations providing financial resources for terrorist activities,” Turkish foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu announced after the EU crackdown.

By most accounts, the PKK’s three-decade-long conflict with the Turkish military has cost more than 40,000 lives, most of them Kurdish. The group gets financing through remittances from sympathetic Kurds living abroad, particularly in Europe, as well as through human trafficking and trafficking in drugs and weapons. Evidence abounds that much of Anatolia’s heroin and hashish trade flows through PKK hands. “The drug trade is one of the Kongra-Gel’s most lucrative criminal activities. Nearly 300 individuals connected to the Kongra-Gel were arrested on drug trafficking charges from the mid-1980s through the early 1990s, more than half of them in Germany,” the U.S. Treasury Department reported in 2009.

With an aim of getting the PKK to lay down its arms, the Turkish government launched its “Kurdish Opening” campaign in 2009 promising limited cultural autonomy to Kurds living mostly in the nation’s southeastern corner. Kurds could broadcast in their language and establish a Kurdish language university faculty. But in December 2009, Turkey’s constitutional court banned the country’s biggest Kurdish political group, the Democratic Society Party. Trouble ensued. “The Kurdish regions of southeast Turkey erupted in protests in December in the wake of the ban, and the Turkish government rounded up scores of Kurdish politicians as tensions escalated,” Turkey’s Hürriyet newspaper reported.

By mid-2010, Kurdish militants responded by calling off a cease-fire that had maintained a crude peace for more than a year. In apparent retaliation for the detentions in Germany, PKK guerrillas kidnapped three German mountain climbers on Mount Ararat in June 2010. The hostages were released unharmed two weeks later. Turkey continues to press the EU to extradite Kurds it accuses of abetting terrorism. It is part of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s pledge to end the 26-year ethnic conflict. □
Reflecting on Europe’s Future

EU panel emphasizes immigration, jobs and security

An old classroom exercise urged students to lay out a map of Eurasia and view the land mass from the perspective of China. From that vantage point, the states that make up the European Union appear to be a small appendage to the larger Asia.

That geographical reversal — a swollen Asia increasingly dominating a shrinking Europe — is a major thread that runs through a 46-page report produced by the Reflection Group on the Future of the EU 2030. Presented to the European Council in June 2010, Project Europe 2030: Challenges and Opportunities starkly lays out problems needing the coordinated attention of EU member states lest they slide into irrelevance on the world stage.

Despite maintaining nearly 2 million Soldiers under arms, the EU struggles to mobilize even a few thousand of them for its common defense, the report says. Plunging birth rates will deprive European economies of 68 million workers they need to compete in the world. The report went even further, criticizing Europe for failing to attract skilled immigrants, modernize its universities, curb reliance on imported energy and lower unemployment.

“2010 could mark the beginning of a new phase for the EU, and the next 50 years could be about Europe’s role as an assertive global actor,” declares an early
European Council President Herman Van Rompuy, left, displays the Project Europe 2030 report handed to him by Felipe González, chairman of the Reflection Group on the Future of the EU.
section of the report. “Or, alternatively, the Union and its member states could slide into marginalization, becoming an increasingly irrelevant western peninsula of the Asian continent.”

The Reflection Group is a 12-member panel chaired by former Spanish Prime Minister Felipe González. Prominent on the panel are Lech Wałęsa, the former Polish president and Solidarity union activist; Wolfgang Schuster, mayor of Stuttgart, Germany; and Jorma Ollila, chairman of Finland’s Nokia Corp. The European Council, made up of the EU’s 27 heads of the state, formed the group at its December 2007 meeting, informally dubbing the panel the “group of wise men.”

The team worked independently for more than a year, intentionally avoiding consultation with the 736-member European Parliament. In a June 2010 interview published on the website EurActiv, Žiga Turk, the Slovenian secretary-general of the Reflection Group, explained that he and his colleagues wanted to steer clear of the “Brussels bubble,” which he defined as a worldview obsessed with grand historic projects such as combating global warming. “My feeling is that maybe it’s not time to make history anymore. It may be more boring, and be a lot of hard work, but it’s about making sure Europe is a good place to live, have kids, work, study and do business in,” Turk said in the interview. “Europe must appear attractive to talent and capital from abroad. It’s not historic, but it’s what people expect.”

The EU views itself as a “soft power” that resorts to military engagement as a last resort. But if the EU is to remain a world player in that softer role, its problems are inseparable from the issue of population decline. At the current average birth rate of about 1.3 children per woman — the replacement rate is nearly 2.1 children per woman — the EU will face massive worker shortages requiring at least 100 million immigrants to fill. Although the report notes that such a large number of newcomers is neither “likely” nor “necessarily desirable,” the EU must coordinate and regularize visa applications and border control. An EU-wide blue card, similar to the green card used in the United States, would grant permanent resident status to immigrants, particularly high-skilled immigrants from Asia and elsewhere. The problem is not unique to Europe. Asian economic competitors such as China, Japan and South Korea face plunging populations due to low birth rates.

“Too often immigration is perceived as a burden to be shouldered rather than an opportunity to be seized. Europe has much to learn in this regard from Australia, Canada and the United States, with which it is in direct competition for talented and skilled immigrants,” the report said. “Yet Europe will only become an attractive destination for skilled immigrants if the latter feel accepted, have full access to formal labour markets and the possibility to set up their own businesses.”

The release of Project Europe 2030 coincided with the Greek financial meltdown that shook the eurozone. With the crisis fresh in everyone’s memory, the report warned nations against dumping a single market in favor of economic nationalism. While reaffirming the continent’s commitment to a “social market economy” that stresses redistribution of wealth, the “wise men” pressed the EU to highlight economic growth and job creation, even at the price of trimming some social benefits Europeans have grown accustomed to. Too many Europeans live off
of the public purse though they are years from retirement, the report said. Not only should they return to work but older workers should delay retirement, in some cases to the age of 70. The call to modernization also encompasses universities. Only 27 of the world’s top 100 universities are in Europe, the report noted, with a detrimental effect on scientific research and development. “In the last two decades, the EU’s potential to generate growth and jobs, and consequently to improve living standards, has lagged behind that of its main trading partners,” the report reiterated.

The report also calls for a new “European security model” to deal with an unpredictable world in which terrorism, nuclear weapons and organized crime are durable threats. The Reflection Group suggested greater investment in Frontex, the EU border security agency based in Warsaw. Properly financed, Frontex could provide member states with a uniform and integrated border control force. The report also notes that Europe spends about half of what the United States does on its combined militaries, but can project forces overseas at a rate of only 10 percent to 15 percent of U.S. capabilities. Investment is lacking in air transport, helicopters, military police and tactical communications.

“With 1.8 million Soldiers under arms — half a million more than the U.S. — the EU is not capable of deploying a 60,000-strong rapid intervention force and it finds it hard to deliver a 5,000-strong force for a Common Security and Defense Policy mission,” the report said.

Some critics of the Reflection Group suggest its report, like others produced by specially selected committees over the years, will receive only a brief hearing before being unceremoniously shelved. As they emerged in May and June, the findings of the report were, in fact, partly drowned out by the contemporaneous Greek crisis. Others accused the “wise men” of working in undemocratic secrecy.

Others complained that EU guidelines unnecessarily constrained the report. “To reflect about the long-term future without being allowed to consider changes to the basic institutional structure of an entity (i.e. the Treaties of the EU) does not invite inordinate creativity,” German political scientist Cornelius Adebahr wrote on the website Global Policy. “But in such a situation, it would have been better for the Group to show the leadership they are asking from others: by either bravely going beyond their mandate, or by refusing to work within such limitations.”

In defense of her work, former Latvian President Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga, vice chair of the Reflection Group, urged the EU to keep the report’s recommendations front and center, even if those recommendations call for sacrifice. “This report of the ‘group of wise men’ is a moral exhortation to European leaders,” Vīķe-Freiberga said in a June 2010 interview published on the French website www.touteleurope.fr. “Short-term thinking is the root of our democratic crisis.”

NATO’s Comprehensive Approach

CIMIC branch focuses on civilian-military cooperation

By Stijn Pz. van Weezel. The author works as an intern at the Civil-Military Co-operation Centre of Excellence (CCOE). The article reflects his views alone and not necessarily those of the CCOE.

Over the last decade international conflict management has undergone significant changes. Increased complexity demands a new approach to face these challenges and streamline the efforts of various stakeholders, both civilian and military. An integrated approach has been adopted in the policy and planning doctrines of various organizations and nations. But when it comes to implementation, it seems fine tuning is needed to make it work more effectively and efficiently. The term used by NATO for this kind of approach is Comprehensive Approach, or CA. This article will deal with the Alliance’s contribution to CA, giving special attention to the use of the Civil-Military Co-operation doctrine, or CIMIC for short.

The end of Clausewitz?
Violent conflicts in states such as Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Sudan have captured global attention. The international community often spends huge amounts of money to deploy troops and facilitate diplomatic efforts to broker a peace. In the last 20 years there has been a steep increase in the number of peace operations involving new players such as NATO, the EU, and the African Union. Despite the profound attention these conflicts or emergencies receive, most conflicts resume within five years of a peace agreement. Throughout the world we can distinguish several regional clusters of war, including Afghanistan/Pakistan, the Horn of Africa and the Balkans. These new types of conflicts are hard to contain. Belligerents don’t behave like parties to wars envisioned by von Clausewitz. Their goals and tactics are different. The warring parties are a combination of state and non-state actors organized in loose horizontal networks, rather than hierarchical militaries. The influx of new actors has changed the character of war as these new types of conflicts are more and more a mixture of political conflict, human rights violations and crime. Furthermore, modern violent conflicts are significantly influenced by social, economical, and environmental factors.

To resolve these type of conflicts, the sole use of traditional military tools (stop violence, defeat the enemy) is not adequate. As a result we have also seen that modern peace operations have expanded their tasks. Not only does a peace operation need to guarantee a cease fire, separate warring parties and monitor a peace process, it must also implement comprehensive peace agreements and help with reconstruction. The military alone lacks the capacities to overcome these challenges because it is not equipped to carry out civil tasks. It needs enhanced help from civilian agencies to fill the humanitarian gap via civil-military interaction. Such an approach is needed because of the many linkages that exist between security and development.

NATO’s reaction
The experience of NATO in Kosovo and Afghanistan led to the development of the Comprehensive Approach in late 2004. Despite extensive efforts there still is no single binding idea about what CA should be or operationalized. Progress on CA has been slow and large disagreement exists within the alliance if NATO even wants to look into further developing CA and enhancing civilian capabilities. At the 2010 Lisbon summit, the Alliance stressed that a comprehensive political, civilian and military approach is a must for effective crisis management. And it addressed incentives to actively engage other actors in the international community to manage crises.

At a NATO stakeholder meeting in September 2010, the Comprehensive Approach was defined as the synergy of all actors and actions of the international community through the co-ordination and de-conflicting of political, development, and security capabilities to face today’s challenges. This is a conceptual framework to describe civil military interaction. NATO uses the term to stress the need for the international community to improve co-operation and coordination of crisis management instruments.

Where the Comprehensive Approach is a political-civilian process, CIMIC is a military organization that facilitates cooperation between the military and civilians. CIMIC’s origins can be traced to Civil Affairs units in the U.S. Army during the World War II and the Vietnam War and by the British in the 1950s to support counter insurgency operations. Apart from its civilian leadership, NATO has no deployable, operational civilian capacity. Its focus on civil-military co-operation is therefore via the civilian agencies that are outside its military parameters but present in...
Since the 1990s, the Alliance has progressed into the civilian sphere, making CIMIC a vital part of its operations and missions.

CIMIC is a complex process linking military contribution and civil contribution within comprehensive and cohesive actions to help stabilize societies. In theater, it is the non-combat function through which the military commander links with the civilian organizations active in his field of operations. It is an operational support tool that integrates the political, security, development, economic, rule of law, human rights and humanitarian dimensions. The three core functions of CIMIC are: support to the armed forces, through military planning and operations; support to the civil environment, through information and advice for civilian agencies; and civil-military liaison.

The Comprehensive Approach should be seen as a mindset to implement reconstruction and development to supply the local population with what it needs, whereas CIMIC is the method through which these efforts can be made. CIMIC is essential in the implementation of the Comprehensive Approach because it is the primary military tool through which the Alliance interacts with civilian agencies. Progress on developing civilian capabilities within NATO and engaging with civilian agencies has met with challenges.

How civil is CIMIC?
Ideally, a successful Comprehensive Approach would combine short term crisis response and stabilization with long term assistance and reconstruction. It should effectively coordinate the overarching process of civilian and military actors engaging at the various levels covering the whole spectrum of interactions in crisis response. CIMIC’s role in this would be to help a military commander steer the process with civilian agencies to reach the desired mission objective. The implementation of both doctrines has not been smooth, probably due to the perceived military ownership. There are large disagreements between member nations about what NATO’s role and tasks should be, and inherent to this discussion is whether the Alliance should engage further in extended peace operations and develop civilian capabilities.

In Afghanistan there is a wide range of adaptations of CIMIC in the field and this necessarily does not contribute to synchronization with the population. Because there is no binding NATO CIMIC doctrine, every country can implement it as it likes. In practice, this encourages Provincial Reconstruction Teams to go for quick wins such as handing out toys to children or opening a medical clinic. Such actions guarantee a nice photo opportunity but may undermine the sustainability of long term projects. There is sometimes little focus on developing a long term plan to meet the needs of a village or district.

Aside from the intra-NATO strife, the Alliance also has difficulties engaging civilian agencies. Owing to largely to civilian suspicions, the relationship between NATO and nongovernmental organizations hasn’t fully evolved. Some NGOs are reluctant to collaborate with the military. This makes aligning activities difficult and hampers the overall civil-military effort in a crisis area. This alignment is crucial, however, for CIMIC to add value. A more efficient coordination is needed to avoid duplication of efforts, resolve conflict and help affected populations. Both parties are aware of this misalignment, but cultural and organizational differences make coordination a challenge. The political interests directing military missions and CIMIC can appear to undermine NGO projects.

A way ahead
Some progress has been made regarding the contribution of CIMIC within NATO’s Comprehensive Approach. One important and urgent issue is standardization of CIMIC doctrine. For CIMIC to be of more significant value, it should become more prominent in military planning. The future will likely engage NATO in more non-article V operations. It should be prepared to operate in conflict situations where humanitarian skills are essential. The tasks the military has to perform in Afghanistan are often ad hoc and include a wide range of activities. CIMIC should focus on supplying humanitarian assistance, hand over ownership of a region to the local government and people as quickly as possible, and engage civilian agencies to deploy structural assistance projects.

NATO should enhance pre-deployment training and exercises with civilian agencies on all levels. Furthermore, both parties should keep each other informed at all levels. In future crisis management operations, the Alliance will need to rely on its ability to liaise and cooperate with civilian agencies, part of the shift of focus towards human security. This collaboration should take place not only in the field but also at the planning level.

An important aspect is training and educating CIMIC personnel. There is a shortage of deployable civilian personnel and rapid turnover. The incorporation of more functional specialists, could contribute to better needs assessment, better liaising with civilian agencies and better execution of CIMIC doctrine. Adding only a tribal or development advisor doesn’t contribute extensively to CIMIC capabilities.

Conclusions
Complex emergencies pose interdependent problems that must be dealt with simultaneously. NATO tries to accomplish this with a Comprehensive Approach and the deployment of CIMIC. Afghanistan has shown how challenging it is to implement new doctrines. To overcome these challenges NATO is moving from a narrow military understanding of CIMIC to a more holistic approach. Furthermore, doctrine implementation requires capacities and common frame of reference in order to standardize CIMIC doctrine. The first step has been underlining the importance of the Comprehensive Approach at the Lisbon Summit. Further steps will include change in the areas of planning, classification of data, development of capacities and doctrinal implementation. This will smooth relations with civilian agencies and eventually deliver a more sustainable contribution.

For a more complete version of the story visit: http://www.cimic-coe.org/
Russia’s Islamic Threat

By Gordon M. Hahn
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007, 368 pages
Reviewed by Sharyl N. Cross
Professor, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies

Gordon M. Hahn’s Russia’s Islamic Threat is an invaluable contribution to the limited Western academic literature on a topic of critical relevance to contemporary international security. Hahn’s work makes clear that the Russian Federation stands among one of several fronts in the worldwide ideological terrorist struggle. There is no question that the Chechen wars corresponded with the wave of desire for independence sweeping several former Soviet republics following the collapse of the empire. At the same time, the internationalist, ideological and tactical links established by the Chechen resistance to global revolutionary insurgency/terrorist networks received only limited attention in academic analysis or policy debates concerning the conflict.

Hahn’s meticulously researched work leaves no doubt that contemporary insurgent/terrorist elements in the North Caucasus established ties of varying degree to al-Qaida and the broader affiliated global terrorist network. These al-Qaida networked groups, operating within and outside the territory of the Russian Federation, share the common goal of dismantling the current international order and installing a caliphate based on an extremist interpretation of Shariah law. Hahn contends that this radically inspired “Islamist network” was based among Chechen-led insurgents, but spans the Muslim republics of the North Caucasus and includes to a “lesser extent” activity in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan.

Hahn’s work includes abundant primary source materials citing countless statements by Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and other leading actors in al-Qaida and affiliated terrorist groups referencing the significance of the Chechen insurgency resistance, and the ultimate aim of creating a “southern Eurasian” or initially more limited “North Caucasian caliphate.” Hahn notes that militants of the North Caucasus use the familiar terms of the self-identified global “jihadists,” describing Moscow as the “far enemy,” and using the term “near enemy” in confronting security officials within local communities.

Beyond establishing a rich array of political, economic, social and demographic factors that might contribute to terrorist or secessionist challenges from Muslim communities in the Russian Federation, Hahn is quite convincing in defining factors likely to “constrain” or limit the challenge. Hahn identifies ethnic and clan divisions and cleavages among Russia’s Muslim population, conflicts between Tatars and Bashkirs, and extensive differences among Sunni, Shia, and Sufi traditions as likely to limit the potential for unification of Russia’s Muslim community into a threat to central authority or regional security.

With all the strengths of this work, there are some concerns that should be noted. The title referencing the “Islamic threat” is undoubtedly objectionable. Terminology should be carefully chosen to convey the exact nature of the threat and to avoid offense. Religious authorities and community leaders of the Islamic tradition have routinely denounced terrorist acts, and the extremist ideological interpretations disseminated by al-Qaida and its affiliates. This issue arises repeatedly in Western scholarship and policy discussion, and it is no easy task to find the right descriptive language, particularly when these terrorist movements refer to the Quran, jihad, and their faith as providing the ideological impetus for their violent actions and world vision.

Nevertheless, a more constructive and accurate title would include avoiding any reference to “Islam” with “threat” or “terrorism.” At the very least, however, employing the term “Islamist” in establishing the political orientation of these groups would have been preferable to referencing Islam in a negative context. Muslims find references such as “militant extremism/terrorism,” “bin Ladenism,” or “Qutbism” less objectionable in disassociating their religion from the zealots who have attempted to interpret the teaching of one of the world’s major religious faiths to serve political ends. Certainly, citizens of Muslim communities in Russia and throughout the world are potential victims of these terrorist networks, and their support has and will continue to be critical for achieving any progress in the overall global counterterrorism effort. Western societies can’t expect to build security cooperation with Muslims by alienating their communities with references casting the Islamic religious faith in a negative light.

In addition, although Hahn demonstrates considerable analytical sophistication in weaving together an interdisciplinary, theoretically informed analysis of the sources.
of contemporary extremism/terrorism in Russia, the causal relationships between factors identified are not uniformly convincing. Hahn cites poverty in Muslim regions in the North Caucasus as enhancing vulnerability to terrorist recruitment/activity. However, countless experts have rightly noted that the linkage between poverty and terrorism has not been well established.

Further, Hahn cites the demographic shift in Russia toward a vastly expanding Muslim population as constituting a threat. In what appears to be an obviously contradictory trend that could influence the author’s conclusions concerning the long-term impact of Russia’s demographic equation, Hahn describes the common ground developing between the Russian Orthodox and Islamic faiths in challenging the perceived adverse affects of Western globalization. The author discusses the growing influence of the “Eurasianist” school among Russia’s elite that argues that unity among Russia’s Eurasian ethnic groups is vital for consolidating Russia’s place as a great power capable of confronting the influence of the United States/Western nations and globalization. In short, looking to the future, one can’t assume that a growing Muslim population in the Russia Federation will result in clashes among civilizations or a greater threat of secession/terrorism.

Hahn concludes by offering a number of important policy recommendations. Hahn is absolutely correct to underscore the importance of limiting the potential for terrorist acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, and for strengthening U.S., Russian and broader international intelligence cooperation. Hahn’s suggestions to “urge” the Russian leadership to protect the political, civil and human rights of Muslim citizens, to restore elements of federalism, and to provide economic support to the North Caucasus are all constructive. However, at this juncture, any attempt on the part of the United States to pressure or urge the Russian leadership on domestic issues will surely be viewed as inappropriate interference and potentially counterproductive.

The U.S. and the Russian Federation share a vital common interest in countering the global terrorist threat. Considerable progress was achieved in building counterterrorism cooperation during the Bush-Putin years via the U.S.-Russia Working Group on Counter Terrorism and other bilateral channels. With sufficient passage of time after the Georgian intervention, the circumstances might be perfect for the new administrations in both countries to once again elevate the terrorist challenge to a central issue for the bilateral agenda. Any successes will require not only close cooperation between the two countries, but also both the United States and Russia working with Muslim nations to build effective intelligence, financial, cyber and information efforts that will help to delegitimize the ideology of militant extremism over the long term among vulnerable populations spanning the globe.

This is a balanced and objective case study that will stand as a major book in the current literature in international security and terrorism studies. Hahn’s analysis unquestionably helps to unravel the sources of a prime security challenge for the Russian Federation and the broader world community and provides a valuable resource for policymakers, counterterrorism professionals and academics.

Editor’s note: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, the U.S. European Command, the Department of Defense or the U.S. government. First published in the Journal of Slavic Military Studies.
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