

per Concordiam

Journal of European Security and Defense Issues

■ **“EUROPLOT” DISSECTED**

Germany's radicalization challenges

■ **CHANGING MINDS**

Deradicalizing violent extremists

■ **YOUTH EXTREMISM**

Europe stresses early prevention

■ **CENTRES OF EXCELLENCE**


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STOPPING
THE SPREAD OF
VIOLENT EXTREMISM

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Welcome to the 13th issue of *per Concordiam*, in which we encourage readers to seek a deeper understanding of the topic of violent extremism. It is our hope that this issue will help develop cooperative approaches to dealing with this global threat to peace and stability.

It is important to note the Marshall Center's recent efforts toward building a better understanding of violent extremism. In September 2012, the Marshall Center hosted a Senior Executive Seminar in conjunction with NATO's International Senior Enlisted Seminar. The seminar's title was "Beyond Al Qaeda: How to Understand and Counter Violent Extremism."

These events provided a forum for interactive discussion and collaborative study facilitated by scholars, practitioners, and senior civilian and military leaders. During six days of study, participants focused on the contributing factors of violent extremism. The Marshall Center set the stage to help current and future policymakers shape a common understanding of this very complex topic.

Here are a few key ideas to ponder as you read this quarter's magazine:

- Violent extremism remains a significant transnational problem with deep roots in increasingly globalized societies. The spread of violent extremism threatens not only domestic security but also the security of whole regions as well.
- Extremist ideology, whether religiously or politically motivated, is a key driver of violence throughout the world. Although sources of radicalization may vary from culture to culture, extremists nurtured on those ideologies can strike at the core of any society.
- The past two years have seen notable successes against violent extremists. The world has an opportunity to sustain the momentum gained by the deaths of many violent extremist leaders, most notably Osama bin Laden. Evidence is emerging that mainstream Muslims increasingly reject radical religious narrative.

Never forget that extremists of all persuasions pose a danger to global security. This subject must be examined with due diligence. Fighting violent extremism must be done with determination but also with insight. All of us can assist each other in developing a better understanding of this complex issue. Therefore, we welcome comments and perspectives on violent extremism and will include your responses in future editions of the journal. Our email address is editor@perconcordiam.org

Our next edition will center on the theme of NATO's future. We will discuss NATO's current status and how it can evolve to meet the security environment of the future. The following issue will highlight perspectives on Turkey and how its defense and security posture influences overall European security.

Sincerely,

Keith W. Dayton
Director



Keith W. Dayton

Director, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies

Keith W. Dayton retired as a Lieutenant General from the U.S. Army in late 2010 after more than 40 years of service. His last assignment on active duty was as U.S. Security Coordinator to Israel and the Palestinian Authority in Jerusalem. An artillery officer by training, he also has served as politico-military staff officer for the Army in Washington, D.C., and U.S. defense attaché in Russia. He worked as director of the Iraqi Survey Group for Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq. He earned a Senior Service College Fellowship to Harvard University and served as the Senior Army Fellow on the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. Gen. Dayton has a bachelor's degree in history from the College of William and Mary, a master's degree in history from Cambridge University and another in international relations from the University of Southern California.

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Cecilia Malmström is the EU Commissioner for Home Affairs, a job in which she has focused on police cooperation, border control, asylum and migration, including efforts to create a joint immigration policy acceptable to all European Union member states. She was the Swedish minister for EU affairs from 2006 to 2010 and a member of the European Parliament from 2001 to 2006. Commissioner Malmström earned a bachelor's degree and a doctorate in political science from Göteborg University.

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James K. Wither has been a faculty member at the Marshall Center since 2000. He is professor of national security studies and director of the senior and international fellows programs. He is a member of the teaching faculty for the Program in Terrorism and Security Studies and the Program in Advanced Security Studies. Professor Wither also taught counterterrorism at the FBI Academy as an adjunct professor at the University of Virginia. He is a retired British Army officer and former researcher at the Imperial War Museums in London.



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Countering Violent Extremism

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The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies is a German-American partnership founded in 1993. The center promotes dialogue and understanding between European, Eurasian, North American and other nations. The theme of its resident courses and outreach events: Most 21st century security challenges require international, interagency and interdisciplinary response and cooperation.

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In this issue, *per Concordiam* tries to capture the essence of the Marshall Center's Senior Executive Seminar (SES) that occurred in September 2012. The SES was a concentrated six-day event during which international senior leaders expanded their understanding of violent extremism. This remarkably successful event was combined with NATO's International Senior Enlisted Seminar, which also focused on countering violent extremism. At the conclusion of the SES, many senior military and civilian leaders left the Marshall Center more enlightened, academically empowered and committed to a shared framework to address violent extremism. As always, we hope to continue this much needed dialogue.

Cecilia Malmström, the EU Commissioner for Home Affairs, leads this issue with a thought-provoking viewpoint article. She provides a high-level perspective of European challenges and cooperative efforts to counter violent extremism. Commissioner Malmström describes the significant progress Europe has made toward establishing a continentwide deradicalization network.

Our first feature article is written by professor Hamed El-Said of Manchester Metropolitan University. His article, "Rehabilitating Radicals," highlights successful programs in mostly Muslim countries to lead radicals away from violence and suggests the programs serve as models for other nations.

Dr. Guido Steinberg of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs provides the next piece, titled "The Jihadist Threat in Germany." As part of an analysis of extremism trends in his country, Dr. Steinberg describes how the German government thwarted the Europlot, a scheme by homegrown terrorists to bomb targets in the Federal Republic.

Our next contributors are Ralph D. Heinz, a German lawyer specializing in international law and human rights, and Lt. Oliver Bühring of the Bundeswehr. In their article, "A Focus on Youth," they discuss how European governments are addressing the problem of disenfranchised youth by evaluating their susceptibility to violent ideologies. The authors also highlight and compare extremism prevention and deradicalization efforts in Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden.

The final feature article was written by the Marshall Center's own James K. Wither. Titled "Lessons from Great Britain," Mr. Wither's article details the United Kingdom's perspective on violent extremism and the country's ongoing efforts to develop a national counterterrorism policy that balances security and freedom. Mr. Wither has also been tremendously supportive of *per Concordiam* while serving as a special advisor for this issue. Thank you once again for your interest in the Marshall Center's quarterly professional journal.

Please contact us at editor@perconcordiam.org. We encourage feedback and email as part of an ongoing dialogue on important defense and security issues. Each issue is available online at the Marshall Center website: <http://www.marshallcenter.org/mcp-publicweb/en/nav-main-ap-publications.html>

— *per Concordiam* editorial staff



per Concordiam magazine addresses security issues relevant to Europe and Eurasia and aims to elicit thoughts and feedback from readers. We hope our previous issues accomplished this and helped stimulate debate and an exchange of ideas. Please continue to share your thoughts with us in the form of letters to the editor that will be published in this section. Please keep letters as brief as possible, and specifically note the article, author and magazine edition to which you are referring. We reserve the right to edit all letters for language, civility, accuracy, brevity and clarity.

Send feedback via email to: editor@perconcordiam.org

ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS

per Concordiam is a moderated journal with the best and brightest submitted articles and papers published each quarter. We welcome articles from readers on security and defense issues in Europe and Eurasia.

First, email your story idea to editor@perconcordiam.org in an outline form or as a short description. If we like the idea, we can offer feedback before you start writing. We accept articles as original contributions. If your article or similar version is under consideration by another publication or was published elsewhere, please tell us when submitting the article. If you have a manuscript to submit but are not sure it's right for the quarterly, email us to see if we're interested.

As you're writing your article, please remember:

- **Offer fresh ideas.** We are looking for articles with a unique perspective from the region. We likely will not publish articles on topics already heavily covered in other security and foreign policy journals.
- **Connect the dots.** We'll publish an article on a single country if the subject is relevant to the region or the world.
- **Do not assume a U.S. audience.** The vast majority of *per Concordiam* readers are from Europe and Eurasia. We're less likely to publish articles that cater to a U.S. audience. Our mission is to generate candid discussion of relevant security and defense topics, not to strictly reiterate U.S. foreign policy.
- **Steer clear of technical language.** Not everyone is a specialist in a certain field. Ideas should be accessible to the widest audience.
- **Provide original research or reporting to support your ideas.** And be prepared to document statements. We fact check everything we publish.
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Email manuscripts as Microsoft Word attachments to: editor@perconcordiam.org

EU Versus Extremism

Europe must respond to the radicalization threat before it turns violent

By Cecilia Malmström,
EU Commissioner for Home Affairs

The list of terrorist attacks carried out by individuals, acting on their own or with limited contacts with terrorist groups, gets longer and longer. And while we were trying to understand the reasons behind Anders Behring Breivik's horrific attack in Utøya, we witnessed another man, Mohamed Merah, killing innocent people in France. Sadly, I believe it's only a matter of time before we read about the next attack on European soil.

The terrorist threat has somewhat shifted away from organized groups to individuals, who are harder to detect and whose actions are harder to predict. To prevent further tragedies, we must adapt to meet this new challenge to our counterterrorism capabilities. Our response must be informed by a deeper understanding of the processes that lead to radicalization.

So far, we – meaning both the European Commission and many European Union member states – have not done enough. Violent extremism is not, and has never been, limited to one set of political views or ideologies. Some have been known to say that “violent extremism is not a problem in our country – we see no threat from al-Qaida.” They could not be more wrong.

The potential for violent extremism exists in all countries. It may manifest itself in different forms, be it right-wing or left-wing extremism, separatism or religiously motivated extremism, but it is always characterized by bloodshed and the scars it leaves on society. From now on, addressing violent extremism must be at the heart of the EU's counterterrorism policy.

But the nature of the challenge requires a different response than the role traditionally provided by police. Instead, we need a wider response involving nongovernmental organizations, civil society groups, community leaders and others. The problems of terrorism and radicalization are international, but the solutions are often local.

In addition to offering financial and political support for projects, the commission launched the EU Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) in 2011. Its aim is to support member states in finding better ways to counter violent extremism.

Some countries have a large amount of experience in tackling these threats; others have been less exposed. But the shadow of terrorism looms large over all of us, and we must help each other to prevent the worst from happening.

The EU Radicalisation Awareness Network is an EU-wide network of practitioners involved in countering violent extremism – teachers, social workers, police officers, religious leaders, researchers and others. The network is piecing together a jigsaw of local knowledge into a European-wide picture. It will use this knowledge to help us answer some of the big questions about radicalization – why do people decide to attack the society that

EU Commissioner for Home Affairs Cecilia Malmström, center, joins Norwegian Minister for Justice and Public Security Grete Faremo and French Minister of the Interior Manuel Valls at a high level January 2013 conference in Brussels to discuss countering violent extremism.

EUROPEAN COMMISSION





EU Commissioner for Home Affairs Cecilia Malmström, left, hosts the inaugural meeting of the Radicalisation Awareness Network in Brussels in 2011. Other attendees included Malmström's EU colleagues Erik Windmar, Marie-Ange Balbinot and Gilles de Kerchove. AFP/GETTY IMAGES

raised them? How can we prevent people from straying onto the path of extremism?

The network met in January 2013 at a high-level conference in Brussels, where local experts met with justice and home affairs ministers from several EU countries. Leading up to the meeting, several RAN working groups presented concrete recommendations for member states.

Among the policy proposals was a plan to set up exit strategies or de-radicalisation programs in all EU countries to help individuals leave violent extremist groups. Local police all over Europe should also be trained how to spot signs of radicalization among suspects.

Another important area is the role of victims. It is important to spread their testimonies to highlight the tragic consequences of terrorist acts. The increasingly sophisticated use of the Internet and social media as a propaganda tool for terrorists adds one more layer to our challenge.

The Radicalisation Awareness Network will work to support those who denounce terrorism and make their voices heard. But this message must be credible. Terrorists will shut themselves off if the message comes from the “enemy state” they have been primed to despise.

We will use personal stories of extremism to debunk the myth that terrorism is exciting, glamorous or glorious. These messages are powerful and may influence that lonely,

disfranchised young man sitting in a basement, building his view of the world through online message boards.

Our discussions at the 2013 conference also revolved around how violent extremism is fueled by a growing wave of xenophobia in many EU countries. Today, extremism is crawling into the mainstream. The growing right-wing extremist and xenophobic movements in Europe are a springboard for violence, but around the EU there are countries that do not take this development as seriously as they should. We are bringing together policymakers with those who work in the field because we want to effect real change.

The Radicalisation Awareness Network has come a long way in its work, thanks to the excellent people we have on board, but as the British say, “The proof is in the pudding.” Ultimately the network will be judged on the results we hope and expect it will deliver. The goal is to develop jointly a better toolbox for the EU by the end of 2013.

While a truly European response is crucial, we must not forget the importance of our international partners. For example, the EU and the United States have agreed to step up cooperation in this field. As we share many of the same problems, we need to pool our resources.

We cannot afford to be complacent if we are to stem the diverse and growing threat from violent extremism. We have to stay ahead of the curve. □

Rehabilitating Radicals



Muslim states have devised innovative programs to help counter violent extremism

By Professor Hamed El-Said, Manchester Metropolitan University

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Terrorism remains one of the major threats facing the world. The death of Osama bin Laden, the former leader of al-Qaida, has not ushered in a new era of peace, free from terrorist threats. Despite that more than a decade has passed since 9/11, which instigated a long “war on terror,” terrorism remains a large problem. There is a growing consensus among scholars, state officials and practitioners that we have mismanaged the fight against radicalism and its offspring, violent extremism. One of the main protagonists of this line of argument is former British Foreign Minister David Miliband, who blatantly stated in 2009 that we were “wrong” in our approach to countering these

phenomena, and that the notion of war on terror has led to prolonging the fight against terrorism and “caused more harm than good.”

These developments have led to a “renewed interest on how and why terrorism ends” (John Horgan and Kurt Braddock, 2010). This renewed interest in the question of what leads an individual or group to leave terrorism has been encouraged and motivated by the emergence and/or implementation of some innovative approaches, mostly by and in Muslim-majority states. These approaches carry different names and terminologies but are generally known in the West as counterradicalization and deradicalization programs.

According to a 2010 study by the New York-based think tank, the International Peace Institute, “deradicalization programs ... have been deemed more successful than military approaches and less likely to foment a new generation of violent extremists.” In his work on Saudi Arabia, the late Carnegie scholar Christopher Boucek reached similar conclusions. Petrus Golose, while analyzing the Indonesian deradicalization program for *The Jakarta Post* in 2009, concluded that “deradicalization programs are the best measures to eradicate terrorism and radicalism, as these programs will touch the issues to their deepest roots.” The author has recently carried out the largest and most comprehensive study of such programs in Muslim-majority states (El-Said and Harrigan, 2012). This work has shown that “soft” measures implemented under the rubric of counterradicalization and deradicalization have indeed proved more effective than purely military approaches in countering radicalization and violent extremism, particularly in reducing the rates of terrorist incidences and recidivism and have achieved other unintended but no less significant benefits and spillovers.

This article focuses on those counterradicalization and deradicalization policies (counter-de-rad), often also referred to as “soft” approaches to countering terrorism. Section two sheds some light on conditions conducive to successful counter-de-rad programs. The third section of the article describes some of the key components of successful programs. The article concludes with some remarks.

Counter-de-rad programs

Counterradicalization is a term often used to describe measures and policies implemented to prevent the emergence or rise of radicalism and violent extremism in society. Deradicalization, on the other hand, refers to policies and measures that attempt to deradicalize groups and individuals who have already crossed the line and become radicals and/or violent extremists. Although this is not the first time the world faces the phenomenon of terrorism (for details on the history, see Annette Hubschle, 2006, and Walter Laqueur, 2007), this current wave differs from its predecessors in at least three important ways (Michael Czinkota, et al., 2010).

First, the current wave is more global in the sense that no one country is immune to its threat. The previous waves of terrorism characteristically took place at the local or national level. Second, terrorism today is far more brutal, violent, indiscriminatory and sudden, which makes it difficult to predict, plan and prepare for. Today’s terrorists have shown an unprecedented willingness to plan and mount devastating attacks with enormous loss of life. 9/11 and the attacks in Madrid, London, Istanbul, Amman and Riyadh, among others, have demonstrated the unpredictability, ferocity and indiscriminatory nature of terrorists. Finally, while previous waves of terrorism were motivated primarily by nationalism, separatism, Marxist ideology and socio-economic inequality, new terrorism is more dutifully and ideologically inspired.

This makes it “especially dangerous” to counter somebody who believes he is engaged in a struggle of good against evil and justifies violence used to achieve his objectives (Czinkota et al., 2010).

“New terrorism,” therefore, is more ideologically oriented and religiously inspired. This is true despite the fact that “religion is not the essence,” but it is rather used to justify acts of violence (Rik Coolsaet and Struye de Swielande, 2008). As a result, this type of terrorism cannot be won militarily. The terrorists’ approach and ideology suffer from a weak ideological standing, one that is politically inept and religiously misinterpreted, distorted and misunderstood. This, therefore, is not a war on terror: It is a battle of ideas, the core of which is an attempt to win hearts and minds. We need to defeat terrorists’ ideology and actions not only by theological and theoretical refutation but also by what Ami Angell and Rohan Gunaratna (2011) described as “the use of smart power;” which goes beyond the use of a military approach to incorporate “the strategic fight – the battle of ideas.” To do this, we first need to understand the ideologies and ideas of terrorists and expose and delegitimize them wherever they exist. We also need to understand the grievances of the communities from which they emerge and on whose behalf they claim to act. It’s from these communities that terrorists draw sympathy.

Not surprisingly then, the focus has recently shifted toward how and why terrorism ends. This shift has been motivated by a growing recognition that the war on terror prolonged the fight and dragged on longer than expected, in parallel with the emergence of some innovative “smart” approaches to counter terrorism in some countries. The superiority of smart approaches to purely military strategies and their tendency to avoid fomenting “a new generation of violent extremists” have lent them more exposure and rigor and drawn attention to their mechanisms, components and conditions conducive to creating pathways out of terrorism.

The smart and soft approaches to terrorism that we are about to discuss vary broadly, with differing objectives, subjects, aims, forms, location of implementation, parties involved, resources devoted to them, and social and political settings where they are implemented. All of them, however, are generally oriented and geared toward peacefully moving groups and individuals away from violent extremism.

A survey carried out by the author and published by the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force in 2008 showed that only a handful of member states were engaged in implementing some meaningful counter-de-rad programs that employ “smart” measures. The overwhelming majority of member states had no such policies. These ironically included most Western countries which, despite rhetoric, have not followed through with policies. They continue to rely on a traditional “security first” approach to counter terrorism threats. As Angell and Gunaratna (2011) noted: A strategic smart approach to counter violent extremism “remains the exception worldwide ... not the norm.”



REUTERS

Pakistani men learn to operate sewing machines in April 2012 at a deradicalization center run by the Pakistani army in Gulibagh in the Swat Valley. Military officers, trainers, clerics and psychologists run three-month courses designed to quell “radical thoughts” of those accused of aiding the Taliban.

Conditions of successful programs

Despite increased popularity of soft counter-de-rad policies, “even the most basic of facts about these programs remains limited” (Horgan and Braddock, 2010). The authors have undertaken the largest inventory of such programs, surveying more than 15 United Nations member states known to have decent counter-de-rad programs (El-Said and Harrigan, 2012). The findings in this article draw heavily on this ongoing research.

Our work has revealed important insights into conditions conducive to successful counter-de-rad programs, both at macro (general environment) and micro (program) levels. At least five macro-environmental conditions seem necessary for the successful implementation of a soft approach to countering violent extremism.

First is the strength of the state. Failed or failing states are magnets for terrorist groups and individuals. They encourage radical and even not-so-radical individuals and groups to take up arms against the state and other factions in society, as in the case of Algeria in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when many individuals and groups simply “feared being on the losing side” (the state). Failing states such as Somalia, Yemen and Afghanistan have also attracted hundreds of terrorists. This led Omar Ashour (2009) to argue that repression is one of three necessary and key factors behind the abandonment of violent extremism (VE) at an organizational level. Repression, however, can lead to further radicalization and violence. Strong states, instead, signal that they are willing and able to defend the status quo. This is why strong states have proven more competent in successfully countering the rise of radicalism in their societies and fashioning effective de-rad programs.

Second, the developmental capacity of the state matters. Not all Muslim-majority states suffer from the threat of VE, or suffer from it to the same extent. Some Muslim-majority

states, Malaysia for example, have faced and continue to face a lower level threat of terrorism. While the literature finds a weak correlation between poverty and terrorism, poor economic conditions – including high poverty, unemployment, large inequities and widespread corruption – create conditions conducive to radicalization and VE. The poor economy of Yemen, for instance, continues to create conditions in which terrorists find fertile ground to maintain and nurture their activities. Many Muslim communities in Western societies are also disadvantaged relative to the general population: economically, educationally and professionally. A recent report by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR 2012) has concluded that soft counter-de-rad programs cannot be isolated from the external environment in which they are implemented. Strong developmental states (states that manage high growth, create jobs, control corruption, and manage relations with their ethnic groups) are not only threatened less often by terrorism but also are capable of facing the threat more effectively when and if it arises. This is mainly because economic success confers political legitimacy and credibility and undermines one of the key claims of terrorists regarding general economic mismanagement, corruption and deprivation.

A third important condition is prison policy and environment. The safety of prison environments and preventing them from becoming schools for radicalization and VE are top concerns for security officials throughout the world. Many countries are content with separating radical and violent extremist prisoners from other inmates and even from one another. Separation alone is insufficient as prison policy. It’s more likely to lead to further radicalization of inmates. Careful and targeted interaction of VE detainees with other moderate inmates can sometimes have a significant moderating effect. Some prisons in developed and



Saudi ex-prisoners listen to a Muslim cleric at a religious course at an Interior Ministry rehabilitation center north of Riyadh. Six months before release from prison, Saudis are taken to this center for an intensive program of rehabilitation and reintegration into society.

GETTY IMAGES

emerging countries alike suffer from overcrowding, gang crime, drugs, corruption, violation of human rights, and poor and humiliating conditions. In such circumstances, deradicalization will be difficult to implement. Violent extremists, by providing protection, food and humanitarian aid, can find fertile recruitment ground. Although conversion to Islam is not necessarily a radicalization sign, more attention needs to be given to the links between radicalization, deradicalization and prison conditions because, as the International Crisis Group (ICG) noted in 2007, “the gains of the one can be undermined by the poor performance of the other.”

Fourth, it is difficult to isolate the impact of events taking place outside detention centers on the prisoners and prison environment itself. For example, the presence of widespread corruption among state officials, repression and brutal suppression of opposition will undermine rehabilitation policies inside prisons (see next section), particularly in attempting to convince detainees that the regime is clean, “Islamic,” peaceful and cares about the economic well-being of its citizens. As the ICG argued in 2009, it is difficult to delink and isolate the impact of developments taking place inside and outside prisons. By extension, what happens in regional and international contexts can influence the prison environment and deradicalization policies. As a high-ranking Saudi official once told me in Riyadh, “Whenever something happens in Palestine, Iraq or Afghanistan, the level of radicalization in Saudi Arabia, both inside and outside prisons, skyrockets.” A former, repented radical Yemeni, while commenting on the impact of U.S. drone attacks in Yemen, asked me, “Where are the American hospitals, clinics and health centers? All that we get is bombs and explosives.” Drone attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan have also had a similar impact in undermining counter-de-rad efforts and discrediting local governments as “collaborators with the

Americans” (from a personal interview with a high-ranking Pakistani military officer in Germany, August 2012).

Finally, the rigor and dynamism of civil society are important. Civil society is a key source of soft power because it mediates between state and society, and also because it possesses extra resources that the state lacks. Civilians understand better how their members, including radicals and violent extremists, think and behave. They can, therefore, act and behave more acceptably to society than the state, enjoying more credibility and legitimacy. Countries with dynamic communities and civil society, such as Singapore, are also more successful in designing and implementing counter-de-rad programs than countries with weak and nondynamic civil society.

Components of counter-de-rad programs

A good understanding of the macro environmental conditions conducive to successful reforms is necessary but doesn’t answer the key question: What are the components or elements that constitute successful, smart counter-de-rad programs? There is no silver bullet, nor is there a one-size-fits-all formula. The various legal, political, social and cultural systems suggest that what works in one place might not work elsewhere, and that it will require modifications and adaptations. Transplantation is not advisable. What we describe here is a combination of practices/measures that have been implemented successfully in certain environments, particularly in Muslim-majority states. With some adaptations, some of these policies have also proved successful in some Muslim-minority states such as Singapore. Timing also seems to be an important factor. Some practices were attempted and failed in earlier periods or different contexts but succeeded later on. In addition to the timing of counter-de-rad programs, practices that proved most effective were those that derived from and were consistent

with national culture, norms and values. We can identify at least seven practices/measures that appear to constitute what Golose referred to as successful deradicalization or “Deradicalization [that] works.”

The first such practice is religious rehabilitation. All programs studied in Muslim-majority states and Singapore included a religious dialogue program. Observers seem to agree that, while other components are also important, a religious rehabilitation/dialogue program is perhaps the most indispensable. There is good logic behind this line of thinking. Most terrorists rely on misinterpreted and misunderstood religious excerpts to justify violence. Also, evidence shows that most terrorists have not been rigorous in acquiring religious knowledge, which makes them vulnerable to the propaganda of the radical preachers. Religious rehabilitation is therefore necessary to delegitimize the actions of terrorists and refute their theoretical and ideological justifications.¹ Saudi Arabia has the best-known religious dialogue program. Each day, detainees debate and discuss with competent scholars, in individual and group formats, such issues as jihad, the relationship between Muslim and non-Muslims (both states and individuals), international treaties and other subjects that are often used by the terrorists to justify their actions.

Effective religious programs require the presence of a sufficient number of competent, knowledgeable, “moderate,” and highly respected scholars. This is no easy task. In Yemen, most scholars refused to take part in the dialogue committee with the detained radicals. In Malaysia, some detainees turned out to be more knowledgeable than scholars in certain areas. In Jordan, the incarcerated radicals refused even to talk to, eat with or pray behind scholars chosen by the government. Only Saudi Arabia seemed able, for historical and cultural reasons, to provide a sufficient number of competent and semi-independent scholars. In non-Muslim majority states, this task is expected to be more difficult.

Psychological programs are the second component. Although the literature finds no correlation between psychological diseases and terrorism, many terrorists and detainees suffer from several psychological issues related to family or friendship relations, work difficulties or lives disrupted by occupation and war. A large number of Saudi detainees, for example, suffer from psychological problems caused by the nature of Saudi society and culture, which permits and encourages polygamy and extended families. This creates problems related to jealousy, inheritance and inequity among siblings. Detainees with psychological and physical

problems might require different treatments since they often suffer from lack of self-esteem and confidence, and this status might undermine their absorptive and collaborative capacity. Some might even have physical problems that might prevent them from participating fully in the program. There is a need therefore to identify and classify detainees according to their psychological and physical status. The best-known psychological programs exist in Singapore and Saudi Arabia. There, psychological testing, classification and treatment have been made an integral part of deradicalization programs involving some of the most competent psychologists in society.

A third component is a social program. Detainees come from different social and economic backgrounds. While some are more financially solvent, others suffer from deprivation. In many cases, the main breadwinner of the family is detained, thus jeopardizing the family’s livelihood and economic and social mobility. In particular, the needs of the detainees’ children for education, health, food and shelter must not be undermined as a result of their

fathers’ acts. The statement “if we don’t reach family members the terrorists will” is repeatedly heard from officials in Riyadh, Sanaa, Singapore and Kuala Lumpur. Neglecting the economic and social needs of the detainees and their families will alienate them, turn them against state and society, and guarantee the emergence of future generations of violent extremists. Saudi Arabia obviously has the most comprehensive, generous and financially sustained social program. Social and economic needs of the families of the detainees – children and parents alike – are met, including education, health and shelter. In Singapore and Turkey, the social and economic needs of the detainees and their families are

met by community and societal organizations, thus saving public money.

Family rehabilitation programs are also important. There is a strong case to be made to mentor and involve family members in deradicalization efforts. Many families are unaware of the reasons and conditions that led their sons to embrace terrorism and the psychological and mental changes that they underwent as a result. Some families are radicalized themselves, which raises the risk of recidivism among released detainees. There is a need to train and mentor families to enable them to deal with their “new sons” correctly, ensuring that the environment to which detainees return will not lead to re-radicalization and recidivism. Involving families can also lead to winning their support



GETTY IMAGES

Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, left, and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton meet before the Global Counterterrorism Forum in Istanbul in June 2012.

Despite the demanding nature of counter-de-rad programs, they remain much easier, more effective and far cheaper in terms of financial resources and human lives than traditional military approaches.

for the deradicalization efforts, an important strategy given the significance of social milieu in terrorism and family relations in the Muslim world. The Saudi family rehabilitation program is the most internationally touted and praised. Families are invited by the state, at the full expense of the government, to participate in the deradicalization program and to encourage their sons to repent. They are also trained and mentored in how to talk to their sons while in prison, and how to deal with any possible contingencies after release. An important hidden strategy behind involving families in the deradicalization program is to witness the good treatment of their sons by the state, which helps to refute rumors by al-Qaida that “if someone gives up or is arrested, they will be tortured along with their families by the government.”

A fifth component is education and training programs. Deradicalization should also take into consideration reintegrating released individuals into society. Detainees with insufficient education, skills and training demanded by the local market face special difficulties finding jobs and reintegrating. “Education is everything,” a high-ranked Saudi official involved in the country’s deradicalization program once told me. In particular, education and training should intensify towards the end of incarceration. Six months before release, for example, Saudi violent extremists are transferred to a purpose-built halfway house where religious debate, general education and training (including on such issues as how to handle life difficulties, solve problems, make decisions, deal with others, etc.) are intensified. Their exposure to society,² family members, relatives and friends also increases during this period.³ Families are encouraged to visit their sons more regularly. The aim of these measures is to prepare the detainee gradually to return to his society and family.

A post-care/release program is the sixth component. A large number of released detainees lack education, training, savings, jobs, pensions or rich family members to support them after release. Some even have a large number of family dependents that they themselves need to support. Social pressure, stigmatization and state regulations can sometimes prevent released extremists from finding jobs, or working in certain sectors. This environment, without assistance, provides a recipe for recidivism. Indeed, lack of such support caused a large number of Yemeni detainees to return to al-Qaida after they were discharged from prison in 2005. The Saudi government goes further to help released detainees in finding new jobs, enrolling them in, and subsidizing, their education. It also helps them establish new businesses and even helps arrange marriages for single men, paying all the costs involved, including accommodation, furniture and transportation. The government also provides

a monthly stipend of 2,000-5,000 Saudi riyals (\$400-\$1,000) for almost one year, or until they manage to stand on their own feet without government support.

A final component falls under what we term “miscellaneous elements.” Counter-de-rad is evolutionary and continuously developing. It needs to take into consideration new and emerging needs of detainees, the prison and the general environment. For example, Saudi officials suggested the need for a history program because many detainees seemed “ignorant” of historical events, particularly concerning the life of the prophet, who they wrongly believe spent most of his life engaged in jihad. They also felt that many detainees have difficulty expressing themselves verbally, and so suggested using art as therapy. The result was two new programs in history and art. They also made physical education and sports an integral part of deradicalization, encouraging scholars and security officers to join detainees in playing soccer or volleyball. It is a well-established fact that healthier individuals (including detainees) are more productive. Healthier and happier detainees operating in a cordial environment can also be more cooperative and receptive to information and advice from scholars and mentors. In most cases, training will be required for everybody involved in counter-de-rad programs, including scholars, sport instructors, and security and parole officers. As Angell and Gunaratna noted in 2011, training is a “collective” process that should exclude nobody. The Turkish government has created the best, most comprehensive counter-de-rad-tailored training programs among the 15 country case studies.

Conclusions

Nobody claims that smart counter-de-rad is an easy process. This article suggests that it might be even more difficult than is generally thought. Successful programs require conditions conducive to successful rehabilitation and reform. They also require religious, psychological, social and family rehabilitation, as well as educational, post-release, and miscellaneous programs that take into consideration requirements of detainees, scholars, and local and national environments. These policies and conditions are intertwined. Lack of one could undermine performance of another. Counter-de-rad is a package made up of many elements, all equally important and complementary.

Despite the demanding nature of counter-de-rad programs, they remain much easier, more effective and far cheaper in terms of financial resources and human lives than traditional military approaches. The counter-de-rad approach is “also more humanitarian,” and, particularly when implemented in the context of Western countries, “will have other benefits; it will reduce humiliation, abuse



UNITED NATIONS

John Baird, minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, from left, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and UN General Assembly President Nassir Abdulaziz Al-Nasser participate in the “Understanding and Countering the Appeal of Terrorism” seminar in June 2012. The event was held in partnership with the Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force and the UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute.

and torture, and in the process remove another justification from extremist indoctrination about how the West tortures Muslims in detention” (Angell and Gunaratna, 2011). Good counter-de-rad policies have also led to a generation of vital information that saved lives and protected public property and goods. A great deal of this information came from the families of the radicals themselves and community members who were encouraged to act. They were empowered by the soft and humanitarian nature of counter-de-rad programs (El-Said and Harrigan, 2012).

Yet counter-de-rad programs remain the exception and not the rule. There is a need to promote smart counter-de-rad programs globally and to encourage United Nations members to pursue and mandate them by law, just as Turkey has done. Counter-de-rad policies are highly motivating. The more countries that pursue them, the higher the level of motivation will be and other countries will emulate their success. Pride and the desire to look good in the international community will spur countries and their officials to outdo one another. Knowledge will accumulate about best practices and conditions conducive to success or failure. Knowledge accumulation will make it easier to measure and compare performance because different countries face similar threats, although they might be implementing their policies under different circumstances. In addition, results will be more valid.

It is very encouraging to see the United States' recent promotion of smart approaches to counter terrorism. This is evident from the establishment in the summer of 2012 of the Global Counter Terrorism Forum (GCTF). The United States was the driving force behind GCTF, based in the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) in Torino, Italy. The United States, however, seems not to have fully and seriously bought into soft approaches, particularly at home. As a new report on preventing VE in America concluded: “There still is no domestic equivalent of Countering Violent Extremism policy seeking to prevent young Americans from being radicalized at home ... the lack of a coherent approach toward domestic counter-radicalization has left America vulnerable to a threat that is not only diversifying, but arguably intensifying” (NSPG, 2011). A similar trend has

also been noticed in Western Europe, which has also failed to embrace a comprehensive “smart” approach toward the threat of VE (ICSR, 2010). As long as the “super power” and other Western countries do not get on board, America will have difficulties preaching what it does not practice. □

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1. It is important to note, however, that the intensity and scale of the religious rehabilitation efforts have varied tremendously among countries. While Saudi Arabia, for example, provided intensive religious dialogue on a daily basis, Malaysia provided only one religious session every month by an imam from the local community.
2. Prominent members of society, for example, are invited regularly to the center to deliver lectures and seminars on different subjects of interest to detainees.
3. Sometimes detainees are allowed to have a weekend off, which they spend with their families, or are even allowed to attend a social event, such as a wedding or funeral, or visit ailing parents in the hospital. This happens without a police escort. Prominent family members are asked to take responsibility for the return of their relative to the detention center after the end of the social event.

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A Human Approach

TO COUNTERING EXTREMISM

By per Concordiam Staff

When hundreds of her fellow Nigerian Christians were massacred with machetes in 2010 near the town of Jos, Pastor Esther Ibanga protested the violence with a “100,000 Women March” across the dusty plateau of central Nigeria. One person she shunned was Khadija Hawaja, a locally revered female Muslim leader from across the religious divide who was planning a similar march for her own co-religionists. That Ibanga and Hawaja now travel the world as partners expounding on the need for reconciliation is a tribute to the success of Vienna-based Sisters Against Violent Extremism (SAVE), founded in 2008 by Austrian professor Edit Schlaffer.

Schlaffer calls her organization the first women’s counterterrorism platform, a security network that considers mothers and wives, with their direct access to danger zones, the world’s “new security guardians.” Few deny the role women can play in fomenting violent extremism – a phenomenon abetted by online recruitment – but Schlaffer insists that behind many a mother ready to acclaim her son a martyr is a scared parent horrified at the bloodletting. “Women are the new front lines to combat violent extremism,” Schlaffer says of a network that has grown to include chapters in places such as Pakistan’s Swat Valley, the West Bank and Northern Ireland.

SAVE advocates “human development” as a means to counter violent extremism, a strategy encapsulated in a 2009 article by Dr. Ömer Taşpinar, a Turkish-born professor at the U.S. National War College and Johns Hopkins University. Taşpinar argues for the need to fight radicalism before it blossoms into terrorism and offers human development, a mixture of social reform and economic growth, as a strategic necessity. In Taşpinar’s view – and by extension that of Schlaffer – human development bridges the divide between the “security first” and “development first” models of counterterrorism.

“All terrorists, by definition, are radicals. Yet all radicals do not end up as terrorists. In fact, only a few radicals venture into terrorism,” Taşpinar noted. “At the same time, it is clear that most terrorists start their individual journey towards extremist violence first by becoming radicalized militants. Since radicalism is often a precursor to terrorism, focusing on radicalism amounts to preventing terrorism at an earlier stage, before it is too late for non-coercive measures.”



SAVE’s goal is to enlist mothers to stop their sons and neighbors, many suffering from unemployment and feelings of injustice, from “jumping into the abyss,” said Schlaffer, who also runs the nongovernmental organization Women Without Borders. Using written and recorded eyewitness accounts, SAVE has compiled a bank of anti-extremist anecdotes. For example, the organization conducted 70 interviews with Palestinian mothers aimed at dispelling the “myth of martyrdom.” Death and incarceration were common fates of many of their sons.

Happy accidents have also played a role. Schlaffer met Ibanga at a conference in Rwanda and inquired about the 100,000 Women March. The professor was surprised to learn that only Christian women had been invited to the protest. She encouraged Ibanga to put out feelers to Hawaja, a prominent Muslim leader from the same part of Nigeria. After initial resistance, the two women, former adversaries, became friends. When the pair are not touring the world, much of their activity is focused on reducing support for Nigeria’s Boko Haram terrorist movement.

Schlaffer considers human development a supplement rather than a replacement for more aggressive responses to violent extremism. She called for a strategic campaign to shift more of the security focus away from coercion and violence. “This is a new tool we need to use in our counterterrorism strategy,” she said. □

Pastor Esther Ibanga, left, joins thousands of women in a 2010 march to protest violent attacks on women and children near the city of Jos, Nigeria. Ibanga is a leading figure in Sisters Against Violent Extremism. She has partnered with her Nigerian Muslim counterpart to preach an end to sectarian terror.

AFP/GETTY IMAGES



Militants train in Pakistan's tribal South Waziristan region along the Afghan border in 2011. Germany has discovered some of its citizens using such camps to plot attacks back home.

THE ASSOCIATED PRESS



THE JIHADIST THREAT IN GERMANY

THE “EURO PLOT” REVEALED
A NETWORK OF GERMAN-
SPEAKING EXTREMISTS TRAINED
TO ATTACK THEIR HOMELAND

By Dr. Guido Steinberg, German Institute for International and Security Affairs

On November 17, 2010, then-German Interior Minister Thomas de Maizière warned that jihadist terrorists might be planning to attack Germany that same month. He announced that he had ordered the Federal Police (Bundespolizei) to increase its presence at airports, train stations and other possible targets. The warning was based on information that al-Qaida had sent teams from Pakistan to perpetrate attacks in Germany and other European countries. Experts and the media soon labeled the plans the “Europlot.” During the next four months, heavily armed paramilitary police secured important landmarks in the country. The closure of the Reichstag to visitors drew an especially nervous public reaction.

This was not the first time jihadists had targeted Germany. But this time, all available information suggested al-Qaida would use the increasing number of Germans who had traveled to the Pakistani tribal areas to carry out a terrorist campaign against Europe’s leading economic power.

In the first years after the attacks of September 11, 2001, Germany had not been a priority target for the jihadist movement, so that German policymakers and the public alike thought they might be spared terrorist attacks resembling the Madrid bombings of 2004 or the London bombings of 2005. Some security specialists believed that German Muslims were not as prone to “jihadist style” radicalization because the vast majority were Turks and Kurds who had not shown sympathies for the Arab-based al-Qaida and its allies. This assumption proved wrong. From 2006 onward, Germany confronted a heightened terrorist threat for two major reasons. First, since 2006, an increasing number of young Muslims in Germany decided to travel to Pakistan to

join jihadist organizations. Second, the presence of German troops in Afghanistan prompted terrorist groups to use those German Muslim terrorist recruits to try to force a withdrawal by attacking German targets. Although German troops had been stationed in Afghanistan since early 2002, the Taliban insurgency gained strength only in 2006, which increased al-Qaida’s and its allies’ awareness of the German presence in the Hindu Kush.

These developments resulted in the Europlot, according to which al-Qaida sent several individuals and groups from Pakistan back to Germany to organize and execute attacks. Fortunately, most of the people in charge of carrying out these plans seem to have been arrested and are currently jailed or on trial. Still, there is no reason to be less alert or cautious. Instead, it might be a good time to summarize the most important developments within the German jihadist scene and draw tentative conclusions regarding these developments for Germany.

THE SAUERLAND FOUR

The Sauerland Four were the “pioneers” of German jihadism, paving the way for potential German recruits to the Pakistani tribal areas and the organizations located there. Members of this group were arrested in September 2007 in a small town in the Sauerland region of North Rhine-Westphalia, where they were preparing explosives for car bomb attacks against NATO’s Ramstein Air Base and nearby off-base facilities.

The group was formed by four German jihadists who traveled to North Waziristan in Pakistan and joined the Uzbek Islamic Jihad Union (IJU). It appears that this



happened more or less by coincidence, rather than as a result of a carefully planned recruitment. As the two leaders of the group, Fritz Gelowicz (born in 1979) and Adem Yilmaz (born in 1978), later confessed, they had originally planned to go fight in Chechnya. When they were unable to travel to the North Caucasus, via Turkey, they went to Damascus to study Arabic instead. Once in Syria, they changed their plans after Yilmaz established contact with a group of Azeri jihadists who promised to send the Germans to Chechnya after they had gone through military training in Pakistan.

In April and June 2006, the four Germans traveled to Pakistan via Turkey and Iran and were trained in the use of small arms and explosives. Although they mainly wanted to fight Americans in Afghanistan, the IJU leadership asked them to perpetrate attacks in Germany with the goal of forcing German troops from Afghanistan. The attacks would have coincided with the debate in the German Bundestag in October and November 2007 over the extension of the Afghanistan mandates for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Operation Enduring Freedom. The IJU hoped that a successful attack in Germany would influence the debate and possibly the vote in parliament. It appears that the German recruits, suffering from malaria, dysentery and hepatitis at the training camp in Pakistan, were easily persuaded to carry out the attacks back in Germany.

The would-be German terrorists were ordered to focus on American and possibly Uzbek targets, but they were given a certain leeway in choosing targets and organizing attacks. When they were arrested, the Sauerland Four had

not yet decided exactly where they wanted to attack, but they were focusing on Ramstein, which they planned to attack using three large car bombs detonated by remote control. The young men planned to flee to Turkey and Pakistan after the attack and rejoin the IJU.

The arrests foiled the Sauerland plot, but the Germans had already recruited a small group of friends to travel to Waziristan. From 2007 on, dozens of volunteers traveled the now well-established route via Istanbul, Turkey; the Iranian cities of Tehran, Mashhad and Zahedan; and the Pakistani cities of Quetta and Bannu to the region of Waziristan, where they joined the IJU and later other organizations. Eventually, Germans formed the largest national group among Westerners in the jihadist training camps in Pakistan in 2009 and 2010.

THE IJU AND ITS GERMAN RECRUITS

When the Sauerland group joined the IJU in 2006, only a few specialists had ever heard of the organization, a splinter group of the older and far stronger Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), both of which were based in Afghanistan until the fall of the Taliban in 2001 and subsequently escaped to Pakistan. IJU leader Najmiddin Jalolov and about a dozen followers left the IMU in 2002 because of violent debates over ideology and strategy. While the IMU insisted on preparing for the coming struggle in Central Asia and did not take part in the insurgency in Afghanistan until 2007/2008, the IJU subscribed to jihadist internationalism and supported the Taliban and al-Qaida in their struggle in Afghanistan.

The IJU (just like the IMU) had longstanding contacts with like-minded jihadists in the Caucasus. Jalolov and some of his followers had trained in Chechnya in the late 1990s and had reached out to Turkish and Azeri fighters who later helped Gelowicz and his colleagues find their way to the IJU in Pakistan. The young Germans were thereby integrated into a Turkic network linking the Turkish jihadist scene to the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. A particular advantage of this network to the Sauerland group was that two of its members could easily communicate with their new colleagues: Adem Yilmaz and Atilla Selek (born in 1985) spoke Turkish, which is similar to Azeri and Uzbek, as their mother tongue. By establishing contact with a primarily Turkic network, the mainly ethnic Turkish German recruits bypassed an obstacle that had hampered the recruitment of Germans until 2006 – that joining al-Qaida and its affiliates in the Arab world required knowledge of at least basic Arabic.

Members of the Sauerland group recruited up to a dozen friends and relatives in 2007 and sent them to Waziristan. The most prominent of these was German-Turk Cüneyt Çiftçi (born in 1980), who became famous as the “first German suicide bomber” when he perpetrated a suicide attack on an American-Afghan military base in Khost province on March 3, 2008, killing two Americans and two Afghans. The attack was later celebrated in a



The Sauerland Four are guarded by police during their February 2010 trial in Düsseldorf on terror charges.

GETTY IMAGES



A German-speaking member of the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), an extremist organization that broke away from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, is pictured. The IJU has recruited German nationals to attack their own country.



One of four Islamic terrorists found guilty of plotting bomb attacks on Frankfurt airport and a U.S. military base in Ramstein is transported to court in Karlsruhe in September 2007. In March 2010, the men confessed and received prison sentences of five to 12 years. EPA

He successfully called on German sympathizers to join the jihadists in Waziristan or support their activities by sending money, resulting in a rapid increase in the number of recruits traveling to Pakistan. Of more than 220 jihadist recruits who went from Germany to Waziristan after 2001 for training by the IJU, al-Qaida or the IMU, nearly 40 left in 2009.

This influx led to the emergence of a distinctly German subculture in the tribal areas, and in September 2009 to the emergence of the German Taliban Mujahedeen – the first exclusively German jihadist group. Its founder and leader, the German-Turk Ahmet Manavbasi (1977-2010), had been a drug dealer who was extradited from Germany to Turkey in 2000. By 2007 he had become the driving force behind the IJU's public relations efforts, building contacts to a small group of like-minded Turks in Istanbul who administered the Turkish language website "Time for Martyrdom," which became home to most of the IJU propaganda in the following years.

Manavbasi expanded his recruitment of young Germans, and in 2009 a small group from Berlin arrived in Waziristan. In parallel, a group of Turks and Azeris who had fought in the North Caucasus joined the IJU. They had not been able to re-enter Chechnya in 2008, and so decided to move on to Afghanistan. At that time, the IJU apparently decided to build a kind of international brigade of Turks, Azeris and Germans. While the Turks founded The Victorious Group (Taifetül Mansura), the Germans named their new outfit German Taliban Mujahedeen. Like the Uzbeks, these fighters were based in the Miranshah and Mir Ali areas of North Waziristan and joined the Haqqani network's activities in Afghanistan.

However, the German Taliban Mujahedeen's main function seems to have been propaganda. The new name was first mentioned in the video "Call to Truth" in September 2009, in which a speaker named Ayyub Almani (i.e., Yusuf

video, which became the first highlight in a public relations campaign primarily directed at Germany and Turkey. The IJU made use of the German recruits to portray itself as a factor in the world of Jihadist terrorism while trying to hide that it remained a small group whose members never exceeded 100 to 200 fighters.

GERMAN TALIBAN MUJAHEDDEEN CAMPAIGN

Eric Breininger (1987-2010), a young German convert to Islam, became the face of the IJU's public relations campaign and featured prominently on its German and Turkish language videos. He had been recruited by Daniel Schneider (born in 1985), the fourth member of the Sauerland group, and arrived in Waziristan in early 2008.

Ocak from Berlin) threatened Germany with attacks: "Only through your engagement here [in Afghanistan] against Islam an attack on Germany becomes an attractive option for the Mujahedeen. So that you try some of the pain, that the innocent Afghan people has to taste day by day. ... It is only a matter of time until the jihad tears down the German walls." In parallel to these remarks, the film shows pictures of important landmarks, including Berlin's Brandenburg Gate, Frankfurt's skyline, the grounds of Munich's Oktoberfest, Hamburg's main train station and Cologne cathedral.

This video was part of a larger public relations campaign by jihadists aimed at influencing the outcome of the late September 2009 parliamentary elections in Germany.

Shortly before the elections, German-Moroccan al-Qaida member Bekkay Harrach threatened terrorist attacks if Germans voted for parties supporting German troops in Afghanistan. Al-Qaida and the German Taliban Mujahedeen lost credibility in Germany when no attacks followed the election of the conservative-liberal coalition of Chancellor Angela Merkel.

AL-QAIDA AND THE EURO PLOT

The IJU's and German Taliban Mujahedeen's public relations campaigns proved to be a double-edged sword because they not only heightened the public profile of the organizations and helped recruitment, but they also drew the attention of the United States, which targeted – along with other jihadist groups in North Waziristan – both organizations' leadership and fighters with intensified drone strikes and other measures. Most importantly, IJU-leader Jalolov was killed by American missiles in September 2009 and many ordinary fighters were killed as well. In April 2010, Manavbasi and Breininger were killed in a rare firefight with the Pakistani army on the road between Mir Ali and Miranshah. Without the strong leadership of Manavbasi, the German Taliban Mujahedeen quickly disintegrated. Most of the organization's German fighters, together with others who left the IMU, joined al-Qaida, which quickly devised plans to send some of them back to Germany to execute attacks there.

Information about al-Qaida's plans and impending attacks in Germany surfaced again, beginning in the summer of 2010. German-Afghan Ahmad Wali Sidiqi and German-Syrian Rami Makanesi, who had been arrested in Afghanistan and Pakistan, respectively, were the first sources. Both reported that they had talked to al-Qaida leaders in Waziristan, where they plotted attacks in Great Britain, France and Germany. German authorities became increasingly concerned in November 2010, when Emrah Erdogan, a German-Turkish-Kurd al-Qaida member, called the Federal Criminal Police from Pakistan and warned of an attack planned for February or March 2011. According to Erdogan, two people had already entered Germany and gone underground, while four others were training and waiting for their orders in Waziristan.

Although Erdogan's information turned out to be unreliable, authorities soon discovered that al-Qaida had sent individuals and groups back to Germany to reorganize the movement and perpetrate attacks. In May 2010, German and Austrian authorities arrested Austrian citizen Maqsood Lodin and German citizen Yusuf Ocak, both of whom had returned from Pakistan to re-establish contact with former comrades who had stayed behind in Europe. In April 2011, German authorities arrested the so-called Düsseldorf cell led by Moroccan Abdeladim el-Kebir (born in 1982), another al-Qaida operative from Waziristan. At the time of their arrest, the four-person cell had begun to prepare explosives for an attack on an unknown target.

During the two trials – Lodin and Ocak in Berlin and Kebir in Düsseldorf – further information emerged about

the strategic debates within al-Qaida that led to sending the German recruits back to Germany. Lodin carried a USB-drive that contained strategic materials, most importantly an internal al-Qaida document called “future work” that laid out the organization's strategies. By perpetrating a larger number of small scale attacks worldwide, its authors argued, al-Qaida would regain some freedom of action and therefore its ability to perpetrate attacks on the scale of September 11, 2001. It became clear, in June 2011, that this paper was more than an internal discussion when al-Qaida released a video in which its leading members presented a strategic vision of “individual jihad” – “lone wolf” attacks by jihadists who had not necessarily been involved in the organization before. This was a major step for al-Qaida, which had always insisted on exerting as much central command and control as possible during operations.


During the Kebir trial, it became clear what the organization had in mind when American authorities provided German prosecutors with a March 2010 letter from Yunus al-Muritani, the mastermind of the Europlot, to Osama bin Laden. In the letter, only one of a broad correspondence between the two, Muritani expounded on his plans to perpetrate attacks in Europe and the U.S. and to build new al-Qaida infrastructure in Africa, where security services are weaker than in the Arab world. Muritani especially focused on concrete plans for future attacks on energy infrastructure worldwide. The Arab Spring and the death or arrest of most of the al-Qaida leadership between 2010 and 2012, however, made these plans obsolete.

CONCLUSION: HOMEGROWN TERRORISM

With al-Qaida's Europlot foiled and its masterminds either dead or arrested (The Pakistanis arrested Muritani in September 2011), the acute danger has dissipated. Nevertheless, Germany will continue to feel repercussions from the radicalization of large numbers of Germans in recent years. Of more than 220 Germans who trained with terrorist organizations from 2001, more than 110 have returned to Germany and only a fraction are in jail or on trial. There is a growing Salafist subculture in Germany, parts of which are sympathetic to the jihadists and whose adherents have served as a recruitment pool for al-Qaida, the IJU, the IMU and the German Taliban Mujahedeen in recent years. There is every indication that radicalization is increasing while the opportunities to join organizations abroad are limited. It is therefore likely that German groups will emerge and turn directly against the German state, without first going to Pakistan for training. It was Ahmet Manavbasi's vision to build a German jihadist organization to take on the German state, a vision that was reportedly shared by prominent IMU propagandist Monir Chouka and other Germans. If the trend toward jihadist radicalization continues in Germany, it is very likely that truly homegrown groups will emerge and pose new threats to Germany's and its allies' security. □

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Department of Defense or the U.S. government.

OBSTACLES



TO PROFILING

THOUGH EXTREMISTS SHARE ATTRIBUTES, DEVELOPING A UNIVERSALLY ACCEPTED PROFILE TO PRE-EMPT VIOLENCE IS DIFFICULT

By per Concordiam Staff

Rahman and Lamine Adam are two British brothers of Algerian parentage who spent their teen years immersed in an ultra-orthodox mosque in London. Rahman, less political and vociferous than his brother, reportedly enjoyed soccer, smoking and dating, while Lamine adopted the guise of a political firebrand and committed radical. Nevertheless, it was Rahman Adam whom British police arrested in connection with a terrorist plot and sentenced to 20 years in prison in 2007. A series of raids known as Operation Crevice implicated Adam in a conspiracy to explode fertilizer bombs to kill civilians in nightclubs, a shopping center and synagogues.

Some academics who followed the case have recounted the story to illustrate how two closely related individuals steeped in the same radical environment could turn out differently. “Conventional wisdom fails to explain how one brother became a terrorist and the other did not,” wrote Jonathan Githens-Mazer and Robert Lambert in a 2010 *International Affairs* article. “If identity issues and exposure to ‘extremist’ ideas are causal factors in the one case, why wasn’t this combination equally causal for both brothers?” But deeper analysis revealed more to the story. Lamine Adam, while not directly blamed for the fertilizer bomb plot, was likely a key figure in instigating his younger brother to commit violence and had personally inquired about bomb-making. In fact, Lamine shook off the British agents who had been monitoring him and fled the country as a fugitive.

The debate over the Adams brothers’ relative culpability illustrates the tortuous process by which academics, governments, militaries and intelligence agencies have tried to establish a universally accepted profile to predict and prevent violent extremism. Are terrorists mainly romantics with a violent streak who find glamour and purpose in causing death and destruction, or is their extremism more a product of ideological or religious zealotry? Are they underprivileged people from unstable countries lashing out against symbols of power or sons

and daughters of privilege from seemingly normal families? How much of a role – if at all – does mental illness play in shaping violent extremism? And finally, what is the ethical dividing line between a “sayer” – a radical who instigates rather than perpetrates violence – and a “doer” – the foot soldier who maims and kills in the name of the sayer’s cause?

Complicating the profiling process is the fact that the world has yet to agree upon a definition of terrorism itself. The United States, for example, defines terrorism as “the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.” On the other hand, the European Union appears to maintain a higher threshold for declaring an incident terrorism based on its level of seriousness. It says terrorism is an act that “may seriously damage a country or an international organisation where committed with the aim of: seriously intimidating a population; or unduly compelling a Government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act; or seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation.” In practice, however, North America and Europe rarely disagree over characterizing an act as “terrorism.”

“It is not only individual agencies within the same governmental apparatus that cannot agree on a single definition of terrorism. Experts and other long-established scholars in the field are equally incapable of reaching a consensus,” wrote terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman, director of the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C.

Universal attributes

Dr. Adam Dolnik, professor at the Marshall Center, has drawn upon widespread research, including site visits to some of the world’s most conflict-ridden places, to assemble a list of

Spanish police released this composite of suspects a few days after the March 2004 Madrid train bombings. The different backgrounds of those involved in violent extremism make advance profiling difficult.

AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE

“universal attributes” he believes define violent extremists. In Dolnik’s view, terrorists are frustrated people nurturing feelings of humiliation armed with an optimistic belief in their power to affect change through violence. In a narrow sense, they share emotional profiles with soldiers and policemen: Both groups are action oriented, idealistic and affiliated with the use of violence for causes they feel are justified. Likewise, violent extremists can attach themselves to causes out of a sense of camaraderie, to be part of a conspiratorial and countercultural heroic enterprise. Late 20th-century left-wing European terrorist movements such as Italy’s Red Brigade and Germany’s Baader Meinhof gang fit that mold. “Terrorists are human,” Dolnik explained. “They are not some machines that are impossible to understand.”

Maajid Nawaz observed that even supposedly Muslim religious movements such as al-Qaida have adopted Marxist and fascist organizing principles. Nawaz, chairman of the United Kingdom’s Quilliam Foundation, a counterextremist group founded by former Muslim radicals, said such groups graft the Marxist concept of a dispossessed international proletariat onto the world’s devout Muslims. The result is the militant belief in the existence of a modern, politicized Ummah (Muslim community of the faithful) that must free itself of foreign and alien influences. Within that ideological framework, Nawaz said, these extremists also exhibit a familiar catalogue of psychological motivations: grievances, identity crises and susceptibility to recruitment from charismatic leaders.

“It’s deeply ironic that Islamist and anti-Islam extremist groups have a symbiotic relationship with each other, feeding off each other’s paranoia and propaganda: far-right extremism, Islamism, more far-right extremism, more Islamism and so on,” Nawaz wrote on his website. “Islamaphobes and Islamists have this much in common: Both groups insist that Islam is a totalitarian political ideology at odds with liberal democracy.”

Misconceptions

A popular belief persists that economic grievance is a primary cause of violent extremism, a view dating back to the origin of the term “terrorism” during the French Revolution. According to this theory, the underprivileged, particularly those living in undemocratic societies without outlets at the ballot box, resort to violence to force political change. Ironically, the French Revolution ultimately supports the opposite argument since, images of the storming of the Bastille notwithstanding, its leaders emerged mostly from the educated upper middle class.

Dr. Marc Sageman, a former CIA operative and forensic psychiatrist who conducted a landmark study of more than 400 captured militant jihadists, determined that three-quarters came from upper- or middle-class homes in which intact marriages were the rule. Nearly two-thirds had

attended college. Before they turned to violence, many militants had been models of integration, seemingly comfortable with Western culture. The presence of millionaires’ sons and physicians among the leadership of al-Qaida is further evidence minimalizing poverty’s role in radicalization.

Poverty is a pretext for many violent extremists, according to Dr. Karin Von Hippel, an expert on regional conflict, peacekeeping and counterterrorism who has worked for the United Nations, the EU and the U.S. government. But she cautioned against being overly dismissive of terror-poverty links. “Perceived poverty” or “relative deprivation” – the sense that one country or element of society benefits unjustly in the division of spoils – can be real motivators for extremism even if the radical himself isn’t poor. Furthermore, militants such as the Taliban in Afghanistan exploit economic conditions when they lure foot soldiers to their movements with promises of steady paychecks.

Studies appear even more conclusive when it comes to whether violent extremists are mentally ill. Despite the emotionalism inherent in much violent extremism, few adherents are mentally debilitated (brainwashed child soldiers in places such as sub-Saharan Africa being among the prominent exceptions). Within their own oftentimes fanatical world views, terrorists see their violent exploits as reasonable. Experts caution that efforts to treat violent extremism as a mental illness can simply create “well-adjusted terrorists.” Sageman has said he identified fewer than five sociopaths or psychopaths among the 400 terrorists he studied.

Similarly, most violent extremists don’t have a background of criminality that would predict future outbursts of violence. And when they do – as in the case of at least one of the 2004 Madrid train bombers who came to Spain as a drug dealer – their initial secularism may have prevented authorities from recognizing them as religious radicals. “Perhaps no theory could have predicted Jamal Ahmidan, a mastermind of the Madrid bombings,” *The New York Times* wrote after the attacks. “He was a feisty drug dealer with a passion for motorcycles and a weakness for Spanish women. His fellow plotters from the old neighborhood in Morocco included petty criminals.”

None of this means a behavioral examination of violent extremism is irrelevant. A major UK counterextremism project notes that personality changes, intensified religiosity, withdrawal from family life, arguments with friends and increased secrecy can be hallmarks of a budding extremist. (Admittedly, nonviolent adolescents are prone to many of the same phases). A counterextremist approach that addresses psychology and morality – pinpointing the human costs of planted bombs and sprays of gunfire – can alter perceptions. In one British anecdote, a Provisional Irish Republican Army “soldier” renounced violence in disgust after his comrade bragged about murdering a pregnant policeman.



Bulgarian Muslim children recite verses from the Quran in Lazhuitsa in 2012. Bulgarian prosecutors indicted the village's imam and 12 others on charges of setting up a branch of the radical Saudi-based Al Waqf-Al Islami foundation.

AFP/GETTY IMAGES

Sayers versus doers

In trying to establish a universally adaptable profile of violent extremists, one of the biggest struggles is differentiating between the activists who carry out violence and the ideological spokesmen who inspire them. At what point does a radical cease being an eccentric with nonconformist views and become a physical danger to society? When should a government act to pre-empt violent words from becoming violent deeds? Such questions are vital not just to pinpointing future trouble but to determining how far “upstream” counterradicalization efforts should flow.

Nawaz warned of the harmful effects of societal “mood music” – radical propaganda, clerical exhortations and media imagery – in which some violent extremists immerse themselves. In some Middle Eastern countries, this mood music can fill the vacuum left by failing institutions, and even in the EU such questions are increasingly relevant as organized Christianity loses its ability to produce social and moral cohesion.

Studies have shown that radicalization is usually a social process, not a solitary endeavor. Friends will join violent movements collectively and enlist more friends and relatives. This bonding exercise is fostered by alienation among unintegrated immigrant groups in Europe. Sageman has developed the concept of “social entrepreneurs”: activists and theoreticians who harness moral outrage over perceived injustices and steer it

toward violence. Religious fanatics can provide the appealing narrative impelling followers to act, supplying godly armor to justify the slaughter of innocents normally forbidden in sacred texts. Britain and France have increasingly focused counterradicalization efforts on some of their countries’ more objectionable “sayers,” deporting militant imams whose sermons and writings were blamed for instigating violence.

The limits of profiling

Critics insist the use of behavioral and cultural stereotypes to identify terrorists before they strike is largely futile. Githens-Mazer and Lambert have dubbed the mood music theory an “existential red herring” with little bearing on what leaves one listener indifferent and another frothing with rage. Many who take up arms against imaginary enemies, particularly in the most recent wave of terrorists, do so more out of a false sense of heroism than out of religious piety. In such cases, looking for violent extremists amongst the pious can become a fool’s errand. When it comes to anticipating and countering violent extremism, there are few substitutes for good intelligence and police work. Profiling shortcuts generally don’t work. Said Sageman: “The inability of specific factors, singly or in combination, to distinguish future mujahedin from nonmujahedin limits our ability to make statements that are specific to terrorists.” □

A FOCUS ON

YOUTH

COUNTERING ISLAMIC,
RIGHT-WING AND
LEFT-WING EXTREMISM
IN EUROPE MEANS
STARTING AT AN
EARLY AGE

By Ralph D. Heinz and Lt. Oliver Bühring



Like most countries, members of the European Union struggle with a growing number of citizens who turn to extremism, some engaging in violent extremism. The different heritage of various nations leads to different kinds of problems with all types of extremists, from left-wing, to Islamist to right-wing. The main target group for recruitment to violent extremism is young people between the ages of 13 and 30. Despite a variety of cultural backgrounds, young people are vulnerable to radicalization in similar ways.

Older theories that link lack of education to radicalization are not adequate. It is true that many violent extremists come from poor, uneducated communities with few prospects for social advancement. But there is a second kind of radical, of both the political and Islamist variety, who is highly educated and integrated into society. Both types play a role within extremist circles, with the educated being the leaders and plotters.

But even among their different intellectual backgrounds, most of the youngsters susceptible to radicalization have one thing in common: They struggle with their identity. With the various kinds of multiculturalism in Europe, it can be hard for young people to find a solid place in society. Not only are they often alienated from “mainstream society,” but in some cases they are not integrated within their “own” communities represented by their parents’ or grandparents’ generation. Regarding ethnic minorities, the differences between first generation immigrants and their offspring born in Europe increase the sense of nonattachment. The majority of Muslims in Europe come from small towns in their country of origin. Their conservative or orthodox beliefs are challenged in the large cities of their own country, as bigger cities tend to be more liberal, no matter where on the planet. Therefore, the cultural shock for first generation immigrants is even greater. Their children, though, born in the West, are lost somewhere in between their liberal western home and the conservative views of their parents.

Regarding right-wing extremists, the main factor is their inability to reach the social status of the parents’ generation. Studies have shown that this leads to a loss of economic and social identity, which is replaced by a peer identity within radical groups. Adding to this is the uncertain economic future many young people face and their desire for strong leadership. Without visible means of climbing the social and economic ladder, young people can fall prey to a talented demagogue

Semiya Simsek, right, and Gamze Kubasik, daughters of victims of far-right violence, present a candle during a commemoration for victims of neo-Nazi violence in Berlin in February 2012.

AFP/GETTY IMAGES

who addresses these problems and shows them a way into a “microsociety” in which the individual actually can do something for himself and find a useful place within his new peer group. As we will see, all prevention programs in Europe address both immediate economic issues and questions of integration into mainstream society.

Preventing left-wing extremism

The European left wingers addressed in this article are more or less a homogenous group. While the experiences of right wingers and Muslim extremists vary by locale, left-wing extremists are united by a common ideal all across Europe. And most violent left-wing extremists in Europe are not motivated by poor economic circumstances, but are part of the middle class.

Compared to the number of dangerous left-wing terror groups that operated in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s – including Germany’s Red Army Faction, Italy’s Red Brigades and Direct Action in France – there are very few left-wing terrorists today. Only the “17th November” group in Greece is still active; however, the Greek government does not have a special prevention program in place, but rather, treats them like any other organized crime group.

Left-wing extremist ideologies have their origin in the longstanding revolutionary Communist, Socialist and anarchist tradition of politically motivated violence and vandalism. It is an activist tradition that aims to overthrow the existing social order. The overall vision is a collectively controlled society without social and economic classes. Left-wing extremists see themselves as defenders of participatory democracy and human rights. They view current representative democracy in European states as a fake democracy without any real influence by the citizen, and their goal is to give power back to “the people.”

In the leftist narrative, “the elite” use the police to suppress the common man and the media to manipulate him. Global inequality and problems imposed on poorer countries by climate change are described as the results of “Western imperialism” and “multinational companies’ greed for profit.” The EU, the World Bank and other international organizations are viewed as “tools of big business,” and a widespread hostility toward Israel as “the extended arm of the U.S.” is widely shared. There is a high level of international cooperation, and the emergence in recent years of various global anti-Capitalist movements has given leftist activists a greater sense of legitimacy and motivation.

Efforts to counter this narrative – usually adhering to a one-on-one approach – resemble one another across Europe. Denmark uses the following steps in its successful program:

First, vulnerable young people are identified. Government programs and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) work together with local community groups such as churches, schools and sport clubs to find kids, some as young as 12, who show openness to extreme ideas. Second, instead of lecturing the individual, police, schools, parents and other institutions engage young people collaboratively. By showing them how their behavior is seen by others using the “mirror” method (“If I witnessed the following situation, what would I think?”), community leaders try to gain their trust.

Third, the collaboration leads to a more open discussion about motives and identities. Problems with family, friends, school or elsewhere can be addressed, and young people are shown multiple ways to solve problems. The last step is strengthening the individual’s skills. Persuading a young person to leave an extremist environment is not always a realistic goal. An initial goal may be to strengthen the young person’s social skills to function in society at large and handle problems and challenges in the extremist environment. If achieved, it might subsequently be possible to motivate and challenge the young person to leave the dangerous environment and find new interests. This leads to a working method that supports the efforts of the individual without condemning him (or her) from the outside. The goal is to bring the coachee to a point where he reaches the conclusion to quit on his own. Psychologists try to correct the faulty narrative that drew the person into the group, replacing his former values with an in-depth understanding of tolerance,

freedom of thought and equality. The process sometimes takes half a year or longer, and includes supervision and support as the extremist withdraws gradually from the group. The concept is similar to the EXIT initiative described later in the right-wing chapter of this article.

In the German state of North Rhine-Westphalia, the state Ministry of Interior, in cooperation with the Ministry of School and Education, publishes the comic series “Andi,” which aims to prevent extremism by helping teachers illustrate how extremist thoughts can lead to terrible consequences. It is directed at students in the particularly sensitive age group of 12 to 18. Young people of this age are building their values and their identity. In their struggle to do so, some are misled by false idols. The “Andi” comic strip campaign, started in 2006, is a success story in Germany’s efforts to counter violent radicalization among youth. Three “Andi” comics address separate topics: Right-wing extremism, left-wing extremism and radical Islamist ideology. North Rhine-Westphalia developed the “Andi” comics, and afterward Hamburg and Lower Saxony adopted the curriculum, in 2009 and 2010 respectively. More than 1 million copies of “Andi” comics have been printed in Germany and demand is increasing. The comic strips are also available as free app-downloads for Apple, Android and WindowsMobile. Overall, German examples of youth counter radicalization could serve as a model for other nations with similar challenges.

In “Andi 3,” the protagonist notices a friend falling under the influence of left-wing extremists and together they learn that radicalization, extremism and violence are not the solution to existing social problems. The series, with a volume each for left-wing, right-wing and Islamic extremism, enhances the ability of young people to argue in favor of democratic values.

Right-wing extremism in Germany

Since Germany’s first democracy was torn apart by left- and right-wing extremists in the 1930s, German officials have been alert when it comes to these threats. Since the end of World War II, Germany has established a stable and reliable democracy under the rule of law and has learned to defend those achievements against attacks from extremists of all kinds. But a series of racially motivated murders conducted by the neo-Nazi underground group NSU (Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund) in the past 12 years have shown there still are frictions in combating extremist groups. Luckily, the NSU terrorists were a solitary case. Nevertheless, right-wing extremism became popular with young people in economically weak northeast Germany in the past two decades.

The “Andi” comic strip, published by the German government and distributed in schools, aims to promote democratic values and tolerance. It’s one of the tools to combat youth radicalization.

MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR OF THE GERMAN STATE OF NORTH RHINE-WESTPHALIA



In modern society, schools are the center of gravity for teaching values, especially when the parents fail to provide them. Right-wing groups, for example, provide strict rules and demand discipline, which leads to strong group cohesion. Missing this in their family or school, youngsters experience a sense of belonging. The same pattern is seen in Islamist groups, especially with German converts. Many share troubled biographies.

“Andi 1,” from the comic series mentioned previously, gives teachers a simple, comprehensive tool to show pupils why tolerance, democracy and the rule of law are worth defending. It is based on an everyday story describing examples of extremism in an average German secondary school. The comic stresses the importance of the German democratic constitutional state and the rule of law on the one hand and warns students about the symbols and methods of right-wing extremists on the other. By discussing values, norms and anti-democratic and extremist thinking, students can improve their judgment and explore. Its popularity is proven by the fact that other German states have adopted this comic book in their own schools.

The Netherlands example

The Netherlands – a nation that traditionally sees itself as tolerant – approaches matters differently. In accordance with that tolerance, racism and right-wing extremist thoughts and atrocities were regarded for many years not as political or cultural problems but as socio-economic and criminal problems. Dutch society almost refused to accept that racism even existed within its borders. The nation, however, experienced different periods of ethnic related conflict rooted in former Dutch colonies like Indonesia and acknowledges that right-wing violence and political influence have spread since the 1990s. After the 9/11 attacks, there have been diverse shifts between anti-Islamic violence and violent acts against right-wing activists. Atrocities included the murders of the Islam-critical politician Pim Fortuyn in May 2002 and columnist and author Theo van Gogh, who created a short film critical of Islam, in November 2004. In the past couple of years, Dutch society recognized right-wing extremism as a severe problem and started combating it with large scale actions involving many parts of Dutch society. Projects directed at racist and right-wing extremist youths often follow German or Scandinavian examples.

A unique approach is a project called “Stompen Dan” (“stomping with the feet”). It’s a joint venture of three southern Dutch municipalities. It addresses the so-called “Lonsdale youth” (referring to the fashion brand Lonsdale, worn to flaunt the letters NSDA in its name, which resemble the German

letters for Hitler’s NSDAP) and picks 30 individuals from this scene. They get an opportunity to organize and conduct a hardcore music festival. Over one year of planning, these young people have to think about all aspects of conducting a festival of that size. They attend seminars on conflict prevention, address any drug or racism issues, negotiate with business partners, and manage a budget of 25,000 euros. Responsibility for the festival is theirs, and the young organizers have to cooperate with each other regardless of skin color and cultural or ethnic background, which is heterogeneous by design. The project is considered a big success, not only because of the 5,000-euro surplus donated to charity, but for its ability to promote responsibility and self-sufficiency among young people learning important lessons about tolerance and acceptance.

Another project, developed in the city Zoetermeer after a couple of incidents with a group of right-wing extremist youths, tried to separate the inner circle of the group from the followers. The former were shadowed by the police and could thus be controlled in an instant, while the latter were involved in discussions by social workers. This project mainly sought to prevent followers from slipping deeper into the scene and made them talk about their problems and think about solutions. Their links to their leaders should be cut off and their isolation replaced by reintegration into society.

Nevertheless, the Dutch struggle against right-wing extremism still faces problems. One of these is neglecting structural deficits. Dutch stakeholders regard right-wing extremism as a security issue and not in the broader context of education. So the symptoms of extremist thinking, like symbols and manifestations of racist and right-wing extremism, are being fought in schools, by police and many other governmental organizations and NGOs. But the underlying reasons – for example xenophobia and grievances of any kind that lead to right-wing extremism – are rarely addressed and insufficiently researched. Another problem is that the actors engaged in combating social and security problems predominantly focus on Islamic radicalization. But though right-wing and Islamic radicalization may appear similar, the circumstances that lead to extremism are in most cases very different. What’s more, right-wing extremism in Germany may stem from different problems than those in the Netherlands. Therefore, the key to combating extremism lies in local structures. The problems originate there, so the solutions must be found there.

The EXIT initiative

In addition to prevention programs, some measures to encourage extremists to leave behind their violent pasts are also successful. Two initiatives in Sweden

and one in Germany pursue the concept of helping members of the right-wing extremist scenes in those countries quit. Founded by former neo-Nazi leaders who teamed up with law enforcement, the groups EXIT Stockholm, EXIT Motala and EXIT Germany try to identify, approach, understand and change members of the violent extremist scene. To illustrate, the methods of EXIT Germany, financed by private foundations, will be explained.

The neo-Nazi scene in Germany operates quite openly and is supported by the National Democratic Party, which survived attempts to declare it illegal. For that reason, locating and approaching individuals are easier than they are with other extremists. EXIT begins with individualized coaching by psychologists. It should be noted that some neo-Nazis share ideology but are drawn more deeply into the extremist lifestyle through peer pressure and force. The EXIT initiative works mainly with those individuals who want to break from the circle of violence and criminal acts. The program consists mainly of individual psychological coaching, like that described in the section on left wingers, and administrative support. In extremist circles, violence against “traitors” is common, so it’s hard to withdraw slowly from these groups without endangering one’s life. In some cases, EXIT helps with relocation, finding a job and, if former colleagues threaten retaliation, a new identity is created, similar to those provided by a witness protection program. EXIT Germany has helped more than 300 individuals in the past decade. Its success has inspired similar initiatives in the future to counter left-wing or religious extremism.

Muslim extremism

Like other European countries, the Netherlands and Spain aim to promote integration, combat terrorism and counter violent extremism. Both countries have significant Muslim populations but with different histories. EU member states have come to believe that the EU should and can play a role in promoting good integration policies. Recently, the European Commission launched programs to support the national efforts of member states, but the results are yet to be seen.

Given the variety of potential social, economic and security policies that could help promote integration and counter extremism, the programs presented for each country should be considered illustrative and not exhaustive. In all European countries, the number of violent extremists and their supporters within the Muslim community is marginal. Despite the fact that the socio-economic circumstances for most Muslims are not very encouraging, the vast majority are peaceful and law abiding citizens.

The Dutch approach

As a result of a history of Dutch colonization of Muslim countries like Indonesia, more than 900,000 Muslims live in the Netherlands, compared with 54,000 in 1971. They constitute about 5.5 percent of the population. One-half of the population of Amsterdam, the national capital, is Muslim. Muslims in the country are usually much younger than the general population, and the “noncolonial” Muslims, those mostly from Turkey and Morocco, are subject to higher unemployment rates, lower incomes and poorer prospects for social uplift. However, the number of Dutch Muslims completing higher education, including women, has improved significantly in the past decade. Muslims have also successfully established a small number of primary and secondary schools in their communities.

The Netherlands adopted a policy of multiculturalism in the 1970s and some analysts say conservative Muslims generally cannot bear the socially permissive atmosphere of this most liberal society in Western Europe. Additionally, second- or third-generation Muslims, who lack roots in their parents’ culture and feel adrift in the Netherlands, may be attracted to extremism.

In its efforts to promote Muslim integration (which started as early as 1994), the Netherlands tried to improve the socio-economic position of disadvantaged ethnic minorities. Through cooperation between the government and immigrants, the objective has been to promote democratic participation, combat poverty, and prevent and counter discrimination and racism. In recent years, possibly owing to a change in society’s receptiveness to immigration, the efforts were readjusted to include a newly agreed “moral obligation” of immigrants to conform to Dutch society and contribute to it. With the political changes in the country within the past few years and a right-wing party in parliament that reflects the views of a growing number of voters, integration efforts have been challenged by the extreme right of the political spectrum.

Nevertheless, the following measures taken by the government of the Netherlands since the mid-1990s have been successful. Two Muslim broadcasting corporations and government-run television stations broadcast programs aimed at ethnic minorities. To improve law enforcement, the government has established programs aimed at increasing community trust and engagement with the police. Government money is used to fund the Moroccan “Neighborhood Fathers” project, which functions similar to the U.S. “Community Watch” program. In both, local communities take responsibility to prevent crime and also extremism. Also, the police try to recruit employees from ethnic minorities to create a force governed by

cultural diversity. Like nearly all European countries, Holland requires immigrants to take tests in the Dutch language and culture to make integration easier for the new arrivals.

In combating radicalism, the Dutch use a two-pronged approach based on prevention and watchfulness. The government tries to enable vulnerable people to resist radicalization and intervenes to identify, isolate and contain radicalization. In this, local authorities play a key role. They promote interfaith dialogue and interethnic contacts, promoting especially sports programs. The government encourages Muslim communities to develop their own religious training programs with the goal of eliminating the need for “imported” imams who do not understand the culture and values of Dutch society. So-called street coaches, mainly kick boxers and martial arts experts who tend to be respected by young males, patrol areas of possible conflict and watch out for anti-social behavior. As another pillar of prevention, the government watches the Internet for extremist websites and has introduced its own websites to counter extremists’ narratives.

The most recent problem identified by Dutch society concerns integration of minorities. The gain of momentum from right-wing parties is triggering a reaction in the form of greater Muslim extremism. The country must counter right-wing extremism more effectively to prevent this from happening.

The case of Spain

Spain has also experienced a growing wave of immigration during the past two decades, mainly from South America. The Muslim community is only one-quarter of the non-Spanish population. Ninety percent of Muslims in Spain are foreign nationals.

Despite the fact that Spain was hard hit by the Madrid terrorist attacks in 2004, Spain undertook few efforts to integrate Muslims in its society. Only recently, Spain started to adopt pieces of the Dutch and the UK approaches to foster a regulated kind of multiculturalism mixed with an assimilation-style approach like that in France. In contrast to the situation in other European countries, Spanish Muslims encounter less hostility based on their faith, but they still struggle with relative poverty.

Government steps to legalize illegal immigrants working in Spain led to an easier approach to integration. Immigration and integration policies in Spain are targeted toward all immigrants, not just the Muslim minority. The Spanish government introduced a Foundation for Pluralism and Coexistence that promotes societal dialogue and recognition of minority religious groups and funds selected integration projects.

Cooperation with Muslim communities works well on the local level but hit some obstacles at the

national level. Owing to disagreement between the two largest associations speaking for Muslims in the country, high-level dialogue at the political level could not be sustained successfully.

As in the Netherlands, Spain’s central government and autonomous regions are trying to develop “homegrown” imams, an idea widely supported by Spain’s Muslims. To close the gap in education between immigrants and native Spaniards – a deficiency that opens the door to radicalization – the government introduced “bridge” classes and tutoring for children of immigrants to replace primary education missed in the originating countries. Funding is a problem in Spain’s struggling economy. In the 2009-2010 school year, only 46 public school teachers for Islamic religious education worked in Spain, even though 300 are needed.

Similar to its European neighbors, Spain also changed law enforcement policy in two directions. It admits former foreign nationals to diversify its police forces and has enacted stricter laws against the support of violence and terrorism. While other countries need to learn how to do “anti-terror” efficiently, Spain, with its experience combating the Basque terrorist group ETA, started off at a higher level.

Conclusion

Countering violent extremism is most effective when socio-economic gaps in the society are addressed at the same time. Faced with the obvious difficulties and costs of accomplishing that task, most countries prefer to prevent radicalization with the measures mentioned above. They can be effective, too, but they need coordinated activity between schools, local communities, law enforcement and governmental organizations. The EU is on the verge of coordinating member states’ efforts and will be willing to finance programs in the very near future. Within these efforts, it’s worth reminding Europe that there is a direct connection between Muslim extremism and the hostility Muslims feel in the host country from right-wing movements.

It is reassuring that various national and local initiatives can be copied throughout Europe and adopted to fight one kind of extremism or another. Understanding reasons for radicalization is the key factor, and as we can see with the Danish approach to left-wing extremism or the EXIT initiatives, listening to vulnerable individuals and building a foundation of respect before engaging in a fruitful discussion is the most promising. But the (re-) formation of a tolerant society that includes all constituent communities is equally important. Europe’s long tradition of equality, freedom and democracy formed societies that acquired one special right and duty: A tolerant society must have the right not to tolerate intolerance! □

The views expressed in this article are solely the authors’.

LESSONS FROM GREAT BRITAIN



THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

The evolution of the United Kingdom's *Prevent* counterterrorism program

By James K. Wither, Marshall Center

The United Kingdom has a long experience with terrorism. Anarchists and Fenians bombed targets in London in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and 3,500 people were killed during the Provisional Irish Republican Army's (PIRA) 30-year campaign for a united Ireland. In response, the UK developed a comprehensive range of anti-terrorist measures, including a tough legislative regime. However, there is little historical precedent for the kind of terrorism that threatens the UK in the early 21st century. PIRA did not embrace an extreme ideology, had tangible political demands and waged a campaign characterized by relative restraint. Noncombatant casualties from terrorist attacks were the exception rather than the norm. The mass-casualty, suicide bomb attacks by Islamist terrorists in London on July 7, 2005, were of a very different kind and alerted the British authorities to the fact that they faced a threat from violent extremism of unprecedented and uncompromising lethality.

In the 1990s, UK security services became aware of the activities of foreign extremists, such as Abu Hamza and Abdullah al-Faisal, who preached openly in mosques in London,¹ but most surveillance was still focused on Irish republican splinter groups opposed to the Northern Ireland peace process. Authorities shifted their main attention to Islamists only after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Given British political and military support for the United States' "war on terror," attacks were anticipated from both foreign jihadists and British-born and bred extremists. The danger posed by the latter made efforts to identify the causes of extremism a matter of urgency for the British government, especially

after the July 2005 attacks and the discovery of other similar homegrown terrorist plots.

The current British counterterrorism strategy is known as CONTEST. The latest published version was released in July 2011.² CONTEST is divided into four principle strands: *Prevent, Pursue, Protect, Prepare*. The *Prevent* strand aims to stop people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. *Prevent* is the focus of this paper, which examines British government efforts to counter violent extremism (CVE) since 2005. Although the causes of violent extremism are many and varied and are often dependent on country-specific factors, the paper also seeks to identify potential lessons for other Western states from British successes and failures during this period. Most Western states now perceive Islamist-inspired extremism as a security challenge, while there is also concern about violence from right-wing groups generated in part by Islamophobia. While approaches to CVE will naturally vary according to local cultural, political and legal norms, the UK's experience is noteworthy because of the scale of the threat it has faced and because Britain has attempted the most comprehensive CVE program outside a Muslim majority country.³

What is violent extremism?

Defining violent extremism is as problematic as defining terrorism. No internationally accepted definitions exist. Although the phrase "violent extremism" is often used synonymously with the word "terrorism," a distinction can and should be made between an extremist and a terrorist. Holding extreme views is not illegal in a liberal democracy,

and few people who express politically extreme views actually go on to commit *politically motivated acts of violence against civilians*, which is the core phrase in most definitions of terrorism.⁴ The phrase violent extremism arguably bridges the terms extremism and terrorism, a violent extremist being someone who supports or incites others to commit acts of terror:

This is the view taken by the British Crown Prosecution Service, which defines violent extremism as:

“The demonstration of unacceptable behavior by using any means or medium to express views which:

- foment, justify or glorify terrorist violence in furtherance of particular beliefs;
- seek to provoke others to terrorist acts;
- foment other serious criminal activity or seek to provoke others to serious criminal acts; or foster hatred which might lead to inter-community violence in the UK.⁵

Successful prosecutions for violent extremism include the radical preachers named above. Abu Hamza, for example, was convicted in 2006 of “soliciting to murder,” largely because of sermons that advocated violence against all “infidels.”⁶ He received a seven-year sentence, the maximum by law for those convicted of encouraging others to commit a terrorist act. Prosecutions for violent extremism have also included measures against right-wing extremists. Members of a group called the Aryan Strike Force were prosecuted for the possession of materials that espoused violent hatred towards Jews, Muslims and nonwhites.

Prosecutions for violent extremism were made possible by the inclusion of the encouragement of terrorism and the “dissemination of terrorist publications” in the Terrorism Act 2006.⁷ The act provoked controversy as critics claimed that measures against those who glorified or praised terrorism damaged legitimate freedom of speech. Understandably, it has proved difficult in practice to secure convictions against individuals and organizations accused of “glorifying

terrorism” because of the subjective nature of defining such behavior. An attempt to ban Hizb ut-Tahrir failed, and the violent extremist groups al-Muhajiroun and Islam4UK were only successfully banned in 2010. The government’s latest counterterrorism strategy formally recognizes a link between groups that espouse extremist views and terrorist ideologies, but in the interests of free speech, no attempt has been made to proscribe general “extremism” through the Terrorism Act.⁸

Sources of violent extremism

In May 2006, the UK Intelligence and Security Committee published a report on the July 2005 bombings. The report concluded that there was “no simple Islamist extremist profile,” because some of the individuals involved in the bombings appeared to be well integrated into British society.⁹ The government’s counterterrorism strategy paper of July 2006 offered a preliminary analysis of potential sources of Islamist extremism in Britain that included exposure to an extremist ideology, personal alienation from mainstream society and grievances due to Western policies toward Muslims.¹⁰ At the time, the latter factor appeared to be particularly significant. A national opinion poll in April 2006 noted that 31 percent of young Muslims agreed that the July 2005 bombings were justified because of British involvement in the “war on terror,” which was widely perceived as a war on Islam.¹¹ After the “liquid bomb” plot in August 2006, a group of eminent Muslims wrote to then-Prime Minister Tony Blair, stating that the “debacle of Iraq” had provided “ammunition for terrorists.”¹²

Some commentators suggested that “multiculturalism” was a factor in the alienation of young British Muslims.¹³ For 20 years, successive governments had tried to avoid imposing a single British identity and culture. This policy was blamed for the self-imposed segregation of Muslim communities, the proliferation of mosques staffed by radical clerics, and



Islam4UK spokesman Anjem Choudary, center, leaves a press conference in London in 2010, the year British authorities banned the group for promoting violence.

GETTY IMAGES

the establishment of faith schools that emphasized study of the Quran at the expense of a mainstream educational curriculum. Other analysts argued that the roots of extremism were economic and social. A report by the Office of National Statistics in 2006, for example, concluded that British Muslims were more than twice as likely to be unemployed as followers of other faiths and up to five times as likely to live in overcrowded accommodations.¹⁴

Since 2005, a vast range of books, articles and official reports in Europe and the United States has addressed the subject of Islamist violent extremism.¹⁵ Understandably, given the wide range of personal and contextual factors that contribute to extremism, no one analysis has proven exhaustive, although common themes have emerged from successive studies. These include: grievances due to real or perceived abuses committed against fellow Muslims, persuasive Islamist narratives and ideologies propagated by extremist leaders, and relative deprivation in the host society. In the case of homegrown terrorists, a range of personal factors appears to have created vulnerability to the extremist message, including issues of identity, frustrated ambition and displacement. Many analysts also discussed the role of

disadvantage. In summary, the paper concluded that al-Qaida influenced extremism was driven by “an ideology that sets Muslim against non-Muslim, highlights the alleged oppression of the global Muslim community and which both obliges and legitimises violence in its defence; a network of influential propagandists for terrorism, in this country and elsewhere, making extensive use of the Internet in particular; and by specific personal vulnerabilities and local factors which make the ideology seem both attractive and compelling.”¹⁷

Current British CVE strategy is based on this assessment.

Government CVE measures

When CONTEST was launched in 2003, analytical and intelligence sources largely focused on investigative work to address the immediate terrorist threat rather than the factors driving radicalization. After the July 2005 attacks, the latter problem received much greater attention. As noted above, the Terrorism Act 2006 criminalized violent extremism, but the government also launched a series of measures to address the perceived sense of alienation in Muslim communities and to counter the spread of religious extremism. The Home Office began a major consultation

The current threat to the UK from international terrorism is severe. The most significant international terrorism threat to the UK remains violent extremism associated with and influenced by al Qaida

– *The Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism, 2012*

institutional facilitators of extremism, namely the Internet, prisons, university campuses and peer groups.

In March 2010, the parliamentary Communities and Local Government Committee addressed the risk factors for violent extremism. The committee’s findings were based on a comprehensive series of written submissions and individual interviews with government officials, local community and religious leaders, academics, and nongovernmental organizations.¹⁶ Much of the evidence presented to the committee revisited themes discussed in previous studies and reports. Not surprisingly, the committee concluded that it was impossible to define a single pathway to radicalization. What the committee described as a “failure to access a shared British identity” was once again acknowledged as a factor that left individuals vulnerable to an extremist ideology, although British foreign policy was now considered a contributory rather than primary driver. Instead, the committee placed emphasis on relative socio-economic deprivation, which made vulnerable individuals more susceptible to political and religious radicalization.

A major review of the *Prevent* strategy was published in June 2011. This paper provided the most sophisticated official British analysis to date of the drivers of violent extremism. The review noted that academic research and the experience of organizations working on *Prevent* strategies had suggested that radicalization occurred as people searched for identity, meaning, and community in an environment where they faced apparent discrimination and socio-economic

exercise with Muslim communities under the title *Preventing Extremism Together*. Recommendations arising from this exercise were included in the *Prevent* strategy. Measures included “roadshows” by Muslim scholars to challenge terrorist ideology, community-led approaches to strengthen the role of local leaders, and measures to enhance mosque self-regulation through the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board.¹⁸ A government commission was established to work with communities of mixed ethnicity to examine causes of tension and barriers to integration. Its report in July 2007 stressed the importance of shared values and visible social justice, along with more practical recommendations such as citizenship education in schools and the promotion of English language training in immigrant communities.¹⁹ The Home Office *Channel* project launched in April 2007 encouraged teachers and community leaders to identify and report teenagers suspected of being attracted to extremism so that local police and community leaders could intervene before they became directly involved in terrorism. As prisons and universities were also considered to be extremism “hot spots,” *Prevent* measures included guidance to universities concerning campus extremism and initiatives to train prison imams, mentor at-risk prisoners and assist Muslim prisoners to reintegrate into society at the end of their sentences.

In March 2007, the Home Office established a cross-departmental Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU) specifically to counter al-Qaida’s ideology and terrorist



A British police officer in Birmingham hands out leaflets in 2007. Britain has one of the most active and far-reaching anti-terrorism programs in the world, but officials have fine-tuned their efforts to avoid stigmatizing particular religions or ethnic groups.



Women walk past a sign in 2011 meant to reassure Muslim residents in Birmingham that the authorities had not singled them out for surveillance. Project Champion, part of a larger British program to combat violent extremism, set up cameras in Birmingham neighborhoods that police believed harbored radicals.

narratives, while the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) engaged with international partner countries to share ideas for countering violent extremism. Given the perceived role of schools in promoting extremist ideology, educational reform was a major FCO focus. This included the establishment of partnerships with madrassas in Pakistan and Bangladesh.²⁰

The government's urgent and wide-ranging efforts to counter violent extremism proved controversial. Laudable core concepts such as "shared values" and "cohesion and integration" were neither defined nor explained, and Liberal Democrat peer Lady Falkner spoke for many when she attacked the government's initiatives as "... a very hurried, let's-do-something sort of response rather than anything substantive."²¹ Much criticism was directed at the government's attempts to co-opt Muslim leaders who were often viewed as unrepresentative of majority Muslim opinion.²² Most seriously, tensions emerged between the *Prevent* and *Pursue* strands of the government's counterterrorism policy. Police surveillance and intelligence gathering caused distrust and anger in Muslim communities. The most damaging allegations were that *Prevent* measures were being used to spy on law-abiding Muslim citizens.²³

Review and reform of *Prevent*

Despite widespread criticism, significant changes to the UK's CVE policy did not take place until the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition replaced the Labour government in 2010. A series of reports provided the impetus for change. The independent think tank Policy Exchange published a major and influential review of *Prevent* in 2009.²⁴ Policy Exchange criticized the belief that self-professed nonviolent Islamist organizations could act as official partners to prevent radicalization when, in practice, these "partners" promoted illiberal, anti-Western views that stoked violent extremism. The report also highlighted the relative lack of

management, administrative and financial oversight of local *Prevent* initiatives. The House of Commons Communities and Local Government Committee condemned much of the execution of the *Prevent* program.²⁵ In particular, the committee confirmed that efforts to mix community cohesion measures with the counterterrorism agenda had left many Muslims with the impression that even benign cross-cultural initiatives were subject to surveillance by the security services. The committee also concluded that *Prevent's* monocultural focus on Muslims had been unhelpful as it stigmatized one section of the community and could lead to the very alienation it was intended to halt.

In November 2010, the government launched a major official review of the *Prevent* strategy. Prime Minister David Cameron also made a keynote speech on the subject of CVE at the Munich Security Conference in February 2011. He announced the end of "state multiculturalism" and official tolerance of viewpoints antithetical to Western democracy and liberal values. He promised to create a society with a strong sense of national identity founded on the values of freedom of speech and worship, democracy, rule of law and equal rights.²⁶ The *Prevent* review and strategy, published in June 2011, claimed that previous CVE policies had confused efforts to promote integration with counterterrorism measures, had failed to confront terrorist ideologies adequately, and had even allowed funding to reach some extremist organizations that facilitated terrorism. The new strategy focused on three main areas: terrorist ideologies and those that promoted them, people vulnerable to the extremist narrative, and sectors and institutions where radicalization was liable to take place.²⁷

The revised *Prevent* strategy retained much from earlier versions, such as the legal framework and controversial measures such as *Channel* and the RICU. In particular, *Channel*, the multiagency program to identify and support

A bus passes floral tributes placed at a memorial for the victims of the London bombings. July 7, 2011, marked the sixth anniversary of the terrorist attacks that killed 52 people on buses and underground trains.



people at risk of radicalization, was to provide the basis of future efforts to protect individuals vulnerable to extremism. Nevertheless, the new strategy addressed most of the strongest criticisms of the previous government's CVE efforts. In the future, *Prevent* would tackle all forms of terrorism, including that from the right wing. The government would no longer work with so-called nonviolent extremist groups that opposed liberal democratic values. Broad initiatives to promote social integration and cohesion would finally be separated from counterterrorism activities. The revised strategy placed a major emphasis on a holistic approach that addressed so-called key sectors that included education, faith, health, criminal justice and charities. The Internet was identified as a key sector in its own right with emphasis on the need for effective online, counterterrorist narratives. The 2011 version of *Prevent* acknowledged that public money had been squandered on CVE and promised much more robust scrutiny, monitoring and evaluation of *Prevent* projects at the local and national level.

It is too early to judge the success of the revised *Prevent* strategy. It did not attract much public interest on its release, not least because effective police and intelligence operations during the past few years have successfully foiled terrorist attacks and diminished public perception of the threat.

Criticism to date has focused on *Prevent's* emphasis on "mainstream British values" and the crackdown on nonviolent extremists, which some claim stigmatizes

non-mainstream, but arguably pro-democracy, organizations such as the Muslim Council of Britain.²⁸ Because Britain is currently enduring a five-year austerity program, little can be done to redress perceived economic and social deprivation in some Muslim communities. This is a long-term problem that remains outside the scope of the *Prevent* program.

Lesson from the British approach

The UK has developed a comprehensive CVE program. No other Western state has put such a sustained effort into countering radicalization. The record since 2005 has been checkered, but British authorities have shown a willingness to learn from mistakes and reform failing programs. The following observations from the UK's CVE experience are intended to advance the sharing of ideas and the dissemination of good practice in CVE.

- CVE measures must have cross-party support. It should not be an area subject to major political arguments. Throughout the period under discussion, a broad consensus remained on counterterrorism measures in the UK. Parliamentary criticisms of *Prevent* were essentially made on practical rather than political grounds.
- CVE measures should not be introduced without consideration of their long-term efficiency and effectiveness. Much early criticism of the *Prevent* strategy stemmed from the fact that many measures were introduced hastily in reaction to an enhanced perception of

the homegrown terrorist threat in 2005-2006.

- National CVE programs should define terms such as “extremism,” “radicalization” and “Islamism.” The latest *Prevent* strategy contains a glossary of terms used in the context of UK CVE, although the authorities recognize that the definitions used “... are not always authoritative in any wider context.”²⁹
- CVE programs should not stigmatize a particular ethnic or religious group. British government efforts to counter Islamist ideology were interpreted as interference in religious practice and caused a backlash. Governments should facilitate, rather than direct, local community efforts to counter radicalization and avoid a heavy-handed involvement by police and intelligence services.
- CVE requires a whole of government approach. It is not primarily a task for the security services. In particular, education and correctional institutions play a key role in CVE. Private sector organizations, especially Internet providers, are increasingly important. *Prevent* has also illustrated the need for cooperation between government departments and civil society, including charities and faith organizations.
- Unlike specific counterterrorism measures, CVE initiatives should be transparent, communicated to all members of the community and involve widespread consultation with those directly and indirectly affected. Changes to *Prevent*, especially in recent years, have been preceded by widespread direct consultation with interested parties, as well as comprehensive data and evidence collection.

Conclusion

As noted above, there are no CVE templates that can be universally applied regardless of a country’s politics, society, history and culture. Although *Prevent* remains a work in progress, it offers a model for a whole of government approach to countering radicalization, which has evolved in response to public criticism and changing circumstances. Cooperation with allied and partner nations remains an important feature of *Prevent*. British academics and officials from the security services have shared ideas with their peers in the European Union, the U.S. and Muslim majority countries such as Pakistan, Bangladesh and Saudi Arabia. A notable example is provided by Professor Peter Neumann, director of The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, who advised the U.S. government on its latest CVE strategy in 2011.³⁰ CVE is becoming an essential element of regional and international counterterrorism programs. For example, in July 2012, a Marshall Center–sponsored conference in Macedonia brought together counterterrorism specialists from the whole Balkan region and included discussion on comparative CVE case studies from Bosnia-Herzegovina, the UK and Germany. Such cooperation will remain critical in an era when the threat of terrorism is no longer purely a domestic matter, but rather invariably involves a range of transnational actors connected by worldwide communication and information systems and united by ideologies with a global reach. □

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3. The latest British security strategy lists terrorism as the most important “Tier 1” security threat to the UK. See: HM Government, “A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy,” Cm 7952, October 2010. Available from: <http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/national-security-strategy.pdf> For an analytical summary of deradicalization efforts in Muslim states see: Maureen Chowdhury Fink and Hamed El Said, *Transforming Terrorists: Examining International Efforts to Address Violent Extremism*, (New York: International Peace Institute, 2011).
4. Reports and studies frequently refer to the process of becoming a violent extremist as “radicalization.” Therefore, the words “extreme” and “radical” are used interchangeably in this paper.
5. The Crown Prosecution Service, *Violent Extremism and Related Criminal Offences*, Section 1. Available from: http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/violent_extremism.html
6. *Ibid*, Section 5. The full list of charges included behavior likely to stir up racial hatred, the possession of “threatening recordings,” and a document likely to be “useful to terrorists.”
7. UK National Archives, *The Terrorism Act 2006*, Chapter 11, Part 1, Offences. Available from: <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/11/contents>
8. *CONTEST*, op cit, p. 59. The right to hold extremist views is protected by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
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NATO Centres of Excellence

Specialized centres
boost the Alliance's
capabilities

By per Concordiam Staff

NATO began developing Centres of Excellence (COE) in Europe and the U.S. in 2005 with the goal of creating specialized intellectual centres that would address critical security shortfall areas among NATO member countries. Today, 18 COEs provide a broad scope of work along four main pillars: Analysis and Lessons Learned, Concept Development & Experimentation, Education and Training, and Doctrine Development and Standards. Three more COEs are in the accreditation process.

The innovative multinational partnerships have achieved success. Each centre specializes in a precise subject matter area and is home to experts within that field. Funding is either national or multinational, and although the centres cooperate closely with the Alliance, they are not part of the NATO command structure. The Allied Command Transformation, located in Norfolk, Virginia, coordinates the COEs.

Using a "smart defense" approach, the centres expand interoperability and work under the principle of no duplication with existing assets and resources among the NATO community. They help strengthen and build relationships between international organizations, nongovernmental organizations and academic groups. The locations, spread across Europe, including several from the old Eastern Bloc, emphasize the cooperative nature of the centres. NATO centres of excellence showcase effective multinational partnerships at a time when cooperation is vital.

For more information, visit www.act.nato.int

COMBINED JOINT OPERATIONS FROM THE SEA (CJOS)

Location: Norfolk, Virginia, United States
NATO accredited: 2006.

Purpose: Supports the transformation of NATO's maritime capabilities. Its goal is to improve the ability of NATO countries to conduct combined joint operations at sea.

COLD WEATHER OPERATIONS (CWO)

Location: Bodø, Norway
NATO accredited: 2007

Purpose: Specializes in establishing efficiencies and best practices for extreme cold weather operations. Works with the Mountain Warfare COE in Slovenia.

CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION (CIMIC)

Location: Enschede, the Netherlands
NATO accredited: 2007

Purpose: Strives to improve civil-military cooperation between NATO, supporting nations and other military and civilian groups.

COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2)

Location: Utrecht, the Netherlands
NATO accredited: 2008

Purpose: Works to hone joint and combined interoperability proficiencies. It advises NATO member countries on the best ways to cooperate for maximum results.

JOINT AIR POWER COMPETENCE CENTRE (JAPCC)

Location: Kalkar, Germany
NATO accredited: 2005

Purpose: Develops and implements innovative use of air assets from all service branches. Perfects best practices for space power.

NAVAL MINE WARFARE (NMW)

Location: Oostende, Belgium
NATO accredited: 2006

Purpose: Partners with the Ecole de Guerre de Mines or War College of Mines. Provides state of the art naval mine countermeasure courses for NATO, Partnership for Peace and non-NATO countries.

CENTRE FOR ANALYSIS AND SIMULATION FOR THE PREPARATION OF AIR OPERATIONS (CASPOA)

Location: Lyon, France
NATO accredited: 2008

Purpose: Specializes in joint and multinational air operations that utilize Computer Assisted Exercise (CAX) and Command Post Exercises (CPX). It is the only NATO COE in France.

COUNTER IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES (C-IED)

Location: Madrid, Spain
NATO accredited: 2010

Purpose: Develops capabilities to counter, reduce and eliminate threats from improvised explosive devices.

MODELING AND SIMULATION (M&S)

Location: Rome, Italy
NATO accredited: 2012

Purpose: Focuses on education, improving interoperability in the field of modelling and simulation, and assistance on data interconnectivity.

OPERATIONS IN CONFINED AND SHALLOW WATERS (CSW)

Location: Kiel, Germany
NATO accredited: 2009

Purpose: Sharpens the Alliance's confined and shallow water fighting capabilities. Contributes to concept development and academic papers.

COOPERATIVE CYBER DEFENCE (CCD)

Location: Tallinn, Estonia
NATO accredited: 2008

Purpose: Advances cooperation, capabilities and information sharing between NATO countries regarding cyber security. Assists NATO countries to detect and fight cyber attacks and studies cyber warfare. Stems from the 2007 cyber attack on Estonia.

JOINT CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIATION AND NUCLEAR DEFENCE (JCBRN DEFENCE)

Location: Vyškov, Czech Republic
NATO accredited: 2007

Purpose: Develops standards for interoperability and capabilities of CBRN defense. Trains and certifies the CBRN Defence Task Force of the NATO Response Force.

ENERGY SECURITY (ENSEC)

Location: Vilnius, Lithuania
NATO accredited: 2012

Purpose: Advises NATO on all aspects of energy security. The need for integrated multinational cooperation grows as pipelines expand and energy producing nations grapple with instability.

MILITARY ENGINEERING (MILENG)

Location: Ingolstadt, Germany
NATO accredited: 2009

Purpose: Advises NATO partner countries on joint and combined military engineering for optimum interoperability. Home to some of the world's leading military engineers.

MILITARY POLICE (MP)

Proposed Location: Wrocław, Poland

Purpose: Will provide expert MP guidance to advance NATO's capabilities in the field.

EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL (EOD)

Location: Trenčín, Slovakia
NATO accredited: 2011

Purpose: Delivers explosive ordnance disposal know-how to NATO and Partnership for Peace nations.

MILITARY MEDICAL (MILMED)

Location: Budapest, Hungary
NATO accredited: 2009

Purpose: Improves military medical competencies by offering courses through the NATO School and sets standards for military medicine. Supplies mobile training teams to certify deployable multinational medical teams.

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE (HUMINT)

Location: Oradea, Romania
NATO accredited: 2010

Purpose: Brings human intelligence expertise to strategic commanders to improve interoperability and standardization.

CRISIS MANAGEMENT FOR DISASTER RESPONSE (CMDR)

Proposed Location: Sofia, Bulgaria

Purpose: Will build and develop crisis management and disaster relief capabilities of NATO and member nations.

MOUNTAIN WARFARE (MW)

Proposed Location: Bohinjska Bela, Slovenia

Purpose: Will enrich operations in difficult terrain and extreme weather.

DEFENCE AGAINST TERRORISM (DAT)

Location: Ankara, Turkey
NATO accredited: 2006

Purpose: Provides anti-terror expertise to defend against terrorism. Publishes the Defence Against Terrorism Review twice a year, and hosts conferences, workshops and training courses.

- Country With COE
- COE in Development
- Centre of Excellence (COE)

Serbia's European Home

Cooperation has drawn the country closer to the EU and NATO

By *per Concordiam* Staff

On a cool, damp March morning near Hohenfels, Germany, squads of soldiers from two nations moved through the woods together, alert to potential danger. The soldiers were taking part in a NATO training exercise in preparation for deployment to Afghanistan. Most of the exercise participants were predictable; the woods, fields and mock-up Afghan villages of Hohenfels were full of soldiers with shoulder patches from a multitude of NATO nations: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Germany, the Netherlands, Romania and the United States. But many would be surprised to discover Serbian soldiers patrolling next to American troops that morning.

Serbia and NATO had not had what can be described as a warm relationship for most of the past 15 years. When Yugoslavia splintered in the early 1990s, NATO forces intervened against Serb-dominated Yugoslav forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo and residual resentment remains. In fact, the destructive policies of former nationalist strongman Slobodan Milošević – who died at The Hague in 2006 while on trial for war crimes – had made Serbia something of a European pariah.

But Serbian relations with NATO and the European Union are thawing. In December 2006, Serbia joined NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, and has become a strategic military partner, under the auspices of which Serbian soldiers participate in NATO training exercises like the one in Germany. Perhaps more importantly, the European Commission granted Serbia official candidate status for EU accession in March 2012. Serbia has begun the political and economic reforms necessary to join the EU. But it still faces challenges to achieve those goals, including deteriorating economic conditions, resilient nationalism and the ongoing Kosovo situation.

EU reforms

In 2006 and 2008, then Serbian president Boris Tadić introduced a series of judicial and constitutional

reforms designed to streamline the government, reduce corruption and improve rule of law. The pro-Western Tadić set Serbia's sights on European integration and eventual EU membership as a means of modernizing the country and stimulating its stagnant and inefficient economy damaged by war, sanctions, corruption and organized crime.

Serbia has faced more obstacles than most other EU candidate countries. Problems with organized crime and corruption, fostered by years of war, placed it behind some of its neighbors in the region. And like Cyprus, Serbia struggles with a separatist crisis. Its economy is considered relatively uncompetitive, its industrial and technological infrastructure outdated. Unemployment hovers about 20 percent, and economist Miroslav Zdravković estimates that average real incomes are the same as in 1971.

The 2011 EU Enlargement Strategy and Progress Reports complimented Serbia on its reforms, stating that "Serbia has considerably progressed towards fulfilling the political criteria related to the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities" and added that Serbia had "taken important steps towards establishing a functioning market economy and achieved a certain degree of macroeconomic stability." In early 2012, Serbia made a series of substantive concessions on Kosovo relations, concessions that European Council president Herman Van Rompuy said resulted in Serbia's receiving EU candidate status.

Perhaps most importantly to the EU, Serbia found and arrested the remaining fugitive war crimes indictees from the Yugoslav wars and turned them over for trial to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia at The Hague. The arrests of wartime Bosnian Serb political and military leaders Radovan Karadžić (2008) and Ratko Mladić (2011), and Croatian Serb wartime leader Goran Hadžić (2011) were hailed as a turning point for Serbia and

CONSEIL EUROPÉEN EUROPEAN COUNCIL



Newly elected Serbian President Tomislav Nikolić, left, meets European Council President Herman Van Rompuy in Brussels in June 2012. He promised his country would continue working toward EU accession.

the entire region and a victory for the rule of law. Tadić also visited Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2010 and apologized for Serbia's culpability in war atrocities, paving the way for reconciliation.

Poor economic conditions led to Tadić's re-election defeat in May 2012. The new nationalist-leaning Serbian government, led by President and former Radical Party leader Tomislav Nikolić and Prime Minister Ivica Dačić, a former Milošević spokesman, eased European worries by pledging to continue the course set by Tadić. Dačić told Serbian news agency B92 that "the new government's position was to continue the EU integration and that it would insist on strict respect of all agreements with Priština [Kosovo];" and announced in August 2012 readiness to discuss normalization of relations, though details will be decided in discussions with EU officials scheduled for September. But the new leadership also swore that, though it would continue negotiations with Kosovo, it would never surrender Serbian sovereignty, which was enshrined in the new constitution passed in 2006.

NATO cooperation

Serbia has become an active, cooperative participant in the NATO PfP. In April 2011, Serbia began an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO, which is a framework of cooperation that provides for specific ways NATO will support Serbia in achieving defense sector reform goals. According to

Serbian forces in the NATO training like that at Hohenfels, which demonstrates the increased level of cooperation. For example, Serbian soldiers learned counterinsurgency tactics from Americans and Romanians. The squad's leader, Capt. Goran Roganović commented in fluent English: "Their experience in Iraq and Afghanistan was very useful for us. We received very useful skills and knowledge from U.S. Special Forces." Though Serbia has no plans to deploy forces to Afghanistan in support of NATO operations, Serbia has provided medical staff on United Nations and EU peacekeeping missions in Africa.

The Alliance has also funded and executed several NATO/PfP Trust Fund projects in Serbia, including programs to dispose of obsolete ammunition and help veterans start small businesses or train for alternative livelihoods, and awarded Serbia grants under the Science for Peace and Security Programme. Serbia currently has no plans to join NATO, though some pro-Western politicians have expressed support. Active participation in Pfp and the Strategic Military Partnership leave it well placed to pursue membership should a future government decide to reverse course.

Kosovo issues

Resolution of the status of Kosovo stands between Serbia and membership in the EU, or even NATO. Kosovo is a touchy subject in Serbian politics; any hint at relinquishing Serbia's claims to Kosovo are considered to

be political suicide, though many Serbs have conceded Kosovo's new status. A minority in Serbia wish to move on toward Europe and put the wars of the Milošević years in the past, even if it means accepting the de facto loss of Kosovo. "Serbia needs to understand once and for all that Kosovo is lost," former Deputy Prime Minister

Jožef Kasa told Serbian newspaper Dnevnik in July 2011, comparing the situation to that faced by post-World War I Hungary. "Constant dealing with the Kosovo issue, instead of economy, means a downfall for Serbia." As Milan

Left: Serbian nationalists in Belgrade protest in May 2011 the arrest and extradition of Bosnian Serbs Ratko Mladić, right in photo, and Radovan Karadžić.

Right: A Serbian infantryman, right, links up with a Bulgarian rifleman during NATO live-fire exercises with U.S. Marines at the Novo Selo training area in Bulgaria.



AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE

CPL. TATUM VAYAVANANDA/U.S. MARINE CORPS

NATO, the IPAP "will allow NATO and Serbia to deepen both their political consultation and practical cooperation."

NATO has a Military Liaison Office in Belgrade that facilitates the participation of



Marinković, a Serbian journalist, wrote on OpenDemocracy.org: “Whether examined from a political or ethical viewpoint, Serbia lost Kosovo deservedly. Serbian state policy during the 1990s could not have been better devised to alienate the nation from the entire civilized world.”

And there are many European-oriented, liberally minded Serbs who abhorred Milošević, his policies, excesses and wars but resent that Serbia’s long-standing historical territorial claims are often dismissed in the West. Nationalist politics feed on this resentment. Dmtar Bechev, a policy analyst with the European Council on Foreign Relations, sees hope. He told Radio Free Europe that the “solid nationalist credentials of Nikolić and his coalition government could give him the flexibility to make compromises on Kosovo that other leaders could not make.”

Serbia appeared ready to make such a compromise In January 2013, offering to remove all remaining Serbian institutions from northern Kosovo if Pristina would agree to full autonomy for the region’s four ethnic Serb municipalities.

Conclusion

Serbia is now on the path to EU membership. “The natural place of Serbia is in Europe, in history, in culture, in geographical terms, in economic terms,” EU Ambassador to Serbia, Vincent Degert, told Euractive. “When you do 80 percent of your trade with the European Union and the surrounding countries, it’s obvious where you are.”

Serbia has been made an official EU candidate but has not yet been given a date to start membership negotiations, which will have to wait until the country shows more progress on reforms and movement toward compromise on the status of Kosovo, according to EU officials. The *Guardian* newspaper cited a Serbian poll showing 85 percent support for the reforms necessary to gain accession, primarily rooting out corruption.

Jerzy Buzek, former president of the European Parliament, emphasized the importance of Serbia not backsliding on reforms in *The Wall Street Journal*: “Serbia must keep up its pro-democratic momentum – not only to meet its European goal, but first and foremost for the benefit of its citizens.” □

Then Serbian President Boris Tadić, left, pays tribute in 2010 to 200 Croat civilians and prisoners of war killed by Serb forces when they captured the town of Vukovar in November 1991. He apologized for the abuses committed by Yugoslav forces.

Frontex Moves **FRONT AND CENTER**



The EU's multinational border-control agency assumes a larger role in confronting illegal immigration

The Italian Coast Guard brings sub-Saharan African migrants to the Italian island of Lampedusa. The Arab Spring ignited a temporary migration crisis as people fled countries such as Libya in 2011.



EPA

By *per Concordiam* Staff

Thousands of migrants from North Africa, mostly refugees from disruptions caused by the Arab Spring, poured into Europe in 2011. They crammed into rickety boats and braved the waves with sights set on Spain's Canary Islands or Italy's Lampedusa Island. The largest number, however, took their chances on the Greek border with Turkey, where the European Union's external borders have been under pressure not just from North African refugees, but from economic migrants from all over Asia and Africa. In 2012, fewer North Africans made the trek, but Syrians fleeing conflict at home have multiplied. Wherever their origin, Greece remains the illegal migrant's favored entry point into Europe.

Recognizing the problem in late 2011, the EU Parliament authorized creation of the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) and European Border Guard Teams (EBGT) and is considering strengthening the EU's external borders through Frontex, Europe's joint border-control organization. But some European policy analysts suggest the EU needs to go further in creating a common European border-control policy, with member states ceding authority to a Frontex better able to protect the continent from transnational crime, including terrorism, illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings.

EUROPE'S BORDERS

Frontex estimates that as many as 90 percent of attempted illegal European border crossings happen in Greece. Since 2006, Greek officials have registered roughly 100,000 illegal immigrant asylum seekers per year, *Der Spiegel* said, noting that "Greece has not been able to cope with the onslaught." As a result, Frontex has a major presence in Greece with the inauguration of Operation Poseidon, a joint venture involving border guards from 23 countries. Contributing countries provide not only expert personnel but also trained sniffing dogs, infrared cameras, helicopters and all-terrain vehicles. And because Greece is a hot spot for migrants and human smugglers, Frontex chose the Greek port city of Piraeus as the location for its first regional office.

Influxes of migrants caused by instability in North Africa and the Middle East raised awareness of the need for coordinated European border protection policy. "On a continent struggling to weather an economic crisis and assimilate immigrant communities already within its borders," the Pulitzer Center for Crisis Reporting said, "many Europeans see strict, unified border enforcement as the continent's first line of defense."

There is no way of knowing how many irregular migrants are in Europe, but Frontex estimates there are 3 million to 8 million, 50 percent of whom entered illegally. Previous EU standards made border

security the responsibility of perimeter countries such as Greece or Italy, causing them to be overwhelmed at times due to limited human and technical resources. The new measures spread the burden more evenly and fairly, given that the intended destinations of many migrants are often countries in the EU interior where jobs are more plentiful. France, a popular end destination for North African migrants during the 2011 crises in that region, temporarily closed its border with Italy to stop migrants from crossing. Frontex implemented Operation Hermes to help Italy, on the front line, to control the refugee situation.

FRONTEX'S EXPANDING ROLE

Frontex's role, which is primarily to coordinate EU border-control policy and operations and provide technical assistance and training to EU member state border agencies, has been expanding since it opened in Warsaw, Poland, in October 2005. Coordination and training national border guards to meet uniform EU standards were among Frontex's original mandates. According to Frontex, there are now more than 130 national border-guard training academies in the EU that establish high standards as well as lay the groundwork for cooperation and joint operations among member states.

Not long after it opened, Frontex conducted its first operation, designed to detect illegal workers and visa overstayers by using surprise document examinations at EU borders. The results exceeded expectations by uncovering forged documents and signs of human trafficking and smuggling.

The new EUROSUR is aimed at improving surveillance of borders and coastlines through an integrated information-sharing network, with Frontex acting as facilitator. The system, the European Commission says, "allows all relevant data from national surveillance, new surveillance tools, European and international reporting systems and intelligence sources to be gathered, analyzed,

and disseminated in a structured manner between the relevant national authorities."

Creation of the EBGTT is an enhancement of the Rapid Border Intervention Teams first deployed to Greece in 2010. They provide member states with multinational teams of border control experts, available temporarily for joint operations and rapid border interventions in emergencies. EBGTT should improve efficiency, thanks to their ability to buy their own specialized equipment rather than rely on contributions from member states. The teams were first deployed to the Polish-Ukrainian border during the Eurocup 2012 to assist with the wave of additional border crossings. New measures also obligate EU members to staff and fund Frontex.

AVOIDING ABUSES

With the increased funding and authority, the European Parliament also required Frontex to establish a "fundamental rights officer" to ensure adherence to international law and the highest human rights standards in handling illegal migrants. Particular attention is paid to the principle of "non-refoulement," meaning refugees cannot be returned to a country where their rights are likely to be compromised. Human rights activists have expressed concern with Frontex's expanded powers and its approach to upholding the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. In July 2012, European Human Rights Ombudsman P. Nikiforos Diamandouros criticized Frontex's handling of arrested illegal migrants. "These are often people fleeing persecution," he said. "But there is no evidence that Frontex operations identify such persons."

Additional reforms have been proposed. In October 2011, the European Commission released its "Smart Borders" concept for a comprehensive new border control system. The goal of Smart Borders is to strike a balance between security and freedom at the EU's external borders, easing passage for legitimate travelers while identifying traffickers, smugglers and illegal migrants.



A Frontex border control unit monitors a security fence along a 12.5-kilometer stretch of Turkish border near Evos, Greece, in 2012.



Greek and Frontex border police collaborate on patrolling near the city of Orestiada to help stop illegal migrants using Turkey as a corridor.



A Slovenian customs officer, left, and his Polish counterpart check a passport as part of a Frontex team on the Croatian border with Slovenia in 2011.

The Smart Borders concept includes EUROSUR, a registered travelers program to expedite the movement of pre-vetted, regular border-crossers and an automated border-crossing system for EU citizens. The adoption of what the EU calls an “entry/exit system” promises to regulate overstaying by tracking travelers’ movements more successfully within Europe.

EU BORDER GUARDS

Reflecting the importance the EU places on securing borders, the European Parliament endowed Frontex with much greater resources. Frontex’s 2011 budget was 118 million euros, a more than sixfold increase from 19 million euros in 2006. But even considering all the money spent, some experts support greater integration of border control and immigration. Josef Janning, director of studies at the European Policy Centre in Brussels, would like to see Frontex transformed into a common border-patrol agency with the same authority over the EU external border that national border agencies have today. Swedish or Belgian guards could patrol the Greek islands, for example, and Italian or Slovenian guards could guard Lithuania’s border with Belarus.

Janning’s conviction that European security is a “common good” whose burden should be shared

across member states still meets with resistance. Border control remains a main element of national sovereignty, and many nations won’t cede that authority lightly. While the EU was expanding Frontex’s powers, it also changed rules to allow Schengen Agreement members more freedom to block passport-free travel in cases of terrorist attack and serious threats to internal security, including persistent problems with illegal migration.

While Frontex agents still defer actual border enforcement to host nation border guards, they have initiated many operations along Europe’s borders. “The countries on the external border are really active,” Jozsef Bali, head of Frontex’s Land Border Sector, said in a 2010 Frontex report. “I have never met during these five years with a refusal from a member state saying, ‘We won’t take part in this operation.’ They really are partners.”


In a short time, Frontex has grown from a new agency with a mandate to help train border guards and coordinate European border agencies into a common border force with dedicated teams ready to deploy to trouble spots, cutting-edge technical support and integrated intelligence capabilities. Frontex has achieved many of its goals but awaits further political integration if it’s to become Europe’s own border police. □

SECURITY



An Afghan policeman stands guard as officials in Herat province burn a pile of opium in July 2011. Authorities had seized 1,886 kilograms of opium and made 265 drug arrests in the western Afghan province during the previous six months.

AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE



combating NARCOTICS

Multinational partnerships help stem the flow of cocaine and heroin into Europe

Months of surveillance paid off in October 2011, when 50 Cape Verdean paramilitary police, in cooperation with Dutch forensics experts, raided a garage in a densely populated neighborhood of the West African island nation's capital. The drugs they found represented the biggest stash discovered in all of West Africa that year: 1,360 kilograms of Colombian cocaine.

Thousands of kilometers away in the village of Zerasari near the Afghan-Pakistani border, anti-narcotics agents from the United States, Afghanistan and Russia had already made a major discovery of their own. The multinational operation captured several drug laboratories that had been hoarding about a ton of high quality heroin.

What united these two operations, which occurred more than 9,000 kilometers apart, was the ultimate destination of many of these confiscated hard drugs: Europe.

A two-directional flow of illegal narcotics – cocaine arriving from the southwest through West Africa and heroin arriving from the east through Central Asia and the Balkans – has encouraged partnerships among nations that once viewed cooperation with apathy or suspicion. As a result, joint operations, training and intelligence sharing have begun to put a dent in a trade responsible not just for widespread human misery but also crime and corruption.

“This is a major success for cooperative actions,” Viktor P. Ivanov, head of Russian drug enforcement, told journalists in Moscow after the success of the U.S.-Russian Zerasari raid. “This shows that there are real actions being taken.”

By *per* Concordiam Staff

COCAINE TRAFFICKING INTO EUROPE

Traffickers have moved an estimated 27,000 to 91,000 kilograms of South American cocaine worth \$3 billion to \$14 billion through West Africa to Europe. Their African base of operations range from small uninhabited islands to the ungoverned belt of territory between the Sahara and the savannahs called the Sahel. The region became a choice trafficking route to Europe in the 1990s, according to Laurence Aida Ammour, a consultant in international security and defense at GéopoliSudconsultance in France.

Vast spaces, poor regional coordination and little to no aerial and maritime surveillance has provided cover for the criminals. Weak laws and law enforcement has long meant that getting caught is unlikely, and getting prosecuted less so. One of the first African bases for Colombian and Peruvian drug cartels was Guinea-Bissau, from which cocaine has been smuggled and shipped into places like Iberia and Italy.

Like Cape Verde, Ghana, Mauritania, Mali, Senegal and other countries in the region are increasing cooperation, information sharing and training with source countries in Latin America and destination countries in Europe. West African-European partnerships, particularly maritime interdiction operations, are starting to bear fruit.

Communications have flowed through Interpol at the Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre, a multinational maritime security center based in Lisbon. Col. António Pinheiro, professor at the National Defense Institute in Portugal, explained that drug traffickers flourish when nations underestimate the threat and fail to cooperate. "The key to solve the problem is 'intel' sharing," Pinheiro said.

Another partnership is AIRCOP, launched in late 2011 by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the World Customs Organization and Interpol. The European Union is providing most of the millions of euros to support the effort, aimed at creating intelligence exchanges among airports and police agencies in Brazil and seven West African countries. From the EU perspective, it's better to interdict cocaine at its source or in transit before it arrives as baggage at an airline terminal in Brussels, Rome or London.

UN anti-narcotics official Alexandre Schmidt estimated that of 822 drug seizures in Europe in 2009, 122 of the parcels originated on flights from West Africa. "The drug traffickers have much more sophisticated means and they are using more routes," Schmidt said during a 2011 anti-drug conference in Senegal that discussed traffickers' use of speedboats, jets, cargo ships and potentially even submarines to reach European markets.

STOPPING HEROIN

Based on its capacity to finance terror organizations, destabilize countries and spread disease via needle use, heroin trafficking into Europe and Eurasia represents perhaps an even worse scourge. More than 80 percent of the world's heroin comes from Afghanistan, where opium poppies remain a source of black market income for hundreds of thousands

"The \$61 billion annual market for Afghan opiates is funding insurgency, international terrorism and wider destabilization."

– UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon

of farmers. Eradication efforts have met with mixed success, production of the drug varying with the weather and the intensity of anti-drug operations.

By one UN estimate, the Taliban makes up to \$300 million a year from drug trafficking. This is only one part of the billions of dollars in proceeds from the sale of Afghan heroin and opium – traffickers and dealers grab the largest share – but this illicit money source pays salaries for Taliban fighters, buys weapons and bankrolls attacks.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon took up the theme in his message for the 2011 International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking. "Drug trafficking, once viewed largely as a social and criminal problem, has transformed in recent years into a major threat to the health and security of people and regions," he said. "The \$61 billion annual market for Afghan opiates is funding insurgency, international terrorism and wider destabilization."

Afghanistan opiates have ensnared millions of addicts in Central and South Asia, but the biggest profits come from smuggling the drugs to Europe, including Russia. Large quantities of the Afghan heroin end up on the streets of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Interpol described the two main trafficking channels as the "Balkan Route" through Turkey and Southeast Europe and the "Silk Route" through Central Asia. "The anchor point for the Balkan Route is Turkey, which remains a major staging area and transportation route for heroin destined for European markets," Interpol reported. As for the Silk Route, "Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan are vital transit countries," the police agency noted.

At a December 2011 conference in Germany, Afghanistan and seven neighboring nations agreed to cooperate more closely against drug trafficking and organized crime. Yury Fedotov, executive director of the UNODC, noted that countries of the region would share counternarcotics intelligence for the first time and hoped to establish joint anti-narcotics patrols.

The same organization admits there's room for improvement at Balkan transshipment points. There transnational gangs originating in Italy, Turkey, the Caucasus, Russia and Southeast Europe exploit the sometimes porous borders



to conduct their trade. Considering the millions of cars and trucks that cross the borders in the region, a satchel of heroin can be difficult to detect. Ioannis Michaletos of the Athens-based World Security Network Foundation called the heroin trade the “locomotive for the generation of illicit earnings in Southeastern Europe,” and the UNODC’s World Drug Report 2010 tried to explain why:

“Once heroin leaves Turkish territory, interception efficiency drops significantly. In the Balkans, relatively little heroin is seized, suggesting that the route is exceedingly well organized and lubricated with corruption. In 2008, the countries and territories that comprise South-East Europe (a total of 11 countries, including Greece and Cyprus) seized 2.8 mt [metric tons] of heroin in 2008. This is in sharp contrast to what is seized upstream in Turkey.”

The news website SETimes quoted Hajrudin Somun, former Bosnia and Herzegovina ambassador to Turkey, who said that drug smugglers prefer doing business in politically unstable countries or those that have historically ranked low in the fight against organized crime, such as Bulgaria and Romania.

“There are some joint regional countries’ police actions against the drug trade and trafficking, but more political

will is needed for linking such activities in an organized chain of coordination,” Somun told SETimes in 2012.

The EU admissions process has been a source of anti-corruption reform in the region. Even recently admitted EU members Bulgaria and Romania have had to wait to join the Schengen zone until European leaders can quantify an improvement in border control and crime fighting. Schengen is the European passport-free zone within which people and goods move more or less freely.

But drug eradication can’t be focused on a single region. It must be a global effort, said Jean-Luc Lemahieu, Afghan country representative for the UNODC. He praised the progress of anti-opium programs in Helmand province and called for greater international assistance in attacking the Afghan drug trade. “More robust regional and global cooperation is essential,” he said. “Our responses should not be limited to Afghanistan alone or even to the region. This is a wake-up call.” □

Afghan policemen guard a handcuffed man caught with 55 kilograms of opium and a Kalashnikov assault rifle in July 2011. Even though Helmand farmers tend nearly half the poppy-growing land in Afghanistan, the amount of land used for poppy cultivation declined 3 percent in 2011.

Creating a New Silk Road

By *per Concordiam* Staff

The Afghan redevelopment strategy calls for making the country a transit hub for the region

For more than 1,000 years, the historical Silk Road, as related by travelers such as Marco Polo, was a multipronged trading network that linked the peoples of Europe and the Middle East with the riches of China. Spanning deserts, grasslands, mountains and seas between the Mediterranean and East Asia, the Silk Road brought wealth to the oases and trading depots along its route, including the towns of Herat and Mazar-e Sharif in Afghanistan. The Silk Road carried more than just the precious spun fabric craved by wealthy Westerners and Middle Easterners. Gold, ceramics, gems, spices, linen and exotic plants and animals also made the nearly 8,100-kilometer transcontinental journey by caravan. So valuable was the cargo transported on the Silk Road – and so lucrative the monopoly exerted by many of its traders – that it inspired the European Age of Discovery that began in the 15th century.



Authorities open a Panj River bridge that later increased trade between Afghanistan and Tajikistan. Such modern infrastructure projects are key to plans for reconstituting a New Silk Road. AFP/GETTY IMAGES

The Silk Road was so consequential for world history that it has become the organizing philosophy around which the international community would like to rebuild Afghanistan. The New Silk Road (NSR) is a multinational strategy that focuses on upgrading infrastructure and liberalizing trade in Afghanistan to aid its re-emergence as a lucrative commercial hub for Central Asia. NSR would bolster landlocked Afghanistan as an indispensable trading crossroads and “energy bridge” for the region. The strategy aims to leverage technical, financial and political resources of coalition partners to develop roads, railroads, pipelines and electric lines. The encouragement of trade, including the removal of commercial barriers at Afghanistan’s international borders, would help complete the transformation.

For the first time in decades, Afghanistan’s neighbors could view it less as a geopolitical trouble spot and more as an autonomous economic and diplomatic partner. By investing in a productive Afghanistan, its neighbors would have a stake in a peaceful Afghanistan. Or so the strategy envisions. Professor Andrew Kuchins, one of the “founding fathers” of the NSR concept, argues that the plan is vital for regional reconciliation: “Promoting greater connectivity between Afghanistan and its neighbors is not just an economic strategy but also a political one. If Afghanistan’s neighbors benefit economically from and have a stake in the country’s economic development, they will have incentives to support the long-term stabilization of Afghanistan as well.”

Despite billions of dollars poured into Afghan reconstruction and development since 2001, the results, by more or less general consent, have not been wholly satisfying if the goal is to create an economically self-sufficient nation. The expansion of rural health care and co-educational schooling notwithstanding, Afghanistan remains dependent on massive foreign aid to pay its bills, provide jobs for its people, stimulate economic growth and equip and train its security forces.

Afghanistan is one of the least developed countries in the world, with a population estimated at 30.6 million people. Officially, half of Afghans live on about \$1 a day, and unemployment hovers around 35 percent. Life expectancy is 48.1 years; infant mortality is the highest in the world, (134 per 1,000 live births). Three-quarters of the population is illiterate. With a high population growth rate (more than half of society is under 18), Afghanistan will need investment to stimulate strong economic growth.

Nevertheless, significant economic progress has occurred since 2001: Afghanistan’s per capita GDP has more than quadrupled, from \$125 in 2002 to \$528 in 2011. More than 7 million children are now enrolled in school, 39 percent of whom are girls, and more than 60 percent of Afghans have access to basic health services, compared with 8 percent



Fuel trucks line up near terminals in Pakistan’s port city of Karachi in July 2012. For landlocked Afghanistan, rail and road access to Pakistani seaports is critical for increasing international trade. AFP/GETTY IMAGES

in 2002. With support from the Sustainable Marketplace Initiative, 680 Afghan businesses have won 1,300 contracts valued at more than \$1 billion that will help create or sustain 13,000 jobs, or about 1 percent of the labor force.

From 2002 to 2007, road construction consumed \$1.43 billion, or 24 percent, of the U.S. aid budget to Afghanistan. Thanks to that investment, 1,700 kilometers of roads were paved and another 1,100 kilometers laid in gravel. Nevertheless, fewer than 10 percent of Afghanistan’s roads qualify as modern, stifling connectivity among Afghans themselves and between Afghans and the larger world.

The economic challenge posed by the 2014 transition and beyond is how the withdrawal of existing civilian and military resources will be replaced. International donors – mostly the U.S. and Europe – agreed during 2012’s Tokyo conference to provide \$16 billion in civilian aid to Afghanistan from 2012 to 2016. But the country can’t rely on large donations forever, and how dwindling aid will impact the security environment in Afghanistan is a major topic of discussion. Theoretically underpinning NSR is a

concern that the country lacks an “overarching” development strategy aimed at self-sufficiency after the military drawdown. Professor Frederick Starr, who has written several studies supporting the concept, said transit and transportation is the key to everything, be it extracting and exporting the country’s billions of dollars in mineral wealth, importing finished Chinese consumer goods, or providing natural gas from Turkmenistan across Afghanistan to the consumers of Pakistan and India.

Much progress is already under way. Uzbekistan used financing from the Asian Development Bank to extend a railway to Mazar-e Sharif and transmits electricity to Kabul. Tajikistan, too, plans to install a rail line to Afghanistan from its capital of Dushanbe. China is helping reconstruct the main north-south road across Pakistan. By broadening this growing network of rail and trucking corridors – east over the Khyber Pass to China, northwest into Turkmenistan to reach the Caspian Sea and Europe and south toward Indian Ocean ports such as Pakistan’s Gwadar – Afghanistan will, for all purposes, no longer be landlocked.

“Neither the development of agriculture nor the

exploitation of natural wealth is possible without the prior development of transport, both within Afghanistan and between Afghanistan and the broader world,” Starr wrote in 2011. “Farm produce is worthless until it reaches markets where it can claim a higher price. Nor can value be derived from minerals, gas, or hydroelectric power until they are delivered to paying customers, whether by truck, railroad, pipelines, or electric transmission lines.”

In Starr’s opinion, NSR will not only provide billions of dollars in taxes, tariffs and royalties for the Afghan government, but also tangible benefits to large swaths of the Afghan population. Even those Afghans not employed directly in producing crops and minerals or transporting them abroad will labor in spinoff businesses spurred by rising general prosperity. These ideas aren’t just theoretical. When a new heavy duty bridge opened across the Panj River between Afghanistan and Tajikistan in 2007, trade increased sevenfold on a route formerly reliant on ferries. Even more surprising, Afghan land prices along the southbound road to Kunduz soared in response to the increased traffic. China has already agreed to invest \$3.5 billion in the Aynak copper mine in



Afghan workers pick saffron flowers on a farm in Herat in 2011. The lucrative export, valued as a spice, could earn Afghanistan about \$200 million a year, income needed to help rebuild the country’s economy. GETTY IMAGES



An Afghan policeman patrols a stretch of the country's first railroad near the Uzbekistan border. AFP/GETTY IMAGES

Logar province near Kabul. In 2010, Afghanistan and Pakistan mutually approved a transit agreement that liberalizes trade between the two neighbors.

The World Bank notes that “robust economic growth” is generally a prerequisite for successful transitions involving the curtailment of outside aid, citing the relatively successful precedents of Rwanda and Mozambique. The examples of China, South Korea and India prove that formerly economically underperforming Asian states rent by inner conflict, be they ethnic or political conflicts, can achieve relatively high standards of living for hundreds of millions of people.

Said Kuchins: “In the long run, the private sector will be the real arbiter of success. Private sector engagement, guidance, and support will be essential for the development of trade and transit infrastructure.”

Critics contend the country lacks the necessary security and legal protections for widespread private investment. As *Time* magazine noted in a 2012 story about the new “trade-instead-of-aid” philosophy, Afghanistan still sits in a complicated region of the world full of unresolved disputes: “On the old Silk Road, the private sector covered everything

from caravans to security. But traders rarely had to worry about the customs delays and prohibitive tariffs that plague regional trade today.”

But supporters argue that investment and security are not mutually exclusive and one can’t take precedent over the other. Economic opportunity spreads security, not least among nonideological members of the insurgency drawn to arms by the higher-than-average pay provided by agents of the Taliban. Starr argues that greater interaction with the world beyond Afghanistan’s borders will help neutralize one of the Taliban’s key weapons: its ability to seal off the country from the world, physically and psychologically.

“Members of Afghanistan’s rising generation will find new possibilities in the fresh contacts, interactions, and influences from every direction that trade will open to them,” Starr wrote. “Transport-borne trade will generate wealth both in the cities and countryside, and will eclipse drug trafficking as the main channel for Afghanistan’s international commercial transactions. It will get Afghan farm produce to lucrative markets that are now beyond reach, and will carry resources and energy to consumers who are prepared to pay premium prices for them.” □



A Macedonian celebrates the decision by the European Council in 2005 to grant the country EU candidate status. The country has made strides to stop proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, an important step in furthering Macedonia's integration into the European Union.

EPA

Stopping WMD Proliferation

Macedonia
is fulfilling
international
obligations to
prevent terrorists
from acquiring
deadly weapons

By Svetlana Geleva and Edvard Mitevski, Republic of Macedonia Ministry of Foreign Affairs

With the paradigm shift in international relations, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) appears to be one of the major threats to international peace and security. As trade becomes more sophisticated and borders more porous because of the accelerated pace of globalization, there is a greater risk that nonstate actors can acquire WMD for terrorist activities. Such circumstances require an adequate response to prevent terrorists from getting hold of deadly weapons. Establishment of stricter export control mechanisms and tangible physical protection measures at the national level, in line with international norms and standards, is seen as a pillar against the spread of WMD. In line with its commitments to peace and security as well as its national priorities, the Republic of Macedonia undertakes concrete legislative and regulatory measures to ensure international compliance and contribute to national, regional and global security. Each country should consistently work on improving national export control regimes and thwart terrorist agendas.

BACKGROUND

In today's globalized world, terrorist attacks utilizing WMD represent a major threat to international security. The beginning of the new millennium featured a growing risk of nuclear terrorism. Rolf Mowatt-Larssen of the Belfer Center of Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government claims that the "21st century will be defined by a paradigm shift to states and groups seeking nuclear weapons and nuclear-related capabilities."¹ This state of play required a multilateral document that will ensure national implementation of international unified policies against WMD proliferation that may lead to fatal terrorist attacks.

In the spring of 2004, the United Nations Security Council acted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and unanimously adopted UNSCR 1540. The resolution aims at quelling proliferation of WMD, including their delivery means and related material, while denying nonstate actors access to them. It represents a comprehensive and mandatory nonproliferation arrangement that imparts significant added value to previous, nonbinding nonproliferation mechanisms.² UNSCR 1540 mandates universal implementation, among other things, by obliging all states to "take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery."³ To avoid gaps in implementation, the resolution established the 1540 Committee to oversee states' efforts to fulfill their obligations under its terms.

We are aware that WMD proliferation and growing terrorist activity remain a serious threat to the globe. Inherently committed to international peace and security, the Republic of Macedonia undertakes all necessary measures to enhance its national nonproliferation laws and regulations, thus bolstering its position as an important link in the disarmament and nonproliferation chain.

PROACTIVE AGAINST WMD AND TERRORISM

By mid-2008, aware that WMD proliferation and terrorism constituted one of the most dangerous threats to world peace, the Republic of Macedonia had become a party to all major international conventions and protocols on counterterrorism and nonproliferation. These instruments include:

- Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
- Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
- Convention on Prohibition of Development, Manufacturing, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC)
- Convention on Prohibition of Development, Manufacturing, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and on Their Destruction
- Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism
- Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional Protocol

In addition to these multilateral legal instruments, Macedonia has been a subscribing state to the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation since November 2002 and unilaterally adhered to the Missile Technology Control Regime's (MTCR) Equipment, Software, and Technology Annex and Guidelines for Sensitive Missile Relevant Transfers in June 2003. Furthermore, Macedonia has been part of the Proliferation Security Initiative from its inception in 2003, and of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism since March 2007. In July 2005, Macedonia and the European Union adopted a Joint Statement on Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism, which foresaw nonproliferation cooperation between the Macedonian government and Brussels.

From 2008 to 2010, the Republic of Macedonia was a member of the Executive Council of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. A Macedonian ambassador served as one of the vice presidents of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. In addition, the 2008 Meeting of State Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention (Paris, December 2008) was chaired by a Macedonian ambassador.

The Republic of Macedonia's future priorities include membership in the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) and, in perspective, the Australia Group (AG).⁴ All of the above stated initiatives illustrate Macedonia's eagerness to become an essential part of the multilateral nonproliferation regimes and a proactive actor in combating WMD proliferation and global terrorism.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND CHALLENGES

As stated in the first report of the Republic of Macedonia to the 1540 Committee, Macedonia "shares the deep concern that one of the most serious threats to the international peace and security nowadays is the risk that non-State actors may acquire, develop, traffic in or use nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery for terrorist purposes."⁵ Thus, the country fully supports UNSCR 1540, seeing it as a significant milestone on the path toward WMD nonproliferation, while backing the work of the 1540 Committee.

As a result, Macedonia has adapted existing laws and enacted new ones to ensure alignment with the relevant UN, EU and other multilateral nonproliferation mechanisms and export control documents.⁶ Strict export controls have been put in place in line with the European Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of December 8, 2008, which defines common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment. In February 2006, Macedonia started implementing the Law on Export Control of Dual-Use Goods and Technology, which was passed by parliament in September 2005. The Law is in accordance with the Community Regime (Regulation of the European Council (EC) No. 1334/2000), subsequent amendments to this regulation (149/2003, 885/2004, and 1504/2004) for dual-use and military goods and multilateral export control regimes



Macedonian President Gjorge Ivanov, left, and NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen meet at Alliance headquarters in September 2012. In its pursuit of NATO and European Union membership, Macedonia has worked to stem the flow of weapons of mass destruction.

EPA

This is true despite a strong awareness of the political importance of the process in a wider, international context. Fortunately, Macedonia has navigated this initial challenge. Technical assistance and training organized by international organizations and partner nations were instrumental in this respect.

Tailor-made programs provided by the Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) of the U.S. State Department, or the ones offered by the German Federal Office of Economics and Export Control (BAFA), among others, contributed in this respect. For example, EXBS provided training for national experts on implementation of export control policies and enabled the establishment of the TRACKER software system that allows licensing authorities to electronically review and exchange opinions and referrals of export license dual-use applications and other control items filed by respective companies. This system is now operational and connects all competent

such as the WA, the MTCR, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the AG and the CWC. Such legislation furthers Macedonia's national system for governance of WMD-related materiel.

Concurrently, interministerial bodies and competent institutions have been established to further enhance compliance with UNSCR 1540. Macedonia created a National Commission to implement the CWC (under the Law on the Implementation of the CWC, adopted in 2006), a State Commission to license dual-use technologies, and a Radiation Safety Directorate to oversee radioactive material.

However, these measures have not yet brought the state of affairs to the desired level. The initial challenge in 2004 (following the adoption of UNSCR 1540) was to raise awareness about the significance of comprehensive, coordinated involvement of all national stakeholders in the assessment of the existing gaps in the legislation and practice in respect of the obligations arising from 1540. For small states with limited administrative capacities this is indeed a challenge. For Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) staffs, which customarily lead the process in small states, an additional challenge is the lack of deep knowledge of the legislation already in place and the national institutions in charge of nonproliferation.

bodies involved in the licensing process, which facilitates coordination between the interlocutors. BAFA likewise provided training, but also legal reviews and expertise to ensure that legislation aligns with the EU and other international standards.

The chief contribution of UNSCR 1540 was helping streamline national activities in the area of nonproliferation while enhancing coordination of actions under the framework of nonbinding or binding export control regimes.

What is the present state of affairs? Awareness has been raised, legislation is in place, and implementing institutions are operational. Implementation of the relevant legislation nonetheless remains a challenge owing to reasons ranging from insufficient funds to limited technical and human resources. Insufficient funds are usually the most serious impediment. Enforcement requires expert information and technological support. In 2010, the Macedonian MFA conducted a mapping process of experts engaged in chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) processes, in an effort to determine their needs. This process was conducted through a streamlined questionnaire aimed at determining the state of play within relevant institutions with regard to

technical capability, expertise, potential gaps in implementation of national CBRN policies, conflict of competences and overlap of activities. The study showed that the bodies in charge of implementing the respective laws are understaffed or lack advanced training and equipment.

Nevertheless, these shortcomings are rectifiable, and measures to do so are in the pipeline. Patterns for improvement involve further training, modernization and acquisitions of new equipment. Exchanges of best practices among regional stakeholders are also beneficial and will lead towards greater regional ownership of the process. The launch of a European Commission initiative to institute CBRN Centers of Excellence (CoEs) for Southeastern Europe, Ukraine, Moldova and the Caucasus promises to serve as a support pillar for the implementation of these measures. CBRN CoEs aim at “implementing a coordinated strategy for CBRN risk mitigation at the international, regional and national levels.”⁷ Established under the EU Instrument for Stability, the initiative has spent 95 million euros (2009-13) on CBRN-related projects, including capacity-building, regional cooperation and equipment. The Republic of Macedonia, through active involvement in this initiative, has already identified its needs and submitted project proposals for improvement of several areas. In parallel, the country continues its work on its home turf. In June 2012, the Macedonian government established the national CBRN team, a comprehensive body consisting of representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (as National Coordination Body), Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Economy (chairing the Dual-Use Commission), Ministry of Health (chairing the Chemical Weapons Commission), Custom Authorities, Radiation Safety Directorate, Ministry of Interior and all other relevant institutions that deal with CBRN. This body would complement and unify, where possible, the activities of already existing bodies, develop a streamlined plan of action, draw a burden-sharing map, and develop and steer overall CBRN national policy. Among other duties the national CBRN team is tasked with: coordination of the competent authorities, monitoring and coordination of the CBRN-related processes, ensuring consistency in the national CBRN policies, monitoring of the implementation of the project and other related activities in the framework of the Centers of Excellence Initiative, initiation and drafting of projects proposals (funded by international organizations), CBRN-related international cooperation, monitoring of international CBRN policies, and ensuring and providing expertise for the implementation of the national CBRN policies.

In June this year representatives of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), the 1540 Committee, and Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) visited Skopje and exchanged views with Macedonian experts on measures undertaken by Macedonia to implement the UNSCR 1540 and develop the 1540 National Action Plan. 1540 NAP represents a priority for our country and is included in the EU accession NAP and the NATO ANP (to be finalized in 2013). It will be drafted

in the framework of the national CBRN team. A team of Macedonian experts was scheduled to visit Vienna in early 2013 to discuss elements of the NAP with OSCE experts and other relevant agencies. The NAP will be designed to meet specific country needs and will identify further measures to enhance 1540 implementation and national coordination. Although its tasks go well beyond 1540, the recently established CBRN team will draft the NAP and serve as a monitoring mechanism for implementation. At its inaugural meeting in November 2012, CBRN team members underlined the importance of improved coordination and exchange of information on non-proliferation issues for the purpose of detecting possible gaps (legal and administrative) and how to overcome them. The stated priority to develop a 1540 NAP was also underlined during the Macedonian Chairmanship of OSCE's Forum for Security Cooperation that occurred in the last trimester of 2012. The Macedonian delegation delivered a general statement at the 696th FSC plenary meeting outlining national achievements in the implementation of 1540 and prospects for the future. Subsequently, the Macedonian National CBRN Coordinator delivered a thorough presentation on the topic under the Security Dialogue agenda item of the 704th plenary session.

Although it needs further advancement, the current nonproliferation system of governance is functional and thus contributes towards regional and global peace and security. In an intertwined world, each link in the nonproliferation chain matters. The combination of WMD proliferation and terrorism represents a common challenge with potentially devastating consequences for our societies, a challenge that no state can effectively deal with on its own. This is a global threat that requires a global response, and the Republic of Macedonia has demonstrated its readiness to contribute.

As for the UN, in particular the Security Council and its 1540 Committee, more intensive action is needed to help states meet obligations under the resolution. Capacity-building and sharing of lessons learned are particularly important. Full implementation of resolution 1540 will be a long-term process. But if states take the threat posed by WMD proliferation seriously, they will spare no effort “to save succeeding generations from the scourge” of WMD proliferation.⁸ □

1. Rolf Mowatt - Larsen's Presentation entitled *Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: Evolving Forms of the Nuclear Genie* (Belfer Center, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University), 21. Available at: <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Evolving%20Forms%20of%20Nuclear%20Genie.pdf>

2. Monika Heupel, “Implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace no. 87 (2007): p. 2.

3. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, Article 3, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/328/43/PDF/N0432843.pdf?OpenElement>

4. The Republic of Macedonia submitted a formal application in December 2010 and this year participated in the activities of the Wassenaar Outreach Group at the expert level.

5. As stated within the first report of the Republic of Macedonia to the Security Council Committee, established pursuant to operative paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004).

6. The first report of the Republic of Macedonia to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to operative paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) contains a list of laws adopted by November 2004. See <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/655/32/PDF/N0465532.pdf?OpenElement>

7. For more information about the CBRN CoE, visit <http://www.cbrn-coe.eu/>

8. Charter of the United Nations, Preamble, available at <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/preamble.shtml>

ADDRESSING REGIONAL SECURITY

A Marshall Center seminar examines crisis management in the Balkans and South Caucasus

By Dr. Sabine Collmer, professor of International Security Studies, Marshall Center

The guns are now silent, but recent regional conflicts such as the Balkan wars and the secessionist conflicts in the South Caucasus continue to strongly influence the way people live, think and interact. Historically, regional conflicts were usually seen as issues to be solved within the narrower confines of the regions themselves. Only after the Cold War ended did regional-level security issues gain more prominence in international politics. With this shift, the phenomenon of regional conflicts has entered more profoundly into global security debates.

In recognition of the broadened security agenda, the Marshall Center is integrating “regional security” issues into its curriculum. A new course called Seminar on Regional Security (SRS), introduced in the winter of 2013, will emphasize new strategic concepts in conflict resolution and transformation. The seminar will benefit from knowledge and experience gained from two other recent additions to the Marshall Center curriculum, an elective seminar now included in the flagship Program in Applied Security Studies (PASS), and a September 2012 international conference, “Crisis Management in the South Caucasus and in the Western Balkans: A Smart Power Approach,” involving experts from 21 countries.

There are two main reasons for refocusing on regional conflicts: First, regional security issues grew more important as the superpower-led blocs of the Cold War era grew less important. Second, it became clear that regional crises have a potential to spill over from the regional to the global level and to destabilize the world as a whole. Such was the case in Afghanistan, when an internal conflict gained international relevance following global terrorist attacks. This clearly reshaped the conceptualization of security. Furthermore, this paradigm shift is reflected in the latest policy responses, such as NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept, which unequivocally

acknowledges that “instability or conflict beyond NATO’s borders can pose a direct threat to the security of Alliance territory and populations.”

SEMINAR CONCEPT

Selected regional case studies look at geographical areas affected by a violent conflict. These crises, whatever their roots, involve more than one nation and cannot be solved within one nation alone. Because these crises could destabilize the larger region, international organizations have conducted initiatives to solve the conflicts. At the same time, the concept has the embedded flexibility of shifting attention to emerging issues, when necessary, as selected crisis regions alternate.

Two well-known example regions were chosen for the initial iteration of the concept in our course: the Western Balkans, a region of primary concern to the European Union because of its geographical vicinity to and impact on Europe, and the South Caucasus, a notoriously turbulent and unsettled region located at strategic crossroads. A key element of the SRS concept is to examine the perspectives of national and international organizations as well as local perspectives on a crisis and its management. Engagement by the international community to stop violent conflict and the establishment of post-conflict order are widely appreciated, because feuding parties are often unable to stop hostilities on their own. This was seen in the Western Balkans as the region became an international testing ground for peace building, state building and reconstruction. In a less pronounced way, the South Caucasus has seen its own version of international crisis management.

Generic patterns of crisis development and management can be derived through comparative analysis. To create a systematic learning process, alternating case studies of crises regions are chosen and analyzed using factors such as development of the crisis, the involvement of different actors

and specific models of crisis management. This method can reveal patterns of conflict from which patterns of successful conflict resolution can be deduced.

OUTCOMES OF THE REGIONAL SECURITY CONFERENCE

After prolonged post-conflict consolidation in both focus regions, experts estimate the potential for conflict is still high. Owing to a deep lack of trust and fundamental differences, sustainable conflict resolution remains a distant goal. During the regional security conference in September 2012, experts from both regions stressed that lasting peace and a functioning democratic system cannot be achieved without support that creates incentives for guided change, including peace negotiations on neutral ground and financial aid from the international community that is provided only under the “conditionality principle.”

The efforts of the international community to re-establish peace, security and a “new” democratic order are evaluated on different levels. Despite praise for the international efforts to end hostilities, the subsequent phases of conflict management and conflict transformation that may lead to state building are difficult, complex and time-consuming. Here, instruments for the prevention of renewed hostilities should be explored as helpful tools.

Post-conflict countries have a long way to go in achieving sustainable peace beyond the initial phase of armistice and treaties. Relatively new concepts of reconciliation that go beyond traditional statist diplomacy can be used here. These concepts call for long-term commitments to establish an infrastructure of reconciliation across all levels of society.

HOW TO APPLY

For application and deadline information, contact the Marshall Center Registrar at registrar@marshallcenter.org, your ministry point of contact, or the U.S. Embassy or German Embassy in your capital city.



The new SRS course will emphasize using these instruments to establish a positive post-conflict order. While every conflict is unique in its geopolitical setting, commonalities can be analyzed systematically and the results added to a structured learning process.

SEMINAR STRUCTURE

The Marshall Center’s new three-week course provides national security professionals with a comprehensive overview of regional security dynamics and conflict resolution strategies. The SRS curriculum, which consists of a combination of lectures, seminars, and case studies as well as active learning units, is organized into four modules: First, it will look closely into the concept of regional security dynamics. Second, it will discuss two conflicting principles of international law – self-determination and territorial integrity – that have to be understood in the context of statehood. A third module deals with the rationale for intervention and the concept of local ownership in the implementation of international assistance. The fourth will analyze models of societal reconciliation that help post-conflict societies turn away from entrenched group divisions.

The goal of the seminar is to enhance the knowledge and the skill sets of national security professionals to enable them to handle crises better and to provide them with a set of possible best practices. SRS offers critical insights into the world of crisis and crisis management by providing a systematic lessons-learned assessment of impacting factors and involved actors. The three-week course seeks to improve not only participants’ knowledge of the two sample regions but aims to achieve generalized conclusions in reference to the capabilities and limitations of crisis management in general. The course’s goal is simple: Learn from former crises to be better prepared for the future. □



Seminar Examines Post-Transition Afghanistan

Leaders from around the world gathered in January 2013 at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies to examine Central Asia's relationship to Afghanistan as security transitions from NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to the Afghan National Security Forces.

Senior Executive Seminar 13-1 attracted 105 participants from 39 countries and focused on 11 key security themes of particular concern to Afghanistan after the ISAF handover in 2014, including border protection, countering narcotics, terrorism and corruption.

The title of the eight-day conference, "Central Asia after ISAF Transition: Regional Challenges and Cooperative Responses," highlighted the need for greater engagement by Afghanistan's northern neighbors: Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.

"The Marshall Center SES brings together the world's leading governmental and ministerial leaders, diplomats, military officers and security sector specialists in a week of open and frank dialogue," said U.S. Marine Corps Col. Philip Lark, deputy director of the SES. "What we want in the end is for participants to have recognition that ISAF transition results in sustainment of Afghan institutions and long-term international support."

The roster of SES speakers broke new ground for the Marshall Center. In addition to presentations by all five U.S. ambassadors to the Central Asian republics, Russian dignitaries, including Ambassador Igor Lyakin-Frolov,

expressed their opinions about the post-ISAF settlement in Afghanistan.

Other speakers included Ambassador Robert Blake, the highest ranking U.S. State Department official focused wholly on South and Central Asian affairs; Dennis Blair, former U.S. director of national intelligence and commander of U.S. Pacific Command; William Brownfield, assistant secretary for the U.S. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs; and James Appathurai, the NATO secretary-general's special representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia.

The SES consisted of plenary meetings attended by all 105 participants, followed by breakout sessions in English and Russian during which leaders could speak candidly and confidentially about the topics at hand. During the course of the eight days, the Afghan delegation requested greater assistance from their neighbors and offered reassurance that the post-2014 environment would be one of continued economic, social and political progress. Regional cooperation, including joint U.S.-Russian counternarcotics training for Central Asian and Afghan officers, was highlighted.

Adm. James Stavridis, commander, U.S. European Command, and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, informed the assembly that ISAF would retain a substantive multinational training and mentoring mission in Afghanistan after 2014. Nevertheless, the bulk of the nation's internal security will be provided by Afghan forces that numbered more than 350,000 as of early 2013.

"The role of Central Asia states, the Caucasus states and Russia is particularly important in consolidating the gains of more than a decade of military operations," Lark said.

The SES, held twice yearly, is tailored to meet the specific needs of national ministers, ambassadors, legislators, admirals, generals and senior government officials. The January seminar was the first time a senior Chinese official had attended what is the Marshall Center's premier event. □

Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us

Book authors: Clark McCauley, Ph.D., and Sophia Moskalkenko, Ph.D.
Reviewed by *per Concordiam* Staff

Andrei Zhelyabov was born a serf in 1851 in Nikolaevka in the Russian empire. At age 9, he learned his beloved aunt had been raped by their lord, and justice was denied because the offender was a nobleman. Bitter toward government and hierarchy, Zhelyabov vowed to kill the rapist when he grew up. The little boy who pledged to avenge his family's honor ultimately left a grim mark on history by assassinating Czar Alexander II. For Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalkenko, authors of the book *Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us*, this case study illustrates the process by which ordinary people can be driven to radicalism.

Friction, the work of two psychologists who specialize in radicalization, suggests that terrorists are normal people whose radicalism springs from normal psychological impulses. They confront the popular misconception that terrorists are “crazy,” using history, politics and psychology to deliver an understanding of how a perceived offense during childhood or early adulthood can lay a foundation for radicalization later in life.


The authors identify 12 methods by which individuals, small groups and large masses of people are radicalized, using terms such as “slippery slope,” “unfreezing” and “jujitsu politics” and providing in-depth, historic examples. Slippery slope, for example, refers to the slow application of pressure that changes one's ideology from mainstream to radical. Radical groups coerce individuals gradually and gently until they give in. Unfreezing refers to brainwashing. A terror group will exploit a person's loss and “fill” that emptiness. As for jujitsu politics it refers to the Japanese

art of wrestling in which an opponent's strength is used against him. The authors cite the 9/11 attacks as an example. Provoked by the attacks in New York and Washington, the United States sent troops to Muslim countries, ironically helping radicals mobilize followers against what they considered to be invasions.

The final section is an in-depth analysis of Osama bin Laden. Raised Muslim, son of one of Saudi Arabia's richest men, soft-spoken bin Laden around the age of 14 joined an Islamic study group with ideas similar to those of the Muslim Brotherhood. The group believed Arab political problems could be solved by Muslim piety. Bin Laden was so dedicated that some accorded him the same respect given an imam. His beliefs evolved, however, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979. He viewed the invasion as an attack on Islam. He was no longer just a devout Muslim encouraging greater devotion from his co-religionists, he was now urging followers to wage violent jihad in Afghanistan against Russian troops.

Affection also played a part because of bin Laden's deep admiration for Dr. Abdullah Azzam, an Afghan jihad leader. Furthermore, bin Laden was a risk taker, so when presented with a challenge, ultimately to defend Afghanistan against the Soviets, he grabbed the opportunity to raise his status through military exploits. Finally, bin Laden illustrated the authors' slippery slope theory. He intensified his involvement over the decades, starting as an arms shipper to Afghanistan, moving on to establishing training camps for terrorists and finally attacking the U.S. on 9/11.

The authors close with a call for governments to create an international database of counter radicalization efforts so that experts can evaluate best practices. *Friction* provides an understanding of the psychological routes extremists take, routes at their most basic level that are not so different from our own. As McCauley and Moskalkenko write: “Political resilience will be stronger, and counterterrorism policies can be more effective, when citizens see that the same mechanisms of radicalization move both them and us.” □



Resident Courses

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PASS-CB 13-11

Sept. 27 –
 Dec. 6, 2013

September	October	November	December
S M T W T F S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30	S M T W T F S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31	S M T W T F S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30	S M T W T F S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

PROGRAM ON TERRORISM AND SECURITY STUDIES (PTSS)

The five-week, twice-yearly program addresses the different aspects of threats to nations and is for mid- and upper-level management, military, government and police officials in counterterrorism organizations. The focus is on combating terrorism while adhering to the

basic values of a democratic society. The five-module course provides a historical and theoretical overview of terrorism, the vulnerabilities of terrorist groups, the role of law, the financing of terrorism and security cooperation.

PTSS 13-4

March 1 –
 April 5, 2013

March	April
S M T W T F S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31	S M T W T F S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30



SEMINAR ON REGIONAL SECURITY (SRS)

The three-week Seminar on Regional Security provides national security professionals throughout the world a comprehensive insight into the complex shape of regional conflict patterns, typical traps of crisis management as well as realistic possibilities for constructive crisis response.

SRS 13-2
Feb. 1-22, 2013

February						
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24	25	26	27	28		

SEMINAR ON COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION/TERRORISM (SCWMD/T)

The two-week seminar provides national security professionals a comprehensive look at combating weapons of mass destruction and the challenges posed by chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats by examining best practices for ensuring that participating nations have fundamental knowledge about the issue.

SCWMD/T 13-5
March 8-22, 2013

March						
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31						

SEMINAR ON TRANSATLANTIC CIVIL SECURITY (STACS)

The seminar is a three-week, twice-a-year class that provides civil security professionals from Europe, Eurasia and North America an in-depth look at how nations can effectively address domestic security issues with regional and international impact. Organized into four modules — threats and hazards, prepare and protect, response and recover, and a field study — it focuses on the development of core knowledge and skills.

STACS 13-3
Feb. 5-22, 2013

February						
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THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE SEMINAR (SES)

The seminar is a forum that allows for the in-depth exploration of international security issues. Participants in winter and fall sessions include high-level government officials, general officers, senior diplomats, ambassadors, ministers and parliamentarians. The SES format includes presentations by senior officials and recognized experts followed by discussions in seminar groups.

SES 13-10
Sept. 10-19, 2013

September						
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29	30					

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