What Roles and Missions for Europe’s Military and Security Forces in the 21st Century?

By Dr. John L. Clarke
The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies

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Foreword

Military and other armed security forces in the 21st Century face an array of requirements quite unlike those of the past. Traditional roles, such as defending national territorial sovereignty, remain, but their importance will be attenuated, as more nations realize that their defense begins beyond their borders, and that security means more than just the military defense of territory and sovereignty.

These forces will be called upon increasingly to plan for, support and execute a broad range of new and non-traditional roles, missions and functions—not all of which are well suited for traditional military forces. New military and security tasks, such as stabilization operations or counter-terrorism missions, coupled with the increasing restraints on resources, will require that armies develop organizations of extraordinary flexibility and capability.

Therefore, what kinds of forces should be developed? To perform what missions? Should some armies be replaced by other kinds of armed security forces, such as paramilitary police forces? Do all countries require a full range of capabilities, or are there opportunities for rationalization among neighbors, who no longer threaten one another?

In this Marshall Center Paper, Prof. John Clarke explores the new requirements thrust upon military and other armed security forces. He examines in detail the range of roles, missions and functions for these forces over the next decade.

In a new perspective on these tasks for military and security forces for the 21st Century, Dr. Clarke develops six...
categories, or mission sets, of requirements, including Intervention/Offensive Combat Operations; International Stability and Support Operations; Civil Support Operations; National Defense Operations; International Humanitarian Assistance Support; and Unilateral Military Operations.

Against these requirements, Dr. Clarke takes a close look at a dozen different kinds of military and armed security forces, asking key questions about the utility of each of them in carrying out the missions. These kinds of forces include not only heavy and light military forces, but also paramilitary police forces and other armed security services.

Dr. Clarke then evaluates these forces, and provides us with his recommendation on which forces demonstrate the greatest utility across the range of new requirements. He plows new ground in identifying what requirements are truly necessary and which kinds of forces are best able to accomplish them.

In this era of declining defense and security budgets, and with the pressing need for military and security force transformation, his recommendations on force structure and mission requirements should be of great utility to defense and security decision makers.

His conclusion—that light conventional infantry forces, special operations forces and paramilitary police forces form a versatile, essential core of forces that every state should consider—is precisely the kind of analysis that decision makers require for the difficult choices they face.

John P. Rose, Ph. D.
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Executive Summary

Are armies the dinosaurs of the 21st Century, soon to become extinct in the new security environment? What is the function of an army? Is security and defense the same thing? What must armies be able to do? And, equally important, what should they not do?

Will armies remain armies? Will they be replaced by other kinds of armed security forces, such as police forces? Should only military forces perform some tasks? What military and security forces are the most useful, given the novel range of threats that we face?

This paper offers an analytical framework for examining these questions. The principal focus is to reexamine the roles and missions of military and security forces in the Europe-Eurasia strategic region, with particular emphasis on how new and emerging requirements challenge legacy concepts and organizations.

The paper analyzes the kinds of missions that military and other armed security forces may face; how these tasks can differ between defense and security functions; and the differences between the two functions. It also evaluates how well a range of existing force structures are adapted to handling these operations.

In particular, this paper suggests a basis for a series of policy proposals to reorient security policy and develop the best range of military and security forces for the current and
future strategic environment. These recommendations are intended to form the basis for guiding transformation efforts in the countries in the Central and Eastern European strategic environment.

Despite much discussion and debate about the reform and transformation of military forces, the military structures of most of the states in this region remain much as they were a decade ago. As was the case during the heyday of the Warsaw Pact, most of the armies of the region still have extensive holdings of heavy forces, with large stockpiles of obsolete tanks and motorized infantry vehicles. While many of these stockpiles have been allowed to rust, continued investment is required to sustain the maintenance and training base.

These traditional, or legacy, forces are poorly suited to the emergent region’s new security requirements. While a residual national defense capability must be maintained, it is questionable whether these forces can even minimally meet today’s security needs. To maintain mobilization capacity centered on rapid reconstitution of these forces would be relatively expensive. Given the region’s parlous state of military spending, it is debatable whether further investment of this kind makes sense.

Modern military forces face a bewildering array of roles, missions and functions, some of them quite new to tradition-bound militaries. These tasks have generated requirements that demand a fresh look at the diverse range of military operations, with a view towards developing a modern taxonomy of military missions.

This paper outlines six operational categories that encompass this broad range of requirements. While not
exhaustive or inclusive, these categories cover the great majority of missions that armies will have to fulfill in the coming decades. It further develops each category by listing specific mission tasks. The categories are:

- Intervention/Offensive Combat Operations
- International Stability and Support Operations
- Civil Support Operations
- National Defense Operations
- International Humanitarian Assistance Support
- Unilateral Military Operations

This paper explores in detail the military and security requirements associated with each of these categories, in an effort to establish the basis for determining the best mix of forces that could best execute those missions.

The paper then analyzes twelve types of military and other armed security forces that exist in the security-oriented ministries of the states included in this study:

- Active conventional ground forces (heavy)
- Active conventional ground forces (light)
- Special operations forces
- Reserve forces
- Border security forces
- Internal security forces
- National guards
- Paramilitary police forces
- Special police forces
- National police forces
- Private military companies
- Commercial security providers
The capabilities and special attributes of each of these force categories is evaluated against the requirements established by the mission sets; this evaluation is then used to determine which types of forces are best suited for each of the mission sets.

The foregoing analysis reveals several conclusions about optimal force mixes for the foreseeable future. While each country will have specific requirements, some recommendations seem applicable across the region. Policy makers must understand these conclusions in order to make the wisest decisions on building the most effective mix of forces able to maintain regional security.

First, channeling money into legacy heavy forces is not an efficient investment. These forces are more costly than other forces examined in this study in terms of maintenance, training and sustainability requirements; their utility is limited, due to their constrained strategic mobility and major logistical needs. Indeed, investments in legacy heavy forces may be counterproductive, because other, more useful force types could be deprived of much-needed support.

Secondly, this analysis demonstrates conclusively that active conventional ground forces (light) and special operations forces have the broadest range of utility for military forces. They rank among the most versatile forces for almost every mission set examined in this study. In addition, the analysis demonstrates that these forces require only modest changes, and more importantly, marginal additional investment. These forces also seem to be best positioned to take advantage of technological innovation as well as to meet emerging future requirements.
With regard to other armed security forces, highly versatile paramilitary police forces appear to be most useful and are good candidates for additional investment. They are able to make important contributions across the range of requirements, particularly in the national defense, stability operations and civil support. They are well adapted to bridging the gap between military and law enforcement approaches to using force. As a result, they appear more useful than internal security forces, which are generally more limited in their scope of operations and a frequently military approach to the use of force. Moreover, paramilitary forces are more versatile than many specialized police forces and thus, are able to meet a much broader range of requirements.

This study is designed to provide a foundation for making the hard choices about what we want armed security and military forces to be able to accomplish in the future—and which of those forces represent the best and most efficient investment.
Introduction

In the 21st Century will we still need armies? To do what? Are security and defense the same thing? What must armies be capable of doing? And equally important, what should they not do?

Will armies remain armies? Will they be replaced by other kinds of armed security forces, such as police forces? Are there tasks that only military forces can perform? What are the most useful kinds of military and security forces, given the novel range of threats that we face?

This paper provides an analytical framework for examining these questions. The principal focus of the paper is to reexamine the roles and missions of military and security forces in the Europe-Eurasia strategic region, with particular emphasis on how new and emerging requirements challenge legacy concepts and organizations.

The paper analyzes the kinds of missions that military and other armed security forces may face; how these tasks can differ between defense and security functions; and the differences between the two tasks. It also evaluates how well a range of existing force structures are adapted to handling these operations.

In particular, this paper suggests the basis for a series of policy proposals to reorient security policy and develop the best range of military and security forces for the current and future strategic environment. These recommendations are intended to form the basis for guiding transformation efforts in the countries in the Central and Eastern European strategic environment.
• Methodology

The paper classifies potential future military and security tasks and requirements and groups them into six categories. Then, it examines the current state of twelve different kinds of military and armed security forces using the well-established DOTLMS (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Leadership, Material and Soldiers) analytical construct. Based on this analysis, the paper draws conclusions about the state of these forces over a cross-section of states in Europe, as well as their utility against the set of mission tasks developed in this paper. Lastly, the paper explores the appropriate mix of military and other armed security forces in a series of policy recommendations for security planners in Europe.

• Scope

The paper focuses on Central and Eastern European military forces, particularly traditional ground forces, and other armed security forces, i.e., paramilitary police, national guards and state police. Although it does not include an analysis of traditional air forces and navies (their missions are likely to remain unique in the emerging environment), it does include other maritime security forces, such as coast guards, because of their law enforcement functions.

This study focuses not only on the proper and appropriate role for military forces, but also on other armed security forces in the region. As many of the new requirements involve domestic security missions, it is appropriate to include these kinds of forces in the equation. These include an extremely wide range of paramilitary and law enforcement organizations, as well as border security forces and national police forces.
Predictably, there is a plethora of armed security and police forces to be found in this region, many with overlapping functions and jurisdictions. Just as is the case with legacy military organizations, new security requirements beg for a reorganization of these forces. Given the security needs of the post-9/11 world, it is probably best to consider both military and other armed security forces in order to leverage the greatest security and defense economies of scale.
PART I: Key Realities of Europe’s Security Environment

The key and, indeed, extraordinary reality is the simple fact that the external, conventional threat has, for the most part, disappeared; the countries of Europe no longer find themselves militarily threatened by their neighbors. The territorial sovereignty of most nations in Europe is no longer in question; the defense of Europe is now to be found, as many have noted, on the Hindu Kush.²

Moreover, despite the tendency to conflate the terms defense and security, it is evident that while the defense of Europe is no longer in question, the security of many countries in Europe is very much threatened. Security, the broader, overarching term, involves law enforcement, counterterrorism actions, anti-corruption measures and economic measures as much as it involves the military functions of defense. It is axiomatic that the security requirements are broader than those of the defense subset of security.

This is compounded by the fact that, unlike external threats that can be addressed by defense efforts, the great majority of the threats facing Europe today are simultaneously internal and transnational, involving a significant law enforcement response that, of necessity, must transcend borders.

The extraordinary changes in Europe’s geopolitical and strategic environments have clearly outpaced the necessary intellectual and institutional transformation process. This is particularly the case for Europe’s military and security forces. For the most part, these forces remain mired in their legacy configurations from the immediate post-Cold War period—large, heavy tank and armored infantry formations, with much of their associated logistic support requirements, which fall increasingly short in attempting to maintain 30- and 40-year old weapons systems.
For many reasons, Europe’s armed forces are in a long-term period of decline, and this trend is not likely to be reversed in the near future. The perception that there is no real external threat, and the resulting lack of a clear political will to do anything costly about it, has created a situation in which stasis is trump. Many European military establishments find themselves in a vicious cycle, with most funding supporting obsolete and obsolescent legacy forces.

Moreover, many European economies, particularly those that are the focus of this study, remain bogged down by an extended period of economic difficulties. With no real increase in defense investment, this is not likely to change. Thus, the real challenge for these countries is to make intelligent investments in key and complementary capabilities that reflect current and possible future strategic requirements and which will provide a realistic response to the potential threats.

A further difficulty is that, for many Europeans, the use of force is no longer a viable option in the course of international affairs. This predilection for finding solutions within the law, preferably within the framework of international institutions, colors much European thinking on the utility of force in the future. As a consequence, there is a clear reluctance to countenance additional investments in any military program, particularly legacy programs.

At the same time, many Europeans note their main concern is physical security, which they relate to the incidence of crime; hence, they are more likely to approve investments in law enforcement-oriented security forces as opposed to strictly military ones.
Consequently, there is little evidence of serious investment in reform efforts or in the development of new capabilities. Many European countries would like to make important contributions to international stability and support operations, but they lack deployment and sustainment capability. In most instances, they would have to rely on other countries to provide these key capabilities.
PART II:  The Legacy Force and Its Implications

Despite much discussion and debate about the reform and transformation of military forces, the military structures of most of the states in the region remain much as they were a decade ago. As was the case during the heyday of the Warsaw Pact, most of the armies of the region still have extensive holdings of heavy forces, with large stockpiles of obsolete tanks and motorized infantry vehicles. While many of these stockpiles have been allowed to rust, continued investment is required to sustain the maintenance and training base.

These traditional, or legacy, forces are poorly suited to the emergent region’s new security requirements. While a residual national defense capability must be maintained, it is debatable whether that requirement can be even minimally met by these kinds of forces. To maintain mobilization capacity centered on rapid reconstitution of these forces would be relatively expensive. Given the region’s parlous state of military spending, it is questionable whether further investment of this kind makes sense.

The acquisition of more modern equipment, even at minimal costs through various “cascading” programs that redistribute redundant equipment from NATO’s more modern armies to newer members, does not appear to truly address this question. Even more modern equipment requires substantial investment in order to sustain and maintain a mobilization capability.6

As a result, the countries of this region are excessively burdened by their legacy force structures. Significant changes are
difficult politically, because many careers are bound up with the fate of these forces. But given the low likelihood of a national defense contingency, it is at least worth asking whether this investment should be made at all, or whether these requirements can be met through other means.

One way to update military force is through cooperative rationalization of defense capabilities. As is the case with older NATO countries, in Central and Eastern Europe defense capabilities appear to be redundant nationally when viewed in a regional context. It should prove possible to achieve some level of rationalization between and among neighbors, particularly in the areas of maintenance, sustainment and training. Initial steps in this direction have already been taken in Western Europe; the Belgian and Dutch navies share many infrastructure assets, particularly in the training and maintenance areas of their maritime forces.

Another legacy of the region’s rapid pace of change is the state of the reserve forces. As with the active force component, the numbers and readiness levels of the reserve force components have already been significantly reduced in these countries. Reserve forces have received comparatively less investment than active forces, and in many cases exist in name only. Their actual strength, organization and level of readiness cannot, in some instances, be determined with any precision.
The legacy force issue is one of the biggest hurdles that military reform advocates must overcome in determining which roles and missions are most appropriate for the future defense. The inherent stasis and inertia can prove politically and economically difficult to overcome in the effort to reorient these new missions.
PART III: Which Roles and Missions?

What are national military objectives and how do they differ from roles for military and security forces, and how do these in turn differ from missions and functions? According to the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, national military objectives include promoting peace and stability as well as deterrence.7

Broad and enduring roles for armed forces are established by law. These include: supporting and defending the laws of the country, ensuring the security of the country against external enemies, and upholding the national policies and interests. Thus, a typical role for military forces would include being the “guardians of the nation.” Other examples might include phrases such as “support and defend the nation;” “ensure the security of the state;” or “uphold and advance the national policies and interests.”8

Missions are tasks assigned to the military forces by the political leadership, such as “defending against air attack.” Missions can be specific to the service, or they can be joint missions, to be accomplished by more than one service acting together. An example of this might be “carry out peace support operations as part of a multinational alliance.”9

Functions include specific responsibilities assigned to the service components. For example, a function of the army might be to provide organized, trained and equipped ground forces to a commander for employment. Note that the service does not do the employing itself, but rather a designated commander. Other functions might include maintaining mobile reserve forces in readiness; providing timely intelligence; and conducting research and developing doctrine.10
It seems clear that many traditional roles, missions and functions of military forces are now in flux. Whereas armies were once the repository of civic virtue and served as the “school of the nation” in helping to engender a strong sense of patriotism and civic pride, these roles now seem less important, particularly with the elimination of conscript armies and the advent of professional forces. Without a clear external threat, the public views armies with less respect and often disdain, and as a drain on public finances.

In a similar fashion, as organizations that often demonstrated their ability to get things done, armies are often asked by political leaders to undertake new and non-traditional missions, such as assisting with law enforcement, drug control or border security. Particularly in the aftermath of September 11th, many armies are being asked to undertake missions that support homeland security efforts.

These kinds of missions bring into question the precise role of an army in society. Although there is a well-understood distinction between military operations and law enforcement, armies in many countries are being asked to carry out the functions of police officers.

The manner in which a soldier employs force is fundamentally different from the manner of a policeman. The soldier’s predilection is to use force in the first instance, while a law enforcement official would use force as a last resort. This essential difference distinguishes between those kinds of security and defense missions that are suitable for military forces, and those more appropriate for other kinds of security forces. Failure to make this key distinction can have catastrophic implications.
PART IV: Mission Sets for the 21st Century

This section examines the variety of missions that military and security forces are being tasked to perform. This paper develops six categories that encompass this broad range of requirements. While not exhaustive or inclusive, these categories cover the great majority of missions that will confront armies in this century. It further develops each category by listing specific mission tasks. The categories are:

• Intervention/Offensive Combat Operations
• International Stability and Support Operations
• Civil Support Operations
• National Defense Operations
• International Humanitarian Assistance Support
• Unilateral Military Operations

Each category may be best understood as consisting of a set of tasks that either traditionally have been assigned to military forces or may be assigned to military forces in the future.

• Intervention/Offensive Combat

Missions of intervention or offensive combat are usually undertaken as part of a coalition. Participating in a military expedition, such as the Gulf wars or the air operations over Yugoslavia in 1999, would meet this criterion. Offensive counterterrorist coalition operations in Afghanistan, as opposed to the International Security Assistance Force operation, would also qualify. These operations require the ability to deploy in a reasonable period of time and on a high level of interoperability. The capability of carrying out sophisticated operations with a high operational tempo is usually also a criterion.
Conventional offensive capabilities may require highly mobile operations using combat vehicles, parachutes or helicopter-borne capability. They include many classic military operations as well as a range of more modern techniques, such as those employed in the Afghan and Iraqi wars, which featured ground terminal guidance of air-delivered munitions. A feature common to all of these operations is that they require a high level of technological sophistication; their successful execution requires commensurately high levels of training and education.

In some instances, a unique or niche capability may be required, such as troops that can operate in a chemically or biologically contaminated environment, or a specialized unit that has been trained to operate in urban or mountainous environments. These operations may include some kinds of stability operations, usually in the aftermath of combat operations, but they are subsidiary operations, not the focus.

On the other hand, many of these highly sophisticated missions, conducted by specialized organizations in hostile, denied or politically sensitive areas, and often considered clandestine, covert or low visibility may require a high level of special operations capability. Many states maintain small numbers of special forces capable of carrying out unconventional missions. Special operations forces can represent an attractive option for many states, as the initial material costs are relatively low and the training, while extensive, can build upon that provided to special police officers.\textsuperscript{11}

• International Stability and Support Operations

This category includes military operations that take place before and after the cessation of hostilities. These operational tasks include a broad array of peace operations and peace support missions and are designed to support diplomatic efforts aimed at long-term political settlement.\textsuperscript{12}
This category includes the four kinds of peace operations:

- Peacemaking, which are principally diplomatic efforts designed to avert or contain a crisis;
- Peacekeeping, which are operations conducted with the consent of all parties and are designed to facilitate the implementation of a truce or cease fire agreement;
- Peace enforcement, which is the threat or use of force in order to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order; and
- Peace building, which are post-conflict activities that strengthen and rebuild government infrastructure and institutions in a post-conflict environment.

Peace enforcement operations, which may range from providing humanitarian assistance, restoring order and stability, and enforcing sanctions to establishing protected zones and forcibly separating belligerents, are evolving into ever more complex missions. They often combine elements of several categories in a single operational area; increasingly require sophisticated technology and, above all, a high level of training and preparation on the part of soldiers. Peace enforcement represents the most challenging operation that many armies of the region are able to undertake at the current time.

Many states in the region already have extensive experience in these operations, particularly as part of international peace operations such as IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia, KFOR in Kosovo and ISAF in Afghanistan. States often view participation in these operations as an opportunity
to make an international contribution and gain important experience for their military forces. Moreover, the nature of these operations, generally not excessively demanding from a technology perspective but very intensive from a manpower perspective, is well suited to the strengths of many of the region’s military organizations, which frequently lack much modern technology but have large pools of manpower.

In particular, the requirements of these peace enforcement operations make them candidates for the employment of some of the paramilitary forces extant in the region. This is particularly true of the peace enforcement and peace-building aspects of these operations, in which police forces can play a particularly useful role, as has been demonstrated by the use of these forces in both Bosnia and Kosovo.  

**Civil Support**

Governments may frequently call upon military forces to help civilian authorities carry out a very wide range of tasks. These civil support operations can be as diverse as the temporary augmentation of key functions during labor strikes, the support of key sporting events, or the restoration of law and order and the protection of life and property in a riot or insurrection. Supporting civil authorities is an important role and function of military forces, but the range of tasks required for some missions approaches the limit of what may be appropriate for military forces.

Civil support consists of three distinct sub-categories:

- Defense assistance to civil authority (DACA)
- Defense support to civilian law enforcement authority (DSCLEA)
- Defense assistance to civil disturbances (DACDIS)
Across this range of operations, military civil support operations are designed to provide temporary support to domestic civil authorities when permitted by national law. The guiding principles are that military forces should always support civil authority and only render assistance when an emergency or other requirement overwhelms the capabilities of the civil authorities. Military forces should undertake civil support operations only when they can bring a unique and indispensable capability to the situation and not as a routine matter. It is worth repeating that soldiers are not policemen; the approach that soldiers bring to the use of force is fundamentally different from that of law enforcement officers.

DACA missions may provide aid either after natural disasters and emergencies, such as earthquakes, floods and other weather-related crises, or following man-made disasters, such as oil spills and transportation accidents. Included in this area are responses to large-scale fire emergencies, such as forest fires. Military forces often manage humanitarian aspects of these emergencies (such as providing shelter and food) or repair damaged infrastructure, such as dikes and bridges.

Military forces can play a decisive role in supporting civil authorities in an event involving the use of weapons of mass destruction. These incidents are referred to as CBRNE (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and high-yield Explosive) incidents. In these incidents, the military often brings unique qualifications and capabilities that can go far beyond those of first responders such as firefighters and police. Even so, if at all possible it is best that local authorities remain in command.

Military forces may also provide support to local and national authorities before and during the conduct of major sports and cultural events. Examples include logistic support during Olympic games and other winter sports events, as well as support for civilian officials during major government events, such as
inaugurations, and major cultural events such as world fairs and other major exhibitions.

Military augmentation of essential services is the last category of possible DACA operations. These missions typically take place during periods of labor unrest and might include providing supplemental air traffic controllers or postal employees, as well as replacing emergency workers, such as firefighters and critical transportation workers.\textsuperscript{15}

DSCLEA missions are those in which military forces provide direct support to domestic law enforcement authorities. In most countries, military forces are restricted or prohibited from actually supplanting those law enforcement elements.\textsuperscript{16}

These are several major tasks within the DSCLEA rubric. These include augmenting border security, supporting drug/contraband law enforcement, supporting domestic police efforts to combat terrorism, supporting security at national special events and generally supporting law enforcement authority.\textsuperscript{17}

Border security, as distinguished from border defense, is first and foremost a function that should be performed by law enforcement personnel. In most instances, customs and immigration officials assure secure borders, but paramilitary troops stationed at the borders can also perform this function. However, when soldiers act in a law enforcement role, it is important to determine how force may be used. Even those states that routinely use soldiers for these purposes must carefully train them in the restricted use of force.

Military forces may support national and local law enforcement authorities in efforts to control illegal importation of proscribed items, particularly illicit drugs. This support may involve reinforcing border security units or providing intelligence,
command and control assistance. Typically, military forces may provide electronic intelligence to law enforcement authorities or may provide an offshore interception capability.

Another legitimate role for military forces is to support domestic law enforcement efforts to counter terrorism, but this requires carefully distinguishing between domestic and overseas efforts. Domestic efforts should remain the responsibility of law enforcement authorities, while military forces should take the lead in conducting these operations overseas. Military forces may provide backup support or logistical support to these domestic operations, but should never assume full responsibility in a domestic context.

As with the DACA example of providing logistical support to national special events, military forces may also provide security support for these kinds of events as part of a DSCLEA task. Special event security support may involve providing checkpoints, roving patrols and entrance/exit security.

Lastly, under DSCLEA, military forces can provide specialized support for civil law enforcement authority. This may involve providing training support, including the use of firing ranges, as well as more extensive support, such as assistance for prison security and special prisoner transportation needs.

DACDIS events, which include a range of disturbances involving violence in a domestic context, (such as riots, insurrections and other mass civil disturbances), almost always exceed the capabilities of the civilian authorities. Military support in these cases represents the most serious level of assistance given to civilian authorities.

While every effort should be made to retain control by civil law enforcement authorities, disruption or violence may rise to a level that requires the imposition of martial law. In
these instances, the military may assume local law enforcement authority, but political responsibility remains in civilian hands, with military commanders continuing to report to civil authorities. DACDIS operations may involve a significant use of force, even as its use remains consistent with the principles of restraint. Every effort should be made to return the situation to civilian control as soon as circumstances permit.

• National Defense

   National defense missions encompass defensive actions designed to deter, destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of adversary attacks on sovereign territory, domestic populations and critical infrastructure. Missions of this nature include most classic defense operations that states have historically conducted on their own territory. These tasks include:

   • Air and missile defense
   • Sovereignty protection
   • Critical infrastructure protection
   • Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) crisis and consequence management
   • Continuity of government operations

   In the United States, these tasks may be referred to as homeland defense missions.¹⁸

   The first task of homeland defense is to protect the nation’s territory, people and infrastructure from air-delivered weapons. This requires an ability to detect, classify, track, intercept and destroy aircraft, cruise missile and ballistic missile threats. Air and missile defense may include passive measures, such as system hardening and concealment and active measures, which include acquisition and targeting measures.
Tasks within the air and missile defense category include interception operations, area and point defense measures, as well as combat air patrol over critical infrastructure and air escort of commercial or military aircraft.

Sovereignty protection involves the defense of population and territory. Although an actual attack on national sovereignty remains remote in most instances, defending territorial sovereignty against an external hostile threat remains a core mission for military force. While these operations are principally conducted on home territory, some may require interdiction of hostile forces outside the national territory. In addition to land defense, this mission set also includes the maritime defense of the national territorial waters and exclusive economic zones.

Sovereignty protection also extends to national space-based systems and defense-related computer systems, thus expanding the concept of territorial sovereignty into outer space and cyber-space. The United States, for example, considers an attack on its national space system to be an attack on its national sovereignty. Similarly, terrorist or hacker attacks on defense-critical computer systems are also considered infringements on national sovereignty. Protecting defense computer systems is a key task for military forces, and is likely to become even more critical as they rely more heavily on computer systems to coordinate operations.

Critical infrastructure protection (CIP) focuses on protecting systems deemed essential to the continued operation of government, business and society. Critical infrastructure is often divided into national critical infrastructure (NCI) and defense critical infrastructure (DCI). NCI includes elements of society that are essential to the economic security of a country as well as the public safety and well being of its citizens. NCI includes energy, water and other vital human and emergency services, as well as information, communications, transportation, agriculture, banking and finance systems. In most instances, NCI protection will be the
domain of law enforcement officials, reinforced as necessary in emergencies by military forces.20

Defense critical infrastructure consists of two categories: critical information assets and power projection capabilities and assets. These include military command, control, communications, computer and intelligence networks (C4I); critical logistics assets and selected strategic sites; as well as air and sea ports. Military forces retain principal responsibility for the protection of DCI assets.

WMD crisis and consequence management is another key task in the national defense mission set. Normally, a WMD event could be expected to considerably exceed the capabilities of local and national emergency services. Military forces are uniquely suited to managing the extraordinary range of tasks associated with these devastating events. Frequently, military organizations may train units specifically to conduct operations in a biological, chemical or nuclear environment, or to detect and neutralize these weapons.

Military forces are uniquely suited to managing the extraordinary range of tasks associated with these devastating events.

Military forces can provide containment and decontamination services as well as essential emergency medical and logistic support. In these events, military forces may, in fact, provide the majority of response services, and thus may assume a lead role in the attenuation and mitigation of these incidents.
The last mission in the national defense mission set is that of maintaining continuity of government. In the event of a major incident involving national leadership, the military may provide essential services, such as communications and logistics, in order to maintain the government’s ability to govern. Decapitation strikes aimed at the national leadership may give rise to widespread panic and may quickly exceed the ability of civil organizations and officials. The ability of military forces to respond quickly and to help maintain key government services can be critical to the government’s survival and its citizens’ safety.

• International Humanitarian Assistance

Military forces, with their extensive logistics capabilities, are often called upon to render assistance abroad in instances of significant human suffering. These operations may take place in the aftermath of a major natural or man-made disaster. These efforts may be carried out in an international environment, frequently as part of a coalition effort, or on a bilateral basis, with one state assisting another.

International humanitarian assistance includes:

• Disaster relief
• Logistics support to international organizations/non-governmental organizations
• Refugee support
• Disaster consequence management

Disaster relief is the most prominent task in this mission set. Military forces with large stockpiles of life-support essentials are often in the forefront of those asked to contribute assistance. Food, blankets, tents and medical supplies are feature items in this effort, along with earth moving equipment and other construction equipment items necessary in the event of earthquakes and other natural disasters.
Equally important to the provision of emergency supplies are the military’s transportation capabilities. These transportation assets, particularly aviation assets, enable military forces to respond quickly, which can often prove vital, particularly in the case of major natural disasters.

While the military often provides aid directly to those in need, in other instances military forces may work closely with partners, such as the Red Cross, to provide logistics support to international organizations or to non-governmental and private voluntary organizations, such as Oxfam, World Vision or the Catholic Relief Agency. Military forces are often asked to support the transport of relief supplies and workers or to assist with communications support.

As a consequence of this close cooperation, military and non-governmental organizations may develop mutually advantageous relations, with the military providing support and receiving operational information in return. In tense situations, military forces may be asked to protect humanitarian aid workers threatened by clans, gangs or other criminal elements. Committing forces to these tasks is a crucial decision, which may allow military forces to step over the boundary of humanitarian operations into the realm of peace enforcement missions, due to the possibility of the use of force.

A third mission task in this set is that of refugee support. Major calamities may create large numbers of refugees and military forces can be instrumental in managing the refugee flow. In addition to logistical support, this mission may require a substantial law enforcement element.

Disaster consequence management is the last mission in this set. After the initial emergency, military forces may help to reestablish order and security. Consequence management includes
many of the tasks outlined in the discussion of DACDIS missions in a domestic context, with the added difficulty of being performed in a foreign environment. These include measures to restore essential government services, protect public health and safety and provide emergency relief to affected governments, businesses and individuals.

**Unilateral Military Operations**

Although conducting military operations as part of a coalition is usually preferable to acting alone, in the interest of national security each national government must retain the ability to undertake missions unilaterally when necessary. These missions can cover the full range of offensive actions (as set forth in the section on intervention actions), as well as the following specialized operations:

- Shows of force
- Strikes and raids
- Counterinsurgency operations
- Evacuation of non-combatants
- Personnel recovery operations
- Offensive counter-terrorist operations

These operations usually require a high level of technological sophistication as well as a robust deployment capability. Some operations, such as evacuation and recovery, may have to be conducted at some distance, thus requiring an air transportation capability. Shows of force, strikes and raids will require an even more complex level of capability, including a significant offensive weapons capability, as well as a long-range deployment capability.

Counterinsurgency operations conducted within national boundaries to suppress insurgent movements, domestic uprisings and rebellions are perhaps the most demanding of these operations.
and often require a full range of military capabilities. These missions often use a special operations capability and very frequently require close cooperation with law enforcement authorities. Even though many insurgencies may utilize terrorist methods and target civilian populations, these missions differ from both domestic and overseas counter-terrorist operations in that they may require large numbers of conventional military forces.

Overseas counter-terrorist operations refer to offensive operations conducted outside the borders of a given state and which are usually conducted by military forces, and thus differ from domestic counter-terrorist operations, which are usually conducted by law enforcement authorities.
PART V: Types of Armed Security Forces

This section analyzes twelve types of military and other armed security forces that exist in the security-oriented ministries of the states included in this study.

- Active conventional ground forces (heavy)
- Active conventional ground forces (light)
- Special operations forces
- Reserve forces
- Border security forces
- Internal security forces
- National guards/Militias
- Paramilitary police forces
- Special police forces
- National police forces
- Private military companies
- Commercial security providers

Many of these forces are found throughout the focus region of this paper. Each of them is associated with a particular set of capabilities and costs; each may be particularly useful in a defined contingency. This section briefly describes each type of force as it relates to the mission sets already detailed in this paper. It should be noted that not all of the states in this region possess the full range of these forces; the intent here is to provide a survey of forces that might be employed to accomplish the mission sets outlined in the previous section.

Active Conventional Ground Forces (heavy) constitute the bulk of the legacy forces in the region. These units, often still...
organized along Soviet doctrinal lines, consist of tank and motorized infantry units, along with their associated artillery and engineer support. These forces form the core of the national defense forces in most countries of the region and with their highly restricted mobility have limited deployment capability. Moreover, chronic under-funding has rendered obsolete force structures that in some instances are not even capable of carrying out the primary core defense tasks.

Active Conventional Ground Forces (light) constitute the other principal component of the core defense force. Light conventional forces are often equipped with a wheeled transportation capability and can exercise some mobility; due to their relative lightness, they are also more adaptable to contingencies requiring air transportation. These light forces also include many specialized organizations, such as paratroop, airmobile and mountain infantry forces, which can be useful in many contingencies.

Special Operations Forces, while small in number, are normally a state’s most highly trained and equipped active forces and can carry out a wide range of conventional and unconventional tasks, including counter-terrorist operations. These forces are also capable of undertaking training and internal defense missions outside state borders. Special operations forces require considerable investment in personnel and training, but are highly mobile and can deploy rapidly.

Reserve Forces constitute the principal backup force structure for the active forces described above. As such, they may contain elements of heavy, light and special operations force structures. For reserve forces, the key issue is the level of readiness, which is a function of manning level, training and equipment. Throughout the region, readiness is quite low; indeed it is remarkable the extent to which reserve forces throughout Europe have disappeared or been rendered inconsequential through neglect.
Border Security Forces consist of a number of different types of organizations, which include border guards organized along military lines, as well as armed border security police forces. This category also includes maritime forces with responsibility for coastal security. These forces can be quite large, and in part as a legacy of the Soviet era, are generally well trained and equipped. In general, their function is to secure the external borders of a country, not to defend them. Thus, their function is principally one of law enforcement. Border security forces may have some highly mobile units equipped with light wheeled armored vehicles.

The central issue is whether these forces view themselves as military or law enforcement organizations. In many cases, they will perform both missions, as is the case with the US Coast Guard; but the key is the mentality of the individual border guard and his approach to the use of force. Many will view themselves as soldiers, drawing on the traditional orientation of most border troops; more modern ones will recognize the primacy of this mission’s law enforcement aspect, and will identify themselves principally as law enforcement officers.

Internal Security Forces, often referred to as interior ministry troops, may be organized along military lines. These forces generally support domestic security: they may guard critical infrastructure, protect senior officials or provide a strategic reserve to deal with unrest and calamities. In many instances, these Ministry of Interior troops may be called upon to deal with insurgencies, as has been the case with Russian troops in Chechnya. The absence of law enforcement and investigative functions in internal security forces distinguishes them from paramilitary police forces, also often controlled by ministries of the interior.

Internal security forces may also include riot police, national police reserves and, in some instances, highly trained counter-
terrorist forces charged with carrying out internal and overseas missions.

_National Guards/Militias_, also called home guards or militias, represent another kind of reserve force. They are often regionally organized, with specific operational areas. In contrast to the reserve forces described above, national guards are not intended to act as a reserve for the active forces, but rather to provide for territorial defense. They have much simplified tables of organization, and they generally have far less equipment, relying mostly on small arms and simple crew-served weapons. Generally, they lack any kind of combat vehicles, but may possess trucks for local mobility.

National guards tend to have even lower levels of training and readiness than reserves. Many do not meet regularly to conduct training. They may be filled by men with a residual reserve service requirement, who may be age 50 and beyond. Nevertheless, they may constitute an important capability commensurate with the level of threat to territorial integrity.

_Paramilitary Police Forces_ are common in European countries and are capable of executing a wide range of missions. These forces, sometimes part of the Ministry of Defense but normally under the control of the Ministry of the Interior, have a variety of organizations and capabilities. They generally consist of two elements: a territorial element, principally concerned with law enforcement activities in non-metropolitan areas; and a mobile element, capable of rapid deployment throughout the state, which may have wheeled armored vehicles and aviation assets.

Paramilitary police forces generally understand their primary role to be that of law enforcement, with a territorial defense role as secondary. Nevertheless, these organizations are flexible and can be employed for many tasks set forth in this paper. Indeed, as evidence of this utility, these police forces are now being employed
internationally in a number of peace operations, such as in Bosnia, Kosovo and Iraq.

**Special Police Forces** include agencies that carry out specific police functions, including aviation police, railway troops, and finance police. These police forces may also include ceremonial and protective formations, organized along military lines, such as presidential guards. In every instance, the purpose of these police forces is limited to a specific function; they do not engage in the general law enforcement activities.

**National Police Forces** include the majority of regular police forces in a given state. They may be organized nationally or regionally, but generally always report to national authorities. They are charged with general law enforcement functions, which may include some national defense tasks as set forth in this paper, particularly in the area of critical infrastructure protection and crisis management. Moreover, these forces may be required to work closely with military forces in the event of DSCEA and DACDIS events.

**Private Military Companies** are civilian-owned and operated firms that carry out military and security functions. Sometimes referred to as mercenary firms, they are usually staffed by former military and police officers and are capable of carrying out a wide range of military tasks. Because of the flexibility that these companies demonstrate, they are often employed in lieu of regular military forces for training missions or other special tasks.

**Commercial Security Providers** supply guards and security officials for special events or at critical installations. These organizations provide training, equipment, and organization for these guards. In comparison to private military companies, their range of services is much more restricted.
PART VI: Assessments and Force Nominations

This part provides assessments and force nominations for each of the six mission sets discussed in Part IV. The assessments consider each of these mission sets and evaluate each of the twelve force types based on their ability to accomplish each of the tasks. These evaluations form the basis for the recommended force solution to each set. These recommendations constitute the nominations for the force mix best suited for accomplishing the mission set. For each mission set the types of forces best suited to the particular mission requirement are indicated in **bold italics** and those that can make a contribution at a lower, but still important level are indicated in *italics*.

Intervention/Offensive Combat Operations

These operations, which will most likely occur outside the state’s boundaries and be conducted as part of a coalition or alliance, require the ability to manage technology as well as to deploy rapidly and to sustain operations over time. In addition, participating forces must be able to contribute effective combat power in a contingency.

Accordingly, states participating in these operations must have forces that can meet these requirements. Because heavy conventional forces can meet some (combat power), but not all (deployability and sustainability) of these requirements, they are judged to be of lesser value for these contingencies. Moreover, the status of many heavy force structures in the region is such that the costs required to put them in a satisfactory state of readiness is simply too great in relation to their potential for employment. Thus, even though this mission set requires a high degree of
combat power, the heavy forces of states in the region should not channel more resources into this area.

The best choices for meeting the requirements of this mission set are *active conventional ground forces (light)* and *special operations forces*. These forces are able to harness newer technology and generally have higher rates of readiness at investment levels that remain acceptable. Combined with probable coalition air assets, the ability of robust, light forces equipped with light vehicles, can be particularly effective in these contingencies.

Special operations forces are particularly well adapted to these requirements, and have high levels of deployability and readiness. Many of the region’s special operations forces are well acquainted with coalition special operations, having participated in numerous international exercises and actual operations.

**International Stability and Support Operations**

The basic requirements of peace operations are now well known, given the experience of the international community over the past decade. These operations are generally manpower intensive, but are not necessarily ones that demand high levels of technological sophistication. With certain exceptions, particularly in the high-intensity peace enforcement operations, *active conventional ground forces (light)* are able to accomplish many of the tasks called for in this mission set. They are particularly useful in *peacekeeping* missions, where there is less emphasis on the use of force other than for self-protection.
Paramilitary police forces are another good choice for meeting the requirements of the mission set. Based on doctrine, organization, equipment and training, these police forces are well suited to carry out many stability operations tasks. They are particularly useful during post-conflict peace building tasks, as well as lower-end peace enforcement tasks that require a capability for re-establishing order and stability during a transitional phase.

Special operations forces, the third option, are very capable in carrying out these tasks. They are particularly useful in supporting peace enforcement tasks and can provide an excellent tool for meeting coalition operations coordination requirements by providing language-qualified liaison teams. Special operations forces are also useful during pre-conflict peacemaking operations, where long established military-to-military contact programs can bear fruit, as well as in peace building operations, due to their inherent ability to conduct training operations for newly established security forces.

Other forces that can be of some utility include certain types of reserve forces, which can be activated to provide a sustainment ability, and private military companies, which are now developing some level of capability suited to low-end peace operations.

Civil Support

This section is divided according to the three mission subsets of DACA, DSCLEA and DACDIS. This section considers only military and paramilitary forces because the essential nature of civil support is to provide support to civilian authority.

Defense Assistance to Civil Authority (DACA)

Because the need for military support to civil authority is unpredictable, active conventional ground forces, both heavy and
light, are likely to be called upon in the early stages of these contingencies. Conventional forces, depending on their state of readiness, can quickly react to a contingency. They have the logistical support and self-deployment capability that allow them to respond quickly and to sustain themselves during the operation. In particular, these forces are well equipped to respond to incidents involving chemical, biological and radiological weapons.

Additionally, both paramilitary police forces and internal security forces are particularly well adapted to law enforcement aspects of these operations. Paramilitary police forces are perhaps best suited, given their equipment, doctrine and training. However, police forces’ capabilities can be quickly overwhelmed by major calamities and may require substantial reinforcement by military forces.

National guards and reserve forces may also be useful, although generally low levels of readiness delay their ability to respond quickly to emergencies. National guards and reserve forces are, however, useful to augment large public activities planned well in advance, such as national sporting events.

Defense Support to Civil Law Enforcement Authority (DSCLEA)

To support law enforcement authority, the best-suited forces include active conventional ground forces (light), internal security forces and special operations forces. Reserve forces and national guards generally lack the capabilities, particularly specialized capabilities and the ability to sustain operations over time, to make a realistic contribution. Active forces can augment border security forces over the long-term and have access to an array of technology, such as ground surveillance radars, that can be used effectively. Special operations forces can provide training support to law enforcement authority, as well as assist in efforts to
combat domestic terrorism; however, civilian law enforcement agencies should take the lead in this mission. It is assumed that paramilitary police forces, if available, will always be involved in these operations as a matter of policy. To the extent that they are controlled by the ministry of defense and are focused on the military aspects of their duties, they would be a natural source of augmentation for the DSCLEA mission.

Defense Assistance to Civil Disturbances (DACDIS)

As with DACA requirements, military assistance during major disturbances or calamities generally requires a rapid response capability. Thus, *active conventional ground forces (light)* and *internal security forces* are the most likely candidates for missions. Reserve forces and national guards, depending on the amount of time available, can also contribute to carrying out these tasks. As with DSCLEA events, *paramilitary police forces*, if not otherwise already engaged, are likely to be called upon to manage these contingencies.

National Defense

The most important forces available to defend the national territory are the *active conventional ground forces (light and heavy)*. This is particularly true in the case of protecting the nation’s sovereignty. Heavy forces are obviously more capable in this mission, but because of the heavy yoke of legacy forces, they are often found at a lower level of readiness than light organizations. However, given the relatively low threat to territorial sovereignty, it may be more prudent to rely on a mix of active forces, *reserve forces* and *national guards*. The latter are particularly capable in providing area territorial defense at relatively low cost. Indeed, it is worth considering whether the bulk of the territorial sovereignty mission can be shifted to reserve and national guard forces. This would result in substantial savings.
For much the same reason, reserve and guard forces may be best suited to protect critical infrastructure, particularly in those instances where the infrastructure does not require a high level of technical sophistication in order to achieve an acceptable level of protection. These reserve elements are able to provide the large numbers of static guard personnel often required for this mission. *Paramilitary police forces* and *internal security forces* can also provide this support, but at a cost to their other duties. A cost-efficient solution to the challenge of protecting critical infrastructure is to employ *commercial security providers* in this role.

**International Humanitarian Assistance**

As was the case for DACA in a national context, providing assistance to international or foreign civil authority in the event of a major catastrophe requires forces able to respond quickly and to supply their own logistic support. These operations may also require a capability for self-defense, so it’s likely to be useful if the forces are armed.

Many of the requirements of providing humanitarian assistance can be met by combat troops, but some tasks go considerably beyond their capabilities. Many of these operations require highly specialized capabilities, such as water purification units and military police, as well as civil affairs specialists, particularly for dealing with the consequences of major calamities and upheavals. The refugee support mission may entail providing basic services such as sanitation and emergency medical services. In addition, logistical support troops are generally very useful during these contingencies, which frequently require substantial movement of supplies and equipment.

Many states would find it difficult to develop, train and sustain low-density specialized troops for these missions; consequently,
active conventional ground forces (light) could be tasked to manage most of these missions. To a lesser extent, paramilitary police forces may be deployed to support these missions. In exceptional circumstances, some internal security forces may also be deployed, particularly for those missions where protection of humanitarian assistance and its providers is required, though employment of these state security forces outside a nation’s own borders may pose legal difficulties.

Unilateral Military Operations

By definition, these operations rely only on national assets and resources; international assistance is not a factor. These operations rely primarily on conventional military capabilities, but they may also draw upon special operations capabilities. In addition to land forces, air and sea assets (as appropriate) may be useful in carrying out some of these missions, particularly if they occur some distance from the home territory.

As previously noted, these operations often combine military and law enforcement operations; it is thus not uncommon for both military and police forces to cooperate in executing them. However, divided lines of command may occur, resulting in an uncoordinated response.

For counterinsurgency operations, active conventional ground forces (light) and paramilitary police forces are generally the forces of choice. Heavy forces are generally not adaptable to fighting counterinsurgency attacks, particularly in urban areas. Internal security forces may also play an important role, but it is critical to distinguish between their law enforcement and military roles. Too frequently, internal security forces may be employed in an essentially military role for which they are neither trained nor equipped.
Active conventional light forces are also well suited for employment in the show-of-force role, as are *active conventional ground forces (heavy)*, particularly if these actions take place on or near the state borders. They are less useful should it be necessary to undertake a show of force at some distance from the state, as they can be difficult to deploy.

*Special operations forces* are uniquely suited to the requirements of strikes and raids outside the state’s territory, as well as recovery operations and the evacuation of non-combatants. They are often able to function independently, a unique match for the requirements of unilateral military operations. Coordinated with air and sea forces, they can conduct operations at long range, as was the case with the Mogadishu (German) and Kampala (Israeli) operations.
PART VII: Conclusions and Recommendations

The foregoing analysis reveals several conclusions about optimal force mixes for the likely challenges of the future. While each country will have its own requirements, some recommendations seem applicable across the region. Policy makers must understand the limited, but real, window of opportunity in which the necessary mission-force mix changes can be made.

First, channeling money into legacy heavy forces is not an efficient investment. These forces are more costly than other forces examined in this study in terms of maintenance, training and sustainability requirements and their utility is limited, due to their constrained strategic mobility and major logistical needs. Indeed, investing in legacy heavy forces may be counterproductive, because it may deprive other, more useful force types of much needed support.

Secondly, this analysis demonstrates conclusively that active conventional ground forces (light) and special operations forces have the broadest range of utility for military forces. They rank among the most versatile forces for almost every mission set examined in this study. In addition, the analysis demonstrates that these forces require only modest change throughout these points of analysis, and more importantly, marginal additional investment. These forces also seem to be best positioned to take advantage of technological innovation, as well as to meet emerging future requirements.

With regard to other armed security forces, highly versatile paramilitary police forces appear to have the greatest utility and
are good candidates for additional investment. They are able to make important contributions across the range of requirements, particularly in national defense, stability operations and civil support. They are well adapted to bridging the gap between military and law enforcement approaches to using force. In this respect, they appear to be more useful than internal security forces, with their generally more limited scope of operations and often military approach to the use of force. Moreover, they are more versatile than many specialized police forces and thus, are able to meet a much broader range of requirements.

The mission of border security invites additional scrutiny. Given the importance and complexity of border security missions, highly specialized enforcement organizations must be developed for this purpose. While military forces are often employed in this role, principally because they represent a low-cost alternative for securing borders, this mission calls for a law enforcement-centered approach, as well as highly specialized training; both are often beyond the scope of military forces.

Given the reduced level of threats to national sovereignty, most territorial security tasks should probably be relegated to reserve forces. While many reserve formations desperately need invigoration, the investment required to achieve a credible level of capability would be, in most instances, modest. Reassigning part of the territorial defense task to a national guard/militia structure is worth considering, because these forces cost less than reserve forces, which must maintain a higher level of readiness and are more resource-intensive from the analytical perspective employed in this study.
This analysis makes clear that across the range of force options, hardware issues, particularly those related to investments in legacy forces, are not the most pressing. For the range of tasks analyzed in this paper, many equipment needs can be met through off-the-shelf purchases, or through limited purchase of technologically advanced mission-specific equipment. Based on this analysis, a progressive approach to upgrading legacy equipment holdings should probably give way to a more aggressive approach that may skip a generation of technology in order to acquire more advanced and more capable equipment.

As important as hardware may be, states can invest more intelligently in personnel: human resources are the key to integrating new capabilities and novel technology. While in the near future, it may seem that equipment acquisition may increase readiness, the challenges of developing the necessary doctrine, organizations and training may actually decrease short-term readiness. In fact, the difficulties of integrating new technology inevitably require additional expenditures in personnel and training. Consequently, additional expenditures for personnel are the *sine qua non* of modern readiness and increased capability.

This paper has demonstrated that the proper mix of forces required for managing future change can be obtained by concentrating on three kinds of forces: light, special operations and paramilitary police forces. Focusing future efforts on this force mix can result in much higher levels of readiness, expanded capabilities and reduced costs, especially when existing redundancies are eliminated. States would be well advised to consider this force mix as they move forward with planning for operations in this decade and beyond.
Endnotes

1 The DOTLMS was developed by the US Army as a set of metrics for determining, *inter alia*, the readiness of military forces for different missions. In this analysis, a C has been added to analyze the utility of additional marginal investment, referred to as Cost, to determine how much investment may be required to achieve a measurable gain in effectiveness. For an example of DOTLMS analysis, see [http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1251/MR1251.Chap9.pdf](http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1251/MR1251.Chap9.pdf).

2 Emerging defense doctrine in Europe is beginning to reflect this reality. The defense of national territory is no longer the first priority in some doctrines. See, *inter alia*, Germany’s new Defence Policy Guidelines. (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Berlin, May 2003), p. 4.

3 With rare exceptions, Europe’s spending on defense continues to decline precipitously. Spending on defense is overwhelmingly devoted to personnel, with little left for new equipment purchases. This has forced many defense ministries to curtail or eliminate many programs. See, for example, Smith, Craig, “Germany to Overhaul Military and Reduce Defense Spending,” The New York Times, January 14, 2004, p. 2.

4 In many countries the process of strategic assessment is not fully embedded. As a result, strategic requirements are not always well thought through, nor are they coordinated with neighbors and partners.


6 The cascading program makes available a broad range of surplus equipment from the long-term NATO members to newer NATO members and applicant states. This equipment is generally a generation or two removed from current acquisition programs. Its acquisition by other countries mandates the establishment of entirely new logistical support systems, necessitating significant investment.

What Roles and Missions?


11 See [www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel) for additional information on special operations doctrine.

12 Ibid. Peace operations also referred to as peace *support* operations, have now been subsumed under the rubric of stability operations in US usage.

13 In particular, Multinational Support Units (MSU), composed of Italian Carabinieri units, have proven to be effective in operations in the Balkans. See [http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2001/0102-07.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2001/0102-07.htm).


16 In particular, the employment of military forces in a domestic context in the United States is severely restricted by the *Posse Comitatus Act* of 1878. See [http://www.dojgov.net/posse_comitatus_act.htm](http://www.dojgov.net/posse_comitatus_act.htm)


18 In the United States homeland *defense* is distinguished from homeland *security*. Homeland security is focused on protecting against and responding to terror attacks, while homeland defense is concerned with the role military forces play in defending the nation. For a further elaboration see Clarke, John, “Securing the European Homeland,” *Journal of Homeland Security*, September 2003.

19 See JP 3-26, p. III-8 for this statement of policy.

20 See JP 3-26, p. III-1 for examples of NCI and DCI.
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