

per Concordiam

Journal of European Security and Defense Issues

■ **RUSSIAN REVISIONISM**
Moscow undermines European order

■ **THE NORDIC VIEW**
Finland weighs its neutrality

■ **ORGANIZED CRIME**
How it corrupts Russia

■ **EXAMINING EU POLICY**
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Welcome to the 20th issue of *per Concordiam*. This issue addresses Russia's recent actions and how they impact Ukraine, Crimea and other regions. In 2014, Russia took an active role in destabilizing Ukraine by manipulating important energy resources, annexing Crimea — including its strategically vital port Sevastopol — and supporting anti-Ukrainian rebel fighters in Eastern Ukraine. Furthermore, Russia used its veto power to prevent the United Nations Security Council from taking action against the annexation of Crimea.


Although this is not the first time we have witnessed irregular or surreptitious warfare, Russia's actions have caused increasing concern throughout the region and beyond. Recent events require that we carefully consider collective defensive posture, overall defense structures, energy security policies and the role of alliances to ensure we are ready to overcome today's challenges and threats. A lively and healthy debate has begun regarding how to modify force structures, increase overall responsiveness and work cooperatively to deter aggression and stabilize the region. In this edition of *per Concordiam*, we address these topics from a wide range of perspectives, including articles written by Ukrainian, German, Kazakh, Lithuanian and Russian authors.

At the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, we actively pursue new opportunities to assist in finding whole-of-government, interagency and international solutions to complex problems. We strive to remain responsive to emerging issues, offering timely and relevant approaches that assist nations confronted with regional and transnational threats. For instance, in August 2014, the Marshall Center sent a team to Central Asia to assist with a security dialogue workshop that addressed the challenges of unconventional warfare in the region. In addition, our Seminar on Regional Security program includes case studies from seemingly intractable conflicts in the Caucasus to help participants work through complex problems and find solutions.

As always, we at the Marshall Center welcome your comments and perspective on these topics and will include your responses in future editions. Please feel free to contact us at editor@perconcordiam.org

Sincerely,

Keith W. Dayton
Director



Keith W. Dayton

Director, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies

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per Concordiam

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and Defense Issues*

Rolling Backward

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George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies

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Marshall Center

The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies is a German-American partnership founded in 1993. The center promotes dialogue and understanding between European, Eurasian, North American and other nations. The theme of its resident courses and outreach events: Most 21st century security challenges require international, interagency and interdisciplinary response and cooperation.

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per Concordiam magazine addresses security issues relevant to Europe and Eurasia and aims to elicit thoughts and feedback from readers. We hope our previous issues accomplished this and helped stimulate debate and an exchange of ideas. Please continue to share your thoughts with us in the form of letters to the editor that will be published in this section. Please

keep letters as brief as possible and specifically note the article, author and magazine edition to which you are referring. We reserve the right to edit all letters for language, civility, accuracy, brevity and clarity.

**Send feedback via email to:
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ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS

per Concordiam is a moderated journal with the best and most thoughtful articles and papers published each quarter. We welcome articles from readers on security and defense issues in Europe and Eurasia.

First, email your story idea to editor@perconcordiam.org in an outline form or as a short description. If we like the idea, we can offer feedback before you start writing. We accept articles as original contributions. If your article or similar version is under consideration by another publication or was published elsewhere, please tell us when submitting the article. If you have a manuscript to submit but are not sure it's right for the quarterly, email us to see if we're interested.

As you're writing your article, please remember:

- **Offer fresh ideas.** We are looking for articles with a unique perspective from the region. We likely will not publish articles on topics already heavily covered in other security and foreign policy journals.
- **Connect the dots.** We'll publish an article on a single country if the subject is relevant to the region or the world.
- **Our audience is international.** The vast majority of *per Concordiam* readers are from Europe and Eurasia. Our mission is to generate candid discussion of relevant security and defense topics, not to strictly reiterate U.S. foreign policy.
- **Steer clear of technical language.** Not everyone is a specialist in a certain field. Ideas should be accessible to the widest audience.
- **Provide original research or reporting to support your ideas.** And be prepared to document statements. We fact check everything we publish.
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- **Bio/photo.** When submitting your article, please include a short biography and a high-resolution digital photo of yourself of at least 300 dots per inch (DPI).

SECURITY IN THE BALTICS

NATO MUST ADJUST ITS DEFENSIVE POSTURE IN LIGHT OF RUSSIA'S ACTIONS IN UKRAINE

By JUOZAS OLEKAS, minister of defense of Lithuania

Russia once again has proved to be a revisionist power. What it is doing in Ukraine is a game changer in international norms. An enduring threat from Russia to the stability and security of the whole Euro-Atlantic area marks the end of the post-Cold War era. Today, nearly 70 years since the end of World War II, the security of Europe is again at stake.

Before delving more deeply into Russia's role in Baltic security, in the context of events in Ukraine, I would like to state the following. First, the rules of the game have changed. Second, all NATO allies — from north to south and east to west — have to understand this. Third, we need to find appropriate measures to respond to the new security situation, or we face ruin.

“Don't provoke Russia.” The Baltic States have heard this argument for many years. Now, we are in a new situation: Russia has disrupted the international order. In reality, this already happened in 2008 with Russia's invasion of Georgia, but it was ignored. Today, we see the world order changing dramatically. The Helsinki Final Act has been thrown out of the window.

We, the Baltic States, have been considered by Russia to be an area of its “privileged interests.” We are concerned by Russia's intention to dominate many spheres; from information space and energy to militarization of the region. However, the Baltic States and Poland were considered paranoiacs, and Russia was considered a normal country. Now, all this has changed. Russia presents both a conventional, large-scale intervention threat and

nonconventional threat based on diversion operations, also known as hybrid warfare. This country is able to move more than 100,000 troops within hours and has shown the growing political will to do so. To adequately react, we need to have instruments in place. It is possible that Russian President Vladimir Putin might test the strength of Article 5.

Russia's aggression in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea took the West by surprise, revealing that we are not ready for contingencies of this kind. It has also proved that Russia's invasion of Georgia was not an isolated event, but a pattern, which means that Putin's policy has been consistent.

How exposed do we feel? We do not feel directly threatened, but we are concerned and alert. The new Putin doctrine — that the Kremlin has a duty to protect Russian compatriots abroad wherever they may be — puts us in a new position. It could give Putin a pretext for an intervention to protect Russians or Russian-speaking residents in the Baltic States as well.

To assess the threat level from Russia, we have to draw lessons from that country's actions. Since about 2007, we have observed increasing Russian military build-up and activities in our region. Russia is implementing a 10-year rearmament and modernization program of its Armed Forces, paying particular attention to the north western direction, especially Kaliningrad, which is becoming Russia's military stronghold. Russia not only perceives NATO to be a source of danger, but increasingly carries out offensive military planning and concrete preparations for neutralization of this danger. This was perfectly demonstrated by the "Zapad" exercises in 2009 and

2013, which, in fact, were rehearsals for an invasion. An important factor is deepening Russia-Belarus Armed Forces integration. Belarus' Armed Forces are incorporated into Russia's military plans.

The security situation in the Baltic region remains tense. Russia continues to strengthen its military posture in Kaliningrad. We are witnessing a considerable increase in demonstrations of Russia's military power close to our borders: troop and naval movements; increased combat readiness and sizable exercises (in the Kaliningrad region and on the Baltic Sea) of an offensive nature; a strengthened Russian military contingent (Air Force) in Belarus; intensified reconnaissance activity; unplanned exercises and snap checks in the Western military region; and intense information warfare directed against the Baltic States.

How reassured do we feel? In this hostile security environment, the solidarity and unity of NATO allies is of utmost importance. A solid reinforcement of the NATO air policing mission in the Baltic space, patrols on the Baltic Sea and the deployment of U.S. units for exercises in our territories represent enormous support from our allies. This helps reassure our people and demonstrates NATO's resolve to help its members if the need arises.

But NATO must sustain the current allied presence near NATO's eastern borders for as long as the security situation requires. All additional stationing of NATO forces and assets (in the air, on the sea and on land) in the Baltic States, including boots on the ground, would be right and measured. We need larger Article 5 exercises, with realistic scenarios, in our region. Establishing a permanent NATO ground presence in the Baltic region would offer more opportunities for joint military training and act as a visible deterrent to Russia.

What Russia would take seriously are military deployments on NATO's eastern flank. NATO's pledge to Russia in the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act — to not station troops permanently in Eastern Europe — is no longer valid for two reasons: First, the act refers to the words "in these circumstances," which have already changed substantially; second, Russia has already broken this act several times by violating its letter and spirit.

However, NATO's increased support and our further requests do not release us from the obligation to do our homework. Most importantly, in Lithuania, we are increasing our defense budget. Our parliamentary parties have signed an agreement to spend 2 percent of GDP on defense by 2020. We are committed to do everything possible



ARMYMAN 1ST CLASS DANVA J. BUTLER/US AIR FORCE

Lithuanian Minister of Defense Juozas Olekas, center, examines U.S. Air Force F-15C Eagle aircraft at Siauliai Air Base in Lithuania in March 2014. The planes participate in the NATO Baltic air policing mission.



Allied troops participate in the NATO exercise Saber Strike 2014 spanning Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Nearly 4,700 personnel from 10 countries participated in the June 2014 exercise designed to promote regional stability and multinational interoperability.

to make the stay of allied forces meaningful and cost effective. We are substantially increasing our host nation support and creating first-rate training conditions and infrastructure.

We are taking necessary steps to strengthen preparedness and response in non-military spheres: energy, cyber and information security. We established the Energy Security Centre, which in 2013 became a NATO Centre of Excellence specializing in operational energy security issues. We are also investing in cyber defense capabilities. The Strategic Communication Department of the Lithuanian Ministry of Defense is investigating Russia's informational attacks against Lithuania and evaluating potential countermeasures. The Baltic States have agreed to coordinate strategic communications to build information warfare capabilities.

NATO should adapt to the changed security environment. The 2014 NATO summit in Wales was an important milestone in terms of reviewing policies and strategy. The review includes a back-to-basics approach for NATO — collective defense and deterrence, reviewing NATO-Russia relations and forward stationing of NATO forces in the most vulnerable territories of the Alliance. Information warfare is a major contemporary “front line.”

Russia's behavior has strategic implications for Euro-Atlantic security. The allies must understand that NATO long-term measures are important not only to the Baltics, but to the Alliance as a whole and its future and credibility. I would like to clarify our red line: Russia cannot dictate to us where NATO forces can be deployed, especially when Russia has broken every possible international norm and agreement.

Last but not least, during this extremely tense period, NATO should remain committed to one of its



A soldier in the Lithuanian Iron Wolf Mechanized Brigade trains American paratroopers on chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defense in May 2014. NATO allies train together in Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to increase interoperability.

key obligations — the spreading of democracy and stability to the east. The Alliance should think of developing an Eastern Neighbourhood Policy that includes resolving frozen conflicts. This is especially important for our Eastern partners that have already chosen the Western path of development: Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia.

Our strategic goal is to provide them a European and Euro-Atlantic future. Putin's strategic goal is the Eurasian Union, which explains why he is reacting to the European Union model as a threat. Our assistance to Ukraine has to be focused on capacity building of national institutions. It is vitally important that NATO and the EU coordinate efforts. Russia's actions pose a direct threat to other NATO partners, particularly Georgia and Moldova. This elevates the importance of their defense relations with NATO. At the NATO summit, Georgia received an enhanced cooperation package supporting measures regarding its membership perspective. This is important not only to Georgia, but primarily for NATO to send a strong signal to Russia.

To conclude, what is happening is a fight not just for the territorial integrity of Ukraine, but for the democratic boundaries of Europe. It is a strong wake-up call for NATO and the West at large. That is why a rapid, united and strong response is needed. One thing is clear: Russia recognizes strength and consistency. Failure to deter Russia's continued proxy war in eastern Ukraine poses a risk to the very diplomatic and peaceful outcome we desire.

Russia has already invaded and destabilized Ukraine. We should not be waiting for anything more to happen. The greatest provocation the West could provide Putin is to fail to stand up to him. Events suggest that the cost of stopping Russian aggression will only grow with time. □

Explaining

RU



RUSSIAN

BEHAVIOR

 **Dr. Gregory Gleason**
MARSHALL CENTER

Moscow's revisionist intervention in Ukraine has disrupted the prevailing international order

Harrowing accounts of events unfolding daily in Ukraine over many months add a grim reality to a turn in international affairs unexpected in the 21st century — the actuality of Europe's largest state confronting an existential challenge launched by the territorial aspirations of a neighbor. "Europe, whole and free" came to be understood as a common aspiration completely within the grasp of all modern European countries. But Ukraine's experiences throughout much of 2014 have bitterly reminded Ukrainians that history has not ended for Eastern Europe.

Whatever mistakes have been made by Ukraine and its neighbors and partners — mistakes of unrealistic expectations, unquenchable ambition, misperception and too little or too much trust — there is one lesson from Ukraine's situation that can be drawn by everyone. Ukraine's current agonies are not exclusive to that country alone; they are shared by a continent. The security of both Ukraine and its partners is key. In the absence of security, there is no long-term prosperity. In the absence of security, there is no enduring liberty. The dilemma of security has Ukrainian leaders facing a classic situation reminiscent of a Greek tragedy — to surrender to a more powerful aggressor is to risk identity and survival, but to raise

arms in defense of national sovereignty is to commit to a conflict whose costs will be bitter. Appeasement is only an invitation to greater and deeper conflict.¹



Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko passes an honor guard during his inauguration in Kiev in June 2014. Poroshenko was sworn in as Ukraine's fifth post-Soviet president and vowed to unify his country amid a crisis with Russia. AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE

AN INTERNATIONAL BREACH

This problem is not merely regional. It is a political crisis that brings to a focus the most fundamental principles of the contemporary international political community. Ukraine's situation is not about being torn between the East and West; it is about the very essence

“ IN THE ABSENCE OF SECURITY, THERE IS NO LONG-TERM PROSPERITY.”

of relations between East and West. It is about the very essence of liberty, national self-determination, and relations among and between countries of the world. The fate of Ukraine as a nation, as well as all the people on its territory, hangs in the balance. Every European country, both near and far from Ukraine, is concerned with the fate of Ukraine but also with the precedent established by how the international community, and in particular the professionals in the security community, relate to Ukraine and to one another during this ordeal. Territorial integrity is the first concern of all countries on Russia's periphery. But in a highly globalized and interconnected modern world, no country is entirely sheltered from threatening and dangerous influences such as energy dependency, media propaganda and possible influence on internal policy decisions. These have become issues of concern to Moldova, countries of the Baltic Sea region, the Caucasus and Central Asia. These developments also have implications for the Nordic countries and Western Europe.

Ukraine's situation represents a challenge to first principles. As Marshall Center Director Keith Dayton pointed out in introductory remarks to this issue of *per Concordiam*, the Russian Federation's use of a veto in the United Nations Security Council to thwart the international community from interceding to prevent violation of Ukraine's territorial integrity represents the first time in the history of the United Nations that a veto-wielding Security Council member has used its status to annex the territory of another UN member. The Kremlin's decision to annex Ukrainian territory undermines the norms and standards of international behavior and the very core of international law.

The significance of Russia's relations with Ukraine

has implications for all of Russia's neighbors and is being followed carefully by the entire international security community. As Gen. Philip Breedlove, commander of the U.S. European Command and NATO's supreme allied commander in Europe, pointed out: "Russia's actions in the Ukraine crisis represent a series of wrong steps in the wrong direction and move Europe further away from its original post-Cold War vision of being whole and free. They have also clearly moved NATO further away from realizing the vision of a strategic partnership with Russia in resolving European and global security challenges."²

Bearing these concerns in mind, we have brought together in this issue of *per Concordiam* a number of informed perspectives on the current situation in Ukraine, on the borders of Russia, and in the general security community as a whole. Russia's policy toward Ukraine represents a threat to the European Union and the international community as a whole. But our goal in this issue is not to vilify and lambast an adversary. Our goal is to clarify the problems and explore the nature of solutions to achieve mutual understanding. Any long-enduring solution to the Ukrainian crisis, whether diplomatic or military, must be based on an agreement that benefits all parties. This is not as difficult as it sounds. Many possible policies and agreements can re-establish Ukraine's territorial integrity, restore its national solidarity, and allow Ukrainians to enjoy open and mutually beneficial economic and political relations with countries on all points of the compass. As we think about these objectives, it may be useful to look backward and forward before turning to the present and steps that can and should be taken.



Ukrainian troops charge a Grad multiple rocket launcher near the eastern Ukrainian city of Shchastya in August 2014. Ukraine accused pro-Russian rebels of killing dozens of civilians fleeing the conflict-torn east. AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE



Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, center, attends a summit in Minsk in August 2014. To his right is Russian President Vladimir Putin; to his left, Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov. AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE

LOOKING BACKWARD

The speed, scope and significance of political events in Ukraine during much of 2014 have taken many people by surprise. Despite being the biggest state in Europe territorially, Ukraine has not been a member of any major European institution, whether it be the EU, the eurozone, the Schengen Agreement or NATO. As a result, Ukraine has played only a minor role in international European interactions. EU negotiators have long been interested in institutionalizing economic interactions with Ukraine and have negotiated a comprehensive Association Agreement that was viewed as a first step in establishing closer political and economic relations with Europe. In November 2013, then-Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich announced during the EU economic summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, that his government would forego signing a long-negotiated and hotly debated westward-looking economic agreement proposed by the EU. Instead, Yanukovich favored signing an equally fiercely debated eastward-oriented economic agreement with Russia and its partners in an incipient Eurasian Union.

In response to Yanukovich's announcement, unrest broke out, particularly in downtown Kiev on Maidan square. For months, protesters occupied public spaces, and police and Special Forces were called out to quell the protests, resulting in accelerating violence in January and February 2014.

The unrest swelled to become what has become known as the EuroMaidan Revolution. Public disorder and protests resulted in Yanukovich's decision to flee Ukraine to Russia. A new interim government was formed in May, and Petro Poroshenko was elected Ukrainian president.

Moscow's perspective on the protests, known as the EuroMaidan Revolution, is viewed in the context not only of Ukraine's rejection of Russia's political and economic initiatives, but also of what is widely seen in Russia as "lessons" from the disintegration of the Soviet Union. As the first decade of post-communist experience proceeded, Russia's capacity to exert decisive influence over the former Soviet republics receded. Georgia's "Rose Revolution" starting in November 2003, followed in 2004 by Ukraine's "Orange Revolution," demonstrated to Kremlin leaders the momentum of centripetal forces in the former Soviet space. Underlying social support for what came to be called in Moscow the "color revolutions" precipitated adamant revanchist responses from the Kremlin. Moscow's policy response grew to focus on two things: first, to pursue integration policies from above and, second, to attribute any drive toward self-determination as the result of Western manipulation and, accordingly, infiltrate grass-roots movements to recapture the peoples and the spaces Moscow saw as being lost to foreigners. When the EuroMaidan Revolution foiled Moscow's efforts to coax, cajole

“ THE KREMLIN’S DECISION TO ANNEX UKRAINIAN TERRITORY

*undermines the norms and
standards of international
behavior and the very core of
international law.”*

and coerce Ukraine toward an eastward-leaning economic union in preparation for expanding to a more expansive Eurasian political union, the Kremlin decided to retaliate by activating every means at its disposal to counter Ukrainian national sovereignty and undermine the westward-leaning Ukrainians.

A look at Russia’s press and mass media in recent years shows how firmly they have become dominated by a specific, ideologically driven narrative of competition with Western governments, particularly the U.S. The dominant theme today in Russia’s public media is that Western governments are trying to isolate and defeat Russia to expand markets and cultural influence throughout Eurasia. The level of Russia’s xenophobia today is exceptional; it exceeds that of at least the last two decades of the USSR, a country and a ruling system known for its fear of foreigners. But this xenophobia isn’t just a feature and vestige of communism — it has antecedents far back in Russian history. Russia’s experience of the Renaissance and Enlightenment was late and mainly secondhand. European liberalism was always resisted by ideological opponents who came to be known as eastern-leaning “Slavophiles” who sought to protect their values



A Ukrainian soldier guards a checkpoint near the eastern city of Debaltseve in August 2014, where government troops and pro-Russian separatists backed by Moscow have fought. AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE

against the onslaught of “Westernizers.”

Ideological competition between East and West also became a geographical competition as interconnecting fringes of Russian tsarist political control in the West often reinforced divisions of religious and territorial differences. Many Slavophile thinkers believed the cultural identity of Ukrainian and Belarussian peoples was less advanced than the overall Slavic cultural identity and that regional instincts and the yearning for national self-determination were merely the product of intrigue and subversion. Polish, Belarussian and Ukrainian peoples — and many others — occupied the areas along the Russian western fringes of political power. Poles in particular represented a threat to the Slavic cultural unity because Polish identity was deeply connected to the Roman Catholic faith. Slavophilism was hostile to Polish national identity. In a similar but less pronounced way, Ukrainian national identity tended to limit the supremacy of Russian nationality.

Russia’s claim to a special role within the Eurasian landmass has an important historical background. Russia’s influence increased in the latter part of the 19th century in pre-emptive expansion for territorial control. In a struggle with the expanding British Empire, Russia eventually played a role in defining the contours of modern day Asia and the Middle East, by defining the outlines of western China, Afghanistan and Iran. Almost all of these borders remain today. The idea of pre-emptory territorial control played an important role in Russian tsarist foreign policy, even as the dominant concept in Russia predated geopolitical doctrines of the 19th century, such as Halford Mackinder’s idea that the “hand that controls the heartland of Asia controls the world.” Russian influence in the borderlands receded following World War I, but the Bolshevik leaders in St. Petersburg and Moscow were adamant not to relinquish any measure of control over the territories of the despised Russian Empire.

Mackinder's idea of the "heartland of Asia" swells Russian spirits today, particularly those of the "Eurasianist" faction of national-expansionists in Russia. Russia's Eurasianists argue for a modern version of Sergei S. Uvarov's 19th-century concepts of *Pravoslaviye* (Правосла́вие), *Samoderzhaviye* (самоде́ржа́вие) and *Narodnost* (наро́дность)—the nationalist trioka of Russian Orthodoxy, autocracy and populism.³ These 19th-century ideas give sustenance to the 21st-century Eurasianists who argue for the primacy of the state against the anti-statist ideas of liberalism.

Russian civilization paid a horrendous price for defending its national sovereignty in World War II and, soon after, began to expand territorial influence to preclude ever paying such a price again. The expansion of Soviet influence in the early years of the Cold War was met with the idea of "containing" an expanding communist power. The idea of containing the Soviet Union originated from a U.S. State Department classified memorandum drafted by George F. Kennan in 1946, a document sober and determined in its realistic policy prescriptions but also replete with respect and admiration for the virtues of Russian civilization. Under the pseudonym "X," the article was published in *Foreign Affairs* and served as an outline for a limited but enduring policy to preclude the expansion through force of arms and subterfuge of the communist system of governance. Winston Churchill, in March 1945, gave the famous "iron curtain" speech in the U.S. in which he warned of the division of Europe into two competing visions of the future. Both the idea of containing the Soviet Union and protecting the countries of Europe from communism were essentially defensive, not offensive, postures. NATO emerged as a perimeter defense community — not as an instrument of imperialism but as an instrument of protection. It continues to fulfill that function today.

LOOKING FORWARD

Looking forward to the future of Ukraine, it is apparently difficult for Russian leaders not to look back on the disintegration of the Soviet Union. As it collapsed, one of the few things the leaders of the resulting 15 independent states could agree upon was the idea of sustaining the "single economic space." In the nearly quarter century since the Soviet collapse, post-Soviet countries have generally failed to maintain market-driven commercial and infrastructural relationships among themselves. Zero-sum, politically driven competition has been the norm, rather than commercially driven exchange of goods and resources. As an antidote to the winner-take-all interactions, many Eurasian leaders have favored integration among post-Soviet countries. The idea of creating an economic union grew out of the simple goal, common among all the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), to establish and sustain a "single economic space" throughout the former Soviet region. But the establishment of a single economic space meant different things to different people. In the eyes of some people, it represented the restoration of Soviet era economic, if not political, relationships. In the eyes of others, it meant only the establishment of a new common region in which trade

and commerce could flourish on the basis of market-driven supply and demand. Some people saw the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC) as a new trade bloc that could compete with other large countries, while others saw it as a preliminary step for integration into the world market and international trade organizations.

In 2001, Russia's new leadership picked up the idea of economic integration and the establishment of an EAEC as the precondition for the global resurgence of Russia. The period 2004-2014 saw step-by-step reconstruction of a centralized government apparatus in Moscow, centered in the Kremlin and pursuing a foreign policy of confrontation with the West. These efforts culminated in 2010 in the development of strategy to establish a new economic and security "architecture." Then-Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin called for the establishment of a Eurasian Union that he promised would bring all aspects of policy and practice into a new supra-national organization that would span the Eurasian continent and challenge the EU for weight and influence. Putin called for steps to conduct "multidimensional integration" through economic integration under the auspices of the EAEC and political-military integration under the auspices of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia jointly announced gradually escalating stages of economic integration that removed customs borders among each other in August 2011. In November 2011, a joint commission to create the Eurasian Union by January 2015 was established. In 2011-2014, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia basically abandoned their goals of functioning as independent states and became satellites of Russia under the auspices of the Eurasian Union and CSTO.

While sponsoring the integration strategy, the Russian government developed a low-cost and easily conducted social infiltration policy through clandestine means. The Russian Special Forces designed carefully orchestrated, tightly controlled, but very low-cost social infiltration programs to incrementally move into contested areas and establish political influence. These techniques were perfected in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2007 and led to retaliatory responses by the Georgian government in August 2008, which were then used as a rationale for Russian armed intervention. Exactly the same tactic was used in Crimea in February 2014 and is currently being used in Eastern Ukraine and Moldova.

When then-Russian President Dmitry Medvedev announced his "Berlin Proposal" in June 2008 and began building European support for a proposed charter for the establishment of what was referred to as the "new European security architecture" in November 2009, Russia's reset was focused on creating a legal framework for Eurasian cooperation based upon negotiated multilateral commitments linking Europe with Eurasia. The Russian reset of relations with the U.S. was viewed mainly as a correction of international power relationships, as new political and economic realities — at least as these were perceived by Moscow diplomats — called for a revised set of policies toward European and Eurasian neighbors in a way that would allow Moscow to enjoy greater distance from Washington. Politically charged

energy trade relationships between Russia and European partners, punctuated by the 2006 and 2009 “gas wars,” left many Europeans suspicious of the consistency of Russia’s relations. The Russo-Georgian five-day war further undermined any European and Eurasian expectations that Russia would be constrained by treaty commitments alone.

Ukrainian determination to withstand eastern Ukraine’s separatist factions did not persuade Moscow’s leaders to find a formula for interactions that would bring stability and self-determination to Ukraine, but only to undermine the possibilities for the country’s stabilization and recovery. After Ukrainian separatists were discredited by the targeting of civilians in such incidents as firing on the Malaysia Airlines MH17 airliner in July 2014, the tide turned against the separatists. But, rather than relenting, Moscow’s political elite has taken further steps, calling for militarization of Russian society against an alleged onslaught from the West. Dmitry Rogozin, Russia’s deputy prime minister in charge of defense issues, asserted that EU and NATO responses to Russia’s posture on Ukraine, in the form of economic sanctions, constitute a violation of international law and trade agreements. Rogozin claimed Western economic sanctions are also destined to be counterproductive. RIA Novosti cited the deputy prime minister: “EU sanctions are sure to fail at their goal of changing Russia’s foreign policy toward Ukraine and also are beneficial to Russia. Their sanctions amount to shooting themselves in the foot. You can undermine a market in an hour but regaining that market can take decades.” Rogozin also took pride in speculating that Western economic sanctions would propel Russia into economic self-sufficiency. “Russia,” Rogozin said, “will be ‘doomed’ to develop its own industry, not merely the notorious ‘assembly industry,’ but real industry from the product design to industrial scale production. Without this home-grown production, all the talk of our independence is no more than words.”⁵

Similarly, one of Moscow’s leading military theoreticians, Aleksei Podberезkin of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs academic institute, argued that “in the present circumstances, the establishment of a Eurasian Military Collective Organization becomes an objective necessity not only for the member states of the CIS and the CSTO, but also for all the Eurasian countries who are interested in preserving their sovereignty and national identity. Military Technical Cooperation among all of these states can provide a powerful political tool of Russian influence.”⁶

Leading members of the Russian political elite see Western policies not only as a challenge to Russia’s policies but as a challenge to the Russian leadership itself. Fyodor Lukyanov, one of Russia’s most prominent analysts of international affairs and editor of the journal *Russia in Global Affairs*, has claimed that Ukraine’s course of policy is apt to be successful in Kiev. Lukyanov noted: “Of course, some kind of form of opposition and instability will persist, but the Ukrainian authorities will succeed in establishing some general control over the territory. The more long-term goal, although no one is talking about it or is going to say it aloud,

but I think it is the change of the political situation inside Russia, and if it can be done, of regime change.”⁷

Among the more ardent of the Eurasianists are those who see events in Ukraine not as a yearning for national sovereignty and territorial integrity in Ukraine, but as merely a continuation of what they regard as nefarious Western imperialism seeking to discredit, isolate and eventually defeat Russia. Russian nationalists such as Sergei Glazyev, a high-level Russian public official who is the deputy secretary-general of the Eurasian Economic Community and executive secretary of the Customs Union Commission, has publicly spoken of the U.S. setting the world ablaze under the guidance of “hawks” who are provoking a global conflict “with the aim of establishing control not only in Europe, but also in Russia.”⁸ Glazyev said, “Russia can’t go it alone against the U.S. and must create an ‘anti-war coalition’ to check the ‘aggressor.’”⁹

RETURN TO DIALOGUE

Communication with Russia has lost the tone of a dialogue. It is imperative to return to the conversation. The European security community and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization should strive to encourage Russia to assist European neighbors by helping Ukraine to stabilize and economically develop in the long-term interests of both Russia and Europe. A divided Ukraine is not in the interests of Europe or of Russia. A permanently divided Ukraine means a permanently divided Europe. There is no long-term prosperity in the absence of security. Russia can serve Russian long-term interests by reaching out to assist Ukraine in good faith and by ceasing to finance and provide moral support for armed extremists who sponsor disorder in Ukraine. Ukrainians should have the right to determine their own future without fear of sedition or foreign subterfuge. The European security community and NATO should also take reasonable steps to encourage Russia to make a commitment to security in Europe without aggression and foreign expansionism. □

1. “Appeasement” refers to diplomatic compromise conducted with the intention of making political or material concessions to an aggressor to avoid conflict, but has the effect of not deterring aggression and instead whetting the appetite for further aggression. Concretely, appeasement usually refers to the announcement of British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain that he had achieved “peace in our time” by agreeing not to intervene to prevent German Chancellor Adolf Hitler’s decision to annex Czech border areas in September 1938. Hitler was “appeased” but not placated, and World War II began a year later.

2. Phil Breedlove, “The Meaning of Russia’s Military Campaign against Ukraine,” *The Wall Street Journal* (16 July 2014). <http://online.wsj.com/articles/phil-breedlove-the-meaning-of-russias-military-campaign-against-ukraine-1405552018>

3. Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, *Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959).

4. X. “The Sources of Soviet Conduct.” *Foreign Affairs*, 25, no. 4 (1947): 566–582.

5. “Rogozin: The West Shoots itself in the Foot by Introducing Sanctions against Russia.” RIA Novosti. (August 6, 2014): <http://ria.ru/world/20140806/1018965640.html>

6. A.I. Podberезkin, *Russia’s Military Threats*. (Moscow: MGIMO, 2014), p. 264.

7. Artem Kobzev, “The Long-term Goal of Sanctions is Regime Change. Interview with Fedor Lukyanov. Lenta.ru (27 July 2014). <http://lenta.ru/articles/2014/07/27/lukyanovworld/>

8. Olga Tanas, “World War on Russia’s Mind When U.S. Duels Over Ukraine.” Bloomberg News. (August 8, 2014). <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-08-08/world-war-on-russias-mind-when-u-s-duels-over-ukraine.html>

9. On July 5, 2014, the head of the Ukrainian Security Service, Valentyn Nalvaichenko, announced initiation of a criminal proceeding against Sergei Glazyev under Ukrainian Criminal Code article 436 (incitement of armed conflict). Ukrainian investigators allege Glazyev is one of the organizers of meetings in Moscow that planned military actions and special operations against Ukraine and also aided and abetted terrorists.

C U R B I N G
**RUSSIAN
AGGRESSION**

By VALENTYN BADRAK, director, Center for Army
Conversion and Disarmament Studies, Ukraine



A VIEW FROM KIEV OF THE MOSCOW-BACKED INCURSIONS INTO UKRAINE

In the first 10 days of August 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin brought his military standoff with Ukraine to the boiling point. First, deposed Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich bolted, then special forces agents in eastern Ukraine and the pro-Kremlin Donbass “elite” failed to live up to expectations. Before the pro-Russian bloc in the Verkhovna Rada, the Ukrainian parliament, visibly weakened, Ukrainian security forces had shown they still had muscles to flex and, finally, the parliament started preparing for a total reset. This started the chain of events that pulled Ukraine out from under Russia’s thumb. Putin is realizing he has bitten off more than he can chew, and he is delirious with frustration.

As if in revenge, the Kremlin has supersized its provocations. Occasional Grad artillery barrages were followed by a murderous aerial bombing of Luhansk Oblast and, within a week, Russian military planes were openly attacking Ukrainian air forces. The unprecedented annihilation of a civilian jet (Malaysian Airlines Flight 17) by Russian-backed separatists, killing nearly 300 passengers, proved to the world that Putin’s team will not stop threatening international order. Moreover, a future large-scale war will not bear the warning of an official declaration from Moscow — if such a mass invasion takes place, it will take the form of a gradual expansion of the current, undeclared war until it becomes so blatant as to be undeniable. Even then, the Kremlin can hide behind any cover it chooses and will lose nothing by retroactively claiming the insertion of “peacekeepers.”

Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, front left, walks with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, center, to watch military exercises upon his arrival at the Kirillovsky firing ground in the Leningrad region in March 2014. REUTERS

TOTAL READINESS

Ukraine has never been as close as it is now to full-scale war with Russia, not even when Putin’s “little green men” swarmed the Crimean Peninsula.

According to a number of analysts, the level of tension (with the intensification of Russian provocations, military-style sabotage and subversion, and mass crimes against the civilian population) is mirrored by the complete readiness of Russian troops for a large-scale attack. Nevertheless, an offensive could be avoided if Putin’s objectives of derailing parliamentary elections and further destabilizing Ukraine can be achieved by less risky means, such as a covert, subversive war. Alternately, the Western world might demonstrate unity in this struggle against the latest threat to world peace and more actively support Ukraine, including with military and technical aid.

Throughout August 2014, ever more Russian reconnaissance and sabotage teams crossed the border into Ukraine, along with military hardware, artillery shelling and precision aerial bombing. The war continued to expand as the Russian military sent heavy weapons and military aircraft into Ukraine, and there is a danger that Russia could use its missile capabilities, including the latest short-range attack missiles. The composition of the separatist combat groups also changed in August — 40 to 50 percent of fighters are now professional soldiers from the Russian Armed Forces. The Kremlin is trying to spur an increase in the number of civilian victims, spreading panic and mistrust of the authorities and, if possible, turn the flow of refugees into a humanitarian catastrophe. Then, Putin can be heralded as a savior, rescuing the war-struck regions from total collapse. Meanwhile, Putin is tireless in his attempts to drag the Ukrainian defense forces into a large, officially declared war or, failing that, into negotiations with the separatists/terrorists (for whom the Kremlin will happily nominate “leaders” like Viktor Medvedchuk or Oleg Tsarev), as he tries to turn the Donbass into



Dutch investigators examine wreckage of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17, shot down by separatist forces near the village of Rassipne, Ukraine, in July 2014.

THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

Unfortunately, even very tangible victories of Ukrainian forces against Kremlin-sponsored terrorist groups are creating no leeway for talks with Moscow.

another Transnistria-like “frozen conflict.” Putin seems happy to use any trick to set fire to Ukraine from within.

Russia’s military argument is hard to ignore. By August 10, numerous Russian reservists had been mobilized along the Ukrainian border. During a short-lived rollback of troops from the border in June 2014, the Kremlin regrouped, replacing “light units” (mainly special units with light armored vehicles) with “heavy” mechanized units that have well-organized, comprehensive support, from preparation of air strikes to logistics. Bold surges by special forces units in lightly armored vehicles, which was the tactic in Crimea, are being replaced by a new battle plan that features military aviation and heavy artillery.

Some believe that the Russian general staff is now studying operational tactics from World War II — in case there is a full-scale war, the generals want to factor in the ideal strike structure and sequence, as well as local geography. Analysts do not rule out the possibility of initial strikes in the south of Ukraine (including from Transnistria and Crimea) and in the north (including fire from Belarus). Large-scale bombing of Ukrainian air bases would be inevitable. To this end, Russia has concentrated significant bomber forces near the border, including long-range planes, such as Tu-22M3 bombers armed with X-22 cruise missiles, which can operate at a great distance and have a launch range of 500 kilometers with accuracy to a few meters.

Other aircraft seen on the move and concentrated along Ukraine’s borders include the new Ka-52 helicopters and Su-35 aircraft, and even Tu-160 and Tu-95MS strategic bombers — both of which can carry nuclear weapons. Ukraine’s defenses have already been dealt a heavy blow by the loss of Crimea, where 25 percent of air defense troops and resources were concentrated, along with 17 percent of the nation’s air force.

On the other hand, many security specialists suggest that Moscow’s bark is worse than its bite. The political scene offers plenty of farcical material, reminiscent of then-Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev’s threat in December 1994 to take Grozny, Chechnya, “in two hours” during the first Chechen War. In the summer of 2014, rumors were thick on the ground that the Pskov Airborne Division was preparing for a Ukraine mission. Vladimir Shamanov, commander of Russia’s airborne paratroopers, wants to make history for organizing the first successful combat jump, his own troops have said.

But many actions suggest muscle-flexing for psychological effect — a mechanized bodybuilding show, choreographed for shock and awe. Without a doubt, one psychological factor is present and dangerous — Putin’s own personality. Mulling over events in his own head, he is beginning to look like a rat caught in a tight corner. If he perceives he is too tightly cornered, he could launch a desperate, full-scale attack. Sadly, many Russians are blinded by state propaganda and may support such a reckless gamble.

Experts note Ukraine’s need to rapidly organize defenses along the entire border, from Belarus to Transnistria. Although Russia currently has the military and political advantage, it could still lose this edge if sufficient assistance is forthcoming from the international community, including rapid coordination of far-reaching, worldwide sanctions, complete political isolation of Kremlin leaders, starting with Putin, and above all, military and technical aid.

Unfortunately, even very tangible victories of Ukrainian forces against Kremlin-sponsored terrorist groups are creating no leeway for talks with Moscow. The very idea of talks in this format is unacceptable to Putin, who would have to admit Ukraine’s existence as an independent state (which would imply a denial of his previous convictions). This explains why Putin is marshalling an army of

diplomats to convince Berlin and Paris that relations between Moscow and Kiev are no more than a spat between neighbors. Unfortunately, French President Francois Hollande and German Chancellor Angela Merkel have continued to allow ambiguous dealings with the aggressor. These dual standards in the main European capitals have given Putin a second wind as the tussle goes into extra time. Putin's hesitation can mainly be attributed to the third round of sanctions, both well-oiled and far-reaching. The Kremlin's chief occupant may now hear his survival instinct hinting to him that a simple miscalculation could now bring him the fate of the miscreant officer in Kafka's *In the Penal Colony*. However, even if Putin's saber-rattling is an elaborate bluff, the rest of the world is being offered Pascal's Wager: If Russia's subversive terrorist war against the Ukrainian people does not evolve into an all-out war, it will be one more bloody daub on the demonic masterpiece by the artist in the Kremlin.



Ukrainian servicemen ride on a military vehicle toward Novoazovsk in the Donetsk region in August 2014. Ukrainian forces engaged separatist forces supplied and abetted by Russia. AFP/GETTY IMAGES

IN A LETHAL BROTHERLY EMBRACE

As soon as Russia began its undeclared war against Ukraine, the Center for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies identified the three factors necessary to stand up to the Kremlin: resilient Ukrainian defense forces, the West's solidarity and readiness to eliminate this new threat to world order, and the ability of the Russian people to ascertain the true intentions of their leader and start resisting Russia's slide into the abyss. Sadly, by the late summer of 2014, the Ukrainian state rested on just one of these three pillars.

The resistance put up by Ukrainian defense forces, and the nationwide, popular resistance to Putin's aggression, has become the main guarantee of victory. Although the widely respected Business Insider moved Ukraine's Armed Forces up on its list of the world's most powerful armies, it would be virtually impossible to defeat the Kremlin-backed terrorists and Russian mercenaries if it were not for the efforts of volunteers within the war zone.

Still, we are far from the tipping point. The military situation can change only after complete closure of the border and all channels used to deliver weapons and Russian fighters into Ukraine. But this requires significant troops and equipment, the creation of special mobile teams in the most dangerous areas, and the rapid adoption of modern target acquisition, tracking and strike systems. Military

aircraft with attack capabilities will also be needed. So far, there is a catastrophic deficit of almost every tool needed to do the job.

Naturally, Kiev has great hopes that the United States and Europe will implement sanctions with solidarity and consistency. In a perfect scenario, sanctions could be a highly effective, asymmetric weapon. The downed Malaysian Airlines jet may become the watershed moment in the series of bloody incidents initiated from the Kremlin. Ukrainian experts see a connection between a clear shift in Western attitudes toward Moscow's activities, and the understanding that Putin's preferred zone of influence may reach as far

as the Atlantic. In such a situation, the West's readiness to initiate finely tuned resistance to further aggression from Moscow is critically important, as are synchronized sanctions executed by the European Union, the U.S. and adjacent allies.

The Chinese perspective carries particular weight with Putin, and if Japan's disapproval is echoed by China, the situation could change fundamentally. Decisive steps by the international community may yet save the shaken world order, and the potential for economic losses could be a genuine guard against world war. Robust sanctions and complete isolation — these are the strongest weapons against Putin. Tragically, many have yet to comprehend that any delay in deploying these weapons could cause the explosive use of genuine weapons of war.

Kiev seeks technical military aid as a matter of active diplomacy. First, all restrictions need to be lifted to allow Ukraine to buy the latest small-arms and data transfer systems — if only for the special

forces (Alpha, SVR Special Operations and certain special units of the Interior Ministry). Currently the situation is tragicomic: Europe refuses Ukraine sniper equipment, while the aggressor, Russia, is furnished with Mistral warships.

Only the U.S. has proven consistent in military and technical aid and cooperation. Although there have been media reports that Canada intends to deliver 20 CF-18A combat aircraft, a final agreement is still to come. The Pentagon has prepared a shipment of equipment, including thermal imaging devices and night-vision equipment. To ensure the success of Kiev's wartime diplomacy, U.S. think tanks urge the compilation of two lists, the first showing the equipment and lethal weapons required. Some think U.S. President Barack Obama is unlikely, in the near future, to agree to send weapons to Ukraine. Objectively speaking, however, such a position is, for Western leaders in the current situation, more risky than offering direct assistance. If the Kremlin makes a military breakthrough, new targets could quickly include the Baltic countries or Kazakhstan. Then NATO would face a true existential choice.

Ukraine needs a military lend-lease arrangement. For example, together with nonlethal equipment from the U.S., Central and Eastern European states could send Ukraine deliveries of post-Soviet arms in exchange for American arms shipments to these states.

American analysts insist a great deal depends on a jointly articulated, open list of Ukraine-U.S. agreements that must include a range of options for Ukraine to compensate the efforts of Western states. In Kiev, revolutionary ideas are being developed. Ukraine is ready to accept broad military and political cooperation with the West. For example, Ukraine could produce target missiles for the U.S.-led missile defense program, or offer territory to place the interceptor missiles (which would, incidentally, allow Ukraine to be protected by Patriot missiles). Military-economic projects could prove of interest — such as the use of the Yavorov test site for large-scale Western military exercises or development of the An-124 Ruslan, a modern heavy transport plane with Pratt & Whitney engines. These are only undeveloped ideas, but it is clear that strategically important agreements could be forged today. Ukraine could become a strong nonmember ally of NATO.

A GLIMPSE INTO THE FUTURE

Experts offer a stern warning that, although Moscow may not now achieve its goals of turning Donbass into a Ukrainian Transnistria, the Kremlin may repeat attempts to incite a civil conflict in

Ukraine if the economic and energy crisis becomes acute. The Institute for Evolutionary Economics (IEE) has identified a protracted 5 percent nationwide drop in industrial production (a 5 percent overall drop). IEE experts predict a 5 to 10 percent drop in gross domestic product (GDP) with a subsequent fall in industrial production of 5 to 12 percent. According to some assessments, decreased industrial production in the East (in the war zone) will be as high as 60 percent, or almost 20 percent of GDP. Thus, the complex economic situation is indeed a threat to President Petro Poroshenko's team. The domestic crisis may be further deteriorated by a reappearance of oppositional political forces, such as those surrounding Yulia Tymoshenko.

At the same time, many politicians, public figures and analysts agree that the latest events have created a unique opportunity to form a strong new army in Ukraine capable of standing up to external aggressors, including those as strong as Russia. It should not be forgotten that Ukraine could end up as Europe's border region, a bulwark protecting European stability after Putin injected the plague of terrorism.

In this context, proactive steps to protect national information space are significant. For example, experts welcome Ukrainian plans to introduce licenses for Russian-language books and quotas for foreign book publishing. Eighty percent of books in Ukraine come from Russia, which presupposes an intellectual and cultural influence on the Ukrainian people by the state next door. Specialists in this field are convinced it would be useful for the Ukrainian Security Service to compile a record of foreigners who have publically voiced anti-Ukrainian convictions.

A trend worthy of attention is the genesis of anti-Putin movements within Russia. Ideas such as the "Siberian March" for federalization, even if firmly thwarted by Russia's uniformed services as an attempt at Russian separatism, should be supported and developed by the international community. In fact, this is not so much a separatist movement as an expression of purely anti-Putin sentiments aimed at reducing authoritarianism and expressing a refusal to support the Kremlin's dubious (and worse) projects. The people of Russia, who "made" Putin, according to Elena Bonner, widow of Andrei Sakharov, may turn out to be the best ally in the struggle against his latter-day demonism. Such movements are still extremely weak in Russia, and are easily quashed by the state police system, but, to blow out the flame of Kremlin aggression from within, the West could do far worse than to support these sporadic strivings for democracy. □



EU

Enlargement

**TO THE
EAST**





The Ukraine crisis offers lessons for Europe about the limits of engagement

By Dr. Katrin Böttger

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Through the Eastern Partnership (EaP) and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the European Union *inter alia* strives to export European values, including democracy, the rule of law and human rights. However, when looking at Ukraine, the EU seems to have failed. The country has fallen into disarray and is currently facing a civil war-like situation in its eastern territories. Mistakes were made by EU officials before the crisis, giving the EU some responsibility for bringing it about and, therefore, enhancing the EU's responsibility to help resolve it.

How has the EU dealt with the crisis so far? How has the crisis affected, and how should it affect, EU foreign policy, including whether enlargement — the EU's most successful foreign policy instrument — is back on the agenda? These are questions European policymakers must contemplate as they work to find a peaceful resolution, while taking into consideration Russia's interests and role in the region.

From left, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko; German Chancellor Angela Merkel; then-European Union Council President Herman Van Rompuy, front; Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili; and European Union Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso attend the 2014 EU Summit where Association Agreements were signed with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. AFP/GETTY IMAGES



Before the crisis: EU policy

The Ukraine crisis escalated immediately after the EU's Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, in November 2013, largely because the EU lacks a strategic and security policy for the EaP and a medium- and long-term security and foreign policy concept in general. In addition, EU foreign policy is broken up into many unrelated pieces. For example, EU policy on relations with Russia has not taken into consideration the EaP policy, although Russian representatives have repeatedly voiced unease about its effect on Russia's political and economic relations with EaP countries. This only changed after the Vilnius summit, when the EU started technical talks with Russia regarding Association Agreements and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTA) with EaP countries.¹

Russia was also underrepresented as a relevant factor in the EaP framework, although this is partly because Russia showed no interest in participating in the EaP. But this is no excuse for the EU lacking a strategic approach toward Russia. EU representatives viewed — and there are many examples of this from Štefan Füle and Catherine Ashton — the Association Agreements and DCFTAs as merely technical matters and underestimated foreign policy implications. Even if EU representatives — true to their words — did not use the EaP as a geopolitical instrument, it was perceived as such by Russia, because it was indeed intended to export European values that are threatening to Russian power structures. EU representatives failed to see this in the runup to the Vilnius summit and seem not to have fully grasped this even today.

Another weakness of the ENP and the EaP is that they were



Pro-European Union protesters gather outside the EU delegation in Kiev in January 2014. Their actions were among those that contributed to the dissolution of President Viktor Yanukovich's government.

AFP/GETTY IMAGES

constructed to constrain Ukraine's EU accession ambitions and as a compromise between EU member states that called for candidate status for Ukraine (i.e., Poland) and others (i.e., Spain) that were unsure or outright opposed to membership.

Additionally, the ENP is still using the enlargement process logic of the 1990s and 2000s, in which the EU took a more passive role and allowed states to approach the Union in an open-ended process. Therefore, EU policy toward ENP states lacks a strategic, proactive component that is independent from the reform and democratization agenda. While the 2014 European External Action Service (EEAS) annual progress report shows that the EU is beginning to understand the limits of this approach,² it has not been able to overcome this completely because EU policy maintains that potential candidate states should be agents in the democratization process. This is certainly true, as any other approach would overestimate the EU's influence in internal reform processes, but it should not keep the EEAS from developing its own, proactive foreign policy vis-à-vis these states, not only, but especially, in cases of reform stagnation.

The EU failed to assess Russia's role and interests in the region to a point that its own officials are now asking themselves how they could have been so naive. The responsible EU officials, including the foreign ministers, the commission and the EEAS, wildly underestimated Russia's interests and influence, both in the negotiations for Ukraine's Association Agreement/DCFTA and in dealing with the crisis that followed. In addition, instead of trying to understand the Russian position and to keep communication channels open, officials and media quickly turned to anti-Russian rhetoric without seriously considering Russian interests in the region or attempting to see Russia as a rational actor. The EU was more successful during its 2004 Eastern enlargement, when it was able to find a common ground concerning Russia's Kaliningrad exclave. The EU representatives do not seem to understand the special affinity that Russia, and many Russians, hold for the former Soviet republics. Russian policy seems to be determined less by its experience with NATO's (1999) and the EU's (2004) Eastern enlargement than it is influenced by talk about NATO enlarging to include Ukraine and Georgia in 2008 and American plans for a missile shield in Central and Eastern Europe, including Poland.

This is also evident in Russia's military doctrine, last updated by then-President Dmitry Medvedev in 2010. These elements are consistently mentioned as actions opposed by the Russian side, leading to the Medvedev doctrine and, ultimately, Russia's annexation of Crimea. This demonstrates the limitations and difficulties of further EU enlargement in Eastern Europe; it also means the spreading of European values will be slowed considerably. EU officials will not help the situation if they interfere too aggressively in internal politics, such as during elections in Ukraine. However, the EU's impact on political and economic transformation should not be overestimated. On the contrary, the "change through trade" (Wandel durch Handel) model seems to have its limitations, and it would be interesting to examine relevant intervening factors necessary for the model to work.

The EU's institutional foreign policy weakness has contributed to the crisis. The main problem lies in the complex division of labor between High Representative Ashton and Commissioner for Enlargement Füle spelled out by the Lisbon Treaty, which leads to two politicians and administrations being responsible for foreign policy and mixes classic foreign policy and integration instruments. This has led to an acute lack of security policy analysis for implementation of the ENP.

During the crisis: EU actions

In dealing with the crisis, the EU has shown a sometimes surprising unity, considering the differing interests of member states, especially with regard to short-term measures to put a lid on the crisis. This is most obvious from the unusual frequency of meetings of foreign ministers and heads of state and governments in reaction to ongoing developments. In addition, member states' representatives have shown unity in dealings with Ukraine and Russia, even though at the beginning there were disagreements between Ashton's EEAS and Füle's Commission Directorate General for Enlargement. In that case, the EU was able to speak with one voice, a goal it has failed to achieve in many previous crises. Some see Russian President Vladimir Putin as an involuntary unifier and the catalyst of a joint EU foreign policy.

However, the EU has made some first and necessary advances toward Russia, all the while strongly criticizing and condemning Moscow's violation of international law in the Ukraine crisis.



These advances include expert-level bilateral consultations on how future Association Agreements with EaP countries will affect their relations, especially economic relations, with Russia.

The EaP and relations with Russia

The most important effects of the Ukraine crisis on EU foreign policy will be on its medium- and long-term development through lessons learned. The crisis has shown that the EU needs to review the ENP and, more specifically, the EaP to avoid similar escalations in the future and allow more space for its own foreign policy priorities. This review should not be rushed, as it was in the case of the Arab Spring, when the annual ENP commission review attempted to give answers for a new, complex and

continuously changing situation in southern Mediterranean countries. Therefore, the following five steps are suggested.

1. Focus on strategic and security policy in the EaP

The EU should start a serious and moderated reflection process on its foreign policy priorities. As part of the process, it should consider not only its interests, but also its limited resources and its strengths and weaknesses, and base its priorities on common values. The review should discuss including the eastern neighbors in even greater measure, and concentrate on the systematic achievement of short-, medium- and long-term goals and less on the individual sensitivities of member states toward small details. The EU should overcome differences to speak with one voice not only in times of crisis, but attempt to do so consistently.



A masked pro-Russian militant patrols a road near the eastern Ukrainian village of Semenivka in May 2014.

REUTERS

2. Future cooperation with Ukraine

The EU will have to find a balanced approach for future cooperation with Ukraine because the country is in dire need of sustainable reform and rebuilding once the civil war is over, which will make the approximation process slow and expensive. To lighten the burden, a set of incentives, including visa freedom, should be developed in close cooperation with Ukraine to ensure a needs-based approach.

Reviving EU-Russia relations

The EU needs to develop a new strategy for relations with Russia to overcome the combination of deadlock and loss of confidence. To move forward, the process should be independent of condemnation of Russia's role in the Ukraine crisis. Even though the term "Russia understander" has been heavily criticized in Germany, a higher priority should be given to gaining a better understanding of Russia without necessarily exhibiting greater empathy for the decisions of Russian politicians. Russia's regional interests must be kept in mind, however, because they would otherwise interfere in the development of the EaP. Creating the Geneva contact group was an important first step in approaching Russia. This was followed by two EU-Russia-Ukraine trilateral meetings on energy security on May 30 and June 2, 2014, attempting to settle ongoing gas supply questions. In addition, the foreign ministers of Germany, France, Ukraine and Russia met July 2, 2014, to discuss a general and unconditional cease-fire for the separatist conflicts in eastern Ukraine, which was finally achieved in Minsk on September 5, 2014. Meanwhile, following the signing of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, the trade ministers of the EU, Russia and Ukraine met for the first time July 11, 2014, to start consultations on its implementation.

3. After the European elections: new personnel

With the European Parliament having been elected in May 2014, and Jean-Claude Juncker having been elected president of the European Commission, the new occupants of other EU offices are being decided. Concerning the EaP, designated high representative Federica Mogherini and the designate commissioner responsible for the

ENP and enlargement, Johannes Hahn, are of particular interest. It will be crucial to achieve a more efficient division of labor between EEAS and the commission regarding the ENP and joint foreign and security policy. Technical cooperation in the association process will have to be better complemented with classic foreign policy instruments, be it under the responsibility of one or several politicians.

4. Organizational and financial engagement for neighbors

The EU will have to decide how much it is willing to involve itself in EaP countries, including how much it is willing to invest financially and politically. Before the Ukraine crisis, the EU was not willing to invest much in the region. If the EU wants to take a more proactive position, a higher financial and political investment would be logical. To shape this policy, the EU possesses a tool box of instruments that range from socialization to conditionality to sanctions.

Conclusion

What are the prospects for EU enlargement and the export of European values — including democracy, rule of law and human rights — to the EU's Eastern neighborhood, taking Russia as a neighbor into consideration, especially in light of the Ukraine crisis? EU enlargement has reached into a geographical region that Russia considers its traditional zone of influence. Until very recently, the EU was not interested in these regions, but rather used the ENP and the EaP defensively, to ward off Ukrainian interest in applying for EU membership. The EU has to realize that attempts to negotiate Association Agreements and free trade agreements with Eastern European countries, especially Ukraine, are considered by Russian leaders as interference in their geopolitical sphere. Meanwhile, EU leaders have to develop a medium- to long-term strategy to answer the question of how much they want to be involved financially and politically in the region. □

Julia Klein, a colleague at the IEP, Berlin, contributed to this article.

1. European Council: EU-Russia summit focuses on Eastern Partnership and combatting terrorism, January 28, 2014, URL: <http://www.european-council.europa.eu/home-page/highlights/eu-russia-summit-focuses-on-eastern-partnership-and-combatting-terrorism?lang=en> (accessed: July 7, 2014).

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NATO'S NORTHERN EDGE

Finland debates its nonaligned status in the face of Russian aggression

By **Tuomas Forsberg**, *professor of international relations, University of Tampere, Finland*

Understanding the reasons behind Finland and Sweden not joining NATO, despite being members of the European Union, requires more knowledge of psychology and history than strategy and politics. Both countries have had lively debates about their relationship with NATO since the end of the Cold

War, and the discussions have intensified with the ongoing crisis in Ukraine and Russia's annexation of Crimea. Finland and Sweden have been keen on developing partnerships with NATO. At the NATO summit in Wales in September 2014, they conducted discussions on enhanced partnership and signed a host nation support agreement with NATO. Although it remains unlikely there will be a swift decision to apply for full NATO membership, it cannot be ruled out either.

Finland's and Sweden's historical traditions of neutrality, which continue under the label of military nonalignment, are the primary reasons they have not joined the Alliance. Sweden's more than 200-year-old neutrality has kept it out of military conflicts. Finland's tradition is shorter and the experience is mixed. Nevertheless, Finns believe that their neutrality policy was the key to its success during the Cold War. Unlike other Eastern European states, Finland did not become a Soviet bloc country but benefited from having good relations with both East and West. The saying "one should not fix what is not broken" applies.

THE WEIGHT OF EXPERIENCE

History, in itself, does not determine policies; rather, the perception of historical experiences does. The experiences of NATO members Norway and Denmark were different compared to those of Sweden, and the Baltic states' experiences were different from Finland's.

Perceptions are also important when assessing normative elements of military alignment versus nonalignment. For Finns and Swedes, neutrality has many positive connotations. In Sweden and Finland, there is a strong psychological commitment to the belief that being outside of military alliances is ethically grounded. Militarily nonaligned countries are believed to be able to serve as bridges or mediators in international conflicts. Some also link a lower level of military

expenditures to military nonalignment, although empirically the truth might be the opposite. Nevertheless, some see no incompatibility between nationalism and a cosmopolitan outlook, or between a strong national defense and pacifism.

Furthermore, psychological factors are important to national identity. For Finland, in particular, the core successful identity aspiration during the Cold War was to become a Nordic country rather than the fourth Baltic state (as it was designated in the Molotov-Ribbentrop treaty of 1939). In these circumstances, it was difficult to abandon this achievement and join NATO with the Baltic states and the other Central and Eastern European countries that once were part of the Soviet bloc. Although Denmark, Norway and Iceland have been members of NATO from the beginning, Finland has always identified more strongly with Sweden.

Identity matters also when NATO is equated with American hegemony in the world. There is an identifiable anti-American current in Finland and Sweden that shapes public discourse and sometimes, though less often, political decision-making. It is telling that Finnish and Swedish public opinion regarding NATO membership has been weakened because of American policies, particularly the Iraq war, than it has been strengthened by Russia's behavior and growing military potential.

Psychology shapes strategic thinking and how Russia is perceived as a potential threat. It is possible to construct a strategic rationale behind the policy of military nonalignment combined with a strong partnership with NATO, membership in the EU and deepening Nordic defense cooperation. This strategic equation is based on the idea that full membership in NATO would provoke Russia more than it would enhance security.

The Ukrainian crisis and Russian behavior have not changed this calculus so far because the amount of provocation to Russia caused by NATO enlargement in times of crisis is thought to grow concurrently with the increased level of deterrence and protection that would be achieved through membership. It is believed that Russia harbors no malevolent plans against Finland or Sweden unless they themselves give reasons for such — and NATO membership is regarded as such a reason.

AN ELUSIVE CONSENSUS

Socially constructed elements of strategic, political and identity philosophies have thus supported military nonalignment



Finnish infantry troops conduct winter training. FINNISH DEFENCE FORCES

in Finland and Sweden. Yet, there isn't a national consensus over NATO membership. From the critic's perspective, the strategic logic of the present nonalignment policy is not well thought out. While Finland prefers to stay militarily nonaligned, it also seeks to preserve the option of joining NATO, but it is not clear when it would use it. A crucial dilemma exists. In times of crisis, when there is a need to join a military alliance, it is questionable that the Alliance would accept new members; whereas, in times of peace, when it is possible to change policy, there is no perceived need.

Maintaining an option to join NATO despite not wanting to apply for membership can be defended on the grounds that it symbolizes the sovereignty of the state in line with Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) principles. Having the option to apply for and eventually join NATO is important, regardless of whether Finland would ever opt for a full membership. That explains why many are willing to support the right to join NATO, in some hypothetical circumstances, although they do not spell out what those circumstances might be.

The NATO option can also be seen as a deterrent. According to this logic, Russia would not put any significant military pressure on Finland or Sweden because it would push them to apply to NATO. With that knowledge, Russia left Finland and Sweden in peace during the Cold War. The Soviet Union did not want to upset the military balance in Northern Europe, it is argued, because it feared that Sweden would join NATO. However, if NATO membership is a deterrent to Russia, it is not clear what Russian actions would indicate that the deterrent has failed and be the triggering factor for joining NATO. Apparently, Russia invading a neighboring country and annexing a piece of its territory is not. Nor are provocative violations of Finnish and Swedish airspace. Clearly, Ukraine is not Finland; but when and if Finland's sovereignty is at stake, it would certainly be too late to join an alliance.

These psychological factors and belief systems help explain why the Ukrainian crisis and Russia's behavior in it have only slightly increased support for NATO membership. Less than one-third of Finland's and Sweden's populations support it. Only a few public figures have changed their opinion on NATO membership because of the Ukrainian crisis, but interestingly enough, they are mostly from the former communists and the Greens.

Although there is no visible quantitative trend supporting NATO membership, there is perhaps a qualitative change. Those in favor of NATO membership are convinced more than ever that they have been right. For those who supported NATO membership in the past, the Russian threat had not been the key issue, but rather Finland's willingness to belong to the relevant organizations that can better influence its security environment and allow it to participate in decision-making. After the Ukraine crisis, supporters of NATO membership have advocated their position more intensively and openly. Those supporting military non-alignment need to defend their views more effectively than before. Although a majority of politicians and public opinion oppose joining NATO, the foreign

policy elite consisting of officials, journalists and researchers largely supports such membership.

RUSSIAN RELATIONS

The strategy based on the idea that provoking Russia is dangerous and should be avoided is challenged by various arguments. One is that Russia already perceives Finland and Sweden as strategic adversaries and NATO membership would sharpen this image only slightly. Russia's assertive and sometimes arrogant behavior is seen as proof that it has strategic interests in Finland and Sweden independent of their membership in NATO. Some raise criticisms that Finland and Sweden already bear the political, military and economic costs of NATO membership, but fail to reap the benefits. "We share the risks," Jaakko Iloniemi, a former diplomat and *éminence grise* of Finnish diplomacy, argued at a June 2014 seminar hosted by Finland's president. "But we do not get the security guarantees."

Moreover, it is not clear what provokes Russia because almost any form of military or political cooperation can be deemed provocative. Limiting defense policy options based on what Russia deems acceptable would mean Finland and Sweden would not be able to deepen Nordic defense cooperation, participate in NATO exercises or have national military bases or maneuvers close to Russia's borders.

It is clear that Russia would not like Finland and Sweden to join NATO, but politicians and security experts disagree over what Russia's countermeasures would be. Those more inclined toward NATO membership believe that the measures would be restricted and temporary, and that it would be possible to continue good relations with Russia in the same manner as Norway or Germany. Those in favor of NATO membership think that Russia would, in fact, benefit from having more friendly nations in NATO.

Yet, uncertainty about Russia's reaction should Finland attempt to join NATO plays a role in the debate. Finns do not want to create an image of betrayal that could be held against them. Conversely, Finland does not earn as much visible good will from Russia as it used to. For example, the Russian Foreign Ministry has criticized Finland for human rights violations in a disproportionate manner. President Vladimir Putin's personal envoy, Sergei Markov, said in an interview with Finnish newspaper *Hufvudstadsbladet* in June 2014 that "Finland is one of the most *Russophobic* countries in Europe, together with Sweden and the Baltic states." Moreover, should Russia close Siberian airspace to European airlines, Finnair would be hit hardest. The official Russian position, expressed by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov when he visited Finland in June 2014, is one based on friendly relations. He stated that "our relationship with Finland is important and based on good-neighborliness," and "we don't want political issues to affect such good relations." In his view, the problems stem from Finland's EU membership.

Finally, joining NATO is also a domestic political issue. In Finland, the biggest political party, the Conservatives, or *Kokoomus*, has adopted a pro-NATO stance. Conservative Prime Minister Alexander Stubb and predecessor Jyrki

Katainen have openly favored NATO membership. Yet, in a multiparty system, the government is bound to consist of a coalition of at least two major parties and no other major party — aside from the small Swedish People's Party — supports NATO membership. Moreover, as political security decisions are traditionally based on a broad consensus, in practice, at least three of the four major parties need to back the membership bid. The Centre Party, the Social Democrats and the populist Finns (formerly known as “True Finns”) all prefer nonalignment, which ties the hands of the government, at least for the moment. The coalition agreement six parties made after the last election included a clause precluding the government from preparing an application for NATO membership.

Although President Sauli Niinistö is a conservative, he has not been willing to push NATO membership openly. Indeed, he has been rather cryptic on his views regarding NATO and Finnish membership. “Sitting on the fence” is one of his metaphors. In August 2013, he argued:

“Dissatisfaction with our current NATO policy — consisting of close cooperation with NATO and the potential of applying for membership at some point — often appears in two different ways. Viewing this as sitting on a fence, one way is to think we should be quick about jumping over the fence, while the other is to think we should not have climbed it in the first place — or at least there was no point to it. I happen to think that being on top of the fence is quite a good place to be. Our present position serves our interests well at this point in time, taken overall. We have freedom to take action, we have choices available, and we have room to observe and to operate. We are not pulled one way or the other.”

Traditionally, the role of the Finnish president has been seen as a guarantor of good relations between Finland and Russia, and Niinistö clearly has adopted this role.

THE WAY FORWARD

On the other hand, none of the major parties is categorically against NATO membership and they support the idea of retaining the membership option. In fact, the defense policy

expert of the Finns Party and head of the Parliament's defense committee, Jussi Niinistö (not related to the president), argued in July 2014 that a new defense review of the pros and cons of NATO membership is needed. The president seconded it but wants a broader review of all defense options. It is unclear whether this is an indication of a policy change. When would the other major parties change their opinion about NATO membership? In particular, if Russian behavior is not what drives NATO policy in Finland and Sweden, what is?

One factor is public opinion. As long as the majority of the public is against NATO membership, politicians tend to stick to the existing policy line. Nevertheless, the relationship between public opinion and party positions is a chicken-and-egg question. There is ample evidence that if the government supported NATO membership, public opinion would change. Only one-third of the population supports membership, but only one-third opposes it consistently. The opinion of the remaining one-third is volatile and would change in circumstances where the leadership argued for membership. Leading politicians and parties have circumvented the public opinion issue by stating in speeches that they have “promised” to hold a referendum asking if Finland should join NATO.

Sweden is the other factor that determines whether Finland will apply. Sweden's bid for EU membership was the quintessential catalyst for Finland's own EU application

in 1992. Nevertheless, Finland joined the eurozone without Sweden, which indicates there is no reason Finland could not join NATO even if Sweden remained nonaligned. If, however, Sweden decided to apply for membership, it would be hard for Finland not to follow suit. Finnish and Swedish leaders have constantly stressed that they would prefer to synchronize their policies with regard to their relationship with NATO and try to avoid sudden moves that would surprise the other.

Will the Ukrainian crisis lead to a Finnish or Swedish application for NATO membership and to a northern enlargement of the Alliance? Such a scenario is not impossible, but it is too soon to tell with any certainty. The odds for and against are quite even. But if one should bet, it might be safer to bet on continuity. The security environment in Europe has changed, but psychology remains more entrenched. □



Sweden's Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt, left, meets with Finland's new Prime Minister Alexander Stubb in Stockholm in July 2014 to discuss defense cooperation.



THE BEAR IS BACK

THE CRIMEAN
CAMPAIGN
REPRESENTS A
DISRUPTIVE SHIFT
IN STRATEGY
FOR RUSSIA

By MAJ. CASEY BENEFIELD, U.S. Marine Corps

Russia's annexation of Crimea demonstrated to the world that the country is capable of using 21st century tactics at the operational level to achieve strategic level results.

Through a combination of conventional and unconventional warfare, Russia caught the West off guard and achieved a relatively bloodless strategic victory in Ukraine. These events have left many of the United States' European allies questioning the recent U.S. decision to refocus its overseas military priorities to the Asia-Pacific region, and have left Russia's neighbors greatly concerned about the future intentions of an empowered Russia. The West's response will largely depend upon opinions as to whether Crimea is an isolated event, a special circumstance unique to Ukraine, or the first demonstration of Russia's willingness and ability to successfully operate militarily and geopolitically in the 21st century.

BACKGROUND

In November 2013, then-Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich abandoned an agreement for closer ties with the European Union and instead announced that Ukraine would seek closer ties with Russia. This action sparked a series of intense protests that would eventually lead to the downfall of the Ukrainian government and, on February 22, 2014, the ouster of Yanukovich.¹

These developments were alarming to neighboring Russia, which has historically viewed Ukraine as solidly within its sphere of influence. According to Dmitry Trenin of the Carnegie Moscow Center, concerned that "Ukraine was suddenly turning into a country led by a coalition of pro-Western elites in Kiev and anti-Russian western Ukrainian nationalists," Russian President Vladimir Putin reacted by ordering the execution of a set of apparently preplanned operations that included the occupation of

People in Sevastopol, Crimea, watch a broadcast of Russian President Vladimir Putin's address to the Russian Federal Assembly on March 18, 2014, as he signed a treaty annexing the peninsula to Russia. THE ASSOCIATED PRESS



Propaganda in Sevastopol in March 2014 urges voters to support a referendum to have Crimea join the Russian Federation. The poster reads, "On 16 March We Choose" and suggests the alternative to Russian rule is Nazi rule.

AFP/GETTY IMAGES



the Crimean Peninsula.² Later, on March 18, in his address to Russian lawmakers concerning the annexation of Crimea, Putin detailed the fears that served as impetus for Russia's actions when he stated that the threat of "Ukraine soon joining NATO ... would create not an illusory but a perfectly real threat to the whole of southern Russia."³

Putin decided to use military power in Crimea based largely on an accurate Russian intelligence assessment of Ukraine's woefully low level of military readiness.⁴ However, Russia's response to the Ukraine crisis differed substantially from its past foreign military interventions. Instead of using mass formations of large motorized divisions to overwhelm its adversary — the up-till-then standard Russian military response — it instead "used small numbers of well-trained and well-equipped special forces combined with an effective information campaign and cyber warfare," according to an April 2014 article in *The Moscow Times*.⁵

BATTLESPACE PREPARATION

It is now clear that while the world's attention was focused on the Sochi Olympics, elite units were being discreetly transferred to the Russian naval base in Sevastopol in preparation for operations in Crimea.

While the specific identities of the units involved and their deployment timelines are still being determined, it is widely speculated that, in addition to the 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade, stationed in Crimea with the Black Sea Fleet, elite Airborne Forces (VDV) and various Spetsnaz (special forces) units, along with a number of units from the Southern Military District, were involved in the Crimea operation.⁶

To divert the attention of Ukraine and the West, on February 26, a large-scale snap military exercise was launched in the Western Military District (MD) that borders eastern Ukraine.⁷ Russian officials said that the exercise, reportedly involving approximately 150,000 Russian military personnel, was not in response to the events in Ukraine and they assured the West that Moscow would not interfere in Ukraine.⁸ As would be clear in a matter of days, these statements were all diversionary tactics to deceive the West and prevent it from effectively responding.

Notably absent from this large-scale military exercise were any units from the Southern MD, which also borders Ukraine and is well-placed geographically to be the staging area for any operation in Crimea. In addition to its strategic location, the Southern MD, in part because the Sochi

Olympics had recently been held there, had the highest levels of military readiness in Russia. Despite this, it was “business as usual” in the Southern MD, according to open-source reports.⁹

It became apparent that while the West was focused on the military exercises being conducted in the Western MD, amid concern that these exercises could be the beginning of a large-scale Russian intervention in Ukraine, small highly skilled military units from the Southern MD were already operating in the Crimea.

THE OCCUPATION OF CRIMEA

On February 27, the day after military exercises started in the Western MD, reports surfaced that unidentified “masked men” had seized government buildings in Simferopol, Crimea’s capital.¹⁰ These men were armed with the latest military equipment, wore unmarked military uniforms and appeared to be highly trained and disciplined.¹¹ Dubbed “local self-defense forces” by the Russians, these units quickly fanned out over the Crimean Peninsula and seized government buildings and airfields, surrounded Ukrainian military bases and secured the key ground lines of communication between Crimea and the rest of Ukraine.¹²

With surprising speed and professionalism, the Crimean Peninsula was occupied in a matter of days without loss of life. By March 1, the Ukrainian military within Crimea had effectively been neutralized, with all Ukrainian bases either occupied or surrounded by the so-called local self-defense forces.¹³ Additionally, on March 5, the Russian military blocked the navigable channel into and out of the main Ukrainian naval base in Crimea by scuttling at least one Russian ship, effectively blockading the Ukrainian Navy.¹⁴ Throughout this period, the Ukrainian military was either unwilling or unable to respond to the rapidly developing situation and remained inside its barracks, offering no armed response to the occupation.

Crimea’s parliament voted on March 6 to join Russia (an action declared illegal by the Ukrainian government in Kiev). By March 18, Crimea had held a referendum on secession, the results of which reflected overwhelming support for secession, and had been annexed by Russia.¹⁵ On March 19, Ukraine began issuing orders to evacuate its military personnel and their families from Crimea, having lost all control of the peninsula.¹⁶

INFORMATION WARFARE

In addition to military maneuvering, Russia strongly leveraged information warfare to further destabilize Ukraine, strengthen pro-Russian feelings in Crimea and attempt to create a basis of legitimacy for its actions in both world and domestic opinion. Through the use of overt channels (secret services, diplomacy and the media), Russia used multidirectional and complex measures to control the storyline of the Ukraine crisis.¹⁷ In fact, it can be argued that in Putin’s version of 21st century warfare, as evidenced in Crimea, information warfare is as important to achieving the objective as the actual maneuvering of military forces.

Throughout the operation, Russian authorities, including Putin, explicitly denied any involvement by Russian military forces and pushed the storyline that this was a grass-roots uprising of the people in Crimea against the “fascist” government in Kiev.¹⁸ These lies were repeated daily, even after it was clear that Russian-speaking troops wearing unmarked Russian military style uniforms and driving Russian military vehicles

with Russian military license plates were in Crimea.¹⁹ However, by maintaining even this shred of deniability, Putin provided an excuse for Western political and business leaders to avoid imposing sanctions or taking other meaningful action against Russia.²⁰

Continuing the campaign of information warfare employed throughout the Crimea operation, Putin suggested in his address to Russian lawmakers that the treaty between Russia and Ukraine concerning the status of Russian naval bases in Crimea was a legal basis, both at home and internationally, for Russia’s actions in Crimea:

“Secondly, and most importantly — what exactly are we violating? True, the President of the Russian Federation received permission from the Upper House of Parliament to use the Armed Forces in Ukraine. However, strictly speaking, nobody has acted on this permission yet. Russia’s Armed Forces never entered Crimea; they were there already in line with an international agreement.”²¹

By referencing this treaty, even out of context, Putin provided justification for the lies Russian authorities told during the Crimea operation concerning military force. This spin fits within the storyline Russia promoted, in that the annexation of Crimea was not a foreign military intervention or a violation of state sovereignty, but rather the democratic process of self-determination backed

It is clear that Russia maintains an elite force of highly trained, professional and very capable special forces units that can be wielded to great effect on the battlefields of the 21st century.

by international law and legal precedent. Putin further accentuated this point in his address:

“They keep talking of some Russian intervention in Crimea, some sort of aggression. This is strange to hear. I cannot recall a single case in the history of an intervention without a single shot being fired and with no human casualties.”²²

Having successfully manipulated the facts to support his objective, Putin went on to use this same address to “close the deal” by requesting that Russian lawmakers officially annex Crimea.



Ukrainian soldiers at a military base outside Simferopol, Crimea, peer through a gate at Russian soldiers in March 2014. Armed Russian troops in uniforms without insignia surrounded Ukrainian military installations throughout Crimea.

AFP/GETTY IMAGES

Russia also relied heavily on propaganda to sway public opinion and further sow discord in an already fractured Ukraine. One example was the continued belief among many in the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine that the use of the Russian language had been banned.²³ The Russian propaganda machine propagated the lie through manipulation and omission of facts. It is true that Ukraine’s post-Maidan parliament voted to repeal the 2012 law permitting more than one official language; however, Ukraine’s acting president, Oleksandr Turchynov, refused to sign the bill until “a new bill to protect all languages is passed.”²⁴ Russia’s propaganda machine exploited the passing of a bill that would have effectively banned the Russian language for official purposes, while conveniently ignoring that it was never signed into law and that the Russian language was never “banned.” Other inflammatory propaganda statements included: “Banderovtsy could storm into Crimea;” “the Black Sea Fleet bases could be taken over by NATO” and “Ukrainian citizens could be de-Russified.”²⁵

Propaganda was also heavily leveraged in Crimea

during the run up to the secession referendum. Through fear-mongering, manipulation of the truth and false accusations, Russia and pro-Russian politicians in Crimea attempted to frame the referendum as a choice between joining Russia on the one hand and yielding to fascism on the other.²⁶ One such advertisement, whose author is unknown, depicted this choice succinctly through two pictures of Crimea, one superimposed with a Nazi flag, the other superimposed with a Russian flag. Above the two images, written in Russian, were the words, “On 16 March We Choose.”²⁷ While not subtle, this was but one example of messaging designed to build support among the populace for the Russian occupation and annexation of Crimea.

Finally, the referendum results and ensuing annexation were themselves critical components of Russia’s information campaign in Crimea. The referendum results, widely viewed in the West as having been achieved through fraud and/or intimidation, indicated that well over 90 percent of Crimean voters supported joining Russia.^{28,29} These results, as corrupted as they might be, were used by Putin to help legitimize Russia’s actions in Crimea during his March 18 address to Russian lawmakers:

“A referendum was held in Crimea on March 16 in full compliance with democratic procedures and international norms. More than 82 percent of the electorate took part in the vote. Over 96 percent of them spoke out in favor of reuniting with Russia. These numbers speak for themselves.”³⁰

By masking Russia’s annexation of Crimea behind a democratic facade, Putin was able to delegitimize internal and international criticism of Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty.

CRIMEA: FIRST OR LAST VICTIM?

One of the most important questions is whether Crimea is an isolated event or the first demonstration of Russia’s new capability to successfully operate militarily and geopolitically in the 21st century. In other words, can or will another Crimea-like event happen? To answer this question, one must first take into account the special circumstances in Crimea that enabled Russia to succeed. Russian political and security policy expert Dr. Mikhail Tsytkin identifies eight enabling factors that contributed to Russia’s success in Crimea:

1. A pre-existing network of pro-Russian political activists were active in Crimea and eastern Ukraine.
2. Russian special forces are culturally identical to the local population of Crimea.
3. Ukrainian security forces were demoralized, corrupt and disloyal to the Ukrainian central government.
4. The massive propaganda campaign in the media

appealed to the target audience in Crimea.

5. This target audience was incensed by the existing socio-economic situation.
6. An unusually inept central government held power in Kiev.
7. Ukraine lacked a well-established national identity shared by the whole country.
8. Geopolitically, Ukraine is more important to Russia than it is to the U.S. and major European powers.³¹

In addition to Dr. Tsyppkin's eight factors, it was also critical that there were Russian military bases in Crimea capable of providing cover and staging areas for invading Russian forces. Tsyppkin says that these factors suggest that a Crimea-type operation could be successfully conducted only in "post-Soviet territories with substantial Russian language diasporas,"³² in which the circumstances are similar to those that existed in Crimea at the time of the Russian annexation.

Crimea may indeed be a special case where many factors shaped an environment that was uniquely permissive to Russian operations. Nonetheless, it should serve as a warning shot to the world, particularly Russia's neighbors, of Russia's capabilities and potential for future actions. Specifically, any state that hosts Russian military forces or is home to a sizable Russian diaspora must now factor the possibility of a Russian intervention into its strategic calculus.

CONCLUSION

Russian actions in Crimea clearly demonstrate that not only does Russia have the will to use military force to redraw international borders in Europe, but, more alarmingly, it has the capability as well. It is clear that Russia maintains an elite force of highly trained, professional and very capable special forces units that can be wielded to great effect on the battlefields of the 21st century. Combined with an effective usage of information warfare, this provides Russia with the means to enforce its will upon other states within the geopolitical context of the 21st century.

It is too early to question the wisdom of the recent U.S. policy decision to "pivot" strategically to the Asia-Pacific region; however, if a newly emboldened Russia continues to pursue policy objectives with military force, this could quickly alter the calculus of European stability. The U.S. and President Barack Obama appear to understand this, with the announcement in June 2014 of an additional \$1 billion in spending to bolster the U.S. military presence in Europe and reassure nervous allies of U.S. commitment to the region.³³ Only time will tell if this commitment is enough. □

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The
Kazakh,
View



Russian Support of Ukrainian Insurgency is Rational by Moscow's Standards

By Svetlana Kozhirova, senior researcher, Center for Military-Strategic Research, Kazakhstan Ministry of Defense

The events that took place in Ukraine, after the declaration in November 2013 that the Ukrainian leadership would not utilize the Eastern Partnership agreement with the European Union, clearly illustrate the growing importance and influence of irregular armed groups. The concept of “irregular armed groups” is not new by any means, but the idea of using this concept to explain current geopolitical trends is novel.

The West unequivocally condemned Russian interference in the Ukrainian crisis. One thing is clear: The smaller the geographical distance between your state and a state experiencing civil war, the less opportunity you have to make strategic choices. Conversely, the greater the distance separating you and insurgents demanding your assistance, the easier it will be for you to decline.

The situation is even more complicated in cases when deciding whether to support irredentists — i.e., citizens of another country who are ethnically close to your own countrymen. Refusing to provide support in such a case will inevitably lead to internal political destabilization and can even delegitimize the state authorities. For example, let us try a thought experiment: Could the Kremlin and President Vladimir Putin himself refuse to support Russians in Crimea?

Rural landscape
in Crimean
mountains

VEER

Theoretically, yes, but in practice, no. In my opinion, the choice made was not strategic as much as situational. Without a doubt, Putin

took into consideration the geopolitical and economic costs of the annexation of Crimea. However, he was also fully aware that Russia's leadership would face even greater costs by distancing itself from the Ukrainian crisis and foregoing Crimea. All this falls neatly in line with rational-choice theory.

Can Russia and Putin personally refuse to provide support to insurgents in so-called Novorossiia, turning away from them completely? Again, theoretically, yes, but in practice, no. We see that even if Russian military vehicles and more groups of well-trained insurgents infiltrated Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts from the Russian side of the border, many Russians and even citizens of the Commonwealth of Independent States (especially those in the Collective Security Treaty Organization, or CSTO) would accuse Putin of “betraying” Russians, of jettisoning Novorossiia, of spinelessness, indecision and even political cowardice.

The Russian term “povstanets,” like the English equivalent “insurgent,” is a highly ambiguous term: Each user imbues it with his own meaning and definition. For example, the authorities of any given state can consider insurrectionists, terrorists, separatists, religious extremists, etc., to all fall under this label — as individuals who operate outside the law and conduct an armed struggle with a legitimate government. Foreign governments that support these same “insurgents,” however, emphasize their just struggle against the illegitimate and “cruel” dictatorial authorities.

Certainly, states (or rather, ruling elites)



Ukrainian soldiers sit on an armored vehicle near Kramatorsk in September 2014 during the conflict with pro-Russian separatists. EPA

on the territories on which such insurgents are active find themselves faced with a strategic dilemma when it comes to receiving assistance from abroad. However, we should not exclusively think in terms of conceptual constructs or generalizations that are distant from concrete reality.

We know, for example, that states such as Iraq and Afghanistan need foreign support on a daily basis if they are to fight insurgents successfully. Despite some degree of progress achieved through U.S. military interventions, these states continue to be politically unstable. They are threatened not only by insurgents and separatism, as well as interethnic and sectarian conflicts, but also by poor development of democratic institutions and weak militaries and intelligence services, all against a backdrop of universal corruption. If the truth be told, they are failed states.

Can Iraq and Afghanistan afford to decline help from abroad? Of course not. In any case, their current governments cannot stay in power without foreign military and financial assistance. For example, the current authorities in Afghanistan, given a complete withdrawal of U.S. and NATO troops, risk a repetition of the fate of Mohammad Najibullah

and his government, who were replaced by the Taliban in 1992.

Therefore, the states named above have almost no choice but to request help. Of course, they not only need support, they are demanding it. Foreign support is keeping them afloat, making it possible to maintain the apparatus of power, support an army, pay wages, promote welfare and hold off socio-economic problems. At the same time, if a country like Afghanistan receives foreign support, it has to settle for being seen as a puppet state, bound by the far-reaching entanglements of foreign powers. Foreign aid (especially financial aid) often catalyzes the spread of corruption, while donated weaponry eventually could end up in the hands of the insurgents. Certain clans and regions are visibly dissatisfied by what they see as an unjust distribution of foreign aid. So any foreign support is a double-edged sword. Can the current leaders of Ukraine decline foreign aid? Of course not. Turning down Western aid in the current crisis would be suicidal.

Kiev's international currency reserves are vanishing at an astonishing rate (the current total is just \$17 billion. The load on the state budget is also



EPA

Russian-backed separatists in Ukraine, including people hoisting communist flags, take part in a rally in Donetsk in September 2014.



EPA

Ukrainian Army soldiers arrive in Mariupol, Ukraine, in September 2014 to combat pro-Russian separatists.

growing, as the “Anti-Terrorism Operation” in the southeast is costing \$2 million to \$7 million daily. The national currency is losing value as I write. Debts to Russia for past shipments of natural gas are continuing to grow. Industrial production is falling, largely due to the war. Without a doubt, Ukraine cannot resolve its financial and economic problems alone.

It should be recognized that, left to fight Russia one on one, Ukraine can bid farewell to any chance of existing as a sovereign state. The war in the southeast has seen some sporadic successes for Kiev, but the troops are badly equipped, insufficiently armed and struggle to maintain supply lines for food and other basics.

Kiev simply cannot survive without significant political, financial, economic and military assistance from the United States, the EU and NATO members (at least including experts, instructors, as well as supplies of nonlethal equipment and military ammunition). In addition, Ukraine has an acute need for support from the West under the aegis of the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and other international organizations. More than this, Ukraine is not ready for serious negotiations with Russia without the involvement of Western partners.


The flipside of the situation is equally self-evident — for many Ukrainians, the authorities in Kiev lack legitimacy and autonomy. Many in the country (and elsewhere, especially in Russia and Kazakhstan), are convinced that President Petro Poroshenko and Prime Minister Arseniy Yatseniuk are not independent political figures, but are beholden to Brussels and Washington. It is often said that if there is to be

a solution to the crisis, it will be forged by global players behind the back of Ukraine.

But is the West ready to assume full responsibility for today’s Ukraine? Is it ready to support the Ukrainian economy, which is desperate not only for foreign investment and technology, but also new commercial markets? Is the West ready to foot the bill for Ukraine’s energy security, when Yatseniuk threatens to cut off Russian gas flowing through the country to serve the EU? Is the West ready to finance the Ukrainian budget? These are all important questions.

Moreover, Ukraine could end up as just one more failed state, unable to exist without massive external support. In its current state, it cannot be a full-fledged member of the EU and will not be much closer to membership five years from now. After losing its clients in Russia, Ukraine may fail to find any substitute market in the West. More than this, there is a risk that Western aid may not ever be used to modernize and diversify the Ukrainian economy, but instead be swallowed up simply supporting the balance of payments. As in Iraq and Afghanistan, foreign aid could also fuel corruption.

The expert community in Russia, the Eurasian Economic Union and the CSTO broadly agree that the goal of the West is not for Ukraine to be integrated into Europe, but merely to prevent the country’s Eurasian integration. Many experts believe that the West is still working from Zbigniew Brzezinski’s assumption that a new Russian empire (whatever name it may have) will be incomplete, and even unsustainable, without Ukraine. The question remains whether Ukraine itself can be viable once separated from Russia. □



ORGANIZED CRIME *in Russia*

Administrative and political corruption have encouraged the spread of criminality

BY ALEXANDER SUKHARENKO, DIRECTOR OF THE CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF NEW CHALLENGES AND THREATS TO RUSSIAN FEDERATION NATIONAL SECURITY, VLADIVOSTOK

Despite the reprioritization of activities by law enforcement agencies and a new focus on countering terrorism and extremism, the problem of organized crime has not become any less urgent. It is no coincidence that the authors of the Russian Federation's (RF) Public Security Concept, approved by the RF president in November 2013, chose to include various aspects of organized crime in their list of key threats to public security.¹

As of January 2014, more than 250 organized crime groups were active in Russia, representing more than 11,000 members.² The most dangerous ones include corrupt civil servants and business people because of their impact on social, economic and criminal situations in Russia. These groups' criminal activities cover a broad spectrum, from contract killings and kidnappings of businessmen to the illicit drug trade and economic crimes. The most common financial crimes include fraud, smuggling of strategic commodities and resources, fraudulent bankruptcies and illegal takeovers, production of counterfeit coins and goods, and money laundering and illegal banking. Finance and credit remain the most highly criminalized spheres, including the consumer market, real estate, foreign trade, and the timber, fuel and energy fields.³

Geographically, traditional epicenters, measured by the number of crimes per 100,000 residents, are found in the North Caucasus, Central, Siberian and Urals federal districts. Statistics reveal a steady decline in the detection of

organized crime. Between 2008 and 2013, the number of recorded crimes committed by organized criminal groups fell by two-thirds — from about 30,700 to 9,100 — while economic crimes dropped to one-fifth — from about 18,300 to 3,500. The relative share of organized crime went from 0.9 percent to 0.4 percent.⁴ The low success rate is attributed to the elimination of the RF Ministry of Internal Affairs operating units, the liberalization of criminal legislation, the permanent reform of the police and an increased workload on law enforcement officers resulting in a less aggressive posture, and a reduced awareness of crimes being planned and committed. These are driven by citizens' lack of desire to cooperate with law enforcement agencies because of mistrust and the absence of the guarantee of personal safety. Suffice it to say that between 2009 and 2013, about 12,000 people involved in the criminal justice process were afforded state protection. Of these, only 7,800 were victims or witnesses. Over 1,000 charges⁵ were filed against people accused of threats against them.

A quantitative analysis of organized crime must take into account its high degree of latency. Recent events in Kushevskaya (Krasnodar Krai), Gus-Khrustalny (Vladimir Oblast), and Sagra and Berezovsk (Sverdlovsk Oblast) offer convincing evidence to support this thesis. For a long time, the authorities in these areas failed to react to local organized crime group activities, thus making life easy for them.





Ibragim Makhmudov, center background, and Rustam Makhmudov, right, accused of murdering journalist and human rights activist Anna Politkovskaya, attend their second trial in Moscow in January 2014. Politkovskaya was gunned down in her Moscow apartment building in October 2006. EPA

CRIMINALIZATION OF REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS

The achievement of financial and economic influence prompts organized crime leaders to consider manipulating the levers of political power. Of ever greater concern are their unceasing attempts to infiltrate bodies of authority. The Russian Interior Ministry has provided information about election campaigns in which 23 candidates were found to be linked to organized crime. In the case of another 423 people, information indicated their participation in criminal acts.⁶

After the pan-Russian voting day on September 8, 2013, the RF Central Elections Commission (TsIK) reported that during 2009-2012, the total number of candidates for elected positions and deputy mandates with a record of criminal convictions increased by a factor of 3.5, from 132 to 469; those convicted of serious and extremely serious crimes grew by a factor of 8.8, from 22 to 194. Despite the institution of an anti-criminal filter, 227 candidates with criminal records — 150 of them serious and extremely serious offenses — took part in 2013 election campaigns.⁷

To infiltrate government structures, leaders of organized crime groups change their personal data, party membership and personal addresses, delete data on past convictions from regional police databases or promote apparently law-abiding and respectable individuals from their close circles. During campaigns, they actively support the implementation of party programs and engage in charitable activities that include repairing roads and apartment building entrances, building children's playgrounds and participating in public cultural events. Observers note numerous cases where alcohol and other gifts were given to voters under the guise of national holidays or sales promotions and wage debts settled with funds from affiliated companies.

Individuals representing organized crime groups in the political process are driven by a number of factors:

- the intention to benefit from legal immunity that is extended to certain elected positions as protection from possible criminal prosecution.
- eagerness to obtain privileges and access to government

funds and to reinforce business contacts for more effective lobbying.

- psychological factors such as personal ambition and vanity.

Marginalization of public consciousness, legal nihilism and political passivity on the part of citizens are the main causes facilitating criminalization of government. According to a survey by the state-funded polling agency VTsIOM, 1 in 3 Russians would vote for a candidate with a past conviction, arguing that a candidate's political program is more important than his past. Additionally, approximately 40 percent of men and young people would support the candidate they liked, regardless of past convictions, and the same question elicited 30 percent support from women and the elderly.⁸

The evident level of corruption among leaders of political party regional chapters, which include representatives of organized crime groups, is a further cause for concern. According to the RF TsIK, in 2013 the party with the most convictions was Spravedlivaya Rossiya, containing 16 candidates with past convictions. The odious LDPR proffered 13 such candidates, while Patrioty Rossii, the RF communist party and Yabloko supported seven, six and five such candidates, respectively. The "cleanest" was the pro-Kremlin Edinaya Rossiya, with just three criminal candidates. It should be noted that the 2013 election campaign featured increased political competition, with 25 recently registered political parties permitted to compete for deputy seats. However, their lists still totaled 60 candidates with criminal records. An additional six independent candidates with past convictions ran, but their offenses had mostly been against property and public security.⁹

The situation has not changed in 2014. According to V. Churov, head of the Russian Federation Central Election Committee, some 320 people with past convictions were planning to run in regional and municipal elections. During the first phase of vetting at the regional level, 240 people had submitted unreliable information about their convictions or had not submitted any information at all. They were registered from 28 parties. In particular, 30 people were running from LDPR, 29 from Spravedlivaya Rossiya [A Just Russia], 27 from the Rodina [Homeland] party, 19 from the Communists of Russia party, 16 from the KPRF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation] and seven from United Russia. As a result, 60 candidates were recalled by their parties. In municipal elections, 88 candidates from 12 parties failed to report past convictions. In terms of numbers, the leaders were KPRF—12, United Russia—11, A Just Russia—seven, Yabloko—six, Pensioners for Justice party—four. In some regions, dozens of candidates with previous convictions were identified: 45 in the Altai Republic, 32 in Bryansk Oblast, 25 in the Kabardino-Balkar Republic, 23 in the Republic of Crimea, and 21 in the Karachay-Cherkess Republic.¹⁰

ECONOMIC OFFENSES

In recent years, on multiple occasions, criminal charges have been brought against Russian deputies and elected officials for racketeering. Such charges have targeted not only members of organized crime groups, but also previously law-abiding citizens. A large proportion of the accused, or convicted, officials were



“The achievement of financial and economic influence prompts organized crime leaders to consider manipulating the levers of political power. Of ever greater concern are their unceasing attempts to infiltrate bodies of authority.”

engaged in business prior to their election.

In September 2010, A. Yaravoy, a deputy of the Gus-Khrustalny City Council and a member of the Vosmyorochnye organized crime group, was sentenced to three years in prison for falsifying documents and attempting large-scale fraud causing pecuniary injury.¹¹

In January 2011, G. Lysak, a deputy of the Primorsk Krai Legislative Assembly sought on charges of organizing a criminal association, smuggling and money laundering, withdrew from his mandate. According to investigators, between 2002 and 2007, the organized crime group he headed illegally introduced Chinese-made goods worth more than 2.3 billion rubles into Russia. A significant portion of these goods were sold at Moscow's Cherkizovsky Market.¹²

In March 2013, a criminal investigation into A. Peunkov, a former deputy of the Arkhangelsk Oblast Assembly, was closed. The investigation revealed that between 2009 and 2013, members of the criminal group he ran attempted to monopolize the mortar sand market by forcing entrepreneurs to secure contracts only through companies under their control. The case documents list 19 victims.¹³ In addition, Peunkov is accused of two murders and three attempted murders, which were conducted by the organized group in a manner detrimental to public safety. The motive was to gain greater influence in the timber cutting industry.¹⁴



Yevgenia Vasilyeva, center, former head of the Russian Defense Ministry's property management administration, attends her court hearing at the Presnensky District Court in Moscow in July 2014. The former aide to former Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov is accused of embezzlement of state property and funds with damage exceeding 3 billion rubles (about \$90 million). EPA

Also in March 2013, A. Mastinin, a deputy of the Altai Krai Legislative Assembly, was arrested on suspicion of embezzling more than 12 million rubles from residents of apartment buildings via his management company for the payment of utilities. He remains a wanted man.¹⁵

In May 2013, A. Kufae, another deputy of the Altai Krai Legislative Assembly who was found guilty of large-scale insurance fraud and money laundering as part of an organized crime group, was sentenced to four years in prison. Total funds stolen from federal and local coffers exceeded 500 million rubles. His sentence was later suspended.¹⁶

In June 2013, O. Tyugaev, a deputy of the Penza City Duma accused of large-scale fraud, was detained in Italy. According to investigators he had organized a group to illegally collect

value-added taxes for fictitious transactions. The total loss is estimated at more than 67 million rubles.¹⁷

January 2014 saw the arrest of M. Magomedov, a deputy of the People's Assembly of Dagestan who was suspected of organizing a criminal association to gain control of property and funds of the clients of the now bankrupt Vitas-Bank. In total, 20 criminal incidents were identified. He is also suspected, together with his close relative and deputy of Kazbekov District, S. Abakarov, of extorting more than 24 million rubles from a local businessman, supposedly to cover interest on a loan issued previously.¹⁸

In March 2014, criminal charges were brought against A. Gasanov, a deputy of Levashinsky District, Dagestan. He was suspected of organizing an interregional crime group whose members engaged in illegal banking. In just seven years, the group laundered approximately 100 billion rubles. The investigation suggests that money was first transferred to shell companies in Dagestan before it was withdrawn as cash and delivered to clients by couriers.¹⁹

A PRECEDENT

In February, in Velikiy Novgorod, a criminal investigation was completed involving First Deputy Oblast Gov. A. Shalmuev. He was accused of organized large-scale fraud, abuse of office and coercion to enter into transactions. In June 2012, the private firm ZAO Trest Zelenogo Khozyaistva won a tender, following which the state-owned firm Novgorodavtodor entered into a contract worth 357 million rubles with the company to repair roads in the district. However, Novgorodavtodor's director and the deputy governor responsible for roads explained that he won the job as a result of a misunderstanding, and a different enterprise, Veche, should have been declared the winner. The director of the ZAO understood that if he did not decline this government contract, he would not only lose the right to participate in similar future tenders, but he would also incur serious difficulties regarding financing and acceptance of completed work. The influential criminal figure, A. Petrov, aka Beefsteak, forced the director to decline this profitable contract. Eventually, Novgorod civil servants signed an alternative contract with Veche, and the ZAO director lodged a complaint with the police.

The investigation established that Veche hired 12 subcontractors, who gave kickbacks to the head of Novgorodavtodor worth 10 percent of the sum of each signed contract. The deputy governor's assistant likewise earned a percentage and the deputy governor also was allocated 300,000 rubles per month. The total sum of losses incurred by the state is estimated to be more than 22 million rubles.²⁰

It is noteworthy that despite the presence of compromising information, A. Petrov managed to build a successful political career; first as member of the political council of the Borovich chapter of the Edinaya Rossiya party, then as a deputy in the district дума. This indicates that certain strata of the regional elite have a vested interest in introducing such persons into criminal/corruption schemes to better manage jurisdictions they control. In other words, a corporate-style merger of politics and crime is taking place. Bureaucrats yield administrative powers and see their office as an asset for generating income, and their activities in office as a form of business, with protection being provided by affiliated criminal groups.

VIOLENCE AND PROFIT

In May 2012, Kushevsky District Court issued a fine of 150,000 rubles to former municipal Deputy S. Tsepoviyaz, found guilty of concealing 12 murders, including the killings of four children, committed in November 2010 by the Tsapkovskiye gang. In November 2013, the leader of the gang, former deputy S. Tsapok, was sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of 700,000 rubles. The court established that, apart from other violent crimes, the members of his gang, active in Kushevskaya between 1998 and 2010, committed 19 murders.²¹

In December 2012, Kurgansk city court sentenced former oblast Deputy M. Gurko to five years in prison after he was found guilty of organizing two crimes by the Lokomotiv organized crime group. This included an incident in 2004, when he ordered an attack on the election campaign headquarters of candidate for governor of Kurgan Oblast E. Sobakin. To intimidate supporters, a member of the crime group threw a live grenade through a window, striking one of the employees. Subsequently, the headquarters was closed. As payment, the deputy gave \$600 to the leader of the crime group, D. Popov.²² Gurko's accomplices were sentenced in November 2011 to prison terms ranging from eight to 24 years.

In April 2013, S. Zirinov, former deputy of the Krasnodar Krai legislative assembly, was arrested on suspicion of organizing a murder attempt on Anapka Cossack Ataman N. Nesterenko, in which Nesterenko was wounded and his driver killed. Investigators believe the attempt was prompted by a conflict between the Cossacks and the deputy's close associates regarding development of the Anapka River basin.²³

In the same month, former deputy of Bryansk City Council and leader of the Saransky organized crime group, V. Kiriyyenko, was sentenced to 8 1/2 years for organizing an attempt on the life of Deputy Gov. A. Kasatsky. A conflict arose between the two, in 2008, and Kiriyyenko, to protect his business, gave the order to kill Kasatsky, who narrowly survived.²⁴

In June 2013, A. Fedorchenko, deputy of the Troitsky City Assembly, was arrested on charges of large-scale fraud. According to the investigation, he headed an organized group that had committed murder, serious bodily harm and extortion.²⁵

In October 2013, V. Ardab'evskiy, the city manager of Miass, was arrested for the murder of two businessmen and racketeering. The investigation suggested that the goal was to eliminate competitors by enlisting the leader of the Turbazovskiy gang.²⁶

Lastly, in June 2014, the Zabaikal Krai prosecutor's office referred to court a criminal case involving Yu. Shkretov, a deputy of the legislative assembly accused of homicide as part of the organized crime group Osinovkiye. According to the investigation, as an entrepreneur in 2003, he took part in the killing of crime boss V. Sviridov, aka Svirid.²⁷ It bears noting that prior to this, Shkretov repeatedly declared his wish to run for governor of the Transbaikal Region.

COUNTERMEASURES

Federal law states that deputies and elected officials must fight corruption, or they can be removed from their positions.

To counter further criminalization of government bodies, Federal Law No. 19-FZ of 21/02/2014 was passed,²⁸ restricting

eligibility for public office for citizens with criminal backgrounds or outstanding convictions for serious or extremely serious crimes. According to the law, citizens convicted and sentenced for committing serious crimes cannot run for office for state and local government bodies within 10 years from the date of cancellation or clearance of a conviction. For extremely serious crimes, the limit is 15 years. If under a new criminal law, the act for which a citizen was convicted is no longer recognized as a serious or extremely serious, the person is eligible from the date such law passed. Concurrently, election documents must disclose information about all past convictions.

The character and decisions of elected officials directly impact the rights and freedoms of citizens in Russia. If they have criminal connections, this impacts the objective execution of their duties and can injure the legitimate interests of citizens and organizations. Consequently, we deem it necessary to correct omissions and factors conducive to corruption that currently exist in anticorruption legislation and to activate the work of state security agencies to disband existing criminal groups associated with interregional and international corruption. □

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Redefining NATO

Recent events in Eastern Europe have forced members to rethink defense priorities

By Dr. Teodora Crina Popescu, International Defense Cooperation Directorate, Romanian Ministry of Defense



LANCE CPL. SAMANTHA A. BARAJAS/U.S. MARINE CORPS



ATO's three core tasks: collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security contribute to safeguarding the security of Alliance members. Acknowledging that security developments beyond the Euro-Atlantic area could negatively

affect the Alliance — and to ensure the freedom and security of its member states — NATO has partnered with countries and international organizations to contribute to the enhancement of the international security environment.

Although a strategic partner for NATO¹ and a privileged partner of the European Union, Russia has adopted a defiant stance toward the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe's enshrined principles. At the same time, it is asserting its power through projects that emulate Western models in a bid to compete with them, such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization versus NATO and the Eurasian Union versus the EU.

Following the latest developments in Ukraine, NATO allies and EU member states have started to acknowledge that security in their proximity should not be taken for granted, and the principles and norms that govern international relations could be breached with no fear of retaliation.

At the end of the Cold War, cooperation and active engagement between former adversaries were considered the game changer that heralded an era that was supposed to diffuse conflicts, bring lasting peace

and consolidate trust. But after 25 years, this model showed its limitations as geopolitics in Europe started to matter again.

Russia's current behavior is the new game changer as it affects the Euro-Atlantic structure, order and security, and signals a return to the use of military force in foreign policy and a renewed competition in military technology.

Russian assertiveness

The annexation of Crimea sent for a second time — after the lesson learned from the Russian-Georgian crisis in 2008 — a strong message to the region about Russia's resurgence and assertiveness

in pursuit of achieving its national interests in the “near abroad” (when its own security is at stake) by using two intertwined means: redrawing borders and using hard military force.

Russia is asserting its *droit de regard* not only over the Russian-speaking communities, but also over its former historical territory. It is a sort of compatriot policy outlined in Russia's National Security Strategy to 2020 and its consequent 2010 Military Doctrine that calls for the political, economic and potentially, military protection of the rights and interests of Russian citizens and ethnic Russians living abroad.

For the past 20 years, Russia, following an incremental approach, established a foothold in several former Soviet states, creating a security belt (*cordon sanitaire*) with strategic military bases and heavy Russian military presence² (e.g., Kaliningrad, Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Crimea). Furthermore, in fostering protracted conflicts around the Black Sea, Russia tries to project, protect and consolidate its influence and control over its near abroad and increase its authority at the regional level.

Russia has consistently signaled a qualitative change of its pattern of behavior, reflected in an increased defense budget, rising military expenditures dedicated to modernization and acquisitions of strategic weapons, and the unilateral withdrawal³ from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in 2007. This behavior is also reflected in the unprecedented frequency and amplitude of military exercises — some conducted with clear anti-NATO member state scenarios⁴ — and the alleged breach⁵ of a landmark arms control agreement through the testing of a new cruise missile. Unfortunately, the Alliance did not always correctly perceive or interpret Russia's intentions.

Russia's plans to countervail NATO's and the EU's actions in its near abroad, to aggressively promote its own integrative projects (using diplomatic, political and economic levers) and to consolidate its influence in the region, revived the danger of defreezing a series of conflicts around the wider Black Sea area and the propagation of secessionist phenomenon. Its opting for old-fashioned nationalism and the use of military force over political negotiations, cooperation and respect for borders that have governed East-West relations could lead to disruptive regional and ethnic conflicts.

Russia's actions have strategic, cumulative and long-term effects and consume a significant share of attention on the Allied agenda, especially NATO's Summit in Wales in the autumn of 2014. The changes generated to the geostrategic coordinates of the

Bulgarian soldiers demonstrate room-clearing techniques in July 2014 as part of Platinum Lion 14-1, a multinational exercise in Novo Selo, Bulgaria, that also included troops from the U.S., Romania, Azerbaijan and the United Kingdom.

Euro-Atlantic region, corroborated by the fact that NATO is identified in Russia's 2010 Military Doctrine as a danger⁶ (a ranking below that of "threat") would definitely have an impact on how the Alliance will re-define itself.

Rebalancing NATO's strategic interests

NATO is an effective political-military organization that fulfills, as stated above, three essential core tasks: collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security. For the past 25 years, NATO successfully focused on the last two tasks to stop conflicts when they had the potential to affect the Alliance's security and to engage through partnership with relevant countries and international organizations to contribute to international security. As stated in the last NATO Strategic Concept, "Active Engagement, Modern Defense," adopted in Lisbon in 2010: "Today, the Euro-Atlantic area is at peace and the threat of a conventional attack against NATO territory is low."

Although this might still be valid, the Russian game changer compelled NATO's Eastern European member states to voice legitimate concerns based on fears and lingering stereotypes embedded in Cold War experiences.

Therefore, NATO should re-evaluate its interests, shift its focus from decades of involvement in out-of-area operations to collective defense, remain operational and be prepared for the worst-case scenario. Moreover, NATO should assume and be able to operate beyond its post-International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) milestone in a post-Crimea security environment where the specter of conventional war, alongside asymmetric threats, is revived.

In this context, the NATO Summit in Wales was a litmus test in which collective defense interests prevailed against individual national interests (spurred by economic dependence or military contracts), sending a strong signal about the solidity and solidarity of the Alliance and the indivisibility of its security.


What should be done?

Changes in the European security environment should inspire NATO to take a series of actions. First, NATO should offer its members short-term, as well as long-term, credible and visible reassurance and deterrence measures. For the European members, especially for Central and Eastern European countries, the flexible response doctrine and the deployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons are of utmost importance.⁷

The current changes in the Euro-Atlantic security environment void the debates on removal of nuclear tactical weapons from the territory of Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium. The status quo⁸ will remain sustainable if the European allies who now have nuclear-capable aircraft renew their political commitment to maintain such capability.⁹ Additionally, NATO should take measures to upgrade dual-capable aircraft readiness, signaling the Alliance's seriousness and resolve. All of this should be reflected in NATO's Deterrence and Defense Posture.

NATO should also ponder accelerated development of military infrastructure and reassignment of military assets to the Alliance's Eastern border (consolidated participation in air policing and surveillance patrols), covering the Baltic States, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria, as well as an increased presence of U.S. facilities on some of these countries' territories. Furthermore, transforming the U.S. presence in Task Force East into a permanent one would clearly reassure Eastern European allies about American commitment to their security. Steadily cut since the early 1990s, U.S. forces in Europe today face the prospect of additional reductions, given the defense sequestration and the strategy shift to pivot to Asia. The time has arrived for the U.S. to reconsider these policies and pivot to Europe again and re-establish the American footprint.

Second, owing to the current level of strategic unpredictability and insecurity, the Allied Military Authorities should be prepared to re-evaluate the threat assessment and subsequent planning.



Romanian soldiers receive instruction from a U.S. Marine, left, during exercise Platinum Lion 14-2 in August 2014. The training brought together forces from the U.S., Bulgaria, Romania and Serbia. CPL. JOSHUA GRANT/U.S. MARINE CORPS

Third, NATO countries should acknowledge the cost of providing security. Although the economic crisis still affects Europe, allies should reverse the tendency to reduce defense budgets and increase defense spending gradually to 2 percent of gross domestic product.¹⁰ Moreover, all projects circumscribed to “Smart Defense” should be streamlined, and the European powers should carry their fair share of NATO’s military burden. This is not an easy task and requires, first and foremost, strong political will and supportive public opinion. Under current circumstances, although the consolidation of the defense sector would be detrimental to other sectors, it will accelerate and strengthen the buildup of a critical capabilities package. European allies should acknowledge that the U.S. alone cannot continue to subsidize Europe’s security and that they have to rebalance the financial burden. Increased focus should be dedicated to joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, strategic airlift and sealift, missile defense and cyber defense.

Fourth, NATO’s core tasks require military forces of a certain quality and quantity. Unfortunately, only a limited number of European Armed Forces are available and prepared for deployment and in many Allied countries the usability targets set by NATO remain unmet. Therefore, the growing gap between the level of ambition and NATO’s available means could affect its military capacity and political credibility. In this context, allies should consolidate operational training, readiness, preparedness, interoperability, sustainability and survivability.

Fifth, NATO should commit to and revitalize a multiyear exercise program (with increased frequency and different levels of ambition) covering especially Article V scenarios. These engagements should not be limited to the NATO Response Force (NRF), but also work within the framework of the Connected Forces Initiative.

After the end of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan in December 2014, NATO intends to shift emphasis from operational engagement to operational preparedness. Therefore, holding regular military exercises tests and validates NATO’s concepts, procedures, systems and tactics (among them the command and control structure, interoperability, readiness and preparedness of forces and logistics). These types of exercises will also demand complementary training and comprehensive education as part of the Connected Forces Initiative to sustain and enhance interconnectedness and interoperability achieved by Allied forces in past operations.

Sixth, NATO should be prepared to swiftly integrate capable partners that decide to join NATO in Alliance structures. Sweden and Finland are cases

in point and already act as de facto member states. They are pro-active actors, participating in NATO-led operations and the NRF, and playing a dynamic role in a number of multinational projects for the development of NATO’s capabilities.

Last but not least, the Alliance has acknowledged that it can no longer conduct business as usual with Russia and that a strategic pause is needed to evaluate this relationship. If Russia continues to display attitudes similar to the one in Crimea, adopts aggressive rhetoric on the issue of Russian-speaking minorities in Latvia and Estonia, and these crises escalate, NATO could consider curtailing any political and military cooperation with Russia and even denounce and consider irrelevant the Founding Act.¹¹ This could lead to a reconsideration of the Political-Military Matters enshrined in this document. □

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, the Romanian Ministry of Defense.

1. As stated in the 2012 Chicago Summit Declaration: “NATO-Russia cooperation is of strategic importance. ... We want to see a true strategic partnership between NATO and Russia.”

2. Kaliningrad is the home of two Russian air bases and also offers access for Russian Baltic Fleet, Baltiysk naval base being its only ice-free port to the Baltic. Bombora in Abkhazia is the largest military airfield in the South Caucasus, and Crimea now offers *permanent* access for the Russian Black Sea Fleet and ensures Russian naval supremacy in that area.

3. Russia issued a statement December 12, 2007, “suspending” its implementation of the CFE Treaty, although the treaty does not contain a provision for suspension, only withdrawal. Under suspension, Moscow stated that it will not participate in treaty data exchanges, notifications or inspections. Although the Kremlin noted that it has no plans for arms buildups, it also declared that it would not be bound by treaty limits. NATO members called on Russia to reverse course and declared their intention to continue implementing the treaty “without prejudice to any future action they might take.”

4. Though the training scenario of ZAPAD (WEST) 2013 envisioned repulsing an attack on Belarus by “terrorist” forces, the exercise’s territorial scope, range of operations and number of units and force types suggested that Russia was practicing for a large-scale war against a conventional army.

5. The allegation is that Moscow flight-tested a new medium-range, land-based cruise missile. Such a test would violate the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which permanently banned ground-launched ballistic or cruise missiles capable of traveling 500 to 5,500 kilometers.

6. The doctrine stated the danger of NATO globalizing its endeavors, attempting to expand its military infrastructure closer to Russian borders and enlarging by adding new members. Clearly, this referred to the intended enlargement of NATO by including Georgia and — before it opted for non-bloc status — Ukraine. The next doctrinal danger abroad was the deployment (or expansion) of foreign military contingents on territories neighboring Russia or its allies.

This probably pointed at the American military facilities deployed in Romania and Bulgaria. Another listed foreign danger was the development and deployment of missile defense systems, a reference to NATO’s ballistic missile defense.

7. Tactical nuclear weapons represent an important symbol of credibility of Article V to these countries.

8. Maintaining the estimated 200 Europe-deployed U.S. tactical nuclear bombs-B61 gravity bombs.

9. Decisions about replacing the aging fleets (Dual-Capable Aircraft) in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy must now take into consideration the necessity of introducing into service an aircraft certified and equipped with the required avionics package to carry nuclear weapons, even though existing planes may be kept operational well into the 2020s.

10. Only the U.S., the United Kingdom and Greece allocated 2 percent of GDP for defense in 2013. Constantly diminishing defense budgets have caused a three-pronged imbalance: increased discrepancy in capabilities between the U.S. and the European allies, European dependency on U.S. capabilities and deficits in European forces.

11. Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, signed in Paris, France, on May 22, 1997.

BUILDING SOCIAL CAPITAL

Marshall Center alumni networks strengthen multinational security cooperation

By Dr. Eliza Maria Markley, Kennesaw State University, United States, Marshall Center alumna

To meet the security challenges of the 21st century, security experts argue that new policies should exhibit enhanced cooperation and coordination among state and nonstate agencies at all levels – local, regional and international. Moreover, cooperation needs to be supported by common principles, norms and rules, predictable behavior and mutually agreed upon tools to address threats.

Political scientist Robert D. Putnam (1995) argues that social capital fosters cooperation based on shared norms. He defines social capital as social networks based on shared norms and trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefits. “Social capital,” Francis Fukuyama (2002) explains, “is what permits individuals to band together to defend their interests and organize to support collective needs” (p. 26). It improves collective trust and social cohesion and positively correlates with economic growth, international trade, macroeconomic stability, and political and civic involvement (Beugelsdijk and Schaik, 2005).

Given its relevance, a question naturally arises: How can social capital develop in the security context? Previous research has looked at international education in the military environment as a transmitter of democratic values and norms and as a facilitator of professional networking (Kennedy, 1998; *The Economist*, 2011). However, existing literature features no empirical research on the development of social capital in the context of global security.

Therefore, the purpose of this study is to establish an academic understanding of social capital in the security context and to explore the extent to which international education of

security professionals develops social capital. Using qualitative and quantitative methods, this study found that international security policy education (ISPE) and shared experiences contribute to 1) fostering social and professional networks that are used as capital for cooperation; 2) the development of trust; 3) emerging shared norms; 4) intercultural competence; and 5) the application of acquired values, norms and practices in participants’ home countries.

SOCIAL CAPITAL IN THE SECURITY CONTEXT

Based on previous definitions of social capital in the civil sector, social capital in the security context is conceptualized as social and professional networks – based on shared experiences, norms and values, and mutual trust – that facilitate the cooperation of security professionals for future benefits. Social capital can be viewed from both an individual and a social perspective. The individual dimension emphasizes that, unlike political, physical and human capital, social capital can only be acquired through interaction with others (Chalupnicek, 2010). This view explains differential success of individuals in

a competitive environment: The more connections (capital) one holds, the more favorable the outcome (benefits).

The social perspective on social capital emphasizes shared values or norms that permit cooperation within a group of security professionals. According to this perspective, social capital is a type of positive group externality in the sense that every member of a security group can benefit from the group's resources (knowledge, information, connections, etc.).

METHODS

The research for this study was focused on the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. It employs qualitative and quantitative methods of investigation, and the main instrument for collecting data was semistructured interviews conducted in 2012 of 93 Marshall Center alumni from 41 countries. Interview questions inquired about respondents' perceptions on forging friendships and professional connections, establishing trust, acquiring values and norms, and their overall Marshall Center experience. Participants were prompted with broad, open-ended questions to ensure that they were not led toward certain answers. Data was analyzed with NVivo 10 qualitative software and was further coded and analyzed with quantitative methods (binary logistic regressions).

FINDINGS

Professional and social networks

The formation and growth of networks of cooperation are the sine qua non of building social capital among Marshall Center alumni in the global security community. Alumni forge and use professional and social relationships for personal or professional benefits. Analysis reveals that the process unfolds as follows: Participants establish a large number of friendships (social networks) while in Garmisch, but the relationships decrease in number and intensity over time (upon graduation) and become what network theory calls "weak ties" (relationships with acquaintances in which frequency of

meetings, emotional intensity and intimacy are low – Granovetter, 1973, 1982).

Weak ties are relevant in large and diverse networks, such as the multinational and multiagency Marshall Center network, because they connect members of different groups (cultures, countries or agencies). Through their connections, Marshall Center network members create bridges of communication that accelerate bureaucratic processes and ensure faster and less redundant flow of information. For this reason, weak ties are the basis for fostering highly utilitarian professional

This study indicates that the Marshall Center environment — including its location; a climate of open relations with faculty and other students; rich social, cultural and professional activities; and a diverse but balanced national representation — is conducive to developing trust.

connections. Their benefits are reflected in an increased transfer of information and facilitated cooperation across security agencies and borders and reduced "red tape." These connections also make it easier to locate professional expertise or assistance in a foreign country and search for jobs. They even act as icebreakers in international negotiations.

Trust

Trust is an essential component of social capital and for the formation of networks. Because networks have no organizational authority, trust allows members to cooperate efficiently (Gausdal, 2012; Tilly, 2005). This study indicates that the Marshall Center environment

— including its location; a climate of open relations with faculty and other students; rich social, cultural and professional activities; and a diverse but balanced national representation — is conducive to developing trust. Furthermore, shared experiences, involvement in sports, sufficient time to interact with colleagues and rigorous selection of participants by their governments are contributing factors to establishing trust-based relationships.

Moreover, the interpersonal trust established among participants while in Garmisch is extended to nonspecific Marshall Center alumni (alumni who have not personally met before). This facilitates the foundation of category-based trust, with the Marshall Center representing the category. This find-

Participants became more tolerant and accountable and more appreciative of a culture of dialogue, listening, debunking stereotypes, interest-based negotiations and involvement in voluntary activities.

ing is particularly important for developing social capital in the security context, in which alumni need to cooperate with other alumni whom they have never met. The presence of trust, therefore, would positively affect the speed, nature and quality of cooperation.

Values, practices and norms

Fukuyama (2002) argues that social capital formation cannot occur unless shared norms and values emerge — the prerequisite for cooperation in all forms of group endeavor. Marshall Center alumni reported increased awareness and acquisition of cooperative democratic attitudes and norms. Participants became more tolerant and accountable and more appreciative of a culture of dialogue, listening, debunking stereotypes, interest-based negotiations and involvement in voluntary activities.

Many respondents recalled that the class atmosphere was confrontational and tense at the beginning of the program, but became cooperative toward the end. This is explained

through their attitudinal shifts. Alumni reported that, in Garmisch, they understood the value of agreeing to disagree and listening, as well as the meaning of “different truths” and ways of thinking. Furthermore, they learned to transition from taking an official stance on matters to expressing personal opinions. This not only avoids conflict but enables participants coming from countries in conflict with each other to contribute to dialogue, interact constructively and even establish personal relationships. These findings are relevant in the context of security because these cooperative values are essential features of democracy.

Participants’ experiences at the Marshall Center also contributed to increased intercultural competence. Respondents perceived their exposure to the multicultural environment as a life-changing experience. This contributed to an increased awareness and openness to other cultures and a higher ability to communicate, relate and work with representatives of different countries and cultures. This is particularly relevant in a global security context, in which security professionals of different cultural backgrounds are required to communicate and cooperate efficiently for the success of multinational operations.

Agents of change

These findings indicate that ISPE and shared experiences at the Marshall Center contribute to building social capital among security professionals. However, other questions arise at this point: What are the consequences of the formation of social capital, and to whom are the alumni applying their social capital in their professional and personal settings?

About half the participants reported employing various systems to implement their Marshall Center knowledge in their country. They are the Marshall Center’s agents of change. This had two major consequences. First, at the national level, respondents challenged long-standing patterns of social interaction and potentially created new norms. Second, at the global level, they contributed to emerging shared transnational standards. This occurred because, although the systems of practice varied based on the settings in which they were implemented, they were instrumental in transferring common Marshall Center norms, procedures and principles to various countries.

For instance, these agents of change

implemented training and established new security organizations and practices (leadership and communication) stemming from Marshall Center principles. Consequently, new norms, such as coordination across agencies and borders, challenged the old and became common transnational standards. These norms are important in a security context because they improve operational communication among national and international agencies and multinational cooperation.

Marshall Center agents of change also sought to implement projects in their home countries' civil societies. They established nongovernmental organizations and involved the community they serve in their programs. Employing nongovernmental practices and community projects contributes to the education of civil society on its rights and its empowerment.

This study also shows that the agents of change share important characteristics. They involve themselves in professional networks, exhibit an increased level of interpersonal trust and report acquiring personal values while at the Marshall Center. More specifically, alumni who engage in Marshall Center professional networks are five times more likely to be agents of change in their own country. Moreover, alumni who report gaining self-knowledge during the programs are three times more likely to be agents of change. This finding is critical to the Marshall Center for delineating future strategies, for it identifies the importance to alumni of remaining engaged in Marshall Center activities upon graduation.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Marshall Center experience contributes to building social capital in the global security context. Programs forge social and professional networks, foster trust and promote shared norms, values and procedures among participants. Moreover, half of alumni apply and implement these practices, norms and values in their countries, becoming active agents of change. Because of their significant role in building shared transnational values and norms, the Marshall Center should attempt to identify and intensify relationships with its agents of change.

Moreover, given the relevance of trust in the security context, developing trust should be a goal of ISPE at the Marshall Center. Although it is part of its seal and motto, "Democratia per fidem et Concordia," trust is not included in the

Marshall Center's mission statement. In becoming a goal, however, it should increase attention to the length of resident courses and depth of interaction among program participants. Both variables affect the degree of trust attributed to relationships forged in Garmisch. The number of longer courses was reduced in the 2014 curricula, while the number of specialized short courses was increased.

Does this mean that cutting back on the social and trust aspects of the Marshall Center experience will negatively impact a critical dimension of building social capital? □

The author's complete dissertation can be found here: http://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/incm_etd/1/

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PARTNERS HELPING PARTNERS

The Marshall Center assembles international teams to help countries revise national security strategies

BY VERNON HODGES, MARSHALL CENTER

Several European nations that partner with the United States are reviewing security policies and strategies. This is underway either as new governments come to power, in light of recent events in Ukraine, for reasons of economic austerity or as a national imperative. Some partners have conducted security reviews with the assistance of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies and other international partners, but have all shared the experience of conducting security planning under austere economic conditions and the threat of emerging challenges on the horizon.

Nevertheless, all acquired a better understanding of the processes a government needs to formulate national policies and strategies that are proactive rather than reactive. In most instances, the whole-of-government approach was employed.

Whole of government

One benefit of the whole-of-government approach is that it promotes and supports national strategic planning that uses all elements of national power to pursue national security goals. In addition, such a system provides for more effective allocation of limited resources and clearly divides responsibilities — avoiding overlaps and dangerous gaps.

A key success in developing and maintaining a national strategic planning system is having a corps of security professionals not only skilled at strategic planning, but experienced in navigating the bureaucratic culture that is pervasive in the interagency process. There are no institutions of higher learning dedicated solely to preparing civil servants for this journey down the interagency path.

When a partner lacks a national strategic planning system and corps of experienced strategists, international assistance can prove invaluable in providing individual capacity-building programs.

The Albanian experience

In early December 2013, the Albanian prime minister issued a governmental order to the minister of foreign affairs to draft a new national security strategy. The foreign minister sought the assistance of the Marshall Center.

When a Marshall Center team arrived in Tirana in late January 2014 to conduct formal discussions with the Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the government had established interministerial and interagency working groups to develop the national security strategy with the goal of producing the document by June 2014. Although the

Albanian working groups possessed the necessary core competencies, they fell short in institutional experience. Considering the brief window to produce a final draft strategy, the Marshall Center began a national security strategy development project for Albania with a detailed plan to guide the development of the national security strategy.

The Marshall Center established and incorporated strategy precepts into a plan of action with milestones to assist the development process, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs developed templates to collect data. Incorporating a transparent and whole-of-government approach was a key objective.

Analysis of the data identified several key drivers that shaped the design of the strategy. Albania's membership in NATO and success in crafting its recent Strategic Defense Review allowed it to focus on nonmilitary national security challenges, such as severe deficiencies in the rule of law, good governance and weak institutions. These deficiencies have created an environment that permits corruption and organized crime to flourish, damaging the Albanian economy. These same deficiencies were cited independently in the European Union's assessment of Albania's efforts for EU candidacy status.

By establishing a strategy development process and supporting the efforts with continual consultations, the Marshall Center was instrumental in helping Albania achieve success. Critical to this success, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and associated working groups took full ownership of the process. The Albanian government recognized the need for a standing institutional capability consisting of professional civil servants skilled in writing strategic documents.

Impressively, the draft was completed within five months of the prime minister's directive. Having a single point of responsibility — in this

case the Ministry of Foreign Affairs — to coordinate, supervise and manage the process in a whole-of-government endeavor is imperative. Likewise, the government quickly recognized the benefit of having a civil service corps that is not tied to political administrations of government.

On July 31, 2014, Albania's parliament approved the national security strategy. Moving forward, the government must institutionalize the strategic

A nation's legislature plays a key role in the national strategy planning process. In addition to appropriating resources, a legislature provides the forum for political and social debate on matters of national security.

planning process and develop a group of security professionals for inter-agency work. But building individual capacity takes time, and institutionalizing a national strategic planning process takes longer.

An important aspect of formulating policy and strategy and conducting reviews is the inclusion of civil society. Needless to say, sensitive information is often involved in developing a threat

assessment. However, to the greatest extent possible, the final product should be produced as openly as possible.

The Polish experience

In 2012, Poland's president established a commission to conduct a national security review, the first of its kind for Poland. The intent of the review was not to produce a new national security strategy, but to take a holistic look at security policy planning, independent of contemporary national strategic planning. The commission was composed of a mix of active and former government officials, scholars, independent analysts, nongovernmental organizations and think tanks. During the course of its work, it identified many outstanding issues while overcoming numerous challenges, but successfully produced a report that established security-related points of reference for national strategic planning and legislative initiatives.

The Polish government emphasized the importance of revising its understanding of the national security environment and strategic ends. It decided to focus not only on violent conflicts and means used to achieve security, but also addressed "human" and "structural" security issues and the concept that national defense remains the essential national security domain.

The Georgian experience

The government of Georgia chose a different approach. It created a national security concept that would serve as the foundation for a new national security strategy while creating and institutionalizing a national strategic planning system. Georgia is only the third country to engage in such a thorough overhaul, after Colombia and Sri Lanka.

Before its five-day war with the Russian Federation in 2008, Georgia lacked a coordinated security policy and, like those of many nations, its crisis management system could be

described as reactive rather than proactive. As a consequence of the war, the government started rethinking its national security policy planning process, and a parliamentary investigation commission was formed to investigate shortcomings. Following recommendations from the parliamentary investigation commission,

a whole-of-government approach, enhancing interagency cooperation during and as a result of the process, enhancing the capacity of agencies involved in the process and establishing transparency and inclusiveness.

The whole-of-government approach and interagency cooperation demand central- and executive-level coordination

Marshall Center with capacity-building programs for agencies and staff planners involved in the review. The aim was to expose planners to basic principles and challenges of security sector governance, writing techniques for producing various strategic documents and the use of analytical tools.

A Marshall Center team visited Tbilisi and began designing a program of seminars and workshops to assist the Georgians. The program's objectives were to examine basic principles and challenges associated with the interagency process and expose planners to proven contemporary best practices in strategic planning and policy development.

Reaching consensus is imperative in building a strategic planning system. This played a role in the structure of the first Marshall Center event for Georgia, a weeklong seminar designed to promote team building, facilitate interagency cooperation, and expose staff planners to best practices and lessons learned in strategic planning. By the end of the seminar, Georgian planners had experience formulating a national security concept under time constraints. A team of international experts representing Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United States facilitated the seminar.

The Marshall Center program provided for a sustained engagement with Georgian planners that included further events at six-month intervals. Unmistakably, sustained engagement and flexibility are key elements of a security assistance program. A government's aspirations to reach certain milestones on a timeline can often be overambitious if they fail to take local politics into account.

In 2010, the Marshall Center held two seminars for Georgian staff planners that focused on the development of a national security concept that facilitated an understanding of interagency roles and responsibilities in the planning process, assessed future national



Polish President Bronislaw Komorowski, left, and Georgian counterpart Giorgi Margvelashvili pass an honor guard in Warsaw in April 2014. The two presidents met to discuss regional security and economic cooperation. THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

then-President Mikheil Saakashvili established an interagency commission to coordinate work on a national security review.

The ministerial-level commission, in turn, created a core structure of interagency working groups composed of staff planners to conduct the actual review work. They were tasked with institutionalizing

to moderate and balance the process. The task of coordinating and supervising the work of the interagency groups belonged to the National Security Council. It also managed the overall national security review process.

Through accumulated experience and consultations with respective agencies, the National Security Council sought assistance from NATO and the

security requirements, and analyzed existing national security planning processes. The events offered practical approaches to develop a framework for strategic assessment of national level capabilities through emphasizing the compilation and analysis of current and future perceived threats to the nation's security.

By the first seminar, the Georgian planners had begun work on a threat assessment, the first phase of its efforts. They established separate working groups to address three threats: military and political, social and economic, and natural and man-made disasters. As a direct result of the seminar, the Georgian government revised its threat assessment and began work on the National Security Concept, an intelligence strategy and National Military Strategy.

In 2011, the Marshall Center held two seminars for Georgian planners. At the first, experts from Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Latvia and Poland shared best practices and lessons learned in developing national security concepts. During the second, experts from Estonia and Lithuania paid similar attention to cyber security issues.

Throughout the process, the National Security Council went to great lengths to ensure transparency in consultation with Georgia's political parties, think tanks and international partners. Such openness continues with partner countries through conferences, seminars and various meetings within NATO's Planning and Review Process, nongovernmental organizations and political parties.

In July 2012, the Marshall Center held a seminar for the planners that focused on the importance and role of action plans in developing, implementing and assessing a national security strategy. The seminar highlighted case studies from Albania, Bulgaria and Italy.

A nation's security strategy incorporates and reflects the values and

culture of its people. For security assistance professionals poised to work with a partner nation on strategy formulation or review, the aforementioned is a very important point of consideration. It has been said that a perfect national security strategy is one in which a local taxi driver can explain it without effort. The Marshall Center provides specially tailored programs to assist partners in their efforts in strengthening their corps of security professionals, be they civil servants or parliamentarians.

The role of legislatures

A nation's legislature plays a key role in the national strategy planning process. In addition to appropriating resources, a legislature provides the forum for political and social debate on matters of national security. To assist partners in this regard, the Marshall Center designs programs and events to strengthen the effectiveness of select groups of parliamentarians from partner nations in the development and implementation of democratic defense and security policies, procedures and programs.

The program goes beyond the general concept of civilian democratic control of the armed forces in highlighting the actual practical means by which democratic security forces are controlled by the political system. Important to this type of program are issues of national personnel management and the development of civilian expertise in the security sector, and the establishment of strategic communication with parliamentarians, senior staff and members of security forces.

While providing assistance to Albania in drafting its National Security Strategy, the Marshall Center conducted a tailored seminar designed as a consensus-building mechanism to introduce a representative sampling of Albanian parliamentarians to the government's effort to draft a new strategy and the necessity of seriously

addressing transnational organized crime and corruption. The aim was to bring Albanians from different political parties together to accentuate the long-term security threat posed by organized crime and corruption and stress the urgency of taking whole-of-government action.

Lessons learned

Incorporating the values, mores and traditions of a nation's people into these programs is vital to the deliberations and should be the foundation of any security assistance program. In addition, successful programs have been those that have spanned years, another guarantor of building enduring capacity. Tailored, sustained programs that complement a partner's self-declared timelines to achieve certain outcomes are a must when developing a national security strategy. In addition, all ministries and agencies should have input, not just the ministerial "heavy hitters" who are equipped to carry out security planning.

Partner nations are keen to share their experiences with other partners. Facilitating assistance from other partners by creating teams of international experts that have achieved success in their endeavors facilitates the establishment of professional development programs for building individual capacity. The best programs of assistance are designed with a clear understanding of the political landscape in the recipient nation. Likewise, transparency and inclusiveness are requirements for an effective national security strategic planning system.

The Marshall Center has accumulated lessons learned over the years — too many to list here. The experiences gathered from its outreach programs have come as a result of assistance programs designed to help current governments with issues at the strategic level, but these lessons can be applied to many assistance programs throughout the world. □

The Status of Montenegro's **EU INTEGRATION**

LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND SECURITY SECTOR REFORMS
DOMINATE THE COUNTRY'S ACCESSION PROCESS

By **Ambassador Aleksandar Andrija Pejović**, state secretary
for European integration, Montenegro

It has been more than two years since Montenegro opened accession negotiations with the European Union, thus entering a dynamic and challenging period. In its first year of negotiations, Montenegro established a negotiation structure that engaged more than 1,300 people from public administration and civil society in preparations for explanatory and bilateral screening meetings with the European Commission. These meetings were held between March 2012 and June 2013 and were aimed at establishing the state of play in each of the areas as well as identifying major institutional, legal and investment challenges for Montenegro.

Montenegro underwent comprehensive social reforms in the second year of negotiations. Changes to major strategy documents, laws, secondary legislation and action plans were adopted or are underway. Administrative capacity for fulfilling the commitments has been enhanced through strengthening existing structures, establishing new institutions and training of employees. These reforms aim for political and democratic stability, the creation of an environment primed for economic growth and improving living standards for citizens.

Our goal, defined in the 2014-2018 Programme of Accession to the EU, is to implement all necessary reforms and make all internal preparations for membership. This document contains an overview of the measures that we need to complete with clearly defined responsibilities, timelines and necessary financial resources.

We are proud to say that, after two years, we have initiated negotiations in 12 chapters, two of which, science and research, and education and culture, are provisionally closed. Apart from the key chapters, judiciary and fundamental rights, and justice, freedom and security, which represent the cornerstone of the rule of law, we also started negotiations on the following chapters: free movement of capital; public procurement; company law; intellectual property law;

information society and media; enterprise and industrial policy; foreign, security and defense policy; and financial control.

Although all chapters are equally important, we have focused on reforms in the rule of law area, which represent the cornerstone of every society's development. Apart from this, Montenegro is negotiating with the EU under a new approach that places the judiciary and fundamental rights, and justice, freedom and security chapters at the heart of the entire process. These discussions started early and are close to the final stage of negotiations. To fulfil the commitments of these chapters successfully, Montenegro adopted comprehensive and elaborate action plans to create frameworks for further work regarding the rule of law.

Furthermore, these two chapters concentrate on judicial reform, the basis of the rule of law and a precondition for exercising fundamental human rights, as well as for overall political and economic progress. We have prepared amendments to the key laws in these chapters that will contribute to the creation of an impartial judiciary, improved transparency in judicial elections, and strengthened professionalism through the gathering of statistics. We have also established judicial and prosecutorial councils and elected all judges in the constitutional court.

An important segment of the rule of law relates to the fight against corruption and organized crime. These are areas to which Montenegro has devoted much attention. The country has improved its legislative and administrative framework, introduced best practices and measured the results. Anticorruption laws have been drafted, and the country plans to establish the Agency for Anticorruption and Special Prosecution Office for the Fight against Organized Crime, Corruption, Terrorism and War Crimes to implement the EU *acquis* efficiently. Additionally, Montenegro actively participates in and contributes to international police actions against organized crime.



Montenegrin Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic, left, meets German Chancellor Angela Merkel at the Balkan conference in Berlin in August 2014. Montenegro is among the countries seeking admission to the EU.

GETTY IMAGES



The country has placed special focus on activities and measures arising from visa-free regime commitments. Considering that external border control is of utmost concern to the internal safety of the EU, we are dedicated to implementing all legislation in the areas of border control, migration, visa and asylum, and police and judicial cooperation.

Aside from political reforms, we are working on fulfilling the economic criteria for membership. A new approach, which places structural reforms and economic governance at the core of the economic criteria, is compatible with the goals of the 2020 Strategy. Government activities are aimed at creating a stable macroeconomy and financial development, a competitive market economy, and strong industrial, agricultural and energy sectors. Their aim is to create conditions for higher employment, but also to develop a more flexible labor force.

When it comes to security and defense policy, Montenegro has enhanced its foreign policy, actively contributes to the international community and regularly participates,

through the use of soldiers and civilians, in international peacekeeping missions. Moreover, through participation in mechanisms for regional security cooperation, such as the U.S.-Adriatic Charter, Montenegro continues to initiate and implement projects with other members of the A5, which represents a significant and positive experience of joint involvement in peacekeeping missions.

Montenegro is satisfied with the fulfilment of the obligations of our Euro-Atlantic agenda. The fourth Annual National Programme has recently been completed, and preparation for the fifth ANP is already underway. Our main focus is to continue reforms in defense, security and intelligence; strengthen the rule of law; and increase public support for NATO membership. We are committed to continuing intelligence and security sector reforms to meet the standards of NATO and to strengthen trust. Reforms in the defense sector have been focused on strengthening the budget and modernizing equipment. In June 2014, then NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh

Rasmussen announced that the Alliance will open an intensified and focused dialogue with Montenegro that, by the end of 2015, would result in assessing whether to invite Montenegro to join NATO.

Montenegro actively participates in the International Security Assistance Force mission in Afghanistan and recently sent the 10th (X) contingent of the Army of Montenegro, which will, as part of a multinational unit with Croatia and Germany, secure the Marmal base in Mazar-e Sharif. Montenegro is committed to contributing to Afghanistan after 2014. We have expressed our willingness to participate in the mission Resolute Support.

It is important to note that in the field of European integration, particularly through the negotiation process in the areas of foreign security and defense policy that opened in June 2014, and through fulfilment of our obligations and constant strengthening of our presence and contributions to the EU's Common, Security and Defence Policy, Montenegro continues to prove that it is a reliable partner of the EU, and that its role and contribution to global security is internationally recognized.

Montenegro will continue to participate in activities in the field of European security and defense policy, initiate projects and cooperate with neighboring countries, confirming its active role in the region and commitment to regional and global security. By identifying forces that are readily available to the EU for military and civil crisis management operations, Montenegro has confirmed its strategic commitment to international peace and security.

Accession negotiations are challenging but remain the best preparation for EU membership. More importantly, negotiations are an opportunity to build a better and more developed society. The development and improvements that we undergo today are investments in a better future and a better quality of life for Montenegro's citizens. We are aware of this fact and accept this opportunity. □

A Difficult Era for U.S.-Russian Relations

Book author: ANGELA E. STENT, Princeton University Press, October 2013

Reviewed by: MATTHEW RHODES, Marshall Center

The *Limits of Partnership* offers a timely review of United States-Russia relations since the end of the Cold War. Angela Stent's scholar-practitioner background as a professor at Georgetown University, researcher and teacher in Moscow, and official at the State Department and National Intelligence Council in the Clinton and Bush administrations provides rich insights into the factors that have hindered fuller, sustained cooperation between the two countries. Interviews with an impressive list of American and Russian insiders further expand the scope of this work. Specialists, as well as general readers, can learn much about both policy processes and substance from Stent's study.


Covering the period from the early 1990s to the fall of 2013, the book charts the rise and fall of four distinct "resets" across successive U.S. presidential administrations. In each case, warm personal atmospherics between top leaders and promising steps in areas such as counter-proliferation lost momentum and gave way to renewed distrust and disappointment.

Specific disputes over issues such as NATO enlargement, missile defense, the Yukos case and military interventions have captured most headlines. However, Stent emphasizes deeper underlying factors, including the abrupt asymmetry in the two states' global power, divergent views of Russia's internal reforms and claims to privileged status within the former Soviet space, and the lack of well-rooted political, bureaucratic or societal constituencies in either country for closer cooperation.

An especially strong chapter on energy and economics complements the general chronological narrative. This section offers a concise, perceptive overview of the evolving connections between the state and business within Russia, the challenges those connections have presented to American investors, and the mix of commercial and geopolitical motivations behind contending regional oil and gas pipeline projects. A similarly focused approach to other topics in the book might have been equally useful.

Still, some shortcomings accompany the book's overall strengths. To begin with, in-depth analysis of ties during the George W. Bush era (more than half the text) contrasts with comparatively cursory treatment of the George Bush Sr., Bill Clinton and Barack Obama years. This might be natural, given that this period corresponds to Stent's longest time in government, but it leaves some notable gaps.

For instance, there is not even passing reference to Bill



Clinton's support of then-Russian President Boris Yeltsin in the latter's showdown with the post-Soviet Parliament in 1993, a key milestone in Russia's political development. In addition, although Stent's writing is admirably accessible, it sometimes lapses into vague generalizations that call for more detail. Examples include comments on the effectiveness of different bilateral working groups as well as on the nature of some interagency policy debates. Last and not least, for the prestigious Princeton Press, the text contains unusually frequent typographical errors.

Despite these qualifications, the book remains highly recommended. Completed just before the crisis over Ukraine, it presents a balanced baseline account of U.S.-Russian relations leading toward their present nadir as well as a clear-eyed analysis of the now-heightened barriers to their improvement. □

Resident Courses

Democratia per fidem et concordiam
Democracy through trust and friendship



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Admission

The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies cannot accept direct nominations. Nominations for all programs must reach the center through the appropriate ministry and the U.S. or German embassy in the nominee's country. However, the registrar can help applicants start the process. For help, email requests to: registrar@marshallcenter.org

PROGRAM ON APPLIED SECURITY STUDIES (PASS)

The Marshall Center's flagship resident program, a seven-week course, provides graduate-level education in security policy, defense affairs, international relations and related topics such as international law and counterterrorism. A theme addressed throughout the program is the need for international, interagency and interdisciplinary cooperation.

PASS 14-9

Sept. 29 -
Nov. 14, 2014

September							October							November						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
	1	2	3	4	5	6				1	2	3	4							1
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
14	15	16	17	18	19	20	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
21	22	23	24	25	26	27	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	16	17	18	19	20	21	22
28	29	30					26	27	28	29	30	31		23	24	25	26	27	28	29
														30						

PROGRAM ON CYBER SECURITY STUDIES (PCSS)

The PCSS focuses on ways to address challenges in the cyber environment while adhering to fundamental values of democratic society. This nontechnical program helps participants appreciate the nature of today's threats.

PCSS 15-1

Dec. 4 - 19, 2014

December						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
	1	2	3	4	5	6
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28	29	30	31			

PROGRAM ON COUNTERING NARCOTICS AND ILLICIT TRAFFICKING (CNIT)

The two-week resident program focuses on 21st-century national security threats as a result of illicit trafficking and other criminal activities.

CNIT 15-4

Apr. 9 - 24, 2015

April						
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18	19	20	21	22	23	24
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PROGRAM ON TERRORISM AND SECURITY STUDIES (PTSS)

This four-week program is designed for government officials and military officers employed in midlevel and upper-level management of counterterrorism organizations and will provide instruction on both the nature and magnitude of today's terrorism threat. The program improves participants' ability to counter terrorism's regional implications by providing a common framework of knowledge and understanding that will enable national security officials to cooperate at an international level.

PTSS 15-3

Feb. 25 -
Mar. 25, 2015

February							March						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21	15	16	17	18	19	20	21
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							29	30	31				

PTSS 15-7

July 9 -
Aug. 6, 2015

July							August						
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11	12	13	14	15	16	17	16	17	18	19	20	21	22
18	19	20	21	22	23	24	23	24	25	26	27	28	29
25	26	27	28	29	30	31	30	31					

SEMINAR ON TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL SECURITY (STACS)

STACS provides civil security professionals involved in transnational civil security an in-depth look at how nations can effectively address domestic security issues that have regional and international impact. The three-week seminar examines best practices for ensuring civil security and preventing, preparing for and managing the consequences of domestic, regional, and international crises and disasters. The STACS will be offered once in FY 2015.

STACS 15-6

June 10 -
July 1, 2015

June							July						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
	1	2	3	4	5	6			1	2	3	4	
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
14	15	16	17	18	19	20	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
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28	29	30					26	27	28	29	30	31	

SENIOR EXECUTIVE SEMINAR (SES)

This intensive five-day seminar focuses on new topics of key global interest that will generate new perspectives, ideas and cooperative discussions and possible solutions. Participants include general officers, senior diplomats, ambassadors, ministers, deputy ministers and parliamentarians. The SES includes formal presentations by senior officials and recognized experts followed by in-depth discussions in seminar groups.

SES 15-9

Sept. 14 - 18, 2015

September							
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13	14	15	16	17	18	19	
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SEMINAR ON REGIONAL SECURITY (SRS)

The three-week seminar aims at systematically analyzing the character of the example crises, the impact of regional actors, as well as the effects of international assistance measures. SRS 15-5 will concentrate on two traditionally unstable regions, looking at actual conflicts in the regions and efforts to achieve stability.

SRS 15-5

Apr. 30 -
May 21, 2015

April							May							
S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	
				1	2	3	4					1	2	
5	6	7	8	9	10	11	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	
19	20	21	22	23	24	25	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	
26	27	28	29	30			24	25	26	27	28	29	30	
							31							

PROGRAM ON SECURITY SECTOR CAPACITY BUILDING (SSCB)

The purpose of this three-week course for midlevel and senior security-sector professionals is to assist partner and allied countries, as well as states recovering from internal conflict, to reform and build successful and enduring security institutions and agencies.

SSCB 15-2

Jan. 22 -
Feb. 12, 2015

January							February						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
				1	2	3	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4	5	6	7	8	9	10	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
11	12	13	14	15	16	17	15	16	17	18	19	20	21
18	19	20	21	22	23	24	22	23	24	25	26	27	28
25	26	27	28	29	30	31							

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