THE FUTURE OF NATO

- SHIELD OVER EUROPE
  NATO pursues missile defense

- RUSSIA AND NATO
  Building a better relationship

- EU DIPLOMACY
  Defusing Serbia-Kosovo border tensions

- SMART DEFENSE
  Bulgaria modernizes its military

PLUS
The rising role of Afghan women
Eurasian free trade zone
Somali piracy declines
ON THE COVER

As Afghanistan prepares to assume control of its security in 2014, NATO faces the end of a mission that’s been central to its existence for 12 years. Confronting emerging challenges such as cyber security, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism requires agility and flexibility from an organization originally dedicated to the territorial defense of Europe.

ON THE COVER

THE FUTURE OF NATO

14 Resetting Relations with Russia
By Dr. Denis Alexeev,
Saratov University, Russia
NATO should seek common cause with its former rival in places such as Central Asia.

20 Ballistic Missile Defense: A New Task for NATO
By Lt. Gen. Friedrich Wilhelm Ploeger,
German Air Force
The European Phased Adaptive Approach prepares to enter its second phase.

24 NATO’s Strategic Challenges
By Martynas Zapolskis,
Marshall Center alumnus, Lithuania
The Alliance is refocusing its mission in light of the drawdown in Afghanistan.

30 Smart Defense in the Information Age
By Lt. Col. Sevdalin Stoykov,
Bulgarian Armed Forces
Bulgaria changes the way it organizes and equips its military.

36 Building International Trust
By Maj. Brian Smith,
Florida Army National Guard
The U.S. National Guard’s State Partnership Program has been a post-Cold War success.
COOPERATION

40 Heavy Seas for Somali Pirates
Hijacking has diminished, thanks to multinational naval missions.

44 The Achievements of Afghan Women
Afghanistan expands opportunities for half of its population.

SECURITY

48 Moderating Border Disputes
By Valdrin Grainca, Marshall Center alumnus, Kosovo
EU diplomacy defuses tensions on the Serbia-Kosovo border.

54 Sustaining the Arab Spring
Europe can encourage democratization in North Africa and the Middle East.

POLICY

58 A Eurasian Economic Union
The proposed free-trade zone evokes memories of the old Soviet Union.

62 Getting Serious About Cyber Security
NATO and the EU offer differing approaches to securing the Internet.
Welcome to the 14th issue of per Concordiam. In this issue, we have gathered articles that consider different perspectives on how NATO is evolving and how that evolution is likely to continue. Since the 2010 Lisbon Summit, NATO has made significant progress in operations, reform and transition. The New Strategic Concept, adopted at Lisbon, provides the framework for the Alliance’s future. per Concordiam first examined NATO’s evolution in an issue published in the fall of 2011. Although NATO has accomplished much since then, clearly more must be done, a process made particularly difficult under the constraints of austerity. We look forward to dialogue with our readers as NATO addresses challenges and contributes to security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond.

NATO-related topics consistently arise in a variety of programs and courses at the Marshall Center. In January 2015, the Marshall Center concluded its Senior Executive Seminar (SES) 13-1 titled “Central Asia after ISAF Transition: Regional Challenges and Cooperative Responses.” The SES brought together top governmental leaders, diplomats, military officers and security sector specialists for a week of open and frank dialogue. This seminar examined cooperative measures and other means to deter violent extremists and counter transnational narcotics trafficking while simultaneously promoting cooperation. SES participants received the message that as NATO’s enduring partnership with Afghanistan shifts to a new phase, increased international efforts will be required from all regional stakeholders to achieve common solutions to common problems. Successfully dealing with challenges such as Afghanistan highlights the continuing importance of NATO for Euro-Atlantic security.

Many key issues remain to be resolved as NATO adapts to an increasingly complex security environment in an age of austerity. The impacts of the U.S. rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region and U.S. and European budgetary constraints also deserve careful analysis and consideration, as does NATO’s evolving relationship with Russia. Other issues – including the development of NATO’s missile defense capabilities, the evolution of NATO nuclear policy and the Alliance’s response to the fast-growing cyber threat – will also be high on the agenda. These and many other NATO-related issues will be analyzed in coming months in the Marshall Center’s resident and non-resident programs.

The Marshall Center continues to evolve as well, especially in the direction of education technology. The eCampus initiative of Dr. Robert Brannon, dean of the College of International and Security Studies, aims to find new ways to harness the latest ideas in advanced education-thinking and help the Marshall Center move ahead in this important arena. Our Knowledge Management Working Group also focuses on this effort in support of broader objectives associated with transformation. The Marshall Center will remain the best in its field, bringing together resident and non-resident course participants in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, and throughout the region we serve. The eCampus initiative is all about connections – participants connecting with instructors, courses, content and alumni networks – improving an already top-quality product.

Our next edition will center on Turkey’s influence in the Mediterranean region. We will discuss Turkey’s growing political and economic power and its regional relationships. The subsequent issue will discuss the connection between economic and national security. We welcome comments and perspectives on these topics and will include your responses in future editions. Please contact us at editor@perconcordiam.org

Sincerely,

Keith W. Dayton
Director
Dr. Denis Alexeev is associate professor of international relations at Saratov University, Russia, and a former visiting fellow at the Marshall Center. He teaches courses on Russian foreign and security policy and national security. His background includes a stint as visiting fellow at the University of California, Berkeley, and delivering lectures at Stanford University. His research has been supported by the Carnegie Foundation and Russian Academy of Sciences. Dr. Alexeev is a 2004 graduate of the Marshall Center’s Leaders Program.

Valdrin Grainca is a Marshall Center alumnus. Since 2011, he has worked as a senior official for Europe at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Kosovo. Previously, he worked with Kosovo’s nongovernmental organizations (Forum for Civic Initiatives) in the fields of security and rule of law. He earned a bachelor’s degree in political science from the University of Prishtina, Kosovo, and a master’s degree in international and European relations from Linköping University, Sweden.

Lt. Gen. Friedrich Wilhelm Ploeger is deputy commander of NATO’s Allied Air Command Ramstein at Ramstein Airbase, Germany. Before his current assignment, Gen. Ploeger served three command roles in Kalkar, Germany: heading the German Air Force Air Operations Command, the Combined Air Operations Centre Uedem and the Joint Air Power Competence Centre. In a German Air Force career that stretches back to 1967, he has served NATO and Germany in Bonn, Brussels and Berlin.

Dr. Jamie Shea is NATO’s deputy assistant secretary-general for emerging security challenges. In a long career with NATO, he served for years as the Alliance’s chief spokesman. He simultaneously holds several academic positions, including as a lecturer at the University of Kent, associate professor at American University in Washington, D.C., and adjunct associate professor of international relations for Michigan State University’s summer program in Brussels. Dr. Shea earned a doctorate in modern history from Oxford University in 1981.

Maj. Brian Smith serves as a Joint Operations Center watch officer for U.S. Central Command. Prior to this assignment, he worked as an operations officer with the U.S. European Command State Partnership Program. Commissioned as an air defense officer, he has served in the U.S. Army since 1990 and is a member of the Florida Army National Guard. Maj. Smith graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point with a bachelor’s degree in aerospace engineering.

Lt. Col. Sevdalin Stoykov is a chief expert in design and development of C4I systems at the Bulgarian Defence Institute. Previous assignments include positions in the Bulgarian Ministry of Defence related to research and development of communications information systems, modeling and simulations. Lt. Col. Stoykov holds a master’s degree from the Naval Postgraduate School, California, and a doctorate from the G.S. Rakovski National Defence Academy in Sofia. He is a 2012 graduate of the Marshall Center’s International Fellows Program.

Col. Arnold Teicht is senior programme advisor, Regional Capacity Development Programme, and course director of the European Training Course in Security Policy (ETC) at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy. His military career includes a variety of positions at NATO Military Headquarters in Denmark and Belgium focusing on operations, exercises and training. He holds a diploma in adult education from the Bundeswehr University, Munich.

Martynas Zapolskis is a doctoral candidate at Vilnius University’s Institute of International Relations and Political Science. Since 2008, he has served in the Lithuanian Ministry of National Defense and as a think tank analyst and researcher. Mr. Zapolskis holds a master’s degree in international relations and diplomacy from Vilnius University. He has also studied at Salzburg University in Austria and Creighton University in the United States. He is a 2012 graduate of the Marshall Center’s Program in Advanced Security Studies.
per Concordiam magazine addresses security issues relevant to Europe and Eurasia and aims to elicit thoughts and feedback from readers. We hope our previous issues accomplished this and helped stimulate debate and an exchange of ideas. Please continue to share your thoughts with us in the form of letters to the editor that will be published in this section. Please keep letters as brief as possible and specifically note the article, author and magazine edition to which you are referring. We reserve the right to edit all letters for language, civility, accuracy, brevity and clarity.

Send feedback via email to: editor@perconcordiam.org

ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS

per Concordiam is a moderated journal with the best and brightest submitted articles and papers published each quarter. We welcome articles from readers on security and defense issues in Europe and Eurasia.

First, email your story idea to editor@perconcordiam.org in an outline form or as a short description. If we like the idea, we can offer feedback before you start writing. We accept articles as original contributions. If your article or similar version is under consideration by another publication or was published elsewhere, please tell us when submitting the article. If you have a manuscript to submit but are not sure it’s right for the quarterly, email us to see if we’re interested.

As you’re writing your article, please remember:

• **Offer fresh ideas.** We are looking for articles with a unique perspective from the region. We likely will not publish articles on topics already heavily covered in other security and foreign policy journals.
• **Connect the dots.** We’ll publish an article on a single country if the subject is relevant to the region or the world.
• **Do not assume a U.S. audience.** The vast majority of per Concordiam readers are from Europe and Eurasia. We’re less likely to publish articles that cater to a U.S. audience. Our mission is to generate candid discussion of relevant security and defense topics, not to strictly reiterate U.S. foreign policy.
• **Steer clear of technical language.** Not everyone is a specialist in a certain field. Ideas should be accessible to the widest audience.
• **Provide original research or reporting to support your ideas.** And be prepared to document statements. We fact check everything we publish.
• **Copyrights.** Contributors will retain their copyrighted work. However, submitting an article or paper implies the author grants license to per Concordiam to publish the work.
• **Bio/photo.** When submitting your article, please include a short biography and a high-resolution digital photo of yourself of at least 300 dots per inch (DPI).

Email manuscripts as Microsoft Word attachments to: editor@perconcordiam.org
NATO’s New Security Challenges

The Alliance must be agile in confronting modern threats such as cyber attacks

By Dr. Jamie Shea, NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary-General of the Emerging Security Challenges Division

Dutch soldiers stand in front of Patriot missiles in January 2013 as NATO prepared to ship the missile battery to Turkey. Such displays of tactical and strategic agility are vital to the defense of NATO members.
During the past 25 years, those analysts who have specialized in NATO have had to become experts in faraway places that were rarely on NATO’s radar screen during the Cold War: Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and the Gulf of Aden. This is because out-of-area operations have been the Alliance’s primary and certainly most visible activity. Moreover, NATO’s post-Cold War transformation has been largely driven by the need to prepare for, carry out and then learn the lessons from large-scale and very costly overseas deployments. NATO’s new Strategic Concept largely reflects this evolution with its emphasis on multinational capabilities, deployable headquarters and command structures, civil-military coordination of effort, and giving global partners more participation in the planning and conduct of operations in exchange for their contribution of forces.

When NATO governments look at the relevance and added value of the Alliance today, they think largely in terms of a “force multiplier” (a term used by U.S. President Barack Obama) or of a multinational command structure that can quickly bring together the mixture of multinational and national capabilities to conduct a land, sea or air campaign. Operations have certainly not been easy or uncontroversial for the Alliance. Just think of the criticism of NATO for its delay in intervening in Bosnia, or for not anticipating Milošević’s ethnic cleansing tactics in Kosovo, or for its shifting strategies and uneven burden sharing in Afghanistan. Moreover, operations are different from the Cold War scenarios of the past in that they do not result in total success or total failure but rather something in between. Even if NATO’s interventions have prevented worst-case scenarios, as in Kosovo or Libya, they have equally not produced the lasting peace, stability and prosperity that Alliance planners were hoping for. Yet, at the same time, operations have given NATO a mission and sense of purpose at a time when the prospect of an Article 5 collective defense mobilization in Europe – the traditional mission – has been at an all-time low.

As the Alliance approaches 2014, the date for the end of its ISAF operation in Afghanistan, and as it sees its other deployments in Kosovo, Iraq, the Mediterranean and the Gulf of Aden also wind down, the question is whether this current NATO business model, based largely on military operations under NATO command and political direction, will be viable in the future. In the past, when one operation came to an end, another was there to take over. Kosovo followed Bosnia, and Afghanistan followed Kosovo. But Libya was different in that an initial Allied air campaign was not followed by a long-term stabilization force on the ground. With declining public support for long-term nation building commitments and rapidly falling NATO defense budgets, governments are increasingly turning to short-term expedients such as drones, special forces operations and military assistance programs to keep threats from failed or failing states at bay. Consequently, if NATO will no longer be primarily defending its populations abroad in the future, it will need to do so increasingly at home and be more visible in what the United States has termed “homeland defense.”

This comes, too, from a recognition that attacks on NATO’s governments and their citizens are more likely these days to come in the form of electronic malware through fiber optic cables, or improvised explosive devices in mass transportation systems, or extreme weather conditions disrupting critical energy grids and infrastructure than in the form of tanks and infantry columns crossing NATO’s borders. Interestingly, 2011 was the highest recorded for insurance claims in response to natural disasters. According to the Financial Times, these disasters cost the global economy $570 billion and made companies and government officials across the globe aware of their vulnerabilities to critical supply chains and production facilities, often located in regions prone to earthquakes, tsunamis and major flooding. Hurricane Sandy, which struck the East Coast of the U.S. in October 2012, showed how a major storm can inflict the kind of damage to homes and infrastructure – and displace populations – that used to be associated with military attacks.

These “weapons of mass disruption” are not only the most likely threats, they are also the ones our citizens are most worried about, especially as they see how easy it is in modern societies for criminals, or
merely disgruntled individuals, to access software programs free on the Internet to steal our credit cards and personal data, or to build rudimentary explosives in their home kitchens. In short, if the vulnerability of the information technologies, energy grids and mass transportation systems on which we all increasingly depend is now the main security threat, NATO has to widen its remit to bring these new challenges under its traditional notion of collective defense and solidarity. Otherwise, there is the danger that when NATO’s ISAF mission ends in 2014, and if no new operation emerges in the near future to take its place, the Alliance will lack a significant trans-Atlantic security project to maintain its recent high profile and to mobilize the resources and political energy of its member nations. Certainly NATO will need to maintain interoperability among its forces and a minimal multinational planning and command structure to be able to generate an operation quickly, if required. But should this be NATO’s only future mission?

With these considerations in mind, it was not surprising that NATO’s new Strategic Concept, adopted at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, also gave the new security challenges a central place. Terrorism, cyber attacks, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), energy vulnerabilities and environmental constraints were highlighted in particular. This was not because they cover all the new threats (for instance, pandemics and organized crime were not mentioned), but because these are the areas where NATO’s essentially military capabilities have some value to add to broader international efforts. In addition, the Strategic Concept also calls on NATO to monitor and analyze the international environment to anticipate crises as a first step to better preventing them. Research by Brown University estimates that the U.S. has thus far expended $3.7 trillion in responding to the 9/11 attacks. Almost half of this sum has gone to the U.S. deployments in
Iraq and Afghanistan. Overall, this expenditure represents no less than 25 percent of the U.S. national debt and $2 trillion of the $7 trillion additional debt that the U.S. has accumulated in the past decade. Clearly security is not going to be a “budget neutral” activity for a very long time, if ever again. So prevention and using more political instruments to manage crises, particularly in their early stages, will no longer be simply desirable but essential.

This said, in adopting the new security challenges, NATO was not just adding to its shopping list. It was also presenting itself with a number of cultural, organizational and conceptual challenges. First and foremost, this is because with the exception of ballistic missile and WMD proliferation, the new challenges are largely civilian. Ninety percent of the Internet is privately owned and there are no national jurisdictions or 200-mile territorial limits in cyberspace. Equally, governments cannot mobilize computers or bandwidth to address a crisis in the way they can mobilize tanks or aircraft; nor can they rely on adversaries giving up the fight because of exhaustion, depletion of resources, geographical boundaries or lack of recruits. None of these traditional constraints apply in the cyber realm, where a computer is not a weapon per se but can have multiple uses for good or bad. So the new challenges cannot be confronted through the mathematical definition of a set of military forces (such as the old 1:3 ratio in Central Europe during the Cold War) or by the threat of military retaliation. Moreover, these challenges may not engage collective NATO defense and solidarity as easily or as automatically as a Soviet tank thrust through the Fulda Gap. Only one ally may be affected by an energy cut off or a cyber or terrorist attack. What is the threshold for activating NATO’s Article 5 if a country is paralyzed for days but no equipment is permanently damaged and nobody is physically harmed? In this case, would NATO solidarity not apply more to helping that
affected country to limit the damage and recover than to
going to war on its behalf? Or, alternatively, would solidarity
not apply more in trying to prevent these attacks in the first
place, or denying the attacker any benefit, than in respond-
ing collectively and with massive force after the event?

In sum, meeting the new security challenges will require
NATO to adopt a new business model. Rather than rely only
on deterrence and defense to ward off threats from actors
that will likely more often
than not be nonstate groups
or lone individuals, NATO
will have to operate on the
principle that attacks by
these nonstate actors (many
of them anonymous) will
inevitably happen. Security
policy must therefore be to
make them harder to carry
out and less successful –
and with a higher degree
of ability to attribute the
sources of the attack via
forensics and freezing of the
evidence. So the Allies have
to develop a real under-
standing of how cyberspace
operates (as opposed to the
more familiar notions of air,
sea and land space); they
must step up intelligence cooperation on these threats and
identify the critical infrastructure (whether IT pipelines or
grids) that need to be protected, given the impossibility of
protecting everything.

They must also better grasp the nature of hybrid threats.
For instance, environmental decay and illegal industrial
waste dumping off the coast of Somalia leads to a decline in
fish stocks. Somali fishermen then resort to piracy, which in
turn drives up insurance premiums for international ship-
ing and leads to an expensive deployment of counterpiracy
warships. The ransoms for the pirated vessels are taxed by
the local extremist organization, al-Shabab, which uses the
proceeds to buy arms and plan attacks, including hostage
taking in neighboring Kenya. This leads to hostilities between
Kenya and Somalia and to a Kenyan incursion into Somali
territory, provoking regional tensions. NATO must not only
understand the threats individually but also analyze how they
impact each other and identify the triggers that can turn a
local threat into a potential major international headache.

NATO’s new approach must focus on prevention,
recovery and overall resilience. Yet this involves a second
cultural shift. The NATO of the past was an Alliance that
had, generally speaking, an “all or nothing” approach.
Either the Alliance owned the issue almost entirely, being by
far the principal actor, or it stayed on the sidelines. Think
of Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan or Libya. NATO’s involve-
ment and contribution were significantly greater than for
any other actor and for large portions of the campaigns.

Missile defense is another area in which NATO is totally in
the lead in what is exclusively a military program. Yet the
great majority of crises today involve a very broad spectrum
of actors and assets (police, intelligence services, emergency
rescue agencies, the private sector, citizen’s action groups,
interior ministries and other international organizations).

There are currently more than 30 different interna-
tional agreements and codes of conduct in the area of cyber
security and many more in the pipeline. NATO can add valu-
able capabilities and expertise in areas such as cyber, critical infras-
structure protection or counter-
terrorism detection technology,
but it cannot play the dominant
role. It has to accept being part
of the chorus rather than the
leading tenor or soprano. That
means defining policies that
not only support NATO’s own
requirements but support the
efforts of others and fit them
into an established international
framework of norms and coop-
eration (for instance, making
NATO’s use of cyber defense or
emerging technologies fit within
international humanitarian law
or the laws of armed conflicts).

The Alliance also has to decide if it wants to be primarily
a technical contributor focusing on equipment, capabili-
ties and technology for the defense of its own organization
and armed forces, or whether it also wants to be a political
actor helping to define the new rules of the game. Examples
include confidence-building measures in cyberspace or
new forms of agreement to combat nuclear or other WMD
proliferation.

Moreover, if NATO is to develop its niche areas, it will
need to interact more with the branches of government that
have the main responsibility, including interior ministries,
cabinet offices, intelligence services and police agencies
such as Interpol and Europol. When NATO Headquarters
organized a meeting of the national heads of cyber defense
in 2011, a large number had never been to NATO before.
So NATO will need to be able to reach beyond its traditional
stakeholders in the foreign and defense ministries and
create a new operational and consultative network. Will the
foreign and defense ministries agree to share NATO policym-
aking with their interior ministry or police counterparts?
Will the latter see NATO, with its heavily military culture, as
a visible interlocutor? Will NATO be able to run successful
partnerships with industry in areas such as intelligent soft-
ware, malware detection, Internet identification smart grids
or new counterterrorism technologies so as to steer industry
towards NATO’s needs? In short, a permanent partnership
is required rather than the occasional meeting when it is
time to negotiate new procurement contracts. Contractor
support will increasingly be embedded in NATO’s day-to-day activities and in its contingency planning for a surge of capability to manage crisis situations.

But no less important in these times of financial constraint will be to analyze the new challenges more systematically in order to determine the most rational and cost-effective approach to meeting them. This has to begin with an upgrade of NATO’s political consultations and intelligence sharing. In recent times, those consultations have been too narrowly focused on regions where the Alliance is leading operations. Indeed, the public often thinks security threats exist only in places where NATO has troops (and some people even believe that the threats exist because NATO deployed the troops in the first place). But the end of ISAF in 2014 should reduce the demands on the North Atlantic Council to direct operations and free up more time for scanning the horizon.

More time needs to be spent analyzing global trends and harmonizing Allied assessments. More time also needs to be spent crafting common NATO positions and locking in partners where possible. The recent common NATO-Russia position at the Biological and Toxin Weapons Review conference in Geneva is an excellent example of such a proactive political initiative even between partners that have differences in other areas.

Winston Churchill famously said, “Gentlemen, we have run out of money. So now we must think.” Similarly, NATO will have to track potential threats at a much earlier stage and achieve a more sophisticated understanding of how hybrid threats are formed from the interconnection of trends such as terrorism, narcotics or organized crime. Such an analysis in NATO can also help its member states to identify the most cost-effective response to a given issue, which may not always be a military deployment. For instance, is piracy best solved at sea or on land? Are private guards on oil tankers more useful than warships in the Gulf of Aden? Is training Somali coast guard and customs personnel a better investment than financing pirate tribunals in Kenya or the Seychelles? Can improved maritime surveillance help to compensate for a small number of available ships? It is by having the capacity to do this kind of assessment and cost-benefit analysis that NATO will achieve better results, especially given that it is very difficult to reverse a military deployment once it has occurred.

The cost of military deployments can also outweigh the value of the strategic objective being pursued. For instance, in Afghanistan, most of the counterinsurgency is carried out by a small number of Special Operations Forces rather than the bulk of the stabilization forces. Or take another example: Billions of dollars have been spent by NATO militaries to deal with the few seconds when an improvised explosive device explodes in Afghanistan and with the resulting shock waves against NATO troops and vehicles. But a different approach, such as the U.S. Operation Global Shield, in which the U.S. military works with U.S. Customs and Border protection and the Pakistani Coast Guard to interdict the illicit maritime transport of chemicals, including ammonium nitrate and hydrogen peroxide, only costs hundreds of thousands of dollars and can be much more effective. This is what the military calls “moving to the left of the bang”: identifying the networks of organized crime, technology, middlemen and terrorists that produce threats, and using the military, police, customs, intelligence services and scientific laboratories to disrupt these networks at their vulnerable points. In sum, a networked threat requires an equally networked response, one that can be adapted as quickly as the threat metamorphoses from one element (small arms) to another (terrorist groups).

The creation of a new division (Emerging Security Challenges) in the NATO international staff in August 2010 has given this new area of NATO’s work a distinct focal point. The new division has been able to bring the rather fragmented strands of NATO’s previous efforts together in a more coherent whole and increasingly to link these efforts to the work of other bodies such as the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the European Union, and the Council of Europe. It has also carried out a review of all its activities to cut down on duplication of effort and to steer them towards NATO’s key priorities rather than treat them as ends in themselves. The partner dimension has also become increasingly important. In May 2011, NATO foreign ministers in Berlin offered the partners an upgraded relationship based on an expanded toolbox of cooperative activities and more “28 +N” consultations with those partners that have specialist expertise and resources to contribute. Many partners share a common vulnerability and interest in dealing with the new challenges alongside the Allies (perhaps a greater interest than in contributing to out-of-area deployments). Consequently, outside interest in working with the division is high, despite some political obstacles (such as the sharing of sensitive intelligence on cyber threats and methodologies). NATO must build new coalitions with partners. This is also a way for Europe and North America to push their norms (for instance on a cyber code of conduct or confidence-building measures) within the broader international community.

During the past two years, NATO has chalked up some successes in expanding its role on the new security challenges. It has agreed to a new cyber defense policy and related action plan. The upgrade of NATO’s Computer Incident Response Centre, completed in late 2012, will bring all of the Alliance’s military and civilian networks under centralized, 24/7 cyber management while allowing the Alliance to provide more immediate and longer-term assistance to its members in areas such as training, education, systems configuration, intrusion detection, data package capture and consequence management. Two rapid response teams are being established, and the NATO Centre of Excellence on Cyber Defence in Tallinn, Estonia, is conducting exercises and pooling information and expertise and has compiled a “Tallinn Manual” on the status of international law in regulating cyberspace. Cyber defense is gradually being incorporated into NATO’s defense planning and NATO exercises are rehearsing the procedures and decision making cycles for assessing and reacting to cyber attacks.

NATO has also conducted an in-depth review of the political and military instruments to combat terrorism that it has employed since 9/11. It is also revising its Defence against Terrorism Programme of Work to look at training and process
management as well as at hard core capabilities such as force protection against improvised explosive devices (which kill and maim more NATO soldiers than any other weapon at the moment) and helicopter and aircraft survivability. The needs of Special Forces, especially in the areas of forensics and dedicated airlift, are becoming more important. NATO’s approach to energy and environmental security is also becoming more systematic, especially in the area of critical infrastructure protection in which we can build on previous work in the field of civil emergency planning and established best practices exchanges between government and the private sector. At the same time, the Alliance’s new strategic analysis capability has helped NATO ambassadors consult on current or potential crisis areas, to improve their situational awareness and to identify how NATO’s many tools (partnerships, training programs, more integrated civilian-military planning, rapid response forces) can be better used for crisis prevention and management rather than being mobilized only late in the day when the crisis has turned into a full-blown conflict.

So the record after two and a half years is a respectable one, but it is not yet fully satisfactory. NATO will need to develop the high-level political attention and the holistic approach needed to respond effectively to the emerging threats. It must define its level of ambition in these various areas, so that the practical work can move ahead without reopening the discussion at every corner. NATO cannot wait for the next energy crisis or Estonian-type cyber attack to get its act together. These challenges are the future of collective defense. Inevitably, over the past years, dealing with NATO’s operations has taken up the greater part of the Alliance’s time at the expense of discussing other equally pressing challenges, unless, of course, they dovetailed with operational requirements such as the need to develop technology to counter terrorist use of improvised explosive devices in Afghanistan. Also, some Alliance countries have been skeptical of NATO’s legitimate role or added value in dealing with these challenges, believing that the response lies primarily with other bodies such as the UN, the EU or Interpol, even though these bodies are often keen to cooperate with NATO and acknowledge its expertise in key niche areas. Such concerns can only be dispelled if the Allies devote more time to discussing the new challenges and to agreeing to coherent NATO policies that allow NATO military and civilian staff to work more freely and productively in areas in which NATO’s expertise and added value are proven.

Leon Trotsky famously said: “You may not be interested war, but war is interested in you.” Similarly, the new security challenges will increasingly test NATO’s posture and readiness, whether it is prepared and willing or not. These new threats are good at identifying and exploiting vulnerabilities and they adapt and reorganize very quickly. In the future, no defense will work statically for decades on end as nuclear deterrence and flexible response worked for NATO during the Cold War years. The future belongs to the agile, not to the stolid. So the new emerging threats will force their way onto NATO’s agenda. It is better that we be prepared to overcome them before they overcome us.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone. They do not represent an official position of NATO.

A similar version of this article appeared in the NATO Joint Warfare Center’s publication “The Three Swords,” January/July 2012.
Resetting Relations with Russia

Central Asia and missile defense are two areas in which NATO and Russia could launch a long-term rapprochement

By Dr. Denis Alexeev, Saratov University, Russia

Russian missiles at a military parade in May 2012 near the Kremlin in Moscow. Russia views NATO’s anti-ballistic missile system as a threat to its missiles.
Despite the “reset” that began in 2008, current relations between Russia and the West are characterized by noticeable complications. More than 20 years after the end of the Cold War and its ideological confrontation, relations between Russia and the countries of the West are contradictory in nature, with areas of close cooperation offset by mutual criticism and distrust. And rather than being a mitigating factor, Vladimir Putin’s return to the Russian presidency has exacerbated the numerous differences of recent years.

On a positive note, Russia and the United States have made considerable progress in establishing a dialogue on nuclear disarmament issues; there has been cooperation on a broad range of projects in politics and economics between Russia and European Union countries; and joint Russia-EU-U.S. efforts to resolve problems in the Middle East, Afghanistan and Iran continue.

However, by no means have these instances become a prologue to closer cooperation and converging viewpoints between Russia and NATO. There are significant differences in understanding
and perception of the current international security agenda. Distrust, competition, political discord and differences in approach regarding the future of European and Eurasian security structures are still clearly visible in relations between Russia and NATO.

**Partnership building**

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia-NATO relations have seen periods of close cooperation and rapprochement and disagreements accompanied by breaking off of contacts and freezing of joint projects. A clearer picture of relations between Russia and the Alliance after the collapse of the USSR can be seen by dividing it into several phases, each with its own particular characteristics and features.

The first phase, 1991-1998, was characterized by a lengthy process of constructing a legal and regulatory basis for bilateral relations through strategic documents signed by Russia and NATO that would define and formalize cooperation. During this period, the Russia-NATO Permanent Joint Council began operation. Both parties took cautious, positive steps toward one another, rejecting once and for all the legacy of the Cold War. Russian and NATO leaders demonstrated the political will needed for rapprochement, slowly but surely forging a path of political and military cooperation. Russia and NATO even conducted joint peacekeeping operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The second phase, 1999-2000, saw a considerable downturn in relations, sparked by Russia’s reaction to the NATO operation in Kosovo, conducted without explicit mandate of the United Nations Security Council and, Russia believes, in violation of international law. Meanwhile, in 1999, Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic joined NATO, extending the Alliance eastward. Cooperation between Russian and NATO peacekeeping contingents in Kosovo was also not always successful.

The third phase, 2001-2004, was characterized by a new wave of rapprochement, largely associated – as paradoxical as it may seem – with Vladimir Putin coming to power. As president, he took several demonstrative steps toward the West, supporting the U.S. in the war on terror and joining the anti-terrorist coalition. There was a reassessment of common threats and challenges and significant progress in relations with NATO. In 2001, the NATO Information Center and the NATO Military Liaison Mission opened in Moscow. In 2002, a new body coordinating bilateral cooperation was created at the NATO Summit in Prague – the Russia-NATO Council – moving consultations and cooperation to a higher level. As NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson put it, the transition from the Permanent Joint Council of “19+1” to the Russia-NATO Council of “20” is not a question of arithmetic, but of chemistry. This phase can be described as one of the most successful and positive in the history of bilateral relations.

The fourth phase, 2005-2012, is the longest and most complex phase in terms of its structure. Russia-NATO relations encountered various challenges and compromises, but fell within a specific formula that can be defined as “pragmatic cooperation and strategic competition.” There were downturns (the 2008 Russia-Georgia war over South Ossetia) and serious steps toward rapprochement (creation of a NATO transshipment base on Russian territory for redeployment of NATO forces from Afghanistan). However, besides the visible and sophisticated military-to-military cooperation, the political tone throughout this phase remained cool.

Other events that Moscow saw as unfavorable happened during this period. A series of “color revolutions” that the Kremlin was convinced were backed by the U.S. and Western Europe shaped regime change in several former Soviet republics. Additionally, the NATO enlargement process continued, with the accession of the Baltic states, while steps were taken to attract Ukraine and Georgia into NATO’s sphere of influence, provoking open irritation in Moscow. Implementation of the program to deploy anti-ballistic missile (ABM) components in Europe also sparked sharp criticism from Russia.

The Kremlin did not expect its Western partners to move so decisively in the East. These U.S., NATO and EU programs in the post-Soviet space were perceived in Moscow as interference in the most sensitive sphere of Russian foreign policy. Moscow had believed that supporting the U.S. and its allies in the war on terror and encouraging a policy of political rapprochement would preserve the status quo in the post-Soviet space, perceived by Russia’s leaders as a zone of vital interest. However, the reality was different. Russia’s decisive August 2008 action in Georgia can be viewed as a specific response to the pressure it perceived in previous years.

None of this, however, indicates a return to confrontation between Russia and NATO. Understanding the psychology and mentality of modern Russian elites is key to understanding Russia’s vision of bilateral cooperation with NATO. Moscow has repeatedly confirmed the common nature of modern threats and seeks to sustain constructive cooperation, at least to the extent this is understood among Russian military and political leadership. Viewing the history of Russia-NATO relations, it’s clear that complications have occurred alongside a considerable number of successful joint projects and operations in military, civilian and scientific areas.

More than 600 significant actions and projects were conducted between 2001 and 2012, including joint exercises and operations. Operational compatibility improved significantly, confirmed by numerous successful exercises, such as coordinated actions in protection of critical infrastructure, counterpiracy operations and combating terrorism. This has unquestionably benefited participating parties considerably and helped strengthen trust between Russian and NATO military personnel.

Russia acknowledges that the years of cooperation were important for its armed forces. In particular, NATO provided serious assistance in developing and organizing the system for transitioning active duty service personnel into reservists. In the past 10 years, more than 150,000 Russian military officers have passed instruction and training courses.
at the Joint Russia-NATO Information and Consultation Training Center in Moscow and its regional branches. The experiences of NATO countries have considerably influenced the process of reforming the Russian Army. For example, Russia borrowed ideas about new troop dispositions, integrating tactical military garrisons into larger strategic commands, and reforming air forces and air defense forces. Some principles of military structure were also largely borrowed from NATO countries.

The process of building Russia-NATO relations indicates that, during the past 20 years, the parties have learned to cooperate on a wide range of issues. They have resolved conflicts and complex situations and overcome seemingly acute and fundamental differences. This experience can be used to intensify cooperation and search for compromises on disputed issues in the future. However, despite reasons for optimism, the most problematic areas in Russia-NATO relations require special attention.

Russia’s view of enlargement
The issue of NATO enlargement traditionally evokes a negative reaction in Russia. Twenty years of Russian foreign policy show that this perception is anchored in something deeper than the nature of Russian power, the personality of the president, the state of the economy or social activity. There are several causes of this perception, both rational and emotional. First, as a continental state, Russia has always sought to secure itself from possible threats by surrounding itself with a belt of friendly states and allies. Given that two large-scale invasions – in the 19th and 20th centuries – came from the West, it is very difficult for Russian political tradition and strategic thinking to disregard NATO expansion.

Including neighboring states in military-political alliances to which Russia does not belong has a powerful negative psychological effect.

Second, NATO expansion into former Soviet republics suggests a painful loss of international status, a feeling common not only among contemporary Russian political elites, but among ordinary Russians. And putting emotions aside, most Russian experts and military strategists view NATO expansion as a violation of the strategic balance of forces in Europe. Russia has no clear answers to significant questions such as: How will the inclusion of former Soviet republics in the Alliance increase security in the region? What threats are prompting NATO to accept new members? How will NATO enlargement ease Russia’s own security concerns?

Nevertheless, the negative attitude toward NATO expansion does not mean that the Alliance is perceived as a threat to Russia. Russian officials, however, often use critical and, at times, harsh rhetoric to discuss NATO and its policies, which creates a certain image of a persistent external threat. In practice, Russia is eager to cooperate in areas such as Afghanistan, counter-drug trafficking and terrorism. An example of this dichotomy is the NATO transit hub in Ulyanovsk. After years of anti-NATO discourse, the Russian government was forced to explain to its citizens that cooperation between NATO and Russia is necessary. Ironically, Dmitry Rogozin, former Russian ambassador to NATO (and known in Russia as a prominent NATO critic), was forced to defend cooperation with the Alliance against criticism within Russia.

No one seriously considers the likelihood of armed conflict. Russia has no disputes with NATO countries that could even hypothetically serve as a reason for conflict, and it is very unlikely that any such conflicts of interests will appear in the foreseeable future. But many in Russia view NATO as an outdated 20th-century alliance unrealistically expanding to strengthen Europe in a modern international security environment, despite rhetoric about fundamental changes in the nature of security threats in Eurasia requiring new methods. In 2008, Russia proposed that adapting European security architecture to the current international environment required a new framework. It’s proposed European Security Treaty outlined a new common security space “from Vancouver to Vladivostok” in which Russia would be a stakeholder. That idea was criticized by many NATO members, and finally rejected, raises serious concern in Moscow.

So changes in the Russian position on the Alliance’s expansion can hardly be expected, regardless of what leader occupies the presidency and which party has the
Anti-missile defense
NATO military experts and political leaders generally regard Russia’s attitude toward stationing ABM components in Eastern Europe as extremely negative. This is partly true, but the situation is more complex than it seems. There are experts and politicians in Russia who believe the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) for deploying the Euro-ABM system undermines global strategic stability. Loud commentary claims the anti-missile system’s ultimate goal is to create conditions allowing an annihilating nuclear strike on Russian strategic targets. The existence of a complex ABM system, with hundreds of interceptors, would deprive Russia of the ability to deliver a retaliatory strike. The press and an entire range of expert publications actively paint frightening pictures of Russian strategic nuclear forces being deprived of their ability to deter a potential enemy attack. Alarmists consider the planned deployment of the Euro-ABM by 2020 to be a factor in increasing the likelihood of armed conflict because the strategic balance between NATO and Russia will be more disproportional.

Such assessments are largely the result of a high level of uncertainty regarding the potential and configuration of the Euro-ABM. How far can it be expanded? What are its future capabilities? No significant progress has been made in bringing the Russian and NATO positions closer together. At the NATO Lisbon Summit in November 2010, Russia and NATO committed to increase cooperation in the area of ABM. However, Moscow’s initiatives to create a joint ABM defense system for Europe, which would have assumed Russia’s direct participation in the Euro-ABM system, were not supported by NATO partners. Nor was there progress on many other issues concerning ABM and its future operation.

Military experts in Russia cannot help being concerned by the unilateral nature of NATO’s buildup in ABM. They lack a clear understanding of the potential and the ultimate configuration of the system, which theoretically may be supplemented by new programs and components after 2020, or of NATO’s goals for the system. Many Russian observers stress their assessment that the overall potential of the Euro-ABM considerably exceeds the capabilities necessary to repel a potential Iranian missile attack. Such conditions make it easy to convince the public and inexperienced politicians that the ABM goals of the U.S. and NATO are threatening, especially given the complex relations between Russia and the Alliance.

In response to NATO actions, Russia has called for a significant increase in defense spending, as well as placement of nuclear-warhead capable tactical missile systems in Kaliningrad Oblast. Concurrently, Russia’s Chief of General Staff Valery Gerasimov officially announced in early December 2012 a Russian proposal to create a joint air defense-ABM system under the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) alliance. The idea of integrating air defense and missile defense systems has existed for a long time, but its implementation was accelerated by NATO’s resolve to station ABM components in Eastern Europe.

Initially, the joint CSTO plan would have established three independent air defense-ABM system zones: an Eastern European zone, a Caucasian zone and a Central Asian zone. The Eastern European zone would control the air space of Russia and Belarus. Agreements to create an integrated air defense with Belarus and Armenia were signed relatively long ago, and the necessary agreements with Central Asian allies were signed in recent months. It is noteworthy that Uzbekistan, despite withdrawing from CSTO, supported Moscow’s initiative. In July 2012, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Air Defense Coordinating Committee, met in Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbek Air Defense and Air Force commander Emurad Mashrapov said Uzbekistan had no plans to abandon participation in joint CIS air defense.

Thus, by strengthening the CSTO’s air defense and ABM capabilities, Russia is not only sending signals to Washington and Brussels, but also increasing the value of any future Russian participation in a joint European ABM System. Russian officials have repeatedly articulated that creating a Euro-ABM without Russian participation will not strengthen European security or mutual trust between Russia and its NATO partners.

However, a large number of respected Russian foreign policy, security, and nuclear weapons specialists, many of whom are directly involved in the creation of new missile technologies and ABM systems, say the Euro-ABM system does not represent a threat to the capabilities of Russian strategic nuclear forces. These experts’ analyses indicate that the technologies employed in the Euro-ABM system are not only ineffective against Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles, but the Euro-ABM is not oriented to intercept Russian missiles. Even when the EPAA is completely deployed in 2020, the ABM system will not be capable of shooting down Russian missiles equipped with the latest anti-ABM technologies, not to mention submarine-launched ballistic missiles located beyond the coverage area. The majority of the most prominent Russian experts, who include Sergei Rogov, Aleksandr Kalyadin, Pavel Zolotarev, Vladimir Dvorkin, Yuri Solomin, Viktor Yesin, Aleksei Arbatov, share this viewpoint to one degree or another.

The absence of a real threat to Russia by the EPAA does not mean Russian concerns are completely unfounded, given the nuances and a lack of clarity on a considerable range of issues. The parties tend to speak different languages in negotiations on Euro-ABM. Meanwhile, cooperation in the area of analysis and mitigation of WMD proliferation still leaves space for rapprochement. There is good potential for cooperation in
strengthening the compatibility of Russian and European air defense and ABM systems in light of possible changes in the strategic situation in the Middle East and North Africa. This could not only extend missile defense coverage in area and efficiency, but would also deter some countries from developing offensive weapons and technologies.

**Improved cooperation**

Russia’s and NATO’s conflicting views on a number of issues certainly do not place them on the brink of confrontation. On the contrary, there are many key issues that may become very important in strengthening and increasing bilateral cooperation.

The question of maintaining security in Afghanistan and Central Asia following the withdrawal of coalition forces in 2014 presents numerous opportunities for cooperation. Research by Kazakhstan’s Institute of Political Solutions shows that, in 2012, the index of security in Central Asia was gradually decreasing while the likelihood of conflict between states in the region was increasing. This is associated with growing competition between Russia and NATO for a regional presence. Central Asian republics are very sensitive to tensions between Russia and NATO in the region, and they rely on their ability to play on antagonisms between the competitors to resolve cross-border disputes and interstate conflicts. Several low-intensity, armed clashes were reported in autumn 2012 between Uzbek and Kyrgyz and between Uzbek and Tajik border guards, events that could grow into a larger regional conflict. These appeared to be attempts by Uzbekistan to use relatively favorable political circumstances, particularly its rapprochement with the U.S. and withdrawal from CSTO, to put pressure on its neighbors.

NATO countries, especially the U.S., would unquestionably be interested in establishing military and logistical infrastructure in the region capable of monitoring functions and serving as a security cordon against transborder activities by al-Qaeda and other violent extremist groups. Russia has traditionally been cautious about strengthening military infrastructure of third-party countries in a region close to its borders. Still, both Moscow and Brussels understand the seriousness of the threat that may come from the South. This could be a good starting point for negotiation and advancement of regional cooperation. A new agenda for resolving a wide range of regional security issues would meet the interests of NATO and Russia.

Such a division of labor would give greater clarity to the strategic tasks of each and could be formalized in bilateral framework documents. An agreement between Russia and the U.S./NATO on delimiting spheres of responsibility could significantly reduce uncertainty inherent in the withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan and diminish attempts by Central Asian nations to manipulate disagreements between Moscow and Washington. Establishing a clear, joint vision on Central Asian regional security development would send positive signals to Central Asian and other post-Soviet republics, encouraging them to take a common course and contribute to the positive development of regional security.

However paradoxical it may sound, the Euro-ABM system also has great potential for strengthening Russia-NATO cooperation. Remaining differences on missile defense actually open up new windows for rapprochement. This would require a number of preconditions. First, NATO would need to make the Euro-ABM system clearer and more predictable for Russia. This requires more than simple assurances that the ABM system is not directed against Russia or granting regular monitoring privileges. Practical mechanisms would need to be implemented, enabling the Russian military to do more than just observe the EPAA transformation. These mechanisms would have to contain options and opportunities, through the forthcoming years, for Russia to become an integral part of the architecture to repel potential threats. It may take years to find common ground as existing differences are still substantial and the rapprochement process is unlikely to move quickly. The parties, however, should leave themselves options for unification of their missile defense capabilities, if and when it might be necessary in the future.

The second precondition stems from the first one. Russia and NATO need to move forward in identifying threats for which the new European missile defense system should be designed to repel. It is increasingly obvious that an adapted ABM system will be able to accomplish more complex tasks than intercepting the few nuclear-warhead equipped missiles that Iran will hypothetically be able to deploy in the foreseeable future. Russia and NATO could increase trust with a frank discussion of potential threats regarding the dissemination of nuclear and missile technologies, with detailed delineation of specific aspects and areas of cooperation.

The general nature of threats, such as instability in the Middle East and North Africa, the spread of extremist movements and ideologies in Central Asia and South Asia, terrorism and many others, require NATO and Russia to establish some degree of technical compatibility and, if possible, integration of their ABM systems. This is clearly not a one-year task – it could possibly require a decade or more – but Russia and NATO have a chance to set a course of cooperation for the long term. Defining a “road map” of Russia-NATO cooperative measures, parallel to the implementation of the existing EPAA, would be a good start. Specifically, each successive step in implementing the EPAA would be linked to measures that would increase cooperation with Russia. Such an agreement, supplemented by a specific list of joint measures, could significantly increase trust and reduce tensions between Russia and NATO. It is possible that military cooperation could become a bridge to smoothing political disputes between Russia and NATO member states. It is an opportunity worth taking.

Successful implementation of the opportunities presented by the two courses mentioned could become part of the agenda for the Putin and Obama governments to resuscitate the “resetting” of bilateral relations. In the end, military cooperation might succeed in smoothing out the political differences between Russia and the United States. In any case, this is a chance both countries should take.

*Editors’ Note:* The U.S. government recently announced plans to abandon Phase 4 of the European Missile Defense Plan.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author.
Ballistic Missile DEFENSE
A New Task For NATO

By Lt. Gen. Friedrich Wilhelm Ploeger, German Air Force

German soldiers demonstrate Patriot anti-missile batteries before sending them to Turkey in December 2012. NATO will use Patriot and other technology to shield Europe from possible ballistic missile threats.

GETTY IMAGES
A

The proliferation of ballistic missiles advances quickly because they are relatively cheap, can be used against a superior opponent, and can be topped with warheads equipped with either conventional explosives or weapons of mass destruction. Some states are already able to reach NATO territory with their missiles. Others could represent a threat to NATO's areas of interest. Missile technology keeps improving: Ranges are increasing, and precision and payload are improving. And the number of states possessing ballistic missiles keeps growing.

NATO cannot ignore this threat. And we cannot afford to have one of our cities become the target of an attack. The threat is real, and NATO needs to take steps to counter it and provide security for its territory and its 900 million inhabitants. That is, after all, its raison d'être. The Alliance needs to act and demonstrate its resolve to protect its territory, its population and its armed forces. So NATO will have to prove that it is neither impressed nor intimidated by the proliferation of ballistic missiles. Ballistic missile defense will – just like air policing today – be a core element and visible proof of the Alliance’s collective defense capabilities, a challenge that could redefine the strategic importance of the trans-Atlantic link.

**Missile Defense in NATO**

The proliferation of ballistic missiles advances quickly because they are relatively cheap, can be used against a superior opponent, and can be topped with warheads equipped with either conventional explosives or weapons of mass destruction. Some states are already able to reach NATO territory with their missiles. Others could represent a threat to NATO’s areas of interest. Missile technology keeps improving: Ranges are increasing, and precision and payload are improving. And the number of states possessing ballistic missiles keeps growing.

NATO cannot ignore this threat. And we cannot afford to have one of our cities become the target of an attack. The threat is real, and NATO needs to take steps to counter it and provide security for its territory and its 900 million inhabitants. That is, after all, its raison d'être. The Alliance needs to act and demonstrate its resolve to protect its territory, its population and its armed forces. So NATO will have to prove that it is neither impressed nor intimidated by the proliferation of ballistic missiles. Ballistic missile defense will – just like air policing today – be a core element and visible proof of the Alliance’s collective defense capabilities, a challenge that could redefine the strategic importance of the trans-Atlantic link.

**Trans-Atlantic Cooperation**

Setting up the protective BMD umbrella remains a complex task, even though NATO has already started to develop an operational capability to protect troops in the field against short-range missile attacks. Systems such as Patriot have proven to be effective, and operators have become familiar with the technology. Now the system’s capacities need to be developed further to protect NATO territory and populations in Europe. A phased-adaptive approach was chosen to reduce technical risks and offer a higher degree of protection from any threat. It will enable NATO always to be one step ahead.

The backbone of the system is those capabilities that the United States offers under the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). The U.S. will make its early warning system available to a new joint command structure, thus reaffirming its commitment to the trans-Atlantic Alliance. The first sea-based defense capabilities were stationed in the Mediterranean in early summer 2011.

But U.S. capabilities alone are not sufficient. To protect European NATO countries, the European partners need to provide additional capabilities such as sensors or effectors. Seven partners (Germany, the Netherlands, France, Italy, Spain, Greece and Poland) already contribute to force protection with defense systems that will be integrated into the new system. The core task is to merge existing capabilities into a new integrated system. This integration of individual partner assets is an efficient way of creating new Allied defense capabilities. This will lead to a higher level of protection than a single country could achieve on its own. The new system represents a strong and visible contribution by both the U.S. and European NATO countries to the common pillar of trans-Atlantic security. It will link the partners even closer and strengthen the Alliance. BMD will lead to greater cohesion in the trans-Atlantic alliance.

**BMD Command and Control**

NATO decided to set up an integrated command and control system that will maintain the integrity of air space and simultaneously provide air defense and protection against ballistic missile attacks. After the heads of state and government and the defense ministers decided in June 2011 to maintain only one air command (at Ramstein Air Base in Germany) under the new structure, it makes sense for the BMD operational command to be established in the same place.

The time frame for the engagement sequence in BMD is extremely short: The reaction time from the detection of a launch until re-entry and impact in the target area is only a few minutes. Therefore, a comprehensive system of rules of engagement and preplanned responses needs to be worked out for all decision-making levels, from the political and strategic level down to the tactical implementation level, and serve as a guideline for leaders at the operational command center in case of a direct threat.

The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), as
## European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Enhanced homeland defense. Deployment of existing radar and anti-missile interceptors aboard Alliance ships in the Mediterranean. SM-3 missiles would provide the coverage against short- and medium-range missiles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Aegis BMD 3.6.1 with SM-3 IA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- AN/TPY-2/Forward-Based Mode (FBM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- C2BMC (Ramstein Air Base, Germany)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) - interim capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Increased capability would allow for the interception of short- and medium-range missiles. NATO would broaden protection by placing interceptor sites on land, while maintaining anti-missile weapons aboard ships for maximum maneuverability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Aegis BMD 4.0.1/5.0 with SM-3 IB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Aegis Ashore 5.0 with SM-3 IB (one site)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- AN/TPY-2 (FBM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- C2BMC - data updates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- ALTBMD (lower tier)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Potential EPAA enhancements:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- THAAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Improved technology would allow the expansion of Europe’s anti-ballistic missile network to counter threats from intermediate-range missiles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Aegis BMD 5.1/5.0 with SM-3 IIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Aegis Ashore 5.1 with SM-3 IB/IIA (two sites)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- AN/TPY-2 (FBM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- C2BMC - data updates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- ALTBMD (upper tier)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Potential EPAA enhancements:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- THAAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- PTSS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- ABIR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>Canceled by U.S. in March 2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### PHASE 1 (2011)
- Enhanced homeland defense.
- Deployment of existing radar and anti-missile interceptors aboard Alliance ships in the Mediterranean.
- SM-3 missiles would provide the coverage against short- and medium-range missiles.

### PHASE 2 (2015)
- Increased capability would allow for the interception of short- and medium-range missiles.
- NATO would broaden protection by placing interceptor sites on land, while maintaining anti-missile weapons aboard ships for maximum maneuverability.

### PHASE 3 (2018)
- Improved technology would allow the expansion of Europe’s anti-ballistic missile network to counter threats from intermediate-range missiles.

### PHASE 4 (CANCELED BY U.S. IN MARCH 2013)
- Enhanced homeland defense.
- Deployment of existing radar and anti-missile interceptors aboard Alliance ships in the Mediterranean.
- SM-3 missiles would provide the coverage against short- and medium-range missiles.

### Command, Control, Battle Management and Communications (C2BMC)

### Alliance ships with Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)

### Standard Missile-3 (SM-3)

### Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)

### Precision Tracking Space System (PTSS)
the Missile Defense Coordinating Authority, has strategic as well as operational command. Sensors and effectors will be placed under the operational control of the Air Commander, who advises SACEUR on threat assessment and the deployment decisions required for optimum defense of the areas to be protected, and who also coordinates levels of readiness and – after delegation of authority – conducts the fire fight.

**Interim and Future Capability**

Between June 2011, when defense ministers decided where to base NATO’s Command Structure, and the Chicago summit in May 2012, NATO and Ramstein Air Command had only 10 months to develop the technical and organizational elements of the new command and control capability. In a major effort, they managed to set up the command and control system in time. The first test run for data links took place at the beginning of August 2011. It went so well that they were confident enough to start the next test: live observation of the engagement sequence against a tactical missile under tactical fire by a German Patriot battery stationed in Crete.

In this case, too, the outcome was very positive. For both tests, Combined Air Operations Centre Uedem’s vehicle-mounted interim technology developed for Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense was used. When the Interim Capability was extended, Ramstein Air Command was equipped with an upgraded version of that technology in March 2012. The performance of the new version was tested during an exercise (Air and Missile Defence Exercise [AMDEX]) at the beginning of April 2012. Only three months lapsed between the release of funds in the second half of January 2012 to the operational testing of AMDEX. With its early warning information and real time monitoring of interception operations, this technology offers Ramstein Air Command the situational awareness required for command and control of defense operations.

At the same time, the NATO Council made decisions on the interim implementation concept, the defense architecture and the rules of engagement that provide the basis for the operational Interim Capability announced in Chicago. At the core of this interim concept are the capabilities provided by the U.S. under phase 1 of the EPA: interception capabilities on AEGIS-equipped vessels, the early warning radar stationed in Turkey, and the satellite-based early warning information as part of the operational NATO command and control system protecting the southeastern part of NATO’s territory.

By 2015 the range and effectiveness of this Interim Capability will have improved so much that Initial Operating Capability is reached, and by 2020 the Final Operating Capability will protect all of European NATO territory.

**Cooperation with Third Parties**

Cooperation with non-NATO countries is one of the Alliance’s stated goals, since those countries might also be affected by the consequences of BMD – intercepted missiles or fragments of interceptors might rain down on their territory.

Large parts of Russia are exposed to the same threat as European NATO countries, and NATO is convinced that political, military and practical cooperation with Russia makes sense. NATO is ready to set up joint centers for the exchange of early warning information and the coordination of activities, ensuring full transparency in these efforts. This is a confidence building measure intended to convince Russia that there is no hidden NATO agenda. However, statements from the Russian side claiming that NATO’s BMD would force Russia to upgrade its offensive systems are not helpful. We are positive that close cooperation with NATO will be in Russia’s best interest.

In one respect, however, NATO will remain adamant: Collective defense continues to be the Alliance’s core task, something NATO will not “outsource” to any state outside the Alliance. The same is true for Russia – it will not want to give up such a core function of its sovereignty.

Ballistic missile technology is proliferating. So BMD has become a new task for the Alliance, and it is vital for trans-Atlantic cohesion. By pooling NATO and U.S. resources, the Alliance managed to cope with the enormously complex task of achieving a first interim operational capability in May 2012.

BMD is not a replacement for nuclear deterrence, but a complementary initiative required if traditional deterrence is not effective. It will increase NATO’s political options. Cooperation with third-party states is NATO’s professed goal, and Russia’s inclusion into early warning and coordination mechanisms is in the interest of both sides.

The decision of the U.S. Government on March 16, 2013, to cancel phase 4 of the European Phased Adaptive Approach does not affect the goal of creating a protective cover for the whole of European territory, population and forces. It has, however, an impact on the system’s capability to intercept ICBMs aimed at the eastern shore of the continental United States. This phase was also at the core of Russian criticism. 

This English translation is an updated version of the German article “Ballistic Missile Defense: Eine neue Aufgabe der Allianz,” which originally appeared in the German professional security and defense journal Europäische Sicherheit & Technik in August 2012.
NATO’S STRATEGIC CHALLENGES

THE ALLIANCE STRIVES TO MAINTAIN INTEGRITY IN AN UNCERTAIN GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT
At the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, NATO adopted a New Strategic Concept – a key political document of the Alliance that identifies the purpose and tasks of NATO, assesses the international security environment and defines relations with other actors. The new Strategic Concept modernized NATO, demonstrated unity among Allies and set an extremely ambitious agenda for the future. In turn, the Chicago Summit in May 2012 – the biggest NATO meeting in history – provided a unique opportunity to assess progress in implementing the new Strategic Concept.1

The main purpose of this article is to assess the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept in the context of Chicago Summit decisions and initiatives, thus identifying the main challenges for the Alliance in upcoming years. It will explore NATO in light of the cooperative security model, developed by Richard Cohen and Michael Mihalka. The system of cooperative security is characterized by various formal and informal institutions and consists of highly interdependent democratic states that are related by common values and close practical cooperation.

COOPERATIVE SECURITY AND NATO
According to Cohen, the cooperative security system includes four “concentric rings” connecting different dimensions of the system: (1) individual security; (2) collective security; (3) collective defense; and (4) promoting stability.2

1. Individual security is focused on human security aspects (human rights, democratic values, well-being, etc.). Security is considered broadly and includes various parameters of economic welfare and sustainable development. It is an internal ring of the system, considered as some sort of “social glue” that ensures internal systemic stability. From the NATO perspective, the Allies are considered to be liberal democracies committed to key principles of human rights. NATO’s rhetoric and activities have a strong element of collectiveness based on common values.

2. Collective security defines the internal side of the system in terms of security between sovereign states. This dimension includes various forms of cooperation between countries in areas such as terrorism, organized crime and natural disasters. The Alliance can be considered the most important institutional and political expression of the trans-Atlantic link, based on the principle of indivisible security between North America and Europe. Various channels of NATO political consultation help maintain the strategic integrity of the system. The Alliance has a
wide network of formal and informal mechanisms for coordination, as well as practical cooperation in various fields.

3. Collective defense is directed toward the external dimension of the system, focusing on defense from external aggression. Members of the system commit to ensure credible defense and effective response to external threats. In practice, it can be institutionalized as various mechanisms and interstate agreements of collective defense. NATO is based on Article 5 establishing a mechanism for deterrence and collective defense, which prevented external military aggression during and after the Cold War. NATO, as a military organization, ensures its efficiency by maintaining an integrated military structure, common defense planning mechanisms, a rapid response force, nuclear deterrence, an integrated air defense system and other capabilities.

4. Promoting stability entails preventing instability outside the system. Potential sources of instability can be eliminated using various political, economic, diplomatic and military measures. In practice, it can be realized as a commitment to protect specific values (such as human rights), prevent evolving threats (WMD proliferation) or enable various institutional confidence-building mechanisms.

Dialogue and cooperation play substantial roles in NATO strategy. They allow the Alliance to enhance a zone of “stability and security” beyond its territory, preventing the emergence of new threats. Crisis management operations, enlargement policy, partnership programs and practical cooperation (for example, common exercises and training) directly contribute to stability projection beyond NATO.

2010 STRATEGIC CONCEPT

One could argue that the 2010 Strategic Concept offered no fundamental change. Despite the substantial transformation of the international security environment since 1999, the key provisions in both the 1999 and 2010 Strategic Concepts remain unchanged: collective defense, effective deterrence, the indivisible trans-Atlantic link, security consultations, partnerships, an open door policy and crisis management remain crucial elements of the Alliance.

The 2010 Strategic Concept can hardly be considered a new strategic vision. The document is more evolutionary than revolutionary; it is focused on generalizations about NATO transformation and the strategic security environment during the previous decade.

Yet, the new strategy clearly demonstrated the relevance and importance of NATO. It reflects a modernized NATO that can hardly be labeled a “relic of the Cold War.” The actual process of preparing the Strategic Concept was no less important than the document itself, as it provided the Allies an opportunity to “synchronize clocks,” renew security commitments and demonstrate solidarity. Importantly, the new Strategic Concept focuses on new threats, including cyber defense and energy security.

The new concept is unique in its ability to strike a proper balance between barely compatible notions: (1) the model of regional organization versus a global spectrum of activities and partnerships; (2) commitment to an open door policy versus a difficult enlargement process; (3) considerable attention to security “at home” versus commitment to substantially improve relations with Russia; and (4) a vision of a nuclear-free world versus maintaining nuclear deterrence.

The 2010 concept set a highly ambitious agenda in areas such as improving NATO-European Union relations, boosting cyber security, developing civilian capabilities, cooperating with Russia, enhancing partnership with the UN and creating a missile defense system. The document is also highly influenced by lessons learned from NATO operations in Afghanistan: the Alliance is committed to strengthen crisis management, ensure broader involvement of partners in the operational decision making process, etc. The global spectrum of NATO’s activities is also reflected in the assessment of the strategic environment, which delves into such fields as ecology, climate change and natural resources.

In terms of cooperative security theory, NATO can be seen to have chosen the model of a multifunctional security structure that combines collective security and collective defense on the one hand with an active policy of crisis management operations and partnerships. With regard to the individual security dimension, NATO’s role remains modest. Common values, human rights and economic welfare are important elements of NATO’s political rhetoric; however, their role remains limited in practical initiatives.

Actual implementation of such an ambitious menu is particularly challenging in light of the current fiscal environment and shrinking defense budgets.

BEYOND CHICAGO

The Chicago Summit provided a unique opportunity to assess NATO’s progress in executing the new Strategic Concept. On the one hand, several important successful developments can be highlighted:

- **First**, NATO agreed to end the Afghan combat mission and fully transfer security responsibility to Afghan authorities by the end of 2014. A new mission of a different nature will be conducted in post-2014 Afghanistan. Moreover, NATO agreed to “provide strong and long-term political and practical support” to Afghanistan, focusing on training, advising and assisting Afghan security forces.

- **Second**, the Alliance declared interim operational capability of its missile defense system, which provides limited capability to defend NATO’s populations, territory and forces against a ballistic missile attack under NATO command and control arrangements.

- **Third**, NATO made an important step forward in terms of implementing the Smart Defense initiative, defined by the NATO secretary-general as a “renewed culture of cooperation” aimed at
greater prioritization, specialization and multinational development of capabilities countries couldn’t afford on their own. NATO’s agreement on “NATO Forces 2020,” decisions to acquire Alliance Ground Surveillance capability and to provide continuous air policing for the Baltic States are among the highlights of Smart Defense in Chicago.6

- **Fourth,** the Chicago Summit focused on the vital role of NATO partners, reflecting the spirit of the 2010 Strategic Concept. The successful operation in Libya demonstrated that partners are “essential to the military and political success”7 of NATO. In Chicago, a unique meeting with 13 core partners was organized, highlighting the importance of their political and financial support. Finally, NATO sent a positive signal to aspirant countries (such as Georgia), encouraging them to continue reforms and emphasizing that NATO’s door remains open. On the other hand, the Chicago Summit also revealed some crucial challenges that will be further assessed from the perspective of the cooperative security model, focusing on (i) collective security, (ii) collective defense and (iii) stability projection dimensions.

**BUDGET CUTS AND INTERNAL COHESION**

With the decrease of operational tempo in Afghanistan, NATO will have to find new “internal glue” to maintain interoperability and Allied capacity to work together. To address this issue, the secretary-general proposed the idea of the “Connected Forces Initiative,” intended to complement Smart Defense by focusing on such areas as expanded education and training, increased exercises (especially with the NATO Response Force), better use of technology and enhanced connections with NATO partners.8

Such an approach sounds good in theory, but in light of fiscal austerity and defense cuts the future of this initiative remains vague. Uncoordinated budget cuts during the past several years, among large and small NATO countries, had a substantial impact. European NATO Allies “have reduced their military spending by almost 20% as a percentage of real GDP, while their combined GDP has grown by approximately 55%.”9 Accordingly, critical military capabilities are affected, as well as the ability to respond to new security challenges, deepening the problem of matching NATO’s capabilities to its ambitions and potentially crippling Allied interoperability.

Smart Defense, often portrayed as a way to address fiscal challenges, is not a silver bullet either. It is criticized for lack of content, providing just one more label for already existing capabilities and projects (such as missile defense) without creating any added value. Moreover, as defense spending is a sensitive political issue, nations are reluctant to “share sovereignty and national industrial interests in defence procurement,”10 thus limiting the potential of multinational cooperation and specialization.

These problems are even more amplified by the growing capability gap between Europe and the U.S. The U.S. was responsible for 72 percent of total Allied defense spending in 2012, up from 68 percent in 2007.11 Moreover, in 2010, “only eight NATO countries allocated more than 20% of their defence budgets to modernisation, and 16 European Allies spent 50% or more of their resources on personnel costs.”12 Such trends are worrying for NATO, especially in light of the U.S. strategic pivot to the Asia-Pacific region and recent decisions to cut its own budget by $487 billion over a decade and withdraw a substantial number of troops from Europe.

As a result, sensitive questions about burden sharing, greater European responsibility and the movement toward a “two-tiered” Alliance are likely to re-emerge. Low public support for defense spending and engagement in operations might put additional pressure on NATO’s internal cohesion and trans-Atlantic link.

**COLLECTIVE DEFENSE**

In Chicago, NATO leaders approved the Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (DDPR), which was mandated in Lisbon to define an appropriate mix of nuclear, missile defense and conventional capabilities. The DDPR brought some clarity to NATO nuclear policy that had not been firmly defined in the 2010 Strategic Concept. The fundamental dilemma concerns the future of U.S. substrategic nuclear weapons located in Europe. The U.S. nuclear presence is an important practical expression of that nation’s commitment to European security. It supports the principle of indivisible security, helps maintain a strategic balance with Russia, contributes to deterrence and ensures nuclear burden-sharing among the Allies.

On the other hand, maintaining such nuclear weapons (and various supporting capabilities, such as dual-capable aircraft) is a considerable financial burden, and its military value is questionable. Moreover, some NATO countries face public and political pressure to remove nuclear weapons. According to the DDPR, nuclear weapons are a “core component of NATO’s overall capabilities for deterrence and defence alongside conventional and missile defence forces.”13 Moreover, the report states that the “Alliance’s nuclear force posture currently meets the criteria for an effective deterrence and defence posture,” implying that current nuclear policy is valid.

Many challenges remain, however. The DDPR identifies several further tasks, such as ensuring “the broadest possible participation of Allies concerned in their nuclear sharing arrangements,” developing and exchanging “transparency and confidence-building ideas with the Russian Federation,” and considering what “NATO would expect to see in the way of reciprocal Russian actions to allow for significant reductions in forward-based non-strategic nuclear weapons assigned to NATO.”14 In other words, NATO still has an ambitious and challenging nuclear agenda, especially with regard to Russia’s greater stockpiles of nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe.

Missile defense is another crucial dimension of NATO deterrence. The New Strategic Concept pays substantial...
attention to this capability, a “core element” of NATO’s collective defense. In Lisbon, NATO made two crucial decisions: To create its own missile defense shield while inviting Russia to cooperate in this endeavor. Importantly, the DDPR states that missile defense can complement the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence but can’t replace them entirely. The success of NATO missile defense depends mostly on U.S. determination to finance and implement the European Phased Adaptive Approach, the key element of the NATO system. Close cooperation between U.S. and European missile defense host countries (Spain, Turkey, etc.) will be crucial. Equally important is the development of effective command and control.

Meanwhile, essential political contradictions remain in improving cooperation with Russia. Russia insists on creating a joint missile defense system based on geographic responsibilities, whereas NATO’s vision is “two independent but coordinated systems working back-to-back.” According to Russia, NATO’s system is designed to contain and thwart Russia. Therefore, Russia not only seeks a formal, legally binding agreement with a set of military-technical criteria that would limit the flexibility and adaptability of the NATO system, but threatens to deploy offensive weapons aimed at destroying U.S. missile defense installations in Europe. This standoff is crucial and could potentially spill over to other areas of NATO-Russia relations.

With regard to conventional NATO deterrence and defense, the latest Strategic Concept clearly expresses NATO’s political will to conduct a policy of visible assurance (exercises, training, military planning) aimed at reassuring member states of NATO’s readiness, credibility and commitment to defend against a wide range of threats.

The DDPR, in turn, recognizes the importance of conventional forces in the fields of collective defense, crisis management, meeting new security challenges and providing visible assurance of NATO’s cohesion. However, in addition to defense budget cuts, NATO still faces important dilemmas regarding expeditionary versus conventional forces development, the practicality of the NATO Response Force, lack of modernization and research and development in Europe, and the need for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities.

Finally, NATO will face a major challenge in terms of boosting its cyber defense capacity. According to then-U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, the progress NATO has made so far “is not sufficient to defend against the cyber threat. The alliance needs to consider what its role should be in defending member nations from cyber attacks. We must begin to take the necessary steps to develop additional alliance cyber defense capabilities.”

**PROMOTING STABILITY**

One of the three core tasks identified in 2010 NATO Strategic Concept is “crisis management,” a concept tested during NATO’s Libya mission. According to the secretary-general, operation “Unified Protector” demonstrated “the strength and the solidarity of our Alliance even in the middle of an economic crisis.” NATO swiftly and successfully achieved its operational objectives, but Libya also exposed deficiencies in the Alliance’s approach to crisis management:

- **First,** while all Allies supported the mission politically, only eight of 28 NATO nations participated in combat operations. That imbalance once again revealed crucial burden-sharing issues within NATO. Internal solidarity was also challenged by Germany’s abstention on UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which authorized the campaign.

- **Second,** while European allies assumed political leadership and provided considerable military assets, “the success of that operation depended on unique and essential capabilities which only the United States could offer.” Libya demonstrated that European countries lack critical assets such as drones, surveillance and aerial refueling.

- **Third,** while Libya showed the crucial role of Arab partners (such as Qatar and the United Arab Emirates), closer engagement with Middle Eastern and North African countries is burdened by post-Arab spring political turmoil in this important region.
Enhanced cooperation with various regional organizations (such as the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the African Union or ECOWAS) remains vital.

NATO also faces major geopolitical challenges. China’s defense spending has soared by 189 percent since 2001, Russia’s by 82 percent and India’s by 54 percent.21 Moreover, since 2008, China’s economy has surpassed in size those of Germany and Japan and now is the world’s second largest. No European country is expected to be among the top five economies by 2020.22 With the return of Vladimir Putin, Russia has firmly defended its geopolitical position in the post-Soviet space; NATO is still troubled by instability in the Balkans, the Mediterranean and the Middle East, including the explosive situation in Syria.

In light of the shifting global economic center of gravity, the U.S. shift to the Asia-Pacific, the changing nature of military conflict, the continuing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and remaining terrorism threats, NATO will face challenging strategic choices that will influence its policies and capabilities. It is not clear, for example, if Europe will be willing and able to join the U.S. in focusing on Asia. Despite the New Strategic Concept’s emphasis on building partnerships, the Alliance does not have productive relations with China, India, Brazil and other rising powers.

Cooperation with the EU is unsatisfactory as well. The Strategic Concept stresses the need for a productive strategic partnership between NATO and the EU by enhancing practical cooperation in areas such as international operations and capability development. However, progress remains constrained owing to unsolved political issues, first and foremost disagreements among Turkey, Greece and Cyprus.

Finally, NATO will face an enlargement challenge. In Chicago, then-U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that “this summit should be the last summit that is not an enlargement summit.”29 However, NATO encounters many problems here as well, as Georgia remains partly occupied by Russia, Macedonia is unable to resolve its name issue with Greece, and Bosnia and Herzegovina is still in the process of addressing an immovable defense property situation.

CONCLUSION

During the past several years, NATO has achieved a high level of proficiency in “talking the talk.” The Allies agreed on a new Strategic Concept and NATO endorsed a wide range of supporting initiatives (Smart Defence, Connected Forces Initiative, Deterrence and Defence Posture Review, NATO 2020) aimed at coping with the challenging fiscal environment, new security threats, reduced military capability, high operational intensity and the upcoming post-Afghanistan era. The fundamental question is if NATO will be able to “walk the walk” in terms of actual execution of these initiatives.

The implementation of the New Strategic Concept has faced many substantial challenges. Looking through the prism of the cooperative security model, these challenges are evident in every main dimension of NATO activities.

With regard to collective security, NATO is likely to face a problem of declining internal cohesion and effectiveness as a result of substantial and uncoordinated defense budget cuts, the growing financial and technological gap between the U.S. and Europe, and the U.S. shift toward the Pacific region. Smart Defense has to become much more than another “bumber sticker” slogan to ensure real change in developing and sharing the critical capabilities needed to address threats.

The dimension of collective defense and deterrence also remains challenging because of remaining uncertainties about nuclear policy, a lack of cooperation with Russia in missile defense and diminished conventional capacity. On the other hand, as demonstrated by Libya, NATO still retains an unmatched capability to project power, supported by a unique multinational command structure. Enhancing cyber defense capacity will remain one of NATO’s crucial objectives.

Finally, in terms of stability projection, NATO has gained substantial experience in Afghanistan. However, much work needs to be done to improve partnerships, deal with rising powers, improve geopolitical thinking, continue the fight against terrorism and build consensus on the future enlargement of the Alliance.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author.

2. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
Bulgarian soldiers march in central Sofia in May 2012 to celebrate the Army’s Day of Bravery and St. George’s Day. Bulgaria has transformed its military and is a major contributor to NATO and EU missions.

Bulgaria seeks to streamline military procurement

By Lt. Col. Sevdalin Stoykov | Bulgarian Armed Forces
Technological developments have improved the quality of human life. Constant improvements in information, transportation, energy and other technologies make the exchange of goods and ideas increasingly fast. Information technology is the main engine for this progress and its potential seems unlimited.

New technologies, however, have also made our world more dangerous, as most security challenges, though not new, have been intensified by spectacular technological progress. New technologies not only leverage the potential of old threats, such as terrorism and organized crime, but have created new challenges, such as cyber security.

In addition, Europe was struck by a financial crisis that deeply affected defense budgets. In the face of these challenges, Bulgaria is working to transform and restructure its armed forces. In the past 20 years, Bulgaria has transitioned from being a stalwart of the Soviet Bloc to a member of NATO. By joining NATO in 2004 and the European Union in 2007, Bulgaria achieved its strategic goal of becoming part of the Euro-Atlantic community as a foundation for its security and prosperity. The country is now focused on restructuring its armed forces so that sustainable development can continue within the defense budget during a challenging time when equipment needs to be upgraded.

BULGARIA AND SMART DEFENSE

In response to new security challenges, NATO introduced the “smart defense” initiative. But smart defense is not a strict dogma. As NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen stated: “Smart defense is not about NATO imposing anything on nations. Ultimately, it is all about making it easier for nations to develop and acquire capabilities – alone, together as Allies, or even involving non-NATO countries, in NATO or in the EU.”

Bulgaria is not an exception. Bulgaria’s NATO transformation has not always gone smoothly, as there have been allegations of corruption, lack of transparency and human rights violations. The Ministry of Defense was not untouched by these bad practices. In 2009, a new government was elected with a clear mandate to fight corruption at all levels. And in 2010, the defense ministry published a white paper that laid out a new vision for national defense and established a solid base for the future development of the armed forces.

This upgrade is required by the armed forces’ new missions. Most current equipment was acquired in the late 1980s during the Cold War. The mission of Bulgaria’s military was different then, designed for full-scale war in open field operations, in contrast to today’s focus on urban-style warfare.

The second driving force for equipment upgrade is interoperability. Most of the equipment on hand was not built to NATO standards and is usually not compatible. This is especially an issue in communications and if not properly addressed, can lead to failure of command and control systems, resulting in operational failure. Additionally, worldwide technological progress necessitates equipment modernization. It would be difficult to win 21st century wars with 20th century equipment. Today’s wars are conducted with high-tech equipment and weapons in a variety of environments: open fields, cities, underwater and cyber space, and are fought day and night. High-precision weapons minimize collateral damage, unmanned aerial vehicles conduct surveillance and robots deactivate improvised explosive devices.

Interoperability, technological progress and the requirements of new missions highlight serious security issues facing Bulgaria. The armed forces are in urgent need of technological upgrade, but this requires an improved weapons acquisition process. The problem can best be addressed by improved equipment upgrade requirements, better allocation of financial resources and stronger political will.

DEFINING THE SCOPE

Defining the scope of required equipment upgrades is essential to obtaining the right mix of needed equipment. National security policies set national security goals, or doctrine, that defines the development of military power and capabilities and, therefore, directly affects the scope of equipment requirements. On the doctrinal level, Bulgaria has established a solid conceptual framework, including the “National Security Strategy of the Republic of Bulgaria,” “National Defense Strategy” and “White Paper on Defence...
and the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria.” Some key points in these documents are:

- Bulgaria accepts the principles of rule of law, democratic values, human and civil rights, and equal opportunity;
- Bulgaria has no aspirations to acquire other countries' territory and does not recognize any aspirations that affect its territorial integrity;
- NATO and EU membership is key to protecting the sovereignty, security, territorial integrity and the independence of Bulgaria;
- Bulgaria is committed to international efforts to combat terrorism, deter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, prevent conflicts and manage crises;
- Bulgaria will develop an effective and transparent defense management system.

The main goal, summarized in the foreword of the 2010 White Paper, is “development of a single set of forces balanced for all tasks, with a unified command and control system for peacetime and during crises, with organisation, equipment and combat training adequately corresponding to the tasks and backed with the required financial and material resources.” This establishes a doctrinal framework aligned with NATO and EU partners and is a solid base for future development.

In recent years, Bulgaria has increased the pace of structural military transformation. Significant improvements were made in force restructuring, increased force training and legal development. Bulgaria remains highly committed to participation in NATO and EU missions and operations abroad, such as NATO’s International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan and Operation Althea, the EU stabilization mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. All of these clearly indicate significant progress in military reform.

One important consideration when planning defense equipment upgrades is the need to balance labor-intensive and capital-intensive armed forces. Labor-intensive armed forces – soldiers on the ground in combat and within peacekeeping and peace supporting operations – may seem cheaper but require close contact with the enemy, making soldiers more vulnerable. In contrast, capital-intensive armed forces rely more on network-centric operations and precision weapons that keep soldiers out of harm’s way, but they require expensive, advanced technology.

After goals are determined and defined in policy, strategic defense planning – as documented in “The Republic of Bulgaria’s Armed Forces’ Development Plan” and “Annual Report on the Status of Defence and the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria” – defines how strategic goals are to be met. The core program for equipment upgrade is the “Investment Plan-Programme of the Ministry of Defence – 2020.” The modernization of the military will be organized in 13 priority projects that will cost about 1 billion euros over 10 years. Final approval for the projects depends on each project’s cost.

In 2011, the ministry confirmed that, despite positive signs, the financial crisis presented challenges in implementing modernization and equipment upgrade. Previous plans for modernization were considered too ambitious and impossible to achieve within national budgetary constraints, resulting in contract cancellations and project postponements.

Budgetary constraints are only part of the problem. A greater concern, perhaps, is the lack of an explicit connection between a defined capability and the corresponding organizational structure, financial parameters and needed equipment. Even if more money could be found, there is no guarantee that the stated goals would be achieved.

Furthermore, equipment should be considered in terms of total life-cycle costs, including acquisition, maintenance and disposal. A failure to connect defined capabilities and corresponding equipment in terms of life cycles is illustrated by the “Bulgarian Force Development Plan,” which ends with a list of needed capabilities but provides planning only to the projected year of accessibility. In addition, there is no explicit correspondence between the list of capabilities defined in the Force Development Plan and the 13 priority projects in the Investment Plan-Programme, though these two plans should be complementary. The development plans should include a vision for both the required equipment and possible future upgrades for all capabilities mentioned in the Force Development Plan. The establishment of clear connections between capabilities and equipment will better define the scope of equipment upgrade.

Bulgaria’s need for equipment upgrade is also defined by its membership in NATO and the EU. This means a commitment to force structure development, training, budgeting and weapons acquisition. Bulgaria has benefited as a result of its successful participation in international capability building within the framework of NATO and the EU. On the technical level, the NATO process of military standardization, certification and codification requires that future Bulgarian military equipment acquisitions meet NATO criteria.

Allied defense cooperation has helped Bulgaria access or obtain equipment that was unaffordable, as demonstrated by participation in the NATO Strategic Airlift Capability. And programs like the “Build-up a Battalion Battle Group within a Mechanized Brigade” project – funded through the U.S. Foreign Military Financing Program – allow Bulgaria to achieve better results through Allied cooperation with assets they can afford.

For smaller countries with limited economic potential, international cooperation is critical. To further improve results through Allied defense cooperation, Bulgaria must use a more focused approach. A deeper analysis of what Bulgaria needs and what Bulgaria can provide as an international partner is needed. Moreover, while technology is developing quickly, defense modernization requires long-term, resource-consuming projects. Bad decisions can have deeply negative impacts.
ALLOCATING FINANCIAL RESOURCES

Allocation of financial resources for military equipment depends heavily on national fiscal policy. Since July 1997, when the currency board was established, Bulgaria has had a restrictive fiscal policy that has brought needed discipline to the Bulgarian economy. But the currency board limitation on government spending implies a severely restricted defense budget. Restrictive fiscal policy also makes it almost impossible to pay for defense modernization by tapping reserves in the national budget.

What part of the defense budget is available for equipment acquisition must be determined. According to the “Annual Report on Defence,” defense spending in 2011 and 2012 was 1.4 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP), less than the 1.5 percent stipulated by the Investment Plan-Programme. The defense spending distribution ratio of 66:25:9 committed to personnel, maintenance and investment also failed to meet the numbers in the White Paper (60:25:15) in 2011. If this trend continues, the White Paper’s objectives will definitely be unrealizable.

The Ministry of Defense is responsible for defense budget management, an integral part of democratically elected, civilian-government control over defense. The defense budget management system administers allocation of financial resources for weapons acquisition. Creation of the Integrated Defense Resource Management System (IDRMS) was a major step toward implementing a planning and budgeting system compatible with NATO practices. The IDRMS is a multiyear, program-based and financially constrained system with well-developed features such as quantifiable target objectives, audit control and management of risks.

Equipment acquisition provides room for improvement. Two courses of change could accelerate the acquisition process. First, financial resources used for military procurement should be identified, funding detailed for the 13 priority projects in the Investment Plan-Programme; and an outline made of where the 10 main programs from the “Annual Report on Defence” fit into the Investment Plan-Programme. Second, better structured and balanced program planning will improve the equipment modernization process.

International relationships also play an important role in the allocation of financial resources for equipment purchases such as the U.S. Foreign Military Sales program. Rather than direct financial transfers, Bulgaria receives military equipment. An example is the $2.4 million contract awarded to Saab in May 2012 under the Foreign Military Fund to deliver the Deployable Instrumented Training System to the Bulgarian Army. Another method is employment of the microeconomic principle of economies of scale, such as the Bulgarian proposal to buy fighter aircraft jointly with Croatia, Romania and Turkey, though this has yet to achieve much support.

International cooperation can be further optimized to provide more than just considerable financial benefits. First, the principle of unity of effort must be more widely employed by better integrating programs for international cooperation into the defense planning and budgeting system. A Ministry of Defense program called “Membership in NATO and the EU and International Cooperation” could be used to create synergy and consolidate national and international financial resources. Second, international cooperation must have not only a political dimension, but also the quantifiable measurement of costs and benefits to protect the budget against temptations to spend precious resources on attractive but unrealistic ideas.
STRONGER POLITICAL WILL

Political will is undoubtedly the main engine for defense acquisition. Bulgaria has seen ambitious plans for modernization lose political support and fail because of a shortage of financial resources. For example, former Prime Minister Sergei Stanishev’s 800 million euro initiative to acquire four Gowind-200 class corvettes from France was later canceled when Prime Minister Boyko Borisov decided the project was too expensive.21

Bulgaria’s long-standing need for equipment modernization has been supported by the military leadership since even before full NATO membership22 and is well understood and politically supported. It is important that the investment plan is one package and that it is a product of a single concept of forces.

Shifting political winds could hurt the viability of the Investment Plan-Programme as defense investment projects are usually long term and require a considerable amount of financial resources. Changes in Parliament could cause approved investment projects to lose political support. Termination of a defense investment project can have significant negative consequences.

Projects should be separated into two groups, defined as long-term projects and mid-term projects, that can be accomplished within a government mandate. Long-term projects would require a broader political consensus in Parliament, which would minimize the possibility that the next government could cancel them. Cabinet approval would be sufficient for mid-term projects, easing interactions between the Minister of Defense and the Minister of Finance, and will guarantee that no unwanted obligations will be left for the next government.

A third group of short-term, relatively low-cost investment projects would be managed by the Ministry of Defense. This would allow the armed forces to acquire equipment that is already on the market, does not require long development, has a low associated risk and is highly useful on the ground. The U.S. Department of Defense commercial off-the-shelf program is an example. This will provide flexibility for quick reaction to a changing security situation. These three groups of investment projects must then be combined into a single government plan for defense modernization.

Finally, the political endorsement process must incorporate a reporting, evaluation and revision system that will protect defense acquisition processes involving the prolonged projects, even if they are politically supported. It would also facilitate adaptation of long-term investment projects to current defense challenges.

International cooperation is essential to acquiring technologically advanced defense equipment, including government-to-government and government-to-business relationships. Participation in NATO and EU operations requires a higher degree of interoperability. These are not staff exercises played on computers. These are real operations; real people in the field with real weapons. Therefore, a lack of interoperable equipment could put Allied forces in danger.

Undoubtedly, membership in the EU and NATO improves synergy between countries in terms of collective defense. NATO’s smart defense initiative is intended to increase this synergy and prevent a decline of Allied defense capabilities in a time of declining defense budgets. Bulgaria has had a shrinking military budget as a percent of the GDP since 2005, so the question of how to do more with less is not new. Bulgaria sees smart defense as a solution not for a local problem, but a solution for a common concern that requires a united effort from the Allies. Through prioritization, cooperation and specialization, the Alliance could achieve genuine and trustworthy defense cooperation. Bulgaria’s political elite must increase efforts to convince the electorate and taxpayers that joining NATO and the EU does not end the process of building national security. This is especially true in terms of defense equipment modernization, where political will remains vital.

CONCLUSION

Equipment modernization for the Bulgarian Armed Forces is essential. Bulgaria has developed a well-functioning
planning and budgeting system compatible with NATO practices, but the weapons acquisition process can definitely be enhanced. The existing system has no need of major restructuring but needs to be employed better. This means better prioritization and financial allocation.

Second, there is a clear interconnection and interdependence among the elements of defining the scope of equipment upgrade, allocating financial resources and demonstrating political will. There is always a financial element when defense equipment is mentioned. And political will has a capabilities element and a corresponding equipment element. These three factors shape one another. Perhaps the key for successful equipment acquisition is the balance among the scope of equipment upgrade, financial resources and political will. Bulgaria has unfortunate experiences with failed projects that lacked either proper financial resources or political support. On the other hand, sometimes precious financial resources were wasted on unnecessary upgrades. A necessary balance and unity of effort could be achieved through a constant cycle of evaluation, planning, implementation and revision of the weapons acquisition process.

There is a saying “the devil is in the details.” For Bulgaria, this means the active and purposeful implementation of the weapons acquisition process, because by implementation, intentions became actions. Implementation is how Bulgaria will build trust and continue to be a strong European partner in NATO.
In 2012, U.S. European Command (EUCOM) conducted 271 events designed to build the defense capabilities of European partners and allies through the U.S. National Guard’s State Partnership Program (SPP). Constituting nearly a quarter of the 1,281 total EUCOM events, at a modest cost of $2.8 million (2.2 million euros), the SPP is arguably one of the most cost-effective security cooperation tools ever implemented by the U.S. military. “The State Partnership Program is, dollar for dollar, my best EUCOM investment,” said Adm. James Stavridis, EUCOM commander. 

Some would argue that it’s also the best NATO investment, for as it has the past two decades, the SPP continues to deliver a relatively scarce commodity not easily transported across borders – trust. Despite its humble beginnings, the SPP helped create an environment of cooperation in which NATO has thrived. And despite the disappearance of the de facto adversary for which NATO was conceived, NATO’s future is bright due in no small part to this unique program that builds enduring and committed partnerships.

BACK IN THE USSR

In July 1987, American rock music icon Billy Joel made history by traveling to the Soviet Union and performing six concerts for audiences in love with Western pop culture. At the time, Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost, a policy of greater openness and transparency, was barely a few years old and tensions between the two world superpowers remained high. Joel’s trip marked the first time an American musician toured the Soviet Union with a fully staged show, and no one knew what the consequences of his visit would be.

For Soviet music lovers who had grown up on bootlegged Beatles and Elvis music, Joel’s trip seemed like an encouraging step toward greater artistic expression and cultural exchange in an area previously considered taboo and strictly controlled. His performances delighted the crowds, and by the time he returned to the United States, Joel was a household name throughout the Soviet Union. Soviet officials allowed him to tour because he held no political aspirations, seemed little threat to their political will and personally footed the $2.5 million needed to pull off the trip. In short, he gained the Soviets’ trust.

After the concerts, glasnost and the related policy of perestroika, which Gorbachev called upon to reduce corruption and bring about political reform, went into hyper drive and created unintended consequences. Within the Baltic Republics of Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia – annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940 – glasnost paved the way for regional elections in which nationalists swept the board. Calls for greater independence from Moscow’s rule grew stronger within these constituent republics, and within two years of Joel’s visit, the Berlin Wall fell. Two short years after that historic event, the Soviet Union collapsed.

To say Joel brought down the Wall or the Soviet Union would be a stretch. To say he accelerated their demise might stimulate a debate. To say he made an indelible impression...
on millions of Baltic citizens and gave many of them their first glimpse of American good will is undeniable. More importantly, Joel’s trip was a building block in creating a foundation of trust. And the world soon witnessed that a small amount of trust among former enemies would pave the way for the greatest expansion in NATO history and the creation of the enduringly successful National Guard State Partnership Program.

**STARTING SMALL, THINKING BIG**

Because of history-defining moments such as Joel’s visit to the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Berlin Wall, by late 1989 most Soviet citizens were no longer afraid to show their support of glasnost. Ironically, they were willing to trust their former “enemy of the state” to help encourage the movement. So when the Baltic States began to break free of Soviet influence in December 1989, the U.S. government looked for ways to increase stability and encourage democracy in the event the impossible scenario of Baltic independence materialized. Little did anyone realize just how quickly the impossible would occur.

On March 11, 1990, just four months after the Berlin Wall fell, Lithuania became the first Soviet republic to declare independence. Latvia and Estonia followed, and by September 1991, the Soviet Union granted all three Baltic States full independence, just two months before the USSR’s complete dissolution on December 25, 1991.

By the time the Soviet Union dissolved, NATO had added only one member (Spain in 1982) since 1950s. The organization desired new members and a new mandate. Wanting to seize the opportunity to work with these three young democracies and bring them into NATO, members needed a solution that would satisfy NATO’s strict membership requirements and not scare candidate countries away or provoke retaliation from Russia. For NATO, how to work with these three former Soviet Republics and the others that would soon follow their lead became perhaps the greatest political question of the 1990s. Furthermore, the collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1991-1992) demanded even greater NATO attention to developing a clear plan for dealing with these new, fragile democracies.

Although many NATO countries first believed that the best way to deal with these new states was to treat them as if they were undergoing humanitarian crises, it soon became apparent that this was not possible. The sheer number and size of the countries in question made humanitarian efforts impractical and unsustainable. These new states needed instruction in democracy and economic self-reliance.

To the delight of the United States and NATO, in early 1992 the Latvian government requested their help in using the U.S. National Guard’s citizen-soldier model to develop its military. Estonia and Lithuania immediately followed suit. U.S. Army generals Colin Powell, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and John Shalikashvili, then-EUCOM commander, welcomed such a partnership building tool to aid non-NATO countries in establishing democratic governments and market economies.

The U.S. proposed joint military-to-military exercises to promote the idea that militaries should be subordinate to civilian authority, respect human rights and maintain a defensive posture. At the time they declared their independence, these new states possessed Soviet-based militaries that focused on countering threats from NATO countries. EUCOM led by establishing the Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP) in 1992. The Pentagon insisted that the National Guard and Reserve spearhead operations in the Baltic countries. Such a move catered to those governments’ desires that their militaries be “reserve-centric” and helped placate Russian fears that the U.S. was expanding into their former republics. The U.S. was trying to engage with the former communist nations that were in the Warsaw Pact, and using active duty troops might have been a little too offensive to the Russians or the folks that were in there, so the idea was to use the small footprint of National Guard troops,” said Air Force Col. Joey Booher, chief of International Affairs for the National Guard Bureau.

Lt. General John Conaway, chief of the National Guard Bureau, and Brig. Gen. Thomas Lennon, head of the JCTP, visited the Baltics in November 1992. A few months later, in April 1993, the first partnerships officially began by pairing U.S. states with different countries: Maryland/Estonia, Michigan/Latvia and Pennsylvania/Lithuania. By the end of that first year, 11 additional partnerships were proposed with the following countries: Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Romania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine. Although the partnership with Belarus never materialized, the U.S. currently enjoys highly successful partnerships with 13 of the 14 (not including Russia) former Soviet republics.

Today, 65 nations partner with 50 U.S. states, two territories and the District of Columbia. The program also includes two bilateral relationships, between the National Guard Bureau and Israel as well as between Minnesota and Norway. What was once just a small pilot program to test the
Membership in the U.S. National Guard State Partnership Program

SOUTHCOM
22 PARTNERSHIPS

Arkansas/Guatemala 2002
Connecticut/Uruguay 2000
Delaware/Trinidad-Tobago 2004
District of Columbia/Jamaica 1999
Florida/Venezuela 1998
Florida/Guaya 2003
Florida/Virgin Islands/Eastern Caribbean 2006
Kentucky/Ecuador 1996
Louisiana/Belize 1996
Louisiana/Haiti 2011
Massachusetts/Paraguay 2001
Mississippi/Bolivia 1999
Missouri/Panama 1996
New Hampshire/El Salvador 2000
New Mexico/Costa Rica 2006
Puerto Rico/Honduras 1998
Puerto Rico/Dominican Republic 2003
South Carolina/Colombia 2012
South Dakota/Suriname 2006
Texas/Chile 2008
West Virginia/Peru 1996
Wisconsin/Nicaragua 2003

EUCOM
22 PARTNERSHIPS

Alabama/Romania 1993
California/Ukraine 1993
Colorado/Slovenia 1993
Georgia/Georgia 1994
Illinois/Poland 1993
Indiana/Slovakia 1994
Iowa/Kosovo 2011
Kansas/Armenia 2002
Maine/Montenegro 2006
Maryland/Estonia 1993
Maryland/Bosnia 2003
Michigan/Latvia 1993
Minnesota/Croatia 1996
New Jersey/Albania 2001
North Carolina/Moldova 1996
Ohio/Hungary 1993
Ohio/Serbia 2005
Oklahoma/Azerbaijan 2002
Pennsylvania/Lithuania 1993
Tennessee/Bulgaria 1993
Texas/Nebraska/Czech Rep. 1993
Vermont/Macedonia 1993

NORTHCOM
1 PARTNERSHIP

Rhode Island/Bahamas 2005

CENTCOM
5 PARTNERSHIPS

Arizona/Kazakhstan 1993
Colorado/Jordan 2004
Mississippi/Uzbekistan 2012
Montana/Kyrgyz Republic 1996
Virginia/Tajikistan 2003

AFRICOM
8 PARTNERSHIPS

California/Nigeria 2006
Michigan/Liberia 2009
New York/South Africa 2003
North Carolina/Botswana 2008
North Dakota/Ghana 2004
Utah/Morocco 2003
Vermont/Senegal 2008
Wyoming/Tunisia 2004

PACOM
7 PARTNERSHIPS

Alaska/Mongolia 2003
Guam/Hawaii/Philippines 2000
Hawaii/Indonesia 2006
Idaho/Cambodia 2009
Oregon/Bangladesh 2008
Oregon/Vietnam 2012
Washington/Thailand 2002
waters of political trust with three Baltic States, turned into one of the most successful programs in U.S. military history and a valuable tool for NATO’s future. When the SPP first began, few could have predicted that, eventually, most partner countries would be capable of taking on NATO tasks on their own without heavy external support.

**TRUST IS EVERYTHING**

Currently, 22 partnerships exist with former Soviet, Yugoslav, and Warsaw Pact countries in the EUCOM Area of Responsibility, making it the largest (tied with SOUTHCOM) and longest running program. With two decades of experience, EUCOM has taken the lead in developing long-term, enduring and committed partnerships that build capacity and trust. The value placed on this trust by the American state Guards and their European counterparts is immeasurable but reflected in every event conducted and in comments made at all levels. Although SPP exercises span military, political, economic and social realms, the program is most aptly characterized by personal and enduring relationships.

During a visit to EUCOM in August 2010, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen remarked, “I love the SPP Program and I support it fully. Every Chief of Defense and Minister of Defense who visits me, always talks about their SPP program. These relationships have been built over many years.” 12

This trust took time to establish. Of the 22 EUCOM partnerships, 12 began in 1993, giving each of these relationships the benefit of a long development period. Many of the career soldiers who were junior enlisted personnel and officers when the programs began now fill the senior ranks and can exert real change. Any animosity or hard feelings left over from the Cold War years have all but retired along with the soldiers who held them, so real change becomes more feasible with each passing year of successful partnering.

The SPP’s impact on NATO and European Union accessions are arguably the greatest contribution of the SPP. Of the 12 partnerships initiated in 1993, 10 of the partner countries have joined NATO and the EU. Two additional countries have joined just NATO, benefiting from SPP partnerships begun in 1996 and 2001, respectively. Six other countries partnered for a shorter period, most recently Kosovo (2011), have not yet joined. Six other countries partnered; in 2011, they are considered designated partner countries, and the program demonstrates “to promote democratic values, encourage consultation and cooperation on defense and security issues to build trust and, in the long run, prevent conflict.” 13 The unique civil-military nature of the National Guard makes this possible because it routinely engages in a wide range of security cooperation activities, many of which parallel NATO activities. They include disaster preparedness, cyber security, anti-drug efforts, border security and humanitarian assistance.

**CONCLUSION**

The State Partnership Program is a proven, cost-effective security cooperation tool instrumental to NATO’s efforts in preventing conflict and securing long-term peace. In many ways, the SPP paved the way for nearly every NATO accession in the last three decades and it continues to help aspiring nations work toward NATO membership.

The program demonstrates, perhaps more than anything else, the importance of trust in international relations. By linking U.S. states with designated partner countries, the SPP promotes access, increases military capabilities, improves interoperability and enhances the principles of responsible governance. It helps to prevent states from failing and contributes to a stable Europe. It supports the broad national interests and international security cooperation goals of the U.S. by engaging partner nations through military, socio-political, and economic conduits at the local, state and national levels. All of these functions support NATO efforts.

None of this would be possible without the creation of enduring relationships. Soldiers at all levels and on both sides of each partnership consider their counterparts an extended family and treat them with the same respect they treat soldiers of their own country. They train together and deploy side by side in combat. With 20 years of success, the program shows that with trust, anything is possible.

---

5. “A Short History of NATO” http://www.nato.int/history/nato-history.html
HEAVY SEAS for SOMALI PIRATES

BY PER CONCORDIAM STAFF
For international shipping, the waters off the Horn of Africa had become some of the most dangerous in the world. The source of the danger was as old as sea travel, but one thought to have been largely relegated to the past—pirates. By 2008, Somali pirates were hijacking dozens of ships each year, taking hundreds of sailors hostage and raking in tens of millions of dollars in ransom.

But a noticeable drop-off in piracy by the end of 2011 continued to accelerate in 2012, thanks to multinational naval patrols and the use of armed security teams aboard cargo vessels. In October 2012, the International Maritime Bureau’s (IMB) Piracy Reporting Centre reported a 54 percent decline in attacks compared to the same period in 2011. Eager to avoid a re-emergence of the piracy plague, the international community is determined to see that trend continue.

MULTINATIONAL COUNTERPIRACY MEASURES ARE SUCCEEDING OFF THE HORN OF AFRICA

Gulf, for example, generally skirt the east coast of Africa en route to the Suez Canal and European and North American ports.

According to the IMB’s data, the number of attacks off the Horn of Africa is the lowest since 2008, when the piracy problem became so acute that the international community was spurred to action. A piracy report by the U.S. Navy indicates that only eight vessels had been successfully hijacked as of mid-November 2012, down more than 80 percent from the 51 successful hijackings in 2010 and the 52 in 2009. The number of targeted ships (those either fired upon or nearly boarded) was also down more than 80 percent from a 2009 high of 129.

Several international naval counterpiracy operations are now under way in the area, including European Union (EU) and NATO naval task forces with substantial contributions from Russia, China and India. Better security on merchant ships, including armed guards, has also helped reduce the problem. Armed merchantmen were standard operating procedure for allied convoys crossing the North Atlantic during World War II but had become relics in the modern, peacetime maritime industry. Until recently, many nations did not allow weapons on their merchant ships. Today, a high percentage of large ships traversing high-risk areas off the Horn of Africa carry armed security details. The practice will likely continue because it’s working: As of December 2012, no ships protected by armed guards have been hijacked, according to the IMB.

Although most such victories have occurred at sea, security operations on shore have also aided the anti-piracy cause. In autonomous Puntland in northern Somalia, the Puntland Maritime Police Force had some success against pirate bases before it ran into money and political problems. Kenyan military operations against the al-Shabab terrorist network in southern Somalia have also hindered pirate activity in the region.

NAVAL COOPERATION

Most Somali pirate teams consist of fewer than 20 untrained men, operating from skiffs, armed with automatic rifles and rocket-propelled grenades. Despite their relatively moderate military capabilities, they have cost the world in excess of $6.5 billion annually, including ransoms worth $160 million in 2011, according to estimates from the One Earth Future Foundation, a U.S.-based think tank. Those increased costs include higher insurance premiums and fuel costs and expensive delays at sea while ships await the arrival of convoys. In response to the outsized financial impact of these ragtag hijackers, dozens of nations, including the world’s greatest powers, have dispatched warships.

According to EU Naval Forces (EUNAVFOR), about 25 warships from the various task forces and contributing nations patrol the high-risk zone.

EU Naval Forces (EUNAVFOR)
The groupings are:

• **EUNAVFOR (Operation Atalanta)** The EU launched the mission in December 2008 and authorized its continuation through 2014. Atalanta fields four to seven ships, depending on the time of year, and its core mission includes protecting World Food Programme shipments and supply shipments for the African Union’s peacekeeping mission in Somalia.

• **NATO (Operation Ocean Shield)** According to NATO, Ocean Shield, which began in August 2009, “contributes to providing maritime security in the region and is helping to reduce the overall pirate attack success rate.” In addition to naval escort and protection, NATO offers counterpiracy capacity-building help to regional countries.

• **Combined Maritime Forces (CMF)** Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) is a 27-nation partnership, led by the United States, with contributions from Europe, Asia and North America and a mission “to promote security, stability and prosperity.” Command of CTF-151 changes regularly. Recent commanders have been from Pakistan, Turkey and South Korea. The combined force is focused on combating piracy, especially off the Horn of Africa.

• **Others** The Russian Navy, which joined multinational anti-piracy operations in 2009, has been especially effective. Russian warships have conducted a number of successful operations, including the May 2010 rescue of the oil tanker MV Moscow University, which then EU Naval Force Commander John Harbour called “an excellent operation all around.” The Shared Awareness and Deconfliction initiative (SHADE), a joint effort of India, China and Japan, began patrolling in December 2008, and Saudi Arabia also sends regular naval patrols to the region.

The various naval forces in the region meet four times a year to coordinate actions, discuss tactics and share intelligence, according to *The Economist*. And NATO and Russian naval forces conducted joint counter-piracy exercises in late February 2013 in the Gulf of Aden. The bedraggled pirate crews, when intercepted, are typically no match for modern warships. They usually attempt to flee or throw their weapons overboard and pretend they are fishermen. As unemployed pirate Abdirizaq Saleh told *The Associated Press*...
in September 2012: “The risks involved in the hijacking attempts were very high. EU navies were our main enemy.” Still, catching pirates has been difficult. The area in question is enormous, about 8.3 million kilometers – as big as Western Europe – and the pirates have extended operations farther into the Indian Ocean to avoid naval patrols near shore.

Atalanta and other operations are increasingly taking the fight to the pirates’ onshore bases and pre-emptively focusing on pirate “mother ships” at sea. Under its newly extended mandate, Atalanta helicopters hit camps near Haradheere, Somalia, a pirate haven, in May 2012, destroying fuel and boats. Lt. Cmdr. Jacqueline Sherriff, Atalanta’s spokesperson, stated that such a move represents a shift of tactics designed to create “a disruptive effect in areas previously considered to belong to the pirates, damaging their sense of impunity.”

SELF DEFENSE
Given the amount of area they have to cover, naval patrols can’t be everywhere at once, and commercial ships often must make the dangerous passage unprotected. Therefore, shipping companies are using enhanced onboard security measures – from passive to lethal – to fight piracy on their own.

EUNAVFOR and NATO advocate using nonviolent means to “avoid, deter or delay piracy attacks.” According to the CMF website, these include maintaining 24-hour lookouts; inhibiting deck access; maneuvering evasively; and installing deck lighting, netting, razor wire and electrical fencing.

Armed security teams have also been vital. A November 2012 analysis from Stratfor, a U.S.-based security consultant, estimated that as many as 70 percent of large commercial ships in the region carry armed guards. British maritime security experts Tom Patterson and Anthony Rix told The Economist that armed guards are probably “the biggest game changer” in piracy reduction.

Some experts, however, consider the use of armed guards to be risky, citing legal issues with transporting and operating weapons and fears that armed merchantmen could provoke the pirates to escalate violence. International law stipulates that ships at sea are governed by the laws of the nation under which they are flagged. Until recently, many countries forbade commercial vessels from carrying arms, but those laws have been changing. Still, many countries don’t allow ships to bring weapons into their territorial waters, forcing some crews to dump expensive weapons into the sea before they enter ports.

The private security model has proved so effective – and profitable for the rapidly expanding maritime security industry – that a private company called Typhon plans to launch its own security flotilla to augment international naval forces, the BBC reported.

NO TIME TO RELAX
It’s clear from the dramatic drop in pirate attacks that counterpiracy measures – multinational naval patrols, armed private security teams and onshore operations – have been effective. Piracy has become much more dangerous for the pirates and much more expensive for its mostly Somali financiers.

But the risk remains high, and most analysts believe it’s too early to declare victory. Norwegian piracy expert Stig Jarle Hansen told The Christian Science Monitor that the pirate apparatus remains intact and that the lure of profit will inspire the pirates to return when they perceive a decline in interest from the international community.

Rear Adm. Duncan Potts, EUNAVFOR’s operational commander, agreed, noting a thwarted pirate attack in November 2012: “This is an indication that pirates still intend to get out to sea, and all involved in countering piracy, whether they are the military or industry, must remain vigilant and prepared.”
The achievements of Afghan women

Protecting women’s rights is a prime consideration after the military drawdown in 2014.

Prior to 2001, Afghan women only dreamed of serving in the parliament, running for president or representing their country in the Olympic Games. But since the Taliban’s ouster from power 11 years ago, some Afghan women are seeing their dreams come true. Dr. Massouda Jalal ran for president in the 2004 election, Fawzia Koofi is a candidate in the 2014 presidential campaign, and track star Tahmina Kohistani represented Afghanistan in London’s Summer Olympics in 2012. These women are all breaking new ground and pioneering new paths to capitalize on newfound opportunities for females in Afghanistan.

By per Concordiam Staff
Epic as their achievements are, so is their uncertainty about the future. Women worry that the Taliban will re-emerge when the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) leaves in 2014 and that the country will descend into barbarism. Some fear the future so much that a brain drain of educated women has begun, the Guardian reports, and more women are abandoning jobs and schools for the safety of home.

“We cannot speak about the future of Afghanistan without talking about half of the Afghan population: Afghan women – and the vital role that Afghan women are playing in paving the path toward the bright future that we all seek for this great country,” Gen. John Allen, the ISAF commander, said in February 2012.

Dr. Jalal made history in 2004 when she ran for president – marking the first time a woman ever ran for the highest office. Jalal had been a medical doctor and professor and campaigned on the principle that she was an outsider unbound by past regimes and regional warlords. She lost the election but was appointed minister of women’s affairs and served two years. Jalal, who champions equality for Afghan women, began the Jalal Foundation, an organization dedicated to educating and empowering Afghan women.

Koofi followed in Jalal’s footsteps and has announced a run for president in the 2014 election. Her supporters have praised her courage, starting with the time she braved assaults to attend school. Koofi became the first female elected to Afghanistan’s parliament in 2005. She applied for the deputy speaker position on her first day and prevailed against male rivals, marking the first time a female was appointed to the position. While in office she raised money to build roads, fought to send more girls to school and encouraged more women to seek higher education.

Her presidential campaign will focus on “a responsible, accountable, good government,” she told Reuters in April 2012. Her intentions are to confront corruption, achieve financial independence for the country by capitalizing on the country’s rich mineral wealth, and pursue equality for women.

“Our daughters are like the hope, the future of Afghanistan. I think we have to stand up. They have to raise their voice,
demonstrate that they have equal abilities in this country like many other people have,” she told CNN in June 2012.

Like Jalal and Koofi, 23-year-old Kohistani is considered a symbol of female empowerment. Her training grounds and equipment were quite different from most athletes training for the Olympics – a derelict stadium and the absence of expensive coaches and pricey track shoes. She instead donned a hijab and covered her body to conform to her religion, ignoring the disadvantage that more clothing would slow her down. For running a brief 100-meter sprint, she received threats and was told she was shaming Muslim women. She vowed to quit many times but always returned to her passion. She refused to believe that the act of running was defaming Islam. Although Kohistani didn’t place in the Olympics, she says she runs for every little girl who is told not to run because of their faith. “I knew I was not going to win a medal when I came here; I am here to begin a new era for the women of Afghanistan to show people that we can do the same things that people from other countries can do. There is no difference between us,” Kohistani told The Telegraph in August 2012. She is now training for the 2016 Olympics.

Women struggle daily in most parts of Afghanistan. Oxfam, a nonprofit organization aimed at ending poverty, reported in March 2012 that 87 percent of Afghan women have been physically, sexually or emotionally abused. Jalal told the Deutsche Welle in October 2012 that women in Afghanistan are disposable to men because 60 to 80 percent of marriages are arranged and compulsory. Moreover, there are about one million male drug addicts in Afghanistan and in some of these households women assume the roles of breadwinners. The justice system is comparatively primitive. Child marriages still take place, and women are arrested and imprisoned daily for fleeing abusive husbands and forced marriages. Nearly 70 percent of the 700 female inmates in Afghan prisons are there for escaping from domestic violence.

The Afghan government has sent mixed signals on women’s rights, and many blame President Karzai for not supporting them, according to Heather Barr, the Afghanistan researcher in the Asia division of Human Rights Watch. In September 2012, high-level Afghan government officials stated that it was not a criminal act for women to run away from violence and that it was not a reason for prosecution, Human Rights Watch reported. Justice Minister Habibullah Ghaleb, Women’s Affairs Minister Hassan Bano Ghazanfar and Deputy Interior Minister Baz Mohammad Ahmadi vowed to end imprisonment of women for fleeing abuse. The declaration is a step forward for women, but many still await release. “Now the onus is on President Karzai and his government to promptly free the women and girls that have lost months or years of their lives on these bogus charges,” Brad Adams, director of Human Rights Watch’s Asia Division, said in a September 2012 article on their website.

Many of these imprisoned women have endured pain and injustice. “While the women and girls who flee abuse often end up incarcerated, the men responsible for the domestic violence and forced marriages causing flight almost always enjoy impunity from prosecution,” a Human Rights Watch report states. For this reason, if and when these women are released, they in many cases will need protection.

Afghan women need to preserve the progress they have made, as well as expand their rights. The rights of women must be addressed in any negotiation process, advocates contend. “If more women were allowed into the provincial and peace councils, this would be a big show to the insurgents that they cannot reverse 10-years of women’s advancements,” Guhramaana Kakar, an advisor to President Karzai, told the Guardian in a May 26, 2012, article. “Security for women cannot be divorced from the wider security agenda in Afghanistan,” Melanie Ward, an ActionAid representative, said to the Guardian.

The international community also has a vital role to play in protecting women’s rights beyond the 2014 withdrawal of coalition forces. It must work to sustain the peace by helping to rebuild the infrastructure, maintain foreign investment and lay the foundation for economic development. This includes engaging in cooperative efforts to mitigate the collateral damage of illicit drug cultivation and promoting viable employment alternatives for all. The international community must recommit to fostering a stable Afghanistan not only for the sake of women, but also for the future of all citizens and the nation as a whole. □
MODERATING
BORDER DISPUTES
Speech-acts by EU diplomats help defuse tensions on the Serbia-Kosovo border
The control of two border checkpoints in the north of Kosovo along the border with Serbia has become a decisive issue in the demonstration of sovereignty. The move by Pristina to control the checkpoints initiated a heated discourse from both parties. The purpose of this article is to analyze how political leaders, using a form of demonstrative communication that linguists call “speech-acts,” securitized border checkpoints. Speech-acts denote a form of linguistics that isn’t just rhetorical but inspires action. Securitization means convincing people that a particular issue amounts to an existential threat. While Serbia and Kosovo practiced securitization, the European Union acted as a desecuritization factor, meaning it moderated the border dispute by relegating it to normal political channels. The EU’s reluctance to grant membership to countries with outstanding border issues influenced speech-acts of national political leaders. This study proves that the EU’s use of membership as leverage has the ability to solve border disputes.

DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM
Securitization of Kosovo’s northern border control has become an important political tool for political leaders in Serbia and Kosovo to legitimize actions. This stance, however, has not fully taken into account threats to regional security and the role of the EU. The Western Balkans is still a “security consumer.” The main security consumer is Kosovo, which declared its independence in February 2008. Serbia has considered Kosovo a province, and control of northern border checkpoints has been one of the most difficult issues between the two countries. If Kosovo’s authorities gained control of this part of the border, it would remove Serbia’s last leverage on Kosovo, especially in the northern part of the country. On the other hand, ceding control of these checkpoints would suggest the government of Kosovo isn’t fully sovereign.

International stakeholders have been in a delicate position. The EU mission, the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), and the NATO military mission, Kosovo Force (KFOR), have adopted a status quo stance by “maintaining a safe and secure environment.” This hasn’t prevented Kosovo’s and Serbia’s leaders from striving to gain an advantage.

The burden of maintaining stability in the Western Balkans has gradually shifted from NATO to the EU. The EU uses soft power as well as hard power. For example, EULEX, the EU mission on the rule of law, provides a law enforcement component through the judiciary and police. Kosovo’s leaders had made clear that their goal is EU membership. Similarly, when Boris Tadić became Serbia’s president, the country chose a European path, reversing former President Vojislav Koštunica’s negative attitude toward the EU.

The role of the EU as a desecuritization actor has been noted in other cases, too. Exemplified by resolution of the once-contested border between Germany and France in Alsace, EU integration is seen as promoter of cooperation. Similarly, Thomas Diez et al. give credit to the integration and association process. The EU acts as a desecuritization actor by transforming identities. The Bay of Piran, a contested border between Croatia and Slovenia, demonstrates the power of conditionality. Slovenia and the EU had halted the accession of Croatia until conflict over the bay was solved. In 2011, both countries, with the active participation of the EU, forwarded the issue to arbitration. Cyprus provides a negative example. Even after it gained membership in 2004, that country’s border standoff remains.
SECURITIZATION THEORY

Securitization theory can help provide answers. Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde have shaped what is known as the Copenhagen School of security studies. Security is seen not as an exogenous process defined by external factors but as an “intersubjective and socially constructed” process of actors. The actors define what security is. This school of thought aims to understand who securitizes what issues, for whom, why and with what results. Politicization of security issues goes beyond politics. It also incorporates the policies and actions of state institutions. Referring continually to an issue as a security threat, politicians enlist speech-acts to mobilize political pressure. The school identifies several types of security issues, and this paper is concerned with the political sector.

The political sector, as the term implies, refers to the political authority of a state. A state has three components: ideas, a physical base and institutions. In the political sector, a threat is generally confined to “giving or denying recognition, support, and legitimacy.” In this context, sovereignty is the issue, but in some cases ideology also comes into play. Legitimacy has an external dimension – recognition of the state by other states and institutions – and an internal dimension – “ideologies and other constitutive ideas and issues defining the state.”

Security issues are socially constructed. Securitization theory suggests that certain properties must be fulfilled to view an issue as securitized. One property of such speech-acts is survival (“existential threat, point of no return, and a possible way out”). Securitization theory breaks speech-acts into three components: “referent objects,” “securitizing actors” and “functional actors.” Referent objects are the people and institutions seen as existentially threatened with a legitimate claim to survival. Securitizing actors are the people who decide which issue will be securitized, thus speech-acts of the political leaders in Kosovo and Serbia are studied. The timeline of the speech acts runs from 2008 to May 2012 with the main focus from June 2011 to December 2011.

KOSOVO POSITION

Since Kosovo declared independence, 90 countries (as of April 2012) have recognized the country. Serbia and five EU members have not. On January 14, 2008, Serbia adopted an “action plan” in case Kosovo declared independence. Border checkpoints were set aflame. Serbia’s then-minister for Kosovo, Slobodan Samardžić, said that the destruction on the northern border was in his nation’s legitimate interest. Another part of the plan was an embargo on Kosovan goods, both those destined for Serbia and those transiting the country to reach Europe. Northern Kosovo, which Serbia considered to be its own territory, was less affected than the rest of Kosovo. The UN and later EULEX took over administration of border checkpoints.

After its declaration of independence, the new Kosovo government was interested in buying time until the situation calmed down. Owing to its shared responsibility with international actors, the government lacked sole executive authority in northern Kosovo. In 2010, Kosovo introduced a plan, which included border administration, to integrate the northern part of the country. The plan failed in most respects.

In 2011, Kosovo reciprocated the trade embargo with Serbia. The embargo was ineffective considering the open border in northern Kosovo. In July, Kosovo sent special police forces to capture two border checkpoints. Serbs responded by burning one of the checkpoints; Kosovar police successfully took control of the second checkpoint. KFOR seized both checkpoints and halted movement of goods and people. The Kosovo government agreed with KFOR and EULEX to defer taking control of the border checkpoints, instead installing only customs officials as long as its conditions were met (halting Serbia’s goods entering Kosovo and customs officials stationed at checkpoints). Speaking of the action, Kosovo Prime Minister Hashim Thaci said it was a “concrete step toward establishing the rule of law … The action that we undertook last night under no circumstances should be considered as a hasty move and with the intention of provocation – in fact, the only objective was and is to establish law and order.” He added that the plan was to establish “strict rules, the same as in other custom points of the Republic of Kosovo.”

He continued: “We are already chasing parallel and criminal structures. … Those structures will face the force
of Kosovar and international justice with regard to smuggling, organized crime, the use of violence, and terrorism. ... The authorities in Belgrade are absolutely powerless to have any impact on the implementation of decisions by Kosovo’s institutions.”

Speaking of demolished border checkpoints, Thaci emphasized that these “violent acts were ordered, coordinated and led by the highest political structures of Serbia.”

Kosovo’s Foreign Minister Enver Hoxhaj reacted similarly: “No other country in Europe tries to administer an area in another country using police and security forces like Serbia.”

Kosovo’s Minister of Interior Affairs Bajram Rexhepi emphasized: “We will not step back in our legitimate efforts to control all of our territory.”

**SERBIAN POSITION**

Serbia’s leaders didn’t remain silent. They contested the right of the Kosovo government to control border checkpoints. Their speech-acts highlight concerns about sovereignty, legitimacy and institutions.

Pristina’s action to control the border checkpoints was dubbed by Serbia’s leaders as unilateral. The speech-act was directed against Kosovo’s sovereignty, which in this case is the referent object. By defining Kosovo’s action as unilateral, Serbia declared itself a party to the dispute. The implication is that the issue of border control must be solved through dialogue between the parties. If the condition is not met, peace in Balkans will remain fragile. The same speech-act has been used by all political figures.

Then-Serbian President Boris Tadić expressed “grave concern” about Kosovo’s move to impose controls on the northern border: “The unilateral ... attempt of Pristina with EULEX to impose customs control on the administrative line in north Kosovo will seriously endanger the peace and stability of the whole region.” He added, “This solution has not been agreed between Belgrade and Pristina and, therefore, it must be prevented.”

Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremić offered: “The question is very simple. We have a dialogue. Are we going to solve open issues in the dialogue or is it going to be imposed unilaterally without consent of the interested parties?” Jeremić said Serbia was prepared to resume talks. “I’m sure we can find a solution,” he said.

Serbia’s negotiation team leader Borko Stefanović went further by viewing the action to take control of the border as directed against the people and depicting it as a security threat. “It can cripple the dialogue and have disastrous influence on the stability of the region.” Stefanović said that Serbia sought to resolve problems between the two “entities” and vowed never to recognize Kosovo statehood. “We should find a systemic solution because we are aware that without resolving the problem of Kosovo, we will not be able to join the European Union,” he said.

After the border checkpoint was burned, political leaders tried to distance themselves from the act. “We were appalled by this act,” Stefanović said. He added, however, that it was an effort by regional Albanians to gain more control over Serbians in the north.

Serbia’s Minister for Kosovo and Metohija Goran Bogdanović said earlier that NATO troops should evacuate the Kosovar police to prevent a further escalation of violence. State Secretary for Kosovo Oliver Ivanović accused Pristina and the international community of planning a campaign to try to gain control over ethnic Serbian enclaves in the north. “This is clearly a part of a consistent plan aimed at placing the north and Serbs in the north under full control. What is worse, I don’t think the Albanians made that plan alone;” Ivanović said. “This, after all, appears to be part of some agreement with the international community, which supports Kosovo’s independence and sees the north as the main obstacle for full implementation of that independence.”

Tadić criticized international officials in Kosovo for allegedly backing Pristina’s plans, saying they will be “responsible for any consequences.”

**EU ENGAGEMENT**

The EU has engaged both parties on technical dialogue to resolve common issues such as customs stamps. When dialogue failed and the Kosovo government sent police to the border crossings, EU authorities reacted.
EU foreign affairs chief Catherine Ashton said: “I remain gravely concerned about the continued tensions in the north of Kosovo and reiterate my condemnation of all use of violence. … Return to dialogue remains the only way for Belgrade and Pristina to resolve the underlying issues.” She added, “The EU expects to see rapid and substantive progress.”

Maja Kocijančič, a spokesperson for Ashton, stated: “We believe that the operation carried out last night by the Kosovo authorities was not helpful. It was not done in consultation with the international community, and the EU does not agree with it. … It is, in our view, essential that we now calm the situation and return to where we were … The issue of trade, needs to be, in our view, resolved through dialogue. … We believe that dialogue is the only way forward to solve the issue of customs stamps and re-establish free trade in both directions.”

EU Council President Hermann Van Rompuy said, “Regional cooperation and good neighborly relations are essential parts of the enlargement process. The European Council will judge each country on its own merits, based on fair and rigorous conditionality.”

Later, after refusing to give candidate status to Serbia on December 9, 2011, Van Rompuy offered incentives for positive behavior: “We encourage Serbia to build on that dialogue and to improve relations with Pristina for the sake of regional stability and Serbia’s own interests. … We will continue to assess the situation and Serbia’s commitment to shared objectives, with the clear aim to grant Serbia the status of candidate country in February 2012 by the Council and to be confirmed by the European Council in the beginning of March 2012.”

**REACTION TO THE EU**

From the beginning, Serbia’s political leaders tried to distinguish between their peaceful intentions and the violence committed by local Serbs at the border crossings. Bogdanović said, “This is an act of extremists and criminal groups. This is not an act of the people of the Leposavić municipality or the people of Kosovo and Metohija.”

Tadić called for an immediate end to the violence and urged Kosovo Serbs to remain calm. “The hooligans who cause violence are not defending Serbia or the Serbian citizens,” he stated.

Later, Deputy Prime Minister Božidar Djelić said: “If we want to join the EU, within which 22 members see Serbia’s borderlines in a different manner, we have to find some kind of a solution. It is the same with Pristina, which is not recognized by five EU states. The EU path is pushing both sides to a compromise.”

President Tadić said: “Serbia has its legitimate rights in Kosovo, and the truth that our Kosovo policy today collides with the interests of becoming an EU member should not be concealed from people.”

After reaching an agreement on an Integrated Border Management strategy (IBM), Tadić asked Serbs in the north of Kosovo “to remove barricades in the restless area, a move that may help the Balkan country in removing a key obstacle for its European Union accession bid. … We have achieved what was possible at the moment. … This solution does not contain statehood symbols of the so-called state of Kosovo, no state symbols whatsoever, no (Kosovo) customs officers that will do their duties, they will only be observers … With this solution, Belgrade could not reverse [the] situation to where it was before unilateral action of Kosovo forces [in July], but it has managed to bring it to situation which is much better than several days ago.”
On Kosovo’s side, Deputy Prime Minister Edita Tahiri emphasized that Kosovo supports dialogue on technical issues (concerning border crossings) excluding sovereignty issues: “We are not going to talk about these things.”

Then, at a later point: “We finally reached an agreement on an integrated management of border crossings. Both sides agreed to implement the European model on all six crossings... equal footing at the border crossings.”

**CONCLUSION**

Securitization of Kosovo’s northern border control has become an important political topic for political leaders in Serbia and Kosovo because it demonstrates loyalty to sovereignty. For Kosovo, failure to control the border is a threat to sovereignty, legitimacy and rule of law. In their speech-acts, political leaders have identified these three components as threatened by criminal groups and Serbia’s policy to control this territory.

For Serbia, the action of the Kosovo police to control the border crossing was seen as a security threat to its own interests. By using the word “unilateral” in speech-acts, Belgrade advocated the right to exert control, or partial control, over policies involving northern Kosovo. Securitization of border control took shape before the move by Kosovo police, but since July 2011, Serbia’s leaders identified the action as a threat to peace and stability in the Balkans, to Serbs living in the area and to sovereignty and legitimacy. The speech-acts were directed at local Serbs, encouraging them not to accept border control from Kosovo, and at international actors, asking them to restore the situation before Kosovo police intervention. By using the words “unilateral” and “dialogue” Serbia emphasized shared decision-making and the right of Belgrade to have a say in northern Kosovo.

The EU, supported by the U.S., Germany and NATO, acted as a desecuritization actor. EU officials supported dialogue between the parties to solve issues of trade and custom stamps. Securitization of border control was viewed as a threat to peace and the wrong way to approach the problem. Also, it was clear to Serbia that if it wanted EU candidate status, it had to normalize relations with Kosovo. Speech-acts by EU leaders influenced speech-acts of political leaders in Serbia and Kosovo. As presented above, speech-acts emphasized dialogue as a way of moving ahead. By proposing concrete solutions to the issue of border control (such as IBM), the EU desecuritized border control by turning it into a technical issue.

Political leaders in Kosovo and Serbia had securitized border control by referencing threats to sovereignty, legitimacy, resident populations, peace, and law and order. The EU has acted successfully as a desecuritization actor by moderating the speech-acts of political leaders. The result has been a more peaceful border and a demonstration of EU diplomacy that could be wielded to solve future territorial disputes.
As the nations of North Africa erupted in popular uprisings known as the Arab Spring, Europe faced the prospect of instability on its southern border exemplified by rickety boatloads of migrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea. Although Europe’s worst fears of uncontrolled North African migration have failed to materialize, the European Union’s encouragement of democratization and economic liberalization in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt remains an important element in building stability along the Mediterranean rim.

Considering how recently long-entrenched authoritarian regimes were overthrown in North Africa, the establishment of freer societies since 2011 has been swift. Solidifying that progress – and building upon it – has been the objective of European policymakers. Communiqués such as “A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean” have announced diplomatic and financial incentives to newly formed governments if they rejected the worst facets of their nations’ political pasts. The year 2013 will be decisive on that front. The European Commission has said it will assess the “reform track record” of North African states in deciding the disbursement of financial aid “for 2014 and beyond.”

**ISLAM IN POWER**

One of the biggest political transformations has been the introduction of Islamic political parties, many of them previously suppressed, into democratic assemblies in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. Most notable was the accession to power in Egypt of the formerly outlawed Muslim Brotherhood under the presidency of Mohammed Morsi. While some Europeans fear the prospect of renewed authoritarianism under an Islamic guise, others view popular support for Islamic parties as a natural outgrowth of these countries’ histories. Professor Alvaro de Vasconcelos, former director of the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), is firmly in the latter camp.

Left: Supporters of Mohammed Morsi gather in Cairo after the Egyptian president assumed greater powers in November 2012. Observers expressed concern that Morsi’s decree reducing the oversight of Egypt’s judiciary could compromise the nation’s progress toward democracy.

Right: A Libyan woman gets ready to vote in Tripoli during Libya’s General National Assembly election in July 2012. It was the country’s first free national election in decades.
“Repression of all Arab opposition movements by the region’s monarchs and secular dictators turned ‘the Mosque’ into the only umbrella under which to mobilise politically,” de Vasconcelos wrote in “Listening to Unfamiliar Voices: The Arab Democratic Wave.” “The fact is that political Islam can no longer be contained, and democracy cannot be built by driving underground parties that have a strong social base. This was tragically demonstrated in Algeria nearly two decades ago. The only alternative to authoritarianism was to craft a transition that allows Islamists to participate in public life and encourages them to unequivocally accept the rules of the democratic game.”

Nevertheless, several developments at the end of 2012 caused some to question their former optimism. A November 2012 announcement that Morsi would no longer heed rulings by Egypt’s federal judiciary stoked fears that he was accumulating powers once wielded by ousted president Hosni Mubarak. The EU has been critical of moves to limit judicial independence, a strong judiciary viewed as a hedge against abuse of power by other branches of government.

Libya’s largely peaceful midyear elections, which led to the formation of an inclusive government in October 2012, were marred by the killing in Benghazi of U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens on the anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. "Reining in the different militia and trying to integrate them into a single national army will be one of the biggest challenges for any new government," the BBC noted in a story on post-Moammar Gadhafi Libya.

In October 2012, Amnesty International bemoaned the new Tunisian government’s weak support for freedom of speech, noting a failure to protect journalists, artists and activists from attacks by religious radicals. But the EU was sufficiently mollified by Tunisia’s democratic progress to award the country “privileged partner” status that will lead to greater diplomatic and economic integration between the African nation and Europe. Writing in The New York Times in late September 2012, Tunisian President Moncef Marzouki argued that focusing on the small minority of extremists in North Africa has been counterproductive to the West’s diplomatic efforts.

“Islamists span a wide ideological and political spectrum. Yet many observers still seem to believe that extremist Salafi groups represent a majority. They are wrong,” Marzouki

Tunisian Constituent Assembly President Mustapha Ben Jaafar, left, greets Libyan General National Congress President Mohamed al-Megaryef in Tunis in November 2012. Two of the leading nations of the Arab Spring, Tunisia and Libya have moved toward greater openness after the removal of authoritarian regimes in 2011.
of November 2012, Agence France-Presse reported. In 2011, scarcely 8,000 migrants had come ashore as the Arab Spring was minimal. The United Kingdom and determined that the influence of recent legal immigration into Germany, France, Spain and the United Kingdom and determined that the influence of the Arab Spring was minimal. Immigrants from Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon and Syria totaled 90,839 in 2011, compared to the pre-Arab Spring total of 111,738 in 2009. Furthermore, nearly three-quarters of migrants in 2011 came from largely peaceful, nonrevolutionary Morocco, the Migration Policy Center said. Libya was never going to be a major factor in the migratory surge since its oil wealth and small population have made it a destination for, not a net exporter of, immigrants.

As the Malta Independent concluded in November 2012: “Migration to Europe has not been accelerated by the Arab Spring, apart from a short-lived movement from Tunisia, but has simply continued along previous trends.”

NEW NEIGHBORS

Most of Europe views stability in its “southern neighborhood” as best served by liberalization and modernization. In a May 2012 communiqué titled “Delivering on a New European Neighbourhood Policy,” the EU listed hundreds of millions of euros worth of aid it planned to disburse to support democratization in North Africa and the Middle East using the principle of “mutual accountability.” A program called Support for Partnership Reform and Inclusive Growth planned to allocate 540 million euros between 2011 and 2013. Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia and Algeria – nations regarded as more flexible when it comes to democratic reform – were the initial beneficiaries.

But in the view of Shadi Hamid, a Middle Eastern policy expert at the Brookings Institution, such installments are too small to make a meaningful difference in changing attitudes and behavior in recipient countries. “The total U.S. and EU ‘incentivised’ funds amount to a total of about $1.3 billion annually. This means that no one country can expect to get more than a couple hundred million dollars at most – a number which is simply too small to boost leverage,” Hamid wrote in a 2012 article published on the EUISS website.

Nevertheless, analysts were heartened by signs in Egypt that Muslim Brotherhood rule wouldn’t overturn some of the accomplishments of previous regimes, including the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. In late 2012, the Morsi government helped broker a cease-fire involving Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip, and helped crackdown on violent extremists in the Sinai Desert.

Overall, North African governments must satisfy a restive citizenry that expects greater freedom and prosperity from its recently installed rulers. A return to the status quo ante bellum will no longer suffice. On the basis of its proximity to Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, Europe has assumed a leading role in this democracy building.

“I would argue that the most important issue on the EU’s foreign policy agenda is how to contribute to a fully free, democratic and peaceful Arab world,” de Vasconcelos wrote. “In order to respond to this challenge, European policy-makers must design a strategy to deal with new regimes, including governments and political parties with which the EU is not familiar and several EU Member States have regarded with suspicion and even as threats over the years.”

wrote. “Radical Salafis who advocate violence and Shariah constitute a very small minority in Tunisia – and even in Egypt they are vastly outnumbered by more moderate Islamists. They are a minority within a minority, and extremely unpopular among both religious and secular Tunisians. They do not speak for all Tunisians, Arabs or Muslims.”

MIGRATION SUBSIDES

The insurrections in North Africa spurred thousands of migrants to approach Southern Europe in makeshift flotillas, sparking fears of an unmanageable exodus. But after-action reports in the EU suggest the wave subsided once popular governments came to power in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. In Italy, for example, focus of tens of thousands migrants and refugees in 2011, scarcely 8,000 migrants had come ashore as of November 2012, Agence France-Presse reported.

The Migration Policy Centre, an Italian-based research organization partly financed by the EU, studied the pace of recent legal immigration into Germany, France, Spain and the United Kingdom and determined that the influence of the Arab Spring was minimal. Immigrants from Morocco,
A Eurasian Economic Union

Some view the customs union as a Soviet-style throwback that could slow growth in the region.

The Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, ending the Cold War nuclear standoff and ushering in a more cooperative era. That historic event was viewed as a victory by most people in what was then known as the “free world” and as liberation by hundreds of millions who suffered under Communist rule behind the Iron Curtain. But a certain nostalgia for Soviet-era economic integration seems to underlie Russian President Vladimir Putin’s support for what he calls a Eurasian Economic Union (EEU).

Ostensibly a tariff-free zone with more deeply integrated economic policies, the EEU would, if Moscow has its way, encompass most of the former Soviet Union. The EEU would model itself on the European Union and strive to lower trade barriers, creating “new dynamic markets” that lead to economic growth and prosperity, Putin says.

Few question the merits of free trade. But to many, it appears as if Russia is trying to reassert economic control over post-Soviet space and reconstruct some of the links severed by the end of the Cold War. At a December 2012 conference in Dublin, then-U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called the plan “a move to re-Soviетize the region.”
Expanding economic integration

The EEU, which would initially include Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, is building on the foundation laid by the customs union launched by those countries in 2010 to establish common tariff and nontariff trade regulation. In January 2012, a Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) took over structures of the customs union with the creation of a common economic space allowing for the unrestricted flow of labor, capital and goods among the three countries. The EEU is scheduled to be ratified and come fully into force in 2015, continuing the process of economic integration.

Putin’s announcement of his plans for an EEU, which appeared in an October 2011 policy statement in the Russian newspaper Izvestiya, was full of references to EU-style free and open markets. Natalia Yacheistova, EEC deputy director for trade policy, told the online news agency Euractiv.com that the EEU will be “taking into account European Union experience. We want to exchange experience with the EU in a way that is mutually beneficial.”

A Eurasian union was first proposed in 1994 by Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev. However, the proposal was largely disregarded by then-Russian President Boris Yeltsin, enmeshed at that time in deep economic reforms and trying to move Moscow toward the West. Yeltsin’s opinion was that post-Soviet periphery states were an economic burden that Russia, given its severe economic situation, could ill afford.

Few would argue against the benefits of an authentic Eurasian free-trade block. Peter Balas, European Commission deputy director general for trade, told Euractiv in December 2012 that the new customs union could succeed if it liberalized economic relations. However, some European analysts worry that a Russian-led EEU could do the opposite, using its economic pull to increase political power by thwarting markets, especially in the energy sector. The lack of legal structure is also a concern. An analysis by the Centre for European Policy Studies, a Brussels-based think tank, suggested that lack of judicial oversight hinders the ability of the union to “build a strong law-based community.”

“When comparing the findings with the figures applicable to the early stages of the European integration process, the conclusion points to a less than favourable outcome for economic integration within the context of the EEU,” Balas wrote.

Reluctant recruits

Besides the EEU’s three founding member states, Kyrgyzstan is negotiating possible accession and Tajikistan may soon follow. But further expansion, particularly in Eastern Europe, faces serious obstacles. In June 2012, Putin said the EEU will have to formalize relations with the EEU to negotiate trade pacts with its member states, including Russia. But according to Balas, the customs union does not comply with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules: “At this stage, we don’t think that the conditions are in place for an EU-customs union agreement, simply due to the fact that the customs union is not WTO-consistent,” he said.

At the EU-Russia summit in June 2012, Putin tried to reassure Europeans that cooperation between Russia
Wheat is harvested near Zhovtneve in Ukraine, where agriculture is an important part of the economy. The country’s fertile land is one reason Russia would like to include Ukraine in a Eurasian Economic Union.
and the EU would be enhanced by the new union. But according to Euractiv, “Russia’s Customs Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan has already delayed Moscow’s accession to the WTO. It is unclear how Russia benefits from such tactics.”

Many leaders of states that Moscow wishes to include in the EEU remain skeptical. Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia are all trying to negotiate free-trade deals with the EU, and Armenia and Azerbaijan are in earlier stages of the same process. “Elites in the neighboring states show little enthusiasm for simply handing over their autonomy and sovereignty to Moscow,” Andrew Weiss of the Washington-based Rand Corporation told the Financial Times.

Ukraine and Moldova, especially, are unlikely to spurn the EU if it comes to a choice between Brussels and Moscow. World Politics Review points out that many potential candidates for EEU membership, especially in Central Asia, would also like to increase economic relations with China. Additionally, regional rivalries such as that between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan would impede agreement on joint economic policies.

Ukrainian case
Ukraine is the key for EEU success, many observers believe. According to World Politics Review, “even the relatively modest change of adding Ukraine to the existing customs union comprised of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia would significantly increase each state’s GDP.” Ukraine is the largest country situated entirely in Europe and, with a population of 45 million, it represents a substantial market for Russian-made consumer goods. Viktor Tkachuk, director general of the Ukrainian Foundation for Democracy, said Ukraine’s accession is fundamental to Putin’s foreign policy: “Moscow isn’t interested in the creation of a free trade area between Ukraine and the EU. Ukraine with its resources, infrastructure and human potential joining the customs union is a primary task of Russia.”

But perhaps most importantly, Ukraine is the gateway to Europe, both geopolitically and economically. It also was part of the Russian or Soviet empires for more than 300 years, and many Russians reflexively still consider it part of the mother country. But Kiev has declined to join the union, with ostensibly pro-Moscow President Viktor Yanukovych saying there were “no grounds” to integrate further. Russia’s attempt to exert control over the Ukrainian state-owned energy company worried the government, coloring its views of the EEU.

Conclusion
For their part, Russian officials discount the concept of re-Sovietization. “There is no talk of re-forming the USSR in some form,” Putin wrote in 2011. “It would be naive to try to restore or copy what has been abandoned in the past. But close

integration, on the basis of new values, politics and economy, is an imperative of our times.” However, Russia and Putin face a tough task in convincing their post-Soviet neighbors to sign on to the EEU. Neighboring states have unhappy memories of Russian political and economic domination and are distrustful of Putin’s motives. After all, the Russian president once called the disintegration of the USSR the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century.”

World Politics Review suggests it’s not in Russia’s interest to rule its neighbors, but rather to influence foreign and economic policy without assuming direct responsibility. “For Moscow, the arguments in favor of such a union are clear,” the publication wrote. “These include securing greater gains from trade, expanding opportunities for Russian foreign investment in neighboring countries and enhancing Moscow’s global influence and status.”

A security guard patrols the gold processing plant at the Kumtor gold mine in the Tien Shan Mountains in October 2012. Kumtor is the largest gold mine in Central Asia and gold is one of Kyrgyzstan’s most valuable exports.
One way to gauge the relative importance that different world organizations place on cyber security is to compare the paths taken by NATO and the European Union. NATO sponsors a Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) in Estonia in recognition of a well-publicized attack on that country’s financial system in 2007. The European Union established the European Cybercrime Centre (EC3), published an official European Cyber Security Strategy and proposes data privacy legislation. Collectively, NATO and the EU are working to prevent and disrupt cyber attacks by dismantling large cybercrime networks, creating a standard for cybercrime reporting and protecting customers’ personal information. With the CCDCOE providing training and capacity building, and the EU providing civilian applications, they are making the Internet a safer place for Europeans.
Interpol estimates that about a million people in Europe are victimized daily by cyber crime for an annual monetary loss of 750 billion euros. Those figures inspired the European Commission to create the EC3 in The Hague in January 2013. The centre targets organized crime networks, by which a large portion of cybercrime is committed, and those who target critical infrastructure or IT networks. Plans call for more than 50 investigators with a budget of 3.6 billion euros. The commission views the new Europol division mostly as a bulwark against the economic and social costs of online criminality, including identity theft, e-crime and the sexual exploitation of children. “This is a good day for Europe,” Cecilia Malmström, EU Home Affairs Commissioner, said at the opening of the Centre in January 2013. “…we send a signal to cyber criminals that we will go after them. And by ‘we’ I mean 27 member states together with the EU institutions, as well as industry, academia and civil society. Never before has the EU responded in such a strong way.”

The European Cyber Security Strategy, likewise, applies a multidisciplinary approach. Released in February 2013, it mandates that each state designate a computer emergency response team for cyber emergencies and reporting of cybercrimes, and bolsters public/private sector cooperation. “The more people rely on the Internet the more people rely on it to be secure. A secure internet protects our freedoms and our ability to do business. It’s time to take a coordinated action—the cost of not acting is much higher than the cost of acting,” European Commission Vice President Neelie Kroes said of the strategy in February 2013.

The EU’s cyber protection efforts also include a unified European data protection law to replace 27 different national laws governing cyberspace. New privacy rights, backed by stiff fines for violators, would include a “right of portability” (marketers would be required to get a customer’s consent before transferring data) and a “right to be forgotten” (customers could wipe user data clean from websites they have visited). The rules will bind both EU companies and foreign companies that process the data of EU citizens or serve the EU market.

Although welcome, limiting abuses in the realms of social media and e-commerce is viewed as insufficient to an increasing number of observers who fear rogue operators on the Internet pose a larger, geo-political threat. That recognition was behind the establishment of the NATO centre of excellence in Tallinn, Estonia, in 2008, followed by the creation of a U.S. Military Cyber Command in 2010.

Some military observers view cyber attacks, particularly those they suspect are sponsored by governments, as Internet versions of reconnaissance to scout out a geo-political rival’s defenses. With that in mind, cyber preparedness “exercises” are becoming more routine and include participation by the private sector. “The consequences of a well planned, well executed attack against our digital infrastructure could be catastrophic,” then-British Armed Forces Minister Nick Harvey told the Guardian newspaper in 2011. And sometimes the best defense is a good offense. According to a story in Britain’s Daily Telegraph, al-Qaida’s online magazine was hacked in 2011 and a manual for bomb-making replaced by cake recipes.

Independent and state-sponsored hackers increased their presence on the international scene in 2012, damaging economies and business operations. Computer security company Symantec estimates the cost of global cyber crime at $114 billion (87.1 billion euros) annually with another $274 billion (209.4 billion euros) in time lost due to down time. In a speech before the American Enterprise Institute in July 2012, Gen. Keith Alexander, commander of the U.S. Cyber Command and Director of the National Security Agency, labeled cyber crime “the greatest transfer of wealth in history.”

In August, the giant Saudi oil company Aramco lost much of its corporate data to a computer virus. Multinational defense contractor Lockheed Martin Corp. reported “persistent” attacks on its networks throughout the year. Financial institutions, including Visa, MasterCard and the New York Stock Exchange, have been targets as well. U.S. and NATO military computers are not immune either. The virus dubbed “Red October” attacked “files encrypted with software used by several entities from the European Union to NATO,” according to a January 2013 Agence France-Presse article.

Some have compared cyber attacks to the nuclear standoff of the last century. As was the case with nuclear arms, fear of retaliation and escalation might prevent governments from wielding the “cyber weapon.” Nevertheless, cyber disruptions will likely play a role in future conflicts. According to Gen. Alexander, cyber attacks have thus far been primarily “disruptive,” but he foresees “destructive” attacks that could disable power grids or knock out air-traffic control systems. Gen. Alexander urged NATO Allies to prepare a good defense that would include a system of real-time information sharing between the private sector, especially critical infrastructure industries, and government security agencies. An important component of such a system would be protecting civil liberties and privacy.

Said The Economist: “After land, sea, air and space, cyberspace is now the fifth dimension of warfare. Could a country launch a crippling attack from cyberspace, say to knock out the electricity grid of a rival state, or snarl up the logistical chain of its armed forces? The answer is: maybe.”
This book provides an impressive, relevant and comprehensive analysis of security dimensions for NATO in the 21st century. Such an analysis is important because NATO members have exhibited a lack of solid agreement on a range of issues. Differences have emerged about whether NATO is a regional organization committed to collective defense or a global organization committed to expeditionary operations, whether the Alliance’s character should be more political or military and whether members should devote themselves to issues such as cyber and energy security. NATO’s relations with Russia are also a burning issue, closely linked to the debate on nuclear weapons, disarmament and missile defense.
Following introductory sections, the book’s subsequent chapters chart a similar approach: an examination of the historical context in which the given issue or topic has evolved; an identification and characterization of key contemporary policy debates and drivers that shape current thinking; and a presentation of possible scenarios relating to the topic. All contemporary discussion about NATO’s relevance and possible future is captured within this coherent approach.

After outlining NATO’s genesis, the book proceeds with second and third chapters that examine the internal adaptation of the Alliance and the U.S. perspective on NATO. Chapters 4 and 5 highlight NATO’s enlargement and partnerships, followed by an analysis of NATO-Russia relations in chapter 6 and NATO’s comprehensive approach in chapter 7. The next topic, NATO operations in Afghanistan, is provided in chapter 8, in which 10 key lessons are offered for further debate. With chapters 9 and 10, our attention is drawn to NATO’s nuclear policy and its approach to cyber security. The discussion of NATO’s approach to missile defense and energy security in chapters 11 and 12 concludes with a focus on new and relevant issues in security policy.

The book offers fresh, in-depth discussions of key NATO topics, puts NATO’s options for further development in a strategic and global perspective and provides different scenarios. Two examples from the book illustrate its analytical approach and fresh thinking:

In the field of NATO partnerships, the first scenario extrapolated from the present suggests that the future of partnerships will be marked more by continuity than change. It suggests the future will represent an extension of the present, particularly in regard to gaps between what heads of states rhetorically agree to at a policy level and what is actually implemented in practice. A second scenario suggests that NATO’s bilateral and regional partnerships will go global to undertake necessary crisis-management operations and preserve the “global commons” and so extend U.S. primacy. In this scenario, NATO would become the default global crisis management instrument and create additional partnership programs to facilitate UN-mandated operations to manage regional flashpoints.

A third scenario suggests that NATO’s regional and bilateral partnerships will seek to balance China in Central, South and East Asia, a process driven as much by allies as by new partners. This would be in response to the logic of power shifts and growing interdependence and competition for finite energy resources and raw materials.

The chapter on cyber security also provides three scenarios. The first, called “business as usual,” is the most positive. It predicts an intensification of current trends during the next 20 years. Increasing economic and social dependence on cyberspace-based systems would continue. Mobile devices and sensor networks (including those in cars) make the efficient functioning of Western economies completely dependent on cyber networks. Cyber attacks against national and multilateral institutions become routine. The third scenario is called “Emergence of a Multilateral World Order.” This outlook is similar in many ways to the “business as usual” case – cyber crime in particular continues to grow in sophistication and impact, and offensive cyber skills become widespread. Along these lines, “cyber” would inspire NATO to develop new capabilities and roles, and could pave the way for the Alliance to continue its work of maintaining a framework for peace in the North Atlantic. However, there is still much debate among the NATO members that would need to commit resources for the Alliance to step into this new role as cyber guardian.

In all, the book provides significant value by offering an analytical and coherent approach geared toward NATO’s future, a future outlined by various concrete scenarios. Each chapter identifies current policy debates and potential trends and encourages dialogue among strategic thinkers as well as students of international relations. It’s a real standout among current publications in the field of international security studies.

Resident Courses
Democraeria per fide en et concordiam
Democracy through trust and friendship

Registrar
George C. Marshall European Center for
Security Studies
Gernackerstrasse 2
82467 Garmisch-Partenkirchen
Germany
Telephone: +49-8821-750-2656
Fax: +49-8821-750-2650
www.marshallcenter.org
registrar@marshallcenter.org

Admission
The George C. Marshall European Center
for Security Studies cannot accept direct
nominations. Nominations for all programs
must reach the center through the appropriate
ministry and the U.S. or German embassy in the
nominee’s country. However, the registrar can
help applicants start the process. For help, email
requests to: registrar@marshallcenter.org

PROGRAM ON APPLIED SECURITY STUDIES - CAPACITY BUILDING (PASS-CB)
The Marshall Center’s flagship resident program, a
10-week course, provides graduate-level
education in security policy, defense affairs,
international relations and related topics such
as international law and counterterrorism.

PASS-CB 13-11
Sept. 27 –
Dec. 6, 2013

A theme addressed throughout the program is the
need for international, interagency and interdisciplinary
cooperation in responding to most 21st-century security
challenges. Participants must be proficient in one of two
languages: English or Russian.

PROGRAM ON TERRORISM AND SECURITY STUDIES (PTSS)
The five-week, twice-yearly program addresses the
different aspects of threats to nations and is for mid-
and upper-level management, military, government and
police officials in counterterrorism organizations. The
focus is on combating terrorism while adhering to the
basic values of a democratic society. The five-module
course provides a historical and theoretical overview
of terrorism, the vulnerabilities of terrorist groups,
the role of law, the financing of terrorism and security
cooperation.

PTSS 13-7
June 28 – Aug. 2, 2013
SEMINAR ON REGIONAL SECURITY (SRS)
The three-week Seminar on Regional Security provides national security professionals throughout the world a comprehensive insight into the complex shape of regional conflict patterns, typical traps of crisis management as well as realistic possibilities for constructive crisis response.

SRS 14-3 Jan. 31 - Feb. 21, 2014

SEMINAR ON COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION/ TERRORISM (SCWMD/T)
The two-week seminar provides national security professionals a comprehensive look at combating weapons of mass destruction and the challenges posed by chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats by examining best practices for ensuring that participating nations have fundamental knowledge about the issue.

SCWMD/T 13-8 July 26 - Aug. 9, 2013

THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE SEMINAR (SES)
The seminar is a forum that allows for the in-depth exploration of international security issues. Participants in winter and fall sessions include high-level government officials, general officers, senior diplomats, ambassadors, ministers and parliamentarians. The SES format includes presentations by senior officials and recognized experts followed by discussions in seminar groups.

SES 13-10 Sept. 10-19, 2013

Alumni Programs

Alumni Relations Specialists:

Barbara Wither
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Turkey
Languages: English, Russian, German
Tel +49-(0)8821-750-2291
witherb@marshallcenter.org

Chris O’Connor
Belarus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Slovak Republic, Ukraine
Languages: English, Russian, Polish
Tel +49-(0)8821-750-2706
oconnorc@marshallcenter.org

Milla Beckwith
Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Mongolia, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
Languages: English, German, Russian
Tel +49-(0)8821-750-2014
ludmilla.beckwith@marshallcenter.org

Frank Bär
German Element, Germany, Austria, Switzerland
Languages: German, English
Tel +49-(0)8821-750-2814
frank.baer@marshallcenter.org

Randy Karpinen
Russian Federation, Middle East, Africa, Southern & Southeast Asia, North & South America, West Europe
Languages: English, Finnish, German, Russian, Spanish
Tel +49-(0)8821-750-2112
karpinenr@marshallcenter.org

mcalumni@marshallcenter.org
Contribute
Interested in submitting materials for publication in per Concordiam magazine? Submission guidelines are at http://tinyurl.com/per-concordiam-submissions

Subscribe
For more details, or a FREE subscription to per Concordiam magazine, please contact us at editor@perconcordiam.org

Find us
Find per Concordiam online at:
Marshall Center: www.marshallcenter.org
Twitter: www.twitter.com/per_concordiam
Facebook: www.facebook.com/perconcordiam
GlobalNET Portal: https://members.marshallcenter.org

The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany.