Police Primacy: The Challenges of Developing Host Nation Police Capacity on Stability Operations
Stability operations are complex military-civilian interventions to address the security, economic, and governance issues that fuel disorder and violence in fragile and conflict-affected states. The United States Department of Defense has described stability operations as: various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.1
Stabilization operations embrace a wide range of missions, from benign traditional peacekeeping to combat with well-armed insurgents or criminal elements. It is often the case that a variety of different activities, including combat, policing, humanitarian assistance, and reconstruction, will occur concurrently in the theater of operations.
Establishing the rule of law is a key strategic objective of a stability operation. In states that are plagued by conflict and where government is discredited or lacking, the maintenance of law and order often falls to foreign military and police intervention forces. These contingents must impose and maintain order in the absence of the effective national and local police forces that normally would perform this task in stable, functioning states. They must also train and mentor indigenous police forces to enable the transition from conflict to normality that will allow foreign forces to withdraw.
Military forces are often essential to create the initial security conditions that allow the civilian components of a stability operation to build a durable peace, however, armed forces are not intrinsically suited to police work. Soldiers are trained to apply lethal force in war. Military force can have a deterrent effect on militias and criminal gangs, but sometimes the deployment of soldiers in a law enforcement role can lead to excessive violence, which invariably alienates the local population and can provoke armed resistance. Some militaries can and do perform effectively in a policing role, but their efforts are ultimately intended to buy time for the development of effective host nation police capabilities. As the latest British counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine acknowledges: The process of transition underpins counterinsurgency. In overall terms where armed forces have to act to support the civil authority they should transfer such security responsibilities to the civil police as soon as conditions allow [authors’italics]. Any sense of permanent presence by allies or partners is likely to be exploited by insurgents and critics from home and abroad.2
U.S. doctrine for stability operations places equal stress on the importance of building host nation civil police capacity: Building host-nation capacity for civil control is paramount to establishing the foundation for lasting civil order. Community-oriented police services under civilian control that clearly separate the roles of the police and military are essential to success.3
In a post-conflict situation, effective policing helps to keep violence at a manageable level and can build public confidence in the stabilization process so that military force may not have to be employed on a large scale. It is, therefore, not surprising that the number of police deployed on United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping and peace support operations has increased dramatically since the end of the Cold War, reaching a level of over 14,340 police on 19 missions by April 2012.4 U.N. policing roles in the early 1990s were limited to monitoring, observing, and reporting on indigenous police services, but in the last 15 years policing operations have become increasingly complex and difficult, with the requirement to undertake an executive policing function and/or the major reform and development of local police services.
Despite the growth in the numbers of police deployed, the provision of adequate numbers of competent foreign police and the process of building the capacity of indigenous police services have proved problematic on numerous stability operations. Effective policing is critically important to the success of the current NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan, but rapid expansion, inadequate training, and under-resourcing have created an Afghan National Police (ANP) that is reported to lack capability, legitimacy, and integrity; it is also plagued by problems of corruption, high desertion rates, illiteracy, and drug abuse.5 Even during the East Timor operation (1994–2004), which overall is regarded as a U.N. success story, the development of a civilian police service has been described as characterized by “slipshod planning, squandered opportunities, and unimaginative leadership.”6 As a result, the responsibilities of the East Timor National Police (PNTL) were left ill-defined, which contributed to an outbreak of renewed violence in 2006.
This paper addresses the challenges of policing on U.N. and coalition stability operations and assesses efforts to achieve host nation police primacy, defined as a situation where indigenous police have the main responsibility for internal security and the maintenance of the rule of law. Much has been written about policing missions since the end of the Cold War, but largely from a narrow campaign or country-specific standpoint. This paper offers a broader perspective: identifying and discussing common, recurring problems that have beset policing operations and assessing national and international efforts to make better use of foreign and host nation police assets. The authors recognize that reform and reconstruction of the judiciary, justice department, and penal system are also essential to establish and maintain the rule of law, but these functions are beyond the scope of this paper.
The Roles of Police on Stability Operations
The division of tasks between police and military forces as well as the composition and role of police forces vary according to mission-specific factors such as the mission mandate; the threat environment; the condition of indigenous security institutions; and the availability of foreign manpower and expertise. Depending on the nature of the operation, foreign deployed police may perform a wide range of tasks including:
- Advice to host nation police services
- Support to military forces against terrorists and insurgents
- The establishment of new host nation police services
- Executive law enforcement functions such as public order, riot control, criminal investigations and intelligence gathering
- Training and mentorship to build local police capacity
On major stability operations, police operate alongside deployed military forces, ideally establishing an effective functional relationship, while maintaining a separate operational profile. The division of labor between the police and military on major operations is broadly illustrated at Figure 1. However, stability operations can be marked by very different security challenges within a relatively small geographic area and rapid changes in the character of the threat. This was notably described by General Charles Krulak as “Three-Block War,” an environment where security forces might find themselves engaged in firefights with insurgents, basic law enforcement duties, and humanitarian assistance concurrently in adjacent city blocks.7
Law enforcement is the civil police’s most important function, but this represents a particular challenge during stability operations. Post-conflict situations are often chaotic; the presence of insurgents and armed criminals gangs, as well as the ready availability of small arms, can cause both foreign and indigenous police forces to be diverted to deal with these high-end threats, thereby limiting their effectiveness in dealing with basic crime prevention and law enforcement at a local level. Population control and protection are likely to be important police functions during all stability operations. These tasks require a high level of skill and robustness as they include public order management tasks such as riot control, the enforcement of curfews and checkpoints, and the general protection of the population against armed gangs. Formed units of para-military police, such as the French Gendarmerie or Italian Carabinieri, are normally better suited for this role than conventional military forces because the former are trained to deal with public order issues and the application of force. For example, following the fall of Baghdad in April 2003, U.S. troops had no suitable training or non-lethal means to prevent the widespread looting that ransacked government buildings. Likewise, during the Albanian riots against Serbs in Kosovo in March 2004, the response by NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) proved woefully inadequate because most national military contingents were not trained, equipped, or mandated to deal with civil disorder.8
Police also have a crucial role in intelligence gathering. Intelligence in the context of stability operations ranges from an awareness of local problems with essential services, governance, and crime, to information about insurgents and their support networks. Foreign deployed police often lack local knowledge, cultural awareness, and language skills. Host nation police can compensate for these deficiencies, provide their foreign military counterparts valuable human intelligence, and offer a local security presence to reassure the population.
The use of indigenous police to arrest violent elements seeking to disrupt the stabilization process can reinforce the criminal nature of these activities, while the employment of soldiers in this capacity may reinforce a local perception that acts of violence are legitimate resistance against foreign occupation. Unfortunately, in many fragile states, police quality is poor and officers are mistrusted or even despised by the people they are supposed to serve. A survey conducted in Iraq in 2006 found that 75% of Iraqis did not trust the police enough to tip them off to insurgent activity.9 In Afghanistan, villagers even in pacified areas have sometimes expressed a preference for the crude certainties of Taliban justice rather than a corrupt, official law enforcement system.10 Local police may have to be judiciously recruited, trained, and monitored by foreign law enforcement officers before they can operate independently. Patience and perseverance, as well as a broader political will to stay the course, are essential. A premature attempt to establish host nation police primacy can jeopardize wider progress towards security and normality. In summer 2005, the British Army prematurely handed over responsibility for urban security in Maysan Province to the Iraqi police. The numbers, training, and motivation of the police were inadequate so the force could not maintain civil order. The resulting security vacuum assisted the growth of Mahdi Army militias with links to Iran.11
The U.N. Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has long stressed the need for “democratic policing,” recognizing that a responsive and accountable local police force that defends basic human rights is essential for the successful transition from a turbulent post-conflict environment to one characterized by long term, sustainable security.12 Building such an indigenous police capacity requires special training for policemen seconded by donor countries, as this task involves skills outside normal police work, including mentoring, advising, training, and consultancy. The U.N. and other international institutions struggle to recruit sufficient police officers with appropriate skills for this vital work yet many still do not receive appropriate or effective pre-deployment training.13
Too Little, Too Late or Too Much Too Soon? Recurring Policing Problems on Stability Operations
Despite growing international experience, common policing problems have blighted successive stability operations. Often, foreign police do not deploy in sufficient numbers or early enough during a stability operation to prevent problems like a rise in criminal activity or a decline in public order in the host country. Efforts to train and mentor host state police forces tend to be insufficiently tailored to local requirements and sometimes emphasize rapid throughput to get “boots on the ground” rather than an investment in long-term, sustainable, quality policing. Capacity building programs for indigenous police forces also continue to be stymied by poor cooperation and coordination between the plethora of national and international agencies involved.
Inadequate Planning: Planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom made no provision for an international police force, not least because senior U.S. officials assumed that Iraqi state institutions would remain largely intact. In May 2003, the U.S. Department of Justice belatedly called for the deployment of 6,600 international police advisors and 2,500 paramilitary police to help the coalition military forces maintain order in Iraq.14 By June 2004, less than 300 police advisors, recruited and trained by DynCorp International, under contract to the U.S. State Department, had arrived in theater. The United States’ main coalition partner, the United Kingdom, had also neglected to include professional police in its post-conflict planning.15
Consequently, British training efforts remained inadequately staffed and resourced and the hastily trained local police in southern Iraq remained weak and corrupt. In the case of the U.N. peacekeeping mission in East Timor, a relatively strong foreign police component of 1,600 personnel was deployed to maintain law and order, but efforts to build a local police force were delayed by the lack of trainers with appropriate expertise. It took six months from the mission’s start in October 1999 before foreign police officers were specifically assigned or recruited to build the Timorese police forces.16 The U.N. Kosovo operation in 1999 also included a robust police mandate with executive authority to conduct investigations, make arrests, and mentor a new Kosovo Police Service (KPS). Unfortunately, the slow pace of recruitment and deployment of U.N. police, which was not completed until February 2002, allowed ethnic Albanians to carry out reprisals against ethnic Serbs and for organized, transnational criminal gangs to become established.17
Shortage of Deployable Police Assets: Unfortunately, experienced, deployable police are in short supply so the process of police mobilization takes much longer than the deployment of a comparable number of military personnel. In contrast to military units, police personnel in developed countries are employed in law enforcement duties in peacetime. Foreign deployment leads to vacant positions in domestic police forces. During a conference in 2000, European Union (EU) members established a “Headline Goal” of 5,000 police for stability operations. This included a rapid reaction force of 1,000, which would be deployable within 30 days. Despite these commitments, it proved very difficult to find a total of just 650 police to deploy on EU police missions to Bosnia and Macedonia in 2003.18 Similar tardiness has characterized contributions to the European Police Mission (EUPOL) in Afghanistan since 2007. Several major states, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, have no national police force. Therefore, the deployment of serving police officers requires the consent of state or local political and police authorities, as well as both available, suitable volunteers, and their selection and training for missions in a more dangerous than normal policing environment. In Great Britain, for instance, a request for police support for stability operations depends on volunteers from 53 separate police forces. Officers are only released with the agreement of Chief Constables and local police authorities. The U.S. has been a major contributor of police to U.N. and coalition missions, but funding and contractual arrangements are complex and police officers cannot be deployed rapidly. The United States has over 17,000 state and local agencies, as well as nine major law enforcement federal agencies. Funding for each mission has to be approved by Congress, with the State Department issuing contract tenders to corporations such as DynCorp for the recruitment, deployment and management of police officers. The U.S. has an additional constraint because its Foreign Assistance Act restricts the expenditure of funds on assistance to indigenous police forces, although it provides for exemptions.19 During the U.N. mission to Somalia in 1992–1995, it took six months for the State Department to obtain funding from Congress and the necessary presidential waiver under Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act to allow a new Somali National Police force to be trained. By the time personnel from the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) began to train Somali police officers, the situation in Somalia had deteriorated to such an extent that the program had to be abandoned. The U.N. mission’s mandate was finally terminated in March 1995.20
Lack of Training Needs Analysis: The training of host nation police rarely stems from an effective in-country training needs analysis. Consequently, police officers have been deployed without appropriate skills or experience. Sometimes standardized models of training have been imposed without sufficient regard for local circumstances because of a mistaken belief that a Western approach to policing has universal applicability. This criticism is endorsed by Dr. Ann Phillips, former director of the Marshall Center’s program in Security, Stability, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTaR). She laments the continued tendency to focus on technical law enforcement skills rather than investing in education fostering basic governance and political issues when training and mentoring indigenous police services.21 For example, the Germans (lead nation for police training in Afghanistan) set up a police academy in 2002 to provide university-level training for senior police officers and a shorter academic program for non-commissioned officers. These programs provided high quality European professional police training, but lacked the capacity to train the numbers of police leaders that Afghanistan needed to cope with high levels of insecurity and violence.22 Attempts by the U.S. State Department to create a Western style police force in Iraq in 2003 were also bedeviled, not only by the high level of insurgent violence, but also by the total absence of a normal professional police culture in the Iraqi Police Service (IPS). Colonel Paul Yingling, a U.S. Army officer who worked with the Iraqi police in Tal Afar, recalls a local force that totally lacked basic investigative skills and knowledge of criminal law.23 The authors of the recent book, The Police in War, have aptly summarized the generic problem in the following manner: “…in mission after mission…training programs have been put in place like canned food that is assumed to be universally nourishing. In complex environments, however, one size doesn’t fit all.”24
Quantity Rather Than Quality: A re-occurring tendency to emphasize the quantity rather than the quality of indigenous police has exacerbated the situation. Adequate numbers are important to impose and enforce security, but police forces must also be trained to behave in a manner that gains the confidence of the local population and reinforces government legitimacy. The training process for local police forces has often been rushed in the mistaken belief that large numbers of hastily trained recruits will prove sufficient, regardless of local law enforcement conditions, culture, and history.25 In Afghanistan, basic police training was even cut from eight weeks to six in order to get a sufficient number of police on the ground to support COIN efforts.26 Poor training has almost certainly contributed to ANP attrition rates, which have been reported to be as high as 75%.27 Similar problems arose in Iraq. In late 2003, the U.S. government ordered military commanders to institute a mass hiring program for the IPS, with slogans such as “30,000 in 30 days” and “60,000 in 60 days.” This initiative helped to resolve the short-term problem of finding employment for young Iraqi men, but did nothing to ensure the development of an effective police service. A Department of Justice basic training program based at the International Police Training Center in Amman, Jordan churned out up to 2,500 new IPS officers each month, but these large numbers could not be adequately managed, equipped, or supported once back in Iraq.28 Not surprisingly, this policy of trading quality for quantity adversely affected command and control, morale, retention, and ethical conduct in the IPS. Hasty recruitment and training also prevents an adequate vetting process. According to Jean-Marie Guéhenno, former U.N. Under- Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, recruitment and vetting provide the most important means of dismantling abusive and corrupt networks within the security forces.29 In contrast to the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, the foundation of successful police reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1999 and 2002 was the vetting of all law enforcement personnel in the country by U.N. mission staff.
Police Recruit Quality and Security: Poor quality host nation police recruits can present additional challenges. This has been most marked in Iraq and Afghanistan, but is by no means a problem unique to these campaigns. In Kosovo, the minimum requirements for KPS recruits were that they must be over age 21, have a secondary education, no criminal record, and be physically and mentally fit. Despite these modest criteria, 80% of initial applicants apparently failed to meet these standards.30
Low pay can be a disincentive, but the intrinsic vulnerability of local police also deters recruits. As security force first-responders and a visible manifestation of the new regime, the local police and often their families are the first to be targeted by peace “spoilers” and criminal elements. Dennis Keller of the U.S. Army War College criticizes police training policy on stability operations because of a general failure to distinguish between the need for both “stability policing,” which necessitates a force with paramilitary capabilities, and “community-based policing” that requires police officers with peacetime law enforcement skills. In particular, Keller stresses the importance of deciding on the timing and manner of transition from one form of policing to the other during the stabilization process.31
Lieutenant General James Dubik, who commanded the Multi-National Security and Transition Command, Iraq (MNSTC-I) in 2007, has argued that host nation paramilitary police forces should be established first in order to allow local police a “protective space,” free from intimidation and violence to begin the law enforcement transformation process.32 Creating effective police forces takes sustained effort over an extended period. Experts estimate that it can take five years to create a new law enforcement organization from scratch.33 General Barry McCaffrey, currently an Adjunct Professor at West Point, stated that it would take “…a decade to create an Afghan Police Force with adequate integrity to operate at village level in a competent manner.”34 These timelines are undoubtedly challenging for an international community that is impatient to see results and often reluctant to engage in protracted civilian capacity building in fragile states. The approach to training the security forces in Iraq between 2003 and 2007 demonstrated this tendency. Both the United States and United Kingdom were anxious to hand over responsibility for security to the host nation army and police and exit from a costly and unpopular war as rapidly as possible.35
A Plethora of Law Enforcement Agencies: Policing efficiency and effectiveness are also hindered by the large number of national and international law enforcement organizations involved in stability operations. Foreign police forces may include military police, formed police and paramilitary units, individual police specialists, and specialized units, including border, counternarcotics, and anti-terrorist teams. Since 1999, the United Nations has provided Formed Police Units (FPUs) of around 120 personnel that can perform the full range of police functions depending on the mission mandate. In 2006, the United Nations established a Standing Police Capacity (SPC) to try to bridge the police deployment gap discussed earlier. Although this small force has never exceeded 50 professional police officers, it has helped establish the U.N. police component on operations in Chad (2007) and Haiti (2010).36 NATO has developed Multinational Specialized Units (MSU). These units of between 250-600 personnel perform public order duties and operate under the same rules of engagement as NATO military forces.37 The European Union has created Integrated Police Units (IPUs), which are deployable teams that can assist existing local police with re-training and re-organization or provide the full spectrum of law and order functions in the absence of an indigenous police force. Outside of EU frameworks, several European states with national paramilitary police forces formed a separate European Gendarmerie Force (EUROGENDFOR) in September 2004.38 The African Union and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) also deploy police on stability missions, although the latter’s role is restricted to monitoring and training duties. This proliferation of agencies has unfortunately tended to lead to a duplication of effort, a lack of consistency in approach, and overall a less than optimal use of scarce resources. The World Development Report 2011 summarized the broader problem as follows: “Internal international agency processes are too slow, too fragmented, too reliant on parallel systems, and too quick to exit, and there are significant divisions among international actors.”39
Differing Doctrines, Operating Procedures, and Caveats: Like military contingents on stability operations, police units deploy with differing doctrines, operating procedures, and national caveats but in the policing and civil justice areas, national systems, structures, legal frameworks, and practices tend to differ more greatly than in the military sphere. Disagreements between donor countries can also lead to weak and unsustainable mandates for international police assets. The U.N. International Police Task Force (IPTF) that deployed to assist Bosnian law enforcement agencies in 1995 had a mandate limited to monitoring, mentoring, and training but included no authority to enforce the law, conduct investigations, or make arrests. The unarmed IPTF could only operate with the cooperation and consent of the Bosnian police and was in no position to deal with continuing inter-ethnic unrest.40
The lack of coordination between foreign police assistance programs is described by Marshall Center International Law Professor Tom Wingfield as the “main weakness” in efforts to build Afghan police capacity. He claims that there is little or no coordination between NATO allies or between U.S. government and non-governmental agencies engaged in law enforcement.41 Wingfield’s observations are supported by a recent report from the British Parliament, which notes the lack of a formal agreement between U.S./NATO and EU/EUPOL regarding their different police training missions, while a number of independent bilateral police training initiatives run by Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, Italy, Canada, and Turkey operate largely independently of the major international institutional police capacity building efforts.42 The U.S.- led NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A) has focused on the rapid training of large numbers of recruits to provide a basic COIN force, while EUPOL and some bilateral efforts have sought to build a professional, community-based police force over the longer term. An agreement in February 2011 between the Afghan Ministry of Interior, NTM-A, EUPOL, and the German Police Program Team has belatedly led to a standardized method of instruction for all ANP training.
The problem is compounded by contradictory concepts of policing in Afghanistan.43 Tension can naturally occur between deployed military and police because of different organizational cultures and operating procedures, but more fundamental government interagency differences can create incoherent national approaches to building indigenous police capacity. The U.S. has particular problems with interagency coordination as the Departments of Justice, State, Treasury, Transportation, and Defense are all involved in some aspect of foreign police training. There is no central coordination of separate assistance programs and no agency has the lead role. As a result, programs are frequently disconnected, while training tends to be duplicated and is sometimes inappropriate for a particular country.44 Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli, the former commander of Multinational Forces Iraq, has gone as far as describing the interagency process on COIN and stability operations as “broken for our lifetime.”45
Bridging the Capability Gaps: Developing Police Capacity on Stability Operations Military Police: There is an understandable reluctance to use the military in a policing role, but for countries that lack formed paramilitary police units, or are faced with an insurgency, there is no real alternative to using soldiers to provide basic law enforcement and training for host state security forces, at least in the early stages of a stability operation. Based on recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, current British stability operations doctrine, for example, acknowledges that military commanders are likely to be drawn into policing and internal security matters and will have to take the lead in basic police training.46 Military Police (MPs) will naturally play a critical role in such circumstances. In Iraq, thousands of U.S. Army MPs conducted a full range of policing and penal tasks. MPs, together with DynCorp employed international police liaison officers and linguists formed Police Transition Teams (PTT), which were embedded with the IPS throughout Iraq after 2006.
Some analysts favor the use of MPs as dedicated stability operations police forces. Mathew Modarelli, an agent of the U.S. Office of Special Investigations (OSI), advocates the use of formed units of MPs, along with Special Operations Forces, to promote “police protocols” in all forces, foreign and local, deployed during COIN operations. In order to free MP assets for this task, he proposes the use of line soldiers and local, state, or federal law enforcement officers to accomplish the in-service duties currently performed by MPs.47
A study by the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in 2010 also recommends an enhanced role for MPs. The report advocates the expansion of the German military police (Feldjäger) into a gendarmerie force capable of taking the lead in law enforcement and indigenous police training during stabilization missions with higher threat levels.48 MPs will probably have to continue to undertake major training and mentoring roles in future, large-scale stability operations. However, MPs have important functions in the full spectrum of military operations and, at least in the U.S. Army establishment, there appears to be no support for proposals such as Mondarelli’s.49 MPs are soldiers and therefore lack the specialized expertise of civilian law enforcement agencies; on their own they cannot offer more than a temporary solution to local police capacity building needs. Based on his experience in Iraq, Colonel Yingling believes that MPs have the wrong organizational structure to train and mentor local police officers, especially in major urban centers. For example, he regards the assignment of a young commanding officer to mentor a senior host nation police chief as insulting to the latter’s rank, experience, and status.50
Stability Police Units: The experience of stability operations going back to the Malayan emergency of the 1950s reinforces the importance of well-trained, well-led indigenous police forces and indicates that smaller numbers of highly trained police officers consistently prove more effective than larger numbers of semi-trained police rushed into service.51 The development of effective police takes time and resources, and, as noted above, adequate security measures that provide a protected space for the development of new police forces or the transformation of existing law enforcement agencies. Security can be delivered by deployed foreign military forces, but their limitations in a law enforcement role have led to a growing demand for what are generically referred to as Stability Police Units (SPU). Units with these paramilitary capabilities, such as Italy’s Carabinieri, can deal with public order problems, tackle violent criminals, and assist and strengthen local “high-end” police forces.52 It was a Carabinieri unit that played a key role in the training and leadership development of the new paramilitary Iraq National Police in 2007.53
As formed units, SPUs can deploy more rapidly into more dangerous environments than individual police. SPUs have also proved cost effective, being more employable in public order situations than soldiers and 50% less costly than individual U.N. police.54 Arguably, they provide the best means of managing the crucial transition from armed conflict to post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction. The concept of SPU has been described as follows: “Stability police are robust and armed police units that are capable of performing specialized law enforcement and public order functions that require disciplined group action. They are trained in and have the capacity for the appropriate use of less-than-lethal as well as lethal force.”55
Different doctrines, procedures, and even nomenclature govern the deployment of SPUs from the U.N., NATO, and EU states. Efforts have been made to establish a consensus on the roles, missions, and standards required of SPUs, as well as the appropriate relationship with deployed military forces and other operational enablers.56 Since its establishment in 2005 under G8 auspices, The Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU) in Vicenza, Italy has led in training and developing SPU capabilities, especially for conflict-prone African states.57 By 2010, the COESPU had trained around 3,000 stability police trainers and deployed mobile assistance teams to provide additional advisory and technical assistance to COESPU graduates.
Since the United Nations deployed formed police units (FPUs) for the first time in 1999 in Kosovo, the number of FPUs deployed on operations has grown significantly—to more than 60 in 2010— comprising more than 6,000 police officers.58 The U.N. Department for Peacekeeping Operations has also developed detailed policy guidance to assist countries contributing FPUs to U.N. missions. These instructions cover command and control and operational procedures. The instructions place emphasis on crucial issues such as the use of force and the norms and values that underpin the U.N.’s approach to policing.59 Nevertheless, the harmonization and accommodation of different policing models and cultures is a broader problem for both the U.N. and other international institutions and will only be resolved over time by the continued development of common standards and doctrine. SPUs and equivalent units can address public order problems but they do not deal with routine law and order functions and, therefore, do not represent a comprehensive solution to the objective of achieving police primacy.
Capacity building is not one of the core tasks of U.N. formed police units. Although some units might be able to assist with training programs on a case by case basis, such work is normally restricted to public order management tasks.60 Domestic police commitments mean that the high quality European paramilitary police forces will only ever be available in limited numbers. In the Bosnia and Kosovo operations, NATO multinational specialized units led by Carabinieri and Gendarmerie units made up only 8 percent and 6 percent respectively of the total international police force.61 It is also worth noting that countries with the most professional paramilitary police forces, such as France’s Gendarmerie Nationale, are not normally leading contributors to U.N. FPUs. According to Tibor Kozma of the UNDPKO Police Division, major donor nations such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, and Ghana have deployed police contingents that lack appropriate training, experience, or expertise in either direct law enforcement or training and mentoring roles.62 Other potential SPU-contributing countries, particularly from Africa, lack the financial resources to equip units to U.N. standards. SPUs have become an essential complement to military contingents and international police advisors. In the United States, which lacks a national paramilitary police force, this has sparked significant debate about the desirability of establishing a constabulary force capable of undertaking high-end police tasks on stability operations.63 A 2009 RAND study recommended an American Stability Police Force (SPF) headquartered in the U.S. Marshals Service that could deploy a battalion-sized unit within 30 days. Predictably, the RAND report acknowledged that any proposal to create a U.S. paramilitary police force would run into resistance from entrenched bureaucracies in the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and State.
Individual Police Advisors: Much of the civilian police effort on stability operations, especially with regards to the training and mentoring of indigenous community police forces, will remain the responsibility of individual police advisors who are normally retired civilian police officers or serving officers who have taken leave of absence from their local forces. These individuals are normally loaned or seconded to the U.N. and other international security institutions by national governments. The U.S. is unique in contracting the whole process out to the private sector and large companies, typically DynCorp International or Civilian Police International LLC, which are responsible for the recruitment, deployment (including pre-deployment training), and management of police officers. European states have not used private sector companies in this role because of political sensitivities and accountability issues. An exception is the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), which made use of private sector companies to conduct some police training and mentoring in Iraq because of a shortfall of eligible serving and retired police officers.64
International Efforts to Improve the Availability of Competent, Deployable Police: National governments have attempted to increase the pool of competent police and other criminal justice personnel available for stability operations. Countries with paramilitary police, such as France and Italy, have added new roles in stability operations to existing standing national capacities. In 2004, Australia launched a standing International Deployment Group (IDP) within its Federal Police for use in regional stability operations.65 Unlike most other countries, the IDP also provides robust pre-deployment training that includes enabling skills such as teaching, advising, coaching, and community development.66
After a poor showing in Iraq, the United Kingdom has also taken a number of measures to improve its ability to deploy police overseas. A U.K. doctrine manual for policing peace support operations was released in 2007.67 The U.K. National Security Strategy in 2008 mandated the creation of a 1,000-strong Civilian Stabilisation Capacity (CSC) unit. This development included a pool of 500 police officers, which theoretically allowed up to 150 officers to be deployed on a single mission. However, a review of international policing policy by the FCO recognized that funding constraints and domestic priorities would continue to limit the U.K.’s capacity, while pre- deployment courses still fail to give adequate weight to training and mentorship skills.68
The United Nations and other international institutions like the EU still struggle to provide adequate numbers of well-trained police in a timely fashion. Progress to implement the national pools of police officers and an on-call roster of police experts recommended by the Brahimi Report of 2000 has been slow and inconsistent.69 As noted earlier, a U.N. Standing Police Capacity was established in 2006, which enables police assets to be deployed rapidly in a crisis to assess the operational requirement and initiate the police components of the mission. However, as the SPC numbers no more than 50 senior police officers and managers, it is no more than a modest enhancement to U.N. capabilities.
The EU’s Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (EUCPCC) introduced in 2007, with a mandate to plan, conduct, and support EU peacekeeping missions, is an equally modest improvement that has not helped recruit satisfactory numbers of police advisors for the EUPOL mission in Afghanistan. A recent and comprehensive report by the Stimson Center recommended three new capacities for the U.N.: a Standing U.N. Rule of Law Capacity of 400 experts to plan, deploy, and lead new missions; a standby U.N. Police Reserve of 16,200 officers with contributing states offered financial incentives for retaining officers on the reserve; and a Police, Justice, and Corrections Senior Leadership Reserve of variable size providing senior police and rule of law experts who could deploy at short notice.70 The authors claim that their proposals would greatly increase cost effectiveness by creating timely, deployable U.N. policing assets at modest extra cost. Such initiatives are entirely in keeping with the need to address the growing demand for international police. Regrettably, donor countries have shown little interest in increasing U.N. funding and the peacekeeping training budget has been cut as the main financial contributor countries seek to rein in government spending.71
Successful Indigenous Police Capacity Building Programs: Despite the prevailing pessimism, it is worth stressing that there are examples of effective police capacity building programs. These illustrate best practice and demonstrate that national and international security institutions can learn from past mistakes. The reform of the Haiti National Police (HNP) since 2004 has been generally successful, even allowing for the severe set-back caused by the earthquake in 2010.72 A number of factors have helped this process. Firstly, police reform has been viewed as a political, rather than just a technical, process by Haiti’s leaders. Secondly, the foreign military and police presence provided by the U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) has created a level of security that has allowed a thorough (seven-month) professional police recruit training program. Supported by MINUSTAH, the HNP has also become professional, introduced vetting, taken action against police abuses, and introduced women into the force. Effective financial support and regulation has ensured regular salaries and raised officer morale. The result is a police force that has gone from being the least to the most trusted state institution in Haiti in just five years.73
Since 2008, the U.S.-led Focused District Development (FDD) initiative has provided arguably the first effective and comprehensive police training and support package in Afghanistan.74 FDD combines a mixture of formal training for ANP units in regional centers with follow-up support by a Police Mentoring Team, consisting of civilian police advisors, military police, and interpreters. The complete ten-month FDD cycle consists of assessment, formal training, and a post-training support program. While ANP units are in training, police work in the district is covered by well-trained paramilitary Afghan National Civilian Order Police (ANCOP). The FDD curriculum is essentially paramilitary and is taught by military officers, but has provided those ANP units trained so far with the necessary survival skills for local police operations during an on-going insurgency.
Both of the above cases illustrate the need to provide a safe and secure environment for a sufficient time to allow a thorough indigenous police training and reform program. In Haiti’s case, police capacity building has undoubtedly been helped by a supportive government, a comparatively benign security environment, and the fact that the police development process has been part of broader security sector and governance reform. Stability operations in small states also allow a relatively high ratio of international police to population that facilitates the establishment of security, which is one of the major reasons why the measures used to stabilize Kosovo and Bosnia proved difficult to replicate in Iraq and Afghanistan, both of which are much larger in physical size and population.75
Future Developments: Manageable Operations, Local Ownership, and A Lighter Footprint
Despite gradual improvements in the capability of police missions, the international community is likely to continue to struggle to field effective police forces in sufficient numbers in a timely fashion during major crises. Military forces, supplemented by SPU, will have to lead in establishing initial law and order in most post conflict environments, while the development of indigenous police capacity will still largely depend on a mix of MPs, individual civilian police advisors, and private contractors provided by a range of different national and international institutions and agencies. Not surprisingly, the most successful interventions are likely to be in small states or regions with manageable security problems and modest capacity building needs.
Manageable and modest may well characterize the future of stability operations. Major stabilization campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have proved to be difficult, protracted, expensive, and politically damaging for the U.S. and its allies. Painful recent experience, combined with the financial fallout from the worst economic crisis since the 1930s, has significantly reduced the appetite of Western governments for large scale military interventions unless vital interests are at stake.76 At the same time, however, the need for involvement in fragile and conflict-prone states is unlikely to diminish. According to the World Development Report 2011, one and a half billion people live in areas affected by “fragility, conflict, or large-scale organized criminal violence.”77 Nevertheless, future stability operations are likely to emphasize lower cost, as well as less intensive and intrusive interventions focusing on a limited number of key issues such as the rule of law, the security sector, and civil administration.
A lighter footprint in future stabilization missions may result in greater emphasis on security force assistance operations. Support to fragile states or regions before armed conflict breaks out or peacebuilding efforts to prevent a relapse into further armed conflict will be more sustainable and less risky than major interventions. Mentoring and training indigenous police forces will be a critical element of these missions, not least to address the threat presented by the growing nexus between terrorist and criminal enterprises. The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), directed by the U.S. State Department, provides an example of such a capacity building approach. Since 2005, several U.S. government departments and agencies have cooperated to strengthen regional counterterrorism capabilities through military and law enforcement improvement programs along with initiatives to promote democratic governance.78 Rather than a substantial foreign police and military presence, more stress will have to be placed earlier on the local ownership of security.
In practical terms, according to Dr. Laurie Nathan, a specialist in security sector reform, it means “…the reform of security policies, institutions and activities in a given country must be designed, managed and implemented by local actors rather than external actors.”79 As noted at the beginning of this paper, local ownership of security has long been recognized as an essential element in a sustainable peace process and a prerequisite for a successful exit strategy for deployed foreign security forces.
Early local ownership may force Western states to be more modest about the results they can expect from police capacity building efforts, especially in societies with high levels of illiteracy and corruption. Shaping indigenous police culture will prove a significant, long-term challenge in these environments and will best be addressed by embedded police advisors with an understanding of local customs and values. With a more limited foreign presence on stability operations, police advisors may have to accept basic standards of competence and behavior. However, whatever the level of training and mentoring local police receive, the success of a capacity building mission will still depend on officers being perceived by the population as effective, legitimate, and accountable. Normative standards of behavior will likely remain more important in this context than technical policing skills.
Policing needs on stability operations will vary. Universal “lessons,” or more dangerously, “templates,” must be applied with caution. Nevertheless, the experience of numerous police missions has demonstrated a need for both paramilitary police units to work with military forces to establish law and order as well as police advisors and trainers who can build local community- based police to sustain a durable peace. A safe and secure environment must be established early on to prevent the loss of popular support for the stabilization process, but the training of indigenous police should not be rushed simply to supply “boots on the ground.” Quality training, mentorship, and support will remain prerequisites for success, whether police are prepared for high-end tasks or for traditional law enforcement duties. Experience suggests that police officers rather than the military should take the lead in the development of indigenous police, although the latter may well remain essential to establish a secure space in which local police can receive the longer-term training and support that they need.
The provision of effective policing for stability operations will continue to challenge the international community, although the achievement of host nation police primacy will remain as critical as ever to the successful transition from internal conflict to sustainable peace. The problems discussed above defy easy solutions. Even in long-established international institutions such as the U.N. and NATO, different perceptions of national interests, domestic political constraints, and bureaucratic inertia continue to have a negative impact on the policing dimension of stability operations. Consequently, although national and international staffs have worked hard to improve policing issues over the last twenty years, their efforts remain a work in progress.
1 Department of Defense Instruction, 3000.05, Stability Operations, September 16, 2009, para. 3. http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300005p.pdf. Stability operations are also often referred to as “peace support operations” or “multidimensional peacekeeping operations.”
2 Ministry of Defence, British Army Field Manual, Vol. 1, Part 10, Countering Insurgency, Army Code 71876, October 2009, 1-25.
3 HQ Department of the Army, Stability Operations, FM 3-07, October 2008, p. 2-10.
4 See: statistics (updated monthly) on United Nations troop and police contributors, available at: accessed May 1, 2012, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml.
5 See: for example, Robert M. Perito, Afghanistan’s Police: The Weak Link in Security Sector Reform, United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 227, August 2010, available at http://www.usip.org/publications/afghanistan-s-police.
6 Ludovic Hood, “Security Sector Reform in East Timor 1999-2004,” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 13, No. 1, March 2006, p. 61.
7 Charles C. Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War,” Marines Magazine, January, 1999, available at: https://www.scribd.com/document/257888431/The-Strategic-Corporal-Leadership-in-the-Three-Block-War-Au-af-Mil-Marines-1999.
8 For a detailed analysis of KFOR’s failings, see: Human Rights Watch, Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo, March 2004, Human Rights Watch, 25 July 2004, available at: https://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/kosovo0704/.
9 Michael Moss, “How Iraqi Police Reform Became Casualty of War,” New York Times, 22 May 2006.
10 Interview with Marshall Center Professor Thomas Wingfield, July 2010. Wingfield was Civilian Rule of Law Advisor to General McChrystal’s COIN Advisory and Assistance Team in Afghanistan between October 2009 and February 2010.
11 Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40, Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution, November 2009, p. 6-14.
12 United Nations, Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations, DPKO, December 2003, p. 85.
13 See: for example, William J. Durch and Madeline L. England (eds.), Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and the Rule of Law, (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, August 2010) pp. 45-47.
14 Hilary Synott, Bad Days in Basra (London: I.B. Tauris, 2008) p. 185.
15 House of Commons Defence Committee, Iraq: An Initial Assessment of Post-Conflict Operations, July 2005, paragraphs 129, 157, 161-6.
16 Hood, p. 63.
17 Robert M. Perito, U.S Police in Peace and Stability Operations, United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 191, August 2007, pp. 8 – 9, available at http://www.usip.org/publications/us-police-peace-and-stability-operations.
18 Peter Viggo Jakobsen, “The ESDP and Civilian Rapid Reaction: Adding Value is Harder than Expected,” European Security, Vol. 15, No. 3, September 2006, pp. 308-309.
19 The Foreign Assistance Act 1974, Section 660. The legislation was introduced because police training efforts were deemed to associate the U.S. with brutality and oppression by local police forces in Latin America. Section 660 applies specifically to foreign assistance funds but has left a wide variety of other assistance programs offered by a range of government agencies with no central coordination.
20 Perito, U.S Police in Peace and Stability Operations, pp. 4 – 5.
21 Authors’ interview, July 2010. For a useful examination of the operational requirements for effective host nation capacity building, see: Phillip Battaglia and Curtis Taylor, “Security Force Assistance Operations: Defining the Advise and Assist Brigade,” Military Review, July-August 2010, pp. 2-9.
22Afghanistan’s Police: The Weak Link in Security Sector Reform, pp. 3–4.
23 Authors’ interview, July 2010.
24 David H. Bayley and Robert M. Perito, The Police in War: Fighting Insurgency, Terrorism, and Violent Crime, (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 2010) p. 3.
25 Espen Barth Holm and Tor Tanke Holm, Peacebuilding and Police Reform, (London: Frank Cass, 2000) p. 33, James M. Dubik, Creating Peace and Law Enforcement Systems, (Washington DC: Institute for the Study of War, October 2010) p. 5 and Walter C. Ludwig III. “Training Foreign Police: A Missing Aspect of U.S. Security Assistance to Counterinsurgency,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 26, No. 4, 2007, pp. 285-293.
26 House of Lords, European Union Committee, The EU’s Afghan Police Mission, HL Paper 87, 16 February 2011, para. 51.
27Ibid, para. 28.
28 Robert K. Byrd, Foreign Police Development: The Third Time’s the Charm, unpublished Strategy Research Paper, USAWC, February 2010, pp. 6-8 and Police in War, p.13. In March 2004, in an unprecedented move, President Bush transferred responsibility for training and equipping the IPS from the State Department to the Department of Defense and the U.S. military, however the primary focus remained “numbers” rather than “quality.”
29 World Bank, World Development Report 2011, p.151, available at: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/806531468161369474/World-development-report-2011-conflict-security-and-development-overview.
30 Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF), 8th International Berlin Workshop: International and Local Policing in Peace Operations, August 2007, p. 53.
31 Dennis E. Keller, “U.S. Military Forces and Police Assistance in Stability Operations: The Least-Worst Option to Fill the U.S. Capacity Gap,” PKSOI Papers (Carlisle PA: Strategic Studies Institute, August 2010), pp. 21-25, available at https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=14927. The DOJ trained IPS recruits in community policing techniques at the police academy in Jordan. Unfortunately, these police officers were very vulnerable in a law enforcement environment dominated by heavily armed insurgents and thousands were killed.
32 Dubik, p. 7.
33 Holm and Eide, p.33, Perito, U.S Police in Peace and Stability Operations, p. 11.
34 Barry R. McCaffrey, unpublished after action visit report for Department of Social Sciences, U.S. Military Academy at West Point, December 5, 2009, p. 6.
35 U.S., but not British, policy changed with the “surge” strategy launched in early 2007.
36 See: accessed on May 1, 2012, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/capacity.html.
37 Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units, The Future Roles for Stability Police Units Workshop, Washington DC, April 4 – 5, 2005, p. 4.
38 Italy, France, Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands
39 World Bank, p. 23.
40 Perito, U.S. Police in Peace and Stability Operations, pp. 7-8.
42 House of Lords, pp. 14-15. EUPOL took over from the previously German led training mission in 2007. See also William B. Caldwell and Nathan K. Finney, “Building Police Capacity in Afghanistan: The Challenges of a Multilateral Approach,” Prism, Vol. 2, No. 1, 12/2010, pp. 121-130.
43 Sebastian Bloching, “Policing in Conflict: an Overview of EUPOL, Afghanistan,” European Security Review, Briefing 7, ISIS Europe, July 2011.
44 See: discussion in Ludwig, p. 289.
45 Quoted in Matthew R. Modarelli, “Military Police Operations and Counterinsurgency,” Small Wars Journal, 2008, p. 2.
46 Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40, pp. 5-10 & 6-14.
47 Matthew R. Modarelli, “Military Police Operations and Counterinsurgency,” Small Wars Journal, 2008.
48 Ronja Kempin and Christian Kreuder-Sonnen, Gendarmerieeinheiten in internationalen Stabilisierungsmissionen: Eine Option fűr Deutschland? (Berlin: Sifting Wissenschaft und Politik, March 2010).
49 U.S. Army doctrine emphasizes adaptability not reorganization. See HQ U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, The Army Capstone Concept, Operational Adaptability: Operating under Conditions of Uncertainty and Complexity in an Era of Persistent Conflict 2016-2028, (Fort Monroe VA: Department of the Army, 21 December 2009).
50 Yingling interview. Col Yingling’s viewpoint on mentorship is supported in a British review of international policing. See: Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Review of Conflict Related International Policing, 1 April 2008-31 March 2009, p. 9.
51 See: for example, discussion in Ludwig, p. 291.
52 The term “high-end” is used to describe police forces that fill the gap between military forces and civilian police. They are trained to deal with higher levels of violence than normal police and can tackle major criminal gangs, special weapons and tactics (SWAT) tasks, riot control, and intelligence gathering, and analysis.
53 Dubik, p. 6.
54 See: statistics in Michael Dziedzic and Christine Stark, “Bridging the Public Security Gap: The Role of the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units in Contemporary Peace,” United States Institute of Peace, 2006.
55Stability Police Units Workshop, p.3.
56Ibid, pp. 17-19.
57 See: http://www.carabinieri.it/internet/Coespu. The G8 Action Plan originally called for the training of 7,500 gendarmes by 2010, although this target has proved too ambitious. The decision by the U.S. House of Representatives in March 2011 to eliminate funding for the USIP, which has provided considerable support to the COESPU, may jeopardize international efforts to build police capacity.
58 See: accessed on May 1, 2012, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping /sites/police/units.html. Prior to 1999, the U.N. only deployed individual police officers (IPO).
59 UN DPKO, Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Ref 2009.32, Effective Date: 1 March 2010.
60Ibid, pp. 5-6.
61 Terence K. Kelly, p. 46.
62 Authors’ interview, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, November 2010. See also comments by Graham Turbiville in Celeski, p. 42, and William J. Durch et al, p. 18 & p. 35.
63 Rachel Bronson, “When Soldiers Become Cops,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, Issue 6, Nov/Dec 2002, pp. 122-127; Robert M. Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America’s Search for Post Conflict Security Forces, (Washington DC: USIP Press, 2004); Terence E. Kelly et al. A Stability Police Force for the United States: Justification and Options for Creating U.S. Capabilities, (Santa Monica CA: RAND, May 2009).
64 M. A. Ashraf, “Policing in Iraq: A Personal Perspective,” Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, Vol. 1, Issue 1, 2007, p. 106.
65 See: accessed on May 1, 2012, http://www.afp.gov.au/policing/international-deployment-group.aspx.
66Police in War, p, 123.
67 FCO, Peace Support Operations–Information and Guidance for U.K. Police Personnel, available at: accessed May 1, 2012, http://www. U.K.internationalpolicing.com/edocs/ipo_guidelines.pdf. The U.K. lacks paramilitary police so international efforts focus on mission leadership, community policing assistance, and training.
68Review of Conflict Related International Policing, pp. 25-31. For example, the U.K. defense review in 2010 cut funding for the Ministry of Defence Police (MDP) by 20%.
69 United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000. paras. 122-125. States have shown greater readiness to deploy FPUs, not least because the donor state is reimbursed by the U.N. for personnel in these units. No such individual compensation arrangements are in place for individual police.
70 Durch & England (eds.), pp. 59-73.
71 See: for example, Micah Zenko and Rebecca R. Friedman, “The Case for UN Peacekeeping,” Council on Foreign Relations, Expert Brief, 2 March 2011, available at https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/case-un-peacekeeping; Brett Schaeffer, “Cuts in U.S. Contributions Necessitate Budget Austerity at the UN.” Heritage Foundation, 20 April 2011, available at https://www.heritage.org/report/cuts-us-contributions-necessitate-budget-austerity-the-un and Richard Gowan, “Will U.N. Peacekeeping Fall Victim to Budget Cuts?” The Globalist, 23 September 2010, available at http://www.theglobalist.com/printStoryId.aspx?StoryId=8708. The United States alone contributes 27% of the U.N.’s budget.
72 See: UNDPKO reports at: accessed May 1, 2012, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/reports.shtml.
73 World Bank, p. 153.
74 Memorandum by Ronja Kempin, House of Lords, pp. 46-47. See also The Police in War, pp. 23-24.
75 See: statistics in Terence E. Kelly, pp. 43-45 & 49.
76 See: for example, Robert M. Gates, “Helping Others Defend Themselves,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, Issue 3, May/June 2010, p. 2.
77 World Bank, Violence and Fragility Overview.
78 See: U.S. Africa Command at: accessed on May 1, 2012, http://www.africom.mil/tsctp.asp.
79 Laurie Nathan, No Ownership, No Commitment: A Guide to Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform (Birmingham: University of Birmingham, 2007), p. 4.
About the Authors
James K. Wither is Professor of National Security Studies at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. He has been a member of the faculty of the Marshall Center since 2000. James Wither is a retired British Army officer and former researcher in 20th Century Warfare at the Imperial War Museum, London. Recent publications include: “Basra’s Not Belfast: The British Army, ‘Small Wars’ and Iraq,” Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol. 20, Nos. 3-4, September-December 2009, pp. 611-635 and “Engaging Reconcilables: Dialogue and Negotiation as Counterterrorism Strategies” in Toward a Grand Strategy Against Terrorism, Harmon C. et al. (eds.) New York: McGraw Hill, 2010, pp. 173- 192.
Thilo Schroeter graduated from the Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington D.C. with an M.A. in International Relations with concentrations in Strategic Studies and International Economics. He also studied International Relations at the SAIS Bologna Center, Dresden University of Technology, and the American University of Beirut. Thilo Schroeter served as an intern at the College of International Security Affairs at the National Defense University in Washington D.C., the German Foreign Office, and the German parliament. In 2010, he was an intern at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen.
The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies is a leading transatlantic defense educational and security studies institution. It is bilaterally supported by the U.S. and German governments and dedicated to the creation of a more stable security environment by advancing democratic institutions and relationships, especially in the field of defense; promoting active, peaceful security cooperation; and enhancing enduring partnerships among the countries of North America, Europe, and Eurasia.
The Marshall Center Occasional Paper Series seeks to further the legacy of the Center’s namesake, General George C. Marshall, by disseminating scholarly essays that contribute to his ideal of ensuring that Europe and Eurasia are democratic, free, undivided, and at peace. Papers selected for this series are meant to identify, discuss, and influence current defense related security issues. The Marshall Center Occasional Paper Series focus is on comparative and interdisciplinary topics, including international security and democratic defense management, defense institution building, civil-military relations, strategy formulation, terrorism studies, defense planning, arms control, stability operations, peacekeeping, crisis management, regional and cooperative security. The Marshall Center Occasional Papers are written by Marshall Center faculty and staff, Marshall Center alumni, or by individual, invited contributors, and are disseminated online and in a paper version.
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, the U.S. Department of Defense, the German Ministry of Defense, or the U.S. and German Governments. This report is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.