“NATO’s final communique from the 2016 Warsaw summit recognized the changed security environment in which Russia’s malign “activities and policies have reduced stability and security” and “increased unpredictability,”requiring enhancement of its “deterrence and defence posture.” Collectively, NATO has broadened its deterrent approach, encompassing a whole-of-government strategy and providing measures of reassurance and deterrence by bolstering military presence, partner capacity, interoperability and alliance resilience. The ongoing sanctions regime complements NATO’s efforts by constraining the resources and mobility of select Russian individuals and businesses. This complementary approach seeks to influence Russia as a unitary state without substantively dissuading the nonstate actors (NSA) Moscow uses to shape the environment and undercut regional stability.
NATO’s deterrent concept is premised on the assumption that Russia operates as a unitary state and is therefore capable of being deterred according to the tried and tested principles and assumptions embedded in rational deterrence theory. Likewise, the preponderance of contemporary Russian deterrence literature focuses on the threats and potential responses to hybrid aggression conducted by a unitary state in the nebulous space between peace and war...”
Excerpt from Ryan L. Worthan, “Putin’s Russia,” per Concordiam: Journal of European Security Defense Issues 10, No. 1, 2020: 24-31.
This article reflects the views of the author and are not necessarily the official policy of the United States, Germany, or any other governments.