NATO’S FUTURE
The World’s Greatest Alliance Turns 70
7 Stronger Together  
By U.S. Army General Curtis M. Scaparrotti, Commander, U.S. European Command, and NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe  
NATO evolves and adapts in a complex world.

10 The 2% Fixation  
By Jack Treddenick  
How a simple formula complicates defense spending.

18 Strong Headwinds  
By Pál Dunay  
Uncertain times jeopardize enlargement.

26 Tools for a New World  
By Michael Rühle  
NATO and nontraditional security challenges.

34 Laden With Risk  
By Graeme Herd  
The complex and evolving NATO-Russia relationship.

42 Of Strategic Importance  
By Natia Gvenetadze, Ministry of Defence, Republic of Georgia  
Cooperation and confrontation on the Black Sea.

48 Adapting to the Russian Way of Warfare  
By Small Wars Journal  
An interview with retired Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, former commander of the United States Army Europe.

56 Light at the End of the Tunnel?  
By Slovenian Navy Capt. Gorazd Bartol, former chief of NATO Liaison Office in Skopje, North Macedonia  
North Macedonia and Euro-Atlantic integration.

60 The Times They Are A-Changin’  
By Ralf Roloff  
The Marshall Center celebrates a milestone of its own.
BOOK REVIEW

64 What the Past Reveals
Reviewed by per Concordiam Staff

Over the centuries, alliances and coalitions have been critical to achieving strategic goals in war and peace.
Welcome to the 35th issue of *per Concordiam*. In this edition, we visit the topic of NATO and its continued relevance as the guarantor of European security. Our topics include how to counter Russian meddling in the affairs of neighboring nations, the parameters for NATO enlargement, ongoing challenges, and the financing issues all members face.

The complex and evolving NATO-Russian relationship is explored by Graeme Herd, a Marshall Center professor. Herd notes that, at best, Moscow’s strategy appears to be to compel the West to recognize Russia’s security interests, its status as a global “Great Power” and as a regional hegemon. At worst, Russia is in a long-term structural decline but is determined to take part in asymmetric great power competition.

Natia Gvenetadze, a department head of Georgia’s Ministry of Defence, addresses zones for cooperation with Russia as well as potential flashpoints for confrontation in the Black Sea region.

While these articles dissect the large and specific challenge with Russia, Marshall Center Professor Pál Dunay shifts focus to address how uncertain times jeopardize NATO’s enlargement. Continued enlargement today is about the development of states’ security and the political model under which people are going to live. As NATO considers the integration of North Macedonia into the Alliance, Slovenian Navy Capt. Gorazd Bartol addresses the steps the former Yugoslav republic must take when investing in its own defense.

The NATO Alliance must develop tools for a new world with nontraditional security challenges, explains Michael Rühle, a member of NATO’s International Staff. Though overshadowed by the rise of interstate tension in Europe, these new challenges are manifold and influence threats ranging from terrorism and organized crime to cyber and energy security. Former Marshall Center Professor Jack Treddenick is skeptical of what is dubbed the 2 percent fixation, a simple formula for member nations’ defense spending that complicates what is actually allocated for defense.

For 25 years, the Marshall Center has been a premier — and I contend an indispensable — platform for nurturing such understanding. Professor Ralf Roloff, the Marshall Center’s deputy dean for resident programs, offers a retrospective on a quarter century of security studies in an increasingly complex and volatile international environment. Through its work, the Marshall Center, a product of a vital and strong German-American partnership, has enhanced European security and indirectly the NATO Alliance by building a network of experts and providing quality programs to ensure peace through strength. We look forward to many more years in shaping the people and institutions that sustain security in Europe and the world.

As always, we at the Marshall Center welcome comments and perspective on these topics and will include your responses in future editions. Please feel free to contact us at editor@perconcordiam.org

Sincerely,

Keith W. Dayton
Director

Keith W. Dayton retired as a Lieutenant General from the U.S. Army in late 2010 after more than 40 years of service. His last assignment on active duty was as U.S. Security Coordinator to Israel and the Palestinian Authority in Jerusalem. An artillery officer by training, he also has served as politico-military staff officer for the Army in Washington, D.C., and U.S. defense attaché in Russia. He worked as director of the Iraqi Survey Group for Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq. He earned a Senior Service College Fellowship to Harvard University and served as the Senior Army Fellow on the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. Gen. Dayton has a bachelor’s degree in history from the College of William and Mary, a master’s degree in history from Cambridge University and another in international relations from the University of Southern California.
Capt. Gorazd Bartol is the former chief of the NATO Liaison Office in Skopje, North Macedonia. He joined the Slovenian Navy, served during the war for independence and later became a staff officer with a focus on defense planning and policy. He has served as an officer to the International Military Staff at NATO headquarters in Brussels. He has a master's degree in national security from Ljubljana University, was a Fulbright scholar at the American Studies Institute at the University of Delaware in the U.S., and graduated from the NATO Defense College in Rome.

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Dr. Graeme Herd is a professor of transnational security studies at the Marshall Center. He was previously head of the International Security Programme at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy. Before that, he was a professor of civil-military relations at the Marshall Center, serving as a seminar leader for the center's Program in Advanced Security Studies and as deputy director of its Senior Executive Seminar. During his doctoral studies on 17th century Russian military and diplomatic history, he studied at the Institute of Soviet/Russian History, Soviet/Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow as a British Council Scholar. He has a master's degree in history-classical studies and a Ph.D. in Russian history from the University of Aberdeen in Scotland.

Dr. Ralf Roloff is deputy dean for resident programs at the Marshall Center and director of the center's Master in International Security Studies program. He is also a professor at Universität der Bundeswehr München. Previously, he was the Marshall Center's senior German professor at its College of International Security Studies, and director of the center's European Security seminar.

Michael Rühle is head of the Energy Security Section in the Emerging Security Challenges Division of NATO’s International Staff. Previously, he was the head of speech writing and a senior political advisor in the NATO secretary-general’s Policy Planning Unit. Before joining NATO he was a Volkswagen fellow at the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Sankt Augustin, Germany, and a visiting fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C. He holds a master's degree in political science from the University of Bonn.

Dr. Jack Treddenick is a former member of the Marshall Center faculty. He also taught at the Royal Military College of Canada and at the NATO Defence College in Rome. He is retired and living in Kingston, Ontario, but maintains professional interests in the economics of defense and security and in international economics.
his year, the 70th anniversary of the founding of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, presents a timely opportunity to reflect on the Alliance’s many achievements while looking ahead to its future. Seventy years ago, leaders from 12 nations gathered in Washington, D.C., to forge a trans-Atlantic agreement that would deter Soviet expansion, foster postwar political stability, and provide for the collective defense of all member states. Allies anchored their commitment through a declaration of solidarity inscribed in the well-known Article 5: “An armed attack against one or more ... shall be considered an attack against them all.” This was the start of the most successful alliance in history.

In the decades since its founding, NATO has undertaken a diverse set of missions, operations and activities. These include counterterrorism; train, advise and assist efforts; capacity building; air policing; refugee and migrant crisis response; humanitarian assistance; disaster relief; maritime security; counterpiracy; arms-embargo enforcement; no-fly-zone enforcement; airborne early warning; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; air and naval strikes; and much more. The range of actions undertaken by the Alliance demonstrates its ability to constantly adapt and successfully meet the demands of an ever-changing security environment.

Given the strategic challenges of today’s complex and dynamic environment, the Alliance continues to adapt to remain fit for purpose. NATO nations have recognized that threats to Euro-Atlantic security require a shift in mindset and a change in military posture. In response, over the past five years, Allies have initiated the largest reinforcement of Alliance collective defense in a generation.

The current phase of our ongoing adaptation began at the 2014 Wales summit, as NATO acknowledged that we faced a pivotal moment in Euro-Atlantic security. An aggressive Russia, instability in the Middle East and North Africa, and transnational threats were identified...
NATO’s adaptation is underway and we have built momentum. But much work remains. We must continue to strengthen our resolve: to obtain the defense posture we need; to meet the spending targets and adaptive measures we have agreed to for collective defense; to preserve the unity of the Alliance; and to protect freedom, democracy, the rule of law and our shared values.

As strategic challenges to a Europe whole, free and at peace. Recognizing these challenges, NATO adopted measures to make Alliance forces capable, credible and responsive. These measures included the establishment of a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) able to deploy land, air, maritime and special operations forces within days, enhancements to the NATO Command Structure (NCS), a revitalized exercise program, and the improvement of tools and capabilities needed to address hybrid warfare threats. The Alliance also agreed to reverse the trend of declining defense budgets and commit at least 2 percent of gross domestic product to defense spending, with 20 percent allocated to major equipment, including research and development.

At the 2016 Warsaw summit, Allies took additional measures to strengthen our deterrence and defense posture. NATO enhanced its forward presence in the eastern part of the Alliance with four multinational, battalion-size battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, which now number over 4,000 troops. In the southeast, Allies agreed to develop a tailored forward presence in Bulgaria, Romania and the Black Sea, to include establishing a Multinational Division Southeast Headquarters in Bucharest. The Alliance also declared that its ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability had reached Initial Operational Capability, highlighted by the transfer to NATO of the Aegis Ashore site in Deveselu, Romania. Additionally, the Alliance officially recognized cyberspace as an operational domain that must be defended.

Last year, at the 2018 summit in Brussels, NATO built on the momentum it had established to further progress in readiness, responsiveness and reinforcement, an effort highlighted by the NATO Readiness Initiative, which calls for “4-30s”: 30 major naval combatants, 30 heavy or medium maneuver battalions, and 30 kinetic air squadrons, all ready to fight within 30 days. In the cyber domain, Allies agreed to set up a new Cyberspace Operations Center within a strengthened Command Structure and also to draw on the cyber capabilities of individual nations for operations and missions. The ongoing adaptation of the NATO Command Structure (NCS) will also include an Initial State Peacetime Establishment (ISPE) manning increase, the stand-up of NATO Headquarters Joint Forces Command-Norfolk (JFCNF) to command and control (C2) operations in the Atlantic, and the establishment of the Joint Support

An F/A-18E Super Hornet launches from the U.S. Navy aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman in support of exercise Trident Juncture in the Norwegian Sea in October 2018. (REUTERS)
and Enabling Command (JSEC) in Ulm, Germany.

To address challenges emanating from Africa and the Middle East, NATO created a Strategic Direction South Hub, which reached full operational capability in 2018. Further abroad, in support of the government of Iraq’s efforts to stabilize its country and continue fighting terrorism, NATO launched a noncombat training and capacity-building mission in Iraq, and now has over 250 troops deployed to support this effort.

NATO’s adaptation is demonstrated not only in the many measures and initiatives just outlined, but also in the increased commitments to burden sharing demonstrated by all nations in the Alliance. Every Ally shoulders a portion of our common defense burden, which includes the “three C’s” of cash, capabilities and contributions. Cash — financial investments in defense remain fundamental to the Alliance’s ongoing adaptation, and since January 2017 Allies have added more than $41 billion in increased defense spending over 2016 levels. By the end of 2020, as NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has highlighted, Allies are on track to add approximately $100 billion in additional spending. Regarding capabilities, NATO’s Defense Planning Process helps ensure that each nation develops the right combination of weapons and forces to meet its own needs and those of the Alliance as a whole. Each member brings unique capabilities, whether it’s nuclear weapons, advanced fighters, naval warships, reconnaissance planes, missile defense systems or long-range artillery. As for contributions, Allies have stepped up their support for NATO-led operations. Over 22,000 Allied troops are deployed on missions under Kosovo Force (KFOR) in the Balkans, Resolute Support in Afghanistan, the NATO Mission in Iraq, and under the Standing NATO Maritime Forces and Operation Sea Guardian. Across all three C’s, NATO has made remarkable progress.

NATO’s adaptation is underway and we have built momentum. But much work remains. We must continue to strengthen our resolve: to obtain the defense posture we need; to meet the spending targets and adaptive measures we have agreed to for collective defense; to preserve the unity of the Alliance; and to protect freedom, democracy, the rule of law and our shared values. This, in turn, fortifies the international order we have created.

NATO has remained strong and united for 70 years, through numerous evolutions and adaptations. As we continue to adapt, we will find, as we always have, that every challenge is best addressed as an Alliance.
the 2% Fixation

How a simple formula complicates defense spending

By Jack Treddenick
The amazing thing about NATO at 70 is that it is still here. Looking back, this surprising longevity has been largely due to its uncanny ability to adapt and evolve in the face of extraordinary change in the international environment. But the Alliance has also successfully endured serious existential threats arising from its own internal tensions. Foremost among these has been the prickly and persistent issue of burden sharing and specifically the disproportionate share of the Alliance’s defense efforts borne by the United States. The intensity of this issue, and hence its potential to undermine the cohesion — and even the existence — of the Alliance has waxed and waned over the years, eventually to quietly recede, leaving intact both the Alliance and its unequal burdens. But as NATO marks its 70th birthday on April 4, 2019, political change in the U.S. has brought the issue into such glaring visibility that it appears certain that either some significant rebalancing will occur, or NATO, whose obituary admittedly has often been written prematurely in the past, will actually pass into history.

**Playing the game**

Every U.S. administration since the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 has expressed annoyance and frustration with the failure of its allies to make greater expenditures for defense. When strategic arguments failed to inspire them to do more, U.S. leaders frequently resorted to signaling, with varying degrees of subtlety, the possible withdrawal of American forces from Europe, thereby removing the most tangible proof of American commitment to European security. Only four years after the signing of the treaty, the Eisenhower administration threatened an “agonizing reappraisal” of its commitment. In the 1960s, President John Kennedy complained of rich NATO countries not paying their fair share and threatened rapid troop withdrawals from Germany. More recently, President Barrack Obama warned the United Kingdom that it would no longer be able to claim a “special relationship” if it did not spend 2 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) on defense. And in 2017, then-Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis issued an ultimatum to NATO defense ministers that unless they increased defense expenditures before the end of the year, the U.S. might have to “moderate its commitment” to the Alliance.

Generally, when these threats became sufficiently credible, allies have committed to increased defense efforts, and occasionally, depending on security pressures, they would actually follow through. They would continue to do so, seemingly, until the U.S. was appeased or distracted by other events. The U.S. argument that wealthy Europe (and Canada) could do much more in its own defense remains unassailable. But tolerating some degree of asymmetric burden has also served America’s interests. Low European expenditures ensured European security dependence on the U.S. and thus legitimized its role as leader of the Alliance. It also justified a large U.S. military presence in Europe, allowing it to simultaneously support NATO and to project power beyond Europe.

The rules of the NATO burden-sharing game therefore seem quite straightforward: The U.S. attempts to balance its demands for increased European defense expenditure with concerns that expenditures do not reach the level where European defense autonomy and subsequent independence in global affairs are encouraged. The Europeans, in turn, search for the lower limit that the U.S. will accept without weakening its commitment to European defense, simultaneously holding in check any enthusiasm they might otherwise have for a united European defense capability.
To date, playing to these rules has been remarkably successful in preserving the Alliance.

How this game actually plays out, however, depends very much on the security environment. Thus, in direct response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its invasion of eastern Ukraine in the spring of 2014, the U.S., after decades of gradual withdrawal from Europe, launched the European Deterrence Initiative, significantly increasing U.S. troop strength and direct defense expenditures in Europe. Subsequently, at the Wales summit in September 2014, NATO members agreed to a defense investment pledge to reach defense spending levels of at least 2 percent of GDP within a decade, and of that expenditure, they would spend no less than 20 percent on new equipment. European members, for the most part, appear to have taken the pledge seriously. To date they have increased defense expenditures by an impressive 14 percent in real terms, which compares to a U.S. increase over the same period of only 2 percent. And, in a remarkable turnaround, they have, in aggregate, halted a quarter century of decline in the share of total GDP going to defense, though the current European share of approximately 1.5 percent remains low compared to the U.S. share of 3.5 percent.

But even before the events of 2014, European complacency with regard to its defense and security dependence was eroding, not only because of the gradual reduction of the U.S. military footprint in Europe, but also the apparent shift of U.S. strategic focus to the Western Pacific. The realization that Europe is but one area of U.S. strategic interest, and not necessarily the most important one, raised apprehensions that the U.S. may no longer be willing to play the burden-sharing game according to the old rules.

**Between a rock and a hard place**

At another level, though, the U.S. continues to stress the value of NATO. Both the U.S. National Security Strategy and its National Defense Strategy underline the linkage between European defense cooperation and American prosperity and security. It is a position vigorously supported not only by the American foreign policy and defense establishments, but also by Congress, which only recently unanimously approved a resolution supporting NATO.

Maintaining this level of support in the current environment, however, will very likely only be possible if European NATO can demonstrate that it is indeed taking on more of the NATO burden. It is in this context that so much significance has become attached to the 2 percent spending criterion. Whether Europe is meeting U.S. expectations sufficiently to ensure continuance of security guarantees has, for the moment and for better or worse, come down to whether the European allies as a whole and individually are spending at least 2 percent of their GDP on defense.

Despite a natural reluctance to be seemingly coerced into increasing defense expenditures, Europe would appear to have little choice but to strive to do so, especially when the threats are intertwined with similar tactics on trade balances and tariffs. Just prior to the June 2018 meeting of NATO defense ministers, when Secretary Mattis forcefully demanded increased allied defense expenditures, the U.S. announced forthcoming steel and aluminum tariffs on Canada and the European Union, justifying them on the basis of national security.

The belief that the U.S. will not make good on its threat to reduce its commitment to Europe is arguably more fragile today than in the past. Indeed, it might be argued, both in America and in Europe, that U.S. withdrawal from Europe would not necessarily be a bad idea, but rather the impetus that Europe needs to get serious about its own defense and to create an autonomous and effective defense capability. This is unlikely to happen. To make sense, both militarily and financially, such autonomy would require at a minimum a single European defense policy and almost certainly the creation of a single European military force. These are unreal ambitions, especially given the EU’s track record in dealing with defense issues. Moreover, at a time when the cohesion of the EU itself is under extreme stress from so many different directions, including immigration pressures, Brexit and rising anti-EU populism, this is probably not the most auspicious time to be advocating even more European centralization. Finally, since burden sharing is primarily about money, the financial effort required to create a European defense capability equivalent to that provided by NATO would almost certainly be much greater than that required to meet the 2 percent challenge currently on the table.
So easy to remember
The 2 percent fixation really represents a triumph of sloganeering over complexity and implies that the NATO burden-sharing issue is merely a dispute over money. The constant repetition of this easily grasped number with its aura of analytical precision has turned it into a persuasive icon of accepted wisdom about defense spending. The reality is, however, that there has never been any analytical justification for it. It has never been established, nor is it even conceptually likely, that 2 percent of European GDP would somehow provide the right amount of military capability required to support NATO’s strategic objectives.

It is true, however, that the share of GDP allocated to defense is a useful measure of defense burden in the sense that it is a measure of what a nation gives up in terms of other things it could accomplish with the same resources: personal spending, industrial investment, public infrastructure, education, health, pensions and so on. It is less useful as a measure of comparative burdens or defense efforts among countries. For one thing, there are certain accounting anomalies that have to be sorted out, particularly regarding exactly what constitutes a defense expenditure. While NATO does have a standard definition for defense expenditures, it includes, for example, military pensions, which in some countries are paid by defense ministries and in others by central pension authorities. In some member countries, such payments represent a significant part of what is claimed to be defense expenditures, but contribute nothing to current military capabilities. Likewise, some countries account for paramilitary police forces in defense budgets; others do not. Expenditures for health care, especially for dependents of military personnel and for veterans, are also included in some national defense budgets but excluded in others where they are provided as part of national health care programs. The U.S., for example, spent over $50 billion on military health care in 2017, an amount larger than the total defense expenditures of any other NATO country other than the United Kingdom. All of these conceptual problems are further complicated by exchange rate swings, differential inflation rates, and other sorts of statistical issues that can invalidate comparisons of defense burdens measured by spending.

A further issue with using share of GDP as a measure of NATO burden sharing is that no country directs all of its defense expenditures exclusively to providing NATO-related capabilities. This is particularly true of the U.S., with its worldwide security interests. As a result, the 3.5 percent of GDP that the U.S. spends on defense globally gives no indication of what it spends solely on the Euro-Atlantic area. While it is impossible to impute total expenditures to specific geographical areas with any precision, rough estimates of American spending for European defense range from 15 to 25 percent. Thus, as the European allies are always quick to point out, comparing U.S. defense expenditure with European expenditures is misleading and grossly overstates the U.S. contribution. But it can also exaggerate the resources and capabilities actually available to the Alliance and thereby dull European resolve to provide more.

But these are minor issues. The fundamental flaw in focusing on the defense share of GDP as a measure of Alliance contributions is that the linkage between money expenditure and capability delivered is extremely ambiguous and varies widely from country to country. Capability itself is a multidimensional concept depending not only on the size and structure of national forces, but also on their equipment, their availability, their deployability, their sustainability, their agility, their interoperability with other allied forces and, most important, on the political will to use them. Not all of these attributes can be reduced to simple money terms.

**Where did this come from?**

If the 2 percent criterion is such a flawed measure, then where did it come from? It appears that NATO simply drifted into it. As indicated in the chart on page 13, average defense expenditures in NATO Europe declined steeply from approximately 3 percent of GDP at the end of the Cold War in 1989 to approximately 2 percent a decade later. Over the same period, U.S. expenditures fell more precipitously, from 6 percent to 3 percent of GDP. It was becoming unpleasantly clear that, if these trends were to have continued, European expenditures would fall below a highly symbolic 1 percent within a few years and, because U.S. expenditures were falling at a faster rate relative to GDP, they would reach roughly the same level at roughly the same time.

However, the fall in U.S. expenditures was abruptly reversed following the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent large spending increases were sustained by the trillion-dollar wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Concurrently, in the wake of the 2002 Prague summit and NATO’s decision to conduct military operations outside of NATO’s geographic area, member countries committed to a comprehensive and expensive set of capability requirements. To finance
these aspirations, they further undertook a “gentlemen’s agreement,” never officially promulgated, to halt the decline in their defense expenditures with a view to attaining levels close to 2 percent of GDP. Despite the good intentions, European defense expenditures as a percentage of GDP continued to decline apace.

The first published reference suggesting that NATO was becoming increasingly focused on 2 percent as a lower boundary for defense expenditures appeared in the 2004 NATO expansion treaties — the “big bang” expansion that included Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia — in which all committed to spend a minimum of 2 percent of their GDP on defense. Despite this increasing consensus, European expenditures as a percentage of GDP continued their relentless decline. By contrast, in the wake of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the U.S. continued its spending increases, peaking at 5.3 percent of GDP in 2009 and only falling thereafter as debt issues associated with the Great Recession of 2008 began to constrain all federal spending.

Difficulties in achieving the Prague Capability Commitments led NATO defense ministers, at their Istanbul meeting in June 2006, to finally declare that “Allies through the comprehensive political guidance have committed to endeavor to meet the 2 percent devoted to defense spending.” Subsequently, just prior to the November 2006 Riga summit, Victoria Nuland, U.S. permanent representative to NATO, openly identified the 2 percent metric as the “unofficial floor” on defense spending in NATO. The final communiqué of the Riga summit, however, included only a diluted “we encourage nations whose defense spending is declining to halt that decline and to aim to increase defense spending in real terms.”

Though it continued to be bandied about in NATO circles, nothing further was officially heard of the 2 percent criterion until the NATO Wales summit in 2014. The commitment was confirmed at the 2014 Warsaw summit and again, most recently, at the 2018 Brussels summit where the allies agreed to “reaffirm our unwavering commitment to all aspects of the Defence Investment Pledge agreed at the 2014 Wales summit, and to submit credible national plans on its implementation, including the spending guidelines for 2024, planned capabilities, and contributions.” The enshrinement of the 2 percent icon was complete.

**Defense choices**

NATO member states remain sovereign nations and as such are free to determine just how much they are going to spend on defense and how they are going to spend it. Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty simply requires NATO members “to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.” How much they actually spend on defense and how they spend it depends on a host of factors in addition to any Alliance commitments. The willingness to spend on defense will depend in the first instance on how they perceive threats to their sovereignty, which in turn will depend upon their immediate geographical neighborhood and their relationship with their neighbors. Greece and Turkey, for example, have long been identified as major contributors to NATO, but their relatively high defense budgets, at least in the past, have had more to do with their acrimonious relationship with each other than with NATO’s strategic requirements.

A nation’s willingness to spend on defense has to be balanced against its ability to do so. This depends on its economic capacity and performance, and critically, on the state of its public finances, especially its debt situation. The global financial crisis of 2008 and consequent long period of recession and slow growth left many NATO members with large fiscal deficits and high levels of public debt leading some, including the U.S., to reduce defense spending. Ironically, countries that experienced negative economic growth but cut defense expenditures at a slower rate actually showed an increase in the share of GDP going to defense. Such is the arithmetic of looking at defense expenditures in terms of GDP share.

Membership in an alliance will also influence the willingness of nations to spend on defense. The economic theory of alliances suggests that once alliance capacity is provided to meet a common threat, nations, particularly the smaller ones, have an incentive to reduce defense expenditures and “free-ride” on the others. As a result, the alliance as a whole ends up with a resource shortfall.

In addition to low spending levels, the reality is that aggregate total spending by European members of NATO is spread over 28 countries, each of which retains its own defense ministry, military headquarters, training establishments, logistics systems and so on. This fragmentation represents a huge fixed cost, severely limiting the resources available for creating real Alliance military capability and denying the Alliance the full benefits of economies of scale that would otherwise be available from a more integrated structure. This is graphically illustrated by the fact that while the U.S. has about 1.4 million military personnel, NATO Europe has over 1.8 million, but is able to produce only a small fraction of the capability produced by U.S. forces.

**A smart way out?**

In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, NATO defense budgets declined dramatically and continued to do so until 2014. To halt the decline in military capability implied by declining budgets, NATO’s secretary-general in 2011 introduced Smart Defence, an initiative later endorsed by member countries at the Chicago summit in 2012. Smart Defence attempted to draw member countries and other partners into collaborative procurement of equipment, integration of force structures and specialization in military roles, all of which were aimed at overcoming the fragmentation of European defense efforts and squeezing more military capability out of declining budgets. More fundamentally, it was an attempt to engender an era of
enhanced cooperation where multinational collaboration was to become the Alliance’s routine operating procedure.

Smart Defence has an appealing logic. However, we have no empirical proof that collaboration and cooperation can really provide more capability. Indeed, there are reasons to believe that it will be much less than anticipated. For one thing, it gives rise to a whole new set of international sharing issues. Thus, nations might avoid collaboration for fear of being dragged into conflicts just because they share a particular capacity with other countries. Or, on the other side of the coin, they might fear that partners sharing a capacity will not be there when needed. Collaborative procurement may also be opposed if rationalization of defense production impacts negatively on domestic industry and employment. In the end, Smart Defence might not increase capabilities at all, given that collaboration itself incurs costs, particularly in terms of coordination and communication. 

A better view
The great appeal of the 2 percent target is its simplicity. By reducing complex defense expenditure issues to a single, seemingly plausible number, it makes it possible to establish measurable performance goals and thus to identify which nations are meeting those goals and which are not. In that sense, it can be a powerful marker of Alliance cohesion and determination. It can also be a persuasive political tool for pressuring member states to pull their weight. The problem is that it is a completely arbitrary number, unrelated in any meaningful way to actual capability contributions. Its focus is on total spending rather than how defense monies are actually spent. Meeting those goals and which are not. In that sense, it can be a powerful marker of Alliance cohesion and determination. It can also be a persuasive political tool for pressuring member states to pull their weight. The problem is that it is a completely arbitrary number, unrelated in any meaningful way to actual capability contributions. Its focus is on total spending rather than how defense monies are actually spent. More critically, it avoids any concern for the relative ability of different member states to convert defense spending into real military capability.

The challenge to NATO, then, if the burden-sharing debate is to become more consequential than a perpetual row over money, is to come up with metrics that focus on capability contributions. To be acceptable, such measures will have to share the virtue of simplicity that has made the 2 percent target so memorable and so politically acceptable. But the difficulty in focusing on defense capabilities, or defense outputs, is that ultimate measures of success are generally immeasurable or completely incongruous: the absence of war is no indicator that deterrence is working; winning a war is an indicator that it has failed. As a result, proxy indicators have to be found that relate as closely as possible to the things that NATO is trying to accomplish.

What NATO is attempting to achieve is most specifically outlined in its Strategic Concept. This document presents NATO’s view of the current security environment and indicates how it intends to respond to challenges arising from that environment. The most recent Strategic Concept, approved at the Lisbon summit of 2010, identified collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security as the Alliance’s essential tasks. Collective defense relates to the traditional North Atlantic Treaty Article 5 commitment that an attack on one member is an attack on all. Crisis management involves the application of NATO political and military instruments to resolving any crisis that might affect Euro-Atlantic security, including crises arising outside of the NATO geographical area. Cooperative security involves NATO efforts to actively engage in international security affairs, primarily through security partnerships with other nations and organizations throughout the wider world.

The latter two tasks arose out of the security environment that existed between 1989 and 2014, where the threat from the Soviet Union dissipated and NATO found itself becoming more of a global security actor. However, the security situation has changed considerably since 2010, suggesting perhaps that it is time for a new strategic concept. In any case, it is clear that Russia has re-emerged as the primary threat and NATO’s emphasis has accordingly shifted back to the first of its core tasks. And, as in the past, NATO’s response is sharply focused on a deterrence strategy, one rooted in demonstrable and convincing military capabilities.

How NATO attempts to go about acquiring those capabilities is the clue to devising better, more meaningful measures of burden sharing. And how it does so is the focus of its Defence Planning Process. This formal, five-step process begins by defining the capabilities required to meet the Alliance’s agreed strategic objectives. Through consultation, it then attempts to apportion capability targets to member countries based on each nation’s own sovereign defense plans and on the basis of a “fair” share of the overall requirements. How fair is determined is, for understandable reasons, not publicized, but after more than 70 years of NATO evolution it has to be assumed that NATO planners have become highly skilled in managing internal political pressures to arrive at pragmatic and workable measures.

The final stage in the planning process is a detailed assessment of how well members are meeting NATO’s
capability targets. At this stage, NATO produces a performance report consisting of 11 metrics for each nation. Two of these metrics represent traditional expenditure inputs, including the much-noted total defense expenditure as a percentage of GDP, and the share of these expenditures allocated to new equipment and research and development, which is the second measure highlighted in the Wales summit pledge.

The remaining nine metrics consist of a mixture of quantitative and qualitative output measures, including current force deployment on NATO missions, as well as deployability and sustainability measures. These measures are then compared to existing NATO targets, such as the requirement that land forces should be at least 50 percent deployable — 10 percent deployable on a sustained basis — as agreed by defense ministers in 2008. Finally, the 11 metrics are ranked in comparison with other members.

This type of report better measures capability outputs and offers a more complete picture of actual contributions to the Alliance. Unfortunately, only Denmark has made its results publicly available; other nations, undoubtedly with good reason, treat them as classified information. This is unfortunate because such measures have real potential to shift the focus of the burden-sharing debate away from the 2 percent obsession and toward the things that really matter to the business of the Alliance.

The use of these metrics, though they are comprehensive, succinct and clear, is somewhat inhibited by the fact that there are 11 of them and they thus lack the uncluttered simplicity of the 2 percent criterion that dominates the burden-sharing debate. Consolidating these 11 measures into some sort of report card with rankings pertaining to funding, available forces and current activities — or cash, capabilities and commitment, as NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg recently put it — could change that.

Apart from the specifics, it is significant that the vocabulary of the burden-sharing debate appears to be changing for the better. This emerged strikingly in the recent introduction of NATO’s European Readiness Initiative. To fill a perceived gap in its response capabilities in the early stages of a European crisis between existing “very high readiness” forces and “initial follow-on” forces, NATO defense ministers at their June 2018 Brussels meeting, again at the urging of the U.S. secretary of defense, endorsed the “Four Thirties” plan, which calls for a force of 30 battalions, 30 squadrons of combat aircraft and 30 ships to be ready to use in 30 days. The terms of this declaration strongly suggest that NATO is now prepared to publicly discuss its plans in terms of concrete warfighting capabilities measured in deployable combat power. Apart from its “30s” symmetry, somewhat evocative of the 2 percent sloganeering, it does compel European governments to focus on force readiness. Importantly, it lays bare the critical need for expedited political decision-making in potential crisis situations and pinpoints the immediate need to build an effective command structure and to prepare the physical and procedural capacity to mobilize forces across national borders.

Performance and patience

NATO burden sharing has always been about more than money. If it were otherwise, the Alliance would surely have disappeared long ago. Expenditure equity is just too visible to be allowed to get too far out of line, but a shift of focus toward what these expenditures actually achieve can move the debate to more relevant considerations and reduce the potential for simplistic measures distracting the Alliance from its proper business of building capability.

In a voluntary alliance, where each member is free to determine what it spends on defense and how it spends it, burden-sharing issues are inevitable. Paradoxically, it is this very freedom that is NATO’s strength. The institutions, bureaucracies, organizational structures, command and control arrangements, planning processes and consultation mechanisms that have evolved over the past seven decades to manage this diversity, and which would be impossible to replicate, are the glue of the Alliance and the ultimate source of its durability.

That being said, if NATO’s next major celebration is to be its centenary, 30 years hence, then getting there is going to require proof from European NATO that it is seriously working toward rebalancing burden sharing by investing in useable capabilities. From the U.S., it is going to require patience and the discipline to refrain from overplaying its hand. ☑
Strong Headwinds

Uncertain Times Jeopardize Enlargement

By Pál Dunay
Established 70 years ago with the signatures of 12 original members, NATO now has 29 members, meaning more than half are accession countries. Enlargement by accession occurred over seven separate occasions, and on one occasion the geographic area increased without increasing the number of member states when the German Democratic Republic (GDR) became part of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in October 1990.

The conditions surrounding the enlargements — the first in 1952 (Greece and Turkey) and the most recent in 2017 (Montenegro) — have varied significantly. The first three enlargements occurred during the Cold War and are regarded as strategic. They contributed to the consolidation of the post-World War II European order and helped determine its territorial boundaries.

The FRG’s accession 10 years after the end of World War II in Europe, in May 1955, had multiple consequences. It meant:

• The FRG’s democratic record had been recognized.
• The country could be integrated militarily, which signaled its subordination and a clear requirement not to act outside the Alliance.
• The FRG’s membership in NATO created an incentive for the establishment of the Warsaw Pact, which followed West German membership by five days in 1955 and led to the integration of the GDR into the eastern bloc. This signaled the completion of the East-West division, at least as far as security was concerned.

The third enlargement — Spain in 1982 — meant membership for a country that had been integrated militarily, including the presence of U.S. bases on its territory, though the accession did not change much as far as the central theater of NATO’s operations in the Cold War was concerned. Although political considerations also contributed, strategic importance determined enlargements in the Cold War era.
The end of the Cold War and the unification of Europe entailed the long-awaited reunification of Germany. However, the conditions of German unity would have been better negotiated between the two German states than internationally in the so-called 2 + 4 Agreement. It was clear that the FRG’s international engagements would continue, including its memberships in NATO, the European Communities and other international institutions. However, it is not entirely clear whether a price has been paid for this negotiation considering Russia’s insistence that the West promised not to enlarge NATO to the east, or at least not to deploy NATO forces there. The West and Russia can be expected to continue an inconclusive debate over these terms with neither side providing any fully convincing evidence.

Strategic vs. political

Whereas the Cold War enlargements have been characterized as strategic, the post-Cold War ones have been presented as political. However, their political nature does not mean they were entirely nonstrategic. The one factor common to the more recent enlargements is that every new NATO member since the late 1990s is a former socialist/communist country. Most had been members of the Warsaw Pact or territorially part of states that were among its members (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) or were republics of the only nonaligned socialist country, Yugoslavia (Croatia, Montenegro and Slovenia). It does not mean that the countries share the same history or political course. However, all of them had nondemocratic periods and all were unfamiliar with democratic control over the military. It is necessary to emphasize that political control of militaries was commonplace in those countries. But the supervision practiced by the communist parties represented a more direct involvement in military affairs. In most smaller socialist countries, unlike in the Soviet Union, the bargaining position of the armed forces was fairly weak and subordinate to the political leadership.

The post-Cold War enlargements were indeed political in some sense. Namely, the military capabilities of the candidate countries were of secondary importance. However, in 1999 when three former Warsaw Pact states (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) became NATO members, classic defense-related considerations were partially suppressed. NATO required only minimum interoperability. It could be said that the enlargement consisted of must-have countries. It was obvious that the Czech Republic and Poland — both having had a turbulent history with Germany, and Poland having had its tribulations with Russia and later the Soviet Union — could not be left out of the first eastern enlargement cycle. Concerning Hungary, the problem was somewhat different, though Germany must have thought some debt was owed because of Hungary’s actions in hastening the Iron Curtain’s fall in 1989. Hungary presented a special problem: It had no NATO neighbor and providing aid to its fellow members would be limited to what could be done with aircraft.

However, NATO was well aware of the interoperability limitations of eastern and central European countries. To address this shortfall, NATO — during its 50th anniversary summit in Washington a month after the first post-Cold War eastern enlargement — made several major decisions, including the adoption of the membership action plan (MAP). As will be demonstrated later, a full mythology has developed around this plan during the past two decades. It is important to emphasize that NATO wanted to lengthen the preparation time for membership. States aspiring to become NATO members enter the MAP and are helped in their preparation. Experts remain divided on whether the MAP actually facilitates membership.

The next eastern enlargement consisted of a more varied club, including states that missed the earlier round due to their own pace of development or for other reasons. The largest group that ever acceded to NATO consisted of seven members: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia. Although Vladimir Putin had replaced Boris Yeltsin as Russia’s head of state by then, opposition to NATO enlargement had not yet reached the level that has characterized the period since 2008. One of the main lessons of eastern enlargement is that it is a fair-weather process best carried out when there is no strong opposition.

The years that followed brought piecemeal advancement, with Albania and Croatia becoming members in 2013 and Montenegro in 2017. Those enlargements demonstrated the Alliance’s determination to keep the door open to states in the Western Balkans.

The Washington Treaty

It is important to contemplate certain legal and political issues when considering the three accessions since 2004. The foundation of NATO enlargement is Article 10 of the Washington Treaty. It states: “The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.”

A closer look at the article’s meaning is essential. The conditions for accession are as follows:

1. Any state may seek membership. The conditions of statehood are defined under international law and are not very demanding. A state can be large or small and have a population in the thousands or more than a billion. Doubts have never been raised with respect to the statehood of countries with weak central authorities.

2. The state must be European, though what exactly constitutes a European state is a delicate question. What are Europe’s boundaries? Responses based on geography may not be identical to those based on politics. Geographically, one would conclude that states east of Turkey’s Asian territory are not in Europe. However, this matter has not been raised with respect to states in the South Caucasus. Hence, NATO’s current political geography would indicate that the border of Europe is on the western border of the Caspian Sea. These two conditions thus seem easy to meet.

3. Members of the Atlantic Alliance enjoy the full freedom to invite or not invite a state for accession. This is understandable because the treaty establishes a collective defense system. Of course, such an invitation must be preceded by mutual interest between the Alliance and a country wanting to join.

4. A state seeking to join must further the principles of the treaty. This may be perceived as ambiguous. However, the preamble and the first three articles of the Washington Treaty provide some context. There are references to democracy, the peaceful nature of the state and its readiness to maintain and develop a capacity to resist an armed attack. Has NATO been consistent as far as meeting its standards? This is subject to interpretation regarding the admitting of new members and when members backtrack on performance. While the Alliance has a mechanism for accession, it lacks one for expulsion. Unless a member wants to leave the Alliance, it will not be obliged to depart. Although this is an abstract possibility and has never been officially contemplated, being aware of it is important.

5. The last material condition may well be the most delicate. Namely, it requires that a state invited to join the Alliance be able to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. This is certainly a perceptional requirement, and NATO members must be confident that the invited state meets it. Two concerns have emerged recently. First, what if a non-NATO member expresses the view that the Alliance’s acceptance of certain countries would threaten the security of the North Atlantic area? Legally, the situation is clear: A state that is not a NATO member has no say over enlargement decisions. However, the political reality may well be different. A large state that can influence European security may send signals that a potential NATO enlargement threatens regional security. Second, what if there are concerns that a country’s accession would not contribute to security because the state lacks adequate defense capabilities and could be perceived as a freeloader? There are two factors that may give such an impression: a low level of commitment by current members that haven’t delivered on promises made during their accession processes and the limited military capacity of some small countries. Taken together, these may cause some member-state politicians to hesitate before agreeing to underwrite the security of a state that may not be able or willing to contribute to collective defense.

The procedural conditions for membership are straightforward. Unanimous agreement among members is necessary to invite a state to negotiate its membership and then to become a member. The members and the accession state must ratify the accession protocol and the new member deposit its instrument of ratification with the U.S. government, the depository of the Washington Treaty. The process requires the consent of every NATO member on a number of occasions. If a member state thinks it might not support a country’s accession, it should immediately make that known and stop the advancement. This was the case in 2008 when some members opposed offering a MAP to more states that were once republics of the Soviet Union—in this case Georgia and Ukraine. In 1997, the opposite occurred, when the U.S. indicated early on at the Madrid summit of the 16 NATO members that it would support the three states up for accession, but no more.
Prospects
The concerns previously mentioned have some foundation. Russia has repeatedly expressed that it considers the advance of NATO infrastructure toward its borders to be a major security threat. Therefore, Russia has been strongly opposed to enlargement. It is every state’s right to agree or disagree with another state’s political orientation and aspiration to gain membership in an alliance. Every state is also entitled to express its views and rely on diplomatic and political means to influence partners. However, there are certain boundaries no state should transgress. The now 57 participating states of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe took the commitment in 1996 to “reaffirm the inherent right of each and every participating State to be free to choose or change its security arrangements, including treaties of alliance, as they evolve.”

This means that states have to respect each other’s choices. It goes without saying that disagreement on a country’s international aspirations should never reach the threat or use of force. This stems from basic principles of international law. Even if, as some assume, the hostilities on the night of August 7, 2008, between Georgia and Russia were started by Georgia, this would not have given grounds to de facto annex two parts of Georgian territory and unilaterally recognize them as “independent” states.

Three states of the former Soviet Union have joined NATO and two more have contemplated a future with the West, including NATO membership. Others have either become members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a collective defense alliance under Russian leadership, declared some kind of neutrality or demonstrated hesitation concerning their alignment.

Georgia
Georgia has committed to aligning its policy with the West, seeking NATO and European Union membership, since President Mikheil Saakashvili assumed power in 2004. The country has backed its words with action, including training its troops according to Western models and often in the West, participating in exercises with Western partners, purchasing Western equipment and contributing to Western efforts, such as the stabilization of Afghanistan and hosting former inmates from Guantanamo. It is clear that for 15 years, Georgia has been committed to becoming a member of the Alliance.

The greatest hurdle to Georgian NATO membership is Russia’s determined opposition. It has taken various forms over the years, including verbal warnings by Putin at the Munich Security Conference in February 2007 and at the Bucharest NATO summit in April 2008. Russia responds whenever Georgia’s membership moves high on NATO’s agenda. It aims to sow internal strife in NATO so that Tbilisi’s aspirations will not be supported by all 29 members. In strongly worded messages, Russia targets Georgians who want to avoid risks and prefer “stability.” Consider the words of Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev on the 10th anniversary of his country’s war with Georgia, when he reacted to Georgia’s possible accession to NATO: “This could provoke a terrible conflict.” Russia is also making efforts to re-establish trade links severed during Saakashvili’s time in office.

More than 10 percent of Georgia’s external trade is now conducted with Russia, and that creates some dependence. Russia also addresses Georgia through propaganda, though Moscow’s ability to influence the population in the Russian language is declining, particularly among a younger generation that is less likely to speak Russian as a second language. Support for NATO in Georgia has declined somewhat from an extremely high level, but remains close to 70 percent.

A major challenge for NATO is maintaining an interest in the Alliance among Georgians when it is clear that a membership invitation will not be extended in the foreseeable future. When the MAP was not extended to Georgia at the July 2018 NATO summit in Brussels, Tbilisi had to live with an upgrade to practical cooperation, or assistance with “countermobility, training and exercises and secure communication.”

Ukraine
Ukraine presents similarities and differences to Georgia. Unlike Georgia, Ukraine did not have a sustained commitment to NATO until 2014. After the Orange Revolution of 2005, Ukraine demonstrated a determination to get closer to NATO. However, by 2010, then-President Viktor Yanukovych informed NATO’s secretary-general that Ukraine’s membership should not be considered. But a little more than a year later, Ukraine returned to NATO seeking closer ties. However, the defense reforms begun after the Orange Revolution had largely remained on paper, and the resources allocated to the reforms disappeared. Moreover, Ukraine’s NATO aspiration was not always backed by popular support. Never before 2014 did a majority of Ukraine’s population favor joining NATO. But by 2017, NATO support had reached 54 percent in Ukraine, a country that neighbors four NATO members and three former Soviet republics. The 2014 Revolution of Dignity and the subsequent Russian annexation of Crimea — and Russian support provided to the separatists in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions — fundamentally changed the dynamic.

Since 2014, a clear Western orientation has extended to every sphere in Ukraine, including trade, investment and defense. The high-intensity conflict in 2014 highlighted the shortcomings of Ukraine’s Armed Forces and contributed to a realization that modernization was needed. That has taken various forms, including Ukrainian training initiatives and Western contributions that involved the delivery of nonlethal equipment and, on a limited scale, defensive lethal weapons such as Javelin anti-tank missiles.

For various reasons, the alignment of Ukraine with NATO does not mean membership will occur in the foreseeable future. As President Barack Obama’s ambassador to NATO stated: “First and foremost ... as it would be impossible to generate consensus in the Alliance to the invitation of a country [that] has a pending request.” Ukraine’s membership in NATO remains uncertain because of Russian interference.

Ukrainian soldiers march during a military parade to celebrate Independence Day in Kyiv. The fate of Ukraine’s membership in NATO remains uncertain because of Russian interference.
conflict with a mighty adversary and territory that has been occupied by it. It is open to question whether the internal dynamics of the conflict will result in a reassessment of Ukraine’s quest for NATO membership.” Russia has opposed NATO membership for former Soviet republics ever since the matter emerged early this century.

Russia was not vocally opposed to the NATO accession of Balkan states, be it Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia in 2004, or Albania and Croatia in 2009. However, lately Moscow is increasingly vocal in opposing continued NATO enlargement in the Western Balkans, and Western influence there more broadly. The reason for this new approach is open to speculation. But NATO enlargement in the region could not have been unexpected in Moscow, and that leads to one possible reason: Russia reassessed the strategic environment and concluded that NATO’s enlargement is to its disadvantage, irrespective of where it occurs. This means that according to Russia’s current evaluation, the geostrategic competition with the West extends to the whole of Europe.

In the 1990s, Russia was against NATO enlargement because it knew that in its weakened condition a change in the status quo would not be to its advantage. Today, Moscow is against enlargement because it wants to reverse history by changing the international order to its advantage. Because its international standing is so central to its domestic self-esteem, Russia can be expected to try to block enlargement for the foreseeable future.

Montenegro

Montenegro, which joined NATO in 2017, simultaneously presented both dilemmas. Russia waged an unexpectedly strong campaign against its NATO accession, and doubts were voiced about Montenegro’s contribution to the collective defense capabilities of the Alliance. Russia thought it had a chance to influence divisions in Montenegro’s domestic politics. As a first step, the spokesperson for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs criticized Montenegro for not holding a referendum on the matter. Indeed, Hungary and some other states held referendums on NATO accession and were fortunate that
public support held firm. However, countries are under no obligation to ask the public to vote on accession; legislative approval suffices. The hostile Russian criticism should have served as a warning concerning Russia’s deep-seated dissatisfaction with the course of events. What followed was unprecedented. Russia engaged in a coup attempt to unseat the pro-NATO accession government and physically eliminate the longtime prime minister (now president). The deep and subversive interference in Montenegro’s affairs was organized from Serbia. When the failed coup attempt was revealed, Russian Security Council Secretary (and Putin confidant) Nikolay Patrushev urgently visited Belgrade, a sure sign of Russia’s illegal and camouflaged activity. Despite those efforts, Montenegro became the 29th member of the Alliance.

In spite of the concerns expressed by some senators, the Senate voted 97-2 to approve Montenegro’s NATO accession protocol in March 2017. Questions about contributing to NATO’s collective defense could be raised concerning every accession country, in particular the small ones with limited military capabilities. The issue re-emerged when U.S. President Donald Trump also questioned whether Montenegro could defend itself or contribute meaningfully to collective defense.

The less some new NATO members deliver on promises made in the accession process, the more difficult it may be to continue with enlargement. This presents a problem because it may be contradictory to the strategic necessity of enlargement. With NATO now consisting of 29 members, it is understandable that the number of European states still able to or interested in joining the Alliance is shrinking. Some — from Ireland to Switzerland and from Serbia to Azerbaijan — are not interested in NATO membership. Others face the obstacle of Russian opposition or are members of the CSTO. All of this raises questions about the future of enlargement.

Security forces face off against people gathered in Thessaloniki, Greece, to protest a deal to change the name of the country known as Macedonia to North Macedonia. Reuters

was revealed, Russian Security Council Secretary (and Putin confidant) Nikolay Patrushev urgently visited Belgrade, a sure sign of Russia’s illegal and camouflaged activity. Despite those efforts, Montenegro became the 29th member of the Alliance.

However, Russia’s objection was not the only hurdle to overcome. Questions were raised in the U.S. Senate about Montenegro’s military capabilities and its capacity to contribute to collective defense. This undoubtedly is a legitimate question that any Alliance member can raise because all members are expected to share in the risk of resisting external military challenges. The question demonstrated the changed atmosphere in NATO, where more than ever each contribution to the shared effort must be measurable.
Macedonia looked like a credible candidate but had its prospective membership disrupted by a political dispute over its name. Greece objected to its name after Macedonia gained independence from the former Yugoslavia in 1991, so it entered the United Nations in 1993 under the provisional name, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, or FYROM. Five years later, Greece rejected Macedonia’s bid to join NATO and Macedonia protested to the United Nations’ International Court of Justice, which ruled in its favor in 2011. But it proved to be a pyrrhic victory. It did not bring about any change because no legal body can deprive Greece of its sovereign right to support or reject another state’s NATO membership. Macedonia’s political factions responded in 2018 by agreeing to the name North Macedonia as a compromise. This renewed negotiations for NATO membership, though Russia tried to block the process. However, the effort faltered when two Russian diplomats were accused of attempting to bribe Greek politicians to object to reconciliation with Macedonia. In turn, Greece decided to replace its ambassador in Moscow, resulting in a temporary chill in diplomatic relations.

Nationalist forces opposing the name change did their best to defeat the efforts even though it is in the country’s long-term interest to open the road to NATO (and later EU) accession. But in early 2019, Greece and Macedonia ratified an agreement to change the name to North Macedonia and put the country on a path to beginning two of the most important integration processes in Europe and the Euro-Atlantic area.

There is a possibility that militarily nonaligned Finland and Sweden may also seek NATO membership. Russia attempted to deter the two states from moving in that direction while discouraging positive signals from NATO. Helsinki and Stockholm, aware of the controversy, continued to deepen their cooperation with the Alliance, but not wanting to risk regional stability, took no formal steps. However, the opening of the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in Helsinki — the first such center outside NATO territory, and thus a benefit to participating states as well as the EU and NATO — was a step that must not have been appreciated in Moscow.

Conclusion

NATO enlargement — just as the enlargement of the EU — is not a l’art pour l’art process. It is about the development of states and the political model under which people are going to live. It is clear that the hope pursued since the so-called Mainz speech in 1989 by U.S. President George H.W. Bush about a Europe that is whole, free and at peace has not been achieved, and there is not much hope it will be attained anytime soon. There are different socio-political models that will have to coexist. A large part of Europe has made its choice. However, there is some unpredictability because some states that belong to core western institutions are not necessarily liberal democracies. There are some states and areas that are still in flux and the ongoing contest is to determine the political model they will follow as their international political alignment. There is no doubt in the West which model is preferable; however, this does not mean those forces will prevail without contestation.

The NATO enlargement process has been very successful overall, as it has helped many small- and medium-size states leave behind a gray zone that is occasionally referred to as “ferryboat country status.” Remaining in that zone — once called Zwischen europa (Europe in-between) by Czechoslovakian President Thomas Masaryk — in such ill-defined situations would have resulted in continuing rivalries for those countries, a grim prospect.

NATO enlargement in this sense is a process that has contributed to the strategic and political transformation and often the consolidation of the European continent. It also has contributed to the collective military power of the West. However, in that sense the jury may still be out as far as the contribution of smaller members to the Alliance’s net military capabilities. It is widely known that the small countries can contribute to the Alliance in specific, well-defined ways, but only scarcely to far-away, high-intensity conflicts. It is necessary to understand where the various members can make a difference and measure expectations against that understanding.

NATO’s doors will remain open, even if few states are expected to cross the threshold anytime soon. If European unification cannot succeed under the terms offered by the West, it is important to define the divisions and to guarantee that the divide causes the least pain to the European population.
This observation by U.S. inventor Charles F. Kettering perfectly captures the logic of seeking to prepare for the future. Security policies are not exempt from this logic. Traditional notions of military security, which are state-centric and focused on the defense of borders and territory against aggression by another state, are increasingly giving way to a complex mix of military and nonmilitary threats that can also affect societies from within. They range from targeted man-made threats, such as cyber attacks or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to broader phenomena, such as climate change or resource scarcity. For NATO, which is based on traditional notions of deterrence and defense against armed attack, and whose founding treaty even defines the specific territory that is eligible for collective protection, the rise of territorialized, nonkinetic threats creates a whole series of challenges. How well NATO addresses them will determine its future as an effective security provider for almost 1 billion citizens.

TRADITIONAL AND NONTRADITIONAL CHALLENGES

The return of great power competition, notably Russia’s revisionism and China’s more assertive foreign policy, is a stark reminder that the increase of nontraditional threats does not spell the obsolescence of traditional security challenges. On the contrary, traditional and nontraditional threats increasingly interact. Cyber attacks, for example, have long been a tool for industrial espionage, yet they have also become integral to military campaigns. Similarly, while the effect of politically motivated terrorist attacks against critical energy infrastructure may be largely symbolic, state-sponsored attacks could also have the goal of undermining a country’s ability to build a coherent conventional military defense.
A soldier stands before a defensive cyber warfare system during the International Cybersecurity Forum in Lille, France, in 2018. The forum is a platform aimed at promoting a pan-European vision of cyber security.

THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
Disinformation can be used as a tool to destabilize a state, yet it can also be part of a hybrid warfare approach, to prepare for (and then mask) direct military aggression against a neighboring state. Climate change, in turn, can increase the number and scale of natural disasters — with the military often being the first responder — but it can also aggravate conflicts between states or generate new migration pressures. Finally, the number of virtual nuclear weapons states is growing due to more countries mastering the full nuclear fuel cycle and the commercialization of proliferation — the emergence of a black market for sensitive technologies.

THE LIMITS OF DETERRENCE
Throughout the Cold War, NATO's central paradigm was deterrence. The logic of avoiding military conflict by demonstrating that one's own military power was congenial to that period's specific characteristics: a single, visible enemy, symmetrical military capabilities, long warning times and, above all, the assumption that the opponent would be guided by a rational cost-benefit calculus. While deterrence remains a major concept in interstate relations, nontraditional challenges such as terrorism, cyber attacks and humanitarian disasters lie outside the deterrence paradigm. Unlike traditional military deterrence, which rests on the visibility of one's military arsenal, cyber capabilities are kept hidden. Moreover, since cyber attacks or energy cutoffs may be deliberately designed to avoid casualties, such actions will be difficult to deter because the aggressor may hope to stay beneath the victim's threshold for a resolute response. Other challenges, such as energy vulnerabilities or climate change, do not lend themselves at all to the deterrence paradigm. Hence, NATO must maintain the deterrence logic in its relationship to Russia and other potential competitors, while acknowledging that deterrence has little relevance beyond the traditional military context.

NATO'S APPROACH
This emerging security landscape challenges NATO on several levels. On the institutional level, the new threats challenge the centrality of NATO because many of them are nonmilitary in nature and thus do not lend themselves to purely military responses. On the political level, the fact that these threats offer little or no early warning, are often anonymous as well as ambiguous, and above all nonexistential, creates dilemmas of attribution, solidarity and collective response. Consequently, NATO needs not only to grasp the specific character of such nontraditional challenges, but also define its role in each of them. At the same time, NATO needs to develop trustful ties with the broader community of stakeholders. To succeed in this approach, NATO must:

- **Overcome the mandate-means mismatch.** NATO had been addressing a range of emerging threats for quite some time, yet it had done so in a compartmentalized way, without clear-cut political guidance or a thorough conceptual underpinning. The 2010 Strategic Concept, which gave considerable prominence to emerging challenges, signaled a change by providing NATO with a wide-ranging mandate to address these challenges in a more systematic way. Moreover, the creation of the Emerging Security Challenges Division in NATO’s International Staff, which happened in conjunction with the release of the Strategic Concept, created a bureaucratic foothold for nontraditional challenges within the organization, facilitating more coherent policy development and implementation in these areas.

- **Improve situational awareness.** By bringing together over 60 intelligence services, NATO provides a unique forum for discussing current and future threats, including nontraditional ones. Intelligence sharing in NATO includes all developments that are relevant to

Cyber specialist Bogdan Botezatu discusses a 2017 cyber attack in Ukraine that hobbled much of the government and private sector on the eve of a holiday celebrating the post-Soviet constitution. NATO must prepare for nontraditional security threats that occur without warning. THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
allied security, ranging from regional conflicts to attacks on critical energy infrastructure. To further enhance situational awareness, NATO created an Intelligence Security Division in its International Staff, while at the same time expanding its in-house analytical capabilities. In contrast to intelligence sharing, strategic analysis allows for a more forward-looking and sometimes more provocative open-source approach toward emerging challenges, ranging from the security implications of artificial intelligence to the strategic consequences of bitcoin.

• **Manage the attribution challenge.** The attribution problem is another area that sets nontraditional challenges, such as cyber attacks, apart from traditional forms of conflict. While the perpetrator of a traditional military attack is usually identifiable (even terrorist nonstate actors like to brag about their deeds), cyber is much more ambiguous. Even if the defender were certain about the attacker’s identity and sought to “name and shame” the perpetrator, he would find it difficult to marshal evidence of a kind that the international community would consider convincing. Moreover, traditional weapons, such as tanks and fighter jets, are owned by states. By contrast, cyber capabilities and other disruptive means are owned mostly by the private sector and even by individuals. If the threat of attribution is to act as a deterrent, the allies will need to settle for less-than-perfect evidence as sufficient to hold a perpetrator publicly responsible.

• **Enhance training and education.** The growing importance of nontraditional challenges is making them a permanent subject of NATO’s education and training programs. Diplomats and military leaders alike must be given the opportunity to develop a better understanding of cyber, energy, climate change and similar challenges as drivers of future security developments. To this end, dedicated courses have been set up at NATO’s training facilities as well as the NATO
Centres of Excellence, and existing courses are being augmented. Given the specialized nature of some nontraditional challenges, notably cyber, NATO must offer courses suitable for subject matter experts, but also needs to invest in strategic awareness courses focusing on the broader picture.

- **Adapt NATO exercises.** The challenge of coping with nontraditional threats is also increasingly reflected in NATO’s exercises. Even a “traditional” military conflict today will include numerous cyber elements, the targeting of energy and other critical infrastructure, and massive amounts of disinformation. Hence, it is only through exercises that the effects of these nontraditional threats can be understood. The integration of nontraditional challenges in NATO’s exercises reflects an awareness of this fact, as does the more frequent use of tabletop exercises, which allow for a more granular approach to specific challenges. For example, the NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence conducted such an exercise with Ukraine in 2017 and contributed to a report about Ukraine’s electricity network.

- **Enhance resilience.** Assuming that certain types of attacks, such as cyber or terrorist, will happen and cannot be deterred, the focus needs to shift toward resilience. Since cyber attacks are happening with increased frequency, the emphasis must be placed on upgrading defenses so that networks will continue to operate in a degraded environment. Similarly, the effects of attacks on energy infrastructure can be minimized if that infrastructure can be repaired quickly. Such resilience measures are largely a national responsibility. However, NATO can assist nations in conducting self-assessments that help identify gaps. This new focus on resilience is also important for NATO’s traditional collective defense: an opponent seeking to undermine NATO’s collective defense preparations will do...
so first and foremost by nontraditional, nonkinetic means, such as cyber attacks or energy supply disruptions.

**Develop links with other international organizations.** The nature of nontraditional security challenges makes NATO’s success increasingly dependent on how well it cooperates with others. Consequently, NATO needs to be much better connected to the broader international community. This is true for its relations with other security stakeholders such as the European Union and the United Nations, but also with respect to nongovernmental organizations. Hence, enhancing NATO’s connectivity is a precondition for its future as a viable security provider. The NATO-EU relationship, which is perhaps the most important of all, has seen considerable progress, notably due to both organizations’ vocation to address nontraditional security challenges. Since many of these challenges are both internal and external in nature, cooperation between NATO and the EU is the *sine qua non* for any pragmatic approach to meeting them.

**Develop links with the private sector.** Another part of a better-connected NATO is a sustained relationship with the private sector. Just as the urgency to enhance NATO’s cyber defense capabilities is leading to closer ties with software companies, the need to develop a more coherent approach to energy security will require NATO to reach out to energy companies. With most energy and cyber networks in private hands, it will be crucial to build public-private partnerships. The goal should be to establish communities of trust in which different stakeholders can share confidential information on cyber attacks and other security concerns. Creating such new relationships will be challenging, since national business interests and collective security interests may sometimes prove to be irreconcilable. Still, the nature of many emerging security challenges makes the established compartmentalization of responsibilities between the public and private sectors appear increasingly anachronistic.

**Improve collective decision-making.** Another obvious challenge pertains to response speed and, consequently, the question of political control. Cyber attacks offer the most glaring example: They simply do not leave one with enough time to engage in lengthy deliberations, let alone with the opportunity to seek parliamentary approval of a response. While this challenge is already significant on the national level, it is even more severe in a multinational context. To overcome it, nations must agree on rules of engagement or pre-delegate authority to certain entities. This quasi-automaticity runs counter to the natural instinct of governments to retain political control over every aspect of their collective response; yet the slow, deliberative nature of consensus building is unsuitable for the challenge at hand. The consensus needs to be built before the event occurs. Consequently, NATO is constantly reviewing its decision-making procedures and seeks to adapt them to the unique circumstances imposed by nontraditional security challenges, such as cyber attacks or hybrid warfare.

**Build a new culture of debate.** Finally, allies must use NATO as a forum for sustained political dialogue about broader security developments. While NATO is engaged on several continents, its collective mindset is still largely Eurocentric and reactive. As a result, many NATO members approach discussions on potential future security issues hesitantly, worrying that NATO’s image as an operations-driven alliance will create the impression that any such debate is only a precursor to military engagement. While such misperceptions can never be ruled out entirely, the allies should nevertheless resist putting themselves hostage to the risk of a few false press reports about NATO’s allegedly sinister military intentions. Indeed, the true risk for NATO lies in the opposite direction: by refusing to look ahead and debate political and military options in meeting emerging challenges, the allies would condemn themselves to an entirely reactive approach, thus foregoing opportunities for a proactive policy. Such a culture of debate is all the more important because many new security challenges do not affect all the allies in quite the same way. A terrorist assault or a cyber attack against just one ally will not necessarily generate the

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**By bringing together over 60 intelligence services, NATO provides a unique forum for discussing current and future threats, including nontraditional ones. Intelligence sharing in NATO includes all developments that are relevant to allied security, ranging from regional conflicts to attacks on critical energy infrastructure.**
The challenge of coping with nontraditional threats is also increasingly reflected in NATO’s exercises. Even a “traditional” military conflict today will include numerous cyber elements, the targeting of energy and other critical infrastructure, and massive amounts of disinformation.

ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES

Given the many structural differences between traditional and nontraditional security challenges, it should not come as a surprise that NATO’s forays into addressing the latter have been difficult. However, since the 2010 Strategic Concept set the stage, much has been achieved. This is particularly true for cyber defense, which has seen rapid progress, including the development of a distinct NATO policy; the definition of cyber as a distinct operational domain, and its mention in the context of the Article 5 collective self-defense clause. While some experts hold that nations remain secretive, even with allies, regarding their cyber vulnerabilities and capabilities, the need for NATO to meet the cyber challenge has been fully acknowledged. The attribution challenge remains difficult to meet in a collective framework, yet the NATO allies have demonstrated the political will to “name and shame” Russia for using the nerve agent Novichok to try to kill former Russian double agent Sergei Skripal.

Other subjects, such as energy security, have evolved less rapidly, but the combination of policy development, inserting nontraditional threats into NATO’s exercises and setting up tailored training courses has given NATO’s role in areas such as counterterrorism, energy security and WMD proliferation a sharper profile. For example, NATO’s role in the fight against terrorism — which includes operations in Afghanistan and participation in the counter-ISIS campaign, defending against improvised explosive devices, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats, biometrics, and identifying returning foreign terrorist fighters — clearly benefited from the visibility of a dedicated foothold in NATO’s bureaucracy, as well as from the Alliance’s education and training opportunities.

Nontraditional challenges have also been a convenient venue for some partner countries to move closer to NATO. Moreover, several of NATO’s Centres of Excellence have proven to be invaluable analytical resources, as have the two Strategic Commands. NATO’s support for scientific research also focuses on nontraditional challenges, including climate change and water security, and NATO has built ties to the scientific community to discuss these and other issues. The allies have also increased their understanding of hybrid threats, notably in cooperation with the EU. In short, NATO has become a serious interlocutor on nontraditional challenges.

All this is not to say that NATO has entirely mastered the difficult terrain of nontraditional security challenges. There are still areas where the gap between expectations and reality remains wide. For example, while the 2010 Strategic Concept refers to climate change as a potential threat multiplier, the allies have yet to develop a visible collective approach to dealing with this phenomenon. The same holds true for resource scarcity and similar issues: While NATO should not militarize what are essentially economic matters, the lack of interest in such topics could lead to all kinds of unwelcome surprises. By the same token, despite a variety of forecasting efforts by the Alliance as well as by individual allies, NATO as a collective entity has not yet embraced this methodology.

Above all, however, on the question of whether NATO could eventually cede its accustomed leadership role, the jury is still out. For NATO to only play a supporting role alongside other stakeholders would require yet another sea change in the Alliance’s culture. As a former high-ranking NATO official put it, “NATO is not accustomed to sharing leadership and decision-making responsibilities with a range of different civilian actors outside the conventional military chain of command.” And yet this is precisely what the Alliance will have to learn.
CONCLUSION: A NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT
Dealing with nontraditional challenges requires a paradigm shift away from deterrence and toward resilience — an enormous challenge for both individual states and alliances. A security policy that accepts that certain threats cannot be prevented through deterrence and that some damage will inevitably occur will be difficult to explain to populations that have become used to near-perfect security. Thus, such a policy will be charged as being fatalistic or scaremongering, while others will interpret it as an excuse for governments to spy on their citizens or simply as an excuse for increasing defense budgets.

Nontraditional challenges thus bring home a most inconvenient truth: What once was almost absolute security has become relative security. Everyone can become a victim, anytime, anywhere. This has far-reaching implications for the modern state, which in the final analysis derives its legitimacy from the fact that it can protect its citizens. Nothing less than a new social contract is needed.

Governments will have to admit that in the age of cyber attacks, terrorism and climate change they can no longer protect their citizens as comprehensively as in the past — and yet, these very citizens will have to give the state permission to use force, including offensive cyber force, sometimes earlier and perhaps more comprehensively than traditional ideas of self-defense may suggest.

The implications of these changes are far-reaching indeed. Efforts to introduce such a new social contract will face stiff resistance. However, inaction would ultimately be more expensive. No one has expressed this better than one of the world’s richest men, Warren Buffett. The famed investor had long been thinking about the question of how major disasters would affect the insurance industry. But he had not turned his reflections into concrete action. In a letter to his shareholders, written a few weeks after the tragedy of 9/11, Buffett admitted that he had violated the Noah rule: Predicting rain doesn’t count; building arks does.
Laden with Risk
President Vladimir Putin has boasted of Russian troops reaching not just Kyiv, but Riga, Vilnius, Tallinn, Warsaw or Bucharest in two days. Senior NATO military officers, diplomats and politicians have warned of a paradigm shift in Russia’s relations with the West, one that is laden with risk as Russia uses conventional forces and Soviet-era brinkmanship for intimidation and coercion, with escalation dominance threatening land grabs. Even before the attempted assassination in England of former Russian spy Sergei Skripal in March 2018, it was evident that there are no clear rules of the road and accepted vocabulary, reflecting a blurring of the lines between domestic and foreign policy and war and peace, as well as ongoing debates over Russia’s strategic motivation and intent.

At best, it appears that Moscow’s strategy is to compel the West to recognize Russia’s security interests and its status as a global “Great Power” and regional hegemon. At worst, Russia is in a long-term structural decline but determined to take part in asymmetric Great Power competition, consciously integrating conventional and subconventional proxy tools to destabilize neighbors. In this context, cross-domain coercion and compellence, raiding and brigandage constitute a rational Russian strategy.

Among NATO members, the understanding of solidarity is differentiated, and United States commitments for the first time appear to be conditional. European NATO members could face the threat of dual revisionism: squeezed between the Scylla of U.S. retrenchment and withdrawal from Europe — driven by trade protectionism, a narrower definition of national interest (which questions commitments to commercial competitors), an aversion to costs and mixed signaling — and the Charybdis of increasing Russian threats, particularly sub-Article 5 and Helsinki Final Act breaches. Direct dialogue with Russia can reduce and mitigate risk and miscalculation.

From the foundations of NATO to the present day, NATO and Russia have remained in structural conflict. Two dimensions are particularly pertinent. First, the structural differences between two leading members of the Alliance — the U.S. and Germany — help explain differences in these allies’ emphasis and implementation of the defense, deterrence and dialogue policy mix toward Russia. While strong defense and deterrence are not substitutes for a negotiated political solution, they may be the twin preconditions for it. Second, when we look at ideational structures within Russia, its constant projection of Great Power status, fear of internal weakness that leads to chaos and disorder, and the need for respect, these factors all negatively shape the attitudes of Russian decision-makers (Putin and his inner circle) toward NATO. Structural factors will continue to influence NATO, not least the outcome of capitalist democratic and capitalist authoritarian state (Russia and China) contests that are waged through political warfare.

**Structure and international relations**

Realist theory explains the outcomes of international relations at the systemic level. International structures influence, shape and even determine the behavior of states that make up the international system. States have different amounts of power and how this power is distributed gives shape to the international system, be it bipolar, multipolar or unipolar, stable or unstable, with structural realists agreeing that the risk of miscalculation is greater in multipolar systems. Structural defensive realists argue that states seek balance and equilibrium.
because this best meets their security needs. Structural offensive realists suggest that hegemony and dominance (power maximization) is the more rational strategy. Power itself is a contested issue (the balance between quality and quantity, inputs and outputs debated), as is the notion of power shifts. Power is shifting from the Euro-Atlantic space to East and South Asia, from military to economic dimensions and from state to nonstate actors, as transnationalism and globalization processes abound. The risks of violent rear-end collisions in hegemonic power transition (the so-called Thucydides Trap) is apparent as China builds decision-making tables to change the rules of the game and the world order, and the U.S. is determined to maintain its hegemonic position.

After World War II, the Truman administration successfully created and led a rules-based liberal international order based on the values of freedom, the rule of law, human dignity, tolerance, pluralist institutions, and open and free trade. All subsequent U.S. presidents, whether Republican or Democrat, have followed this broadly bipartisan liberal internationalist tradition. *Pax Americana* was underpinned by U.S. global engagement through the exchange of ideas, peoples, trade and alliances. This Western-centered system was based on Wilsonian liberalism and multilateral institutions. It was supposed that in a predictable, interdependent, one-world system, shared strategic threats would create interest-based incentives and functional benefits that would drive global cooperation, with the U.S. as a European power (institutionalized through NATO) and indispensable partner.

The end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union lifted structural restraints on the U.S., which proceeded to push for the expansion of the U.S. liberal international order. President Bill Clinton embraced an enlargement and engagement doctrine, enlarging market-democratic states through NATO expansion and attempting to engage former adversaries (Russia and China), while maintaining a position of dominance to deter potential rivals and peer competitors. The Bush “freedom agenda” and Obama’s “global leadership” both sought to promote the expanding liberal world order in their own ways. Donald J. Trump’s electoral victory constituted the biggest surprise in two or three generations (perhaps since President Harry S. Truman’s victory in 1948). The Trump administration propounds anti-globalization and anti-immigration, questions the efficacy of multilateral institutions (European Union, NATO, World Trade Organization), and advances pro-economic nationalism and protectionism rather than liberal internationalist impulses, drawing a distinction between U.S. values and policies.

The role that structure plays within the political West must also be considered. Apocryphally, Henry Kissinger was said to ask, when U.S. national security advisor: “Who do I call if I want to speak to Europe?” Following the global financial crisis, the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, and then Brexit, and in the context of a rising economic and more militarily assertive China, any contemporary U.S. national security advisor has a clear answer: “Berlin, the chancellor’s office.” If the political West’s strategic center of gravity is the belief of elites and societies in democratic ideals (checks and balances, transparency, free and independent media, vibrant civil societies), functioning law-based institutions, diverse identities, and shared norms and values, then its operational center of gravity is the trans-Atlantic partnership between the U.S. and Germany — the Berlin-Washington axis.

President Trump has variously stated: “Germany is captive to Russia”; “NATO is obsolete”; “NATO is worse than NAFTA”; “the European Union is a foe”; and, “I called him [Putin] a competitor. And a good competitor he is. And I think the word ‘competitor’ is a compliment.” This rhetoric bolsters pre-existing beliefs held by Putin and his inner circle of strategic decision-makers and shapers that the West is naïve, riven with exploitable tensions and on the brink of implosion. From this perspective, a drift toward a post-Alliance and post-West era provides Russia the opportunity to exploit what it considers a process of U.S. burden-shedding and retrenchment. This understanding is, at best, partial. It fails to recognize why, how and to what ends the U.S. renovates its strategic posture. Under Trump, the U.S. is not isolationist. It seeks to re-engage globally through bilateral relationships rather than through multilateral institutions. As such, it relies on allies to uphold the balance of power in the Middle East and Europe, while seeking to lead a balancing coalition in the Asia-Pacific. According to Harvard University Professor Stephen M. Walt, “offshore balancing” is a rational choice for the U.S. Its regional allies become the first line of defense, the U.S. “passes the buck” and the allies pull their weight. President Trump is quoted in *The Atlantic* magazine as commenting to German Chancellor Angela Merkel: “And I said, ‘You know, Angela, I can’t guarantee it, but we’re protecting you, and it means a lot more to you than protecting us. Because I don’t know how much protection we get by protecting you.’”

From the foundations of NATO to the present day, NATO and Russia have remained in structural conflict.
Some observers state the issue of defense spending even more starkly. Historian and columnist Victor Davis Hanson writes in the *National Review* that “Germany’s combination of affluence and military stinginess is surreal. Germany has piled up the largest trade surplus in the world at around $300 billion, including a trade surplus of some $64 billion with its military benefactor, the United States, yet it is poorly equipped in terms of tanks and fighter aircraft.” While Germany’s defense spending was 1.1 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2013 and will be 1.5 percent in 2024 (moving from $34 billion to $62 billion), structural imbalances mitigate against the potential prospect of Russian hegemony in Europe. First, the EU has 560 million people and a $17 trillion economy, while Russia has only 146 million people and an economy that is less than $2 trillion. Second, combined European-NATO defense budgets are currently four times greater than Russia’s. Third, if by 2024 Germany does spend 2 percent of its GDP on defense, then its defense budget alone will surpass that of Russia.

In a commentary on The Strategist website, former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt argues that the U.S. overstates the notion of free riders and unequitable burden sharing by overstating its own leadership role and commitments within NATO and toward Europe. The U.S. military budget approximates to 72 percent of combined defense spending by all NATO member states, but half of that is directed toward maintaining the “U.S. presence in the Pacific, and another quarter is spent on operations in the Middle East, strategic nuclear command and control, and other areas,” Bildt writes. With regard to U.S. forces and facilities in Europe, most “are actually focused on the geostrategic arc from India to South Africa. With facilities such as Ramstein, Fairford, Rota, Vicenza and Sigonella, the U.S. has long used Europe as a staging ground for deploying forces elsewhere. And the early-warning and surveillance facilities that the U.S. maintains in the United Kingdom and Norway are there to defend the continental U.S., not Europe.” As a result, combined European defense spending on European security is twice that of the U.S.

Just as Russia and the West are in structural conflict, structural differences between Germany and the U.S. affect how these allies manage the confrontation with Russia. Looking at German and U.S. approaches toward Russia, we can see that Russia matters to both, though in different ways. U.S.-Russia relations are characterized as “thin” and globally focused. Unlike Germany, the U.S. is capable of strategic autocracy, is energy independent.
and its trade with Russia is one-tenth that of Europe’s. Though Ukraine and Russia constitute one of the few issues that garner bipartisan support, the North Korean nuclear crisis, the future of Iran in the Middle East following the U.S.’ withdrawal from the nuclear deal (the Joint Comprehensive Plan announced in May 2018), and coping with China’s rise are higher priorities than Russia for the Trump administration. In essence, the structural constraint at the heart of the U.S.-Russia relationship is a simply stated reality: Russia is too weak for the U.S. to recognize it as an equal; Russia is too strong to be willing or able to accept unequal tactical ally status.

By contrast, Germany-Russia relations are “thick” and regionally focused. Beyond the deep historical and cultural ties, Germany imports 30-35 percent of its oil and gas from Russia and has a strong and extensive business relationship. Germany does not have the luxury of foregoing cooperative relations with Moscow, given its geopolitical proximity. In Germany, Russia is perceived as a threat to the European order but not to Germany per se (German plans exist for the defense of Europe, but not Germany itself). In the U.S., Russia is considered an irritant, a great regional power relevant to U.S. policymaking in the Asia-Pacific, the Middle East and North Africa, but not one of its top five global priorities, nor a central organizing principle. NATO, meanwhile, assumes a 360-degree perspective regarding Russia. The U.S. is much more insulated than Germany from problems Russia can initiate and exploit. Moreover, the perception in Germany that the current U.S. administration constitutes a greater challenge to the liberal order than Russia is recognition that the U.S. is the guardian and backbone of the system.

While there are limits to how far any German policy can go in terms of punishing or isolating Russia, President Trump is constrained in forging a more cooperative Russian policy by Congressional sanctions, a national security team that views Russia as a short-term threat, and adversarial and ongoing investigations of campaign collusion with Russian security services. Thus, because of — rather than despite — some differences in their approaches to foreign and security policy, national interests and priorities, a strong U.S.-German political-military relationship is the critical building bloc of Western cohesion. In other words, where Germany and the U.S. agree, NATO follows, the EU adapts, and the “political West” is sustained and strengthened; where they diverge, transatlantic relations are strained, and dissonance has the potential to become a divorce.

**Structural factors and Russia’s strategic intent**

As it takes two to tango, let us turn from NATO to Russia and examine the role of structural ideational factors in shaping Russian attitudes toward NATO. Structuralists view outcomes as products of a range of macro-level, long-term factors that are difficult for individuals to change. These factors include dominant ideas and cultural traits, economic development and resource endowment, and legacies of the past, such as, in the case of Russian patronal politics, sistema, a sense of exceptionalism, mission and even messianic beliefs. These structural factors influence the “bandwidths,” parameters and operating environment within which individuals in leadership positions make decisions. Legacies of the past shape the experiences and background of Russia’s leaders, the institutions they work within and the strategies they formulate. While Russia’s leadership can instrumentalize Russia’s “glorious past” to justify policy choices and preferences, consciously or not these same leaders are shaped by phobias, foundational myths, perceived vulnerabilities, and other elements of a strategic psychology and strategic culture. Structural factors are thus critical to explaining Russian antipathy to NATO.

When examining the ideational context, three interlocking interenabling discourses that draw on the lessons of Russian history grow stronger through time: a return to Great Power status; a well-founded fear of instability; and an understanding that respect is generated, ultimately, through fear. These lessons have been attributed to a number of factors, not least the role of geography, the development of the Russian economy, the role of the elite, the emergence and consolidation of a service state, and a strong leader defending a besieged fortress against external adversaries intent on the destruction of the Russian people and their sacred beliefs and inalienable values.

The first lesson of Russian history is that Russia was, and shall always be a Great Power. Contemporary national security decision-makers argue a rules-based balance of power system — exemplified by the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and the Yalta and Potsdam conferences in 1945 — brought stability because Russia saved Europe from itself. From the very beginning, the Russian elites and population considered Great Power status and equality with other Great Powers to be a source of stability, pride and dignity. A belief that respect is derived, ultimately, from the fear of Russian military might and an understanding that Russia’s ability to enter into zero-sum negative-sum games and win was profound. Russia’s higher pain threshold was predicated on the ability of its people to suffer and endure, and this acted as a deterrence against encroachment on its statehood. It followed then that no one and nothing would constrain Moscow within its borders and across its external sphere of influence.

The second lesson of Russian history is that Russia can transition from stability to collapse, disorder and...
anarchy extremely quickly, that the sources of instability are multiple and that when Russia is weak, external actors take advantage. Following the October 1917 Russian Revolution, the Russian Civil War witnessed “Whites” versus “Reds,” with an Anglo-American expeditionary force landing in Archangel while Japanese, Chinese and U.S. military contingents occupied the Maritime Provinces in the Russian Far East. The lesson was clear: internal weakness encouraged external intervention. During the Cold War, Soviet leadership firmly understood that the U.S. sought to destroy the Soviet Union and that the Dulles’ Plan would achieve this end (Allen Dulles was head of the CIA). According to this conspiracy theory, the U.S. would subvert and influence a “fifth column” within the Soviet Union to undermine Soviet values and morals, and ultimately betray the majority.

At the end of the Cold War, while serving in Dresden between 1985 and 1990 as a counterintelligence officer in the KGB’s Chief Second Directorate, Putin witnessed the speed at which order in the German Democratic Republic descended into chaos, as the seemingly most stable and Stalinist of the Soviet satellites crumbled and fell in 1989.

In the Putinite mindset, encroachment upon Russia has taken many forms, including an ideational contest in which the West would instrumentalize its political system to undermine, weaken and ultimately control Russia. According to this perspective, democracy, the rule of law and human rights are contemporary tools of Western power that Russia should resist. NATO is the hard-power backstop of soft-power tools designed to enable a post-modern color revolutions-type coup d’état. Thus, if Russia accepts Western constraints, limits and control, then Russia becomes, in Putin’s words, a “colonial democracy.”

The third lesson in Russian history is that respect for Russian Great Power status ensures stability and respect is ultimately generated through a healthy regard, even fear, of Russian power. In the late imperial period, Russia’s only two allies may have been its “army and its fleet,” in the words of Czar Alexander III. Today, Russian power is ultimately predicated on maintaining an independent nuclear triad and modernized conventional forces. If we condense or distill the essence of Putin’s key speeches in which he articulates a world view — Munich (February 2007), Bucharest NATO summit (April 2008), Federal Assembly Address (March 2014) and U.N. General Assembly Address (September 2015) — into one key message, then we find a plaintive Putin repeatedly asking the same classical Russian question: “Do you respect me?” Putin’s passionate cri de coeur (“Listen to us now!”) at his address to the Federal Assembly on March 1, 2018, when he unveiled five new hypersonic weapons systems which purportedly could destroy the U.S., in effect advanced the proposition: “Love me or I will punch you in the face.” Indeed, Russia’s most successful export commodity is not hydrocarbon energy, but fear. Russia’s weeklong Vostok exercise in September 2018, combining 300,000 soldiers, 36,000 tanks and other vehicles, and 1,000 aircraft, appeared to be a vast, elaborate psychological operation, laden with theater, symbolism, deception, coercion and compellence, with Russia messaging China as much as the U.S. Russia is not afraid that neighbors are afraid of Russia, but rather Russia fears that its neighbors do not fear Russia’s abstract collective military might.

Russia views the world in terms of realpolitik, balance of power and zero-sum thinking, exhibiting a military-first approach and opposing the more cost effective, legitimate and sustainable rules-based liberal order.

**Conclusions**

The evolution of Russia-NATO relations will provide an indirect test for the sustainability and appeal of political-military systems over the next decade. In
1990, capitalist authoritarian systems accounted for 12 percent of all regime types; by 2018, it was 33 percent. Can liberal values and institutions, civil rights and political freedoms continue to provide for economic development, high standards of living, security and national prestige? Might capitalist authoritarian systems provide an alternative path to economic modernity, national interest and prestige? In the past 20 years, 15 of the 20 fastest-growing countries have been autocratic regimes. Two-thirds of the fastest-growing economies by per capita income are nondemocracies, Roberto Stefan Foa, a political science lecturer at the University of Melbourne, writes in a 2018 article in the *Journal of Democracy*. Are capitalist authoritarian states strong and capable of delivering political stability and order? Can they manage investments in public goods and infrastructure? Or are such regimes felled by authoritarian decay and caught in a “modernization trap”? The answers to these fundamental questions will determine the structure of the international system and shape the relevance and role of NATO in the future.

An enduring and effective trans-Atlantic security relationship delivers over time net benefits to all members. Clearly, if states share common economic and security interests — this can include a shared threat perception, assessment and approach against an adversary, and the political will to finance, build and use the tools to that end — and elites and societies share values, such as the rule of law and respect for democratic procedures, then it follows that there is greater political will to think and act strategically. Shared values and interests have a trust-building and mediation role, allowing for negotiated give-and-take solutions or management of differences, and for costs and benefits to even out over time. Do the NATO allies share a strategic vision about the common future of the political West and the role of NATO as the leading transatlantic institution? NATO needs to create a narrative — tell a rational story to our publics — as to what NATO is and why the Alliance has utility. Given the sharpest tool in NATO’s defense-security toolbox is a credible public commitment to its values, opinion leaders must make the case that market-democratic states deliver peace, stability, prosperity, liberty, and the rule of law, and can protect societies under attack. Part of the narrative should stress that Germany is the U.S.’ most important bilateral relationship, each state protects the other, and that the 70-year relationship has a long-term and enduring future. 

Members of a Russian history club in St. Petersburg move a World War II gun during a military show in 2018 dedicated to the deadly Nazi siege of Leningrad, the Soviet-era name of St. Petersburg. Russia projects its willingness to suffer great losses as a deterrent against encroachment on its statehood. THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
OF STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE

Cooperation and confrontation on the Black Sea

By Natia Gvenetadze, Ministry of Defence, Republic of Georgia
Recent developments in the international system have increased the complexities of global security structures, not least of which is the resurgence of Russia as an ambitious regional and global power. When Russia demonstrated a capacity to launch proxy operations across its near abroad, NATO and Western-aligned countries in the region proved incapable of consolidating and exhibiting an effective counterstrategy. In 2014, then-NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen characterized Russian military aggression as “the most serious crisis in Europe since the fall of the Berlin Wall” and declared that NATO “can no longer do business as usual with Russia.”

Russia’s efforts to restore its pre-Cold War, Soviet-style regional supremacy include a number of hybrid operations in the Baltics, Eastern Europe and, most recently, in the Black Sea region and Eurasia. Russia is mainly focusing on soft power to challenge the West without crossing red lines. Many experts agree that Russian policy is driven by its desire to restore its “great power” status. The annexation of Crimea, following Russia’s 2004 invasion of Georgia, is an indicator of the Kremlin’s evolving military strategy in the Black Sea region.

Any discussion of the new Russian Black Sea agenda must touch on its historical aspects. The Black Sea was referred to as a “Soviet lake” during the Cold War. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Black Sea region became less geostrategically significant for the West, according to Boris Toucas of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “but it remained instrumental in shaping Russia’s concept of its ‘near abroad.’” Russia lost its most important geopolitical and trade corridors in the region. Black Sea ports had given the Soviet Navy a regional stronghold to control trade routes for goods and energy, and to influence the littoral states, Gunnar Åselius explains in The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Navy in the Baltic 1921-1940.

After the Cold War, the region was relatively stable in the new unipolar world absent a strong Russia with “great power” ambitions. Today, however, as BBC News’ Jonathan Marcus said, Russia “is back with a vengeance, eager to consolidate its position nearer home; to restore something of its former global role and to make up for perceived slights perpetrated by the West.” The Black Sea region is once again in the spotlight of a new balance-of-power struggle between Russia and the West.

Regional significance

In classical geopolitical terms, the Black Sea region is considered fundamental to Euro-Asian stability and security due to its geostrategic importance as an intersection of east-west and south-north corridors. The region’s geographical location has always placed it in the spotlight of great-power interests, which is probably one of the main factors constraining progressive integration and practical cooperation there.

The region has a complex array of existing reactive and frozen conflicts. The conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria have been innate to the region since the Soviet collapse and the re-emergence of newly independent states. The escalation of some of these existing conflicts has been aggravated by the initiation of new ones in Ukraine, in the Crimea and the Donbass. The region’s unresolved conflicts not only hamper opportunities for cooperation and partnership among regional actors, but they also stimulate further destabilization and negatively affect the region’s security environment.

Theoretically, the Black Sea region is geographically important for the cross-regional trade and transit of goods and energy resources. Practically, it is a playground of power politics. For this reason, its significance is often discussed with reference to the interests of major regional and international powers such as Russia, the United States, NATO and Turkey.
Three interdependent dimensions define the region’s significance: security, trade and energy transit routes. The region’s importance as a trade and transit corridor greatly enhances the strategic security interests of regional and global powers. With its proximity to gas and oil in Russia and the Caspian Sea, the Black Sea region is a significant global transit zone for current and planned oil and gas pipeline routes connecting Europe, Russia, Central Asia and the Middle East.

Europe, which is largely dependent on gas and oil transiting this region, is looking for ways to diversify its energy imports to secure them from an unpredictable Russia. One of these is the Southern Gas Corridor, which is designed to diversify the European Union’s natural gas imports. However, the Black Sea region could also host alternate delivery routes for Russian-supplied energy.

The Black Sea has also become a logistical center for Russia’s naval operations in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. By annexing Crimea, Russia has increased its status as a maritime power. Russia plans to modernize its fleet and construct new bases, and seeks to improve its military advantages in the region. Janusz Bugajski and Peter B. Doran of the Center for European Policy Analysis point out in a 2017 paper: “Its Black Sea fleet is positioned to deny military access to the Caucasus and Ukraine. The integration of Crimea provides Russia with an additional coastline of several hundred kilometers, together with the crucial Black Sea port of Sevastopol.” This is in addition to the 220 kilometers of Black Sea coastline Abkhazia provides Russia.

However, the Turkish Navy is still the most powerful in the region. Turkey maintains a leading role in the Black Sea security framework, where it actively supports its policy of preventing external powers from dominating the region. Turkey has traditionally controlled the Bosphorus Strait, a privilege granted by the Montreux Convention, although considering Russia’s aggressive politics and considerable military advantage, it will be difficult for Turkey to continue its traditional policy toward the Black Sea. Turkey will need to find a balance in its cooperation with Russia and NATO relative to Black Sea security. Russia’s current upgrading of its Black Sea fleet and desire to dominate the region complicates the situation.

**Russia’s regional interests**

Russia sees the Black Sea region as vital to its national security and its trade and transit of energy. Russia’s economy relies heavily on being an energy provider, making it important to control pipeline routes.

Russia has always been the biggest regional power in both economic and military terms. “Russia still views security in terms of geography and realpolitik,“ Oksana Antonenko and Bastian Giergerich explain in their article in *Survival*, and regards neighboring countries to its west as crucial to its security. Although, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, countries gained their independence and started to build their own domestic and foreign policies, Russia still is far from accepting this as a reality and “considers the region to be a sphere of its exclusive influence or, as former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has put it, Russia’s ‘zone of privileged interest,’” Tracey German writes in a 2014 paper for the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s strategic ambition is to restore Russia’s international power and limit NATO’s influence. Toucas points out that the main theme reflected in Russia’s national security strategy of 2015 and its military doctrine of 2014 is “the Kremlin’s overarching obsession with fragmentation and subversion, especially in the Black Sea and Caucasus regions.” This reflects the fact that “the Russian military elite see regaining Crimea as momentous in restoring strategic competences,” according to a 2015 Chatham House paper.

Putin has referred to Russia’s resurgence as “restoring historical justice.” Aware that it failed to contain NATO’s enlargement into Romania and Bulgaria, Russia sought every opportunity to prevent further expansion of the Alliance to its immediate borders. Therefore, Russia’s aggressive policy in the Black Sea region is intended to diminish NATO’s role there. The heavy militarization of the region, supposedly for preservation, enhancement and advancement of these embedded Russian interests, has been the most significant aspect of Russia’s regional activities. According to Bugajski and Doran: “The purpose of this modernization is to build a combined arms force that can deny access by NATO to the Black Sea and project power outward and threaten U.S. and NATO interests in the Mediterranean and Middle East.”

**NATO’s Black Sea interests**

NATO’s modern engagement in the Black Sea dates to the period after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Because of its distinct geographic location, the region acquired an important role for the West in addressing emerging security challenges and fighting the global war on terror. NATO member states, therefore, realized that they “require unfettered access to the Black Sea region for ensuring security in the Balkans and Middle East. The region is critical for NATO’s communication and access to Afghanistan for managing the postwar transition. Securing the regional energy infrastructure through the Black Sea region is vital for meeting Europe’s energy needs,” writes Sharyl Cross in the journal *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*.

In terms of security, “NATO’s strategy in the Black Sea region is guided not only by the rivalry with Russia but also by terrorism, proliferation and energy concerns,” Nadia Alexandrova-Arbatova writes in her contribution to *The Wider Black Sea Region in the 21st Century: Strategic, Economic and Energy Perspectives*. At its 2016 Warsaw summit, the Alliance recognized the strategic importance of the Black Sea and the need to enhance cooperation among members and partners. Also, recognizing that current developments in the region bring serious challenges to NATO credibility, Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg acknowledged the possibility of increasing Alliance military capabilities in the region.
Russia and NATO

Historically, the NATO-Russia relationship has been described as one of “problems, mistrust and misperceptions; the relationship could hardly be characterized as a true partnership,” according to Antonenko and Giegerich. Russia views NATO as an anti-Russian organization that remains a threat to its security, despite the clear statement in NATO’s founding document that the Alliance is defensive and not directed against anyone. Russian policymakers also view NATO as an instrument of U.S. policy in both Europe and Eurasia.

What appears to be real about NATO-Russia relations in the Black Sea region is that red lines have been crossed for both sides. The Russian president declared as long ago as 2008 that: “We view the appearance of a powerful military bloc on our borders … as a direct threat to the security of our country.” On the other hand, then-NATO Deputy Secretary-General Alexander Vershbow characterized Russian activities this way in 2015: “To the East, Russia has torn up the international rule book. It has returned to a strategy of power politics. It threatens not just Ukraine, but European and global security more generally. … Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is not an isolated incident, but a game changer in European security.”

It is widely believed today that the balance of power in the Black Sea region is changing in Russia’s favor. Russia well understands the importance of the Black Sea for the projection of its interests and is using an aggressive approach to become the dominant actor in the region. Russia sees NATO’s expansion as a threat to its national security and will do anything to block NATO from becoming dominant in the region. However, NATO is already present, considering that three littoral states are Alliance members. Russia’s considerable military superiority in the region and its aggressive policy are alarming to NATO and are seen as a challenge to Euro-Atlantic security as a whole.

The final communiqué of the NATO Warsaw summit highlighted the importance of the Black Sea region: “We face evolving challenges in the Baltic and Black Sea regions. … Russia continues to strengthen its military posture, increase its military activities, deploy new high-end capabilities, and challenge regional security. These developments have resulted in increased unpredictability that could be mitigated through reciprocal transparency and risk reduction measures.” Validating this assessment, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe Gen. Philip Breedlove warned in 2014 that Russia’s militarization of the Crimean Peninsula would have an effect on most of the Black Sea.
A fever for recreating a buffer zone on its western borders has pervaded Russian leadership for a long time. “It started with the trauma of the fragmentation of the Soviet Union, the voluntary demise of which Vladimir Putin later called ‘the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century,’” Toucas says. By invading Ukraine, Russia shattered the belief that war was inconceivable. Russia has succeeded in transforming the West’s restrained reaction to its violations of the fundamental principles of European security into a strategic advantage and continues to aggressively pursue its interests in the region. In November 2018, Russian ships seized Ukrainian naval ships and sailors on the Black Sea in defiance of established maritime law.

Conclusion
Although long neglected, the Black Sea region is now experiencing strategic competition among multiple actors with conflicting interests. But there is no comprehensive strategy to counter Russia’s aggressive policy in the region. “The geopolitical ‘grand chessboard’ in the Black Sea area is being reordered, with the Euro-Atlantic community on the one side and Russia on the other seeking to reconfigure their overlapping spheres of influence in the aftermath of the Crimean crisis,” European security blogger Raluca Csernatoni writes. From a practical point of view, the crisis in Crimea “illustrates the limit of the European attractiveness as well as the retrenchment of U.S. influence from the Black Sea area,” according to Igor Delanoe in Atlantic Voices.

When Turkey, NATO and other littoral states understand that “control over the Black Sea lies at the core of revisionist ambitions to restore Russia’s international power and to reverse the changes of the post-Cold War era,” they shall then find feasible solutions that can address their common concerns, Bugajski and Doran believe. An effective regional cooperation platform is currently lacking and, given this limited cooperation, the Black Sea region is unlikely to become stable soon. This does not serve the interests of any of the regional states except possibly Russia. Before its Warsaw summit, “NATO did not hold a proactive strategic vision in terms of its role in shaping the security environment in the Black Sea,” Christopher S. Chivvis, Andriy Shevchenko, Eka Tkeshelashvili and Gor Munteanu write in a 2016 article for the German Marshall Fund of the United States. In the absence of full NATO engagement, Russia will shape the future of the region.

How the West, and specifically NATO, reacts to Russia will also determine Russia’s future course of action. However, the current Western and regional response to Russia’s revisionist adventures in the region is insufficient. In light of heavy Russian militarization, the space for cooperation between the Western bloc and Russia in the Black Sea region is narrowing. Absent a decisive move by NATO and its regional allies, Russia can be expected to further pursue its policy of intrusion and to effectively diminish Western influence in the region. The picture remains undefined, but the Black Sea region may become the epicenter of a NATO-Russia rift.
Policy recommendations:

- **Intensify NATO’s presence in the region.** The Alliance should be more engaged in the Black Sea region to enhance security. It should intensively conduct joint training, exercises and operations. NATO should reassure aspiring members that its “open door” policy is still relevant and cannot effectively be vetoed by outside powers. It is imperative for the Alliance to design an action plan as soon as possible to promote a more active engagement with NATO partner countries that ensures security in the region. NATO should be present and ready to engage.

- **Promote regional cooperation and enhance regional cohesion.** The Black Sea region today lacks a comprehensive regional structure. Despite being under the umbrella of one entity, the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, countries belong to different blocs and have different approaches. Due to their differences, the focus of regional states has been directed more outside than inside the region. There is also a lack of regional cooperation, and countries do not and cannot identify themselves as a single regional bloc. The interlinked and overlapping conflicts of big powers have practically shattered regional integration. Therefore, the region needs to identify mutually beneficial interests and create a format of cooperation to advance those interests.

- **Develop a comprehensive maritime security strategy.** NATO has yet to develop a comprehensive maritime security strategy for the region, despite recognizing the importance of maintaining maritime security in the Black Sea. A common security agenda is required to address common security challenges, to include a common security-threat assessment, with clearly set objectives and courses of actions to be implemented when needed.

- **Develop the capabilities of the Black Sea countries.** NATO’s eastern members are too weak to counter Russia’s military. Neither do they possess sufficient capabilities to address Russia’s assertiveness. The littoral states and leading NATO members must increase their defense spending, modernize their armed forces and naval capabilities, and cooperate more intensively to emplace effective deterrents and defenses. At the Warsaw summit, the allies also agreed that the enhancement of partner countries’ defense capabilities is within NATO’s interests and directly serves to strengthen Euro-Atlantic security.

- **Promote NATO-Russia dialogue.** As discussed, the security challenges in the Black Sea region impact not only the region, but also the West. Therefore, dialogue between the West and Russia is imperative to avoid further escalation of the conflicts within the region and damage to the wider security architecture. Both NATO and Russia need to find ways to stabilize the regional environment and cooperate in terms of maritime security.

The Novorossiysk Fuel Oil Terminal at Russia’s Black Sea port is part of a major energy transit corridor. Reuters

The Russian navy landing ship Nikolai Filchenkov sails through the Bosphorus strait in Istanbul, Turkey, on its way to the Mediterranean Sea in August 2018. Reuters

The Russian navy landing ship Nikolai Filchenkov sails through the Bosphorus strait in Istanbul, Turkey, on its way to the Mediterranean Sea in August 2018. Reuters

QUESTION: When talking about your legacy in Europe, the freedom of movement — the creation of a military Schengen zone — the infrastructure for mobility is at the core. How and in what way do these elements boost the deterrence architecture? Where is the Alliance in this effort of building this freedom of movement space?

ANSWER: An aspect that gives me a lot of confidence is the fact that the EU (European Union) is taking on this military mobility as one of its main projects under PESCO (the Permanent Structured Cooperation). The EU has the resources to improve infrastructure, it has the authorities and political mechanisms necessary to help improve the cross-border permissions. That is encouraging. Another aspect that makes me optimistic is that both NATO and the EU recognized the importance of this, and they are collaborating on improving it. Several countries have worked very hard, particularly Poland and the Baltic countries, to reduce the amount of time required to get permissions to cross borders.

The problems are related to the capacity and capability of the infrastructure. There is not enough rail to move large numbers of NATO forces quickly. I am still not confident that we have a process in place where, in a pre-crisis situation, there is enough or that sufficient rail cars will be made available in enough quantity to move fast enough to prevent a crisis from happening. Secondly, the bridges and the highways network, particularly in Eastern Europe, must be strengthened and improved to allow quicker ground movement.

Q: Why is this infrastructure of mobility important from a deterrence perspective?
A: We need to think how fast the Russians are moving. We must be able to move as fast as or faster than they do so that they do not make the mistake of thinking that they could launch an attack of some sort in an area before we could respond. That is why speed is so important to quickly move large formations and a lot of equipment. It is not practical to have troops all along the frontier. It would also appear to be provocative. So, you must assume that NATO countries, including the United States, are going to have normal peacetime trainings and rotations. Any crisis is going to require us to be able to move quickly from the training areas or from the deterrence status in Poland or Romania. It is like during the Cold War. Most of the troops were not on the border, but several hours away in garrisons. You’ve got to practice two types of movements: from the U.S., Canada, United Kingdom, Spain and Norway, as well as troops that are already in Germany, Poland, Romania and the Baltic states. That is why speed is so important. If the Russians can see that we don’t have the ability to move a lot of equipment and people quickly, I think that increases the risk of them making a terrible mistake, and then we have a different situation. That is why I am emphasizing speed. To have speed, you have to be able to move. That is rail, highways, airports and seaports. To get into Romania, although we already have about 1,000 U.S. soldiers there and Black Sea air policing, reinforcements have to come from the North and the West over the Carpathian Mountains. If we do not have highways that allow heavy equipment to move over the Carpathians quickly and enough rail to move heavy equipment quickly, then I think our deterrence capability in Romania and Bulgaria is not as good as it can be.

Q: The Wales and Warsaw summits were essential for setting up the adaptation of NATO to the post-Crimean security environment in Europe. What unfinished business do we still need to contemplate for developing an effective deterrence architecture on the Eastern Flank? From a Bucharest-Black Sea perspective, what we see is a massively imbalanced Eastern Flank with a center of gravity focused on the Baltic ecosystem.

A: The Alliance has done very well adjusting very quickly to this new security environment. The Wales summit was just four years ago and the Warsaw summit two years ago. We’ve seen significant changes in the structures, commitments and in the processes of NATO. This is the reason why NATO has been the most successful alliance in the history of the world. It is not only about its commitment to collective defense over so many decades, but also about the ability to adapt.

Having said that, I do believe that NATO needs to think of the Black Sea as a security region, not as a body of water surrounded by different countries. We need to think about the Black Sea in a regional way, recognizing that the Russians are using the Black Sea as a power projection base into the Middle East and Mediterranean. We must recognize that we have allies and very close friends (Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova) that are constantly under pressure from Russia. The Alliance needs to encourage collaboration between the member countries and the partner countries to share intelligence, to do more maritime exercises, to improve missile defense in the region, and more exercises where we move across the Black Sea into Georgia or Turkey to make sure we have freedom of movement in the Black Sea and on the ground around it. The Black Sea region is just as important as the Baltic Sea. We’ve done a lot in the Baltic region. I believe the Black Sea region is going to be the key area where Russia will challenge the Alliance over the next 10-15 years, and we’ve got to ensure credible deterrence there as well as provide support for our partners in the region.

It might be even more important when you think about what the Black Sea means to the Russians and how they use it to exploit their capabilities and the trouble they are causing in Syria, the pressure they are putting on Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova. The Russians have not lived up to what they are saying they would do in the Minsk process and don’t show any indication of cooperating in Ukraine — so we need to think about what does that mean for Crimea? Does the West and the world recognize territorial boundaries, territorial waters for Russia because of Crimea? We need to be unified on this to make sure that no one takes the eye off the ball in the Black Sea because...
of the illegal annexation of Crimea and the implications for the Black Sea — on the water and what is below the water. Of course, there is another angle involved — what are the implications for the Danube River; the fact that there are so many allies as well as partners through which the Danube River passes, and that Russia is now closer to the mouth of the Danube.

The other unfinished business is air and missile defense. I think we must figure out how to encourage Germany and the Netherlands to take more responsibility with missile defense and short-range air defense because of all the unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) the Russians can put in the air. So, you need that integrated, layered air and missile defense. We need to improve the protection of our allies in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. We need to improve protection for European citizens who would be within range of the missiles coming out of Kaliningrad — to include northern Germany, Denmark, Poland, Norway, Finland and Sweden. I think NATO needs a large exercise focused on air and missile defense every year that would enable us to practice coordination and the ability to integrate different kinds of systems into the appropriate levels of command. Germany hosts several cities and facilities (Hamburg, Nuremberg, Ramstein) necessary for rapid reinforcement and transportation that would be within range of the Russian missiles. All these places could be targets. You must protect the facilities that are necessary — seaports and airports and major rail. I do not believe the Russians would ever intend to invade to control territory in Germany. I don’t think that is their interest. What they can do is go into the Baltic states, Poland and Romania to challenge the Alliance and try to demonstrate the Alliance cannot protect its members. That means a short, limited, quick attack — not something that would have been expected back in the ‘80s. Territorial defense, land defense is probably not the priority west of Poland.

Q: On the Eastern Flank, one of the original sins of NATO enlargement in the 1990s was the decision not to deploy on a permanent basis significant allied forces on the territory of new members. Such a decision was taken in a very different operational security environment, a highly permissive one from a political point of view as well as from a military point of view. Now we see revisionist behavior and military capabilities that are challenging the very essence of how NATO used to reinforce and deter. Has the time come to fix, adjust NATO’s Eastern posture on a permanent basis? Do you see a political consensus on this topic in the U.S. and older Europe?

A: First, maintaining the cohesion of the Alliance is the most important thing. We’ve got to maintain that. A decision to permanently station troops in Lithuania, Poland or Romania with families and two- to three-year tours like in Germany should only be made in consultation and with the agreement of all the allies. If the Alliance decides that is helpful and effective in the same way that the Alliance agreed with the deployment of the enhanced forward presence (EFP) battle groups, then I would be more supportive. Poland is a great, reliable and strong ally, and they’ve done so much to contribute to burden sharing. Their offer to host U.S. forces in permanent basing is an example of that. So, I’m not against permanent basing per se … but I am against doing it as a bilateral action between the U.S. and Poland, without the support of the rest of our allies, because I am concerned it would add friction and discord within the Alliance. The problem is that some allies think that such a move provokes Russia unnecessarily or raises the risk of a crisis and they see it as a mistake on our part. The move could also create additional friction with allies who are already at odds with each other. Russia will react, without a doubt, and all our allies will have to deal with the consequences, so they should be consulted in this. The EFP was so successful because it had the support of all 29 nations. I think permanent basing, with the support of all 29 nations, would therefore be successful. Meanwhile, if Eastern Europe wants to enhance NATO’s deterrent effect, a potentially divisive military presence is not the right way to do it. It’s far better to protect the cohesion of the Alliance, while ensuring that trained and ready forces are ready to move in if necessary.

To have permanently stationed troops in Europe, the U.S. Army would have to grow significantly, and I don’t see that happening. I think we can achieve the strategic effect we need to achieve with rotational forces that include the EFP posture, air policing, the multinational exercises. The U.S. has a continuous presence of rotational troops in Bulgaria, Romania and Poland and has small numbers in Latvia and Lithuania. I would like to see an increase in the infrastructure for logistics from the U.S. side in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania that would help us with rapid reinforcement and with the strategic effect of having Americans continuously in all three Baltic countries. We could also pre-position ammunition and fuel, those things necessary to enhance speed. I like the idea of having mobile, short-range air defense units deployed in all three Baltic countries as some sort of mobile tripwire. This would make it more difficult for Russia to attempt a strike. In addition, we need to continue practicing the movement of Patriot surface-to-air missiles around different countries as we did in the last couple of years. Finally, I think we need to make the conversion from air policing to air defense.
Q: From a problem definition point of view, the fundamental challenge the latest National Defense Strategy identifies is the eroding U.S. military advantage with regard to China and Russia that undermines what is called the American way of war. What are, from a European theater perspective, the key ingredients developed by the other side designed to offset the American way of war?

A: First, the American way of war relies on allies and coalitions. Foremost, our capability and strength really come in part from this wonderful alliance, from the fact of always having partners that go with us and bring additional capabilities. That is very important. In this context, Russia and China both are constantly looking for ways of splitting that cohesion with disinformation, with cyber, trade — with finding ways of creating friction, tension and distrust inside the Alliance and the EU.

Another aspect of the American way of war is that we have always relied so much on air power and sea power. Russia and China have developed significant A2/AD (anti-access/area denial) capabilities that would limit, at least for a period, our ability to fully employ all our air and sea power potential. They’ve developed military capabilities, systems and doctrines aimed at undermining the American way of projecting power to defend U.S. allies’ interests. Credible air defense layers and anti-ship missiles are part of their asymmetric approach in countering the American way of war.

Thirdly, at the tactical level, the Russians have worked very hard making improvements in their electronic warfare (EW) and UAV capabilities. As an alliance, we must be prepared to operate in an environment that is very competitive in terms of cyber and EW threats.

Q: The latest National Security Strategy emphasizes that the key feature of the operational environment is the era of great power (multi-domain) competitions. Has the U.S. government developed the right whole-of-government machinery at the theater level to compete across political, economic and military arenas? What about NATO?

A: I think the improving collaboration between NATO and the EU is an important part of that. One is a security alliance, the other one is a political/economic institution. So, you must have collaboration there to really be able to project a whole-of-government approach, including information, diplomacy and economic tools. Inside the U.S., it has to start at the top. There are a lot of smart people who understand that, certainly in the U.S. Department of Defense. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis and his staff understand it and all the combatant commanders know this. Frankly, I think that the Department of State does not get enough resources to do its job, and that undermines our effort. The Department of State has got to be better resourced to accomplish its tasks. This is an area where there is a wide margin for improvement.

Q: How would you characterize the Russian way of war in Europe — the objectives of the Russian disruptive strategy?

A: Russia’s strategic objective is to be seen as the great power in Europe. To do that, they have to undermine, disrupt, divide, make irrelevant the Alliance and undermine the EU. The way they do that with the EU is using energy resources as leverage. The Nord Stream 2 pipeline is causing a lot of tension and friction inside EU member countries, and Russia knows this. A fully operational Nord Stream 2 would give Russia much more influence inside European countries. This type of pressure is part of their way of war. I don’t think Russia thinks of themselves as at war or not at war. They are constantly in confrontation mode — sometimes it is kinetic with the military, sometimes it is economic or informational. All these things in combination are how they do this. They don’t need the capability to conquer. To undermine the Alliance, they just need to successfully take part of an allied country. They still believe they are entitled to buffers, to a sphere of influence — Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova are examples. This is accomplished by making sure these countries cannot join the EU or NATO, or by putting an A2/AD bubble near them — in this way they can influence. All these elements are part of Russia’s way of war.

We have just to think together, continue adapting and build a strong deterrence.

Q: What should be some of the crucial elements of a potential area-access strategy to preserve NATO’s access to the frontline allies?

A: The Alliance is going in this direction. There is a word I keep hearing: coherence. The adaptation initiative that is coming out, including the establishment of a

“Russia’s strategic objective is to be seen as the great power in Europe. To do that, they have to undermine, disrupt, divide, make irrelevant the Alliance and undermine the EU.”

Fighter jets and a helicopter sit on the deck of China’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, as it sails into Hong Kong. China is integrating stealth fighters into its air force and developing an array of missiles able to attack air and sea targets at great distances. THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
“The Alliance is going in this direction. There is a word I keep hearing: coherence. The adaptation initiative that is coming out, including the establishment of a Joint Sustainment and Enabling Command that would be based in Germany that is not only for the reinforcement of Lithuania, but for the entire Alliance.”
Joint Sustainment and Enabling Command that would be based in Germany that is not only for the reinforcement of Lithuania, but for the entire Alliance. I think, overall, the Alliance is looking to be more coherent in all of its planning, capabilities and adaptation initiatives. What stitches all of this together is infrastructure — rail, highways, pipelines, fiber networks that allow fuel, communications and movement. What we need is a framework of infrastructure that provides the Alliance the ability to move quickly, provide logistics anywhere needed. Napoleon had a series of magazines, depositions along the realms that he would take during his campaigns. In that way he always had ammunition and equipment in places around Europe that would enable him to maneuver. We need a modern version with a vibrant network, fuel pipelines, improved rail and highways, seaports and airfields that would allow us to do this. This network is vital for an area-access strategy. I think that to encourage this, countries should get credit toward their 2 percent (gross domestic product NATO contribution) if they build or improve infrastructure that has real military value, even if it serves a dual use. A pipeline could carry commercial and military fuel. Countries seeking business and commerce could all benefit from improved dual-use rail, roads and bridges. To encourage a country like Germany to do this, it should count toward the 2 percent.

**Q: What is your main takeaway from the latest NATO summit in Brussels? What remains to be done?**

**A: **There was real substance achieved and delivered leading up to and during the summit. The command adaptation with the two new commands, the 4X30, the continued improvement of cooperation between NATO and the European Union, the continued emphasis on military mobility, the recognition that Georgia is closer to membership. Despite the nearly complete public focus on the issue of 2 percent and burden sharing, at the end of the day we still had a commitment by the allies to continue investing in security as well as several other tangible accomplishments. This shows the resilience and adaptability of the Alliance and why it will remain the most successful alliance ever.

I think people should start thinking about burden sharing in a more sophisticated way. What does the 2 percent actually mean? The current metric is useful in a political sort of way, but it is not very useful in a practical operational sense. We need to look at burden sharing in a way that delivers what the Alliance needs. In my view, the Alliance needs improved infrastructure for speed and military mobility, improved air and missile defense — particularly in areas like the wider Black Sea and the greater Baltic Sea region. The Alliance needs to continue working toward coherence of all the operational plans. SACEUR (supreme allied commander Europe) is leading the way here and we made huge progress, but this is an area that needs continued effort to improve the coherence of how the Alliance deters. Finally, the Alliance needs to continue to focus on overall readiness. The Bundeswehr and other allies have got to improve the level of readiness of their equipment and of their units. Secretary Mattis is always emphasizing readiness. It is in the culture of the U.S. Department of Defense.

**Q: Are there concerns with how NATO deals with the A2/AD domes/bubbles at the fringe of allied territory? On the Eastern Flank, we see the emphasis on developing IAMD (integrated air and missile defense systems), on investing in national porcupine postures, while at the alliance level, there is increased focus on multidoomain reinforcement and on increasing speed and readiness. Is this enough? The whole effort seems to favor a deterrence-by-denial posture. What it is missing is the deterrence-by-punishment piece. Shouldn’t this focus be balanced? Shouldn’t we talk also about the right ways to dismantle, neutralize and be able to operate inside a competitor’s access denial bubble?**

**A: **Key in countering the A2/AD capabilities that Russia has installed in Kaliningrad and Crimea (and they are also attempting to establish a similar capability in the Arctic, closer to the border with Norway) is to understand that these places are bastions, but they are not impregnable. We need to continue to understand what capabilities they have, what vulnerabilities they have. We need to emphasize freedom of the seas and freedom of movement in the Baltic and Black seas and in the Arctic. The world’s greatest Navy needs to push back against Russian harassment and interference with shipping. We are going to have to improve both the air and missile defense protection around both of these regions to be able to neutralize their long-range missile capability. Ultimately, solutions will require our own EW capabilities to counter their significant capabilities. It will always be a joint solution between land, air, maritime and cyber forces. Finally, we should continue to highlight what Russia is doing in the information space. The Russians passed a law acknowledging that Crimea is part of Russia since the time of Catherine the Great. What this tells us is that they have no intention of leaving Crimea. The West needs to continue to highlight their intransigence and unwillingness to be truthful and honest in their negotiations.
LIGHT at the End of the Tunnel?

North Macedonia and Euro-Atlantic integration

By Slovenian Navy Capt. Gorazd Bartol, former chief of the NATO Liaison Office in Skopje, North Macedonia
Since the 1949 signing of NATO’s founding document, the Washington Treaty, NATO’s purpose has remained the same: Preserve peace. This is done by members pledging to defend one another. NATO members stand together in solidarity, shared purpose and fair burden-sharing.

As a result, NATO’s commitment to the safety and security of all 29 allies is unwavering. At the heart of that commitment is Article 5, NATO’s collective defense clause. An attack on one ally is an attack on all allies. That is the essence of the mutual defense commitment, and it has helped NATO keep the peace in Europe. NATO embodies the unique bond that unites Europe and North America. Our security is indivisible. In a world of global challenges, global solutions and trans-Atlantic cooperation are needed more than ever. The Alliance has been successful these past seven decades because of its ability to adapt to changing security challenges.

Since 2014, the Alliance has agreed on and implemented the most significant reinforcement of our collective defense since the Cold War. Consider:

- The establishment of eight multinational headquarters in the eastern part of the Alliance to link national and NATO forces.
- The tripling in size of the NATO Response Force to 40,000 and establishment of a 5,000-strong, high-readiness task force able to move within days.
- The increased NATO presence in the southeast region of the Alliance.
- The stepped-up air policing over the Baltic Sea and Black Sea and deployment of four multinational battalions to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland.

This was done to prevent conflict, to deter potential aggression and to ensure NATO’s collective defense. After all, NATO is and has always been a defensive alliance.

In addition to ensuring that collective defense, NATO is working to project stability beyond its borders, including through partnerships. At the 2016 Warsaw summit — against the backdrop of an increasingly unstable global security environment and based on a broad and strengthened deterrence and defense posture — NATO leaders agreed to contribute more to projecting stability and strengthening security outside its territory, thereby contributing to overall Alliance security.

Consider the July 2018 meeting of NATO members’ heads of state. Amid speculation that the Alliance is struggling to find its place in the modern world, the allies came together and reinforced why NATO is the most successful military alliance in history. It decided to:

- Raise the readiness of its forces.
- Increase its ability to move them across the Atlantic and within Europe.
- Modernize its command structure.
- Establish a new cyber operations center.
- Boost its contribution to the fight against terrorism through a new training mission in Iraq, more support for Jordan and Tunisia, and a package of additional measures for the south.
- Sustain its presence in Afghanistan until conditions...
NATO embodies the vital bond between Europe and North America. The Alliance guarantees security, freedom and shared values that include a commitment to defend each other. Decisions made at the Brussels summit show that, as the world changes, Europe and North America stand together and act together in NATO.

NATO is the most successful military alliance in history, keeping almost 1 billion citizens across Europe and North America secure and representing half the world's economic might — and half the world's military might.

NATO has been engaged in the Western Balkans for more than two decades and is deeply connected to the countries of the region and to its ongoing stability. Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Montenegro and Slovenia have joined NATO, and Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina are close and valued partners. NATO forces in Kosovo continue to maintain peace and stability. The Alliance wants this region to be secure, prosperous and free. All of North Macedonia’s NATO friends support its accession efforts. But success is not taken for granted.

Politics in the country, and the region, have been challenging. But in Skopje and beyond, considerable progress has been made, particularly in creating a new, more open, more inclusive political culture. Diversity is a strength, not a weakness. Where there is inclusion and open dialogue, supported by good governance, there is resilience. In the Washington Treaty, the allies explicitly stated their commitment to the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. Those principles — those ideals — define NATO’s essence. And, increasingly, they define North Macedonia’s. This is why the Alliance welcomes North Macedonia’s commitment to pursuing the path of Euro-Atlantic integration and NATO membership.

NATO has shown that the path to joining the Alliance is still open to countries that are willing and able to meet the responsibilities involved. The Washington Treaty states that allies “may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state” to join the Alliance if it is positioned to “further the principles” of the treaty and “contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area.”

Those are the conditions under which, at the 2008 Bucharest summit, NATO decided it would extend an invitation to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to join the Alliance as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue had been reached within the framework of the United Nations. At the NATO summit in Brussels in July 2018, a historic agreement was reached between Athens and Skopje to solve the name issue, and in line with NATO policy, it was decided to invite the government in Skopje to begin accession talks to join the Alliance.

The allies have been impressed by the determination and enthusiasm shown by North Macedonia. While it is good to be ambitious, it is also important to be realistic. There is still much more work to be done. Allies are bound together not just by common interests but by common values, and countries wishing to join the Alliance must demonstrate that they share those values. That means sticking to the path of reform. NATO will be with you every step of the way.

There has been important progress on key areas of reform — for instance on transparency, accountability, oversight of the intelligence and security agencies, and judicial reform. And that must continue. The roles of government, Parliament and the opposition are crucial: Each bears a responsibility to the people they represent. Civil society also has a critical role to play. And every single citizen has a contribution to make, no matter where or which community they come from.
Good relations with neighbors are imperative. NATO has welcomed the signing of the Prespa Agreement, and also welcomed the ratification of the Treaty of Friendship with Bulgaria. The Alliance will continue to encourage the improvement of relations with others in the region.

For more than 15 years, the brave men and women of North Macedonia’s highly skilled Armed Forces have participated in allied missions in Kosovo, Afghanistan and other locations. They have helped to bring security and stability and helped the people there to dream of a brighter future. NATO appreciates all the contributions made in support of international security, and North Macedonia’s citizens should be proud.

NATO will continue to provide practical support for defense reforms, help improve defense education and increase transparency in the defense sector. The Alliance welcomes the continuing reform of national defense institutions and looks forward to seeing the fruits of the Strategic Defense Review.

But it is also crucial for NATO to see Skopje investing in defense. NATO is a military alliance whose chief purpose is collective defense fused by a solemn commitment to come to each other’s aid. All NATO allies have committed to increase defense spending to 2 percent of gross domestic product. The Alliance wants to see North Macedonia moving in the same direction and commends the government’s commitment to meeting the 2 percent target. NATO also wants to see efforts to boost the ability of its militaries to work together on operations; security is the bedrock of prosperity and economic opportunity. Since Montenegro joined NATO in 2017, foreign investment from allied countries has doubled.

Finally, let me reiterate: NATO membership will give this great country an equal voice in discussions, an equal vote in decisions, and the security that comes with being part of the world’s most successful military alliance. It means having 29 other countries committed to protect and defend North Macedonia and its national sovereignty against any aggressor. This is a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to become a full member of the international community with all the benefits that this brings.
The Times
They Are
A-Changin’

THE MARSHALL CENTER
CELEBRATES A MILESTONE
OF ITS OWN
In June 2018, the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies celebrated its 25th anniversary amid an increasingly complex, contested and volatile international security environment. Knowledge, experience and the open exchange of ideas are more relevant and important to establishing a peaceful and prosperous security environment in Europe and its neighborhood than ever before. In other words, the Marshall Center has become an indispensable academic and political institution that is highly appreciated in the countries it serves, as well as by its stakeholders, the United States and Germany. For 25 years, the Marshall Center has been operating in this changing and challenging international environment. This anniversary provides a good opportunity to step back to consider the strengths of and the opportunities for this unique institution. What are the prospects and perspectives for the Marshall Center?

By Ralf Roloff
DEPUTY DEAN FOR RESIDENT PROGRAMS AT THE MARSHALL CENTER
The Marshall Center started with a strong German-American partnership. Germany and the U.S. agreed to establish a center for security studies that could support the painful and thorny transformation of former communist states and societies into democratic and well-governed states that tend to integrate into Western security structures, such as NATO and the European Union. Establishing a working system of security cooperation with former Warsaw Pact countries and former Soviet republics was the bread and butter of the Marshall Center's work during its first decade. Security sector reform and democratic control of armed forces had been the main areas of focus of studies and programs. Courses were initially nine months long, not just due to the quantity of subject matter to be covered, but because it was a fundamental premise that security cooperation requires establishing working interpersonal relationships and networks. Building trust and confidence requires the investment of time and effort in the participants — enough time to digest and discuss new perspectives on security sector reform, democratic control of armed forces and a fresh view on the European security architecture.

A second element established throughout the Marshall Center's first decade was outside activities to address contemporary issues relevant to partner countries. The Marshall Center established a conference coordination center that has planned and executed more than 40 events per year throughout the region. A small but very active unit undertook research on the security aspects of transformation. It became quite clear that the mission of the Marshall Center was directed not only toward supporting transformation, but even more so toward integrating the former Warsaw Pact countries and Soviet republics into the Western security architecture and helping them to prepare for membership in NATO and the EU.

The post-Cold War decade ended abruptly with the terrorist attacks on 9/11. This date marks a sea change in world politics, and it marks a remarkable mission change for the Marshall Center. Building a global coalition for the war on terror became a major effort of the Marshall Center. This shift in mission resulted in the creation of one of the very first programs on countering terrorism worldwide. With the ongoing global fight against terrorism and the large military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, demand grew for support by qualified academic programs on a strategic level. As a result, new residence programs were developed, such as a program for stability, reconstruction and transformation that took a particular look at the opportunities and limits of military and civilian interventions, operations and missions. A third pillar has been a program on homeland security and internal crisis management, which took a comparative perspective regarding U.S. and European approaches, discussing their weaknesses and strengths. These three new programs built a very strong
response to the growing demand from partner countries, as well as from American and German stakeholders.

As a result, the portfolio of the Marshall Center has been broadened, and with it, the level of expertise has broadened as well. Academic programs further developed in the direction of analyzing transnational security challenges. A full-fledged residence program on countering organized crime and countering transnational trafficking of narcotics was established. As cyberspace has morphed into the backbone of the international economy, society and security, the Marshall Center engaged at a very early stage in developing a cyber security program that goes beyond the technical questions and takes a broader strategic look.

In many aspects, matters of interest have clearly been moving from more regional issues toward transnational and global issues. Perhaps, it has been posited, the logical consequence should be that the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies becomes the George C. Marshall Global Center for Security Issues. Would that move the Marshall Center in the right direction and further develop its mission to keep it relevant for stakeholders and the partner countries? The answer is a lukewarm “not really” — the regional component of the mission remains paramount. This discussion was basically overtaken by events: In 2008, the Russia-Georgia war brought regional security issues back onto the agenda. Even more, the Ukraine crisis and Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 rudely brought the Marshall Center back to the regional reality. It responded to the Russia-Georgia war with a seminar on regional security and to the Ukraine crisis with European security seminars. The Marshall Center has responded to the demand to address in-depth more current and relevant security issues in an ever-challenging European and global security environment with curriculum changes, including a massive increase of nonresident activities and the establishment of a larger nonresident directorate within the College for Security Studies.

With an increasing demand for the timely and policy-relevant exchange of knowledge, expertise and ideas, Marshall Center academic programs are constantly adapting curriculum to meet the highest academic standards, as represented by the accreditation of all its programs under the Bologna Process. Adaptation does not only concern topics and academic quality. Innovative formats for activities and programs have been developed, tested, improved and implemented. The implementation of tailored seminars for parliamentarians or senior officials in national, bilateral or trilateral formats is a key example. Workshop formats are increasingly replacing classical instruction, and new exercise- and scenario-building formats are finding their way into the curriculum.

The most recent adaptations to the changing security environment are the strategic initiatives. This format introduces a completely new element. It not only brings the Marshall Center’s work closer to policymakers in Germany and the U.S., but to partner countries as well. Relevant security policy issues are discussed in well-established groups of experts and officials, and the results inform policymakers in the U.S. and Germany. With renowned partners such as the Munich Security Conference, the German Marshall Fund, the Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik, the Aspen Institute and others, the Marshall Center is positioning itself as a valuable and appreciated partner for strategic dialogue.

“"The times they are a-changin’,” Bob Dylan sang. This is not only true of the past 25 years of international security, it is certainly true as well for the work of the Marshall Center. The German-American dimension of the Marshall Center makes it an especially valuable instrument for both partners, given the current trans-Atlantic irritations. For 25 years, the Marshall Center has benefited European security by building a working network of security experts and providing quality programs. The time has come to harvest this huge alumni network and integrate it even more effectively into the curriculum and all other activities. The Marshall Center has great potential to grow its activities and be creative in providing a German-American platform for security studies regionally and globally. The Marshall Center has proved over the past 25 years that there is a desperate need for this type of institution and that it fills a place in the landscape of security institutions that no other can fill. Ad multos annos, Marshall Center! □
Seven precarious coalitions battled French attempts to dominate Europe in the Napoleonic wars. Only the last one ultimately prevailed at Waterloo to send the emperor into permanent exile and restore peace to the continent. That peace lasted nearly a century. The alliance itself, having achieved its primary aim, dissolved almost immediately.

The reason there had been six previous coalitions is that various nations had joined for strategic purposes. When those had been secured, they departed the coalition, or, in some instances, Napoleon defeated them and forced them into alliance with France. In those circumstances, the remaining coalition’s attempts to permanently defeat Napoleon stalled. Such is the way of most military alliances. Historically, they serve an immediate purpose to combat a credible and pending threat. Once the threat is removed, the armies disperse. Two Western democracies — the United States and United Kingdom — united with the totalitarian communist Soviet Union to battle the fascist powers of Nazi Germany, Italy and Japan in World War II. Once the Axis powers surrendered, members of the Allied coalition of necessity went their separate ways. In contrast, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization alliance of the U.S., Canada and many European nations has survived and succeeded for an unprecedented 70 years, even following the implosion of its chief adversary, the Soviet Union.

In *Grand Strategy and Military Alliances*, authors Peter R. Mansoor and Williamson Murray pull together leading historians to examine military alliances throughout history to establish parallels and discontinuities that are applicable to the present-day NATO alliance and to ad hoc “coalitions of the willing.”

Their premise is that today especially, alliance and coalition are essential requirements for a great power to achieve its strategic goals. The intent of this collection is to show the crucial importance that alliances and coalitions have played in the conduct of strategy in peace and in war over the centuries. In doing so, Mansoor and Murray seek to overcome what they see as the arrogance of, for example, American leaders who have at times in the past 30 years casually dismissed the importance of alliances, other than as “convenient political window dressing for American aims.” An alliance such as NATO has endured for 70 years because all members respect each other and contribute as best they can to the collective defense — an uncoerced coalition of the willing.

Mansoor’s and Murray’s collection notes the many alliances and coalitions that have succeeded, but their writers also discuss some that have failed magnificently, such as the German-Austrian “alliance” of World War I, and the Axis of Germany-Italy-Japan in World War II. Some alliances were interstate groupings formally constituted by treaty while some of the coalitions represented
more informal groupings, brought together by common interest. They summarize that some consisted “of the willing, the more-or-less willing, and the not so willing.” These degrees of commitment matter less than an agreed strategy to stay together until a common enemy is destroyed.

In the coalitions against France, and then Napoleon, individual members participated for different aims, usually territorial. Some members did not see a necessity in defeating Napoleon for all time. Mansoor and Murray explicate that alliances are more likely to succeed the more closely their aims align. By the time of the seventh coalition, defeating Napoleon for all time had united the alliance members in a go-for-broke grand strategy. And that coalition succeeded where the previous six had failed.

Readers will discover that transparency and unity of command are key elements to successful alliances. The Allied powers in World War II worked tirelessly to ensure this in their respective theaters. Allied strategy sought to exploit the two fronts Germany faced in order to place the enemy in a vice grip. In contrast, the Axis powers did not unite and take military actions together for strategic aims. Germany surprised Japan with its invasion of Russia, while Japan surprised Germany with its attack on Pearl Harbor. They did not coordinate their operations to support the other in any meaningful way. And the Germans sometimes had to bail out Italy from misadventures not previously coordinated with Berlin.

This volume competently and comprehensively explores a variety of alliances, at least from a European perspective. These include the so-called Anglo-American way of war; the Anglo-Prussian alliance and the Seven Years’ War; the Franco-British military alliance during World War I; the Grand Alliance of World War II; and NATO adapting to survive in the Cold War.

Contributors also examine the political and military challenges of coalition warfare, starting with the Peloponnesian War and Sparta’s strategic alliances, and moving to the now obscure Anglo-Burgundian alliance and grand strategy in the Hundred Years’ War. A review of the Franco-American alliance tests the merits of the argument that the Americans could not have secured independence from Great Britain without France’s aid. Another essay disputes the practical utility to either country of the German-Austrian alliance in World War I. The most recent alliance reviewed is that of the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, which is dubbed a “coalition of convenience in a changing world.”

This volume presents many important takeaways, the most important of which is that coalition warfare is hard. National interests often must be subsumed to keep squabbles at bay in diverse alliances. Lead nations must weigh competing cultures, resources and policies for all coalition members, Mansoor and Murray argue. In its alliances to fight global terrorism, the U.S., for instance, learned it needed greater sensitivity when operating with coalition partners who brought with them national caveats and differing means to operate, train and employ tactics. The authors write that the U.S. military performed poorly with allies because its post-Cold War professional education did not stress sufficiently the importance of alliance and training opportunities with potential allies. Part of this resided with seeking “partners as much to lend international political legitimacy to these ventures as it did to strengthen the coalitions in a military sense.”

Mansoor and Murray stress that “Alliances are stronger when allies need each other, either to stave off defeat or to secure victory. Alliances that include countries as mere political window dressing will invariably be weak creations of major powers with hesitant buy-in from reluctant allies.” In turn, “the creation of effective alliances among unequal powers is possible, but the most powerful alliance member needs to be willing to accommodate the interests of the smaller powers to ensure alliance harmony.”

One must appreciate why such cooperation is essential, whether to formal coalitions or to those that do not exist today, but may in the future, to address a pressing security challenge: Coalition management engages in friction, and friction is inherent in coalitions and alliances going back to the ancient world. The more opportunity to work out differences in peace, the greater opportunity to reduce friction in war.

The authors remind readers that alliance management occurs on three levels: political, military and technical. Of these, the political basis is the most important. The political goals underpinning alliances — whether defense against shared threats, a collective attempt to balance other powers, a mutual desire to conquer, the maintenance of the existing economic and security order, or other objectives — trump all other factors in determining their durability. In recent years, NATO has cooperated in peacekeeping, counterinsurgency and compliance operations. The Alliance has held together throughout, but what has given NATO a more urgent sense of purpose is Russian aggression in Central Asia and hybrid warfare and spoiler activities in Eastern Europe. Countering Russian actions requires political cohesion, and NATO has returned to its principles of active defense in response.

The case studies show that alliances that do not work in peacetime will perform no better (and probably worse) in wartime, when pressure on policymakers and military leaders increases by an order of magnitude. By contrast, leaders who take the time to understand the political and military cultures of allied nations will be most effective in fashioning a cohesive bond among them. “Relationships based on blood, friendship, honor and professional respect can help to smooth relations among allies,” Mansoor and Murray write. In an era when no nation can go it alone in a great military undertaking of any enduring consequence and purpose, these are lessons nations would do well to learn and embrace.
Resident Courses
Democratia per fidem et concordiam
Democracy through trust and friendship

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