Journal of European Security and Defense Issues

AFGHAN ADVANCEMENT
Military women make a mark

HUMAN TRAFFICKING
Europe’s illegal trade

ARRESTING PIRACY
Bold steps in Somalia

STOPPING NARCOTICS
New Central Asian initiative

PLUS
Turkey’s new turn
EU labor shortages
Protecting the Olympics

THE COST OF CORRUPTION
Corruption is an issue of international importance. Bribe taking and misuse of office not only undermine good government but also weaken a nation’s ability to defend itself and attract foreign investment.

As Southeast Europe tackles crime and corruption it becomes more attractive to foreign investment.

NATO and Macedonia offer lessons about combating misconduct in defense appropriations.

A web of treaties and agreements encourages good behavior around the world.

Misconceptions about human trafficking and smuggling are widespread.
Upgrading Europe’s Militaries
“Pooling and sharing” become watchwords during an era of tight military budgets.

Imprisoning Pirates
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Welcome to the ninth issue of per Concordiam. In this issue, we focus on the topic of corruption from a national security perspective. Although we typically think of national security threats as coming from outside our borders, we should also remember that poor governance and ineffective rule of law can allow threats to grow from within. Unfortunately, corruption is found in every country in the world. The international community recognizes the importance of this issue, as evident by the 158 countries that have ratified the UN Convention against Corruption. Although most try to counter corruption, the success rate of these efforts varies widely. There are many examples of countries that have adopted effective measures to combat corruption and have enjoyed positive results. At the same time, many countries continue to experience systemic levels of corruption that have a profound negative impact on nearly all aspects of daily life.

Within every country, opinions about the cause and pervasiveness of corruption differ. It is equally difficult to arrive at a universal definition of corruption. There is much debate about corruption being a cultural issue or victimless crime. Because of these and many other similar issues, nations often find it difficult to develop effective strategies to address corruption. Unlike most traditional crimes, corruption often involves direct illegal cooperation between criminal elements and the very state authorities whose job it is to prevent this crime. As a result, the criminal organizations and state authorities involved in corruption are highly motivated to keep the activity hidden from law enforcement organizations.

Corruption deprives nations of resources that might otherwise be applied to the most pressing national security requirements. It undermines the population’s confidence in government, which is a requirement for making hard national security choices. It complicates and, in some cases, prevents effective international cooperation because other states are unwilling to invest in the security of corrupt states. Ultimately, it weakens the state internally and internationally and makes it more vulnerable.

Although all forms of corruption are bad, the aspect of corruption that should concern us most is when individuals betray public trust and use their official government positions for illegal gain. As public servants, it is our responsibility to set and uphold the highest standards and promote trust and confidence in the rule of law.

We invite your comments and perspectives on this subject. We will include your responses in our next two editions. The first will focus on migration and its impact on European and Eurasian security, while the second will address stability and reconstruction operations in Afghanistan. Please contact us at editor@perconcordiam.org

Sincerely,

Keith W. Dayton
Director
Michael Donofrio joined the Marshall Center in September 2011 as a contract instructor in countering illicit trafficking. Mr. Donofrio is a retired federal criminal investigator with more than 26 years of experience as a customs agent and administrator fighting corruption, money laundering, and narcotics, human, and arms smuggling and trafficking. Employed at Culmen International LLC in Alexandria, Virginia, Mr. Donofrio earned a master’s degree in public administration from California State University, East Bay, and a bachelor’s in biology from California State University, Sacramento.

Gabrijela Gjorgjevic, a Marshall Center alumna, is an analyst for NATO in the Policy and Planning Department in the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Macedonia. From 2008 to 2011, she was a defense counselor at the Macedonian mission to NATO, where she was engaged in the NATO Building Integrity Initiative and was a case study lecturer on regional courses delivered by NATO. Ms. Gjorgjevic has conducted a variety of seminars and courses at the NATO Defense College, Rome, and the NATO School, Oberammergau. In 2000, Ms. Gjorgjevic was awarded a Chevening Scholarship from Oxford University for three months of postgraduate research on the first round of NATO enlargement.

Robert Leventhal is the director of Anticorruption and Governance Initiatives in the U.S. State Department’s International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Bureau. Mr. Leventhal coordinates U.S. government participation in multilateral anti-corruption initiatives, assists in shaping U.S. policy on addressing corruption internationally, and manages support for good governance projects. Mr. Leventhal has served as director of the Europe and Eurasia Division of the American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative, where he oversaw programs in Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia; as program director with Transparency International-USA; and as an institution building officer with the UN Mission in Guatemala. He holds degrees from Yale Law School and the University of California, Berkeley.

Avgustina Tzvetkova is a deputy defense minister in Bulgaria. Ms. Tzvetkova began her career in journalism working for Bulgarian National Radio and Television. From 1995 to 2006, she was program director and secretary-general for the Atlantic Club of Bulgaria and from 2004 to 2009 served as president of the Euro-Atlantic Education Initiative Foundation, which implements projects in the area of NATO and security issues. In 2008 and 2010, she was political advisor to Nikolay Mladenov in his capacity as minister of defense and foreign affairs minister. Her expertise encompasses relations with NATO and the United States, Euro-Atlantic cooperation and anti-corruption policy. Ms. Tzvetkova has been involved with the International Language Academy, Oxford; the Marshall Center; and the U.S. State Department. She’s a member of the advisory board for the International Institute for Political and Economic Studies. Ms. Tzvetkova graduated from the Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski with majors in history and archaeology.

Valbona Zeneli is a professor of national security studies at the Marshall Center. Born in Albania, Dr. Zeneli is an economist with an interest in international economy, marketing and international security politics. She is a graduate of the Marshall Center’s Leaders Program in International and Security Studies and is a board member of the George Marshall Center Alumni Association, Albania. Dr. Zeneli has served as economic advisor to the Albanian ministers of defense and economy, and as chief of protocol and economic advisor to the prime minister. She has also worked for Albanian private companies as an international relations advisor. She holds a doctorate in political economy from the University of Bari, Italy, earned a postgraduate diploma in international marketing from Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., and graduated with honors in business administration from the University of Bologna, Italy.
Crime and corruption impact all countries to differing degrees. But in all cases, they undermine democracy and hamper the rule of law. The international community has a responsibility to take a united stand in preventing and controlling corruption. Government focus on public trust, accountability and transparency are steps in the right direction. This issue of *per Concordiam* focuses on crime and corruption and their implications for national security.

This issue starts with a viewpoint article by Bulgarian Deputy Minister of Defense Avgustina Tzvetkova. She examines the impact of corruption on the integrity of the state and reforms in the defense sector. She takes a candid and critical look at crime and corruption challenges in her home country of Bulgaria and outlines crucial steps toward implementing a successful anti-corruption program.

Our first feature article, “The Cost of Corruption,” is written by Dr. Valbona Zeneli, professor of national security studies at the Marshall Center. She provides a regional perspective on corruption with a focus on how it hinders investment in Southeast Europe.

The next article is by Marshall Center graduate Gabrijela Gjorgević, who writes of the potential global impact of corruption in “Corruption Corrodes Security.” She highlights NATO’s initiative to combat crime and corruption and the NATO Building Integrity Initiative, as well as anti-corruption efforts in her native Macedonia.

A piece by Robert Leventhal, director of Anticorruption and Governance Initiatives at the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, explains the increased international willingness to combat corruption and its transnational impact.

Finally, in “Separating Fact and Fiction,” Michael Donofrio, countertrafficking instructor at the Marshall Center, explains the misconceptions about the differences between human trafficking and human smuggling and how this can impede law enforcement’s ability to investigate and prosecute trafficking organizations effectively.

The next issue of *per Concordiam* will examine migration and its implications for European and Eurasian security, followed by an issue focused on stability operations and transformation in Afghanistan. We invite you and people you know to submit articles on these themes to enhance discussion of the issues addressed in *per Concordiam*.

We encourage your feedback and look forward to your emails in this ongoing dialogue on important security issues. Please email us at editor@perconcordiam.org. Each issue is available online at the Marshall Center website: www.marshallcenter.org
Regarding your *per Concordiam* journals:
1. They are received with great enthusiasm and read accordingly.
2. I use them to update my knowledge on security matters, which I then use for security orientations at Rotary and various other clubs.
3. Someday, I might collect suitable information in order to publish a paper for the Marshall Center, for which I have the greatest respect and admiration since my stay in 1996.

*Peter Adser-Larsen*
Danish Armed Forces, retired
Marshall Center alumnus

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I’d like to thank *per Concordiam*. I appreciate the upgrade that this magazine has achieved! I’d like to suggest the possibility of creating a small page for the alumni to announce what the associations are all doing. I think in this opportunity, *per Concordiam* can show global influence and range.

*Lt. Col. João Alvelos*
Portuguese Armed Forces
Marshall Center alumnus

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Could I get a subscription to *per Concordiam*, please? It provides very interesting perspectives and viewpoints, as well as ideas for the future. I am using SACEUR’s article on building strategic connections in an operational way, in our endeavor to create a truly comprehensive and interagency new NATO Maritime Command.

*Peter van Mierlo*
Operational Analyst & Advisor
Allied Maritime Command Naples

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Send feedback via email to: editor@perconcordiam.org

**ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS**

*per Concordiam* is a moderated journal with the best and brightest submitted articles and papers published each quarter.
We welcome articles from readers on security and defense issues in Europe and Eurasia.

First, email your story idea to editor@perconcordiam.org in an outline form or as a short description. If we like the idea, we can offer feedback before you start writing. We accept articles as original contributions. If your article or similar version is under consideration by another publication or was published elsewhere, please tell us when submitting the article. If you have a manuscript to submit but are not sure it’s right for the quarterly, email us to see if we’re interested.

As you’re writing your article, please remember:

- **Offer fresh ideas.** We are looking for articles with a unique perspective from the region. We likely will not publish articles on topics already heavily covered in other security and foreign policy journals.
- **Connect the dots.** We’ll publish an article on a single country if the subject is relevant to the region or the world.
- **Do not assume a U.S. audience.** The vast majority of *per Concordiam* readers are from Europe and Eurasia. We’re less likely to publish articles that cater to a U.S. audience. Our mission is to generate candid discussion of relevant security and defense topics, not to strictly reiterate U.S. foreign policy.
- **Steer clear of technical language.** Not everyone is a specialist in a certain field. Ideas should be accessible to the widest audience.
- **Provide original research or reporting to support your ideas.** And be prepared to document statements. We fact check everything we publish.
- **Copyrights.** Contributors will retain their copyrighted work. However, submitting an article or paper implies the author grants license to *per Concordiam* to publish the work.
- **Bio/photo.** When submitting your article, please include a short biography and a high-resolution digital photo of yourself of at least 300 dots per inch (DPI).

Email manuscripts as Microsoft Word attachments to: editor@perconcordiam.org
The contest is open to current participants and alumni of the Marshall Center. Your essay should be an opinion piece identifying the most significant regional security success that has impacted your country. Contest participants should discuss the evolution and development of the regional security issue and what led to its successful resolution. The essay should explain how success was achieved by identifying solutions, addressing lessons learned and opportunities for partnerships and cooperation and explaining how to ensure continued success. Some examples of prevailing regional security issues are civil-military cooperation, combating terrorism, energy security, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), crime and corruption and cyber security. Participants’ essays should stimulate debate and an exchange of ideas.

Details:

**Eligibility:** Entrants must be participants or alumni of the Marshall Center.

**Format:** Entries must be presented in the format of a persuasive essay (Associated Press style), be between 1,000 and 3,000 words using a 12-point font with double spacing, and must include notes and bibliography (not included in the word count).

**Topic:** What is the most significant regional security success that has impacted your country?

**Research:** Please cite sources, Web addresses with access dates and interviews with professionals. Please use the notes and bibliography style of citation in The Chicago Manual of Style.

**Entries:** Must be submitted online only to editor@perconcordiam.org and received by 1700 CET on July 6, 2012.

**Evaluation Procedure:** Three winning essays will be selected on the following criteria: originality and creativity, logical presentation of supporting arguments, factual/historical accuracy and scope of research.

Final judging and selection of three winning essays will be conducted by a committee of Marshall Center faculty. Results will be announced at www.marshallcenter.org and the Marshall Center alumni portal (GlobalNET) http://members.marshallcenter.org on Sept. 15, 2012.

**Awards:**

Each winner will receive a prize as follows:

- **First Place** — publication of the essay and author’s profile in a future issue of *per Concordiam* and on the Marshall Center alumni portal (GlobalNET) and a framed gift of the Marshall Center with an engraved brass plate courtesy of the Friends of the Marshall Center.
- **Second Place** — honorable mention in a future issue of *per Concordiam* and on the Marshall Center alumni portal (GlobalNET)
- **Third Place** — honorable mention in a future issue of *per Concordiam* and on the Marshall Center alumni portal (GlobalNET)

Winning essays will also be featured on the Marshall Center’s public website www.marshallcenter.org.

Entries will not be acknowledged or returned, and contributors will retain their copyrighted work. However, submitting a paper implies the author grants license to *per Concordiam* to publish the work. The Marshall Center reserves the right to use any or all entries for promotional purposes.
A survey of 655 *per Concordiam* readers has revealed a continued preference for articles on counterterrorism, organized crime, countering violent extremism, cyber security and energy security. The magazine’s editorial staff collected the thorough feedback in a June 2011 online survey, and plans to use the information to refine and develop future magazine content.

Survey participants hail from all over Europe and Eurasia, but the Black Sea region and Southeast Europe were the most strongly represented. More than a third of respondents work in their countries’ ministries of defense, and another quarter of respondents held jobs in interior ministries or police forces.

When asked to select from a list of topics that they were most interested in reading about, 58.9 percent of survey takers picked counterterrorism. Nearly 52 percent expressed an interest in articles about organized crime, including narcotics and human trafficking. Close to 45 percent of *per Concordiam* readers said they wanted to read about cyber security, while a like number selected the topic of energy security.

Story preference varied somewhat by region. Black Sea respondents expressed a greater interest in energy security. In Southeast Europe, organized crime ranked more highly as a preferred magazine theme. But readers from both regions place corruption near the top of the list of topics. The editorial staff pays close attention to the input received from its readers. Per your feedback, the theme of this issue of *per Concordiam* is crime and corruption and their relationship to national security.

This was the second time *per Concordiam* sought the opinions of its readers. Initial survey results compiled in late 2009/early 2010 helped the editorial staff tailor content in preparing to launch the magazine. The 2011 survey gathered input after readers had a chance to digest several issues of *per Concordiam* on themes that included political and military partnerships, terrorism, energy security and weapons of mass destruction.

About 80 percent of respondents in this recent survey indicated that they read most of the material in each issue of the magazine, and an almost identical number expressed satisfaction with the appearance, length, quality and accuracy of articles. The vast majority of readers said they would read even more content if supplemental material were posted online.

*per Concordiam* strongly encourages readers to submit articles for publication in future editions of the magazine. Staffers will carefully review reader submissions and work together with authors to produce professionally relevant stories.

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*By per Concordiam Staff*
Bulgaria Uproots Corruption

Reform focuses on defense and security sectors

By Avgustina Tzvetkova, Deputy Defense Minister, Republic of Bulgaria

Corruption in the sphere of national security constitutes a direct encroachment on the integrity of the state, on citizens’ sense of security, on the authority of institutions and on the international image of the country. The occurrence of corruption in the defense sector compromises reforms aimed at modernizing the armed forces. If the conditions that generate corruption are not abolished, the planned changes will only remain theories written on paper. Practical implementation is doomed to failure, turning into a screen behind which shady forces seek influence and conceal unacceptable abuses of power and position in office.

The experience in Bulgaria proves this point. In a period when defense sector arbitrariness in resource management reigned, there was total nontransparency in the decision-making process and reckless disregard for internationally accepted standards of defense management. Therefore, the basic task at hand for the leadership of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) was to build a strategic environment for conducting reforms that not only guaranteed that current corruption be eliminated, but also minimized the risk of future corruption.

The MoD proceeded with the conviction that three components guarantee the implementation of a successful anti-corruption reform: political will, a clear strategy for its practical application, and objective external evaluation to act as a corrective when necessary and compare chosen methods with proven best practices for building integrity.

The first step was to institutionalize the fight against corrupt practices by setting up a Standing Council on Anti-Corruption. Its basic tasks were to develop a system of measures aimed at fighting corruption, to exercise control over the implementation of these measures, and to provide solutions for the improvement of legislation. It had to introduce transparency into formulating decisions and the decision-making process, as a basic weapon against hidden practices related to abuse of position in office for personal gain.

All activities of the present leadership of the MoD are conducted under complete public scrutiny. This practice contributed considerably toward
improving the relations between the political leadership of the defence ministry and the public. Thus, a message was conveyed to society that the MoD was firmly committed to protecting the public interest in the defense sector. The basic measures used were the introduction of systematic accountancy and responsibility for the undertaken activities and achieved results.

Furthermore, the practice of openly discussing development of all legislative projects allowed the minister of defence to inform the public regularly about the most significant internal, coalition and international events related to the country’s defense policy. Indicators of irregularity and/or malpractice can be submitted to the website of the MoD, and every message received is given a response and, if necessary, follow-up checks or other administrative actions. At the same time, the MoD initiated an active bilateral dialogue with representatives of the nongovernmental sector by distributing a regularly published bulletin that provides detailed information on anti-corruption measures and the achieved results in this sphere in the MoD. The public was granted full online access to announcements about public procurements.

A clear vision of the reforms in the armed forces enables the public to closely examine the motivation that serves as a basis for conducting the reform, as well as all the necessary stages toward implementing the reforms. Guided by this conviction, during the mandate of the present government, we developed a strategic plan of defense policy and the building of modern armed forces under conditions of transparent accountability, regarding how the defense budget is spent.

After a public debate involving representatives of nongovernmental organizations, civil society and scientific-academic circles, the National Assembly adopted the “White Paper on Defence and Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria.” Fighting corruption was incorporated as a fundamental principle in the white paper, and transparency became a key pillar of the new management philosophy of the integrated MoD.

Another new basic document is the Plan for the Development of the Armed Forces, which marked the beginning of new defense management built on a modern base with clearly defined and attainable goals and priorities. A Long-Term Investment Plan was also adopted as a logical continuation of the development plan. This plan established the prerequisites for principled, consistent and transparent investment policy. The investment projects we plan to implement from now on will be submitted for approval, depending on their cost, either to the Council of Ministers or to the National Assembly. This mechanism guarantees complete civilian control over defense spending.

To lay the foundations for more ethical relations with the public and business representatives, the Standing Council on Anti-Corruption developed an ethical code of conduct for military and civilian personnel, and the structures were directly subordinated to the minister of defence and the Bulgarian Army. The council also developed an internal system of reporting and investigating both established and potential cases of conflict of interest in the MoD, in those structures directly subordinated to the minister of defence and in the Army. We approved rules for the application of the law on preventing and determining conflicts of interest. The goal was to build a lasting and effective system to counteract corruption, and a realistic and professional assessment of the present situation with recommendations to fill gaps and correct deficiencies.

With this understanding, the MoD completed the self-assessment questionnaire of the NATO Building Integrity Initiative in September 2010, and in December of the same year participated in a peer review by a joint team of NATO representatives and experts of the nongovernmental organization Transparency International UK. In its final report, the reviewing team stated that after only 1½ years into the new government’s mandate, the results were impressive and the need to address corruption is clearly understood at all levels of the MoD and in the structures and bodies subordinate to it. The report’s recommendations were included in the action plan, which outlined specific future steps to prevent corrupt practices within the ministry.

In the first place, members of the Standing Council on Anti-Corruption made a decision and approved an integrity
pact that is to be concluded by the MoD and participants in public procurement, purchasing and property rental. Through the integrity pact, the MoD is committed to ensuring that no abuse of position-in-office for personal gain takes place. The pact was signed by the minister of defence and becomes an integral part of the documentation on conducting public procurement and tenders.

Following the MoD's announcement, the Integrity Pact became one of the most broadly covered initiatives of anti-corruption policy in the Bulgarian mass media. This proves that the document is perceived positively and represents new trust in the institution. With the goal of exercising systematic and follow-up control over the corruption environment, the Inspectorate of the MoD developed, and the Standing Council on Anti-Corruption approved, methods for evaluation of the corruption risk. The follow-up report on the application of the methods must comprise suggestions on ways to eliminate risk in the structures where its presence has been established.

It is generally agreed that dealing with corruption depends both on the specific anti-corruption measures and on the overall reform of a defense sector that must formulate clear rules and priorities in conducting the policy.

The basic goal of the reform conducted in the MoD was to build such an organizational and legislative environment, which will eliminate both corruption in defense policy and the prerequisites that engender corruption. The mechanisms that guarantee the execution of this task are the following: capabilities-oriented budgeting based on programs; maximal increase in the transparency of the process and admitting a maximum number of participants into procedures on defense procurement; accelerated removal of the MoD from all types of characteristic economic functions; reducing to a minimum the necessity of “urgent deliveries” by sending organizational-staff units that possess already built-in capabilities to participate in operations.

The most important change was the introduction of capabilities-based budget planning to eradicate nontransparent and ineffective defense spending. Previously, resources were wasted on totally unnecessary and/or artificially exaggerated sectors, seriously damaging capability building elsewhere.

With the goal of immediately changing this situation, we conducted a Force Structure Review accompanied by fixing prices to the capabilities, which allowed us to build a model based on the balance between the planned capabilities and available resources. The basic goal was to improve programmed defense planning and budgeting on the basis of necessary defense capabilities. Maximum transparency is assured by preparing periodic progress reports on the results of the implementation of the programs and forwarding them to the National Assembly and the public. Through amendments to the Rules of Organization and Structure of the MoD, we separated the process of planning from the process of budgeting. Thus, we put an end to the practice of delegating the right to spend funds nontransparently.

The overall process of planning was established on a firm legislative base with strict prioritization. Complete coordination and transparency among the activities related to the preparation of six-year defense programs (medium term planning) was achieved. As was the formation and execution of the budget of the MoD for the specific year on the basis of the defense capabilities and the preparation of the Unified Financial Plan for materiel and technical provision that served as the basis for conducting the acquisition of defense capabilities. A balanced system of indexes showing the efficiency of the implementation of the defense programs was introduced and a strategy for risk management in defense programs was developed.

We also carry out monitoring and periodic analysis on contract fulfillment through a register of the concluded contracts. Apart from the register, the Defence Investment Directorate maintains an updated matrix that stores information on the progress of the procedures and remarks on their execution. Based on the matrix and register, the Defence Investment Directorate provides weekly reports to the MoD leadership.

Related to decentralization and more effective defense spending, we granted legal and financial independence to the Joint Force Command and the Commands of the Services. Our goal was to remove the central and operational bodies from responsibilities unfamiliar to them, and to give the Commands the opportunity to solve problems related to their day-to-day operations. This change, which in itself categorically represents greater optimization and budget transparency, could in some cases lead to an increased corruption risk since the Commands will already be able to sign contracts independently and, from the beginning of 2012, to conduct public procurement. That was the reason why the Standing Council on Anti-corruption decided to apply to the commands all anti-corruption measures that exist at the central level.

The disposal of excess defense assets is another area that is extremely susceptible to corruption. In the Action Plan, we outlined special measures to prevent corruption in the process of utilization, including cooperation with the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency aimed at analyzing and assisting the process-in-progress, as well as intensifying the participation in the Regional Approach to Stockpile Reduction Initiative, in which our goal is training and exchange of experience.

Another sphere of potential corruption pressure is human resources. The Standing Council made a decision, incorporated in the Action Plan, to introduce a system for identifying sensitive positions of the MoD with a view to corruption risk, and to form commissions on conducting public procurement after the deadline for submitting bids. We believe we will be able to reduce to a minimum the possibility for participants to acquire internal
information from members of commissions about what their competitors are bidding.

Procedures for personnel selection and career development of servicemen were established on a clear and principled basis. Human resources development was linked to periodic and more frequent publication of registers containing information on vacancies for privates, non-commissioned officers and officers. We introduced a principle of rotation for senior officers that forbids them from holding the same position for more than five years. These measures were aimed at introducing maximum transparency and fairness into human resources development. They will ultimately curtail possibilities for malpractice and abuse of position-in-office, and encourage selection of candidates based solely on professional and moral qualities.

At the suggestion of the Inspectorate of the MoD, we developed internal rules for planning and assigning public procurement and control of concluded contracts. We also developed internal rules of the MoD and the Bulgarian Army for control and prevention of money laundering.

In addition, the Internal Audit Directorate periodically prepares reports on factors and conditions that can lead to corruption, dereliction or bad management. These reports are included in statements on the execution of the plan-schedule for urgent measures and activities conducted by the government and by the legal bodies aimed at accomplishing legal reform and the struggle against corruption and organized crime.

The adopted law on Military Police regulated and broadened its rights with regard to preventing corruption by introducing mechanisms for rapid identification and putting an end to corrupt practices.

Creating an environment in which corruption is an exception and not a rule requires building capabilities in both the civilian and military employee sector. Civilians and military personnel have to recognize corruption in all its forms and disguises, and receive training to prevent and counteract corruption whenever they come upon cases of malpractice and abuse of position-in-office. In this respect, the MoD paid special attention to explanatory processes and specialized training in anti-corruption practices of civilian and military personnel in the MoD, the structures subordinated to the minister of defence and in the combat formations. The MoD executed a pilot training course in anti-corruption that will be added to the syllabus of instruction at the Defence Staff College.

As a leading country in Southeastern Europe with respect to counteracting corruption in the sphere of defense, Bulgaria introduced a project to put this topic on the agenda of countries participating in the Southeastern Europe Defense Ministerial (SEDM) process. In October 2011, at a meeting of SEDM defense ministers, member countries welcomed the project “Building Integrity in Defense” and instructed the chairman of the Coordinating Committee and the Political-Military Steering Committee of the Multinational Peace Force Process to initiate the project.

In spite of the efforts made and the systematic approach applied in the struggle against corruption, we still have to work persistently at the middle levels of administration in the MoD. We also encounter difficulties popularizing anti-corruption measures because for years the MoD set a standard for nontransparency and explicitly corrupt practices. The changes are still treated with distrust by the media and the nongovernmental sector, and even by certain circles in the administration. We understand that they need time to examine what lies at the core of the changes to become convinced that these are profound and irreversible processes and not merely wishes expressed in beautiful phrases.

Building a malpractice-free environment is the most important condition for the success of reforms in the defense sector, and without a firm and coherent anti-corruption policy they are doomed to failure. The most convincing proof of this is that for the first time, real reforms leading to evident results are being implemented in the Bulgarian MoD, and that these reforms will transform the armed forces into a modern, efficient structure of high combat readiness prepared to serve society in the best possible way.
THE COST OF CORRUPTION

ATTRACTING MORE FOREIGN INVESTMENT TO SOUTHEAST EUROPE REQUIRES INSTITUTIONAL REFORM

By Valbona Zanelli, Marshall Center
Research on the political and international economy has yielded important insights on the relationships between corruption, the quality of institutions, FDI and economic growth. Still, there are few systematic and comprehensive studies of corruption trends and consequences. For this purpose, an analytic study was conducted using recent econometric methodologies in Southeast Europe to research and understand the relationship between FDI and the quality of institutions, since this issue has recently become a major item for the security of the region.

Corruption and organized crime have also been identified by the European Union as major problems in Southeast Europe and have been considered main obstacles to the very-much-aspired-to integration of these countries into the EU.

Corruption is a widespread phenomenon and governments will never be able to totally defeat it, but not all corruption is the same. The level of corruption and the consequences it brings to society are different.

Studies show that the entire Southeast European region has high levels of corruption, particularly “grand corruption.” The practice is most devastating politically, undermining development, the market economy and democracy itself. It is like a cancer that destroys people, societies and future development. This common disease in the region is attributed to the existence of weak state institutions and strongly connected to the troubled history of these countries.

After the fall of the Iron Curtain in the 1990s, all the countries of Southeast Europe embraced open trade and investment regimes, but economic and social liberalization were not easy. It was a big shock for countries such as Albania, Romania and Bulgaria, though the situation was a little different with the countries of the former Yugoslavia since they were more integrated with Western countries through trade.

Since the beginning of transition, the main objective of these countries seemed to be integration into the global economy, and according to Western liberal economists, this could be achieved only by large inflows of FDI. The rapid growth in Central and Eastern Europe over the last years to a large extent has been accredited to the successful transition from centrally planned economies to market economies and also to the inflows of foreign investment into the region.

Since FDI was supposed to play a critical role in growth and development, governments in all the countries of Southeast Europe encouraged foreign investors to invest and take part in the privatization process, believing this would also be beneficial for faster integration into the EU. During the last two decades, this was one of the main objectives for these transitioning countries.

FDI is an important indicator of global economic health and stability, and scholars and economists consider it to be a major catalyst for development, particularly in developing and transitioning economies. It’s a strong channel for direct economic growth (increasing employment, exports, income), one of the main sources of private capital to replace outdated capital in scarce economies, a vehicle of modernization and technology diffusion, and a driving force for sustainable development.

Corruption is one of the main diseases that have plagued Southeast Europe in the last 20 years. This phenomenon is perceived as an impediment to the development of these countries by: weakening the legitimacy and effectiveness of institutions, undermining economic growth, jeopardizing foreign direct investment (FDI), threatening democracy and undermining the well-being of the population.
But history and econometric research have shown that this positive effect of FDI in the development of the host countries is very complex and does not lead automatically to development, but rather depends on certain policy conditions such as human resources, development of the financial market, level of openness to trade, and, more importantly, the quality of the institutions and rule of law in host countries.

There are different theories on the main determinants for the attraction of FDI. The volume and the distribution of foreign investment are influenced by location-specific attractiveness, political and economic stability, the property and profit tax system, market size and labor composition, geographic proximity and financial markets.

Today there is more evidence that the geographic distribution of FDI is strongly influenced by the host country’s political and institutional quality, reflecting foreign investor confidence in the local investment environment. Some studies even argue that efficient institutions contribute to economic growth more than trade or location. This is even more important for the countries of Southeast Europe since almost all of them have experienced instability during the transition process.

The region offers unique opportunities for investors in terms of size of markets, strategic position, proximity to Western Europe, natural resources, flexible and well-educated labor, and investment policies, to name a few. But annual FDI inflows remain low in the global context, although there has been a big increase since the 1990s.

Foreign investors did not see much attraction in Southeast European countries. (The situation was totally different with the Eastern and Central European countries, which had high levels of FDI and sustainable economic growth.) Reasons varied, but included the political and economic instability of the region; underdevelopment of the economy in places where communism was especially harsh, such as Albania; transformational recession in Bulgaria; wars, political disintegration and ethnic conflicts in the former Yugoslavia; and high levels of corruption in most of these countries.

The unfinished transition process is not favorable to foreign investors because of the gap between formally adopted laws and the inability of the institutions to fully enforce them. Poor infrastructure, problems with property rights, administrative barriers, nontransparent privatization processes, weak results in fighting corruption and the thriving
informal market continue to discourage foreign investors. At the same time, this also undermines the implementation of good development reforms.

The transition from communist regimes to market economies created unique opportunities for illicit profiteering and high levels of corruption. This was a moment of great opportunity, which improved economic flexibility and freedom of movement of goods, people and capital. Fast private gains are attractive when societies face the difficulties of transition, increasing incentives for corruption at all levels of the society. Financial wealth also becomes a symbol of social status.

Recurrent problems affecting corruption include the persistence of high-level corruption, poor fiscal leverage, a nonefficient judicial system, corruption in public administration related to low wages and economic control from the shadows.

Measuring this phenomenon is almost impossible because of the illicit nature of the activities, but the cost of corruption, according to different studies, exceeds by far the damage caused by any other single type of crime. The World Bank has calculated that more than $1 trillion is paid in bribes every year worldwide, and the damage and harm of this phenomena is even greater.

Statistical data also indicate that foreign investments are distributed unevenly through the countries of Southeast Europe, and it is interesting to research the main factors contributing to this. Economic and political factors and the geographic position of these countries strongly influence corruption. The transitional period from centralized to market economy has created massive opportunities for the appropriation of rents. Lack of transparency in the privatization process and lack of legal instruments for control have created various illegal activities, such as smuggling, tax evasion, organized crime, financial fraud and a gray economy that resulted in enormous illicit gains for individuals in a short time.

Corruption negates growth and development in several ways by representing an additional cost to the economy, distorting market competition, generating monopolies and eliminating regular and transparent market mechanisms, leading to wrong decision making, poor allocation of resources, loss of legitimacy, less foreign investment or at least attraction of “nonqualitative” FDI.17

Ethnic conflict in the region distracted governments from the implementation of real economic reform. Old elites remained in power and their mentality, bad economic policy implementation and
nonfunctioning “check and balance” systems resulted in fragile democratic institutions and weakness of the state to fight petty and political corruption seriously. Transition mostly takes place in a weak and highly politicized framework. For this reason, efficient and high quality institutional reforms are very important for these countries.

To verify the hypothesis that institutional quality and FDI strongly correlate with each other in Southeast Europe, an empirical analysis was conducted using recent econometric methodologies and data from the last two decades (1992-2009) for eight countries (Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina). To measure the quality of institutions, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development indicators were used in this analysis. The other potential explanatory determinants that we used include both traditional gravity factors, such as market size, GDP growth, human capital, natural resources and tariffs, but also other factors such as the presence of foreign banks and the agglomeration model.

The results confirmed a very strong positive and significant relationship between the quality and performance of institutions and the attraction and distribution of FDI in the region. (Croatia had the highest FDI per capita and Albania the lowest.) The same study also confirmed that the positive effects of foreign investment in the countries under consideration are stronger where the institutional framework is more efficient and less corrupt.

Another important point of our research was to check the relationship between the level of corruption (using Transparency International data) and the attraction of foreign investments. The analysis showed a significant negative relationship between the level of corruption in the host country and the attraction of foreign investments.

We can declare (even based on statistical studies) that there is a strong causal relationship between the quality of the institutions in the host country and the interest of important
foreign businesses to invest in it. What seems difficult to understand, rather, is the direction of this relationship. Better institutions and enforcement of the rule of law may attract more FDI in transitional countries, but good institutions might result from the presence of serious multinational companies in these countries.

FDI can help by reducing corruption and generating sustainable development. Thus, a crucial task for the governments of Southeast Europe is developing their institutions and reducing corruption. The institutional environment must facilitate business and promote development. If state institutions are corrupt, EU law cannot be implemented and enforced, and development through foreign investment cannot be achieved.

Consistent political stability, strong enforcement, healthy monetary and fiscal policies, and strong anti-corruption reforms contribute to attracting “qualitative” foreign investments, and also to their positive effects on growth and development. Countries that have implemented transition policies successfully have been granted relatively speedy membership into the EU, which has further accelerated FDI, generating still more growth and development. (Bulgaria and Romania are already EU countries and Croatia plans to join in 2013.)

Countries of Southeast Europe fulfill what is called “first nature geography,” with their strategic position and natural resources, but to be competitive in the global economy have to fulfill “second nature geography,” the interaction between economic agents in a strong institutional environment. The countries of the region have to be careful in their policies and institutional reforms to provide good outcomes in the future. Creating a good business environment and high quality institutions is essential. Fighting corruption by all means is necessary.

1. Corruption is defined as “misuse of public power for private benefits” Transparency International.
3. Generalized method of moments (Arellano and Bond 1998) was used for the cross-country analysis.
7. Bulgaria and Romania are members of the European Union.
11. This is according to the personal opinion of the author of the article.
19. Generalized method of moments (Arellano and Bond 1998) was used for the cross-country analysis.
NATO takes the lead in containing bribery and abuse of office in the defense sector

BY GABRIJELA GJORGJEVIĆ, MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA
Living in a global era we are faced with threats of all kinds. Is corruption one of them? In a way it is and affects all of us. The problem of corruption is neither new nor restricted only to developing countries. Its nature can be extremely diverse and the context and relevance of the problem varies widely between countries and time periods. The world has focused on the problem in recent decades with the increase in global cooperation for achieving economic and social growth in all countries.

The globalization process has been driven by policies that have opened our economies domestically and internationally. After World War II, and especially after the Cold War, many governments adopted free-market economies, increasing their productive potential and creating new opportunities for international trade and investment. But globalization remains controversial. While proponents see globalization as a way for poor countries to raise their standards of living and develop economically, opponents believe the process creates an unfair international free market that only benefits multinational corporations at the expense of local enterprises, local cultures and the common people.

A LONG HISTORY
Corruption as a phenomenon has always been present in societies, in different times and in different forms. The roots of corruption go back to the history of human civilization. References to corruption were found in the writings from the fourth century B.C. in India and in the writings of ancient Greek philosophers like Aristotle and Plato. The word corruption comes from the Latin word “corruptus,” which means “to destroy.” Nowadays the word corruption has many meanings, but usually is connected to governments and is widely used to mean political corruption, or the abuse of power for private gain. The power of corruption is even greater since it’s hard to measure and operates without transparency, which means “behind the scenes.”

There is no consensus on the definition of corruption. Black’s Law Dictionary defines corruption as “the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully or wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others.” Black & Garner and Braguinsky defined it as “misappropriation of government property or revenues made possible through government regulations.” Gradually, the concept has expanded to include all areas of life. Hodess defined political corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power by political leaders for private gain, with the objective of increasing power or wealth.” Political corruption leads to lack of transparency in public life and lack of faith in the system by the population.

Political corruption also encourages business corruption through an institutionalized system of bribery and other illegal payments. Therefore strong links exist between corruption and economic growth. It is not fair to say that corruption exists only in less developed – or developing – countries. Corruption may be more conspicuous in those countries after their recent transitions to a free-market economy. Nor is it right to attribute corruption to absolute poverty in the Third World. Relative poverty also generates corruption to a significant extent. There are always parties in all countries that benefit from corruption and seek to maintain the system. Recent analyses go as far as to connect the fight against corruption with the fights against terrorism and human rights abuses.

CORRUPTION IN THE DEFENSE SECTOR
The defense sector is not immune to this phenomenon either, if you take into account research done by Transparency International, which categorized defense as the most corrupt amongst public sectors. Corruption affects the capabilities of military units and influences morale. The existence of corruption is often exploited by organized crime and terrorism to acquire information. In the medium term, it affects the whole process of attracting qualified personnel, military or civilian, and degrades professionalism. Among the consequences are a loss of public trust and reduced defense budgets, which in turn could endanger the maintenance of the armed forces and diminish capabilities. Corruption can compromise national security and tarnish the international image of a country.
The international community today, and NATO as a politico-military organization within that framework, is forced to deal with corruption. It leaves the success of certain international projects and missions in doubt. For example, the so-called Afghan “crisis of confidence” is due to the large presence of corruption in that country. Corruption, drug addiction and desertion in the Afghan Army impede the transfer of responsibility from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to the government of Afghanistan.

Another example is Somali piracy. Massive piracy couldn't exist in Somalia without the collaboration of corrupt authorities. The ransom required for the release of hostages, which averages about $12 million, suggests the pirates are operating a well-organized business. The ransom money is shared with the authorities, which offer protection and weapons to the criminals.

Like other global organizations fighting corruption, NATO views the phenomenon as a global threat and in 2007 started an initiative to battle corruption in defense establishments. All nations are confronted with the long-term affordability and sustainability of defense and security expenditures. The demand to invest in new capabilities and to meet the challenges of ongoing operations is not new. However, all nations are under increasing pressure to make maximum effective use of limited funds and demonstrate that they are accountable for the resources allocated for defense and security. In addition to wasting limited public resources and undermining public trust and confidence, corruption has a negative and corrosive impact on the ability to execute NATO-led operations.

BUILDING INTEGRITY
The NATO Building Integrity initiative within the Partnership Action Plan for Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB) was adopted in November 2007 at the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council ambassadors meeting. Building integrity in defense structures, promoting best practice and reducing corruption are integral NATO goals expressed in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Framework Document and further elaborated at the Istanbul Summit. The same initiative is open to all NATO and PfP countries in accordance with the Bucharest Summit Declaration, paragraph 32.

The efforts focused on a development package for education and training prepared in consultation with experts from countries and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Three main instruments are products of this initiative, which supports national defense reforms and meets international obligations under the United Nations Charter. This includes development tools for self-assessment – a questionnaire, NATO courses on building integrity, and a handbook on best practices. The initiative is gaining importance as nations fall under growing economic pressure to maximize use of limited funds for defense and security.

In 2008, this initiative grew into the Building Integrity Trust Fund project led by Poland, Switzerland and Great Britain. Norway also got involved. While other NATO trust funds focus primarily on the release or destruction of surplus ammunition in certain countries, this trust fund is the first of its type developed within the PAP-DIB. Given the different nature of this initiative, this project, where appropriate, can influence existing procedures.

Since 2008, this trust fund has three phases with total costs of 26 million euros. The first phase is completed with the development of the above-mentioned three tools. The second phase, which is in progress, aims at enhancing existing tools, mainstreaming the initiative and embedding it into national and NATO structures, as well as providing more tailored practical support for individual nations to reduce the risk of corruption. Phase 2 is focused on developing tailored programs to support Afghanistan, nations in Southeast Europe and the Ukraine. Phase 3 is scheduled for 2015-2020 and will cost around 19 million euros. It will embed tools and mechanisms in NATO and national structures based on work conducted in phases 1 and 2.

The Building Integrity Initiative is focused on raising awareness and developing practical tools and mechanisms to transfer knowledge, promote good practice and build capacity. Education and professional development of people who work in the defense and security establishment is a keystone of the initiative. Main achievements to date include a NATO Leadership Course, which is certified by Allied Command Transformation. This is the first NATO course developed and conducted in collaboration with an NGO – Transparency International. A Building Integrity Self Assessment Survey and a Peer Review Process that map current practices and procedures in defense establishments are also of great value. The Building Integrity Self Assessment has been completed by Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Norway and Ukraine. The completed
survey results and peer review provide a framework for sharing experiences as well as developing national action plans and benchmarks. The text of the Building Integrity Self Assessment can be accessed from the NATO and Transparency International websites.

The Compendium of Best Practices in Building Integrity and Reducing Corruption in Defense, a joint effort of NATO and the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), provides a strategic approach to reduce corruption risks. The compendium focuses on the practicalities of designing and implementing an integrity building program, taking account of the cultural specifics of defense organizations. The text can be accessed from the NATO and DCAF websites.

Also important is the establishment of a pool of subject matter experts drawn from national ministries, international organizations and civil society who take an active role in the development and implementation of all aspects of the program. The experts play an important role in enhancing knowledge of corruption and understanding its impact on military operations and peace building.

Corruption has a negative impact on security forces and their operations. It undermines the development of professional security forces, wastes resources and damages public confidence. Afghanistan is ranked by Transparency International and the World Bank as one of the most corrupt nations in the world. According to UN surveys, Afghan citizens identify corruption as one of the primary obstacles to security and development. Building Integrity efforts are aimed at reducing the risk of corruption through increased transparency and accountability in the Defense and Interior ministries, including the forces under their authority. Strengthening transparency and accountability in the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) is complementary to ISAF-led efforts aimed at detection and prosecution. This dedicated program provides practical support to the efforts of the Afghan government to combat corruption and promote good governance.

The aim of this tailored program is increased transparency and improved accountability in ANSF, reducing the risk of corruption, and making the ANSF a leader in good practice and smart defense. Implementation will take place over 10 years (2011-2021). The emphasis will be placed on capacity development, lessons learned, and implementation of best practices at the central and sub-national levels. Further, a center will be established within the ANSF at the Afghan National Security University. This will be an integral part of the ANSF training and education system responsible for design and delivery of education and training activities for all ranks of the ANSF.

**FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN MACEDONIA**

Changes that began in the spring of 1989 announced a process of social change exemplified by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the transition...
to a new democratic order. This transition was a difficult and long process manifested by a decline in industrial production, record unemployment, poverty, inflation, and rising crime and corruption. Following independence in 1991, the Republic of Macedonia has found itself in a continuous institutional, social and economic transition to a democratic and market-oriented state. Although Macedonia, unlike other Yugoslav republics, was spared the Balkan wars, the country was not spared the negative consequences of the conflict. Infrastructure was unevenly distributed across the former Yugoslavia and trade routes were severed starting in the early 1990s. Embargoes and rivers of refugees further hampered the development of the region.

In this period, citizens lost the benefits of lower relative prices for services, and purchasing power suffered with high unemployment. Institutions, faced with rapid changes to the “rules of the game,” created a surge of new legislation that led to frequent turnover and the loss of capacity for effective monitoring. As certain groups in society tried to get rich quickly, corruption appeared in every segment of the society. In the beginning, corruption appeared in the form of petty corruption, but grew into political corruption as state-owned enterprises were privatized.

Being aware of these issues, the new government has focused on a determined, thorough and uncompromising fight against corruption. It has created a zero tolerance atmosphere for corruption and aims to strengthen measures for discovering and punishing violators and depriving them of illegal income.

The creation of a normative and institutional framework for dealing effectively with corruption in Macedonia began in 2002 with the adoption of the Law on Prevention of Corruption. Of course, before the adoption of this law, Macedonia possessed regulations and institutions addressing corruption as a general crime, but apparently these regulations didn’t yield the expected results. Therefore, the state created a more efficient legal and institutional framework to establish good preconditions for successfully tackling corruption.

The State Commission for Prevention of Corruption is composed of seven members – prominent experts in law and economics – who serve five-year terms, without the possibility for reappointment.

In 2003, the commission adopted the first National Programme for Prevention and Repression of Corruption, which suggested...
measures to prevent corruption. The country adopted many new laws and amended more than 40 existing laws. The Constitution was amended to start the process of judicial reform.

The legal framework of anti-corruption policy consists of several laws. It includes the Law on Prevention of Corruption, which is fully compliant with European Union standards; the Law on Criminal Procedure and Penal Code, which provides legal control for acts of corruption; the Law on Monitoring of Communications; and the Law on Anti-Money Laundering and Other Proceeds from Crime and Financing of Terrorism.

Also part of Macedonia’s anti-corruption framework are laws addressing public prosecutions, financial political parties, public procurement, access to public information, elections, property confiscation, conflicts of interest and financial oversight. The government also formed an inter-ministerial body to coordinate the battle against corruption. Macedonia has ratified all European and international conventions and protocols relating to corruption, harmonizing them with national legislation.

Tackling corruption requires establishing systematic and concrete normative and institutional rules and procedures. In this regard, Macedonia has created a solid framework for combating corruption. But this operational framework needs to function better to provide more real, visible and effective results.

In Macedonia, a large number of people have been sentenced for misuse of their official position and authority, and receiving bribes. Those convicted include a former prime minister and deputy minister, a mayor, judges, notaries, customs officials, police officers, tax officials, a state attorney, doctors and corporate directors. Areas that are most susceptible to corruption are mainly public services, customs, police, the judiciary, administration, health, education and the private sector. Such corruption has been punished by up to 14 years of imprisonment, confiscation of property, forced compensation and prohibitions against pursuing former professions.

Macedonia is on track in its fight against corruption, reflected in the rankings of Transparency International for 2010, in which the country placed 62nd. That’s an improvement over the years 2003-2009, when Macedonia’s ranking ranged from 71st to 106th. In 2010, Macedonia shared 62nd place with Croatia, Ghana and Samoa. Compared to other countries from the region, Macedonia falls behind Turkey (56), but surpassed Montenegro (69), Serbia (78), Albania (88), Bosnia & Herzegovina (91) and Kosovo (110).

CONCLUSION
The current economic crisis relates to corruption. The global crisis is an opportunity to strengthen the fight against corruption because corruption is one of the factors that caused the recession. Three things are essential – political will, political energy and domestic consensus. An anti-corruption fight is much more efficient if it is initiated by the affected country itself, when it generates the necessary political will and public support. Furthermore, in terms of anti-corruption, there should be no difference in standards for developed and developing countries.

During the transition from communism, most economic factors stabilized, but problems endured in areas where the transition process was slower, enabling corruption to reappear. The countries that did not transform their economies quickly faced a greater tendency towards corruption.

We must not treat corruption as an isolated phenomenon. It affects each and every aspect of society, obstructs decision making at every level, blocks development and destabilizes countries. This is why the fight against corruption must take a central place in reforms working towards coherently and effectively building efficient democracies on a global scale.

While corruption may vary across countries and companies, it is truly global considering the massive flow of illicit money between rich and rich, poor and poor, and rich and poor countries.

We are all aware of the fact that there is no security without development and no development without security. We must continue to work together to strengthen transparency and good governance, two essentials for the stability of all countries.

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Russian opposition protesters stage a mock vote against the government in Moscow in 2011. The rally was called by the People's Freedom Party on a platform that includes an end to political corruption in Russia.
As little as 20 years ago, discussion of common efforts to combat corruption was largely taboo. Corruption was not a mainstream issue for development agencies or international financial institutions, where it was reportedly referred to as the “c word.” Nongovernmental organizations were not in place to raise awareness and lead the charge. When high-level political leaders met to discuss issues of shared concern, they were silent on graft.

While the burden of graft may be as big as ever, fortunately the environment – in terms of efforts to address it – has changed dramatically. Among countries in Western and Eastern Europe and around the globe, serious efforts are under way to build will and adopt measures to combat corruption. Confronting corruption requires country-led reform and enforcement, but at the regional and global level, a variety of multilateral initiatives has gathered momentum to promote sustained and meaningful country action.

This effort is being driven by an ever sharper understanding of the harm caused by corruption. Countries and other stakeholders around the world have recognized that corruption undermines stability and can feed extremism, fosters transnational crime and other transborder illicit activity, discourages investment, deters business activity, and saps development, democratic consolidation and the rule of law. These are some of the same factors that have motivated the United States for many years to make combating corruption internationally a priority. This effort was recognized again by the May 2010 National Security Strategy and is echoed consistently in the themes raised in international settings by President Barack Obama, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and other senior U.S. government officials.

Much of the multilateral effort falls into three categories. First, countries have adopted shared commitments, often international treaties that remove anti-corruption efforts from the realm of finger pointing and instead focus on what to do about it by defining the measures any country should consider. They establish road maps for reform and offer benchmarks to enable peers, investors and citizens to gauge progress.

Of course, as challenging as it may be to agree on shared standards, it often is even harder to ensure their application in practice. The second significant area of international activity consists of initiatives to promote and support implementation and enforcement. Many of the conventions have monitoring processes to gauge progress and spur follow-up by the parties. (In fact, from mid-2010 to late 2011, the U.S. was subject to four such anti-corruption review processes.) In several regions, including parts of Europe, countries with similar legal traditions, language or common interests are banding together to gain greater familiarity with anti-corruption tools and share their good practices. More networks are springing up to bring practitioners together and facilitate cooperation to combat what itself is increasingly a transborder phenomenon. Finally, there is sometimes a will to reform but not yet a way, in terms of capacity. Donors are increasingly providing technical assistance to help countries consider and adopt new laws and institutions and enhance their ability to put them in practice.

In a world of important yet competing priorities, finite resources, and resistance to reform by entrenched interests, a final, vital area of effort involves building and sustaining high-level attention and political will. Public commitments by the world’s leaders, in various regional and economic groups, increasingly underline the importance of tackling corruption, and there is more and more momentum to translate those statements into concrete action and cooperation.

The U.S. has made supporting this dynamic a priority. While no system is perfect and U.S. laws and institutions to combat corruption continue to evolve, the U.S. invests significant effort in leading by example. The U.S. record of enforcement against foreign bribery is unparalleled, and the government is a leader in...
promoting cooperation to recover proceeds of corruption stowed abroad (so-called stolen assets). The U.S. continues to deny safe haven by refusing entry into the country to corrupt officials, their enablers and beneficiaries. During the current administration, the U.S. has adopted new public ethics rules, Congress has enacted requirements for U.S. companies to publish payments made related to the extraction of natural resources, new whistle-blower protections have been adopted, and new commitments on transparency in government are underway. The U.S. works closely with European partners on addressing corruption at the global level, and partners with many countries in Eastern Europe and elsewhere on improving governance and combating corruption. The country also energetically pursues domestic corruption cases, including those against high-level officials such as members of Congress and state governors.

Establishing Shared Standards

Turning to the first area, shared commitments, the number and reach of multilateral treaties on corruption have expanded vastly since they first appeared about 15 years ago. Countries in Western and Eastern Europe may be parties to two or even three such conventions, presenting risks of multiple reviews and overwhelmed experts, but also providing rich opportunity for peer learning, self evaluation and improvement. The earliest anti-corruption treaties were delimited by geography or their specialized subject matter, starting with the 1996 Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, a regional treaty that was the first multilateral instrument on corruption. While the IACAC covers a number of prevention and criminalization measures, the 1999 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (often known as the Anti-Bribery Convention, or ABC) is one of the most targeted, focusing on bribes to foreign public officials to win or maintain business abroad, as the U.S. had done through the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). The U.S. adopted the FCPA in the late 1970s in part on the principle that U.S. companies should not do abroad what they were not permitted to do at home, and encouraged other countries to make the same commitment. The ABC also requires parties to adopt “books and records” measures, such as prohibiting the establishment of off-the-books accounts and inadequately identified transactions. It requires that sanctions be “effective, proportionate and dissuasive” and that countries establish liability for legal persons or companies. In 2009, parties adopted revised recommendations that gave countries updated guidance on implementation of the convention and laid out best practices for companies to prevent corruption.

The ABC has 38 parties (all 34 OECD countries plus Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria and South Africa), collectively accounting for a large portion of world trade. The Russian Federation recently joined the OECD's Working Group on Bribery and quickly followed up by acceding to the ABC. India, China and other countries have participated as formal or informal observers. All parties are subject to a robust peer review follow-up process that includes site visits by experts producing publicly available reports that cite gaps and make recommendations for improvement. Recent reviews have focused on parties’ records on enforcement, in many cases citing continuing shortcomings. There have been too few enforcement actions by too few countries, although when enforcement of these laws does occur, as with German and U.S. sanctions against global conglomerate Siemens AG totaling approximately $1.6 billion, it can send a powerful message.

Many Council of Europe member states in Western and Eastern Europe are parties to the two Council of Europe (CoE) Conventions, which are substantively broad – more so than the Inter-American Convention and much more so than the ABC. The Criminal Law Convention on Corruption entered into force in 2002 and has 43 parties. It forbids active (offering) and passive (accepting) bribery of domestic and foreign officials and of international bodies. It also covers bribery within the private sector itself, accounting offenses, money laundering, liability of legal persons, and trading in influence. The Civil Law Convention on Corruption came into force in November 2003 and has 34 parties. New provisions include civil law remedies for people injured by corruption, international cooperation in civil cases, voiding of contracts that are secured by or advance corruption, sufficiency of statutes of limitations, and whistle-blower protection. Parties, as well as others that join the CoE anti-corruption monitoring body, the Group of States Leaders of the Open Government Partnership, led by the U.S. and Brazil, commence their transparency initiative in New York in September 2011. The OGP encourages openness to fight corruption and promote good government.
against Corruption (GRECO), are subject to the group’s rigorous peer evaluations, similar to those conducted for the OECD ABC.\textsuperscript{9} Kazakhstan is the latest country to apply to join GRECO. Beginning in January 2012, GRECO's latest round of reviews will focus on prevention of corruption in the judiciary, prosecution and parliaments, issues of great relevance in the region. The European Union has begun exploring participation in GRECO, as part of its recent efforts to enhance action against corruption in EU member states (more on this below). This development would raise interesting questions about how a regional body can participate in such a mechanism.

The panorama changed again significantly with the negotiation of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), the most comprehensive international instrument on corruption.\textsuperscript{10} It was opened for signature in December 2003 and entered into force in December 2005. The pace of joining the convention has been very rapid, and 159 countries have become parties, including 47 Western and Eastern European countries, as well as the EU itself. UNCAC offers comprehensive chapters on preventive measures, criminalization and law enforcement, international cooperation, and technical assistance and information exchange. A walk through the convention is a walk through a complete range of anti-corruption issues – from special investigative measures to bribery of foreign public officials, from procurement reform and transparency in the management of public finances to money laundering. As broad as the convention is, it is also politically balanced: There is a mixture of mandatory and optional provisions and, particularly in the prevention chapter, the convention does not require implementation be harmonized. For example, while states must endeavor “to establish measures and systems requiring public officials to make declarations to appropriate authorities,” the particular way to get there is left to the party.

The convention also establishes the first ever comprehensive legal frameworks for recovery of proceeds of corruption moved abroad by corrupt officials – from tracing and freezing, to confiscation and return. Many countries negotiating UNCAC considered the problem of “stolen assets,” corrupt officials acquiring assets illicitly – and hiding those assets in foreign jurisdictions – as one of the key problems a global convention should address.

The convention establishes a Conference of States Parties (COSP) to take political decisions to further implementation. It has met four to five times, most recently in Marrakech, Morocco, in October 2011. The COSPs allow the parties to agree on next steps in areas such as prevention, technical assistance and asset recovery. The 2009 COSP, in Doha, Qatar, agreed to adopt a process for review of implementation. The basic framework is similar to the peer reviews under the other conventions, although site visits to the reviewed country, consultation with civil society, and publication of the full review report (versus an executive summary) were controversial and formally remain optional. Yet many countries under review are considering these features and, in fact, opting in. This round of reviews, which will take four years to cover all parties, looks at the criminalization and international legal cooperation chapters. Seven Western and Eastern European nations were among the pioneers in the first year of reviews (Bulgaria, Croatia, Finland, France, Lithuania, Spain and Ukraine), as well as the U.S. and others. Twelve countries in Europe, including the Russian Federation, have reviews under way as part of the second year.\textsuperscript{11} Many have served as reviewing countries as well. Reviews will not only highlight achievements and gaps, but are also meant to identify technical assistance needs where appropriate.

From Legal Commitments to Practice

Aside from legal instruments such as treaties, there are a large number of initiatives under way to promote implementation, i.e., continued reform, application of laws in practice, and enforcement. In fact, there are too many to comprehensively survey. Some are supported by international organizations or groups of countries; others are practitioner driven. All can make important contributions. At the global level, an exciting new multistakeholder initiative, the Open Government Partnership (OGP), was launched in September 2011 to focus on increasing transparency, accountability, anti-corruption and citizen participation, including the use of new information and communications technologies.\textsuperscript{12} The initiative requires countries to endorse a declaration of principles and make a series of concrete, independently monitored commitments in the areas mentioned above, commitments developed through broad domestic multistakeholder consultation and tailored to each country’s needs and goals. In addition to a coordinating committee of the eight founding governments and nine nongovernmental organizations, the initiative is open to any government that meets certain basic reform criteria; 52 have indicated their intention to join.\textsuperscript{13} An OGP networking mechanism can pair countries with other countries, businesses or NGOs that have good practices or other resources to make reforms. The U.S. has undertaken an ambitious set of OGP commitments, which are available on the OGP website along with the commitments of the other participating countries.\textsuperscript{14} The transparency and oversight principles of OGP are reflected in other long-standing initiatives such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and efforts to increase transparency in aid.

Aside from transparency, another area of intensive work on implementation of international anticorruption commitments is recovery of stolen assets. While there is much interest in asset recovery, the cases can be complex, with different legal systems involved, lack of channels for informal cooperation, formal requirements for mutual legal assistance, and difficulties in tracing assets and establishing their links to crime. Recent declarations by the UNCAC COSP\textsuperscript{15} and the G20\textsuperscript{16} provide useful road maps for collaboration to overcome these challenges, and partner initiatives exist to help with the follow-up. The Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative (StAR), a joint initiative of the World Bank and the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), is a principle
actor in this area.\textsuperscript{17} As with organizations such as the International Center for Asset Recovery in Basel, StA\textsuperscript{R} provides capacity building, develops policy recommendations and guides for practitioners, and facilitates cooperation. StA\textsuperscript{R} recently launched the Asset Watch website to report asset recovery around the world. Interpol, working with StA\textsuperscript{R}, serves as the platform for another effort in this area, the global asset recovery Focal Point Initiative.\textsuperscript{18} Focal Point establishes a network of expert practitioners in recovering the proceeds of corruption, complementing regional networks such as the Camden Asset Recovery Inter-Agency Network. It allows police and prosecutors from 100 countries around the world to identify each other and communicate over a secured network.

Other initiatives have focused more broadly on supporting anti-corruption authorities and other practitioners. The International Anti-Corruption Academy is a new center of advanced education and study established in 2011 in a state of the art facility outside of Vienna by the Austrian government, UNODC and other partners.\textsuperscript{19} It offers training courses, symposia and a graduate degree program in anti-corruption studies. The International Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities, as well as a new World Bank-supported initiative, the International Corruption Hunters Alliance, brings together officials from anti-corruption commissions and specialized units to build solidarity and foster networking and exchange of good practices. As the European experience of the last decade shows, anti-corruption bodies can be critical actors in the fight against corruption, complementing regional networks such as the Camden Asset Recovery Inter-Agency Network. It allows police and prosecutors from 100 countries around the world to identify each other and communicate over a secured network.

A variety of other activities are under way to support reform and reformers in Europe. For the last dozen years, the OECD has coordinated the Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, which provides regional training and policy dialogue, develops good practices and guides for practitioners, and facilitates exchanges (“twinning”) among anti-corruption authorities and other partners.\textsuperscript{19} (In Europe, the European Partners Against Corruption, comprised of police oversight bodies and anti-corruption authorities of EU member states and Council of Europe member countries, is working to similar purposes.\textsuperscript{21})

Mirroring activity at the global level, Europe has developed new tools and initiatives to help– and press – countries to address corruption. In June 2011, the EU, recognizing that four out of five EU citizens regard corruption as a major problem and that corruption costs the EU economy an estimated 120 billion euros per year, announced a new policy to combat corruption.\textsuperscript{22} The policy sets up an “EU Anti-Corruption Report,” a mechanism for the periodic assessment of EU member states’ efforts to fight corruption. Every two years, starting in 2013, the report will identify trends and weaknesses, as well as stimulate peer learning and exchange of best practices. The European Commission (EC) will issue the reports based on inputs from a variety of sources, including existing monitoring mechanisms, independent experts, stakeholders and civil society. The policy calls upon member states to improve implementation of anti-corruption legal instruments already in place in Europe and abroad. The EC will work toward modernized rules addressing public procurement, accounting standards and audits for EU companies. It will adopt a strategy to combat fraud affecting the financial interests of the EU, focus more on anti-corruption issues within the EU enlargement process and neighborhood policy, and use conditionality more in cooperation and development policies.

Spotlighting Corruption
Expressions of high-level political will are important to sustain momentum for reform. Although it was not common a dozen years ago, high-level gatherings such as leaders’ summits increasingly address corruption. Important declarations in key political or economic forums such as the Summit of the Americas and the Asia-Pacific Economic...
Cooperation (APEC) enunciate priorities, establish principles and incorporate commitments for action that complement politically what countries undertake through treaties. The G8, beginning with the 2003 Evian Summit, has made detailed declarations on combating corruption and raising transparency. A public reporting process in 2008 and 2009 heightened accountability for follow-through by G8 members (APEC is undertaking a similar process). The G8 Deauville Partnership with countries from the post-Arab Spring Middle East includes a prominent anti-corruption and asset recovery component. In Europe, high profile expert meetings, such as the annual series of Counter-Corruption conferences sponsored by the Marshall Center and the U.S. State Department, and the November 2011 World Forum on Governance in Prague, provide additional emphasis.

The world took note when the G20, a group of the world’s top economies that gained new prominence during the global financial crisis, decided to take on corruption. The effort began at the Pittsburgh Summit in 2009, but the real achievement was the adoption of a comprehensive action plan at the Seoul Summit in 2010. The plan, among other things, called for broader membership in the UNCAC and ABC, engagement by the Financial Action Task Force on the interaction between corruption and money laundering, adoption of whistle-blower protection measures and enhanced cooperation on asset recovery, and more work on denial of safe havens to corrupt officials. It also promoted increased engagement with the private sector to combat corruption. Leaders established an anti-corruption working group to coordinate follow-up and gave it a mandate to report back. The public report at the Cannes Summit in July 2011 revealed important signs of progress, such as the adoption of new foreign bribery legislation in China, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom, and India’s ratification of UNCAC. The G20 could be a significant positive force for continued action, uniquely bringing together the largest economies, including emerging countries whose economic growth and political influence make them indispensable players.

What this mosaic should convey is that the world is interested in combating corruption as never before. Success is far from assured: Indicators, themselves imperfect, show a very mixed record of achievement around the world. One observer has compared combating corruption to mowing grass – a job that never ends. Countries are often better at adopting laws than applying them. It’s hard work to build and sustain strong, independent institutions. Political will can wane, and increasing transparency and public oversight can be challenging in many places. (This overview has focused on government; another article of equal length would be necessary to do justice to the often valiant efforts of civil society, including the pioneering Transparency International, other NGOs and business.) But the wide range of activity at all levels – global, regional and national – reflects an earnestness to take on corruption and a refusal to accept business as usual. The corrupt are on notice – looking at Europe and the world, the game is definitely on.  

2. The list of enforcement actions maintained by the U.S. Department of Justice is available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/ftpa/cases/cia.html  
3. Presidential Proclamation 7750, one of the authorities for such denial of entry, can be found at http://eедocket.access.gpo.gov/2004/pdf/04-957.pdf  
4. For example, Illinois governor Rod Blagojevich was sentenced to 14 years in December 2011 after he was convicted of 18 corruption charges.  
5. www.oecd.org/daf/nocorruption/convention  
7. For details, see http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/ftpa/cases/siemens-aktiengesellschaft.html  
10. For the text of the convention, parties, and other background, see http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/.  
11. Countries to be reviewed each year are listed at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/ CAC/country-pairings-year-1-of-the-review-cycle.html  
13. Including, in Western and Eastern Europe, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Georgia, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and Ukraine.  
18. https://www.interpol.int/Public/Corruption/AssetRecovery.asp  
23. www.oecd.org/corruption/acn  
The crimes of human trafficking and smuggling aren’t always portrayed accurately.

By Michael Donofrio, Marshall Center
Law enforcement may fail to recognize the victims of human trafficking as they often emerge as undocumented individuals, unlawfully present in a given country, and are frequently involved in adjunct criminal activity. Discerning the victims of human trafficking from the onset of their initial encounter with law enforcement is critical to developing a successful prosecution of the organizations and individuals involved in trafficking humans. Immediately deporting or placing the victims into criminal justice systems will likely impede the ability to successfully investigate and prosecute trafficking organizations successfully. Additionally, failing to recognize the physical and psychological trauma that the victims may be experiencing will often limit their cooperation with law enforcement. Several misconceptions are pervasive throughout law enforcement communities and civil societies worldwide that impede the effective investigation and prosecution of trafficking organizations. This article seeks to address some of those common fallacies.

**FALLACY #1:**
*Human trafficking and human smuggling are the same type of criminal activity.***

On the contrary, human trafficking and human smuggling are completely different types of crimes. Human smuggling involves the facilitation, transportation, or illegal entry of a person across an international border in an effort to evade a particular country’s immigration laws. Human smuggling is often conducted to provide a material benefit to the person being smuggled, benefits such as employment, education, health services and reunification with family. Human smuggling generally occurs with the consent of the person being smuggled. In fact, that individual may often hire a smuggling guide to assist him with his illegal entry into another country. In human smuggling, once a person arrives he is often free to leave and enter the economy, make social arrangements, and participate in the commerce of the country he has illegally entered.

Human trafficking, on the other hand, is about the exploitation of victim. The victims of human trafficking are mere commodities to the criminal organizations that smuggle them. Human trafficking victims are almost always forced into labor or employment against their will. They are frequently not free to leave the supervision of their controller and typically have their identification documents taken from them (Lehman & Janssens 2007). Human trafficking victims are often kept incommunicado from their families. Entry to another country for a human trafficking victim is often done under some type of fraud, coercion, force or threat.

On occasion, the differences blur as people who initially paid to be smuggled into a country find they are not released after entry, but rather held captive until additional smuggling fees are supplied. Under this type of scenario, human smuggling may morph into crimes that range from unlawful restraint to kidnapping. Unless additional smuggling fees or ransoms are paid to the smugglers, threats of violence and actual violence may befall the subject of the smuggling venture.

**FALLACY #2:**
*Illegal entrants are undocumented.*

This is frequently not the case. Illegal entrants often have identity documents, but are lacking identity documents that would allow them to enter or remain in a given country after a certain period. Illegal entrants frequently possess identification, including licenses, identity cards and passports, but they lack documentation immigration authorities require.

For example, a student lawfully entering on a student visa drops out of school or stays beyond the time authorized by the visa. The student maintains his passport (with an expired or invalid visa) and other identity documents, but no longer possesses the required documentation to stay lawfully in a country. Similarly, when illegal aliens are arrested along the southwest border in the United States, they frequently possess driver’s licenses, fishing licenses, passports, Matricula Consular cards, or other identification documents. Matricula Consular cards are documents Mexican Consulates issue to Mexican citizens who do not reside in Mexico. However, they have no relevance to an individual’s immigration status.

Individuals without immigration documents allowing them lawful admission and/or presence in a country are often subject to deportation.

**FALLACY #3:**
*An international border must be crossed for a crime to qualify as human smuggling or human trafficking.*

Human smuggling does require crossing an international border as the intent of this crime is to evade the immigration laws of the country where entry is made. In human
trafficking, although crossing an international border is frequently a part of the crime, it is not a necessary element of the crime. Human trafficking can occur within a single town, province, state, district or country.

**FALLACY #4:**
*Human trafficking victims are always involved in other criminal activities.*

Many victims of human trafficking may become involved in ensuing criminal activity, but this is often not the case. Although human trafficking victims engage in prostitution, drug abuse, robberies, identity theft, and many other crimes, others may work under compulsion in venues like sweatshops, construction sites, farms or private homes as au pairs or servants. These individuals may never attempt, or commit, any subsequent crimes while they remain victims of human trafficking.

**FALLACY #5:**
*Human trafficking victims know exactly what they are getting themselves into.*

Human trafficking victims are often subjected to fraud by relatives, close friends, employment agencies and others. The literature is replete with examples of young women forced into prostitution after thinking they would be taking legitimate jobs such as waitressing and travel guides. There are also frequent depictions of relatives holding victims as captives in domestic servitude after enticing them with offers of high pay and short hours, or soliciting them as au pairs. Employment agencies often gain notoriety in cases where they advertise for employment in jobs that do not exist with the intent of enticing victims into human trafficking and the forced labor that often emanates from it. In some extreme cases of human trafficking, the victims may not even know where they are or what country they are in (Finnegan 2008).

Once in the world of human trafficking, victims are often subjected to threats, violence, physical and emotional abuse, disease, captivity, and situations that they could not even have imagined when they responded to an advertisement for employment abroad. Men, children and women may all fall prey to human traffickers.

**FALLACY #6:**
*Human trafficking victims are always harshly treated during transportation.*

Criminal organizations certainly have used almost unthinkable means to transport human trafficking victims. Reports of victims dying while being held in ocean containers or locked commercial trucks or being forced to cross through unforgiving terrain are not uncommon. However, the criminal trafficking element has come to realize that a worker who has not been subjected to extreme duress will likely be more profitable. A concept referred to as “soft trafficking” has become more prevalent, wherein a victim might just be given a plane ticket, rail ticket, or some other public means of transport (Finnegan 2008).

Certainly, when a victim is falsely enticed by employment opportunities, they are much more willing to travel voluntarily for what they believe is their personal betterment. Only when they arrive in the trafficking venue, see their promised job evaporate, and are faced with living, often in a strange land and stripped of their identity documents, do threats, violence, and other coercive means come into play to keep them under the control of the traffickers.

**FALLACY #7:**
*Human trafficking victims want help from law enforcement.*

Cooperation from human trafficking victims becomes almost an imperative in successfully prosecuting trafficking organizations. Unfortunately, human trafficking victims often are extremely distrustful of law enforcement (Bales & Lize 2007). They may be fleeing a country where police corruption is pervasive, or be running away from personal or economic oppression in their homelands. As noted earlier, human trafficking victims may be involved in other criminal activity and thus do not want the knowledge of that criminal activity to become apparent to law enforcement. Others, because of their circumstances, may refuse to trust anyone they encounter. The mental and physical anguish they have been subjected to may be overwhelming. When sex trafficking victims escape from their exploiters, they often go to nongovernmental organizations instead of law enforcement (Moosy 2009). Law enforcement practitioners must recognize the potentially fragile state of human trafficking victims when they are initially encountered.

**CONCLUSION**

Differentiating the crimes of human smuggling and human trafficking is the first step toward effective law enforcement efforts against human trafficking organizations. As trafficking organizations are often difficult to penetrate, the effective use of victim-witnesses to provide relevant evidence can be an invaluable tool. Furthermore, understanding the nature and scope of the situations human trafficking victims may find themselves trapped in will increase law enforcement’s ability to recognize and address their needs appropriately. Law enforcement should consider providing legal, psychological and limited economic support to the victim-witnesses of human trafficking in conjunction with appropriate non-governmental organizations. Countries may also be able to provide incentives to cooperating victim-witnesses such as stays of deportation, visas, temporary residency or even permanent residency. Law enforcement must continue to recognize that without the cooperation of human trafficking victims, prosecution of the trafficking organizations is often much more problematic.

The next issue of *Per Concordiam* will focus on migration and its impact on security.

**Sources:**


Changing of the Guard in Turkey

Is the resignation of Turkey’s top military commanders a cause for optimism or concern?

By per Concordiam Staff

The July 29, 2011, resignations of Turkey’s leading military officers triggered a political earthquake in a country that since its founding in 1923 has looked to its army, navy and air force for stability and secularization. Gen. İşik Koşaner, chief of the Turkish General Staff, relinquished his post to protest what he called the persecution of hundreds of military officers accused of plotting a 2003 coup against the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The heads of the army, navy and air force resigned along with Koşaner, displacing the nation’s entire high command. Few doubt that the new military leadership endorsed by Erdoğan will be more closely aligned and integrated with the AKP, ending the Turkish military’s 90-year role as an independent government watchdog and power broker.
But opinion is divided over the deeper meaning of Erdoğan's power play with the military. Some maintain that relegating the Turkish armed forces to a secondary role in society is a healthy step for a nation hoping to build democratic credentials for membership in the European Union. As recently as 1980, the Turkish military ousted an elected government and altered the nation's constitution, the third time it had done so. But others wonder whether the AKP, with its roots as a traditionalist Islamic party, is more interested in consolidating power by removing the largest single obstacle to societal dominance. They point out how the Erdoğan administration has jailed journalists, academics and businessmen who publically criticize the government. Hundreds of military officers – including nearly half of the nation's admirals – remained jailed as of late 2011.

“Turkey has been exchanging a military form of authoritarianism for civilian authoritarianism,” Gareth Jenkins, a British security affairs expert based in Istanbul, said in the Guardian in February 2011. “What we have seen in the last couple of years is blatant political persecution, suppression of the free press and people being thrown in jail without knowing what they are charged with.”

But how will the shifting balance of power between Turkey’s government and military affect the country’s relationship not just with NATO, but with its neighbors in the region? Turkey’s NATO membership dates back to 1952, and many of the imprisoned military officers came of age during a time of close Turkish-Western cooperation. On the other hand, the country’s new chief of staff, Gen. Necdet Özel, is a lesser known figure among Alliance members. Even before the recent transition in military leadership, Turkey’s foreign policy had begun to tilt more towards the East.

As a columnist in Turkey’s Hürriyet newspaper wrote in August 2011: “Policy differences between the AKP and the military are likely to melt away, with the two joining around a nationalist foreign policy line incorporating a powerful non-Western stance, which the AKP has implemented to make the country a regional power.”

Many scholars, journalists and politicians who track Turkey are not alarmed by the country’s seeming about-face. They insist Turkey is resuming its role as interlocutor between the West and the Middle East, trusted in the Islamic world for its leadership hearkening back to the Ottoman Empire and in the West for being a democratic republic vying for membership in the EU.

Erdoğan, President Abdullah Gül and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu have pursued what they describe as a “zero problems” policy with Turkey’s neighbors. Not only has Turkey taken steps towards normalizing relations with historical rival Armenia, it has negotiated deals in Lebanon, sent provincial reconstruction teams to Afghanistan, promised cultural autonomy to Turkish Kurds and pressed for an end to Syria’s dictatorship.

Turkey has welcomed Iraq’s new democratic government and is drafting a free trade agreement with Baghdad. In a bid for EU acceptance, the country is striving to improve relations with Greece, including the opening of an international gas pipeline linking the two nations. In the summer of 2011, the government announced it would pay restitution to Armenian, Greek and Syrian Christians dispossessed of their churches, businesses and homes in the early days of
the republic, a decision encouraged by the European Court of Human Rights.

In September 2011, Turkey and the U.S. announced they would share leadership of the new Global Counterterrorism Forum, aimed at preventing violent radicalization in countries emerging from authoritarian rule in the so-called “Arab Spring.”

“Although on the surface, it looks like the country is abandoning western leanings, the reality is far more complicated,” scholar Fadi Hakura wrote in a story for London-based think tank Chatham House. “Following the end of the Cold War twenty years ago, some sort of re-alignment was inevitable. Turkey was bound to re-integrate economically and politically into the Middle East and Eurasia.”

But the AKP’s move toward greater civilian control of the military has created anxiety in one of the Islamic world’s most secular nations, where founding father Mustafa Kemal Atatürk installed a staunchly secular form of government in 1923 to replace the old Ottoman sultanate and caliphate.

Traditional turbans and head scarves were forcefully discouraged, and Atatürk adopted the Latin alphabet for a language that had previously used Arabic script.

Despite its reformist agenda that has helped modernize Turkey’s economy, the AKP appears to represent a culturally conservative force in a country that isn’t always tolerant of opposing views. Dozens of journalists have been jailed and accused of conspiring against the government, leading some European media outlets to accuse Erdoğan of “Putinism,” a reference to Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. “The dubious arrests have thrown further doubt on the extent of press freedoms in the EU candidate country,” Der Spiegel wrote after one of the latest series of journalist arrests in March 2011.

After winning a third term in office with the parliamentary elections of June 2011, Erdoğan’s immediate goal was to amend the Turkish constitution imposed by the military after the 1980 coup. He has spoken in favor of a system featuring a strong president similar to France’s instead of
the largely ceremonial presidency now held by Gül. Should Turkey approve the new form of government—a move the EU generally supports—Erdoğan would likely stand for the presidency. Lacking the necessary votes to alter the constitution, the AKP will need to partner with other parties if it wants to complete the job by 2012.

As for Turkey’s EU aspirations, the country began negotiating for inclusion in 2005, but as of 2011 had met fewer than half of the economic, political and legal credentials for membership. “Negotiations have been stalled for some time, with no real movement in more than a year,” Der Spiegel wrote in the summer of 2011. Sticking points have included judicial reform, food safety, environmental policy and agricultural reform. In addition, the recent financial crisis in neighboring Greece likely reduced the EU’s appetite for taking on new members, particularly those from the same region. Leading EU members such as Germany have proposed a “privileged partnership” status for Turkey shy of full membership. The sluggish fulfillment of its EU ambitions has likely led Turkey to seek greater economic integration with Eastern partners.

“This is most visible in the altering foreign trade picture,” Chatham House’s Hakura wrote. “In 2008 Turkey’s trade with the EU dropped below fifty percent for the first time, while that same year Middle Eastern countries accounted for 8.7 percent of its imports and 19.3 percent of its exports—both record figures.”

Another disagreement with the EU emerged in mid-2011, when Turkey threatened it would temporarily suspend relations with Brussels to protest Greek-controlled Cyprus’ elevation to the rotating EU presidency in July 2012. Turkey occupies the northern part of Cyprus, and the EU has encouraged reunification of the Greek and Turkish sections of the island. Analysts and journalists suggest such disagreements are signs that Erdoğan’s government is adopting a more activist foreign policy in the eastern Mediterranean, a supposition bolstered by the AKP’s attempts to wrench greater control from the Kemalist military.

“In Turkey, the elected governments have never been the real power,” Turkish newspaper editor Yasemin Čongar told The Washington Post after the chief of staff changeover. “That’s what’s changing now. It’s kind of an unwritten law that they always abide by the military. It’s the founder of the republic, guardian of the regime, guardian of secularism. Now it’s changing a bit. But it’s a very, very hard process.”

Former Turkish chief of staff Gen. İlker Koşaner, left, attends a wreath laying ceremony with Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan in late 2010. Koşaner resigned in mid-2011 to protest the Turkish government’s arrest of military officers.

Relatives of Turkish military officers arrested on suspicions of trying to overthrow the country’s democratically elected government protest in 2011. Hundreds of the country’s top Army and Navy officers have been charged with plotting a coup, charges some Turks insist are politically motivated.
Takings on Trafficking

The Central Asian Counternarcotics Initiative promises a united front against opiates

By per Concordiam Staff

On August 9, 2011, police in Tajikistan arrested three men and seized nearly 32 kilograms of heroin. The three men – a Tajik, a Russian and a Kyrgyz – formed a multiethnic gang representative of the regional spread of heroin trafficking. Almost daily, opium and its derivative heroin are smuggled out of Afghanistan into Central Asia en route to Russia and Western Europe, leaving a trail of crime and drug addiction. A month before that big arrest, the United States Department of State put forth a new plan to intensify the fight against drug trafficking in Central Asia. “The new Central Asian Counternarcotics Initiative (CACI) would establish counternarcotics task forces in the five Central Asian countries (Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan) that would collaborate with similar units that already exist in Afghanistan and Russia,” according to an article in World Politics Review. The U.S. State Department would pay for training of personnel and purchase much-needed equipment. Successful implementation of CACI would create a law enforcement network that, World Politics Review noted, “would link both the main narcotics source country, Afghanistan, with key transit countries,” allowing authorities to tackle the narcotics trafficking problem from multiple angles.
A counternarcotics specialist embedded with the U.S. Marines in Helmand province, Afghanistan, speaks with an Afghan opium poppy farmer and his sons.

“According to a 2010 report from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan produces 85 percent of the world’s heroin, and almost one-fourth of that is exported through post-Soviet Central Asia.”
A GROWING PROBLEM

According to a 2010 report from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Afghanistan produces 85 percent of the world’s heroin, and almost one-fourth of that is exported through post-Soviet Central Asia. There are concerns in the region that the impending drawdown of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan could be a boon for traffickers, leading to an increase in the exportation of opiates.

Russia, struggling with an epidemic of heroin addiction, is especially concerned. According to UNODC estimates, 1.6 million to 1.7 million Russians use illegal opiates, representing 1.68 percent of the population. Viktor Ivanov, director of Russia’s Federal Service for Narcotics Traffic Control, thinks the numbers could be even higher. More than 30,000 Russians die from drug abuse every year, mostly from heroin. Ivanov told The Independent in 2009 that the heroin addiction epidemic is “a threat to our national security, our society, and our civilization itself.” For Central Asian countries, heroin addiction has often been viewed as a problem for Russians and Europeans. But while the problem hasn’t reached the same crisis level as in Russia, Central Asian countries are also experiencing rising rates of drug use and addiction.

Russia has consistently expressed dissatisfaction with ISAF efforts to curb the cultivation of Afghan opium poppies, a concern that potentially complicates the “reset” of relations between the U.S.-led Alliance and Russia. Ivanov claimed that 2009 poppy production was 44 times higher than before NATO deposed the Taliban in 2001, though that total was cut in half in 2010, mostly thanks to an opium crop disease. Health activists and Western drug treatment experts say Russian policies are partly to blame, pointing to insufficient and largely ineffective drug treatment programs and a culture that shuns treatment. Vanda Felbab-Brown, an expert on the Afghan drug trade at the Brookings Institute, noted that Russia, as successor to the Soviet Union, bears some blame for policies enacted during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. “The Russians destroyed rural Afghanistan,” she told The Washington Post. “Traditional cultivation was destroyed, and poppies, which need no fertilizer and little rain, thrived.”

Now, Russia would like to see an opium eradication program in place in Afghanistan, but the U.S., formerly a supporter, now views eradication as a counterproductive policy that serves only to alienate the local population.

SUCCESS THROUGH COOPERATION

Still, Russia and the U.S. have continued to talk and cooperate. Despite disagreements on strategy, both governments view Afghan heroin trafficking as a serious problem. Five joint counternarcotics raids in Afghanistan from October 2010 to February 2011 netted more than 2,600 kilograms of heroin and opium and destroyed several heroin labs. The raids, conducted by U.S. military, Afghan police and Russian counternarcotics agents, were a positive example of the power of cooperation. Ivanov told Interfax in April
In September 2011, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told ITAR-TASS that he would like to see even greater cooperation between NATO and the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which includes all of the former Soviet Central Asian states except Turkmenistan. “The Alliance currently operates in Afghanistan, and the CSTO has the appropriate force on the outer Afghan border,” said Lavrov. “Interaction in real time could improve the effectiveness of efforts to intercept the flow of narcotics.” The CSTO has conducted regular drug interdiction campaigns, dubbed “Kanal,” in Central Asia.

Tajikistan, the poorest country in the region, shares a 1,300-kilometer border with Afghanistan, much of it in the rugged Pamir Mountains. It is also the most used path for Afghan-grown drugs moving along the northern route to the markets of Russia and the rest of Europe. The Tajik government insists it lacks resources to patrol the border adequately. To a lesser extent, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, Tajikistan’s Central Asian neighbors that also border Afghanistan, have also struggled to impede narcotics trafficking.

The U.S. proposed CACI would help provide those missing resources. According to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, the seven anti-drugs agencies “would share sensitive information, improve coordination on joint and cross-border operations, and help build cases against wanted or arrested traffickers.” In June and July 2011, William Brownfield, U.S. assistant secretary for the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, visited Central Asia and the UNODC to facilitate information exchange and coordinate operational activities of various regional law enforcement agencies, primarily against narcotics trafficking.

CACI also envisions a leading role for the Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre (CARICC), a regional law enforcement center based in Almaty, Kazakhstan. CARICC was formed by regional governments and the UNODC to facilitate information exchange and coordinate operational activities of various regional law enforcement agencies, primarily against narcotics trafficking. CARICC maintains liaison relations with Interpol, Europol and the World Customs Organization.

WILL IT WORK?

Some question whether another initiative and millions of dollars of additional aid will make a significant impact on the narcotics trade in Central Asia. Writing for the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies at George Washington University, professor George Gavrilis asserts that previous initiatives have resulted in only modest returns. Gavrilis blames this on “Central Asian governments’ resilient resistance to cooperating with one another even in the face of mutual security threats.” He’s also critical of claims that the international community is indifferent to Central Asia’s narcotics problems and their need for additional money to fight drugs. “The United States, European Union, and UN have extended counter-narcotics assistance to Central Asian republics that cumulatively totals in the hundreds of millions of dollars,” he notes. “Diverging interests” – not money shortages – have stymied cooperation among Central Asian governments, Gavrilis said.

Russia advocates more cooperation, but has expressed skepticism about CACI. According to World Politics Review, many Russians dislike the U.S. taking a prominent role in an area where the CSTO and UNODC have usually taken the lead. Russia considers the former Soviet republics to be within its privileged area of interest and opposes even the smallest U.S. military presence in the area. Russia prefers the U.S. focus on building law enforcement and counternarcotics capacity in Afghanistan. Brownfield told Radio Free Europe that the U.S. and Russia share an interest in curtailing drugs and CACI “does not require a massive presence by either the United States or the Russian Federation.”

NO SMALL MATTER

There is plenty at stake in the battle against Afghan narcotics trafficking. Ivanov estimates that Afghan heroin is responsible for more than 1 million deaths worldwide since 2001. Opiates are a major public health problem and injecting those drugs contributes to the spread of HIV, hepatitis and other diseases. Opium cultivation also supports international organized crime syndicates and finances terrorist groups. According to the UN, narcotics trafficking is the largest source of revenue for organized crime, and the Afghan opium crop yields tens of billions of dollars in profits for drug dealers. Drugs also contribute to official corruption, damaging public institutions, degrading public services and undermining the population’s trust in public institutions.

To reduce the flow of deadly Afghan narcotics cooperation is needed from all involved parties, regional and international. CACI provides the means to combine the unique talents and experience of security and law enforcement agencies from Afghanistan, Russia and the Central Asian republics, reinforced with advanced training and equipment, to produce the cooperation necessary to reduce the global scourge of opiate trafficking.
A Desperate Trade

The EU remains a magnet for human trafficking, despite some successes at curbing it

By per Concordiam Staff

A 2010 article in *Time* magazine’s world edition introduced Masha, a 19-year-old Ukrainian prostitute plying her trade in the port city of Odessa. Waiting for a chance to grab a ship to Turkey, Masha exemplified the new face of human trafficking in Europe: The sex trade she represents has less to do with kidnapping and violence and more to do with voluntary servitude that enriches criminals and tarnishes the reputations of host countries.
“Nobody takes us by the hair and drags us onto the ships,” Masha told the reporter while motioning to the entrance of the Crimean port. “Those are like the gates to freedom for a lot of us.”

The statistics tell a less enlightening story. In its 2010 report on human trafficking, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime estimates that one in seven of Europe’s hundreds of thousands of prostitutes are victims of trafficking. A sizeable percentage is smuggled from West Africa to Europe, where earnings are confiscated by overseers who hold the women in virtual bondage. Legalization of prostitution throughout much of the European Union has brought some of these women out of the shadows but has left a vast black market unregulated by the state. Even in Amsterdam’s red-light district, one of the continent’s most socially tolerant bastions, politicians are trying to stem the tide of criminality by raising the minimum age of prostitutes to 21 and shutting down many storefront brothels.

“The crime is less often about the flat-out duping and kidnapping of naïve victims than it is about the coercion and exploitation of people who initially entered a particular form of service voluntarily or migrated willingly,” the U.S. State Department announced in its latest annual report that grades each country on its support for anti-human trafficking laws.

Stubborn progress
More than 20 years after the collapse of the Soviet Bloc loosened borders, Europe’s battle to control human trafficking has achieved some tentative victories. Tougher interdiction efforts have cracked down on Macedonian and Albanian depots through which thousands of involuntary prostitutes were handled like cargo, generating stories of sexual slavery, physical brutality and theft. The expansion of the European Union into the Balkans – and the adoption there of EU law – has also helped lessen trafficking from its post-Soviet peaks.

Though not eradicated, such criminality, including sexually oriented indentured servitude, appears to be less of a problem than it was even as late as 2006, governmental and nongovernmental agencies report.

As the most glaring face of the illegal migration problem, Moldova, Europe’s poorest country, has been the focus of anti-trafficking agencies. Success has been mixed. The country, along with its neighbors Romania and Ukraine, allegedly supplies tens of thousands of Western Europe’s prostitutes. In the late 1990s, stories proliferated of sexual servitude in which young women were promised false jobs in the West only to have their passports confiscated by hoodlums who dragooned them into the sex trade.

Few women seem to have any such illusions these days, and much of theodox follows mamachki, or madams, who play on women’s desire for financial security. As Time wrote in late 2010: “The poverty and general hopelessness in many villages of eastern Ukraine, Moldova and Romania now run so deep – especially in the wake of the financial crisis – that the promise of a job as a prostitute abroad is enough to get the vast majority of trafficked women to sign up voluntarily. They follow the mamachki to foreign resorts or big cities in Western Europe, where the prevalence of sex workers from the ex-Soviet Union has earned them a nickname: ‘Natashas.’”

Nigerian connection
Much of the attention has shifted to Africa as a source of prostitutes. A 2007 Danish documentary titled “Trapped” broadcast horror stories of Nigerian women forced into sexual slavery through a trans-Saharan trafficking network delivering victims to hubs in Italy, the Canary Islands, Malta and Denmark. Filmmakers introduced Anna, a Nigerian teenager lured to Denmark by deceitful neighbors who promised her a good job. Instead, she was locked up by a Nigerian madam who insisted Anna pay 60,000 euros to regain her freedom.

“I was so scared to go to the police because if I went to the police, they would send me back to Africa,” Anna told an interviewer.

A five-year study by the Italian National Anti-Mafia Bureau estimates that
“The crime is less often about the flat-out duping and kidnapping of naïve victims than it is about the coercion and exploitation of people who initially entered a particular form of service voluntarily…” – U.S. State Department

Nigerians, most from Edo State in southern Nigeria, constituted nearly three-quarters of Africans active in Italy as sex workers. Nigerian police place the number of their countrymen working in the Italian sex industry at 10,000 to 15,000. While some of these women board flights to Europe, many are transported across the Sahara by gangs using well-worn caravan routes.

The UN reported in 2010 that “the trafficking of women for sex work is one of the few types of migration where a dominant role is indisputably played by professional criminals formed into networks.” Some of the profits reportedly leak into the hands of North African terrorists.

A U.S. Army War College Strategy Research report dubbed human trafficking the world’s fastest-growing criminal enterprise worth about $9.5 billion per year. The report called it the third-largest source of money for organized criminals after arms and drugs.

“An ounce of cocaine wholesale is $1,200 but you can only sell it once,” the report’s author wrote. “A woman or child is $50 to $1,000 but you can sell them each day over and over and over again.”

Legalization discontent
Some European countries have legalized prostitution on the assumption that pimping, exploitation and smuggling would largely vanish in the glare of tolerance and openness. The reality is more complicated.

Legalization has created an underground of undocumented and unregulated prostitutes, most of them foreign, who shun paying taxes and acquiring the necessary immigration or work visas. Only a tiny minority of Germany’s tens of thousands of prostitutes are officially registered. Many of the rest work clandestinely, despite decriminalization of prostitution in 2002.

Officials in Albania, long a hotbed of illegal trafficking in prostitutes, complain legalization in northern European countries can obscure rampant victimization going on under the noses of the authorities. “The legalization of prostitution has created a wall behind which traffickers can hide and repress victims,” one Albanian source told The New York Times in 2009.

In fact, Jane’s Intelligence Review reports that about 15,000 women trafficked through Poland each year end up mostly in Germany and the Netherlands. Most come to Poland legally before criminals confiscate their passports and pressure them to work as prostitutes. The open borders of the EU’s Schengen zone make transporting victims easier.

“Despite the legalisation of prostitution and attempts to provide it with the status of a regular profession with all its rights and obligations, these cases demonstrate that pimps and criminal gangs have not disappeared from the prostitution scene,” Jane’s wrote in 2010.

Fighting the problem
As recently as 2001, the Macedonian town of Velesita produced lurid tales of prostitute “slave auctions,” complete with pimps who enforced obedience with cigarette burns and mass rape. Journalists declared Velesita a hub for moving victims from the Balkans to Western Europe. By 2011, Macedonia’s image had improved.

The U.S. State Department, which maintains the world’s most comprehensive list of country-by-country anti-trafficking efforts, has elevated Macedonia into its top tier category. The State Department cited vigorous prosecution of corrupt officials who had been aiding traffickers, which set “a notable example in the region for addressing official complicity.” One police officer on the traffickers’ payroll was sentenced to eight and a half years in prison.

Nigeria, too, has earned top ranking for its attempted crackdown on the prostitution pipeline originating in the south of the country. In 2003, Nigeria formed an agency called NAPTIP (National Agency for the Prohibition of
Traffic in Persons and other related matters) that devotes 100 police officers to eradicating human trafficking.

Before NAPTIP, Nigeria had no specific laws against such trafficking. Today, its laws are some of the strictest in the world with penalties that include life in prison for exporting or importing girls under the age of 18 for prostitution. Program organizers claim to have prosecuted 100 traffickers and “rehabilitated” more than 5,000 victims by providing shelter and vocational training.

“We shall sweat it out in our actions to combat this evil trade,” NAPTIP executive Simon Chuzi Egede said in a statement. “Our war against human trafficking is not to be pursued with unwarranted aggression or needless violence. It is a war of brain, it is a war of tact, and it is a war of diplomacy while drawing its strength from the rule of law.”

Reacting to rising public disgust with trafficking, some EU members have agreed to stiffen laws against prostitution. Sweden banned the purchase of sex in 1999, although selling sex remains legal, an incompatibility that some prostitutes claim merely pushes the industry into the shadows.

The Netherlands is debating raising the minimum age at which prostitutes can work to 21, on the theory that it would reduce teenaged trafficking victims. The prosecution of six members of a Nigerian trafficking gang in 2009 revealed that 140 mostly underage girls had entered the country with phony asylum papers and were then forced to prostitute themselves across western Europe, Agence France-Presse reported. Stories described how traffickers enlisted traditional voodoo-style religions to cow some of the women into submission.

“The Nigerian criminal group used the Netherlands as a transit country to other destinations, especially Italy and Spain,” Jane’s said in a 2010 article. “The victims were instructed to ask for asylum upon arrival at Schiphol airport and were then picked up by the pimps from asylum centres and put to work in window brothels.”

**Victims of fate**

In the desperate towns near the Black Sea, trafficking appears to be a less violent and abusive affair than it was a decade ago. Groups such as the International Organization for Migration have opened treatment shelters in Moldova that have helped thousands of women. Some of the trafficking has moved to the breakaway province of Transnistria. A New Yorker article reports seeing recruitment ads in Transnistria that no longer worked in Moldova proper. Some deceptively seek the services of nannies “without complexes” to work in the West.

In places like Odessa, most of the prostitutes enrolling to work overseas consider themselves victims of fate rather than victims of oppression, Time said. For all the unpleasantness of such a life, many are attracted to the higher standard of living they observe abroad.

“Reporters always come here demanding to see the victims,” Olga Kostyuk, who runs a charity for Odessa’s sex workers, told a reporter in 2010. “They want to see the men, the pimps, the manipulators behind all of this. But things are not so simple now.”
Upgrading Europe’s Militaries

The EU proposes pooling and sharing to improve security in a cost-cutting age

By per Concordiam Staff

The 27 militaries of the European Union spent 210 billion euros in 2009, more than the combined annual defense budgets of Russia, China, India, Japan and Saudi Arabia. But this seemingly lavish level of military spending hasn’t translated into a degree of military readiness acceptable to EU and NATO leadership.

European helicopter crews take part in Italian Call 11, a 2011 exercise involving more than 50 multinational practice missions. Helicopter training is an area in which European militaries pool and share equipment and expertise.
Consider the evidence of shortfalls and limitations cited by EU military officials in the past year alone:

- NATO members based in the EU felt compelled to withdraw warships from vital naval missions off the coasts of Somalia and Libya. The cited reason: Lack of money.
- The European-led Libyan operation to protect civilians could not have occurred without aerial surveillance and air refueling technology supplied by its North Atlantic partners in the United States.
- EU militaries maintain about 1.7 million personnel in uniform, but are immediately prepared to deploy no more than 100,000 of those Soldiers and Sailors.
- Out of 2,500 combat aircraft available in the EU, only 5 to 10 percent are available to fulfill overseas missions.
- For a recent training mission in Somalia, the EU couldn’t find an available military doctor and needed nonmember Serbia to supply one.

For Gen. Håkan Syrén, the Swedish chairman of the EU Military Committee, these examples represent a “hollowing out” of European defense that could become dangerous in a world beset by security challenges old and new. Military missions abroad, combined with transnational challenges like ballistic missile defense and cybersecurity, will continue to call on the resources of Europe. But those resources are being depleted as the eurozone struggles to balance its budgets. “The conclusion is inescapable although politically inconvenient,” Syrén noted during a presentation to the 10th annual Berlin Security Conference in November 2011.

Fiscal constraints have demanded new approaches. Among the most popular watchwords are “pooling and sharing”—the idea that the 27 militaries of the EU group their resources and coordinate training with one another. Known in NATO circles as “smart defense,” this money-saving policy has achieved a number of recent successes. The establishment of joint NATO strategic airlift air base in Hungary able to accommodate C-17 military transport planes is one example of pooling. So is the British-French proposal to share aircraft carriers, joint French-Belgian pilot training and the decision by Nordic countries to pool intelligence collection in Bosnia.

Along the same lines, NATO has modified former Soviet helicopters for use among its members, replacing some of the 23 different types of not-always-compatible helicopters used in Europe. Revolutionizing its capabilities in intelligence gathering, Germany is equipping its military with Euro Hawk high-altitude reconnaissance planes, technology originally developed for the U.S. military.

Despite these accomplishments, EU military leaders warn that pooling and sharing can’t succeed if nations cut their military budgets too deeply. Between 1999 and 2009, military spending among the 27 members of the EU increased nearly 30 percent, from 163 billion euros to 210 billion euros. But measured as a percentage of the EU’s total economic output, spending plunged nearly 20 percent, far below levels deemed sufficient by NATO. And austerity programs introduced since 2009 promise even deeper cuts. “Pooling and sharing certainly needs to be explored, but that will not compensate for the huge decline in our defence budgets,” Lt. Gen. Ton Van Osch, director general of the EU Military Staff, announced at a defense conference in late 2011.

The case of Slovakia is illustrative. In a press conference in 2011, former Slovak Defense Minister Lubomir Galko pointed out that 86 percent of the country’s already lean defense budget covered obligatory expenses like payroll, taxes and fuel. A scant 4 to 5 percent of military allocations financed expeditions abroad in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Cyprus, and much of the country’s military equipment, some from the Soviet era, was considered outdated. Slovakia joined NATO on the assumption it would spend 2 percent of gross domestic product on defense, but in 2011 spent an estimated 1 percent of GDP. Galko warned that further military cuts in Slovakia could mean nothing less than the “liquidation” of the country’s military.

To focus defense budgets on the essentials, EU militaries like Slovakia’s have phased out conscription on the theory that a solid core of professional Soldiers is preferable to half-trained units of short-timers. Germany is consolidating the commands of its Army, Air Force and Navy in the city of Koblenz. Although such moves save money, they are not enough to protect militaries from depletion.

NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has made “smart defense” a top subject for discussion, going as far as to appoint two special ambassadors to spread the message of pooling and sharing to European capitals. Such cooperation isn’t always easy. Defense procurement is fragmented and vulnerable to national rivalries and deliberate duplication. Overhauling how a particular military equips itself threatens not just national military autonomy, but national economies that rely on defense industry jobs. For example, Europeans are equipping their Air Forces with jet fighters manufactured by four competing companies. Duplication is even more extreme when it comes to ground forces.

“Of 41 large procurement programmes in Europe—those worth more than 1 billion euros—only 11 projects are multinational. There is tremendous waste in European
defence spending; for instance, there are 23 separate armoured-fighting-vehicle programmes for essentially the same type of equipment,” said a 2009 study from the EU Institute for Security Studies titled “European Security and Defence Policy: The First 10 Years.”

Van Osch elaborated further. Of 300 recent pooling and sharing proposals submitted to Brussels, only nine turned out to be workable, he said. And of those nine, more than a third had to do with training and education. In other words, national governments have been reluctant to tackle the issue of duplication of equipment if it means loss of jobs domestically. The European Defence Agency, the EU-wide body created in 2004 to improve military effectiveness, cannot compel member governments to make or cancel purchases of military equipment.

The financial crisis has also put a crimp in the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy, part of the Lisbon Treaty that raised the possibility of a European military force that could act independently of NATO. In reality, not least because of budget constraints, the EU has avoided duplicating NATO’s functions and structure.

At the Berlin Security Conference in November 2011, EU military and civilian leaders reiterated their desire to remain part of the North Atlantic Alliance, but stressed the need for the EU to proceed with forming multinational “battlegroups” each consisting of at least 1,500 soldiers. Germany, Poland and France, as part of their “Weimar Triangle” agreement, are moving forward with creation of a battlegroup by 2013. An “EU battlegroup” of 2,800 troops from six countries should be ready for deployment by the end of 2012 for humanitarian and peacekeeping missions, The European reported in late 2011. The formation of these battlegroups corresponds with NATO’s long-standing desire for more European rapid reaction forces.

The EU envisions each of these battlegroups having a civilian component to solidify Europe’s commitment to “soft power” and humanitarian missions. While supporting civilian-military cooperation, NATO Secretary-General Rasmussen warned Europe against skimping on the military hardware necessary to sustain even soft power: “As a committed European – and a staunch Atlanticist – I find this suggestion at best naïve, and, at worst, dangerous.” Rasmussen said in a 2011 speech, “It is completely out of touch with today’s increasingly complex security environment.”

His concerns were echoed by Jiří Šedivý, the Czech Republic’s first deputy minister of defense. Speaking

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**EUROPEAN MILITARY POOLING INITIATIVES (active and proposed)**

27 EU militaries share resources in various areas

- Helicopter and jet pilot training
- Military transport hubs
- Maritime surveillance
- Satellite surveillance
- Military field hospitals
- Air-to-air refueling
- Smart munitions
to European security officials in late 2011, šedivý urged EU militaries to prepare for an “unprecedented confluence of negative trends” that includes cyber network assaults, missile proliferation and turmoil in the Middle East. Either Europe improves security jointly or it risks returning to a 19th century system of unstable alliances that led to destructive wars in the early 20th century, šedivý said. For Ioan Mircea Pascu, a Romanian member of the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee, shortages of equipment and personnel have led to the troublesome use of “improvised toolkits” to address crises abroad.

Recent news from Europe has given cause for encouragement. After neglecting airlift capacity for decades, European militaries have begun investing in hundreds of A440M aircraft, a smaller continental cousin of the C-17. Many of the A440Ms will be based at the European Air Transport Command in the Netherlands, one of the EU’s major pooling and sharing initiatives. The continent-wide Galileo satellite navigation system, produced by the same consortium that makes civilian Airbus jets, will provide the EU with a sophisticated system for guiding its forces in the field. The formation of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn, Estonia, was among the first joint steps taken to address threats in cyberspace.

“The time has come for a change of mindset regarding cooperation on defense capabilities,” European Defence Agency Chief Executive Claude-France Arnould said at a meeting of EU defense ministers in late 2011. “The question is no longer whether we should cooperate or not. It is now whether we want certain capabilities or not.” □
Guards and prisoners stand in the yard at Somaliland’s new Hargeisa maximum security prison, financed by the United Nations to hold Somali pirates convicted in other countries.
A new prison in Somaliland could aid efforts to curtail sea raiding around the Horn of Africa

By per Concordiam Staff

A new maximum-security prison built to incarcerate pirates opened in March 2011 in the self-ruling enclave of Somaliland. Funded by the United Nations, the prison seeks to relieve the burden of incarceration from nations that prosecute Somali pirates, a prominent reason why partnering nations have been unwilling to prosecute. Piracy hurts the global economy by raising prices on goods, subsidizes extremist organizations and hinders famine relief directed at the pirates’ fellow Somalis. International warships patrolling off the Horn of Africa have arrested thousands of pirates in the last few years; however, only about 10 percent have been prosecuted, perpetuating a cycle Navy officers call “catch and release” that frees pirates at sea to attack again. Ending catch and release sends a clear message that pirates will be prosecuted and raises the stakes of piracy, turning it from an occupation chosen for easy money and low risk to a dangerous livelihood that could result in life in prison.

Security experts agree that part of the solution to curbing piracy off the coast of Somalia lies in prosecution. In March and April of 2010, 275 pirates were captured by European Union naval forces, but only 40 were prosecuted, leaving hundreds of these high-seas robbers unpunished. Navy officers say it’s one reason why pirating in the region persists. Catch and release was never a viable long-term solution, security expert John Pike said in a Voice of America article published in June 2010. “I think if pirates felt they would face serious penalties, either very long jail time or something worse, they would rethink whether this was a good line of work for them to be in,” Pike said. Countries have been reluctant to prosecute because of the expense associated with incarcerating non-nationals in their prisons and out of fear that, upon release, the pirates would seek asylum and become de facto refugees.

Piracy continues to rise

Pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean continue to rise. The number of attacks and hijackings increased in the first three months of 2011 to a record high of 77, up from only 26 in the same period of 2010, Reuters reported in May 2011. Ransoms to free the ships and their crews in 2010 grew to total about $238 million, with one $9.5 million payoff for the release of a South Korean oil tanker in November 2010. Even if pirates seize a small number of ships, the multitude of hostages on board can guarantee plenty of ransom money.

Pirates have expanded their area of attack in the last couple of years to cover the northern part of the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea. They increase operational range by using open skiffs about 6 to 8 meters long and dedicating one as a refueling vessel. Some use a mother ship and tow four to eight skiffs for actual attacks. Until recently, piracy declined during the rainy season from May to September and November to February, but increasingly they have become less deterred by the weather and continue to attack through monsoon season.

The impact of piracy

Evidence is mounting that some pirate ransoms are going into the pockets of the Islamic extremist group al-Shabab. John Steed, military advisor to the UN on counterpiracy, told Reuters in a July 2011 article that “links between armed pirate gangs and Somalia’s al Qaeda-affiliated rebels were gradually firming.” Detained pirates told Alan Cole, a UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) piracy expert, “that some level of cooperation with al-Shabab is necessary to run a criminal enterprise.” Vice Adm. Mark Fox of the U.S. Navy suspects pirates and members of al-Shabab even share training camps, The Wall Street Journal reported in January 2011.

Prices of imported and exported goods have risen as a result of sharp increases in maritime insurance rates and additional fuel costs
Pirates off the Horn of Africa have expanded their area of attack to include the northern Indian Ocean. Often ships will avoid the pirate-infested waters of the Gulf of Aden for a safer but longer route around Africa, adding approximately 2,700 miles to the journey.

Challenges for conviction

Many of the Somali pirates brought to court do not know what a trial or court is. For most, it is the first time they have seen a functional government and justice system. Some are under 18, but determining age is difficult because they usually do not have documentation. If they are younger than 13, they are legally considered incapable of committing a crime, but proving this is difficult. Courts try to determine age by skeletal X-rays and examination of cartilage at the ends of long bones that disappears during adolescence. Malnourishment and hard labor at an early age complicate the analysis. Much weighs on the outcome of scientific experts. If pirates are older than 13, they can be sentenced to long prison terms, even life behind bars if they attempted to murder or killed a hostage. Two Somali men are examples of that. Ali Abdi Mohamed and Burhan Abdirahman Yusuf were sentenced in August 2011 to life in prison for commandeering a yacht that ultimately led to the death of two American couples.

Somali pirates are being convicted by courts around the world, but security experts say the number isn’t high enough to become an effective deterrent. The idea of special international courts to try captured pirates has been introduced. The UN has supported this initiative and called for a courthouse in Somaliland and Puntland, two autonomous regions of Somalia. Jurisdiction has presented challenges. Jailed pirates have been released because courts say the crime occurred out of their jurisdiction. A January 2011 UN report suggested courts apply the principle of “universal jurisdiction”
to try detainees, as the Seychelles and Kenya do, and calls on nations to cooperate in gathering evidence and transferring suspects. Kenya and the Seychelles have prosecuted dozens of pirates but can’t handle the entire load. Somaliland and Puntland have also been suggested as locations for the international pirate courts. “Tackling piracy should take place chiefly in Somalia,” said Jack Lang, UN special advisor on legal issues related to piracy. Warships patrolling the waters of the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean operate under the framework of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and Security Council resolutions. The Law of the Sea, signed in 1982 by 150 countries, says countries are allowed to seize and prosecute those committing piracy on the high seas. However, maritime law experts say it doesn’t take into account failed states like Somalia, and question what happens when pirates act within territorial waters or neighboring waters and the nation is incapable of securing its territory.

Yemen, the United States, Germany, the Netherlands, and other countries have convicted pirates in their courts. When a ship sails, a crime committed against it is considered a crime against that country; the ship represents a floating part of that country. Prison sentences range from five years to life. The U.S. in particular has used stern prison sentences to dissuade pirates from attacking a U.S. vessel. “Today’s sentences should send a clear message to those who attempt to engage in piracy: Armed attacks on U.S.-flagged vessels carry severe consequences in U.S. courts,” Neil MacBride, U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, said in a Reuters 2011 article after five men were convicted for trying to attack an American warship off Africa in 2010.

KEY INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Resource-sharing partnerships and international cooperation have reduced the number of successful attacks in the Gulf of Aden and surrounding Somali waters. NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield, the EU’s Naval Force Somalia-Operation Atalanta, and the multinational Task Force 151, are making strides to curtail Indian Ocean piracy. The UN, the EU, the Arab League and NATO have joined efforts to fight piracy, involving countries such as Pakistan, the United States, Somalia, Djibouti, Australia, China, South Korea, Egypt, Japan, Russia and Singapore.

Cooperation on the high seas has paid off. In 2004, the Malacca Straits near Indonesia suffered from the second highest number of pirate attacks in the world; today the problem has virtually vanished. Recognizing that piracy is transnational and difficult to defeat single-handedly, nations began sharing intelligence, policing their own territorial waters, and using airplanes to scout for pirates. The decision by the governments of Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore to share responsibility and pool resources has almost eradicated piracy in the Malacca Straits.

NON-NATIONALS PRISON DILEMMA

While the Somaliland prison provides a cooperative solution, there are kinks that still need to be worked out. The prison serves as a model for the region, and its conditions are far better than other Somali prisons. It can accommodate 460 inmates, and in March 2011 already held 300 pirates. As of late 2011, the prison held only native Somalilanders convicted of piracy. Somali authorities are not yet willing to accept transfers of non-nationals. Piracy expert Roger Middleton of the British think tank Chatham House is optimistic that this will change: “[T]here is a fairly good chance that some kind of agreement can be reached, a bit like what happened with Kenya, to take some pirates even if they are ‘foreign.’ ” Puntland has reached an agreement with the UN to accept pirates convicted abroad, but their prisons are full. Cole, the UNODC piracy expert, hopes Somaliland would agree to take overseas pirates as well.

Piracy experts look favorably upon the prison opening and believe it plays a critical role in tackling piracy. “The opening of Hargeisa Prison symbolizes a key action in helping to significantly boost anti-piracy efforts on a regional level and addresses concerns from neighboring countries over housing convicted pirates in their prisons,” a March 2011 UNODC news release said. The Seychelles Ministry of Foreign Affairs affirms that “piracy must be addressed by assisting the Somali authorities in tackling piracy within their own country and in establishing the rule of law. Workable and reliable prison infrastructures within Somalia, exactly as the UNODC is doing, is part of this important process.”

A Kenyan court in November 2010 ordered the release of nine suspected Somali pirates, saying Kenya lacks jurisdiction to try them for crimes committed outside its territory. Disputes over jurisdiction often prevent prosecution of pirates.
British Olympic organizers not only have to deal with the shadows of Olympics past, including the notorious kidnappings at the 1972 Munich Games, but also recent threats exemplified by the 2005 London terror bombings and the 2011 riots that raged across the British capital. Britain’s multiyear effort to provide a safe and inviting experience for more than 10,000 athletes from 200 countries will cost a minimum of 750 million euros, making it the nation’s biggest domestic security operation since World War II. Should the British model work as planned, the Russians could emulate it when they host the Winter Olympics in Sochi in 2014, an event violent extremists have publicly vowed to disrupt.

“It is the basic feeling to have a sense of security but it is equally important not to exaggerate. Not to curtail the rights of those visiting. Not to have seven or eight controls and have 2 to 3 hours of travel time,” Helmut Spahn, former head of security for the 2006 World Cup soccer championships in Germany, told Reuters in story about the Olympics in September 2011. “You don’t have to see security. It can operate in the background. Successful events will be those that have flexible plans, prepared for every scenario.”

Years of Preparation

Britain has spent years honing its safety and security strategy for the games that will run from July 27 to August 12. Organizers have installed thousands of video surveillance cameras, hundreds of X-ray machines, 17 kilometers of electrified perimeter fences and other equipment into the infrastructure of its Olympic venues centered on East London. Armed unmanned aircraft, road and railroad surveillance, Royal Navy warships moored on the Thames River: All are meant to deter and, if necessary, combat any attempts at violent extremism.

As many as 15,000 private security guards could join more than 10,000 police officers to guarantee the safety of spectators and athletes in 34 locations spread around the Greater London area. Britain’s Home Office even established an Olympic Security Directorate that, if necessary, could tap the more than 1 billion euros contained in the government’s annual counterterrorism budget.

A national emergency committee has staged exercises mimicking threats to the Olympics. One event in September 2011, a month after the London riots, tried to anticipate a slew of disruptive scenarios. “We are going through the whole gamut – from food poisoning to terrorism through to heat waves and rail disruption,” Alaric Bonthron of the London Metropolitan Police Service told The Associated Press. “We have to understand how we manage the games in those situations.”

Troubled History

As the Olympic Games have evolved, so has the security apparatus needed to protect them. The games in the early part of the 20th century came off largely without violence, but by mid-century that began to change. The kidnapping of Israeli athletes that tarnished the 1972 Munich Summer Olympics was the most notorious from the standpoint of violence, but less well-known are the deadly riots that occurred on the eve of the Mexico City Games in 1968. Police and soldiers opened fire on mostly student protestors in the city center while athletes rested 11 miles (18 km) away in the Olympic Village in the suburbs of the Mexican capital. Hundreds died.

Pre-Olympic rioting – with none of the deadliness of Mexico City – also affected the 1988 Olympics in Seoul, South Korea. In 1996, an explosion from a pipe bomb at the Atlanta Summer Olympics in the United States killed...
one person. The extent to which security has taken center stage is easily illustrated: Organizers of the 2004 Olympics in Athens – three years after the 9/11 attacks reignited fears of terrorists committing mass murder – spent 10 times more for security than was spent on the Atlanta games.

**Britain’s security strategy**

London police were subjected to an unwanted trial run in reacting to the riots of August 2011, when the shooting of a London man set off violence, arson and looting as far away as Manchester and Birmingham. Police were criticized for acting too timidly at the beginning of the two weeks of mayhem, though 16,000 officers that swarmed the capital eventually restored order by making thousands of arrests. “We are still reviewing everything post-riots to make sure we have learned the lessons,” Bonthron said.

For Olympic security coordinator Chris Allison, assistant commissioner in the London police, one lesson was the need to broaden the security screen to take in sites outside the Olympic sports arenas. Otherwise, Allison warned, these more thinly patrolled areas could become “soft targets” for terrorists. “If there is a soft target 200 yards down the road from the main venue, and it’s got a couple of Olympic rings over the top of it, that’s where the baddies are going to go to,” Allison told The Associated Press in September 2011.

It’s not lost upon British organizers that the so-called London “tube” bombings of July 2005, in which 52 people were killed, occurred the day after the International Olympic Committee awarded the games to London.

A longer-term British strategy has been the use of the government’s Prevent program to suppress domestic Muslim extremism by subsidizing mainstream voices with a nonviolent outlook. Prevent-financed programs claim to have steered dozens of people away from violent extremism since 2007. “Radicalisation awareness among members of the public was a crucial factor leading to the arrest of aspiring suicide bomber Andrew Ibrahim of Westbury-on-Trym, Bristol, in 2008,” Jane’s Intelligence Review wrote. “Patrons of Ibrahim’s local mosque … alerted the authorities after noticing suspicious burns to his hands and feet. It turned out that he had had an accident handling peroxide-based explosives for a planned suicide bombing.”

**Assisting Russia**

The Russian Olympic organizers hosting the Sochi Winter Games in 2014 will likely learn from the British experience. Violent post-Soviet separatist movements based in the Caucasus have claimed credit for many acts of terrorism, including the 2011 bombing at Domodedovo airport in Moscow. Reuters reported that Caucasus terrorists have threatened to take their lethal campaign to the “Russian heartland” and have “levelled threats at the 2014 Winter Olympics, scheduled for the Black Sea resort town of Sochi, a region some militants consider ‘occupied.’ ”

The need for British-Russian security cooperation was made clear in a September 2011 visit to Moscow by British Prime Minister David Cameron. In fact, information sharing between past and future host countries has become an Olympic tradition. The Chinese hosts of the Beijing Olympics of 2008 learned about security from the Greek hosts of the Athens Olympics of 2004. As it prepares to hand off the Olympic torch to Britain, China has shared some know-how. “Of course, Britain and Russia are both hosting the next Summer and Winter Olympic Games, so I’m sure we’ll be working together on those,” the prime minister said. “I hope we can share experience of running a successful London 2012 to help Russian preparations for the Sochi Winter Olympics in 2014.”
This page: Gen. Suhaila Siddiqi arrives at a command center for earthquake aid efforts in March 2002 in Nahrin, Afghanistan.

Opposite, left: Afghan National Army Brig. Gen. Rahimi Razia, Chief Nurse of the ANA, tells a reporter in October 2010 that she plans to visit all five ANA medical centers.

Women in Afghanistan are breaking out of their traditional roles and becoming military generals, cabinet members and surgeons. Once punished for venturing out of their homes without a male escort, they are acquiring more freedom to contribute to the protection and development of their country. This modern generation of female leaders, including Gen. Suhaila Siddiqi, Brig. Gen. Rahimi Razia and Gen. Khatool Mohammadzai, are viewed as pioneers who have overturned stereotypes in this male-dominated society.

Gen. Siddiqi is a woman of firsts in Afghanistan. She was one of a select few female generals in the Afghan National Army (ANA), one of the first women to hold an Afghan government cabinet position as health minister in 2001, and one of the few prominent women who declined to wear a traditional burqa. “The General,” or “General Suhaila” as she is known, graduated with a doctorate in endoscopic medicine from the Medical School of Moscow State University in 1961 and climbed through the medical corps ranks during her 39 years in the army. She is Afghanistan’s most respected surgeon, according to the BBC, and is credited with saving hundreds of lives.
Gen. Siddiqi openly fought against the Taliban's suppression of women and children, and told The Times of London that priority should be given to primary school education, the economy and reconstruction of the country. She believes that women should obey Islamic law, but that men and women are equal under its tenants. The general negotiated with the Taliban to return to her medical post after they had banished her and all women to their homes. She agreed to return on the condition that she and her sister, Shafiaq, were released from the burqa requirement. The Taliban relented.

The new Afghan government agrees with the general’s noncompulsory burqa policy. “Already, more women are showing their faces in public,” she told the Los Angeles Times. “Many have become used to the burqa and are still afraid to go out without it. But this is a matter of habit, and it cannot survive.” Despite the Afghan government abandoning the burqa requirement, its use remains widespread for cultural and religious reasons.

Gen. Siddiqi comes from a royal Pashtun family that produced Afghanistan’s exiled king Zahir Shah-Siddiqi. Her older sister, Mastura, taught medicine at Kabul University and Gen. Siddiqi followed in her footsteps, graduating first in her class. Upon graduation she immediately started working for the Russian-built Four Hundred Bed hospital in Kabul. She climbed the ranks and became the highest ranking woman in the Afghan Army at that time. While many well-connected Afghan families fled the country for a more comfortable exile, she stayed. “It is a matter of pride for me. I stayed in my country, and I served my people. I never fled abroad,” she told the Guardian.

Brig. Gen. Rahimi Razia followed a similar path into the high ranks of the Afghan military. She is steadfastly committed to Afghanistan and has served 38 years as a military nurse. She currently serves as chief nurse of the ANA. Brig. Gen. Razia serves as a powerful mentor to nurses, medical professionals and women across Afghanistan. She represents nurses at the ANA Office of the Surgeon General and helps set policy for the five regional hospitals – in Kabul, Herat, Kandahar, Paktya and Mazar-e-Sharif – that make up the ANA hospital system.

The task confronting Brig. Gen. Razia is enormous. The nation’s health care system can be primitive. “Nearly three decades of war and religious extremism have devastated medical libraries and crippled the educational system for doctors, nurses and other health professionals,” The New York Times reported in September 2010.

The Taliban destroyed medical textbooks during their rule from 1996 to 2001, objecting to human anatomical illustrations they considered blasphemous. Doctors in Afghanistan were left without reference books such as Physicians’ Desk Reference to aid in prescribing medicine and performing medical procedures. Surviving books show Taliban bullet damage. Medical reference book donations from the University of California, Los Angeles, have helped restock the shelves of Kabul Medical University.

Brig. Gen. Razia launched Afghanistan’s first military vaccine program in 2005 to improve the health of ANA Soldiers and protect them from historically debilitating diseases that weaken their ability to fulfill their missions. After reviewing cost, logistics and disease impact, her staff started vaccinating for polio, typhoid, MMR (measles, mumps and rubella) and meningitis. The goal is for every ANA Soldier to receive the vaccines. “If our army is not a healthy army, they would not be able to do their duties well,” Brig. Gen. Ghulam Sakhi Affi said at the opening ceremony of the program, reported and published on the Sunni Forum website.

In October 2010, Brig. Gen. Razia initiated a grand tour of the ANA medical system, starting with Paktya Regional Medical Hospital. “The good things I saw here included the friendship with the nurses with each other and the leadership. Also, I found that the hospital was very clean. ... This is the best hospital I’ve seen in my visit,” she was quoted as saying in an International Security Assistance Force-Afghanistan news article.

Gen. Mohammadzai is a trailblazer as well. As a paratrooper, Gen. Mohammadzai has more than 500 jumps to her name. On March 21, 2005, in celebration of Afghan
New Year’s Day, she parachuted holding a sign that said: “We want education, employment and salaries for widows, orphans and handicapped people.”

“Becoming a general, especially in Afghanistan as a female, is not an easy thing. I wanted to work hard and show other Afghan females that a woman can be a general,” she told Haseena Sullaiman, an Afghan journalist. “I had to work very hard; sometimes I was even scared for my life. I still went ahead and did it.”

Gen. Mohammadzai grew up in a wealthy and educated family, but now lives modestly with her sister and son. Her husband was killed during the Soviet war when their son was only 40 days old. Throughout her career she faced death more than once, being fired upon, poisoned and nearly killed by a malfunctioning parachute. She holds a black belt in three martial arts, is a trained commando and is highly skilled in weapons. She recalls the frustrations of Taliban rule, when she was restricted to her home. What hurt most during her confinement was being unable to wear her uniform and go to the barracks, she told the U.A.E. news organization The National in January 2011. Among her main responsibilities today is running the Afghan Army’s female sports teams.

Thanks in part to the trailblazing efforts of those three female generals, the ANA is recruiting more women than ever. Television advertisements in February 2010 invited women between the ages of 19 and 35 with at least nine years of education to sign up. The ANA also started a female officer training program. “Although women have served in the Afghan Army in the past, this is the first time that officer training has been available to them, and is highly skilled in weapons. She recalls the frustrations of Taliban rule, when she was restricted to her home. What hurt most during her confinement was being unable to wear her uniform and go to the barracks, she told the U.A.E. news organization The National in January 2011. Among her main responsibilities today is running the Afghan Army’s female sports teams.

The number of opportunities open to women in Afghanistan is growing, and the world is taking notice. “For the first time outside of the setting of the United Nations and of the international community, there is a groundswell of concern, from Parliaments to First Ladies, from entertainers and media stars to nongovernmental organizations, all calling for the full recognition of the rights of women and girls in Afghanistan,” the UN said on its website.

The statement recalls the words of former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 2001: “I would like to take the opportunity to say to all Afghans: ‘There cannot be true peace and recovery in Afghanistan without a restoration of the rights of women.’ Afghan women have embraced those words, and are now, a decade later, in a prime position to take advantage of the opportunity to help their country. }
While much of the European Union grapples with high unemployment, spending cuts and austerity, Germany’s economy, Europe’s largest, has outperformed the EU average. Over the years, as corporate profits have improved and industrial production has grown, Germany has identified a shortage of information technology specialists, doctors and engineers. Among the main reasons for this shortage are an aging population and low birth rates. About 2 million skilled workers will be needed to avoid labor shortfalls that could force German companies to leave the region, resulting in the loss of billions of euros in revenue. Labor experts believe the solution lies in workers emigrating from Eastern Europe and Spain, regions that are struggling economically and are producing a surplus of skilled workers.

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The number of Germans age 65 and older will increase from 16 million to 24 million by 2030, according to the Federal Statistics Office. Consequently, Germany’s working age population will shrink by almost 10 percent by 2020. The number of people over the age of 80 will more than double, rising from 4.5 million to 10 million by 2050. Moreover, the birth rate in Germany is 1.38 children per woman, far too low to keep Germany’s population steady at 81 million. In fact, Germany’s population is projected to drop by 17 million over the next 50 years. “Without the help of targeted immigration, we won’t be able to solve this problem,” Frank Jürgen Weise, head of Germany’s Federal Labor Agency, said in a May 2011 Deutsche Welle article. Labor experts agree that they must obtain workers from outside of Germany.

DOORS ARE OPENING

In 2004, when Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, the three Baltic States, Hungary and Slovenia joined the EU, Germany instituted the waiting period to prevent a flood of job seekers it feared would swamp its job market and then fragile economy. Since 2004, however, many skilled workers from these new EU states settled in with stable jobs and family in places like Ireland and the UK, countries that welcomed them early on, making Germany’s recruitment task harder. German economists say that drawing skilled labor from other countries is the key to keeping their economy, the world’s fifth largest, on track. Economists estimate that 100,000 to 400,000 workers, mainly Poles, will migrate to Germany from 2011 to 2013.

With the highest unemployment rate in the EU, Spaniards are also flocking to Germany. About 17,000 Spaniards applied for the European Commission’s job exchange program in June 2011 for positions in Germany. During a trip to Spain in February 2011, German
Chancellor Angela Merkel invited young Spaniards to come to work. As a result of the rush of Spaniards now in Germany, Spanish is increasingly spoken in Berlin, but lack of proficiency in German is hurting recruitment. “A lot of them [Spaniards] want to grab a backpack and head north right away. In fact, a lot of them do—and come back, frustrated at not having found a job and not being able to communicate with German people,” entrepreneur Michael Wagner said in a July 2011 Time magazine article.

Others are enrolling in German language classes, in both Spain and Germany, where enrollment continues to grow. Elena Ballestín is one of five Spaniards in a German language class in Berlin. She relocated to Germany a year after she graduated with a business degree and couldn’t find work in Spain. She now works in a restaurant and lives in a one bedroom apartment with her boyfriend while she studies German, hoping it will land her a better job. “My parents suffer with me being away, but they think it’s better than me being unemployed in Spain,” she told The Wall Street Journal. The Spanish government is encouraging job seekers to leave and signed an agreement with the German government that encourages German companies to hire Spaniards.

**STAY-AT-HOME MOMS RETURN TO WORK FORCE**

Some of Germany’s worker shortage can be eased by turning to its own population. EU President Jose Manuel Barroso wants stay-at-home mothers to go back to work to bolster the workforce. There are 27 million women of working age in Germany, and fewer than 40 percent have full- or part-time jobs. The EC recommends Germany take steps to create more child care centers and reduce income taxes for dual earners, the Daily Mail website reported in June 2011. Tax incentives are being explored for couples to encourage more part-time, second-income earners to take up full-time work. A white paper prepared by eight ministries for Chancellor Merkel in May 2011 said: “An estimated 1.2 million professionals could be tempted back to the workplace if the options to combine child care and work were improved.” The report added that the mothers are, for the most part, highly educated and motivated.

**LABOR SANCTIONS LIFTED**

Strict German labor laws that have prevented some from moving to Germany are now being lifted. “Every time we decide to hire someone from outside of the EU we have to deal with so much bureaucracy and many hurdles appear along the way,” German software executive Stefan Dahlke said in an August 2011 Reuters article. Before the latest revision, a company wanting to hire a foreign worker had to prove that it couldn’t find someone inside the EU. Additionally, a visa would be issued only if the salary was higher than 66,000 euros (about $84,000) annually—a figure that is more than double Germany’s average annual salary. In 2010, 691

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Dmitri Trenin’s new book *Post-Imperium: A Eurasian Story* gets to the core of the geopolitical identity crisis that defines post-Soviet Russia. It’s not an ethnic nation state like Poland or Georgia, but rather a post-imperial entity centered on a strong leader. As such, Russia risks fading into irrelevance if it doesn’t modernize and liberalize its economic and political system, Trenin asserts. The emergence of competing centers of influence – a democratic European Union, an economically dynamic China and a resurgent Islam – would all but ensure that an unreformed Russia will fail to realize its aspirations as a 21st century “great power.”

Trenin doesn’t advance this thesis of “modernization or marginalization” lightly. For decades, he served in the Soviet military before becoming a senior research fellow at the NATO Defense College in Rome in the 1990s. Today, he is director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, an international research foundation staffed largely by his fellow countrymen. Trenin’s background permits him to see international events, including NATO expansion and oil pipeline politics, through the eyes not just of the liberal West, but of Kremlin hard-liners. The reader benefits from that dual perspective.

_Post-Imperium* describes a Soviet empire that, exhausted by decades-long competition for supremacy against the United States and its allies, unraveled largely peacefully in the 18 months after Russia declared itself sovereign from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in June 1990. Compared to other colonial breakups, such as France’s retreat from Algeria and Indochina, Moscow’s withdrawal from Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia was a model of magnanimity, Trenin contends. The USSR, as successor state to the Czarist Russian Empire, had simply lost the fire in its belly for the imperial enterprise, particularly after the Red Army abandoned Afghanistan in the late 1980s. Trenin insists the empire is gone for good, never to return, though the rhetoric of Russia’s current leaders bears a superficial resemblance to old-style Soviet nationalism.

Much of the book delves into Russia’s relationship to its former neighbors, particularly those former Soviet republics that have banded together in that increasingly ceremonial entity called the Commonwealth of Independent States. In the realm of economics, many of the former Soviet republics have reoriented themselves away from the old imperial center, toward China in the case of Central Asia, the EU in the case of Ukraine and Kaliningrad, and Turkey in the case of Georgia and Azerbaijan.

Yet historic attachments remain. Russia’s insatiable demand for cheap immigrant labor draws millions from former provinces like Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Armenia. In fact, about half of Tajikistan’s gross domestic product comes from remittances sent home from workers living in Russia legally and illegally. Central Asian oil and natural gas still flow through Russian-controlled state energy conglomerates. Attempts by some of these countries to pursue a too independent foreign policy can provoke resistance in Moscow. The gas pipeline standoff with Ukraine in 2006 is an example of what Trenin dubs “resource nationalism,” Russia’s use of energy to demand political compliance from its closest neighbors. Russian influence remains decisive in the perpetuation
of so-called frozen conflicts outside its borders, such as those between Georgia and South Ossetia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and Moldova and Transnistria.

Trenin takes pains to show that some of Moscow’s recent positions have been counterproductive and squandered some of the good will accumulated over the post-Soviet era. For example, pipeline squabbles, instead of illustrating Russia’s mettle, ended up spooking the EU into seeking out more reliable energy suppliers, giving birth to plans to build the Nabucco pipeline beyond Russia’s borders. Since energy is Russia’s most competitive industry on the world market, such international loss of respect stings.

Trenin’s prescriptions for a revived democratic, free market Russia make sense. The country must re-establish the rule of law, guarantee property rights and uproot corruption. Moral and legal conventions must apply not just to ordinary citizens, but to the ruling elite. Otherwise, the country will be doomed as a bad risk for foreign investment and an unreliable partner on the world stage. Its energy-based economy succeeds and suffers at the whims of volatile world oil and gas prices. A more solid foundation, based on shared technological innovations with the West and Asia, is necessary. Stretching across two continents from the Baltic Sea to the Pacific Ocean, the country must adopt the perspective of the old imperial double-headed eagle, the western end of the country craning its gaze toward the EU and the eastern end toward the growing economies of East Asia.

Depopulation caused by falling birthrates must be addressed, in some cases by liberalizing immigration, even at the risk of rising xenophobia. Ironically, anti-immigrant sentiment is added proof that Russia is beyond its empire stage and suspicious of foreign entanglements, Trenin says. Criticism of Stalinism and Soviet totalitarianism – not nostalgia – should be the order of the day in Russian society. The country must also bury lingering Cold War sentiments in tandem with the United States.

“Russia will never again be an empire,” Trenin writes near the end of the book. “To be seen as a great power in the twenty-first century, however, it has to become a great country, above all for its own people.”
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PROGRAM ON TERRORISM AND SECURITY STUDIES (PTSS)
The five-week, twice-yearly program addresses the different aspects of threats to nations and is for mid- and upper-level management, military, government and police officials in counterterrorism organizations. The focus is on combating terrorism while adhering to the basic values of a democratic society. The five-module course provides a historical and theoretical overview of terrorism, the vulnerabilities of terrorist groups, the role of law, the financing of terrorism and security cooperation.

PTSS 12-6
June 8 – July 13, 2012

PROGRAM IN ADVANCED SECURITY STUDIES (PASS)
The Marshall Center’s flagship course, a 10-week, twice-yearly program, is rigorous and intellectually stimulating and provides graduate-level study in security policy, defense affairs, international relations and related topics. It consists of core studies and electives, including assigned readings, seminar discussions, debates, panels, role-playing exercises and field studies. Participants must be proficient in one of the two languages in which the program is taught: English or Russian.

PASS 12-9
Sept. 21 – Nov. 29, 2012
(Nominations due July 27, 2012)
SEMINAR ON COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION/TERRORISM (SCWMD/T)
The two-week seminar provides national security professionals a comprehensive look at combating weapons of mass destruction and the challenges posed by chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats by examining best practices for ensuring that participating nations have fundamental knowledge about the issue.

**SCWMD/T 12-10**
**July 13-27, 2012**
(Nominations due May 22, 2012)

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SEMINAR ON TRANSATLANTIC CIVIL SECURITY (STACS)
The seminar is a three-week, twice-a-year class that provides civil security professionals from Europe, Eurasia and North America an in-depth look at how nations can effectively address domestic security issues with regional and international impact. Organized into four modules — threats and hazards, prepare and protect, response and recover, and a field study — it focuses on the development of core knowledge and skills.

**STACS 12-7**
**July 17 – Aug. 3, 2012**
(Nominations due May 22, 2012)

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THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE SEMINAR (SES)
The seminar is a forum that allows for the in-depth exploration of international security issues. Participants in winter and fall sessions include high-level government officials, general officers, senior diplomats, ambassadors, ministers and parliamentarians. The SES format includes presentations by senior officials and recognized experts followed by discussions in seminar groups.

**SES 12-8**
**Sept. 5-13, 2012**
(Nominations due July 11, 2012)

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ALUMNI COMMUNITY OF INTEREST (COI)
WORKSHOP ON COUNTER ILLICIT TRAFFICKING (CIT)
This four-day alumni outreach event co-organized by U.S. African, Central and European commands will explore how security is impacted by transnational criminal networks expanding operations. This workshop for alumni from Europe, Africa and Asia will address how multinational cooperation can reduce corruption and destabilization from crimes such as drug, human and weapons trafficking.

**COI**
**June 18-21, 2012**

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