ON THE COVER
NATO’s New Strategic Concept recommits the Alliance to providing stability in an ever-changing security environment. In an era of tight budgets, NATO members must accomplish missions more efficiently. An emphasis on partnership building — and a more effective use of manpower and equipment — will be vital as NATO confronts the challenges of the 21st century.

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Welcome to this issue of *per Concordiam*, which addresses NATO’s New Strategic Concept. For more than 60 years, NATO has been a successful Alliance of leaders with the vision and commitment to face security challenges that confront Europe. With the adoption of NATO’s New Strategic Concept by the heads of state and governments of the Alliance, following the Lisbon conference, a new vision and direction for NATO is evolving.

NATO protected the trans-Atlantic area for more than 40 years of the Cold War. As the Cold War ended and old security threats dwindled, a renewed growth in democracy, economics and security spread across Europe and Eurasia. To embrace the changing security picture, NATO began to expand membership in the Alliance. Millions of people previously cut off behind the Iron Curtain rejoined Europe, and a wave of hope swept across the Continent.

New security challenges to the Alliance emerged with the dawn of this new era. New regional crises were caused by failing states, violent extremism, and frozen conflicts. As the former Soviet Union disintegrated, the possibility of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction increased. These security challenges caused NATO to reassess its Strategic Concept.

The phrase “Active Engagement, Modern Defense” summarizes the New Strategic Concept. The new strategy addresses the global context of emerging security issues and encourages Allies to modernize their armed forces. The contributors in this issue of *per Concordiam* examine some of the challenges NATO members face in implementing the new strategy. Among the many hurdles are the increasing gap between U.S. and European defense expenditures and capabilities and the increasing financial costs of building net-centric military forces. Member nations are dealing with major downturns in their economies and evaluating austerity measures to ensure government programs are funded adequately. Another concern is how to make the NATO decision-making process more timely to respond to an evolving security environment.

We look forward to your comments on NATO’s New Strategic Concept. Your responses will be included in our next two issues, the first about the wave of change in North Africa and its impact on Europe and the second about the effects of crime and corruption on national security. Please contact us at editor@perconcordiam.org

Sincerely,

Keith W. Dayton
Director
Oana Lungescu is spokesperson for NATO. She joined NATO after a journalistic career with the BBC World Service, where she covered the European Union and NATO for radio, television and online. In 1985, she joined the BBC’s Romanian Service in London and was later appointed European affairs correspondent in Brussels, where she covered nearly every EU and NATO summit. Between 2009 and 2010, she reported on European affairs from Berlin. Her documentary series “State Secrets,” about secret police archives and her own file within them, received a jury’s commendation in the 2010 UACES-Thompson Reuters Reporting Europe awards. In 2002, Ms. Lungescu received a European Woman of Achievement Award.

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Welcome to the seventh issue of *per Concordiam*. The overarching theme of this issue is NATO’s New Strategic Concept. To meet the evolving challenges of the 21st century and beyond, NATO nations have reaffirmed their original commitment to remain cornerstones of stability in the Euro-Atlantic region. NATO also recognizes the need to adapt to a dynamic security environment through expanded partnerships and improved capabilities in an era of budget constraints. Our contributors address some of the unique challenges that will put NATO’s New Strategic Concept to the test.

NATO spokesperson Oana Lungescu opens this issue of *per Concordiam* with her viewpoint explaining lessons that NATO has learned during Operation Unified Protector in Libya.

The lead feature article is “Partnership Building in the 21st Century” by Adm. James G. Stavridis, SACEUR, and Lt. Col. Barbara R. Fick, Special Assistant to SACEUR. They write, “The New Strategic Concept gives the Alliance the mandate and impetus to deepen existing partnerships, improve partnership mechanisms, and reach out to new partners beyond the region and across the whole of society.”

The next article, “Blueprint for the Next Decade,” by Dr. Klaus Wittmann, a Senior Fellow with the Aspen Institute Germany, takes a critical look at NATO’s New Strategic Concept and its ability to ensure NATO’s relevance as it adapts to the unique security environment of the 21st century. He concludes that the real task, beyond the “language” of the document, is successful implementation to ensure strengthened strategic partnership, enhanced practical cooperation and capability development in response to a diversified security environment.

Next is “NATO’s Post-Lisbon Challenge,” co-authored by Alessandro Scheffler of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies and T.J. Cipoletti of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The authors discuss the impact of NATO member nations’ resource commitment and defense budget constraints upon the Alliance’s ability to reach the ambitious goals of the New Strategic Concept.

The final feature article, “NATO’s Need to Know,” written by Col. Gregg Vander Ley, a recent U.S. Air Force Fellow at the Marshall Center, recommends that the Alliance pool intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance to maximize capabilities and minimize overall cost to member countries.

Congratulations to Marshall Center alumni Costinel Anuta, winner of the inaugural *per Concordiam* essay contest. His entry, “NATO 3.0,” addresses the dynamic international security environment and suggests ways that NATO’s New Strategic Concept can ensure resiliency and agility. Anuta’s essay appears in this issue of the magazine.

As an additional note, second place goes to Edval Zoto with his entry “Together Toward the Future – Euro Atlantic Security Approaches After Lisbon and Astana.” Third place goes to Lubomir Tokar, who submitted the essay “Security Challenges for 2020: What Will NATO Do?” We would like to commend all of the participants for offering their fresh perspectives on NATO.

The next issue of *per Concordiam* will focus on the impact of changes in North Africa and the Middle East on Europe and Eurasia. In the subsequent issue, the magazine will address how crime and corruption affect national security. We encourage submissions on these themes from Marshall Center alumni, security and government leaders, and scholars with an interest in defense and security issues in Europe and Eurasia.

We also welcome your feedback and dialogue on these and other important security issues. This journal is available online on the Marshall Center website: http://tinyurl.com/per-concordiam-magazine

— *per Concordiam* editorial staff
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Per Concordiam magazine addresses security issues relevant to Europe and Eurasia and aims to elicit thoughts and feedback from readers. We hope our first six issues accomplished this and helped stimulate debate and an exchange of ideas. Please continue to share your thoughts with us in the form of letters to the editor that will be published in this section. Please keep letters as brief as possible, and specifically note the article, author and magazine edition to which you are referring. We reserve the right to edit all letters for language, civility, accuracy, brevity and clarity.

Send feedback via email to:
editor@perconcordiam.org

ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS

The intent of per Concordiam is to be a moderated journal with the best and brightest submitted articles and papers published each quarter. We welcome articles from readers on security and defense issues in Europe and Eurasia.

First, email your story idea to editor@perconcordiam.org in an outline form or as a short description. If we like the idea, we can offer feedback before you start writing. We accept articles as original contributions. If your article or similar version is under consideration by another publication or was published elsewhere, please tell us when submitting the article. If you have a manuscript to submit but are not sure it’s right for the quarterly, email us to see if we’re interested.

As you’re writing your article, please remember:

- **Offer fresh ideas.** We are looking for articles with a unique approach from the region. We probably won’t publish articles on topics already heavily covered in other security and foreign policy journals.
- **Connect the dots.** We’ll publish an article on a single country if the subject is relevant to the region or the world.
- **Do not assume a U.S. audience.** The vast majority of per Concordiam readers are from Europe and Eurasia. We’re less likely to publish articles that cater to a U.S. audience. Our mission is to generate candid discussion of relevant security and defense topics, not to strictly reiterate U.S. foreign policy.
- **Steer clear of technical language.** Not everyone is a specialist in a certain field. Ideas should be accessible to the widest audience.
- **Provide original research or reporting to support your ideas.** And be prepared to document statements. We fact check everything we publish.
- **Copyrights.** Contributors will retain their copyrighted work. However, submitting an article or paper implies the author grants license to per Concordiam to publish the work.
- **Bio/photo.** When submitting your article, please include a short biography and a high-resolution digital photo of yourself of at least 300 dots per inch (DPI).

Email manuscripts as Microsoft Word attachments to: editor@perconcordiam.org
NATO’s First Lessons From Libya

By Oana Lungescu, NATO spokesperson

When NATO leaders met at the Lisbon summit last November, the world looked very different. No one predicted the momentous uprisings of the Arab Spring. No one predicted that, within months, NATO would be leading an operation to protect civilians in Libya under a United Nations mandate. And no one predicted that such an operation would involve the participation and active support of many countries in the Arab world.

At the end of March 2011, NATO launched Operation Unified Protector under United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973 to protect the people of Libya against attack and the threat of attack, and to enforce the arms embargo and the no-fly zone. Together with our partners, many from the region, we have carried out that mandate with remarkable success. We launched a complex operation with unprecedented speed and conducted it with unprecedented precision. We prevented a massacre and saved countless lives. In just over 6 months, we disabled a war machine which Moammar Gadhafi had set up over 42 years and turned against his own people. We created the conditions for the Libyan people to determine their own future.

It is still too early to draw full lessons from our Libya operation. But several lessons are already being learned. Some are similar to those from Afghanistan; others are new. These lessons can be grouped under three headings: concept, capabilities, and commitment.

The first lesson is the importance of having the right concept. The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept, agreed on at the Lisbon summit, was prescient. It highlights NATO’s core tasks of crisis management and cooperative security, as well as the value of early political consultation. Twenty-eight nations bring 28 cultures, perspectives, histories, geographies and foreign policies to the NATO table, and early political consultation allows the opportunity to bridge any differences of opinion and build the necessary consensus.

We began to discuss Libya soon after the crisis started. So we were ready to act immediately when we were asked to help. Our decision to assume command of the operation in Libya was taken in a matter of days. By contrast, in the 1990s, it took many months to make the necessary decisions to intervene in the Balkans, even though we had 12 fewer Allies.

NATO’s New Strategic Concept places considerable emphasis on the importance of a wide network of partner relationships with countries and organizations around the globe. The Libya crisis has once again underlined the importance of these partnerships. We have been working very closely with the U.N. as we implement its historic mandate, as well as with other international organizations such as the League of Arab States and the African Union. And our partner nations have been involved in the political consultations and planning from the earliest stages. They broaden the coalition politically, which is extremely important, and they also play an invaluable role where it matters most: on operations.
The second lesson from our Libyan operation is the need for a full range of military capabilities. In this mission, Europe and Canada have taken the lead. They provide all the naval assets and most of the air assets. But certain aspects of our Libya operation, as well as our operation in Afghanistan, simply could not have been conducted without the highly advanced military capabilities of the United States, such as drones, intelligence and surveillance equipment, and precision weapons.

There is a risk that European Allies, owing to defense budget cuts, will fall even further behind the pace of technological change. However, in these difficult economic times, entire national budgets, including defense spending, are under intense scrutiny. So, if we are to bridge the technology gap, the money we have must be better spent.

Many nations are unable to provide individually some of the high-tech equipment we need. But in an Alliance such as ours, every Ally need not have the full range of equipment. What we need is for the full range of equipment to be available to the Alliance as a whole, and for every Ally to be able to play a part under strong, integrated NATO command and control capabilities that get the very best out of the individual contributions.

It is for these reasons that the NATO Secretary-General launched the idea of “Smart Defence” earlier this year. This approach encourages nations to resort to multinational solutions to develop, acquire and maintain capabilities they can’t afford alone. This would help the Alliance have the right capabilities. It would also help reduce the burden of capability development on individual nations. And it would help bridge the technology gap. “Smart Defence” will be a major project as NATO prepares for the Chicago summit next May.

The third, and final, lesson is that the right concept and the right capabilities are important, but not sufficient, without the political commitment to use them.

Making the political decision to deploy military force is never easy, but the rapid and careful application of force can often prevent a crisis from developing into a more serious one. From this point of view, our Libya operation has been a great success. NATO generated the necessary political consensus and commitment to authorize an early military deployment.

In September 2011, the North Atlantic Council decided to extend the operation for up to 90 days, while keeping it under regular review. NATO and our partners expressed their commitment to continue the mission for as long as necessary, but terminate it as soon as possible, on the basis of the assessment of our military authorities and in coordination with the United Nations and the National Transitional Council.

Commitment remains key. We need to demonstrate Alliance solidarity, not just in words, but also in deeds. Having made the political decision to act, we also need to make the political decision to deploy the right forces and capabilities. For instance, the deployment of attack helicopters in Libya showed NATO’s ability to adapt to a fast-changing situation on the ground.

NATO has reasons to be confident about the future. We have the right concept in place, we are developing the right capabilities and Allies have shown the necessary commitment.

NATO is here to protect all 28 Allies, to safeguard the freedom of all our populations, and to make us stronger together than we can ever be alone. We may never be able to predict what security challenges lie in store. What we can predict is that whatever the challenges, NATO will remain an effective Alliance in dealing with them.

Information in this article current as of October 2011.
NATO’s New Strategic Concept lays out a plan to broaden international cooperation. At their summit meeting about a year ago, in Lisbon, NATO leaders adopted a New Strategic Concept that will serve as the Alliance’s road map for the next 10 years. The new concept provides NATO’s vision for an evolving Alliance that will remain able to defend its members against modern threats and commits NATO to become more agile, capable and effective. Recognizing that the Alliance is affected by, and can affect, political and security developments beyond its borders, the Strategic Concept guides the Alliance to deepen and broaden its partnerships substantially and increase its effectiveness and flexibility to contribute to Euro-Atlantic and international security in the 21st century.

Existing Partnership Frameworks

Partnership is not new to NATO. During the past two decades, the Alliance has reached out to partners to build cooperative security. NATO has established various frameworks for cooperation with specific partnership communities, including the Partnership for Peace, the Mediterranean

By Adm. James G. Stavridis and Lt. Col. Barbara R. Fick
British Royal Marines engage pirate boats in the Indian Ocean. NATO's Operation Ocean Shield has offered protection to merchant vessels preyed upon by Somali pirates.
Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. Partnership for Peace, established in 1994, is aimed at creating trust between NATO and other states in Europe and the former Soviet Union.

Today, there are 22 Partnership for Peace countries. NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue via the Mediterranean Cooperation Group1 (created in 1997 at the Madrid Summit) has promoted a greater understanding between NATO and the seven Dialogue countries. Information exchange has been at the heart of the Dialogue, sharing information on NATO’s policies and activities and exploring the security needs of participating countries. NATO launched the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative in 2004 at the summit in Turkey. This initiative offers countries of the broader Middle East region opportunities for practical bilateral security cooperation with NATO, to contribute to long-term global and regional security.2

These partnership frameworks also allow a degree of flexibility through different cooperation menus and individual partnership programs in support of specific goals agreed upon by NATO and the respective partner countries. NATO cooperates on a purely individual basis with a number of countries that are not part of its other partnership frameworks. Often referred to as “global partners,” they include Australia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Pakistan, Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition to frameworks for cooperation with specific partnership communities, the Alliance has developed tailored programs and cooperation activities for individual countries or specific agreed upon operational needs. Two such programs are the Afghanistan Cooperation
Program and the Structured Cooperation Framework for Iraq. These regional and tailored frameworks and programs are a key part of the Alliance’s evolution after the end of the Cold War and will serve as building blocks for reforms and the enhanced partnerships Allied leaders identified as essential to the capabilities required to address 21st century security challenges.

EXISTING PARTNERSHIP CONTRIBUTIONS

NATO’s existing partnerships make a clear and valued contribution to Allied security, to international security more broadly and to defending and advancing the values of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law on which the Alliance is based. In addition to providing the foundation for expanded and enhanced partnerships, these partnering frameworks and operationally driven partnership mechanisms have resulted in true operational success for missions ranging from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, the NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A), and Training Mission Iraq (NTM-I) to counterterrorism in the Mediterranean, counterpiracy operations off the Horn of Africa and in the Gulf of Aden and operations around Libya in support of United Nations Resolutions 1970 and 1973.

ISAF and NTM-A: NATO-led ISAF is composed of 48 Allied and partner nations. ISAF aims to prevent Afghanistan from once again becoming a haven for terrorists, to help provide security, and to contribute to a better future for the Afghan people. NATO-ISAF, as part of the overall international effort and as mandated by the U.N. Security Council, is working to create the conditions whereby the government of Afghanistan can exercise authority throughout the country. In addition to security operations, ISAF troops support the NTM-A, providing mentoring, training and operational support to the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). Operations and support to NTM-A have also led to the development of a series of initiatives, programs and agreements carried out in cooperation with a number of partner countries aimed at supporting the troops on the ground and furthering relations with the Afghan government. At the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, NATO and Afghanistan reaffirmed their long-term ties by signing a Declaration on Enduring Partnership. The document, which marks NATO’s continued commitment to Afghanistan, provides a political framework for future enhanced cooperation, particularly in the field of Afghan National Security Forces capacity-building and Security Sector Reform.

Comprehensive Approach: Also a focal point of the New Strategic Concept, the Comprehensive Approach has been key to Allied operations since earlier operations in the Balkans and through its evolution in more recent humanitarian, peace and military missions. This approach articulates the links along the spectrum from hard power to soft power and searches for productive partnerships with allied governments, international organizations and private sector entities that share an interest in promoting security and enabling governance in troubled regions. In recent years, the practice of integrating the military effort within a whole of society approach to stability has become known as the “Comprehensive Approach” among Allies. Seeking to achieve the highest possible degree of coordination, cooperation and unity of effort from the different actors involved, the Comprehensive Approach exemplifies partnership and expands our understanding of broader partnership communities beyond military boundaries. The Comprehensive Approach is integral to counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and serves in the effort to transition the country to a stable and secure environment in which the Afghan government is capable of meeting the needs of its people.

Iraq and NTM-I: At the Istanbul Summit in June 2004, the Allies agreed to be part of the international effort to help Iraq establish effective and accountable security forces. The outcome was the creation of the NATO Training
Mission in Iraq (NTM-I), which to date has trained more than 14,000 Iraqi security sector personnel. NTM-I is involved in police training, establishing and mentoring Iraq’s military academies, and facilitating substantial equipment donations and regular out-of-country training hosted by NATO Allies. All NATO Allies contribute to the effort through deployment of trainers, provision of equipment or financial contributions. The government of Iraq regularly praises NTM-I, and requests its continuation and expansion.

**Active Endeavor:** Under Operation Active Endeavor, NATO ships patrol the Mediterranean and monitor shipping to help detect, deter and protect against terrorist activity. The operation evolved from NATO’s immediate response to the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, and, in view of its success, is continuing. As the Alliance has refined its counterterrorism role in the intervening years, the experience that NATO has accrued in Active Endeavor has given the Alliance unparalleled expertise in deterring maritime terrorism in the Mediterranean. NATO forces have hailed more than 100,000 merchant vessels and boarded 155 suspect ships. By conducting these maritime operations, NATO has benefited all shipping through the Straits of Gibraltar. Moreover, this operation is enabling NATO to strengthen relations with partner countries, especially those participating in the Alliance’s Mediterranean Dialogue.

**Ocean Shield:** Building on previous counterpiracy missions conducted by NATO beginning in 2008 to protect World Food Program deliveries, Operation Ocean Shield is focusing on at-sea counterpiracy operations off the Horn of Africa. Approved in August 2009 by the North Atlantic Council, the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia – comprising almost 40 ships from Allies and partners – contributes to international efforts to combat area piracy. This operation challenges normal paradigms, with information-sharing and coordination as the keys to success. These operating forces, from four different task forces under different mandates, have had an impact coordinating through NATO’s shared awareness and deconfliction efforts. These efforts, along with the commercial shipping industry’s strong encouragement of best management practices, have forced changes in the way the pirates operate; they have adapted by moving farther out into the Indian Ocean. Piracy in the Gulf of Aden has been somewhat reduced, but as the pirates continue to alter their methods, the international community must continue to cooperate and expand across the broadest spectrum of partners to build regional counterpiracy capacity.

**Unified Protector:** The entire 28-nation Alliance, plus six additional nations (Sweden, Ukraine and four Arab countries) are supporting the NATO effort in Libya in some capacity, albeit doing different tasks as per national views. Despite some divergence of views...
among the various Alliance and coalition members, the effort is holding together well, putting real pressure on Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi, fulfilling UNSCR 1970/1973, and – coupled with economic and political pressure – enacting a reasonable response to Gadhafi’s violence against his people. NATO has established essentially a 100 percent effective arms embargo, and has hailed, boarded and inspected hundreds of ships. More than 18 ships are on station at any given time. The Alliance and its partners have also established essentially a 100 percent effective no-fly zone that stretches over the country. This includes the efforts of five NATO AWACS, as well as 40 other Allied and partner aircraft. These have prevented the loss of tens of thousands of civilians after Gadhafi’s threats to make the “streets run with blood.” As NATO and its partners transition from Operation Unified Protector, the broader international community will be needed to assist the new government in establishing stability and enabling a return to economic productivity.

NEW PARTNERSHIPS
In addition to building on existing partnerships to increase their capability and effectiveness, summit leaders called upon the Alliance to enhance international security through partnerships with relevant countries and other international organizations. In particular, the Strategic Concept highlights the importance of enhancing collaboration with the European Union and U.N. It also stresses the priority accorded to forging a true strategic partnership with Russia. In particular, the Alliance will pursue cooperation with Russia in the sphere of Missile Defense as well as enhance our cooperation in counterpiracy, counternarcotics, counterterrorism, and ongoing ISAF operations.

The EU is another potential partner for NATO in its Comprehensive Approach and progress has been made in the areas of cooperation and coordination between these two entities. In land operations, tactical coordination continues and, in Afghanistan in particular, there has been a growing willingness on both sides (ISAF and EU Police Mission Afghanistan) to coordinate efforts. This will hopefully lead to a more complementary approach, combining resources and capabilities to build Afghan National Security Forces' capacity. In the fight against piracy, NATO and the EU have agreed to share tactical information for increased situational awareness and synergy. There have been other examples of tactical cooperation such as a recent incident during which an EU ship refueled a NATO ship at sea. This common use of logistics support is an area that offers potential for further cooperation between the EU and NATO.

A TRUE STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP WITH RUSSIA
Established in 2002, the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) provides a framework for consultation on current security issues and practical cooperation in a wide range of areas of common interest. Its intent, to establish and increase bilateral cooperation, was set out in the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act. This framework has facilitated dialogue and cooperation that will be the foundation for an increased partnership between NATO and Russia. Through the NRC, NATO and Russia have already begun to implement this goal by developing a Work Plan for 2011 cooperation. Priority areas to deepen, upgrade and widen cooperation include: Afghanistan, missile defense, counternarcotics, counterpiracy and counterterrorism. In particular, NATO and Russia are already working on a set of concrete proposals for Afghanistan: logistics help to the coalition, sales of Mi-17 helicopters, and possibly training of Afghan security forces in Russia. While there are challenges, there is also a real sense of commitment to reinforce and increase this partnership.

THE 21ST CENTURY AND BEYOND
The 28 nations of NATO generate more than half of the world’s GDP, and can collectively field millions of military personnel and thousands of ships and aircraft. It is an Alliance that is active in the real world doing real operations, most often in close cooperation with partner nations. NATO has 150,000 military and civilian personnel on three continents in active operations – engaged in Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq, the Balkans, piracy, cyber, missile defense – and is still conducting military exercises and training to maintain collective defense. The Alliance has evolved in fundamental ways in its 60 years.

The role of NATO as an Article V defensive Alliance whereby “…an attack on one nation shall be viewed as an attack on all” has remained constant. However, significant changes have occurred in the global environment. Geopolitical factors and international relations have evolved beyond what was once termed, “post-Cold War.” Technology has made the world a smaller place, and in some ways erased international borders. Threats to security have changed from traditional, easily defined conventional threats to include a wide range of transnational challenges that are not easily defined or compartmentalized, such as piracy, cyber attacks and terrorism.

With the adoption of the first Strategic Concept since 1999, the Alliance has a well-defined path forward into this turbulent 21st century. The Summit was a good example of NATO moving out and responding to a changing world. NATO already has begun to reach out to partners around the globe. The New Strategic Concept gives the Alliance the mandate and impetus to deepen existing partnerships, improve partnership mechanisms, and reach out to new partners beyond the region and across the whole of society. No one of us, no single country, no single Alliance, is as strong as all of us working together. By increasing and deepening Alliance partnerships, NATO and its partners increase the strength and effectiveness of their collective defense capabilities.

1. Currently seven countries: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.
2. Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates have joined, and others such as Saudi Arabia and Oman have also shown an interest.
NATO’S NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT HONES THE ALLIANCE’S ROLE IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD

Klaus Wittmann, Brigadier General (retired), Bundeswehr
ow well does NATO’s New Strategic Concept succeed in ascertaining a modern definition of the purpose, character and role of the 60-year-old Alliance in the 21st century? Does it recommit and reassure all Allies and answer today’s and tomorrow’s security challenges while establishing concrete goals for continuing reform and renewing public support?

NATO’s founding document, the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, finds its concretization in the Alliance’s Strategic Concept, which is constantly reviewed and periodically updated. The Treaty itself remains valid, as does its commitment to international peace, security and justice. Based on a common heritage of freedom and founded upon the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, the treaty embraces the purposes and principles of the United Nations and supports the peaceful settlement of disputes. The Washington Treaty’s main provisions endure: consultation (Article 4), mutual assistance in the case of armed attack (Article 5) and openness to new members (Article 10).

The first Strategic Concept was issued in 1991, after the end of the Cold War, and revised in 1999. However, the 1999 document had been outdated for some time, since it was adopted before the terror attacks of September 2001, NATO’s Afghanistan mission, the Iraq war, the Russo-Georgian conflict, and predated the growing awareness of globalized security challenges for which there are no military “solutions.” Therefore, the question was posed whether NATO – which had successfully protected Western Europe during the Cold War, helped stabilize the developing “Europe whole and free,” and pacified the Western Balkans – would develop into an Alliance for the 21st century and what that requires.

For several years, there was great reluctance in NATO Headquarters and member capitals to revise the 1999 document. Some feared a “very divisive process,” but proponents of a New Strategic Concept countered that the Allies were so divided on several central issues that a “uniting effort” was urgently needed.³ A convincing new mission statement was essential to document NATO’s continued relevance in the diffuse security environment of the 21st century.

A PUBLIC AND PARTICIPATORY PROCESS

NATO commissioned the New Strategic Concept during its 60th anniversary Summit at Strasbourg/ Kehl in April 2009. Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen chose a procedure drastically different from the way previous Strategic Concepts had been developed. Rather than lengthy closed negotiations among the member nations, resulting in texts fraught with diplomatic formulae, compromise language and “constructive ambiguities,” Rasmussen initiated a public and participatory process.

This time, several particular difficulties had to be taken into account: first, NATO’s engagement in an ever more problematic mission in Afghanistan, where it is left with a bulk of tasks taken on by the International Community; second, the unwillingness of “post-heroic” societies, exacerbated by the financial and economic crisis, to sacrifice for security; third, a lack of agreement among NATO members on fundamental matters regarding its character, role, tasks and policy; fourth, the impression that solidarity among Allies was weakening; fifth, divergent threat perceptions among a now much more diverse Alliance membership; and, finally, NATO’s image – particularly in the Muslim world – as an instrument of often problematic United States policy, or in the perception among its own populations and media that NATO is a relic of the Cold War.

Because NATO’s continued relevance and public support were so crucial, preparation of the New Strategic Concept was launched by the Secretary General with an “inclusive and participatory approach” and emphasized “interactive dialogue with the broader public.” A Group of 12 experts was formed under the chairmanship of former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. After a comprehensive series of seminars and consultations, the group presented its report, “NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement,” in May 2010. The document reflected agreement among the group members, though this did not yet mean consensus among the 28 NATO governments.

It must be recognized, however, that the Albright Group did a good job in “loosening the ground,” as it were, in preparing consensus, fueling public debate and interest in NATO, involving the strategic community, providing transparency and inducing member states to clarify their positions and “show the color of their cards.” The Secretary General and his closest collaborators developed a draft and controlled the process, collecting comments from the member nations and consulting discreetly about contentious aspects while avoiding negotiations involving the layers of NATO bureaucracy that would beget ever more diluted text.

The New Strategic Concept was adopted on November 19, 2010, at NATO’s Lisbon Summit by the Heads of State and Government under the title, “Active Engagement, Modern Defence.” Even
though the 11-page document – half the size of its predecessor – passes over some persistent differences of opinion, on the whole it is a credit to the Secretary General’s chosen procedure and political energy. Analysts had said that the process would be as important as the result. And as significant as the outcome might be the fact that in the course of this work, NATO member nations had to reflect not only on their own security policy, interests and priorities but on the demands of Alliance solidarity. This resulted in many national priorities being aptly accommodated by the final draft. In sum, the New Strategic Concept is a good achievement, as it rallies and recommits Allies behind NATO’s purpose and solidifies the Alliance.

AMBITION CONTENT

The content of the New Strategic Concept revolves around three core tasks: defense and deterrence, security through crisis management, and promoting international security through cooperation. These tasks emanate from enduring principles: NATO’s purpose to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members, its character as a unique community of values; the affirmation of the primary responsibility of the U.N. Security Council and the critical importance of the political and military transatlantic link between Europe and North America. These tasks and principles ensure that “the Alliance remains an unparalleled community of freedom, peace, security and shared values.”

The New Strategic Concept restated unequivocally that the commitment to Collective Defense (mutual assistance in the case of an armed attack) from Article 5 of the Washington treaty “remains firm and binding.” This was important in light of concerns expressed particularly by new Allies, who feared that this commitment could be diluted or taken less seriously by NATO members who, “surrounded by friends and Allies,” might put harmony with Russia first. The long discussion process clarified that reassurance of all NATO member states is a precondition of everything else NATO does. So it is significant that the New Strategic Concept pledges to “carry out the necessary training, exercises, contingency planning and information exchange for ensuring our defence against the full range of conventional and emerging security challenges, and provide appropriate visible assurance and reinforcement for all Allies.”

Rather than focusing on territorial defense (the threat of a conventional attack against NATO territory is low), the New Strategic Concept considers an array of present and future security challenges. These include proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, cyber attacks, international terrorism, threats to critical energy infrastructure and emerging technologies, all seen as areas in which the Alliance can demonstrate solidarity. The threat assessment is broad and the security challenges are seen as diffuse, volatile and unpredictable, implying that possible NATO action will be decided on a case-by-case basis. The assessment also vaguely references climate change, the long-term consequences of which can have potential implications for global security.

The New Strategic Concept does not prioritize between defense and crisis management tasks. In recognizing that crises and conflicts beyond NATO’s borders can impact the Alliance’s security, it declares prevention and management of crises, as well as stabilization of post-conflict situations and support of reconstruction, as necessary NATO engagements. Monitoring and analyzing the international environment are important to crisis prevention. “Dealing with all stages of a crisis” calls for broader and more intense political consultations among Allies and with partners.

Satisfying the statement that “NATO will be prepared and capable of managing ongoing hostilities” is a tall order; however, given the Afghanistan and, more recently, the Libya experience. An explicit lesson drawn from Afghanistan is the need for a comprehensive political, civilian and military approach. After controversial debates, it was decided that NATO would create “an appropriate but modest civilian management capability” as an “interface” with civilian partners. Rightly, the training of local security forces is highlighted.

Elaboration of the third core task, “Promoting international security through cooperation,” starts with arms control, but the commitment to “create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons” is limited to the goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Further reduction of nuclear weapons is linked to concomitant steps by Russia. On conventional arms control, the statement, “to strengthen the conventional arms control regime in Europe,” is rather limited and lacking in novel ideas.

Building and enhancing partnerships, based on the existing formats (Partnership for Peace, Mediterranean Dialogue, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, Ukraine, Georgia) are emphasized, including cooperation with other institutions such as the U.N. and the European Union. However, of other security-relevant institutions, only the U.N. (with the intent to give life to the 2008 U.N.-NATO Declaration) and the EU are mentioned. Some space is devoted to the relationship with the latter, but as long as this cooperation is blocked for political reasons, the statements remain largely declaratory.
The Lisbon Summit has been widely interpreted as a breakthrough in NATO-Russia cooperation and as contributing “to creating a common space of peace, stability and security.” NATO is seeking a “strategic partnership” with the expectation of reciprocity from Russia, using the full potential of the NATO-Russia Council for dialogue and joint action. Convinced that “the security of NATO and Russia is intertwined,” NATO proposes enhancing political consultations and practical cooperation in the areas of shared interest, such as missile defense, counterterrorism, counternarcotics and counterpiracy. A cautious agreement by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to “explore” missile defense cooperation, was seen as an important advance in mutual cooperation. In turn, NATO did not overly emphasize its “open door” policy, limiting itself in the Strategic Concept to the conventional statements of principle.

Finally, regarding “Reform and Transformation,” the New Strategic Concept reinforces Alliance intent to maintain sufficient resources; deployability and sustainability of forces; coherent defense planning; interoperability; and commonality of capabilities, standards, structures and funding. A continual process of reform “to streamline structures, improve working methods and maximise efficiency” is pledged, once again.

A COURAGEOUS DOCUMENT
The New Strategic Concept is a courageous document, because it challenges the zeitgeist in several regards: First, in spite of the vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world, it emphasizes the need for nuclear deterrence as long as such weapons exist; second, although many global security challenges are not of a predominantly military nature, NATO enlarges its ambition as a security provider; third, while it remains a regional organization, it avoids an insular, Eurocentric perspective and looks toward the global horizon; fourth, in spite of recent problems with the enlargement process – and Russian indignation about it – the Alliance maintains its “open door” policy for European countries fit for accession and able to make contributions to European security; and, finally, without antagonizing Russia, it takes seriously the concerns of Central and Eastern European Allies.

The development of the New Strategic Concept was dissimilar to previous experience in that normally such documents are not particularly forward-looking. Rather, they tend to be mainly the codification of previous decisions: theory follows events and concepts come
after reality, as was the case with the 1999 Strategic Concept, though the 1991 document was an exception because of the completely novel situation. It is to the credit of the Expert Group and the Secretary General that the Lisbon Strategic Concept is impressively programmatic and future-oriented.

**NOT ALL THAT SHINES IS GOLD**

A number of small – but not unimportant – flaws should have been avoided. The extension of the term “partnership” to include cooperation with International Organizations (e.g. the U.N. and the EU) dilutes and devalues NATO’s successful concept of “Partnership” (with a capital P). Also, at a time when conflict prevention appears ever more important, it is difficult to understand why the New Strategic Concept makes no mention of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), let alone the African Union. Furthermore, despite the commendable stand on nuclear weapons, NATO’s characterization as a “nuclear alliance” is somewhat excessive and might prove counterproductive. In addition, the document is weak in considering lessons learned from Afghanistan, lessons pertaining to the broader international community, which cedes many responsibilities to NATO, and internal lessons regarding command and control, coordination, multinationality and so forth. Finally, it would have been logical to add “consultation” to the stated triad (collective defence, crisis management, cooperative security) as a fourth “essential core task” since NATO’s much broader global security involvement will require rigorous activation of Article 4 (consultation) of the Washington treaty.

The elegant text, moreover, conceals disunity on a number of issues, such as the question of whether NATO is a regional or a global organization; its political or military character; the balance between collective defense and expeditionary orientation; the assessment of certain security challenges and their emphasis in the view of individual Allies; the NATO-EU relationship and its political “blockage”; the U.N. mandate issue; the approach to

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French Prime Minister François Fillon, left, meets an Afghan who planted trees for a nongovernmental organization in the Kapisa Valley in 2010. Close coordination between NATO and civilian operations is essential to successful redevelopment of war-torn places like Afghanistan.
Russia; and nuclear weapons policy. In some of these areas, verbal consensus may quickly collapse in the face of concrete tasks, requirements and challenges.

It can be gathered from the New Strategic Concept that NATO continues to regard itself as a regional organization, but one with a global perspective, which emphasizes consultation among Allies, as envisaged in Article 4 of the Washington treaty. The perennial debate whether NATO is a military or a political organization should at last be put to rest. It is a political-military security organization that places its unique capabilities (military forces, integrated command structure, common defense and force planning, experience in multinational military cooperation and expertise in training) at the service of international security. Nevertheless, NATO’s place in the international system needs to be better defined.

THE REAL TASK: IMPLEMENTATION

The new Strategic Concept will only be as good as its implementation, as recognized in the Lisbon Summit Declaration by its many urgent taskings to Foreign and Defence Ministers as well as to the Permanent Council. Therefore, it should be read together with the Summit Declaration and the NATO-Russia Council Joint Statement. Successful implementation of the principles and intentions is crucial in the areas discussed next, and in some respects may also require more conceptual work.

The first core task – deterrence and defense – requires a reinterpretation with “new” security challenges. Combating terrorism, cyber threats, threats to energy security, piracy, organized crime and trafficking in human beings cannot be done with military force alone, and NATO’s added value must be defined. Viewpoints on NATO’s role and the function in these areas vary greatly among Allies. Regarding defense, it remains to be seen to what extent preparatory measures and contingency planning will be implemented, and how visible, and thereby effective at providing “assurance of all Allies,” they will be.

This is one aspect in which the relationship with Russia appears fragile. The upbeat interpretation of the NATO-Russia Summit in Lisbon came from a “breakthrough” on missile defense (though the agreement “to discuss pursuing missile defence cooperation” was cautious), on plans for concrete cooperation in various practical fields (including a “Joint Review of 21st Century Common Security Challenges”), and on a very positive statement of intent about further use of the NATO-Russia Council. Together, NATO and Russia must overcome zero-sum thinking in security policy. And a substantial NATO response to Medvedev’s missile defense proposals is overdue, in recognition that Russia’s place in the European security order is still insufficiently defined.

Concerning nuclear weapons policy, it is clear that the remit contained in the Summit Declaration to “review NATO’s overall posture” points to the need for a fundamental debate about the role of nuclear weapons, to include extended deterrence and forward stationing, the shift from “deterrence by punishment” to “deterrence by denial,” and the future of “nuclear sharing.” The task for NATO and its member governments remains to reconcile public expectations for “global zero” with the explanation of deterrence requirements in the (presumably very long) transition period. Conspicuously, the debate about a nuclear-free world has until now been a Western soliloquy.

Conventional arms control is given importance in the New Strategic Concept, and the Summit Declaration envisages a revival of the High Level Task Force, which had accompanied the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations in the 1990s. But there are no new ideas, and to “work to strengthen the conventional arms control regime in Europe” is not enough. The CFE Treaty – suspended by Russia – is all but dead, and its confidence-building instruments of verification and transparency are corroding. Therefore, a new departure in conventional arms control is required. This means broad talks among all European states – most prominently Russia – over conventional military forces, their potential linkage to tactical nuclear weapons, threat perceptions, doctrines, force levels and weapon holdings, leading to negotiations on numerical limitations, regional constraints and transparency measures. Such an approach would enhance confidence in the strictly defensive orientation of military postures, advance cooperative security among the nations of Europe, and might even further nuclear disarmament and missile defense cooperation.

Because new security challenges are not mainly amenable to military responses, NATO is not the sole actor and Alliance solidarity in this field does not automatically invoke Article 5, “broadened and intensified” consultation, as pledged by the New Strategic Concept. But is there a realization that this will require a genuine cultural shift in NATO? Many obvious security issues have never reached the Council table, not least for fear that disagreements would be interpreted as an internal crisis. Also, in order to bring about a qualitative improvement in the consultation process, a much-improved analysis and assessment capacity is needed at NATO Headquarters. This appears to have been recognized in the establishment of a new Emerging
Security Challenges Division in the International Staff. However, it remains to be seen to what extent it will produce valid political-military analysis or deal with relevant issues (including long-term implications of climate change), and whether it will contribute to broaden the Council agenda.

Developing “a more efficient and flexible partnership policy” is an immense task, and should involve a review of the basic Partnership for Peace document. One priority should be strengthening the consultation clause when Partners see menaces to their security. It is an open question whether NATO will improve operations of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, which played no role whatsoever in the months before the outbreak of the war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008. And utmost transparency is required toward powers such as India and China regarding the further development of “global” partnerships with like-minded countries, or those contributing to the Afghanistan mission.

As noted previously, it is striking that at a time when crisis prevention gains ever more significance, the Strategic Concept makes no mention of the OSCE. As all Allies are also OSCE members, NATO should strengthen organizational potential and mechanisms and align with the OSCE’s emphasis on “soft security,” such as human rights, confidence building and early warning, and to strive for better crisis management and prevention of violent conflict.

The African Union, through which Africans are taking ownership of African problems, also deserves support from NATO, not only in concrete operations, but also with assistance based on the Alliance’s rich experience in such fields as consultation, civil-military cooperation, education and training, security sector reform (SSR), force planning, arms control and confidence building.

Much space is, however, devoted to the EU and its Common Security and Defence Policy as an important complement to NATO, better enabling European countries to take responsibility for security and stability on their continent and at its periphery. Nevertheless, as long as cooperation is still blocked by individual Allies, statements about a strengthened strategic partnership, enhanced practical cooperation, broadened political consultation and fuller cooperation in capability development remain hollow.

Finally, cooperation with the U.N., though close to satisfactory on the ground in foreign missions, requires enhancing consultation at the political-strategic level. The 2008 U.N.-NATO Declaration should be rejuvenated. Liaison procedures and effective consulting practices are necessary. The U.N.’s Peace-Building Commission should be a venue for institutional cooperation. It remains to be seen how quickly these good intentions will overcome U.N. mistrust toward NATO.

**PERSUASION IS CRITICAL**

The Comprehensive Approach requires persuasion and better implementation. It is essential to acknowledge that missions such as Afghanistan cannot succeed through military effort alone, and that their joint, interagency and multinational character require close and synergistic cooperation with international organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). This is not about hierarchy; NATO should not aspire to dominate others, but to coordinate with them. Self-evident as the concept is, greater efforts are needed to make it work as a truly integrated civilian-military effort, overcoming national and institutional interests and bias. Improving NATO’s interaction with NGOs is crucial, but it brings about the meeting of different, often opposing, institutional cultures, in which the military wishes to take control, whilst the NGOs seek to preserve their independence and impartiality. Further efforts are needed toward mutual understanding and joint planning and training.

The New Strategic Concept, the Summit Declaration and the “Lisbon Capability Goals” do not contain more than the obvious goals (usability, deployability, sustainability, etc.) regarding the development of NATO’s military capabilities. These concepts are well-known from the 1999 Defence Capability Initiative, the 2002 Prague Capabilities Commitment and the Comprehensive Political Guidance of 2006 and yielded very limited results. With the financial and economic crisis and the resulting drastic cuts in many national defense budgets, it is difficult to see how the gulf between ambitions and means will be bridged better than previously. Increased joint development of military capabilities and multinational, cost-effective approaches are needed.

Also, in the field of missile defence, apart from the foreseeable resurgence of disagreements among Allies and of Russia’s mistrust, cost may be hampering swift implementation of this important improvement in NATO’s missile defense.

For NATO’s internal reform, the New Strategic Concept and the Summit Declaration give the Secretary General a broad mandate and great authority “to streamline structures, improve working methods and maximise efficiency.” Implementation will be the crucial test of NATO’s “continual reform,” and it is revealing that the Declaration (in the context of Command Structure and Agencies Reform) twice refers to outstanding decisions about the “geographic footprint,” meaning the strong interests of individual nations in retaining NATO commands, installations
or institutions on their soil.

It will be interesting to observe the pace and scale of the New Strategic Concept’s implementation also in the fields in which further conceptual work is desirable. They include lessons from operations and guidelines for further NATO operations; the appropriateness of NATO’s Level of Ambition; counterinsurgency in the NATO context; progress with the NATO Response Force; assessment and further development of multinationality; training assistance and NATO’s contribution to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration and SSR; NATO’s role in nonproliferation; and public diplomacy.

Study and formulation of common Alliance positions are also needed in other fields, such as developments in international law regarding defense against potentially apocalyptic attacks with no forewarning; “Responsibility to Protect” in cases of genocide and massive human rights violations; problems of “humanitarian intervention”; implications of “failed states”; and further development of a credible deterrence doctrine in a multipolar world with a multitude of state and nonstate actors.

The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept makes a good case for NATO’s relevance in the 21st century, notwithstanding this critical look at “What does it mean and imply?” And given the Cold War Alliance’s amazing adaptation after the end of East-West confrontation, it marks another significant transformational step – programmatically. The Allies must now demonstrate the political will and provide the resources to implement what they have courageously proclaimed.

NATO’S POST-LISBON CHALLENGE

SMARTER DEFENSE IN AN AGE OF AUSTERITY
The November 2010 NATO Lisbon Summit was almost unanimously considered an all-around success, highlighted by the approval of a New Strategic Concept. The process that eventually produced “Active Engagement, Modern Defence” was far less painful than expected after many had criticized the open and inclusive approach taken by the Group of Experts as “opening Pandora’s box.” These critics lamented that such a process would reinforce lasting fissions and undermine Alliance cohesion. Rather, at the end of the day, NATO found itself more united and relevant than many had suggested. While tensions surrounding Operation Unified Protector in Libya have, at various points, seemingly undermined that cohesion, trans-Atlantic leaders must seek to recapture Lisbon’s momentum if history’s most successful Alliance is to “carry out the full range of NATO missions as effectively and efficiently as possible” in an era marked by austerity and an ever more unpredictable global security environment.

While the ambitious strategy approved at Lisbon was accompanied by reaffirmations that sufficient resources must be provided to achieve its goals, the so-called Lisbon Capabilities Package was more measured, reflecting the tight fiscal realities confronting European governments. The new triad of core tasks – collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security – was to be bolstered by a capabilities commitment, but the Allies could only agree to endorse a modest package focused mostly on enablers such as C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance), cyber defense, counter-IED, and medical support logistics. Funding for the further development of missile defense – including a modest 200 million euro split among 28 Allies over 10 years to upgrade the existing ALTBM (Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence) system – remains uncertain, though it was included in the package and was identified as “a core element of our collective defense.”

Despite Lisbon’s shortcomings in terms of resource commitments, NATO plans to maintain the capability to sustain “concurrent major joint operations and several smaller operations for collective defence and crisis response, including at strategic distance” in the face of a toxic political environment for such missions stemming from the International Security Assistance Force mission in Afghanistan. To live up to this level of commitment, the Strategic Concept announced that NATO will “develop and maintain robust, mobile and deployable conventional forces to carry out both our Article 5 responsibilities and the Alliance’s expeditionary operations, including with the
NATO response force.” However, it remains unclear whether the Alliance’s laudable political ambitions will be met with the necessary resources to ensure these commitments remain credible.

As noted by United States Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy, the Strategic Concept merely provides a blueprint, and the Alliance must now undertake the hard work to build it. In the aftermath of the global economic downturn, which hit Europe hard, an age of austerity has been forced on Allied capitals. The financial outlook for most NATO countries—with the notable exceptions of Turkey, Germany and Poland—appears bleak, both in the short- and long-terms. Even before the crisis, the economic picture for many European countries in the post-2020 period appeared gloomy because of unfavorable demographic trends and their anticipated impact on labor growth and age-related spending.

While Europe is emerging from the crisis, the downturn may have caused a permanent shock to European economies, and the Continent faces the possibility of a “lost decade” in terms of economic growth. For some economies, striking a balance between addressing high public debt and supporting growth presents a difficult challenge. Experiences from prior banking crises suggest that high unemployment may persist, and the unavoidable correction of current account and competitiveness imbalances could prove costly from both growth and budgetary points of view. While fiscal austerity is a necessary instrument of crisis management in times of market turmoil, financial consolidation will soon take its toll on growth. Many countries are adapting to the concept of a significantly less prosperous “new normal” of economic growth.

In late 2009 and early 2010, the reality of impending austerity measures created fears that defense budgets may be a primary target of cuts, and initial consolidation plans did little to allay those concerns. The United Kingdom was considering cuts of 20 to 25 percent in discussions leading up to the Strategic Defence and Security Review, or SDSR. France, which as recently as 2008 underwent a radical defense reform, was considering a cut of 5 billion euros. In Germany, an 8.4 billion euro consolidation order from the treasury was readily accepted. In Italy, a 10 percent budget reduction seemed unavoidable. While these proposed cutbacks were troubling, the situation seemed even more worrisome in Central and Eastern Europe, with Romania facing a 20 percent cutback and Bulgaria a force reduction of roughly the same amount.

These numbers alarmed NATO officials, particularly those from the U.S. In 2009, U.S. Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair warned that the crisis might render Allies unable to “fully meet their defense and humanitarian obligations,” an estimate that would be repeated in his Annual Threat Assessment 2010, when he warned that budget consolidation will “constrain European … spending on foreign priorities … and spending on their own military modernization and preparedness for much of this decade.” Likewise, NATO Secretary-General
Anders Fogh Rasmussen worried that “we have to avoid cutting so deep that we won’t, in future, be able to defend the security on which our economic prosperity rests,” while, in his famous farewell remarks, former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates foresaw the “very possibility of collective military irrelevance.”

Fortunately, defense budgets would ultimately avoid such dire projections. Compared to general consolidation efforts, the share of the burden borne by defense has often been well below the average hit taken in other budget areas. While this is a positive development, it may also be misleading: Afghanistan; obligatory contributions to international organizations such as NATO, the European Union and the United Nations; ongoing reform efforts; contractual procurement obligations; and defense industry concerns have so far protected defense budgets to some degree. However, as the Allies disengage from Afghanistan and the public starts to feel the fiscal contraction in social spending, political pressure to reduce defense spending will ratchet up as the requirement to protect “the boys” declines. In combination with political fatigue arising from Iraq and Afghanistan, calls for a peace dividend seem inevitable. And while defense spending will at best remain constant with defense inflation, the growing pension burden and the costs of the transformation to a more professional force will continue to hollow out budgets from inside. Many states have already recognized that the current reductions will not suffice, as rumors about the content of the U.K.’s next SDSr indicate. In France and elsewhere, a “reform of the reform” seems to be a question of “when” rather than “if.”

Current developments in European defense might also provide some indication of what lies ahead for the U.S. The impact of the planned cutbacks will be particularly painful for European militaries, given recent trends. As opposed to the U.S., where the defense sector experienced an almost unprecedented increase in the last decade, defense cuts in Europe have recurved during most of the post-Cold War period. A recent study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, or CSIS, shows defense budgets and troop numbers have been steadily declining for 20 years, while operational engagements of European countries have steadily increased. Consequently, even before the crisis, only five of NATO’s 28 members were living up to their commitment to spend 2 percent of GDP on defense, and most Allies spent significantly less.

The recently approved Lisbon Capabilities Package, as pointed out by Gebhardt and Crosby, “reflects as much the rapidly changing challenges of national security in today’s world as it does the lack of success of previous efforts.” The many institutional initiatives, be they NATO’s Defence Capability Initiative and Prague Capability Commitment or the EU’s various Headline goals, have failed to close the transformational gap across the Atlantic. Similar to that in the U.S., the European Allies transformation evolves in three dimensions:

1) Continuous involvement in stabilization missions at strategic distance has shifted forces toward a more expeditionary focus;
2) Such missions have triggered the adoption of civil-military and whole-of-government concepts, such as the effects-based approach to operations or the Comprehensive Approach;
3) This limited revolution in military affairs has spurred attempts to develop network-enabled (as a more modest form of a network-centric) capability.

The bleak future of European defense spending will put in jeopardy even the recent achievements of these three dimensions of transformation. After years of engagement, NATO forces are now probably better trained and equipped than ever before. Moreover, many upcoming improvements, mainly in the pre-2015 period (for example, in Strategic and Vertical Lift), are hard to stop, owing to contractual and industrial commitments.

But this positive trend will be offset by future developments. The exit from Afghanistan will see the end of extra-budgetary funding like the U.K.’s Treasury Special Reserve, or TSR, which has served as an important driver of “expeditionary” transformation. The country has bought much of its most relevant and modern equipment – Armed Personnel Carriers, UAVs and C4ISTAR equipment – through TSR-funded Urgent Operational Requirements. Where such money was not available,
prioritization of operations-related procurement has ensured that funds were allocated appropriately within the defense budget. At the same time, predeployment training and operational experience have provided a sense of professionalism.

These prioritizations have, however, come at a price. Modernization projects in other categories have been delayed repeatedly and nonfunded commitments have become more of a rule than an exception (worth 25 billion pounds sterling before the SDSR in the U.K. alone). At the same time, European navies face a decade in which considerable parts of their fleets will require replacement, while elsewhere costly equipment like the Joint Strike Fighter will weigh heavily on may countries’ procurement accounts.

Aside from procurement, operations and maintenance costs will remain a reason for concern. The “frontline first” doctrine has often left the operational readiness of nondeployed forces in a disastrous state. As operational training ends and returning equipment is reintegrated into already overstretched maintenance accounts, the condition of forces like Italy’s – which currently has one operational Ariete tank – provides an early window into a potentially dark future.

These pressures make the prospect of maintaining even current capabilities a formidable challenge. In addition, NATO will have to transform the fields of network-enabled warfare, adopt the Comprehensive Approach, and take on new functions such as missile- and cyber-defense. As a result, many view NATO’s 2012 summit in Chicago with anxiety, fearing that the Lisbon Capabilities Package will have met the same fate as its predecessors by then. The history of the NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance System and Medium Extended Air Defense System might preview what is on the horizon.

While this account suggests pessimism, success is not impossible. As the CSIS report outlines, European budgets show a paradoxical trend: a significant decrease in troops and funding contrasted with an increase in spending per soldier as decreases in troops outpace budgetary decline. If we consider per-soldier spending an indicator of military quality, this provides countries with a chance to invest in the right kind of capability. Many European countries spend too much on personnel without improving the overall quality of forces. While force reductions, like those being undertaken in Germany,14 carry significant short-term challenges, in the long-term they pave the way toward a “leaner, but meaner” force.

With its highly successful SAC (Strategic Airlift Capability) and SALIS (Strategic Airlift Interim Solution), NATO has again proven that it can play a positive role as a force multiplier. The Anglo-French defense agreement provides another useful example of how partnering with other countries can help nations achieve otherwise unaffordable capabilities. As opposed to multinational projects of the past, which viewed the involvement of as many partners as possible as adding intrinsic value and, according to the “juste-retour” principle, had industrial and political concerns taking priority over both utility and affordability, these initiatives show that cooperation among countries with similar needs and capabilities can be successful. As stated by Secretary-General Rasmussen: “The era of one-size-fits-all cooperation is over.”

While many look at such noninstitutional cooperation with suspicion, the heterogeneity of European forces means different Allies might require different approaches to cooperation. In difficult economic times, the mere ideological value of institutional cooperation itself cannot replace real added value.

While one of the great themes of the debate surrounding the Strategic Concept was strengthening consultations, so far consultation on and coordination of reform efforts have been lacking. Nations need to develop a process to ensure the coherence of NATO’s future collective defense posture. Washington’s leadership will be critical. Fortunately, the 2012 summit in Chicago will ensure American interest in post-Lisbon developments. Because the Europeans are particularly weak in the sphere of research and technology, the U.S. would be well-served to offer incentives, especially in the field of network-enabling capabilities. An increased willingness to share technology with Allies could prevent superfluous spending efforts in some countries and might provide smaller Allies with their only access to such technology. Given the fragmentation of the European defense market and the low level of investment in research and development, easing technology transfer could greatly enhance European capabilities.

Ultimately though, the ball is in Europe’s court. It is uncertain whether the demands of this changing security environment combined with economic
constraints will provide the impetus for leaders to assume a “cooperative imperative” to overcome deficiencies.

In a twist on the now famous words of U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, former NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana has noted that, rather than demilitarization, the crisis might provide us with a window of opportunity to rationalize defense spending. Secretary-General Rasmussen has coined this ‘Smart Defense’, which he defines as “how NATO can help nations to build greater security with fewer resources but more coordination and coherence, so that together we can avoid the financial crisis from becoming a security crisis.” It’s now up to European leaders to decide whether the Continent will adopt this concept of ‘smarter’ defense, or simply be content to do less with less. 

The authors would like to thank Stephen Flanagan and John Kriendler for providing many helpful insights.

3. Ibid., p. 16.
4. Ibid., p. 15.
5. Ibid.
8. “Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,” Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence, February 12, 2009.
NATO Summit paves way for a renewed Alliance...!” the headlines proclaimed. The New Strategic Concept, approved at the 2010 NATO Lisbon Summit and the first in 11 years, provides a road map for the coming decade. The decade will offer NATO numerous internal and external challenges: two active war zones outside Alliance borders (ISAF and Libya), expanded commitments within the region (an air-policing mission in the Baltic Region) and counter-piracy initiatives near the Horn of Africa. Adding to these challenges are significantly reduced military budgets across NATO nations, budgets further constrained by global economic problems, impacting NATO capabilities. The methodology for realizing Strategic Concept goals is through informed decision-making and real-time information awareness, necessitating an information dominance system of systems that currently eludes NATO commanders. A comprehensive Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) architecture is necessary to achieve this level of dominance. Specifically, this article makes three recommendations to NATO. First, rapidly develop and expand interoperable systems for command and control (C2) and information dissemination. Second, radically adapt C2 procedures for deploying shared assets. And third, build a NATO-operated Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Rapid Deployment Force.
The application of sophisticated ISR systems and the use of UAVs have exploded since the start of operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq. This transformed operational speed, depth and effectiveness of ISR information dissemination. The only NATO-owned surveillance asset is the NATO Airborne Early Warning (NAEW), with the remaining ISR systems proffered by other participating nations. The NAEW is a multinational and immediately available airborne surveillance, warning and control capability in support of Alliance objectives with deployment authority controlled by the North Atlantic Council (NAC). Seventeen of NATO’s 28 member nations provide financial support and 14 provide personnel to the combined command. Most national forces in the Alliance have UAV systems in their inventories or are acquiring the capability over the next few years. Seventeen of the 28 Alliance members have nearly 5,000 UAVs, from hand-held micro UAVs to airline-size reconnaissance platforms, in their current inventories. New technologies and increased reliability mean that UAVs offer significant operational benefits, and governments across the globe are increasingly recognizing the key roles they play in traditional defense. In the civil sphere, they conduct myriad missions such as tracking Somali pirates, scouting forest fires and counting migratory animals. Unfortunately, most of these systems are developed in a proprietary environment and do not rapidly integrate into existing C2 structures.

NATO, in addition to standardizing policy and doctrine for each element of the ISR system, is pursuing two parallel strategies to remove incompatible systems within its architecture. First, it is developing a NATO-owned ISR capability, similar to the NAEW, which is derived from the RQ-4B Global Hawk UAV platform. It is also finalizing a C2 system capable of integrating diverse UAV platforms into a single system.

NATO is bridging the gap between nationally derived ISR capabilities and its stated requirements with the development of the Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) program, the first real attempt to have a coordinated ISR enterprise under NATO control. AGS will be an integrated system, consisting of an air and a ground segment, enabling the Alliance to perform persistent surveillance over wide areas from high-altitude, long-endurance, unmanned air platforms operating at considerable stand-off distances. The intent is to provide by the year 2016 a single surveillance data node to interface and exchange information with component commands, tactical operation centers and intelligence networks. Figure 1 depicts the system architecture composition of the AGS Core system.

In an impressive step in the right direction to develop greater UAV interoperability, NATO recently announced the Multi-sensor Aerospace-ground Joint ISR Interoperability Coalition (MAJIIIC2) program aimed at linking participating nations’ sensor data from their ISR, surveillance and EW systems, even if their individual platforms were not originally designed for that kind of compatibility. While the name behind the original acronym suggests a focus on aerospace platforms like UAVs, the project aims to handle any sensor platform on ground, sea, or air. The specific benefit of MAJIIIC2 is that the data itself is exchanged outside the boundaries of any collecting system and can be shared with (or denied to) anyone with network access. It greatly multiplies the available ISR to a commander. He can instantly access imagery from other nations’ UAVs, meaning that he does not have to deploy his own asset, or he can deploy his own UAV in another area, allowing for the most efficient use of the assets. Though mutually supporting, AGS and MAJIIIC2 are separate, parallel networks providing leaders with similar data streams necessary to develop information awareness.

Up to this point, it seems that NATO is pursuing a sound strategy. It has policies in place to regulate new system development, it is building a multinational surveillance program, and it is building a communications architecture to enable all ISR systems to feed into it. So what is the problem? Time and money. The AGS program has been conceived and developed for more than 15 years, and costs are expected to exceed $4 billion. Only 14 nations participate in the program, and budget constraints forced Denmark to drop out. Program aircraft are undergoing their first successful test flights. Radar and other sensors are still in design phase. It is not expected to reach full operational capability until 2016 at the earliest. MAJIIIC2, on the other hand, is expected to cost approximately $100 million, a cost spread among nine nations. It’s not expected to reach full operational capability until 2016, but has been integrated successfully into realistic exercises and passed a deployed operational test in Afghanistan.

NATO should consider ceasing development of the AGS and fully develop, fund and accelerate MAJIIIC2. Having one system as the Alliance standard is the single most important thing NATO can pursue to expand information
sharing, not just for UAVs, but as a base line of interoperability across all NATO members. The Alliance must fully develop a single, synchronized ISR network and implement a rapid imagery and intelligence sharing capability to enable the diverse operations they expect to encounter. The AGS system is not revolutionary and incorporates relatively older and less capable technology. The sensors designed for the AGS program will integrate with MAJIC2. Cutting AGS would save billions of dollars. Additionally, MAJIC2 is capable of incorporating other sensors, like battlefield surveillance radars, and NATO should therefore encourage all of the 28 member nations to join the development of the system. NATO should also strive to cut the implementation timeline of the system in half, by reinvesting a portion of the AGS money.

The second recommendation is that NATO should establish a crisis-action cell with standing authorities to deploy NATO-operated ISR forces (as well as necessary supporting forces) in a non-combat role, to support intelligence/information requirements. As the main forum for collective security and defense in the Euro-Atlantic area, NATO has adapted to its new security environment and attempted to respond to new demands. Since the September 11, 2001, terror attacks in the U.S., the Alliance has had to rethink its role in response to terrorism and the role it plays in security outside of its traditional mandate and borders. This has led to the development of new missions and strategies, but has done little to change the decision-making model within the North Atlantic Council with respect to deploying forces.

Displayed in the recent resolution to support air strikes in Libya, the consensus-based decision-making process is cumbersome and not time-sensitive. Additionally, the
information utilized by NATO leaders to make the decisions is derived from numerous and sometimes sensationalized sources such as the media. The purpose is to enable the right force structure to mobilize rapidly and gain the requisite information to assist the North Atlantic Council to make informed, yet rapid, consensus-based decisions for further employment of follow-on NATO forces.

As mentioned above, the only NATO-operated surveillance system is the NAEW, which is not capable of providing the spectrum of intelligence and information required by NATO leaders. NATO should construct a UAV rapid deployment force by pooling existing UAV forces or through the development of niche capabilities. The Alliance should develop a NATO-owned package of smaller UAV systems with the ability to rapidly deploy to feed the information requirements of senior policymakers. As an example, a low-cost and rapidly mobile approach is to procure systems like the INSITU Integrator or the South African ATE Vulture UAVs, which are capable of launch, flight and recovery operations without a runway or prepared sight. Additionally, for these and similar systems, training is simple and the aircraft are easy to fly and maintain. They operate at low-altitude and therefore do not require extensive knowledge of the airspace structure, and can operate autonomously or linked to a larger network.

There are two methodologies for developing this capability: pooling and niche operations. The greatest advantage of pooling resources is that it offers the Alliance a capability that is rapidly deployable in the near-term and offers nations the ability to contribute equipment and/or personnel without the potential for negative effects of national caveats.

Similar in capability, yet diverse in size, NATO’s military force has not changed structure since its inception. Most member nations have similar force constructs as their fellow members. As NATO expanded into Eastern Europe, the force model for the new members mirrored the western military defense model. In addition to some of the newer members of the Alliance, some of the smaller member nations such as Iceland, Luxembourg and Portugal have little ability to support a larger military contribution to the Alliance. NATO should encourage nations such as Iceland, Estonia, Luxembourg and Albania to develop niche UAV capabilities. By encouraging a common-funding approach, costs could be minimized and NATO could multiply its number of tactical UAVs and significantly add to its overall ISR architecture. These assets could either be owned and operated by each member nation, or supported under a NATO-operated construct similar to the NAEW.

The final statements of the 2010 Strategic Concept focus on promoting international security through cooperation and partnering. At the root of this cooperation is the principle of seeking security ‘at the lowest possible level of forces’ by supporting arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.” The methodology for realizing these goals is through informed decision-making and real-time information awareness. Financially, there will be costs that will be difficult to agree upon, but the lasting effect of developing a comprehensive ISR capability enables the Alliance to converge capabilities instead of developing diverging systems. The recommendations are a paradigm shift for NATO. Instead of developing capabilities nationally and then re-engineering them (and paying again) at the Alliance level to make them interoperable, the Alliance must seek to develop a comprehensive approach that will deliver capabilities designed to be interoperable, and enabling member nations to maintain a flexible, mutually supporting relationship without overburdening smaller nations, or excessively taxing larger ones.

A resilient, collective defense is the cornerstone of NATO, but if we define NATO territorial security as “homeland” defense, we can borrow three concepts from U.S. homeland security: contain\(^1\) (limit the threat potential), absorb\(^2\) (mitigate the consequences of the threat) and recover\(^3\) (repairing any system targeted by an enemy). But how can NATO implement such an approach?

**Foresight, Scalability and Feedback**

In line with the above-mentioned dimensions of resilience, I have tried to identify some current evolutions that could be used as an “anchor” point for resilience development. Therefore, I will examine foresight as a key to limit threat potential, scalability as a way to mitigate the consequences and feedback as a means for rebuilding a targeted system.

Between 2008 and 2009, we have witnessed the first organization-level foresight\(^4\) exercise within NATO, in the framework of the Multiple Futures Project. In the effort to elaborate on the previously mentioned assessment, Allied Command Transformation took two views into consideration: one with a focus on the future of the security environment and the other imagining plausible NATO futures.
The future of the security environment in the Multiple Futures Project’s report is built on four scenarios:

- **Dark Side of Exclusivity** (weak and failed states generate instability in areas of interest, and the states of the globalized world are faced with related strategic choices)
- **Deceptive Stability** (developed states preoccupied with societal change and demographic issues rather than geopolitical risk)
- **Clash of Modernities** (advanced, rational networked societies with inherent fragility challenged by external authoritarian regimes)
- **New Power Politics** (increasing number of major powers, competition and proliferation undermine value of international organizations).

In analyzing the four scenarios, the Allies found 33 security implications, but the interesting conclusion was that most of the top five security implications were nonmilitary (e.g., disruption of vital resource flows or negative impact on economy).

Another facet of the foresight exercise envisaged a range of alternative “future NATO’s” based on capturing NATO’s main dimensions of change (such as the trans-Atlantic link, the U.S. leadership, the area of operations and a few other characteristics). Even though a majority of the participants felt that the disappearance of NATO was conceivable, the question of whether NATO would exist in 2025 was not systematically addressed, the approach deemed unacceptable for the purposes of the exercise.

However, by combining three key drivers (U.S. willingness to assume a leadership role in NATO, impact of the European Union and threat perception) and concluding that developments within the Alliance were more important to its future than what happens outside NATO, the analysis led to several scenarios: the “strong” versus the “dispersed” toolbox, the return to ESDI versus shared partnership, and a future NATO as an “old boys’ lounge.”

To make the foresight actionable, the findings of the Multiple Futures Project were used in drafting NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept.

The second concept useful for our analysis is the **scalability** of Allied capabilities, in the light of its potential to mitigate the consequences of a threat. Given the fact that capability is not narrowly defined within NATO – being used with multiple understandings – I will define the term as the ability to achieve a specified (military) effect, with specific lines of development.

**Scalability** could be defined, with reference to the telecommunications and software industries, as the ability to handle growing amounts of work and tasks flexibly and efficiently. I will bring into play only two characteristics ensuring this feature: Allied capabilities’ **connectedness** and **modularity**. While modularity could be seen as “an established technique for organizing and simplifying a complex system” by using principles such as cohesiveness, encapsulation, decoupledness and reusability/commonality, connectedness deals with the concept of Network Centric Warfare, which is not about hardware and routers but about people, organizations and processes.

A suitable model for a better understanding of the idea of scalability is the NATO Response Force. The NRF was designed as a “high readiness and technologically advanced force … capable of performing tasks worldwide across the whole spectrum of operations.” It is composed of a core (deployable headquarters, land, air and naval units) and enabling modules (intelligence, combat support, etc.). Even though the feasibility of the concept has been questioned mainly because of its continuous redesign, this has nothing to do with scalability, the debate being more connected to divergent views about the NRF’s purpose and resourcing.

The third premise is focused on **feedback**, or in NATO’s case, on a lessons learned system. Since 1996, the need to extract the appropriate lessons from NATO operations and exercises and the process of converting analysis into remedial actions led to the idea of building a lessons learned capability. NATO began by establishing the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre. JALLC is the lead agency for the analysis of operations, exercises, training and experiment; the collection and communication of lessons learned; and delivering analysis support to the Alliance and its partners at the strategic and operational levels. It followed up with the development of a Lessons Learned Database. The centre and the database now assists with strategic planning and the design of a specific capability for lessons learned.
were used in drafting the Group of Experts report on the 2010 Strategic Concept.

Lastly, in approaching the problem of lessons learned, we have to take into account that in periods of dynamic change producing strategic discontinuities, learning must be nonlinear and involve a configuration of skills and competences. Therefore, the three-step process proposed at the 2010 Lessons Learned Conference – that begins with a Lesson Identified, develops it into a Lesson Learned and, through formal and informal distribution methods, becomes a Lesson Shared – would have to cope with the previously discussed dynamic of change.

**Transformation to agilization:** Resilience framework for NATO

The three previously mentioned terms – foresight, scalability and feedback – could be the backbone of a new way of doing business for NATO, in the framework of resiliency. Therefore, even though the current buzzword for change within the Alliance is transformation, we have to be open to a shift in describing NATO’s development by taking into account the following ‘equation’: While the transformation process provides for adaptability, the agilization process leads the organization towards resiliency.

There is a wide range of definitions for transformation. They include “a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations,” and “an iterative, ongoing process that seeks to adapt and master unexpected challenges in a very dynamic environment.” Yet another definition is “a process that is all about changing the way we fight by adapting new technologies, developing advanced war fighting concepts and then integrating the two in a decisive manner.” Although transformation can be illuminated by experimentation, the idea of having adaptation as the core or an alternative view of transformation underlines the fact that embracing resiliency requires more than transformation.

According to experts, an agile organization is based on the following tenets: robustness (the ability to maintain effectiveness across a range of tasks, situations and conditions), resilience (the ability to recover from or adjust to misfortune, damage or destabilization in the environment), responsiveness (the ability to react to a change in the environment in a timely manner), flexibility (the ability to employ multiple approaches and the capacity to move seamlessly between them), innovation (the ability to do new things and the ability to do old things in new ways), and adaptation (the ability to change work processes and the ability to change the organization). The only thing I would argue with in analyzing this vision is the role of resilience within the framework of agility. If we define resilience as the ability of an organization to respond, monitor and anticipate threats to current operations and agility as the strategic willingness to embrace changes and seek out the opportunities within a change, we might see resilience more as a result of agility.

If we are to picture the difference between transformation/adaptability and agilization/resiliency, we could make an analogy to the following so-called models: Sisyphus and Madonna.

While promoting the development of a new Strategic Concept for NATO, Peter van Ham, researcher at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael in The Hague, coined the idea of remodeling NATO by using the American pop singer Madonna as a role model for self-reinvention. Business experts analyzing Madonna’s career noted how the artist changed her style, music or message almost every year to preserve a “fresh” image that ensured longtime success. These experts have borrowed from Madonna’s career to help reinvent organizations, using names such as Madonna’s curve, strategy or effect.

Meanwhile, even though I am unaware of any business model built on Sisyphus, the ancient king of Corinth from Greek mythology, I use him as a symbol of futility. Because of the nature of NATO (the need for the harmonization of almost 30 sometimes-divergent views) it is time-consuming to implement a conventional policy of change. If negotiations run too long, NATO runs the risk that it will implement an already obsolete policy.

Though we may see the concept of resilience is strongly connected to homeland defense, we could elaborate on Gen. Stanley McChrystal’s idea of using a network to defend against a networked enemy in Afghanistan as an example of agility/resiliency abroad. By describing the Taliban as “more network than army, more a community of interest than a corporate structure,” the former International Security Assistance Force commander emphasized that an “effective network involves much more than relaying data.” Therefore, “a true network starts with robust communications connectivity, but also leverages physical and cultural proximity, shared purpose,
established decision-making processes, personal relationships and trust. Ultimately, a network is defined by how well it allows its members to see, decide and effectively act. In other words, NATO is in need of a new way of doing business.26

NATO inherited a “stove piped” structure27 and has started the optimization process, but much remains to be done in terms of agility. To reach the 3.0 version envisioned by its secretary-general, NATO needs to move from a traditional framework of transformation (a Sisyphus-like approach) to a framework of agilization (a significant reinvention of the organization in terms of agility). In short, the organization must efficiently use and expand its ability to see into the future, its scalable structure and its learning system.

In the light of the previously mentioned premises, we could argue that the elements are already in place for this transition: There is a foresight system in place that has proved its usefulness in the development of the New Strategic Concept for the Alliance; the network is perceived more often as an indispensable instrument for NATO’s future, even though there is a certain lack of connection between networks across the Allied spectrum; and the feedback (lessons learned) system is widely used, but needs to adopt a nonlinear approach.

Now comes the toughest challenge for NATO agilization: Are all members ready to generate the political will needed for such tremendous change? One of the answers is that pressure for change will at some point lead to questioning the current decision-making system to avoid impeding operational plans.

In the meantime, another issue, strongly connected to political will, could arise: Does NATO need an all-inclusive framework for managing threats or is the organization in need of a strategic reorientation toward a cost-effective/priorities-oriented approach? What values do we want to protect and how much are we willing to pay?

An agilization framework might give an impetus for NATO to overcome its old model of doing business and to update its “software” to a 3.0 version. But it could also be seen as a Pandora’s Box, unleashing new challenges to the fundamental values of the organization.

2. I merged the term of Israel’s view on resilience - contain - with its corresponding definition from the U.S. view, because I think that the term “resistance” initially used in the U.S. view is a bit inaccurate to express the idea of limiting threat potential.
4. Which could be seen as an organized and systematic process to reduce uncertainty regarding the future (Helene Lavoix, ed., Strategic Forecasting and Warning: Navigating the Unknown, The Centre of Excellence for National Security is a research unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, November 2010).
5. European Security and Defence Identity.
14. “A Lessons Learned capability provides a commander with the structure, process and tools necessary to capture, analyse and take remedial action on any issue and to communicate and share results to achieve improvement. A desire to improve and the right mindset are essential to ensure that the capability works in harmony.” (2010 NATO Lessons Learned Conference Report, 26-28 October 2010, Portugal, http://www.jalk.nato.int/newsmedia/docs/2010%20Lessons%20Learned%20Conference%20Report.pdf, accessed May 1, 2011)
17. The term “agilization” was coined by Ian Tolinm in Agilization - The Regeneration of Competitiveness, as a process of transforming enterprise behavior for the purpose of meeting the competitive imperative of organizations of the 21st century.
A Promising Post-Soviet Start
Is Georgia at a political crossroads?

by per Concordiam Staff

Georgian performers welcome the French warship Jean de Vienne in Batumi in 2010. The ship participated in exercises with Georgia's Coast Guard. Georgia has pushed for closer ties with the European Union and NATO.
Georgia, a mountainous South Caucasus nation on the Black Sea, could make its mark on the world as a model for a successful transition from communist backwater to dynamic democracy. Georgia's young, aggressive, Western-oriented political leadership aims to modernize the economy through investment and reform, and in the process, reshape a country known in the former Soviet Union as a hotbed of corruption and organized crime into an example of good governance.

Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili has pushed strongly “to move Georgia out of Russia’s orbit and into NATO and the European Union,” The Times of London reported. More than 900 Georgian troops serve with NATO forces in Afghanistan, making Georgia the second highest per capita contributor to the International Security Assistance Force mission. Still, Georgia’s task is far from simple. It grapples with separatist crises in the provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and Saakashvili has quarreled with Russia’s leaders – who support the separatists – almost continuously, resulting in the brief 2008 war between the two neighbors. While Georgia struggles to recover from the political and economic fallout of the war, Russia considers Georgia to be within its sphere of influence and voices opposition to NATO expansion into the region.

Youth movement
As Georgia moves – sometimes erratically – along the path of transformation, it benefits from its youthful leadership. An article in Vestnik Kavkaza highlights the extraordinary youth of Georgia’s political class, bureaucracy and business elite. The article reports that the average age of government ministers and parliamentarians is 32, while the average bureaucrat is only 28 years old. And Georgia is led by American-educated President Saakashvili, who at 36 was the youngest president in the world when he came to power during the 2003 “Rose Revolution.”

The Rose Revolution grew out of street protests following what Eurasianet called “rigged parliamentary elections” in November 2003. The ruling party of then-president Eduard Shevardnadze, the former Soviet foreign minister, claimed victory despite independent vote counts
and exit polls indicating differently. Such an outcome might have been routine during Soviet days, but the Georgian people demanded better from their post-Soviet leaders. Tens of thousands poured into the streets of the capital Tbilisi, demanding Shevardnadze’s resignation and new elections. But when riot police and Soldiers laid down their arms and joined the protesters, the old regime fell without a shot fired. Opposition leader Saakashvili was elected president two months later, and his party swept parliamentary elections in March 2004.

Georgia’s new generation of leaders, whom the Vestnik Kavkaza article dubs the “Golden Youth,” came of age during the Soviet Union’s Brezhnev era and were primarily the children of Communist Party nomenklatura. They attended the best schools, including Western universities, grew to “hate the Communist model” and developed an “instinctive aversion to Russia as the successor of the hated USSR.” The article concludes that the youth and the passions of Georgia’s decision makers explain much of the change, and many of their mistakes.

**Early reforms**

In 2004, the new government began an aggressive campaign to rein in government corruption, fight crime, privatize large sectors of the economy and transform taxation and budgets. A 2006 analysis for the Foreign Policy Research Institute by Vladimir Papava, who served in the old regime from 1994 to 2000 as Georgia’s Minister of Economy, examined the successful economic and legal reforms of the Saakashvili-led government:

**TAX CODE REFORM** – The tax code was completely revamped. The Value Added Tax and payroll taxes were reduced and the income tax was changed from a progressive scale to a flat 12 percent. The number of taxes was also reduced from more than 20 to only seven.

**BUDGET REFORMS** – The government “drastically reduced redundancies and improved its ability to maintain financial order.” Budgets were tightly controlled and administrators held responsible.

**COMBATING OFFICIAL CORRUPTION** – The new government arrested dozens of former government officials and their families and friends on corruption charges. Unlawful accounting practices in the budgeting process were eliminated. Bureaucracies were streamlined and corrupt officials dismissed.

“Before the Rose Revolution, there was widespread tax avoidance and evasion, reflecting state weakness and corruption, and impacting severely on service delivery,” Transparency International, a global anti-corruption watchdog, said in a report. As a result of the tax code and budget reforms and the crackdown on official corruption, there has “been a massive increase in the government’s tax-take.”

The Saakashvili government also undertook a massive privatization initiative and Georgia’s improved reputation allowed it to attract “high-value privatization deals” worth much more than was possible before the Rose Revolution, Papava explained. The reforms were so successful that Georgia was able to renew its International Monetary Fund program and received more than $1 billion in foreign grants and credit. Thanks to the reforms and revenue from privatization, Georgia’s economy grew steadily from 2004 until 2008, when the Russian war, followed closely by the international economic crisis, resulted in reduced direct foreign investment and economic contraction in 2009. “Since 2005, Georgia has moved up to 12th place from 112th among 181 countries surveyed on the World Bank’s annual Doing Business ranking,” USAID reported.

The reforms did not end with the economy. The police were completely reorganized. The traffic police were eliminated, ending “the practice of bribery” on the roads, and a Western-style police patrol was established, Papava said. This reform is credited with increasing tourism and Papava estimates it enlarges opportunities for Georgia to develop into an international transportation corridor. The government’s reformist mindset also helped end a separatist conflict in the Adjara Autonomous region. The separatist leader fled under pressure, and the province, which had functioned as a haven for organized crime, was peacefully reintegrated into Georgia.

**It’s not all roses**

In the seven years since the Rose Revolution, there have been two periods of massive civil unrest (2007 and 2009), when tens of thousands of protestors clamored for
Saakashvili’s resignation. His government has weathered all storms, but discontent simmers, as shown by the massive protests. And the “August War” with Russia in 2008 damaged the nation’s self-confidence and effectively ended chances of immediate reincorporation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia into Georgia.

The war highlighted the government’s youthful inexperience. According to the report from the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Georgian forces instigated military action against South Ossetia, after a period of increasing tension, under the unsubstantiated pretext that Russian forces had begun a large-scale incursion into the region in violation of Georgian sovereignty. Russia responded with overwhelming force, driving Georgian forces out of South Ossetia and Abkhazia – which took advantage of the conflict in South Ossetia to advance its own territorial claims – and pushed into Georgian territory, threatening Tbilisi. By misjudging the situation, including overestimating Georgian military capabilities and underestimating Russian resolve, the Saakashvili government led the country into an unwinnable war that risked Georgia’s survival and tarnished its international reputation.

After rapid progress in the immediate aftermath of the Rose Revolution, the pace of economic reform slowed dramatically. “While Georgia’s multifaceted reform has won wide acclaim for combating street-level corruption, it has been criticized for failing to fix deeper structural problems, like poor accountability and rights violations,” Eurasianet wrote.

Of particular concern are certain aspects of Georgian tax policy. According to Transparency International, “The excesses of the Financial Police are again a fact of life for many businesses in Georgia. Budgetary shortfalls are a major motivating factor, but so too are political considerations, with tax audits, as one commentator noted, being used as a political club.” Jim McNicholas, USAID Resident Country Director, emphasized the importance of reform, telling The Financial newspaper: “New investors look to see whether there is a level playing-field for small and medium enterprises to grow and that policies affecting businesses, such as tax policy and enforcement, are transparent.” Even Saakashvili admitted in the online magazine Civil Georgia that “shortcomings still remain in the relations between the state and the entrepreneurs,” regarding unfair treatment and excessive penalties.

At a crossroads

Georgia is approaching a political crossroads. Relations between Saakashvili’s governing National Movement Party and the fractured opposition have been noxious, with most opposition lawmakers boycotting parliament. The current political atmosphere threatens to undermine public faith in government institutions.

Opposition protesters in 2007 accused Saakashvili of corruption and authoritarian rule. The government used riot police and tear gas to quell the demonstrations and shut down opposition TV stations, damaging Saakashvili’s democratic credentials. Protestors returned to the streets in 2009, again accusing the government of heavy-handedness and lack of transparency, and demanding early presidential elections. Saakashvili refused to step down, but promised constitutional reforms. These were passed in October 2009, diminishing the powers of the president, empowering parliament and making the prime minister head of state. The changes will not take effect until Saakashvili leaves office in 2013.

Georgia has made remarkable progress since the Rose Revolution and has proven a dependable friend and partner to NATO with its valuable troop contribution to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. But continued reforms are necessary if the nation is to achieve the goal of becoming an authentic liberal democracy. Thomas De Waal points out in The National Interest that “Saakashvili’s best legacy would be to step down peacefully and allow a constitutional transfer of power to someone else, who is not himself.”

Commentators caution Saakashvili and his allies against falling into the illiberal and anti-democratic trap that too many former revolutionary reformists have, believing they are too valuable to relinquish power. The 2012-2013 elections will determine much. The opposition has a chance to come together and participate in the political process. The International Crisis Group concluded: “The current government should understand that its domestic legitimacy, as well as continued international political and financial support, is contingent on the successful implementation of further reforms and a credible leadership transition.”

Post Soviet Conflict

South Ossetia and Abkhazia broke with Georgia as the Soviet Union dissolved. While Georgia asserted its independence, the two provinces claimed their own rights to form independent states. Bloody civil wars followed in South Ossetia in 1991-92 and Abkhazia in 1992-94. Abkhazia, once a separate SSR, was joined to Georgia by the Soviets in 1931. The Abkhazia war was especially brutal with allegations of war crimes against both sides. The resulting bad blood hampers reconciliation. After the 2008 war, Russia and three other countries recognized the independence of the breakaway provinces, but no other nations have followed suit.
Europe’s Missile Shield

NATO seeks Russian cooperation on Phased Adaptive Approach

When NATO agreed in November 2010 to install a European-wide anti-ballistic missile shield, the Alliance welcomed Russian involvement in the creation of a defensive network of radar stations and interceptors meant to thwart nuclear-tipped missiles.

NATO’s “Phased Adaptive Approach” – the gradual development of the missile shield in stages through 2020 – was calibrated to address Russian fears of NATO encroachment while giving the Alliance more time for anti-missile technology to advance. Although the NATO and Russian positions have yet to converge, frequent meetings between the Alliance and Russia through 2011 promise an era of wider cooperation as relations continue to reset between East and West.

Even as the USS Monterey, a U.S. Navy guided missile cruiser designed to track and intercept missiles, steamed into European waters in March 2011 to support the Phased Adaptive Approach, former U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates flew to Moscow to meet Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. The Kremlin had expressed wariness of the missile shield as recently as February 2011 during the 47th Munich Security Conference, when Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov objected to NATO’s overtures as a “take it or leave it offer.” A statement that appeared more conciliatory emerged from the Gates/Medvedev meeting, as reported by Russian News Agency RIA Novosti: “Russia is ready to tackle the common tasks aimed at protecting the continent from possible missile threats together with its partners while sticking to a range of principal conditions, including the existence of real guarantees that the countries’ anti-missile potentials will not be aimed at each other.”
The Phased Adaptive Approach
The Phased Adaptive Approach springs from NATO’s 2009 decision to overhaul a 2007 plan that would have placed the bulk of the ballistic missile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic. Although the Alliance stressed that the previously envisioned ballistic missile defense, or BMD, was designed to engage potential threats from emerging nuclear powers, Russia expressed concern that the system could target its long-standing stockpile of intercontinental ballistic missiles. Russian leaders argued BMD would neutralize its status as a nuclear power, overturning the strategic balance that had reigned since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.

The Phased Adaptive Approach that started in 2011 is using existing missile destruction technology tested successfully in the Pacific Ocean, including the SM-3 interceptor and ship-based radar. Ships equipped with these systems would likely deploy to the eastern Mediterranean to defend against regional missile threats. The USS Monterey’s arrival was the first step.

“The first phase ... involves ships, because we have sea-based missile defense capabilities now, as well as forward-based radar that can provide information to those ships,” senior U.S. Department of Defense official John Plumb announced in March 2011.

Phase 2, planned for 2015, would expand installation of interceptors to sites in southeastern Europe and broaden protection to include shooting down short- and medium-range missiles. In May 2011, Romania agreed to the placement of such a site. Phase 3, arriving in 2018, promises improved equipment to intercept intermediate-range missiles. Poland approved legislation in April 2011 ratifying that country’s future installation of those interceptors. The US-Poland Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement entered into force on September 15, 2011. The final phase, scheduled for 2020, is expected to include technological upgrades capable of destroying intercontinental ballistic missiles.

NATO has sought to install land-based sensors as close as possible to emerging nuclear threats east of the Mediterranean. Turkey has yet to decide...
whether it will accept such NATO early-warning radar, but the Balkans has been discussed as an alternative site for both radar and interceptors. Instead of placing most interceptors in Poland, as outlined in the previous BMD plan, shipborne interceptors would provide greater flexibility and maneuverability. If stationed in the Black Sea, those ships would provide another avenue for cooperation with Russia, which maintains a Black Sea fleet.

“Starting in 2011, the phased, adaptive approach would systematically increase the defended area as the threat is expected to grow,” the White House said in a 2009 statement. “In the 2018 timeframe, all of Europe could be protected by our collective missile defense architecture.”

Healing differences
In preparation for NATO’s Lisbon Summit in November 2010, Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen invited Russian leaders to Portugal to discuss collective missile defense. The summit marked the first time that NATO heads of state formally agreed to pool resources for BMD. The Alliance and Russia have yet to bridge all their differences, however. One of the biggest issues is whether NATO members would merge their efforts completely with a similar Russian anti-missile network or simply share information, and possibly technology, with the Russians.

In early 2011, Russia lobbied for a single system under joint NATO-Russian control, a proposal NATO declined to accept. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reiterated the point at the Munich Security Conference: “We will not accept any constraints on our missile defenses.”
Meetings of the NATO-Russia Council, initiated in 2002 to help defuse tensions and broaden negotiating channels between the former rivals, have often been contentious when the topic switches to missile defense. Gates’ 2011 visit to Moscow helped break some of the ice around the issue. Ellen Tauscher, U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, announced at the time that she viewed Russia as a “full-fledged participant in the European missile defense system,” RIA Novosti reported in March 2011.

“We want to protect all of Europe, not just some of Europe,” Tauscher said in the article. “We want our European allies and friends to buy into the European Phased Adaptive Approach; it is not something that we want to impose on them – that’s not what friends do.”

Tauscher’s comment reinforced the missile defense consensus, including a proposed rapprochement with Russia, publicized at the Lisbon Summit: “We will continue to explore opportunities for missile defense co-operation with Russia in a spirit of reciprocity, maximum transparency and mutual confidence. We reaffirm the Alliance’s readiness to invite Russia to explore jointly the potential for linking current and planned missile defence systems at an appropriate time in mutually beneficial ways.”

**Negotiations to continue**

The reality is sure to be messier than such proclamations suggest, international affairs experts say. Tensions increased briefly in February 2011 when Georgia dubbed the Phased Adaptive Approach “interesting,” though it did not formulate a concrete position regarding hosting land-based early warning radar, a system earlier offered to Turkey. Russia has made no secret of its distaste for NATO expansion into Georgia, and the radar placement proposal raised suspicions among Russians that Georgia is forging closer links to the Alliance.

“Most Russian policymakers still feel alienated from the current European security architecture since many decisions are made by NATO that Russia opposes but cannot resist. For this and other reasons, it is still unclear whether this latest effort since the end of the Cold War to reorient the NATO-Russian relationship towards cooperation will succeed,” Jane’s Intelligence Review said in a February 2011 article.

Missile defense is also linked to the fate of tactical nuclear weapons, the portable bombs of which Russia maintains a vast superiority relative to NATO. If a missile shield neutralizes a nation’s ballistic missile potential, it arguably raises the profile of tactical nuclear weapons that can be delivered under the radar by artillery and aircraft. Or so the argument runs in Russia. The U.S. and Russia have vowed to discuss tactical nuclear weapons in future arms control negotiations, although the subject was excluded from the recently signed Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or START II.

The Guardian summed up the thinking of many experts in an editorial in March 2011, a couple weeks after the USS Monterey sailed for Europe with its kit of anti-ballistic missile technology. “What is now clear is that further progress in transforming NATO, improving U.S.-NATO-Russia relations and nuclear threat reduction is dependent in large part on developing a cooperative approach to missile defence,” the newspaper wrote. ©
Integrating Central Asia

Cooperation is critical for the resource-rich region

by per Concordiam Staff

Central Asia is endowed with a surplus of natural and human resources. The region possesses abundant energy and minerals, some of the world's largest tracts of arable land and a highly literate population. It also borders on some of the fastest growing economies in the world, including China and India.

"Central Asia is poised to become a significant actor in this new global paradigm and the next frontier of economic opportunity," said Angel Gurría, Secretary-General of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. Despite this high praise from the OECD, the five former Soviet Central Asian countries – Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – have been struggling to varying degrees to integrate into the world economy.

Positive reforms are needed if Central Asia is to achieve economic integration and realize its vast potential. The OECD notes that the region is overly dependent on natural resource extraction and does little to promote investment, economic diversification and worker training. Critics say the region needs investment in infrastructure – not only pipelines to export natural gas and oil to an energy-hungry world, but also highways and railroads to ship produce and manufactured goods, and schools to educate its citizens. Most importantly, a number of analysts agree that the Central Asian nations need to improve intraregional cooperation and integrate their economies to compete effectively in world markets.

Much of the region suffers from poor economic growth and high unemployment, forcing large numbers of its citizens to migrate abroad in search of jobs. Some observers fear that despite its competitive advantages, the region could plunge into failure.

Wealth of energy

Central Asia is home to vast energy resources and has potential for even greater energy production. The region boasts substantial reserves of traditional fossil fuels – oil, natural gas and coal – and large deposits of uranium. Hydroelectric dams proliferate, and the hot, dry climate produces wind and sunshine that could be harnessed as large-scale sources of electric power, according to the "Central Asia Atlas of Natural Resources," published in 2010 by the Asian Development Bank, or ADB.

Kazakhstan, the largest and most developed of the five nations, was the world's 16th largest oil producer in 2009, with estimated reserves of 30 billion barrels. Turkmenistan's natural gas reserves are 7.5 trillion cubic meters, the fourth largest reserves in the world, according to Oil & Gas Journal as reported by the U.S. Energy Information Administration, or EIA. Kazakhstan (15th) and Uzbekistan (19th) also rank in the top 20 for natural gas, reporting an estimated 2.4 trillion and 1.8 trillion cubic meters, respectively.

Kazakhstan also sits atop the world's second largest known uranium deposits, 651,000 tonnes, according to December 2010 data from the World Nuclear Association, or WNA. Uzbekistan ranks 12th globally with reserves of 111,000 tonnes. In 2009, Kazakhstan mined 27.6 percent of the world's total uranium. Demand for uranium is expected to increase as the world looks to boost energy supplies while reducing carbon emissions. Supplies of Cold War surplus weapons-grade uranium and plutonium, which account for about 15 percent of civilian nuclear fuel, could be exhausted in a few years, the WNA said.

Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have little in the way of fossil fuels (although a recent gas find in Tajikistan shows promise), but both have abundant hydroelectric potential. The two mostly mountainous republics already have more than 40 hydropower stations and plan to build more. According to the ADB report, "hydroelectric potential for the region has been placed at more than 450 billion kilowatts per year, with an estimated 90 percent of this presently unused."

Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan plan to grow into electricity exporters, with an eye toward the markets of China, Pakistan, Afghanistan and India.
A NATO helicopter patrols a new rail line between Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan, and Termez, Uzbekistan. The railroad is part of the Northern Distribution Network, which supplies the NATO mission in Afghanistan and provides valuable commercial links within the region.

PETTY OFFICER 1ST CLASS MARK O’DONALD U.S. NAVY

A Tibetan nomad on horseback leads her camels full of goods in China’s northwest Qinghai province. China and India will reopen a historic trading route through Tibet that was once part of the Silk Road.

AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE
Pipeline politics
There is tremendous demand for Central Asian energy, and the region’s proximity to Europe and the energy-craving Asian economies makes it ideally situated to serve as an export and transit hub. “The energy resources of Central Asia can be a force for predictability in the global economy, ensuring diversity of sources and markets and transit routes, while at the same time bringing a new sense of economic possibility in the region itself,” William J. Burns, U.S. Under Secretary for Political Affairs, said in 2009.

Unfortunately, much of the energy transit infrastructure is aging and inadequate for today’s demands. According to a 2010 study by Spain’s Real Instituto Elcano, maintenance and management of the mostly Soviet-era pipeline system is sometimes inadequate. The lack of maintenance brought about an explosion in a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Russia in 2009. There also aren’t enough pipelines to handle increased production of and demand for Central Asian oil and gas, a problem for a region dependent on pipelines to export energy to world markets, the U.S. EIA points out.

New projects to get Central Asian gas to European markets include the Western-backed Nabucco and the Russian-backed South Stream pipelines, both routed across the Caspian Sea and Turkey. Some analysts argue that a southern pipeline through Iran would be easiest and cheapest, but the political and security situation in that country forestalls EU or U.S. participation or financing. A new natural gas pipeline between Turkmenistan and China opened in December 2009 with the ability to boost capacity along with demand. And according to the U.S. EIA, the Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline – online since 2006 – will be expanded to handle twice its current load by 2013.

Rail and highway improvements
Central Asian transportation links play an important role in supporting NATO operations in Afghanistan. The Northern Distribution Network, or NDN, is “a series of commercially-based logistical arrangements, connecting Baltic and Caspian ports with Afghanistan via Russia, Central Asia, and the Caucasus,” according to the Center for Strategic International Studies. In 2011, the NDN will carry three times the supplies it did three years earlier and now carries half of all cargo destined for Afghanistan. NATO hopes to “promote the economic, transportation and security integration of the region” through the NDN, according to a March 2011 article in Eurasia Review.

The World Bank highlighted some of the problems associated with Central Asian transportation. Geography is an unavoidable obstacle. If one discounts the Caspian Sea, Central Asia is completely landlocked, limiting easy access to efficient water transportation. It is also covered by large deserts and includes some of the highest, most rugged mountains in the world, which limit available transport corridors and increase costs.

Railways are the primary mode of intercity transportation, and existing railways are well developed. But these Soviet-era networks were designed to connect the region with Russia, and “that leaves links among the Central Asian countries and other neighbors, including Afghanistan, China and Iran, largely underdeveloped,” the World Bank said. That could soon change. Central Asia Newswire reported that China offered $2 billion (1.4 billion euros) in January 2011 to finance the Kyrgyz portion of a railway linking it with Kyrgyzstan and China in exchange for access to Kyrgyz gold, aluminum and iron ore. Construction of a new railway linking Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Iran began in 2010.

Highways are more problematic. Many roads are poorly maintained and, as with railroads, the Soviet network was “designed without reference to future borders between nations that were not conceived of at the time,” according to a 2009 analysis from the Central Asian Regional Economic
Cooperation Institute, or CAREC. This leads to frequent border crossings and necessitates development of alternate routes. Inefficient border checkpoints and other regulatory delays can double the time required to cross the region.

As part of a 2005 study by the U.N. Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, a truck traveling from Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, to Novosibirsk, Russia, took 208 hours, 129 of which were absorbed at border crossings and assorted police and bureaucratic checks, most in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan implemented a customs and border control reform program, moving some procedures online, and has formed a “Customs Control Committee” to identify export and import bottlenecks, the U.N. said. To further eliminate traffic delays in Central Asia, CAREC aims to “upgrade six corridors to international standard by 2017.”

Diversification and integration
The richness of Central Asia’s natural endowment can create economic dependence. According to the OECD, oil and related products account for 65 percent of Kazakhstan’s exports, while gold makes up 29 percent of Kyrgyzstan’s. Foreign direct investment is critical to building Central Asia’s economies, but it is directed overwhelmingly toward natural resource extraction. The OECD recommended the region promote “high-potential sectors that could be developed to increase wider competitiveness,” including agribusiness, information technology and business services. Other recommendations include reducing state control over capital investment, removing burdensome business regulations, increasing access to financing for small- and medium-sized businesses and improving the “deteriorating education system.”

Integration among the Central Asian countries is essential to growth and development. These countries, once thoroughly integrated as Soviet republics, have sometimes squabbled over resources and security as independent nations. But experts say they would benefit from reintegrating transportation and communication infrastructures, lowering barriers to trade and travel and cooperating on security, border enforcement and drug interdiction.

According to the Carnegie Endowment for Peace: “The development of the economies of the region is already distorted by the difficulties of intraregional and international trade. Future development of these countries will be put at further risk if the pace of integration is not increased.”

Central Asia has a long history of linking East and West. That vital role was interrupted for nearly a century under Soviet governance. “Central Asia has for thousands of years served as a bridge between East and West, North and South,” said Burns, the American diplomat. “The old Silk Road transported not only goods and people, but ideas, cultures, and technology. It helped create great civilizations and foster great innovations. Central Asia can have a similarly historic impact today.” Regional and international economic integration, careful development of natural and human resources and cooperation are the keys.

LEFT: An Afghan Border Police officer guards the Freedom Bridge across the Amu Darya River. The bridge is the only border crossing between Afghanistan and Uzbekistan and is an important commercial link.

CENTER: An oil rig rises over the Tengiz oil field in Kazakhstan, near the Caspian Sea. Kazakhstan is one of the world’s largest oil producers.

RIGHT: Central Asian leaders turn a valve to release natural gas into a pipeline that began delivering gas from Turkmenistan to China in 2009. From left in foreground: Chinese President Hu Jintao, Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov and Uzbek President Islam Karimov.
Food as Security
The world tries to blunt the effects of food price rises

The World Bank announced in February 2011 that food prices could reach “dangerous levels,” and provoke unrest, a fear partly borne out by nearly simultaneous protests in North Africa and the Middle East. At that time, the Bank’s food price index sat just 3 percent below the 2008 peak that had sparked widespread riots in Africa, Latin America and parts of Asia as staples like wheat and corn were priced out of reach of many of the world’s poor.

An estimated 44 million people in low- and middle-income countries have fallen into what the Bank describes as “extreme poverty” since food prices resumed their rise in June 2010. The task before the world is to restore a balance between supply and demand. Technology, international cooperation and efficient use of foodstuffs could all go a long way to avoid further human suffering and global insecurity. Maire Geoghegan-Quinn, the European Commissioner of Research, Innovation and Science, expressed a sense of urgency in a June 2010 press release, “Food security is a stark matter of life and death and without it there is no other kind of security.”

What is to blame?
Prices of wheat, corn, sugar and edible oils have risen sharply from June 2010 to January 2011, most in the range of 75 percent. International economists blame a weak dollar, high oil prices, growing demand from developing countries and bad harvests in key countries like Russian and Australia. Global meat price increases are partly due to the drop in supply combined with increased meat consumption. Consumers are eating more meat, largely owing to changing diets reflecting growing affluence. When consumers eat meat, they are eating more grain indirectly, as opposed to eating meal and bread.

The International Food Policy Institute estimates that from 2000 to 2030, per capita meat consumption could rise 49 percent in China, 79 percent in India and 22 percent in Brazil, boosting grain demand for animal feed. It takes about 8 pounds of feed for a cow to gain a pound, and 2 to 4 pounds of grain for a chicken to put on similar weight. In recent years, because of a drop in cattle prices, fewer farmers raised cows in major exporting nations like Argentina, Brazil and the United States, Mark Topliff, an economist with the English beef and sheep industry, told the Guardian. The removal of EU subsidies under the Common Agricultural Policy also reduced livestock in Europe.

The cost of oil also factors into the availability and price of food. It costs more to produce and ship grain and raises the price of petroleum-based pesticides, fertilizers and herbicides. “Unexpected oil price spikes could further exacerbate an already precarious situation in food markets,” said David Hallam of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations told Reuters in March 2011. In the spring of 2011, as traders worried about unrest in North Africa and the Middle East, oil prices hit 2 ½ year highs and approached 2008 records.

Flooding in Australia curtailed wheat and sugar cane production, inflating the prices of both. Russia experienced weather related obstacles as drought and wildfires in September 2010 severely damaged the country’s wheat supply.

Speculation could also have played a role in driving up food prices. Forty-eight world agriculture ministers that met in Berlin in January 2011 issued a joint statement that they were...
Butchers package meat at a Sao Paulo, Brazil, supermarket in 2007. A growing appetite for meat in developing countries could boost food prices worldwide.

AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE
“Concerned that excessive price volatility and speculation on international agricultural markets might constitute a threat to food security,” Bloomberg reported.

Banks and hedge funds have been accused of buying up vast stocks of food, forcing prices to rise. German Agriculture Minister Ilse Aigner announced that the stakes are too high to allow “gamblers” to play with food markets. “Food and agricultural commodities are not like anything else. Sometimes it’s about pure survival,” Aigner said in a Bloomberg report in January 2011.

**Breeding instability**

In a U.N. General Assembly speech in February 2011, France’s Agriculture Minister Bruno Le Maire warned of a resumption of food riots if the world did not find “concrete, rapid and efficient solutions.” Riots had broken out in Tunisia, Algeria, Jordan, Morocco and Mozambique in reaction to high food prices. In Algeria, three people were killed and 300 injured in riots over food and housing costs, CNN reported in January 2011. Protests started a week earlier over spiraling costs of milk, oil and sugar, and the government responded by slashing duties for sugar and oil by 41 percent, Algerie Press Service said. Similar protests in Tunisia in January 2011 toppled President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali from power after 23 years.

In January 2011, governments in North Africa, the Middle East and Asia bought staple crops, such as wheat and rice, in bulk on the market to build a cushion of supplies against future price rises. The U.N. warned that hoarding, essentially attempting to influence the market, had only made the food crisis worse in 2008, an article in *The Telegraph* reported. “They often provoke more uncertainty and disruption on world markets and drive prices up further globally, while depressing prices domestically and hence curtailing incentives to produce more food,” U.N. food official Richard China said in the article.

High and unstable food prices present a particularly difficult challenge to developing countries in which people spend more than half of their income on food. According to the February 2011 World Bank report, Kyrgyzstan, Bangladesh and Tajikistan were harmed the most by high wheat prices. The EU is taking measures to protect Kyrgyzstan. In November 2010, the European Commission signed a 2 million euro financing agreement with Kyrgyzstan to ensure their country’s food security. “The project will support the government in improving the collection, analysis and dissemination of food security data across the food supply and demand chains and the establishment of a government early warning system and a commodity outlook that facilitates the management of food security policies,” European Union News reported in November 2010.

**Further impacts**

Rice has weathered the price storm better than other grains. Global rice prices have been relatively stable and should continue to be so. The World Bank’s Food Price Watch reported that the export price for Thai rice increased only 18 percent between June 2010 and January 2011 and that prices remained 70 percent below 2008 peaks. The announcement that Bangladesh and Indonesia, two large rice importers, will increase domestic stocks has helped rice prices remain stable. Rice prices have helped keep the grain price index low, despite a rise in prices for other grains.

Inflation is making more than food prices soar. Clothing was the main driver in inflation in March 2011. Increasing global demand and shrinking supply drove cotton prices to an all-time high in February 2011. Cotton prices doubled between early 2010 and early 2011 and threaten to drive up costs for retailers, inevitably leading to more expensive clothing for consumers. Demand for cotton has exceeded supply for the last five years. Production constraints have driven cotton supplies to their lowest level since 1993, as growers in Australia, Pakistan, China and India produce less for the world market.
Wildfires destroy a field of grain south of Moscow after weeks of devastating drought in July 2010.

Search for solutions

Food crises will require the attention of governments and private enterprise. The U.N. warned in a March 2011 Bloomberg article that “food output will have to climb by 70 percent between 2010 and 2050 as the world population swells to 9 billion and rising incomes boost meat and dairy consumption.”

Using corn for food instead of energy would help. Some say growing corn for ethanol production is a mistake and contributes to high food prices. A large percentage of the U.S. corn crop is used to make ethanol, a blending additive used to create a cleaner burning auto fuel. Ethanol advocates argue that environmental benefits outweigh that diversion of corn from the food supply.

But analysts suggest it is a mistake to use food for fuel. “One-quarter of all maize and other grain crops grown in the U.S. now goes to produce fuel for cars and not to feed people,” the Guardian said. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) suggests using instead “alternative feedstocks, such as cellulosic materials, which produce energy more efficiently, and at the same time to allow more open trade in biofuels and feedstocks.” Food inflation may weaken opposition to genetically modified foods. Europe currently bans most use of genetically altered seeds, what detractors pejoratively call “Frankenstein foods.” Despite this resistance, food prices and shortages may open minds to increasing production through genetics. “Policy makers and food companies are pressing the genetic modification topic in a bid to temper aversion to biotech crops,” The New York Times reported after the 2008 food crisis.

Genetically altering foods to boost crop yields isn’t new. Thanks to the work of people like Norman Borlaug, father of the post-World War II “Green Revolution,” food-scarce Mexico doubled wheat yields in 1956 and became self-sufficient. India, Pakistan and Sudan followed suit with comparable success.

Borlaug “developed genetically unique strains of “semidwarf” wheat, and later rice, that raised food yields as much as sixfold,” according to The Wall Street Journal in September 2009. His modifications produced high-yielding crop varieties that helped avert mass famines predicted in the 1960s. The Economist also reported in September 2009 that Borlaug dismissed criticism of genetically engineered food as “rubbish, unproven by science” and touted the potential benefits as “endless.”

Experts contend that the world must also remove political obstacles to food procurement. “Today’s economic and agricultural situation is perilous. It faces much greater volatility than all of the other economic sectors in the world without exception,” La Maire said in a U.N. speech in February 2011. OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurria called for greater transparency in food production and a removal of import and export restrictions that impede the proper functioning of markets. “Agriculture markets have always been volatile,” Gurria said, “But if governments act together then extreme price swings can be mitigated and vulnerable consumers and producers further protected.”
Peace at the Pole
Nations seek common ground to avoid conflict over Arctic oil and gas
by per Concordiam Staff

Trying to avert an international struggle for control of undersea oil and gas near the North Pole, NATO and Russia are inching toward a diplomatic solution to apportion the mineral riches that scientists believe rest within the Arctic. The region’s harsh climate and technological limitations of oil and gas drilling have left much of the Arctic off limits to successful exploitation. But recent warming has shrunk the size of the polar ice pack, and nations have begun staking claims to territory that was once considered economically inaccessible.

The stakes are high: The 6 percent of the globe above the Arctic Circle contains an estimated 90 billion barrels of oil and 1.7 quadrillion cubic feet of natural gas, according to a 2008 appraisal by the U.S. Geological Survey. The vast majority of those minerals lies offshore and would be easier to recover if sea ice were thin or nonexistent. “For now, the disputes in the north have been dealt with peacefully, but climate change could alter the equilibrium over the coming years in the race of temptation for exploitation of more readily accessible natural resources,” U.S. Adm. James Stavridis, NATO’s supreme allied commander, said in an article in the Guardian in October 2010.

Several events in late 2010 suggest that the five countries that make up the Arctic region – the United States, Russia, Norway, Denmark and Canada – aim to keep tensions in check. In September 2010, Russia convened an international arctic forum in Moscow at which Prime Minister Vladimir Putin insisted the territory north of the Arctic Circle would be “an area for cooperation and dialog.” That same month, Russia and Norway signed a treaty, 40 years in the making, that delineated the maritime border between the two neighbors in the Barents Sea and Arctic Ocean. It wasn’t just petroleum prospects. Fishing and navigation rights also prompted the settlement. “It sends an important signal to the rest of the world – the Arctic is a peaceful region where any issues that arise are resolved in accordance with international law. It reflects the parties’ active role and responsibility as coastal states for securing stability and strengthening cooperation in the Arctic Ocean,” Norway’s Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg announced at the time.

A NATO conference in the United Kingdom in October 2010 edged the world even closer to ensuring that competition in the Arctic remains peaceful. The Environmental Security in the Arctic Ocean conference drew participants from 17 nations. One of the chairmen of the conference was Alexander Vylegzhanin of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The rise of China, Japan and Korea as Arctic maritime nations suggests more countries will have a hand in Arctic governance in the future, a democratic expansion of responsibilities that conference attendees discussed. “The balance is one of achieving national interests and common interests … for the world as a whole,” said professor Peter
U.S. and Canadian Coast Guard ships survey the Arctic continental shelf in August 2009. Northern countries are trying to define territorial waters in the Arctic, a region expected to contain 90 billion barrels of oil.
Berkman, a NATO advisor who runs the Arctic Ocean geopolitics program at the University of Cambridge.

Climate scientists have raised the possibility that the Arctic Ocean could shed its ice starting as early as September 2030. Such forecasts have encouraged nations to stake claims to waters far from their coastlines. Some of those territorial claims conflict. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea provides for a 200-mile economic exclusive zone in which countries can harvest resources. But the law provides for expansion beyond 200 miles if a nation can prove its continental shelf is more extensive.

Russia tested that provision in 2007 when it sent two mini submarines to plant a titanium flag on the seabed, 4.3 kilometers beneath the ice at the North Pole. Russian scientists focused on the 2,000-kilometer Lomonosov Ridge, an underwater mountain range that Russia insists is part of its continental shelf. Canada, which asserts rights to some of the same waters, dubbed the mission a publicity stunt without legal standing. In fact, the U.N. had previously rejected Russian claims to the ridge, citing a lack of geological evidence.

“This isn't the 15th century. You can't go around the world and just plant flags and say, 'We're claiming this territory,'” Canadian foreign minister Peter MacKay told CTV television.

Though arguments over fishing and shipping lanes have created friction in the past, the region's potential mineral wealth draws the most attention these days. Scientists say the Arctic harbors the largest trove of undiscovered oil and natural gas in the world. The U.S. Geological Survey might even have underestimated the future mineral potential of the Arctic, since it counted only resources recoverable using existing technology and ignored unconventional oil and gas fields. Greenland, an autonomous country within Denmark, has begun granting licenses to petroleum companies to drill for oil and gas. In late 2010, Scotland's Cairn Energy, one of those license holders, announced it had struck oil. Norway and Russia are looking north to tracts in the Barents Sea harboring an estimated 318 trillion cubic feet of gas, an amount many times higher than those countries' known reserves.

If global warming continues, extraction could become easier. Not only would drilling be simpler in the absence of sheet ice, but shipping the oil and gas to market would be less hazardous in ice-free seas. Nations have talked...
about establishing routine shipping lanes astride Canada and Siberia to connect Europe, Asia and North America, versions of the old Northwest and Northeast passages sought by European explorers in the 1500s and 1600s. Nevertheless, in its 2009 Arctic Maritime Shipping Assessment, the Arctic Council, an intergovernmental agency founded in 1996, cautioned against minimalizing the perils of the polar climate. Even if ice routinely vanishes every September, the Arctic Ocean will remain ice-locked in winter and prey to icebergs year-round.

Russia’s polar submarine expedition raised worries that a new “cold war” might be materializing in the Arctic, which Russian leaders dubbed a “strategic economic resource” in 2005. But in 2010, Russia went out of its way to sound conciliatory, particularly at the Moscow conference in September. Not only did Russia place the Lomonosov Ridge question in the hands of the U.N., but it stressed the need to repair environmental damage in the Arctic inflicted by the former Soviet Union. Alexander Pelyasov, director of Russia’s Centre of the North and Arctic Economy, suggested to the Guardian that his nation’s policy hasn’t always been consistent since the days of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1989. “I think you have to get a balance between co-operative behaviour and national interest. It’s a very difficult balance,” Pelyasov said in a Guardian article in September 2010. “Unfortunately, over the past 20 years we have sometimes gone in this and that direction.”

NATO has stressed its preference for creating a zone of cooperation rather than a zone of competition at the top of the world. The military’s role would be to support peaceful civilian uses above the Arctic Circle. Said Adm. Stavridis: “Some may argue the Arctic should be completely free of military forces in order to preserve the goal of peace and universal utility to humankind, but I personally believe that the military has a rightful and necessary role in the high north.”
Yet despite multiple successes borne on the back of this large security outlay, allied counterterrorism strategy is “not as good as it should be,” said Jamie Shea, Deputy Assistant Secretary-General in NATO’s new Emerging Security Challenges Division. Fears of Mumbai-style attacks, further security breaches at airports and crippled computer networks have tempered NATO’s self-assessment in the realm of counterterrorism and called forth demands for improvement.

“I would give us a ‘B’ rather than an ‘A’ in the 10 years since 9/11,” Shea announced from the podium at the Counter Terror Expo in London in April 2011. Ten days after Shea spoke, U.S. commandos killed al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden in Pakistan after a nearly 10-year manhunt.

Viewing the past decade through the prism of al-Qaida, Shea said terrorists, despite repeated defeats on the battlefield, can take credit for creating persistent worldwide havoc. Al-Qaida has spun off franchises that act in its name with little guidance from the “home office,” Shea noted. It’s so well-known, it can claim credit for lethal acts it had no hand in. Even its failures, magnified by the media, can produce the destabilizing fallout of a mini-9/11. For example, the 2010 plot to ship explosives through printer ink cartridges cost $4,000 to finance, but has provoked countermeasures whose bill in the United Kingdom alone has topped $1 billion.

 Shea’s less-than-stellar evaluation came amid a call for the European Union to take a greater role in the fight against terrorism, whether it be sharing more airline passenger data, foiling terror finance networks or doubling down on cyber security. While acknowledging that counterterrorism is largely within the purview of national governments, Cecilia Malmstrom, European Union Commissioner for Home Affairs, accepted a wider role for the EU.

Sharing the dais with Shea at the London counterterror conference, she announced the creation in September 2011 of a Brussels-based anti-radicalization network to challenge terrorist propaganda that portrays killers as romantic freedom fighters and religious martyrs. The network will devise and share anti-terror approaches through an online forum and EU-wide conferences.

Malmstrom also described an April 2011 meeting in Budapest with U.S. Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano in which both sides recognized the “striking” similarities in their approaches to disrupting terrorist money transfers.

“A recent Eurobarometer study shows that four out of five Europeans want more EU action against terrorism and serious crime,” Malmstrom said. “In line with this, I see a gradual shift from Member States towards the realization that even in a sensitive area like terrorism there is room for more EU cooperation.”

Along similar lines, Muhammad Rafiuddin Shah, acting officer of the United Nations Counter Terrorism
Task Force, reiterated his organization’s support for a 2006 counterterror strategy that has succeeded in “building libraries of counter narratives” on the Internet. A Pakistani, Shah asserted that his nation’s military and intelligence agencies track al-Qaida’s movements “day and night” and criticized U.K. citizens of Pakistani descent who have dabbled in terrorism, accusing them of lacking gratitude to their host country.

Shea himself cited advances in the global anti-terror fight. Civilians have adopted military anti-IED technology to protect public transportation. Ports, harbors and oil terminals are safer than they were before 9/11. Broadening the fight to the biological level, NATO has established battlefield forensics laboratories with which Special Forces in Afghanistan can gather DNA samples of terrorists and insurgents. Soldiers can share that information with law enforcement agencies around the world through Interpol.

But as one of the top officials addressing NATO’s emerging security challenges, Shea complained that civilian agencies responsible for protecting computer networks lack the necessary military command structure to head off a cyber attack. He warned that cyber attacks have been “mostly the property of state organizations,” but won’t stay that way for long.

Dr. Paul Killworth, a British government computer expert, was not alone in predicting growing sophistication among terrorists when it comes to waging war online. A September 2010 computer virus could have been the first inkling that Islamist radicals are interested in the offensive capabilities of cyberspace. A Libyan hacker launched the “Here you have” worm that was briefly responsible for 10 percent of all global computer spam. The hacker described his actions as a protest against coalition activities in Iraq.

Even iPhones and other hand-held communication devices provide a “rich seam” for terrorists to mine. Killworth noted that terrorists have focused on causing physical damage, but stressed that “a major cyber attack could change that … encourage others to go down that same route.”

Counterterror strategy is complicated by the fact that individual threats don’t disappear, but merely stack up and compound. Airports have to police themselves not only against the box-cutter-wielding hijackers of 2001, but the shoe bombers of 2002, the liquid explosives smugglers of 2006 and the ink cartridge attackers of 2010. “Our enemies are innovative. They certainly take lessons from previous attacks,” said Patrick Mercer, an English Member of Parliament who served several tours in Northern Ireland with the British Army.

Shea foresaw a day when major international terrorist groups ceased to be a strategic threat to NATO members, a prediction partly confirmed by bin Laden’s death in May 2011. But Shea cautioned nations against relying on a combination of skill and luck to avoid further 9/11s, attacks that could come as much from radicalized self-starters as from major players like al-Qaida.

Mercer re-emphasized the need for a nimble counterterror strategy to uncover the inevitable plots aimed at influencing governments even in the absence of casualties. He pointed to the disintegration of regimes in North Africa and the Middle East and the creation there of political vacuums conducive to extremists. Islamist radicals are also reportedly building alliances with narcotics traffickers in places like Mauritania and Mali, money from which can finance terror. “Violence,” Mercer said, “is a thing of the future.”
Russians lay flowers at the site where a suicide bomber set off an explosion that ripped through Domodedovo airport near Moscow in January 2011.
In response to the attack in Moscow, Russian authorities widened the airport security net to include public airport areas and mandated security screenings for all those entering a Russian airport. The governments of the Czech Republic and Ukraine have also beefed up security by equipping airports with more bomb-sniffing dogs and sharpshooters. Just weeks after the Moscow attacks, the European Commission introduced a plan to begin passenger security screenings at the time of ticket purchase and share this data among European Union members. The Domodedovo attack appears to be the first time that violent extremists have attacked an unrestricted airport area since the failed 2007 bombing at Glasgow Airport in Scotland, when assailants rammed a fiery truck into glass doors near the passenger check-in counter.

For the past 10 years, the goal of airport security has been to keep bombs and bombers off planes. Airport buildings themselves were not considered high priority targets. But that changed in January 2011 when a suicide bomber attacked Moscow’s Domodedovo Airport, killing 35 and injuring more than 100. The blast occurred in the international arrivals hall, where passengers meet family and friends after passing through customs. The Domodedovo attack appears to be the first time that violent extremists have attacked an unrestricted airport area since the failed 2007 bombing at Glasgow Airport in Scotland, when assailants rammed a fiery truck into glass doors near the passenger check-in counter.

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Alternatively, privacy advocates have begun questioning the wisdom and effectiveness of security enhancements in the wake of Domodedovo, adding another wrinkle to the long-standing debate over restrictions on air travel. Striking a balance between maintaining national security and preserving civil liberty has grown increasingly complicated. Philip Baum of the London-based security publication Aviation Security International warned in a January 2011 Telegraph article that adding security checkpoints may do more harm than good. Extremists are attracted to places containing large groups of people because it maximizes the destruction and number of victims. And the bigger the death toll, the bigger the media coverage terrorists receive. “As you ratchet up the number of checks, you have large numbers of people standing in line and the queues themselves can become targets,” Baum said.

And security screenings cannot accomplish everything. Domodedovo spokeswoman Elena Galanova told Russia’s Interfax news agency that 22.3 million travelers pass through Domodedovo annually, not including airport visitors. Considering that volume, “total security screening is practically impossible. It just leads to a massive crush,” Galanova said. It is difficult to screen areas, such as arrival terminals, where large crowds of people gather. Complicating the security picture, some airports, to generate revenue, encourage the public to shop, drink and eat in the terminal. Keeping track of those shoppers and diners can be difficult.
EU PASSENGER DATA SHARING
The European Commission's passenger data-sharing proposal would expand on previously existing agreements with the U.S., Canada and Australia. The commission would require airlines to provide names, addresses and other passenger data for flights entering and leaving the EU.

Originally, the proposal would have forced airlines to share passenger data for all flights, including those between EU states. However, European Parliament member Manfred Weber told the Deutsche Welle that it would have contradicted the Schengen agreement, which guarantees visa- and passport-free travel for most EU members. Weber added that he “cannot believe that we are now looking to screen the movements of people in Europe, for this clearly contradicts free travel and the freedom of movement.” Security advocates say providing passenger lists gives authorities more time to identify and remove suspects and reduces misidentification.

But how would that data be protected? EU Home Affairs Commissioner Cecilia Malmström pledged that the commission “would create safeguards to ensure maximum protection of passengers’ privacy,” the Deutsche Welle reported in February 2011.

European parliamentarians have raised concerns about data abuse. “If we do intend to go through with it, we need to establish ways of organizing data so that it doesn’t get out of control and abused,” said Birgit Sippel, a German member of the European Parliament. “In the end, we will ask that the swaps contain very little – and targeted – information.” But, before this proposal can become law, the 27 EU governments must reach consensus.

Germany’s highest court has enforced limits on data sharing. In March 2010, it overturned a law that allowed authorities to retain phone call recordings and e-mails to fight crime and terrorism. The court demanded stricter controls on the data and ordered information deleted immediately. The ruling acted as a warning to private sector companies such as Google, Facebook and Microsoft about the need for transparency regarding personal data, Der Spiegel said.

FULL BODY SCANNERS
Equally controversial is the use of full body scanners. The scanners have been at the center of the debate on airport security since their introduction in May 2007 in the Netherlands. A handful of other European nations also use them: the U.K., France, Germany, and Italy. The EU’s European Economic and Social Committee advised against the use of the scanners as recently as March 2011. Etienne Shouppe, Belgium's secretary of state for transport, described scanners as “excessive” in a meeting of aviation security experts in January 2010, the Christian Science Monitor reported. Spain voiced concerns about the invasiveness of these machines that can peer through clothing and create 3-D images of passengers. The Guardian reports that the scanners threaten to breach child pornography laws in the U.K. Civil liberties groups demand scanner images be safeguarded against distribution.

Body scanner security breaches have occurred in the U.S. For example, scanner images that Florida passengers were told would be deleted immediately were published online, the Washington Post reported in November 2010. Additionally, when travelers at U.S. airports refuse the scan, they must undergo
The United Kingdom has launched a demonstration project to help speed passengers through airports without sacrificing security. The streamlined 15- to 20-minute security check could use eye scans, real-time behavioral analysis via telescopic cameras, and “managed queuing” that discreetly sorts low-risk passengers from high-risk ones.

The goal is nothing less than a structural overhaul of unpopular airport screening procedures that promise to grow more cumbersome as the number of global air travelers rises and security threats multiply. Experts have predicted eventual systematic breakdowns at large European airports in places like London, Amsterdam, Frankfurt and Paris.

Mike Shaw, director of the U.K. branch of French electronics corporation Thales, called for an improvement in a process that treats all airline passengers as “potential terrorists.” “Ninety-nine percent of everyone who travels just wants to get from A to B,” Shaw said. Thales successfully demonstrated the new airport screening concept, known as INSTINCT-TD2, to British security officials in early 2011. Shaw outlined the results at the Counter Terror Expo in London in April 2011.

After winning the contract from the British government in 2010, Thales enlisted academics and small- and medium-size companies to help resolve the airport security quandary. Eventually 20 companies participated in demonstrations at some of Britain’s busiest airports, including Manchester and Birmingham. The test-runs highlighted three main technologies.

One was a “recognition on the move” technology in which a traveler’s iris is scanned with beams as the passenger rides an escalator connecting an airport’s ticketing and boarding areas. For further efficiency, the passenger’s carry-on bag could run through scanners running the length of the same escalator.

Another concept involves visual surveillance of passenger facial features and behavior, hunting for flushed faces, clumsiness and other signs of nervousness that can suggest malevolent intent. Such a system could go further to measure heartbeat and changes in voice patterns. During one airport trial using such detectors, Thales caught an airport shoplifter, though no potential terrorists.

A third technology favoured by U.K. officials during the trials was a managed queuing system that separates passengers into low-, medium- and high-risk categories without their knowledge. Such unobtrusive categorizing can begin at the moment of ticket purchase, if, for example, a person makes a cash purchase of a plane ticket to a destination popular with terrorists. One of the aims is to provide “seamless passenger flow,” especially for low-risk travelers.

The U.S. is fast-tracking airport security upgrades of its own, and British officials said the Department of Homeland Security has monitored INSTINCT-TD2 for possible use in the Western Hemisphere. To be most effective, the upgraded security architecture should also be installed in terminals in Africa and Asia, not just in the large European hubs, Shaw said.

“Aviation is one of the key challenges to our security. INSTINCT is a vital part of the Government’s response in seeking innovative solutions to counter current and future threats,” U.K. Minister of Security Baroness Neville-Jones announced in December 2010. “We will continue to call on industry and universities to help drive counter-terrorism solutions.”

an “enhanced pat down” that can include touching of private areas. Hundreds of passengers have filed formal complaints.

British civil libertarian Simon Davies, director of the human-rights group Privacy International, told the Voice of America that body scanners are an affront to personal dignity. He contends that despite all of the money spent on body scanners, they have proven to be an ineffective counterterrorism tool. On the other side of the debate is Italy’s Foreign Minister Franco Frattini, who supported his country’s installation of scanners at airports in Rome, Milan and Venice. “The right not to be blown up on an airplane is a more important right” than privacy, he said in a 2010 article in *The Christian Science Monitor*.

**LIQUIDS CONTROVERSY**

Wherever possible, the EU would like to ease restrictions on travel, while maintaining security. In February 2011, the EU announced it would allow airline passengers carrying wine, perfume and other liquids bought at duty-free shops outside Europe to take those items aboard planes when they catch connecting flights at about two dozen European airports, The Associated Press reported.

European and U.S. airport security professionals are concerned this may create a security gap and confuse passengers traveling to the U.S. The U.S. Transportation Security Administration hasn’t said whether passengers will be allowed to bring these items on U.S. domestic flights, but based on reports in 2011 this appears unlikely.

In 2006, both the EU and the U.S. agreed to ban liquids of more than 3 ounces after British authorities unraveled a plan to bomb U.S.-bound planes using liquid explosives hidden in soft drink bottles. Victoria Day, spokeswoman for the Air Transport Association, said she hopes the U.S. and the EU will “harmonize requirements to appropriately accommodate security and passenger-processing considerations.”

**LESS INTRUSION, SAME PROTECTION**

At an airline industry conference in October 2010, British Airways chairman Martin Broughton made a plea for effective security without intrusiveness, the *Guardian* reported. Broughton said the U.S. and Europe are worried about removing a security measure once deemed necessary for fear that their decision would provide an opening for an attacker to penetrate the system.

The article warns governments against taking a “what if” approach to security, saying those fear-based scenarios are infinite. Broughton suggested security procedures be constantly re-evaluated for effectiveness.

*The Economist* surveyed its readers in November 2010 about whether airport security procedures such as removing laptop computers from bags and taking off our shoes really prevent attacks. Nearly three-quarters of readers said they thought airport security was already too stringent. Britain’s *The Telegraph* took the opposing view: “Airline bosses may not like security measures, but they keep us one step ahead of a versatile enemy.”

Both sides agree on one thing, however: The bombing tragedy in Russia suggests that the time is right to review airport security procedures once again. □
Kissinger’s Harvard doctoral dissertation, later published as ‘A World Restored – Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812-1822,” dealt with forging the comprehensive peace settlement at the Congress of Vienna after the final defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo. Charles Kupchan devotes extensive space to the Concert of Europe, including the radical popular revolts of 1848. The contrast between social and political reforms in Britain and France, and the more reactionary sentiments holding sway in the rest of continental Europe, is rightly highlighted.

Kupchan places the Concert of Europe not directly in the longer flow of European history, but in a fresh analytic context. At the start of the book, he compares the Concert to the Iroquois Confederation in North America. Later in the book, he provides comparisons to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the European Community and the less successful Persian Gulf Cooperation Council.

Many historians and political scientists may complain that certain subtleties are glossed over or overlooked. For instance, Kupchan sees the Concert of Europe as ultimately a failure, given the extremely disruptive nature of the events of 1848. A contrary point of view is that the Concert and the subsequent Congress of Europe were fundamentally successful since general war was averted for a century after Waterloo.

Regarding recent developments, more detailed discussion of the degree to which European and wider world history has influenced the European Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and other organizations cited would have added a useful related dimension. Integration of the extensive, and somewhat diffuse, historical examples and information assembled by the author is achieved by his use of a consistent conceptual framework. He describes a four-phase process of basic elements necessary for achieving stable peaceful environments.

First, a state breaks out of diplomatic or physical conflict by initiating peaceful contact with its adversary, a process Kupchan calls unilateral accommodation. Second, the adversary so contacted indicates it...
will restrain itself reciprocally. An important third step, if these initial gestures are to bear long-term results, is for societal integration to develop between the adversarial states. This involves interchange among ordinary citizens as well as relatively influential professionals and leaders in government and the private sector. The fourth factor is the most general and comprehensive, encompassing “the generation of new narratives and identities.”

The author emphasizes such amorphous dimensions as popular culture and political icons such as “charters, flags, and anthems.” These new narratives can lead to a “new domestic discourse.” In fact, Kupchan is actually focusing on the transfer of nationalist and patriotic sentiments from one set of territorial arrangements to another.

Successful security communities for Kupchan include the Concert of Europe until 1853, the European Economic Community until 1963, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations until the present. Just as he is too harsh in judging the Concert, the same sentiment applies to his discussion of the European Community, given its challenged and troubled, but still successful, expansion into the more substantial European Union, which offers a single currency and a truly common market.

As for achieving national union, Kupchan cites as success stories the unification of Germany and Italy and the formation of the United States. Less nationalistic examples provided are the Swiss Confederation from 1291 to 1848, the Iroquois Confederation from 1450 to 1777, and the United Arab Emirates since 1971.

The author is particularly impressed by Anglo-American rapprochement, though he mentions that the extensive examination of this relationship by historians may exaggerate its importance. Given the significance of anti-British sentiment in American politics and popular culture before the Second World War, his emphasis on this rapprochement is justified. The importance of Theodore Roosevelt in the evolution of American attitudes toward supporting British power and influence is highlighted, along with the closely related influence of Alfred Thayer Mahan and his maritime perspective on great power influence.

Kupchan’s splendid thought-provoking analysis implicitly supports the shift of American political science toward greater emphasis on economics. The return to the concept of “political economy,” which British scholars never really abandoned, has been partly a reaction to the rise of the multinational corporation in the 1960s, as well as the end of U.S. international economic dominance reflected in President Richard Nixon’s termination of Bretton Woods fixed exchange rates in 1971.

Meanwhile, U.S. economists, if chastened by their inability to predict and manage the economy, generally ignore political scientists. Books such as this may encourage a wider dialogue, not least because of its persuasive use of history and finely polished prose.
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