COULD ENERGY POLITICS LEAVE EUROPE IN THE COLD?
As Russia wields its vast natural resources as a political weapon, it must realize its energy strategy is a two-edged sword.
EU aims for stable, prosperous Eastern Neighborhood
Plan will boost regional political and economic ties and energy security.

Spain, Mexico renew anti-terrorism accord
Sharing resources adds punch to the fight against organized crime.

Afghanistan’s spillover
EU and Central Asia confront the new Taliban threat.

Soft targets
Recent attacks suggest only international cooperation will stop new terrorist trend.
Welcome to *per Concordiam*

It is with great pride that I present the inaugural issue of *per Concordiam*, the George C. Marshall Center's quarterly journal that addresses defense, policy and security issues in Europe, Eurasia and beyond.

We are excited about the opportunity the journal provides to promote candid and constructive dialogue on security topics that confront us. *Per Concordiam* is unique because it provides an avenue for Marshall Center alumni to present their distinctive perspectives, or those of their organization or ministry, about important security topics that will help us see these problems from a different point of view and to engage one another in a productive exchange of potential solutions.

In early 2009, we conducted a survey to gauge perceptions of our readers about the future security environment in Europe and Eurasia. The survey was followed in April 2009 by a conference of distinguished alumni currently serving in positions of leadership. The intent of this project was to better understand security challenges as they are perceived by European, Eurasian and North American decision-makers. The results of the project demonstrated that the most pressing security concern over the next decade is energy security, making it the natural theme for the inaugural issue of *per Concordiam*. Our project revealed that the term energy security has different meanings to our European, Eurasian and North American alumni, and it is our hope that this issue will facilitate understanding and discussion on such an important topic.

I expect the authors who contributed to this issue will generate a great deal of thought and discussion among the magazine's audience. We hope to hear from defense and security practitioners, academics and subject matter experts who have knowledge and understanding of a given topic. However, there is rarely a universal solution for the security challenges we face, and as we publish this and subsequent issues, our editorial board welcomes constructive dialogue, observations and suggestions so academics, defense and security experts and decision-makers can be presented with opposing viewpoints.

I encourage each of you to consider contributing your unique perspective and knowledge to future issues of *per Concordiam*. I cannot overstate the value that your submissions will have in the success of this journal. The material generated by our alumni, their peers and superiors — and by the original thinkers and academics interested in the European and Eurasian regions — has the capacity to bring critical topics to our collective attention and provides a forum for discussion that can help circumvent intractable problems. I hope this journal becomes preferred reading for you, and I look forward to hearing your insightful viewpoints, objective arguments and rational discourse.

Sincerely,

Dr. John P. Rose, PhD
Director

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Dr. John P. Rose
Director, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies

John P. Rose is the director of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. A retired U.S. Army brigadier general, he has 34 years of international, operational, academic, business and strategic planning expertise. He holds master's and doctorate degrees from the University of Southern California, Los Angeles, and attended the Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government in Cambridge, Mass. His published works include *The Evolution of U.S. Army Nuclear Doctrine, 1945-1980* and 10 journal articles on nuclear strategy, military doctrine and long-range planning.
Andris Piebalgs
was the European Commission energy commissioner until November 2009. He assumed the post in 2004. He has had a long career in the political and diplomatic service. In Latvia, he served as a parliamentarian, minister of education and finance, undersecretary of state for European Union affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was ambassador to Estonia and the EU. Britain’s The Economist newspaper chose him Eurocrat of the Year in January 2007. He has a physics degree from the University of Latvia.

Ferdinand E. Banks
is one of the world’s leading academic energy economists. Widely published, he has lectured at universities and institutions in more than a dozen countries. He is currently a visiting professor at Uppsala University, Sweden. He has published 12 books, including his latest, The Political Economy of World Energy: An Introductory Textbook. He has a doctorate from Uppsala University.

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is currently the politico-military strategist at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. He is a U.S. Air Force Eurasian regional affairs specialist. He earned master’s degrees in Eurasian security studies and irregular warfare from the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif., in international relations from The Fletcher School at Tufts University, Mass., and in telecommunications and network management from Syracuse University, N.Y.

Roger Kangas
is a professor at the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies of the National Defense University in Washington, D.C. He has written numerous articles and book chapters on Central Asian politics and security and is finishing a book titled Playing Solitaire: Competing National Security Strategies in Central Asia. He received his bachelor’s degree from the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., and a doctorate in political science from Indiana University. He is also an adjunct professor at Georgetown University.

Andrew Monaghan
is an advisor in the research division of the NATO Defense College in Rome. Also, he is the senior researcher on energy security matters and NATO’s contribution in the field and represents the college in NATO’s Energy Security Task Force. He received a doctorate in Russian foreign policy (Russian perspectives of Russia-European Union security relations) from the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, where he also earned a master’s degree in war studies.

Phillip Cornell
works at the International Energy Agency in Paris, where he is engaged with energy policy issues. Before that, he was a senior fellow and director of international initiatives at the NATO School, in Oberammergau, Germany, where he worked on NATO energy security policies. He continues to serve as an adjunct faculty member with NATO. He has a master’s degree in international economics (energy focus) and European studies (security focus) from the Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D.C.
The months leading up to the inaugural publication of any endeavor are a thrilling, exasperating and mildly stressful time, to say the least. Now that we have the first issue of *per Concordiam* out the door and in your mailbox, we on the staff can sit back and relax a bit.

Or not.

We’re already hard at work on the next issue, which focuses on domestic security, and the subsequent issue on terrorism. But the success of future issues of *per Concordiam* depends largely on quality submissions from George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies alumni, the organizations and governments they work for, and academics and scholars interested in security and defense issues in Europe and Eurasia.

The focus of this March 2010 issue, energy security, is a timely topic. It is virtually impossible to address energy security in Europe and Eurasia without mentioning Russia and its vast resources of oil and natural gas. Far too often, articles focus on the consequences of Russian energy policy, not the rationale behind the policy.

Roger Kangas’ article, “Wielding the Energy Sword,” examines and largely debunks the claim of maliciousness in Russian energy policy and focuses on the country’s use of energy security as a political tool that can cut both ways.

As a result of the uncertainty of Russia as a supplier, Turkey finds itself at the energy crossroads. Phillip Cornell, in his article, “Turkey: On the Energy Crossroads,” examines the unique position Turkey — perhaps the most geographically and politically significant transit state — holds in addressing an issue that, yet again, seems to force the question of whether Turkey faces east or west.

In addition to affecting nations, the topic of energy security is certainly going to stress existing partnerships and treaties as it continues to grow in importance.

Andrew Monaghan, in his article, “NATO Targets Energy Security,” takes a look at the implications of energy security to NATO following the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit in 2009. Given the fluctuations of fossil fuel markets, many nations are looking to ensure their future energy security through alternate means, which leads to the love-hate relationship Europe has with nuclear energy. Fred Banks examines this dichotomy in his article, “Nuclear Renaissance.”

In Central Asia, water management has been a thorny issue since the breakup of the Soviet Union. Resolving this problem requires the cooperation of the region’s five states. Maj. Steven Taylor’s article, “Water Management: A Central Asian Security Concern,” outlines the challenges these nations face and discusses their efforts to find solutions acceptable to all sides.

We hope you find this premiere edition of *per Concordiam* interesting, timely and relevant and that it inspires debate and discussion. All the articles in this edition, and all future editions, will be available online at the Marshall Center home page at www.marshallcenter.org.

We look forward to hearing what you, the reader, have to say.

— *per Concordiam* editorial staff
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We hope the articles in *per Concordiam* inspire debate and
discussion. Our intent is to
publish important information
addressing issues that impact
Europe and Eurasia.

More importantly, we hope this journal will
provoke a response from readers. Starting with
subsequent issues, we will have a Letters to the Editor
section where we will publish letters from
our readers.

Please keep letters to no more than 200 words
and make sure they refer to articles appearing in the
past two issues of our journal. We reserve the right to
edit letters for language, civility, accuracy, brevity and
clarity.

We welcome feedback, which you can send via
e-mail to editor@perconcordiam.org.

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ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS
The intent of *per Concordiam* is to be a moderated journal with the
best and brightest submitted articles and papers published each quar-
ter. We welcome articles from readers on security and defense issues
in Europe and Eurasia.

Here’s how to submit an article:
First, e-mail your story idea to editor@perconcordiam.org in an outline
form or as a short description. If we like the idea, we can offer feed-
back before you start writing.

We accept articles as original contributions. If your article or similar
version is under consideration by another publication, or was published
elsewhere, tell us when submitting the article to us.

If you have a manuscript to submit but are not sure it’s right for the
quarterly, e-mail us to ask if we’re interested.

As you’re writing your article,
please remember:

*Offer fresh ideas.* We are looking for articles with a unique ap
proach from the region. We probably won’t publish articles on topics
already heavily covered in other security and foreign policy journals.

*Connect the dots.* We’ll publish an article on a
single country if the subject is relevant to the
region or the world.

Do not assume a U.S. audience. Most *per Concordiam*
readers are from Europe and Eurasia. We’re less likely
to publish articles that cater to a U.S. audience. Our
mission is to generate candid discussion of relevant
security and defense topics, not to serve as an echo
chamber for U.S. foreign policy.

*Steer clear of technical language.* Not everyone is
a specialist in a certain field. Ideas should be accessible
to the widest audience.

*Provide original research or reporting to support
your ideas.* And be prepared to document statements.
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attachment to: editor@perconcordiam.org.
In those days, coal meant energy. Coal was the primary fuel of the European economies, fueling homes, businesses, factories and transport. Millions of jobs depended on its extraction, processing and transportation, not to mention its consumption. For Europe, the links between security and energy were clearly established.

The same question faces the world today: Is energy security a factor for peace, or does it aggravate conflict? In some parts of the world, access to energy is clearly an issue that exacerbates disputes. In some cases it may be a direct cause. For today’s EU, as in the 1950s, energy security is, and must remain, a motor for peace.

The EU is the world’s second largest energy consumer and the largest energy importer. Fifty-four percent of all energy used in the EU is imported, 60 percent for gas and 84 percent for oil. Demand for imports is rising. In recent years, world energy demand outside Europe has risen faster than ever before. One of the EU’s greatest challenges is to ensure that growing energy dependence does not become a risk to wider economic or international security.

To tackle these risks, the EU’s response is clear. Our own energy security depends on building up cooperation, dialogue and negotiation with all stakeholders based on mutual respect and trust. Within the EU, 27 member states and almost 500 million citizens have come together into a single internal energy market, based on commonly agreed goals, political objectives and legislation. Closely related to this is our approach to climate change, which we see as the other significant international threat to security.

Countries geographically close to the EU can also join the European internal energy market. Countries in the European Economic Area and the European Energy Community have already done so. At the same time, the EU is seeking to develop its energy relations with other countries. Traditionally, the focus was on long-standing energy suppliers, such as the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and Russia. But it is clear more is needed to ensure international energy markets are able to function smoothly and transparently now and in the future.

The EU therefore places a high priority on developing energy relations with new partners. These may be energy producers, such as Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, transit countries, such as Ukraine and Turkey, or large energy consumers, such as the United States and China.
The EU shares a mutual interest with consuming, producing or transit states across the globe to ensure a stable and predictable framework for energy supply flows, including the establishment of new energy infrastructure. Nowhere is this more true than in the Caspian region and Central Asia.

The success of the EU’s approach is demonstrated by the conclusion of an intergovernmental agreement between the EU and Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria to facilitate the building of the Nabucco pipeline. This is the first concrete project in the EU’s vision of a new energy corridor, the “Southern Corridor,” bringing greater energy security to countries from the Caspian, through the Middle East and Turkey, to the EU. Other projects in the Southern Corridor may benefit from this vision and from the recent agreement.

All countries involved in the Southern Corridor, whether producer, transit country or consumer, will benefit from greater diversification and security in their energy markets and economies. For the countries of the Caspian Basin and Central Asia, as well as those of the Mashreq region and the rest of the Middle East, the realization of this corridor would enable secure and long-term access to one of the world’s largest, most integrated and financially attractive energy markets.

For the countries of the Southern Caucasus and the Black Sea region, the realization of this corridor would offer the possibility of additional energy supplies to new markets as well as a long-term source of gas transmission revenue.

And for the EU, the Southern Corridor offers geographically new sources of energy and the potential to enhance commercial and economic relations with the countries of the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia in particular.

National actions alone cannot assure energy security. Neither can the EU, despite its size and advanced stage of energy integration. But the EU has shown that energy collaboration, dialogue and understanding are a means to bring greater energy security not only to its own citizens but to the wider world.

As European Commission President José Manuel Barroso declared at the signing of the Nabucco Intergovernmental Agreement, “Gas pipes may be made of steel, but Nabucco can cement the links between our people.”

“The EU is the world’s second largest energy consumer and the largest energy importer. Fifty-four percent of all energy used in the EU is imported, 60 percent for gas and 84 percent for oil.”

1. Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway are here.
2. Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia and the U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo.
Europe’s massive energy consumption requires building new pipelines to connect energy sources to consumers. Energy politics have the potential to stop that energy flow.
Journals, newspapers and Web sites are replete with articles that address the Russian energy situation. Much of the focus is on how the Dmitry Medvedev-Vladimir Putin administration cajoles, threatens and rewards neighboring states through oil and gas cross-border transfer routes.

Those who profess a zero-sum perspective in international relations gleefully parallel the current “energy wars” to the Cold War, as such a topic is perfect for “great game” analysis. Such realists usually cite the cutting off of energy supplies to Ukraine in 2006 and 2007 and the increasingly problematic Russian-Georgian energy network. Others, who prefer more liberal perspectives, see this situation as a basis for interlocking security frameworks, noting that “Russia needs Europe as much as Europe needs Russia.” Some see the Russian gas routes through the Baltic as a way to link it more fully to northern Europe as proof of this approach. Naturally, as is the case for most multinational situations, the concept of energy security in Europe and Eurasia is one that possesses multiple levels of interest and motivation. Fortunately, there are many reports and feature articles that present this perspective, too.

Dr. Roger Kangas
National Defense University
Washington, D.C.
SHORT OF RESTATING THE
OBVIOUS AND NOTING THE EXISTING
LITERATURE ON THE TOPIC, this
story focuses on Russia’s rationale for
its energy policy and how such policies have
both direct and indirect consequences for
regional players.

It is clear the Russian government consid-
er its energy reserves to be a strategic asset and
a potentially effective tool of engagement with
neighboring states. However, what is the ideal
end-state envisioned by Russia and what are
the possible limitations of this policy? Moreo-
ver, has this policy caused more than just
immediate reactions from neighboring states
that would suggest they are actually changing
their own broader strategic energy policies? To
illustrate this latter point takes an examination
of the Russia-Central Asia relationship. After
all, Central Asian countries currently require
Russian participation in their own energy
projects because of their inextricable link to the
broader Russian-dominated export network.

As one widens the scope of discussion, it is
possible to note how other states react and pos-
sibly adjust their own regional energy policies in
light of these shifts. If one strips away the polem-
ics, is it possible to assess the impact of Russia’s
decision to use energy — and energy transit —
as a tool in its diplomatic and security toolbox?

WHILE THE CURRENT
MANAGEMENT OF THE ENERGY
SECTOR IS EQUALLY OPAQUE,
then-President Putin targeted
individuals such as Mikhail
Khodorkovsky, considering him
to represent the worst of the
"kleptocratic" oligarchs.

It is almost required that any
commentary on post-Soviet Rus-
sia’s foreign affairs makes some
reference to the fact that it ceased
being a “superpower” when the
Cold War ended. Debates now
center on whether it is a “re-
gional power,” a “major power,” a
“large power” or a “great power.”
Whatever the level of power, if
one understands how Russia
could regain some of its former
influence, it is logical to focus
on a resource that it possesses in
great quantity: energy, specifically oil and gas.

Estimates vary, but most assume Russia has
a base level of at least 60 to 80 billion barrels of
oil reserves. With increasing interest in foreign
investment, as well as the more aggressive strate-
gies employed by the state-dominated firms,
Russian exports have increased over the past
decade to nearly 10 million barrels a day. In
terms of gas reserves, Russia possesses nearly
1,700 trillion cubic feet, with exports at 6.75
trillion cubic feet. Thus, this non-OPEC state
possesses roughly 4.6 to 6.2 percent of the
world’s oil reserves, and an impressive 25.7 to
27.2 percent of the world’s gas reserves, de-
pending on the data used.

Clients are largely in Europe, although the
Asian market for both oil and gas is growing.
With specific projects to China and the Far
East, such as the 3,000-mile-long (4,800 km)
East Siberia-Pacific Ocean oil pipeline under
construction, the expectation is that energy
exports will increasingly shift to the growing
markets of Asia. Assuming that Russia’s own
energy needs are constant, or grow at a modest
rate, the amount of export potential and actual
revenues are astounding. From an economic
perspective, the possibility of having energy
revenues rebuild Russia is front and center for
the Putin-Medvedev team. Not surprisingly,
this is why energy security and energy exports
have become matters of national security — in
doctrine and practice.

What is the Russian government’s motiva-
tion to securitize energy? Russia began the 21st
century with an inferiority complex honed
to perfection, on one hand, because of the
collapse of the Soviet Union — what Putin
calls the greatest tragedy of the 20th century.
And on the other, because of the tabloid-like
global debacles of the 1990s — including the
economic nightmare of hyperinflation and
the embarrassing antics of Boris Yeltsin. This
was clearly unacceptable to Putin as he began
his presidency in 2000. The continuation of
the Chechen conflict with renewed vigor and
the flexing of Russia’s muscle as a permanent
member of the U.N. Security Council — on is-
iues such as potential sanctions against Iran re-
garding its suspected nuclear program — were
two immediate manifestations of this newfound
strength and improved self-image. There was
also the desire to focus on the energy sec-
tor, and playing on Russia’s strengths in this area reaped significant dividends.

Looking back, it appears the focus on energy-as-political-power addressed three key issues for Russia: the perception of domestic corruption and cronyism, economic fragility and geopolitical weakness. As for the first, many ordinary Russians welcomed the attack on the “oligarchs” as righting a wrong of the past decades. The government took over or split up into more modest entities the energy firms that developed under the control of corrupt officials and allies of the past administration. While the current management of the energy sector is equally opaque, then-President Putin targeted individuals such as Mikhail Khodorkovsky, considering him to represent the worst of the “kleptocratic” oligarchs. Equally important, government policies saw a return of state control on key sectors, and by his second term, Putin recast the energy sector as a strategically important asset and returned it to the “commanding heights” of the economy. Much as the energy sector was viewed in the Soviet period (and, unsurprisingly, by other countries in the world), business and government blended together in the oil and gas industries. This allowed the increasing revenues to shore up the economy and make the country less fragile.

Paralleling these internal developments, the rise of Russia’s energy sector allowed it to regain a more credible geopolitical position. As Russia has already had a number of years to develop a policy on energy security, it must temper discussions of what to do with what has already taken place, as this has shaped how others perceive Russian policy. To this end, it is clear that the policy motives regarding energy fall into both positive and negative categories. Russia has used energy to:

- Finance military modernization
- Develop the country’s economic infrastructure
- Build partnerships

In the positive category, this has been beneficial primarily to the Commonwealth of Independent States and to the periodic call for a “gas industry OPEC-like organization” that would include countries such as Iran, Algeria and others. Some may view exporting energy to enhance a bilateral relationship or shape a regional structure in this light.

On the negative side, Russia has also been willing to use energy to:

- Gain political concessions
- Hurt or punish adversaries

Of course, one can quickly cite examples of periodic embargoes and supply limits to Ukraine, Georgia, the Baltic states and even threats to others as cases where this has happened. Much as
one sees in other parts of the world, particularly among the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries nations, the possibility of withholding energy supplies can be enough to affect another country’s policies. Even the economic logic expressed by Russia had merit, especially as it was supplying gas to neighbors at subsidized rates. However, the desire to break shipments before the end of contract periods can come under criticism.

It is important to note that each of these is a rational stratagem legitimized by the past practices of other states. Without question, Russia has used all of these approaches with respect to neighboring states. There are limits. In spite of harsh words and threats of “further action,” it still is the case that such negative use of energy supplies has not led to violence. Perhaps it is only in Hollywood that states go to war for oil. Indeed, this is the case thus far and, arguably, the current leadership in Moscow would be reluctant to do so. After all, Russia’s energy policy plays into a broader national policy (regaining pride in the country) and international policy (a return to Russia’s rightful place within the community of nations) and abets the national security strategy of a state that is improving its standing in the world. From Moscow’s perspective, using energy as a tool of foreign and security policy is both logical and necessary.

A simple truth is that national policies do not have the luxury of being conducted in a vacuum, regardless of motive, and do have effects on neighboring states, even if the relative importance and magnitude of this effect is debatable. One needs to look no further than the five states of Central Asia — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan — to see how Russia’s newfound exertion of power in the energy sector can have secondary and tertiary effects.

As often noted, Central Asian states themselves possess significant energy reserves and are in the process of developing a network for the export of oil and gas. Kazakhstan is awash in oil. Turkmenistan has gas reserves at internationally competitive levels. Uzbekistan possesses enough of both to remain self-sufficient. For these three states, the total reserve estimates vary. Kazakhstan holds as much as 40 billion barrels of oil and 100 trillion cubic feet of gas. Turkmenistan, while only having a possible 600 million barrels of oil, has nearly 100 trillion cubic feet of gas. Uzbekistan has around 590 million barrels of oil and 65 trillion cubic feet of gas. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, while importers of oil and gas, have the potential to export hydropower and, ultimately, were the states ever to come to an agreement — could participate in a broad energy network in Central Asia.

One could argue that Russian energy policies have little or no impact on these states. This might be the case if the Central Asian energy states had an established production and transit network that offered varied routes, which at present, they do not. The nascent condition of Central Asia’s energy industry has resulted in a more short- to medium-term focus on the part of the respective administrations.

For most of the 1990s, the goal of these states was to get a quick infusion of outside money, technical know-how and support for export routes that would turn these natural endowments into profit-making commodities. Writers like Steve Levine have noted the importance of energy to these states and the specific objectives sought in the “great energy game.” The limitations of the Central Asian states, especially in terms of geography, ultimately re-
quire Russia to play an influential role in the region. In and of itself, this is not a problem. The fact that an external actor can offer investment opportunities and partnerships for export routes is potentially beneficial. Indeed, because many of the Soviet-era routes are north-south and pass through Russia means there is logic to Russia’s engagement in Central Asia. To this end, Russia has not been disappointing.

At present, a sizable percentage of Central Asian oil and gas is either in a partnership with Russian firms or transits via Russian pipelines. Scholars such as Theresa Sabonis-Helf and Daniel Yergin have outlined in detail the ever-increasing control Russia has over the electric grid in the countries as well, noting that one needs to look at the broader energy market holistically. Therefore, there is a touch of realism when looking at the effects an aggressive Russian energy policy might have on the Central Asian states. What have been the direct consequences? Since the renegotiation of prices between Russia and Ukraine, and the periodic stoppages of gas to Georgia (and the August 2008 conflict), Turkmenistan found itself subject to similar price shifts, especially as it was negotiating the price of its gas flowing through Russian pipelines. This has caused some criticism on the part of Turkmen officials, but the fundamental contracts between Russia and Turkmenistan still remain. There does appear to be greater interest in participating in the Nabucco pipeline or other non-Russian energy routes. But only when such pipelines are constructed would one see Turkmenistan truly lessen its ties with Russia. Likewise, Russia’s policies have influenced Kazakhstan. It was not a coincidence that Kazakh investments in future pipeline routes through Georgia and Turkey went on hold shortly after the August 2008 Russo-Georgian conflict.

The fact that threats to export routes are real and not hypothetical has made the Central Asian states reconsider their options. Before concluding that Central Asian states are more than willing to submit to Russian whims, one must consider that the assertive actions of their northern neighbor are accelerating searches for alternative routes. The obvious choices include China, the desire to resurrect the TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) route and even potential routes through Iran or over the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan and into Europe. In each of these, the notion in the 1990s that multiple pipelines would ensure economic development now includes a sense of geopolitical security. In recent months, for example, the Kyrgyz government proposed the Bishkek Initiative, which has at its core multi-

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TURKMENISTAN HAS GAS
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REMAIN SELF-SUFFICIENT.
As we see the secondary effects of Russia’s energy policy in Central Asia, it is not surprising that other states are now reevaluating their own policies vis-à-vis Russia. For some states, many in the EU, this is a business decision each must address logically. The commonly held belief is that Russia will remain critical to Europe in the foreseeable future. As noted by Andrew Monaghan and Phillip Cornell, Russia’s decision to use energy as a tool of foreign and security policy has had a direct impact on countries’ bilateral relations with Russia. But does this also apply to how these states prioritize their Central Asia policies? At present — keeping in mind the significance of Afghanistan in any outside countries’ policy toward the five Central Asian states — the answer is a qualified yes.

The United States, for example, has had a fairly fluid set of policies toward Central Asian states. While this is not the place to discuss the evolution of U.S. policy, it is appropriate to note that the policy has included — and stressed, at various times — human rights, democratization, economic development and privatization, security concerns and combating terrorism, access and transit routes to operations in Afghanistan and energy. It is simplistic to suggest policies have been “either-or” among the more security-related topics and those focusing on human and political rights. Rather, throughout the nearly two decades of American activity in Central Asia, all of these elements have been part of U.S. policy and pursued by various departments and agencies within the U.S. government.

Regarding energy, it is all about exploitation of resources (and the opportunity for U.S. and other energy companies to fairly participate) and the transport of the product to market. U.S. policy in the 1990s did stress energy security, but with respect to the Central Asian states being able to diversify their own export routes. This was not a policy directed against Russia, but rather one that would offer states such as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan the opportunity to maximize profits and create a diverse, expanding and varied portfolio of client states. Ideally, the energy revenues put back into the respective economies would enhance social and political stability. Diversification was to benefit Central Asian states, not necessarily the United States.

However, the forceful exertion of Russian influence in the export and transit of energy from 2006 onward has affected how the United States colors its discussion of Central Asian energy.

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THE RIPPLES WIDEN

Workers check a valve on a natural gas pipeline at Vecses, Hungary. More than half of Hungary’s natural gas supply arrives from Russia via Ukraine — making it vulnerable to Russian energy politics.
The primary motive remains the same, even as the United States has begun a third presidential administration that has addressed Central Asian energy. A nuanced interpretation has emerged in the discourse: Central Asian states should develop alternative routes not only because of good business sense but because routes through Russia are now subject to the whims of geopolitical desires and to retaliatory action, which makes it imperative that Central Asian leaders speed up these alternative routes. While some policy analysts and pundits cast this as an anti-Russian agenda, the U.S. government has avoided that language.

Other countries have also emphasized the energy component in their recent negotiations with Central Asian states. Obviously, the Nabucco pipeline, if it includes Turkmenistan, would elevate the energy factor in European relations with Central Asia. (See Cornell’s article, “Turkey: On the energy crossroads,” page 30.) It is clear EU states are looking to Central Asia and the broader Caspian region with renewed interest. While the Nabucco route gets the most attention and print, other options and investment opportunities are emerging, with the intent of bypassing Russia and of offering choices to the suppliers and consumers.

China, for example, has aggressively sought to establish a presence in the region and offer contracts for energy routes eastward. The agreements to develop fields in Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are part of this policy, which actually predates the current Russian assertiveness. However, this policy does appear to be more forward-looking as the search continues for more complex and higher-priced routes. Even Afghanistan is pushing for pipeline routes south — to help develop the country and reignite the notion it will be a transit corridor for commercial goods and energy from Central Asia to points beyond. Afghan officials are increasingly including this in their public speeches, especially to foreign audiences. They engage India, Pakistan and even Iran. While the alternative routes have been in discussion for years, in the past three years representatives from these countries have stepped up their efforts to entertain alternative routes. Even with the fluctuating and uncertain energy prices, there has been a renewed desire to seek out new routes — arguably because of the “Russian question.”

In the end, the bilateral relations between Russia and any of these states depend on a host of issues — the majority of which do not deal with Central Asia. Bilateral ties remain critical, and EU-Russian, Chinese-Russian, and U.S.-Russian dyads must be the primary consideration in addressing concurrent energy policies. However, as energy is a global commodity with a global transport network, the actions and secondary reactions in the region reflect the inevitability of how one country’s actions can have a worldwide ripple effect.

Without question, the assertiveness with which Russia has acted on its current energy status has created an entire industry in both serious discussions and conspiracy theories. Whether one sees this as Russia taking advantage of its natural wealth, or hatching a sinister plot to create a new power basis for an “empire,” Russia’s energy policy is important in and of itself. Moreover, the effect it has on neighboring states and their own energy policies is evident. Such reactions need study to understand them in a rational manner.

Should Russia use energy as a tool of policy? Of course. Some argue that energy needs are a basis for regional security, and the broader transnational considerations ought to apply. Quite frankly, Russia has a geological gift and has every right to develop, exploit and export this product in the manner most appropriate for the country, or firms, that actually develop the energy industry. For the Russian government and its citizens, it makes sense to maximize profit and gains. Moreover, it would be wise to do so in a way that would be environmentally friendly and suitable to the Russian domestic situation. Having said that, if the decision is to use energy as part of a foreign and security policy, wise leadership would also understand that each action has potential consequences. Presenting things in zero-sum terms and carrying out policies that almost encourage a “hazing” mentality will have long-term effects.

As noted before, Russia cannot operate in a vacuum, and must understand that any direct usage of energy as a weapon will have important secondary and tertiary effects. The desire to punish Ukraine and Georgia is clear, as noted by the repeated vitriolic statements of Russian officials. Right or wrong, there is a desire to play “the energy card” as a retaliatory measure against these states. The consequences in other areas become clear. The Central Asian states — inextricably linked to Russia — are accelerating their search for alternative routes. Even if they politically support Russia’s position vis-à-vis Ukraine, Georgia or other states, they must now consider the direct impact such policies have on their own economies. Similarly, other states that feel the impact of Russia’s mercenary policies are re-exploring Central Asian routes as alternatives. For some, like China, the contracts sought years ago now appear in a much more significant light, and there is a greater effort to complete them.

In the end, even as we’re years into the 21st century, strategies employed in past centuries still apply. It would behoove all states — energy exporters, transit states and consumers — to understand that this is truly a global commodity. Wielding the energy sword may allow a state to possibly slay their opponents, but improper handling of this razor-sharp implement can wound the possessor just as deeply. □
NATO Targets Energy Security

Strasbourg-Kehl summit prompts alliance response

Dr. Andrew Monaghan
NATO Defense College
The disruption of the flow of natural gas in January 2009 seriously affected a number of allies and partner countries.

The international context of 2008 and 2009 has highlighted the importance of securing the energy supply. The war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 affected European energy supplies by causing the temporary shutdown of the Baku-Supsa pipeline. The NATO secretary-general noted that since the conflict threatened the sophisticated supply network of the Caucasus, it was also partly about the security of the energy supply.¹

The long-running dispute over gas pricing and transit tariffs between Russia’s giant Gazprom energy company and the Ukrainian state-owned company, NJSC Naftogaz of Ukraine — which led to an unprecedented cutoff of gas supplies to European Union markets in January 2009 — underscored concerns in the Euro-Atlantic community about energy security.

But while this context emphasized the importance of a complex and often politically influenced problem, it has not clarified the tension between energy being a security problem and one of a mostly economic, technical and commercial nature.² Indeed, in many ways it has complicated the situation for NATO. A military security role for the alliance becomes more relevant in certain ways and yet, simultaneously, NATO faces the increasing risks of involvement in other issues and disputes in which it has little to contribute and in which its contribution may aggravate the situation.

This paper briefly establishes the background of the NATO discussion about energy security. It then examines the areas in which the alliance can make a positive contribution to the wider energy security. It looks at European energy security more specifically, before drawing together some ramifications for NATO.

NATO and Energy Security

The declaration released after the alliance’s Strasbourg-Kehl Summit in April 2009 underscores the framework of NATO’s energy security position. Reflecting the process — started at the 2006 summit in Riga, Latvia —
— of drafting a coherent and suitable role for the alliance, the declaration notes the principles agreed to at Bucharest, Romania, and a report on progress achieved.

Thus the alliance affirms its continuing support for “efforts aimed at promoting energy infrastructure security” and intention to “ensure that NATO’s endeavors add value and are fully coordinated and embedded within those of the international community, which features a number of organizations specialized in energy security.” The declaration points to the critical importance of diversification of routes, suppliers and energy sources, and interconnectivity of energy networks. As an important note, it also refers to the “disruption of the flow of natural gas in January 2009 seriously affected a number of allies and partner countries.”

**Diversification of Europe’s Energy Supplies: NATO’s Added Value**

By linking the alliance’s role to the wider European discussion of diversification of routes, suppliers and energy sources, NATO adds value to the international effort in two ways.

First, calls for diversification highlight the wider membership and partnership of the alliance, including major producers and transit states — particularly the United States, Canada and Norway, which are major energy producers and members of the alliance but not of the European Union. It also provides an important window to the Arctic region, which will become an increasingly important element of the energy supply chain. Turkey, another NATO member, is a key energy transit state and major energy hub for European supplies — indeed it is crucial for plans for European energy diversification. But at the same time, Turkey has a complex relationship with the EU — so its NATO membership provides an important political and institutional mechanism for engagement.

Second, the search for diversification leads toward regions of greater political instability and greater vulnerability to conflict or terrorist and pirate attacks. Thus there is a clearer need for coordinated military protection for such supplies and routes. This is evident in Nigeria, a key oil producer for NATO member states. Nigeria is an important focus for NATO, given the violent activity and threats posed by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, which seeks greater control over Niger Delta oil production. Such activity clearly affects supplies, the effective exploitation of resources and the price of oil.

A second example is that of piracy off the Horn of Africa, a problem that became increasingly prominent in 2008. To increase security, NATO responded with Operation Allied Provider, from Oct. 24 to Dec. 12, 2008, and coordinated the handover of that mission to the EU naval forces’ Operation Atalanta. While piracy is a problem for all shipping, its relevance to energy security was highlighted when pirates seized the MV Sirius Star, a supertanker that carries about 25 percent of Saudi Arabia’s daily oil production. A number of attacks have taken place against other tankers, including the Abdul Kalam Azad and the Kriti Episcopi.

By emphasizing its naval capabilities, NATO can bring a capacity that other major energy organizations, including the EU and International Energy Agency, do not possess. Thus, the alliance can add value to the wider international energy security effort. NATO’s maritime situational awareness facilitates monitoring activity on the high seas and the sharing of data among NATO navies. The alliance also coordinates naval assets to protect oil and gas shipments, such as liquefied natural gas-carrying tankers on the high seas.

To be sure, there are limitations to what a consensus-bound organization can do to project power. But important questions remain, not the least of which is who would pay for the alliance
A gauge in Hajdúszoboszló, Hungary, shows the pressure inside a pipeline from Ukraine bearing Russian natural gas. Some leaders contend that NATO intervention into energy security may cause a bigger split in the Russia-EU energy dispute.

**European Energy Security: A Risk for NATO**

But at the same time it tries to cast this complementary military security role, the alliance risks becoming entangled in other problems in which different organizations play the main roles and in which NATO has little, if any, constructive role. Indeed, by becoming involved, the alliance may exacerbate the very problem it seeks to address. This applies particularly to the nature of Russia’s energy partnership with the EU and especially the tensions inherent in the Russia-Ukraine energy relationship framed by the ongoing gas price problem between Gazprom and NJSK Naftogaz of Ukraine. The ramifications of the problem already have had a major impact on gas supplies to European (including NATO member) states. Despite the long-running nature of the problem and more immediate clear warning signs in December 2008, the cutoff — let alone its rapid escalation — appeared to surprise many in the Euro-Atlantic community.

The resolution in January 2009 of the immediate problem, which centered on the inability to agree on a price for Russian gas supply to Ukraine, and a tariff for the transit of Russian gas to Europe before the end of previous agreements on Dec. 31, 2009, did not resolve an important underlying issue: Naftogaz Ukrainy ability to pay for gas supplies to Ukraine. The agreement stipulated the energy company must complete payments for monthly gas imports by the seventh day of the following month. This was not broken. But the perilous state of the Ukrainian economy and, more specifically, the financial status of Naftogaz Ukrainy itself generated concerns about its ability to pay. This surfaced in late May 2009, when Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin noted Moscow’s concerns about the Ukrainian side’s ability to make the payments. An agreement reached by Putin and Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko in early September 2009 appears to have temporarily relieved some of the more pressing issues, particularly regarding the amount of gas Ukraine will import from Russia. But the financial status of Naftogaz Ukrainy itself and its ability to pay remains a concern, and the parties could revisit the agreement if the Ukrainian economy improves.

Moreover, the wider picture of relationships among the EU, Ukraine and Russia — and Russia’s place in the European “energy architecture” — remains complex. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin noted the uncertainty created when the EU and Ukraine signed a gas pipeline declaration in March 2009, arguing that changes to the management of Ukrainian gas transport make it impossible for Gazprom “to unilaterally finance its Ukrainian partners.” This highlights the wider tensions over responsibility.

European Commission President José Manuel Barroso considers the problem to be “mainly between Russia and Ukraine.” However, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev argues this is “not just a problem for Russia and Ukraine, as some people occasionally try to paint it,” and insists the EU plays a role in supporting Ukraine financially (while at the same time Moscow appears to seek bilateral agreements with Ukraine). Significantly, Moscow proposes the EU consider different options for financing supplies. And, “[i]f the European financial institutions decide that this kind of work is possible, then the Russian Federation will consider how much it can contribute.” (Emphasis added.) This is an important point: Moscow increasingly paints the EU as the actor who should take more responsibility — having decried the EU’s...
To keep up with the European Union demand for natural gas, Russian gas giant Gazprom continues building pipelines from its fields, like this one constructed near the Arctic Circle, to its customers.

inability to respond appropriately in January 2009.

Indeed, more broadly, the European energy architecture is at an important moment. Moscow argues that the Energy Charter Treaty, or ECT, is out of date and unable to meet current challenges as exemplified by the gas dispute in January 2009. Medvedev stated in May 2009 that “Russia is not a party to the charter and will not implement it … Clearly, other instruments … are needed.”

Through the EU has sought to emphasize that the treaty remains the cornerstone of the legal framework of European energy, Moscow has launched a series of proposals for the reconsideration of the energy architecture. It appears willing to withdraw from the treaty altogether. Order number 1053-r of the Russian government, signed by Putin, announced Russia’s “intention not to become a participant” of the ECT.

**NATO's Best Bet**

The flux caused by Moscow’s effort to reconsider the overall European energy architecture and the explicit mention of the impact of the January 2009 dispute in NATO's Strasbourg-Kehl Declaration are important developments for the alliance. They suggest that because of its impact on member states, a future gas price and transit dispute may be an alliance problem.

However, this opens an important gap between intentions and capabilities, since it remains unclear what added-value role the alliance might play in resolving such an event, beyond the purely internal approach of encouraging member states to fulfill their gas storage commitments (which should be a regular role, regardless of any imminent gas dispute).

To be sure, the economic, technical and commercial aspects of the dispute took on a political and even a security aspect in January 2009. But while NATO should pay close attention to the nature of the legal foundations of Europe’s energy architecture, a dispute should not be an incentive for the alliance to become involved in what is essentially an EU issue.

A NATO intervention is likely only to serve to entrench the established political positions, particularly in Moscow, but also in Kiev, and drive a deeper wedge into the dispute. Moreover, NATO risks an internal split over such a role, since it may prove difficult to achieve consensus across the alliance on whether NATO could respond, let alone how. Externally, NATO risks the perception it is unwilling or unable to fulfill its agenda by inaction or by being drawn into an escalating situation in which it has little capacity to act.

Instead of focusing on Europe’s energy security, it is increasingly necessary for NATO to more clearly define its geographically broader military security role.

2. The key points concerning the future security of energy supply remain well-known. There is an ongoing need for much greater internal solidarity and coordination within the European market, first and foremost in the EU. Second, the strategic problem remains the efficient exploitation of energy resources. The current economic climate suggests a low investment period into both upstream exploitation and infrastructure projects. This indicates the likelihood of stagnation in hydrocarbon production, particularly gas. However, these issues lie outside the NATO discussion and are not discussed in this paper.
4. Major routes include the Turkish Straits, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum. The Nabucco project also plans a route through Turkey. The collection of so many routes through one state might raise the question of the extent to which this is true diversification. This point becomes all the more salient given Turkey’s strategic energy relationship with Russia.
6. The Kriti Episcopi called on the EU naval force, which responded and thwarted the attack.
10. Ibid.
11. There is an interesting parallel here with Moscow’s emphasis on the EU’s responsibility for monitoring the ceasefire lines in Georgia.
Brazen pirate attacks and incidents of armed robbery on commercial shipping off the Somali coast have prompted an armed European Union response.

The union sent the EU Naval Force Somalia in December 2008 to help patrol the waters off the Horn of Africa, under the name Operation Atalanta. The force joined the larger international Combined Task Force 151 already conducting anti-piracy patrols in the area, and the NATO-led Operation Allied Provider.

The EU’s navy of ships from 10 nations joined the larger United Nations task force, which has ships and other assets from more than 20 nations. The naval patrol supports several U.N. resolutions aimed at fighting piracy and providing safe passage through the area.

In June 2009 the European Council extended the naval operation, set to end in December 2009, through December 2010.

“We must fight piracy in the Indian Ocean and off the coast of Somalia, and I condemn the actions of those who commit piracy,” European Parliament President Jerzy Buzek said in October 2009. “We must support the Somali authorities in bringing back stability and peace to their country.”

Safeguarding shipping in the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden is vital to the EU. Up to 95 percent of the trade by EU states, and 20 percent of world trade, passes through the Gulf of Aden. That means an estimated 33,000 ships transit the area annually.

The EU is conducting this, its first maritime military operation, within the framework of the European Security and Defense Policy. Greece, France, Belgium, Sweden, Netherlands, Norway, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom said they will send ships and people to continue the action. These assets rotate in and out of the task force, whose command also rotates.

The Task Force’s Objectives Are to:

- Protect World Food Program vessels delivering food aid to displaced persons in Somalia.
- Protect vulnerable vessels cruising off the Somali coast.
- Deter, prevent and repress acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast.

The EU also participates in the work of the International Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. It established a cooperative framework and arrangements to enable Operation Atalanta to collaborate effectively with other naval forces — such as from India and China — deployed to the region to provide support. In October 2009, the Bloomberg online news agency reported that the EU will consider training Somali security forces to augment the anti-piracy patrols.

The International Chamber of Commerce’s International Maritime Bureau, or IMB, reported in September 2009 that the number of attacks doubled off the Somali coast and increased fourfold in the Gulf Aden during the first nine months of 2009, compared with the same period in 2008.

However, the number of successful attacks — hijackings — dropped, said IMB Director Capt. Pottengal Mukundan. “The naval vessels operating off the coast of Somalia continue to play a critical role in containing the piracy threat,” he said. EU Naval Force Somalia

A Dutch special forces boarding party member from the frigate De Zeven Provincien, above, scans the area near a boat the team is about to board in the Gulf of Aden in April 2009. The EU is fighting piracy off the Horn of Africa with its Operation Atalanta task force.

The Swedish warship Malmo, below, tows a boat carrying weapons and ammunition, presumably belonging to pirates, found drifting in the Gulf of Aden off the Somali coast in June 2009.
Diversity could fuel EU’s energy security

Dr. Ferdinand Banks
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In a talk I gave at the University of Siena, Italy, in 2009, I took the liberty of explaining why a peaking of the world oil supply was certain, and conceivably sooner rather than later. Of course, when the price of oil can reach $147 a barrel, and bona fide experts claim that a price of $200 a barrel is possible, it seems appropriate to suggest that a flattening of the global oil output curve is scarcely worth noticing.

The question now becomes “What does this have to do with nuclear energy?” The short answer is “everything,” because when the price of oil escalates, references to nuclear energy multiply in publications and on television screens in every corner of the industrial world. This is perfectly natural, because oil is a benchmark for the world energy economy — a standard of value — and a large increase in price is a sign that bad economic news might be on the way. The dilemma is that an exhaustible resource (i.e., oil), whose exhaustibility becomes increasingly apparent with every passing year, has a tendency to lose its charm. Eventually it brings frowns to the faces and questions to the lips of rational human beings, which is a category that often includes a few decision-makers.

That being the case, instead of passively waiting for another large oil price increase to cut the ground out from under the international macro economy, it might be wise to think in terms of constructing a more satisfactory energy system. Fortunately, a mention of that project can already be found in many newspapers and news magazines. It goes under the name of diversity.

As it happens, diversity is a controversial concept, because it can mean radically different things to different individuals. In a brilliant and easy-to-read article, Richard Rhodes and Denis Beller (2000) said, “Because diversity and redundancy are important for safety and security, renewable energy sources ought to retain a place in the energy economy of the century to come.” By itself, this statement is enough to warm the hearts of every environmentalist between Stockholm and the navy yards at Cape Town, South Africa.

Nuclear power is environmentally safe, practical and affordable. It is not the problem — it is one of the solutions.
But they continue by insisting that “nuclear power should be central. Nuclear power is environmentally safe, practical and affordable. It is not the problem — it is one of the solutions.”

One of the solutions! I wonder what Svante Axelsson, head of the Swedish Society for Nature Conservation, or physicist Tomas Kåberger, head of the Swedish Energy Agency, would have to say about that. Axelsson published an article in a Stockholm morning paper that included some mathematics that simply ignored a glaring reality 500 kilometers away. The gentleman was attempting to show the economic advantages of liquidating the Swedish nuclear sector and replacing it with wind turbines. However, he must know that the cost of electricity, which in Sweden is determined by nuclear and hydro, is among the absolute lowest in the world, while the cost (and price) of power in Denmark — perhaps the promised land of wind energy — is among the highest in the world.

As for Kåberger, I find him especially shortsighted to the dismal economic consequences that would result from binding the energy hopes and dreams of his country to a non-nuclear future. The issue is straightforward.

The physics is simple, and has been simple during the past 30 or 40 years for the ladies and gentlemen who deal with that subject on a daily basis. But the economics is almost a complete mystery. Here I do not mean just Axelsson and Kåberger, but also those people who decide how much we must pay for our electricity in the coming years and to a certain extent where and how we live, what we drive or do not drive and the prospects for our children.

**MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUND**

For many years I have made a practice of expressing myself to my students as follows: Most of the people who genuinely understand nuclear economics refuse to tell us about it — often for social or financial reasons — while those other persons are unceasingly provided with golden opportunities to present their half-baked offerings. The flood of misinformation about energy matters has almost reached avalanche proportions and can be expected to increase as the expression “nuclear revival” (or nuclear renaissance) gains momentum.

Recently, Britain’s Financial Times newspaper published a long tirade by a certain gentleman
When European consumers feel the pinch of higher fossil fuel prices there is an increase in interest toward alternative energy sources.

where he stated that we are inexorably moving toward a non-nuclear world in which all carbon dioxide emissions are “sequestered.” Jeffrey Michel, a real energy expert, is no great friend of nuclear, but he has called the sequestering of carbon dioxide a “thermodynamic travesty,” and indicates that if taken to extremes, it could place a considerable economic burden on the countries in which it is practiced.

Another point needs to be made here. Five years ago, Britain’s Royal Academy of Engineering presented some “carbon net” values for electric generation sources that took into consideration the intermittency of wind (as reflected in the “capacity factor” for wind installations). The difference between the cost of nuclear and wind was so large (in favor of nuclear) that I decided to avoid controversy by not referring to it in my work.

But then I noticed that when the oil price began to move up, the same happened with the price of coal and natural gas. Many utilities in the United States were forced to introduce some of the largest rate increases in decades for electricity prices. When asked why, they immediately put the blame on the increase in cost of coal and natural gas, which was clearly associated with the price of oil. At the same time, the American nuclear-intensive firms Exelon and Constellation Energy were able to greatly increase their profits, because although they charged the same price for their electricity as non-nuclear competitors, the cost of uranium only increased by a small amount, if at all. Let me also suggest that if it had not been for the macroeconomic meltdown that began in July 2008, the already high electricity costs to large industries in the eastern part of the United States might have increased by at least 25 percent.

Germany also plays a very interesting role in the global energy drama, because while about 42 percent of Germans want nuclear to remain, about 52 percent in this highly literate country want it banished as soon as possible. What does not seem to be understood is that if a complete nuclear retreat takes place, and the Kyoto goals are realized, energy prices in Germany could go into orbit. Germany seems to have high hopes where renewables and increased gas imports from Russia are concerned; but I am not certain that this alternative works to their advantage, particularly the latter part. I prefer to believe that politicians should want a large amount of their energy requirements to be accounted for by sources over which they have complete control.

At the same time, I am quite willing to admit that on the basis of what I have seen and/or heard in countries like Sweden and Germany, nuclear antagonists seem to possess only an adversarial interest in the energy future unless the discussion is about “carbon free” items. Something that is missed here, often by nuclear supporters, is that a highly efficient nuclear sector could turn out to be invaluable.
Strong opposition to nuclear power is evident in Germany. Activists blocked and delayed a shipment of 123 tons of radioactive nuclear waste from western France to a dump site in Gorleben, Germany.

as a source of finance for investments in the renewables sector. This should be quite clear on the basis of advertisements sponsored by highly profitable oil companies and seen everywhere.

**THE ONLY OPTION**

In a long and complicated 2006 article in The Energy Journal (of the International Association for Energy Economics), five important energy researchers presented an argument for nuclear power as a hedge against uncertain gas and carbon prices. The article contains helpful information about the cost of nuclear power from 2005 to 2006, or perhaps slightly before. Some unexpected increases may have taken place since that time. I am thinking, in particular, of the costs associated with the European Pressurized Reactor under construction in Finland that, in terms of capacity, is the largest in the world.

The trouble in Finland is really quite simple. It is a “one-of-a-kind” — “custom built” — reactor. In a decade or so, reactors of that size, and larger, will be standardized and constructed for much less money. However, it is useful to note that the Finns are already thinking of another such reactor, although they are in an ideal position with respect to the natural gas of both Russia and Norway.

Something of particular interest to me was a statement at the end of the article: “The Finnish experience shows that if well-informed, electricity intensive end users with long-time horizons are willing to sign long-term contracts, then nuclear new build can be a realistic option in liberalized markets.”

I have had a few words with David Newbery and other experts on this matter and tried my best to explain that “liberalized” markets are quite irrelevant for this sort of discussion. Twelve Swedish reactors were constructed in a completely nonliberalized setting. They gave Sweden the lowest electricity costs in the world and the highest income per head in Europe. Moreover, I can assure you that it was not a question of this “build” being a “realistic option.” It began shortly after the first oil price shock, and given the outlook, it was the only option.

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As the European Union works to include more nuclear power in its quest for energy security, it must also find ways to guarantee nuclear security.

The threat of a terrorist attack on a nuclear facility is real. French police arrested nuclear physicist Adlène Hicheur in October 2009 for suspected ties to the al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb terrorist group. He worked at the European Organization for Nuclear Research on the Swiss-French border. The arrest increases fears the militant group is looking for weapons technology or planning to attack nuclear targets, Agence France-Presse reported.

The European Union looked to prevent such attacks when it passed a bill on nuclear safety standards in June 2009. Achieving a common legal framework and a strong safety culture in Europe is the aim of the nuclear safety directive. That makes the EU the first major regional nuclear principal to provide binding legal force to the main international nuclear safety standards, an EU news release stated. The directive also reinforces the independence and resources of national competent regulatory authorities.

The threat of terrorism, or of terrorists obtaining nuclear materials, has brought nuclear security to the forefront of EU discussion, even as nations try to cash in on nuclear power.

EU Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs said nuclear safety is an absolute priority for the union. The new directive tries to address safety concerns “by clarifying responsibilities” and providing “increased guarantees to the public as required by EU citizens,” he said. “It sets binding principles for enhancing nuclear safety to protect workers and the general public, as well as the environment.”

Piebalgs said the continuous development of nuclear safety is a responsibility not just for Europe, but for the world. “Not simply for us but also for coming generations,” he said.

Nuclear power plants are a security concern, said Rebecca Harms, a member of the European Parliament’s Green group. “Nuclear technology poses a clear terrorist threat. Nuclear power stations are like pre-installed bombs because they are not safe from attack, for example by aircraft,” she told the Brussels-based EUobserver.com.

The European Nuclear Society disagrees. In a statement on its Web site, the group said detailed structural analysis of nuclear plants shows that a direct strike by an aircraft engine or fuselage “would not breach or perforate post-tensioned or reinforced containment walls except at unrealistically high impact velocities.” A strike might penetrate reinforced exterior concrete walls but would not cause “failure of the steel shell” that protects the reactor.

The EU has the largest number of nuclear power plants in the world. Some EU nations plan investments or life extensions of nuclear power plants to meet the growing electricity demand, improve security of supply and tackle climate change. As the union grows, it needs a common approach to guarantee the highest level of nuclear safety.

The new nuclear safety directive “is an adequate response to this need,” the news release stated. It requires member states to set up and continuously improve national nuclear safety frameworks. It also enhances the role and independence of national regulatory authorities, confirming license holders as having the prime responsibility for nuclear safety.

Member states must encourage a high level of transparency of regulatory actions and guarantee regular independent safety assessments.

With the new directive, the news release stated, the EU could become a model for the rest of the world, especially with the renewed interest by nations in nuclear energy as a means to achieve energy security.

Editor’s note: information from the European Union and Brussels-based EUobserver.com was used in this article.
Disruptions to Europe's energy supplies benefit Turkey as the EU works to establish alternatives to existing energy sources.
Natural gas delivery disruptions and their connections to political disputes have gained attention over the past several years, mostly for obvious reasons related to Russian supplies to Europe.

While those disruptions are usually far more complex in their origins and political connections than reported in the press, the most tempting lens through which strategists can view such things is one of great power competition.

The resulting “with us or with them” rubric can bring scrutiny on countries caught in the middle. But in the past year, countries such as Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have shown once again that national interests are deeper than regional or political affiliations, and when it comes to energy policy in Europe’s neighborhood, alternative export and transit options are rarely off the table.

Therefore, despite the suspicious commentary surrounding Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s August 2009 visit to Ankara, it should come as little surprise that the same is the case for Turkey.

Turkey indeed finds itself in the middle, or perhaps more accurately at the center, of Europe’s pipeline politics. Geography is clearly a key factor, but so are Turkey’s institutional bonds to Europe, its shifting relations with Russia and ongoing historical efforts to play a greater role concerning its Turkic cousins farther east.

Since the mid-1990s, the West has turned to Turkey as an alternative route to the Caspian and Central Asia for oil, gas and wider regional influence. Regional leadership was stillborn when Turkey’s post-Cold War attempts to position itself as a trade and political bridge to the Turkic peoples of Eurasia stumbled in the early 1990s. The oil link, however, was realized, mainly when the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline went online in 2006, thanks to major Western political and financial backing. Today the central issue is gas, as disruptions to European supply have built momentum within the European Union to find alternatives to Russian routes from the gas-rich Caspian.

Thus, the grandiose summit-level ceremony staged in July 2009, when the EU’s $10.3 billion Nabucco natural gas pipeline project planned to run through Turkey to Austria was officially launched in Ankara, may be excused. But the fanfare only helped to obfuscate the still rather sorry state of the Nabucco project and the political unity it depends on. One by one, participating countries and potential investors have voiced concerns over Nabucco’s commercial viability, largely because the gas to fill the future pipeline is not yet committed. Azerbaijan, the most obvious source, is not a major gas exporter — and, anyway, Baku has recently shown its willingness to court other (Russian) export options as well. Accessing Turkmen gas would require a long-speculated but politically difficult trans-Caspian sub-sea gas line. And Iraq, despite positive talks with Turkey in September 2009, remains risky in the absence...
of dependable regional production-sharing agreements and a federal hydrocarbon-sharing law.

Such questions about Nabucco’s viability have made financing very difficult, dimming its prospects and encouraging participants to withdraw political support. Those prospects hit their low point in 2009, when even then-EU Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs voiced doubts over Nabucco’s future. Given the July signing, the project will likely go ahead in some form. But a recent two-year completion delay (to 2014) and periodic breakdowns in Azeri-Turkmen Caspian negotiations certainly do not bode well.

Despite the dour outlook, Turkey has always been a major supporter of Nabucco, even when fellow transit states such as Hungary or Bulgaria seemed to seriously waiver. Those countries’ vulnerability to disruptions of Russian gas imported via Ukraine was exposed in January 2009, hence their willingness to back any project that would most urgently improve their energy security — including those of Gazprom, the Russian gas giant partly responsible for the January disruptions.

The fact is that, backed by Gazprom’s financial heft, as well as political support from Russia, Bulgaria and (as of August 2009) Turkey, the alternative sub-sea South Stream pipeline always seemed more likely to see ground broken than Nabucco, with its hodge-podge political and financial support. The reaction in Brussels (and among armchair strategists) to the eastern Europeans’ Gazprom deals was one of more than raised eyebrows. In the zero-sum world of some EU officials, who see successful Russian alternatives as further threats to their flailing Nabucco project, members who do deals with Gazprom are to be chastised for undermining Europe’s collective energy security.

In Turkey, though, policy is driven neither by desperation nor by European finger-wagging. Ankara’s multivectored energy policy envisions Nabucco as one part of a network of projects that take advantage of Anatolia’s unique geographic positioning between the huge European market and the major producing regions to Turkey’s east, north and south. And while EU membership prospects may indeed have helped to color Turkey’s energy diplomacy vis-a-vis Brussels when accession talks were bearing fruit, subsequent Turco-phonie comments from Paris and Berlin (plus the stalled opening of the energy chapter of accession negotiations) have undermined the potency of that carrot — and with it any sticks EU officials may try to wield by criticizing Ankara.

Put simply, Turkish aspirations to become an energy hub were always more comprehensive than the limited role Europeans seemed to expect of it as a mere conduit to Europe. Messages from European capitals discouraging Turkish EU ambitions and Ankara’s subsequent policies have only laid that fact bare, and not, as some analysts claim, “lost Turkey.”

Thus, the deal struck during and since Putin’s August 2009 visit, initially to conduct environmental studies and later to allow South Stream into Turkish waters, should be neither surprising nor viewed within a zero-sum context. Russia is Turkey’s largest trading partner outside the EU and has long been a major energy supplier. While recent projects such as the Blue Stream north-south pipeline continue the traditional energy-import trade imbalance, Turkish firms have in recent years gained significantly in Russian construction and retail markets, deepening mutual economic interdependence. On top of this, the political chumminess between Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Putin cannot be denied. But that arrangement helps to grease the wheels of an established and growing trade relationship — not create one.

Outside the EU-Gazprom dichotomy, Turkey has also been diversifying its energy partners at a serious pace recently, conducting bilateral gas talks with Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Azerbaijan and Qatar. And as a sign of support for Nabucco, as well as openness to partners despite being politically unpalatable in Brussels, Turkey has in recent months begun to flout the unspoken taboo of the project. In September 2009, Erdogan joined some industry voices — including former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder’s — in declaring that Iran should be seriously considered as a supplier to Nabucco if the project is to succeed.

Turkey’s wider foreign policy strategy has been styled as “zero problems with neighbors,” and Erdogan has accordingly brought political will to bear on outstanding deadlocks in the region. In some cases, as with Greece, Cyprus and Syria,
those overtures are welcomed by its NATO allies. Inevitably in others, such as with Iran and Russia, Turkey’s new regional vigor may not suit those in the West inclined to the zero-sum mentality. But when it comes to energy, it should be understood that the transatlantic instinct of the past few years to find the national security implications of energy politics is rather reversed in Turkey. Ian Lesser wrote in a June 2009 commentary that “at base, Turkey will seek to decouple the security relationship with Moscow from the elaborate web of energy and commercial ties that have developed across the Black Sea.” The same can be said of Turkey’s relationship with Iran: Despite warming trade relations and Erdogan’s supportive words for Nabucco, Turkey confirmed in September 2009 that it will go ahead with its first missile defense system.

Therefore, officials in Europe and Washington should keep a few points in mind before chastising Turkey for its energy politics. First, Turkey’s recent openness to participation in gas projects, whether with Gazprom, Iran or other neighbors, is not a case of an ally betraying the group. Rather it is a sign of Turkey’s emergence as a global energy hub with accordingly global interests. Second, Turkey remains supportive of Nabucco, to a degree perhaps even surprising, given the wavering of fellow transit states and the depth of its energy ties to Russia. Third, the general cooling toward Turkey’s EU candidacy during the past two or three years is not sending its energy policy into the arms of the West’s rivals. However, it has caused Ankara to put less stock in the veneer of euro-solidarity, and so exposed the value it has always placed in commercial bonds across the Black Sea and to the East.

Finally, energy is strategic, but not always coupled with security. Turkey continues to be a valued and dependable NATO ally, and its wider drive toward a more open foreign policy is bearing fruit across the region — usually in the interests of the West.

If Europe wants to stay in the game with regard to Caspian gas, Turkey’s domestic power sector and overland exports from the Middle East, it should start offering substantive carrots to Ankara, beginning with the opening of the energy chapter in accession negotiations under Spain’s EU presidency. Vague accusations about Turkey’s strategic orientation will not suffice — and, instead, are bound to unnecessarily strain what President Barack Obama has called the “model partnership.”

Editor’s note: The views expressed in this article are the authors and do not represent those of either NATO or the International Energy Agency.

1. Reports from SOCAR, the Azeri energy company, that it could boost output to 40 billion cubic meters (bcm) by 2020 are highly optimistic. Currently the country produces about 29 bcm.
WATER Management: A Central Asian Security Concern
The leaders of the five nations of Central Asia — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan — attended the Aral Sea Summit in Almaty, Kazakhstan, in April 2009 to discuss potential avenues to save the Aral Sea. Each of the leaders seemed to agree there must be a solution found to save the Aral.

However, the meeting served as continued evidence that water management issues in Central Asia are far from being resolved as discussions deviated from sparing the Aral to frosty debate about broader water problems. This situation is not novel. It has existed almost constantly since the nations gained independence in December 1991. However, diverging national interests among Central Asian governments have resulted in a constant inability to agree on an effective water management plan in spite of multiple agreements and concerted efforts by the United Nations, the European Union and other third parties to help settle the impasse.

A LOOK BACK
The collapse of the Soviet Union thrust Central Asian nations into a situation that required a transformation from Soviet republics, where Moscow managed all aspects of government, to sovereign nations that needed to manage their own affairs. The Soviet system directed the Soviet Socialist Republics of Central Asia to adhere to a scheme of water distribution that required the upstream republics Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to transfer water to the downstream republics Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The water irrigated fields in the downstream countries, which was crucial for the quite profitable cotton industry. In exchange for the water, the downstream countries sent oil, gas and coal to the upstream countries to provide critical electricity during the brutal winter months. Since the Soviet Union collapsed, little has been done to address the water distribution scheme. In fact, the current physical infrastructure for water distribution remains a legacy of the Soviet Union, and this seems to be a significant contributor to the problems with water that exist in Central Asia today.

The vast majority of water in Central Asia comes from the mountains of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. As the snow melts, two main rivers, the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya, carry the water to the Aral, running through the downstream consumer states of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Each of the downstream countries is highly dependent on the rivers for irrigation, industry and public welfare.

Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan both have large reservoirs that hold meltwater from winter snow. When the weather warms and there is a need for water downstream, they open their dams to feed the two great rivers. However,
neither Tajikistan nor Kyrgyzstan has the natural hydrocarbon resources to generate electricity, nor can either country afford the prices their downstream neighbors ask for such resources. As a result, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have been releasing water from their reservoirs during the winter to generate electricity through hydropower. The second-order effects of this are twofold. First, the water released causes flooding downstream as frozen riverbeds flood with rushing water. Second, the water released in the winter causes premature exhaustion of water stores in the reservoir during the summer months that, in turn, exacerbates the arid conditions that naturally occur on the Central Asian plains. As a result, the agricultural-dependent nations downstream have great difficulty irrigating crops and providing water for their populations.

**WATER SECURITY**

Resolving the equitable distribution of water has gained relevance in recent years since the upstream countries plan to develop hydropower to ensure not being in the cold during the winter. Because the two rivers carry roughly 90 percent of Central Asia’s water, the downstream countries have serious concerns that summer irrigation needs will be more difficult to meet because they perceive Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan will deplete greater water resources to generate power. Upstream countries have attempted to barter with water, offering to sell it to downstream countries or trade for energy resources. However, downstream countries do not consider water a commodity one can buy or sell, but rather a gift to which all are entitled. In fact, in its 2001 National Water Policy, Uzbekistan notes that water is a “priceless gift of nature” for that nation’s citizens. In this light, downstream countries believe upstream countries have no right to trade water as a commodity for energy because water is an entitlement for all humans, and that the planned hydropower projects will create a situation in which less water is available to support agricultural needs. Considering downstream countries depend greatly on crops — cotton, rice and wheat — that demand a great deal of water, any reduction in the amount of available water could cause significant damage to national economies reliant on agricultural production.

Compounding the problem is the fact that environmental conditions are growing more severe each year. The United Nations Development Program reports the demand for water has “increased by more than a quarter during the last decade” and that only 700 cubic meters of water are available per person each year, although it is assessed that 5,000 cubic meters of water are needed. Complicating matters further is the mismanagement of water during irrigation. A 2002 report by the International Crisis Group noted that disrepair in existing irrigation systems was so severe that “half of all water never reaches crops.” A combination of factors in downstream countries — such as antiquated irrigation infrastructure, overuse of available water and reduced supply — causes water shortages, while demand is growing due to population increases and agriculture expansion plans. This situation has caused “an annual cycle of disputes,” causing tense relationships between the upstream and downstream countries. The potential for the situation to deteriorate further exists as the effects of global warming begin to impact the region. The World Bank reported that the expected rise of temperatures in Central Asia in the coming decades will bring second-order effects such as drought, extreme storms, seasonal flooding and reduced glacial meltwater.
Even as Central Asian nations continue to demonstrate a general unwillingness to work toward a binding solution that is mutually acceptable to all sides, each nation still continues to put national interests first in attempts to gain leverage over the others and is suspicious of the other nations’ water plans. For their part, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan claim the prices demanded by downstream nations for energy resources are unaffordable. They also claim they have no alternative but to release water in the winter to generate the electricity required to ensure the survival of their citizens. Kyrgyzstani officials say the release of water in winter to generate electricity has become more necessary in recent years as the prices the country pays for Uzbek natural gas are nearly three times that charged to Kazakhstan.6

The upstream nations further point to the fact that all responsibility for infrastructure maintenance of reservoirs, locks and dams has been theirs alone, despite their claims they consume very little of the water. However, the Central Asian states supposedly reached an agreement in July 2009 where downstream countries agreed to share some of the cost associated with infrastructure maintenance in the upstream countries.7 If the signatories of this accord manage to adhere to their agreed upon obligations, there is hope for future cooperation on water issues in the region. On the other hand, the dozens of agreements Central Asian nations signed since their independence go largely ignored.

**CONFLICT RESOLUTION**

The U.N., EU and many other organizations and states attach considerable significance to the region and have worked hard to help Central Asian countries develop programs and institutional structures on a variety of issues designed to guarantee stability and economic prosperity in the coming years. However, as it relates to Central Asian water management, evidence of a long-term, cooperative approach by the nations of the region is essentially absent. Both the upstream and downstream countries control resources that the others need. The collective inability or unwillingness to reach political consensus on how to effectively manage the resources has brought the issue to a critical juncture. It stands to reason that conditions will not improve for either upstream or downstream countries if the issue is not resolved to the satisfaction of all parties. Downstream countries look at hydropower construction plans in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan with skepticism because they fear access to shrinking water resources will become even more restricted. Support for these projects from the U.N., EU and World Bank have not assuaged downstream countries’ unease.

A number of publications have expressed concern about the potential for water security to become such a hotly contested issue that it leads to armed conflict. In fact, a Brookings Institution report cites regional news service reports that described cross-border disputes that occurred over “water-related” issues between March and May 2008.8 As conditions in the region deteriorate further, and demand for water far exceeds an ever-diminishing supply, there is potential for a sense of desperation to set in among countries — either upstream or downstream — if they believe their national livelihood is threatened. Fortunately, the situation has not worsened to such an extent, thus far. With international organizations such as the U.N. and the World Bank increasingly paying more attention to both the region and the issue, a solution amenable to all parties may be closer to becoming reality.

At the conclusion of the April 2009 Aral Sea Summit, all parties signed a document to confirm their interest in developing a mechanism that is mutually acceptable “for the overall use of water resources and the protection of the environment in Central Asia, taking into account the interests of all the region’s states.”9 Considering that the Aral Sea is now substantially smaller than its original size because of mismanagement factors, it is prudent for Central Asian nations to take steps in the near term to preclude a similar outcome with the Sur Darya and Amu Darya rivers, and the infrastructure upstream that helps feed them. Failure to do so is in no nation’s best interest.

4. Ibid, i.
International Team Training Afghan Forces
Seeking a stable Afghanistan

The future of the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan became clearer when the United States announced in December 2009 that it would send 30,000 more troops to the country.
The United States said Afghan forces will start providing their country’s security after July 2011, when U.S. troops will begin pulling out of the country. After the announcement, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen of Denmark said two dozen countries would send more than 7,000 additional troops to Afghanistan.

The NATO mission, in addition to combating Taliban and al-Qaeda insurgents in the country, is to protect the Afghan people and to help train the country’s military and police forces. The announced pullout makes setting a timeline for Afghans to take back full control of securing their country a high priority. Until the pullout begins, the NATO effort must remain in place.

“It is right in my view that eight years since Sept. 11, and after many achievements in Afghanistan ... we look at how we can get the Afghans themselves more involved in taking responsibility for their own affairs,” British Prime Minister Gordon Brown told Agence France-Press in September 2009.

The leaders of Britain, France and Germany agree NATO can help by accelerating and improving the training of the Afghan police and army.

“We should consider increasing the speed, size and quality of training of the Afghan security forces as well as how best to create the proper local environment,” the three leaders stated in a September 2009 letter to the United Nations.

The letter underscores the need for “new benchmarks and timelines ... to set our expectations of ownership and the clear view to hand over responsibility step by step to the Afghans, wherever possible.” Signs of that policy were apparent during the August 2009 Afghan elections, when Afghan forces took the lead in providing election-day security and NATO forces were on standby to provide support.

Providing training, mentoring and equipment for the Afghan military and police has been a main objective of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF, mission in Afghanistan. The U.N. Security Council created it in December 2001. The alliance assumed leadership of the force in 2003, at the request of the U.N. and the Afghan government. As of October 2009, the force numbered about 73,000 troops from 43 nations.

The force is helping the Afghan government extend its authority across the country and establish a stable and secure environment for sustainable reconstruction, development and good governance. That task has proved extremely challenging because of the growing Taliban insurgency and the disputed presidential elections. Opposition parties claimed that fraud marred the elections, which brought into question the legitimacy of President Hamid Karzai’s government. The country averted a runoff election and further turmoil when opposition leader Abdullah Abdullah refused to enter into a runoff election.

To address the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan, and speed up the recovery process, ISAF raised its troop levels in 2009. However, the troop surge has not yet produced the desired results. The insurgency continues to intensify, causing more civilian and military casualties and leading to widespread disillusionment and frustration among Afghans and the international community. Displaced insurgents moved to other areas, raising concerns in neighboring nations.

As a result, public support in the nations contributing troops is waning, while the political pressure on their leaders to devise an exit strategy grows.

In this context, professionally trained and effective army and police forces are essential to quelling the insurgency and bringing peace and stability to Afghanistan. Force leaders understand that and are working to train the Afghan military and police.

The Afghan National Army is trying to build a force of 134,000 troops by 2010, but Gen. Stanley
McChrystal, the top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan, said the target should be 240,000, The Associated Press reported in September 2009. McChrystal, in an assessment of the Afghan situation, said the police force needs to grow from the current 92,000 to 160,000, which would raise the total number of military and police security forces to 400,000 by 2014.

“This will require additional mentors, trainers, partners and funds through an expanded participation by GIROA [Afghan government], the support of ISAF, and the resources of troop contributing and donor nations,” the general’s assessment stated.

Obama ordered 4,000 additional military trainers as part of the 21,000 new U.S. troops he requested in March 2009, the AP reported. Some countries are contributing more trainers as well. Australia sent 450 new troops, in addition to the 1,100 that were already on the ground, the BBC reported in April 2009. Australia is the biggest non-NATO contributor to the force. About 100 of the additional troops are training the Afghan army in Oruzgan province.

Turkey increased its troops from 900 to 1,700 before taking over the international force’s Kabul regional command in November 2009, Turkish Brig. Gen. Metin Gurak told the AFP. Turkey plans to train and equip 450 Afghan Soldiers by May 2010 and continue helping in reconstruction efforts, Gurak said.

The ISAF works with the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan to monitor, mentor and train the Afghan police. The police agency arrived in June 2007 to consolidate the individual training efforts of EU countries in Afghanistan, which started in 2002.

The EU police trainers support the reform process and work to train a trusted Afghan police force that works within the framework of the rule of law and respects human rights. As of September 2009, there were 165 Afghans and 264 non-Afghans — mainly police, law enforcement and justice experts — deployed to Kabul and regional and provincial areas.

The European Community is the largest contributor to the U.N. Development Program’s Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan, which pays the operating costs of the Afghan police. It has already paid more than $299 million, according to the U.N. Afghanistan Report 2009.

As of September 2009, there were 5,000 coalition trainers working with the Afghan military and police, the AP reported. Some 256 teams...
work with the Army and 85 with the police, the Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan reported.

Australia, Canada, France, Great Britain, Mongolia, New Zealand, Poland, Romania and the United States, and private for-profit contractors provide the current training and mentoring, the American magazine The Nation reported.

Recruiting, training and equipping security forces is tough in a country of 28 million people, where less than one-third of the adult population is literate, malnutrition is high and the Taliban often pay better wages, the USA Today newspaper reported.

“We have a very weak economy and we have been at war for the past 30 years, and it still continues,” Afghan Lt. Gen. Sher Mohammed Karimi told Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in September 2009. Karimi is the Afghan National Army chief of operations. “We are now moving forward with international help, and over the past eight years we built the military from zero to having 95,000 soldiers now.”

Moreover, corruption, absenteeism, desertions, lack of discipline, vanishing supplies and an excessive dependence on their foreign counterparts plague Afghan forces. The task of unifying a force made up of a patchwork of often hostile ethnic groups further complicates the training mission.

Additionally, 90 percent of Afghan Soldiers cannot read or write, which slows down the training of the Afghan security force. Trainers must devote time to literacy classes so recruits can perform basic tasks such as taking notes, filling out forms and reading maps and manuals before they can move on to more complex technical training.

There has been progress, but for many, training efforts are not proceeding fast enough.

“We now have a national army and it is being built further,” Karimi said. “But we all are very impatient and trying to build everything in one day. We cannot build everything overnight.”

Gen. David Petraeus, head of U.S. Central Command, agrees. “No question about the need to develop the Afghan national security forces as rapidly as possible, and likely to higher numbers,” he said at the Association of the U.S. Army conference in October 2009. “But we have to keep in mind that there are limits to how fast you can accelerate that development,” particularly of commissioned and noncommissioned officer leaders.

The Afghan Army has few operational units. A July 2009 U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction report stated that only 24 of 559 Afghan police units are ready to operate without help from international forces. The situation is better for the Army: 47 of 123 units are operating independently. However, ISAF conducts more than 90 percent of its operations in conjunction with Afghan troops.

“How soon the Afghan Army and police are ready to stand on their own will depend on the security situation in the country, Petraeus said, recalling the problems he encountered as commander of the Multinational Force-Iraq. When violence spiked there in 2006, “the Iraqi security force effort nose-dived,” he said.

Petraeus is committed to preventing a replay of that situation in Afghanistan. “It is hugely important that the security situation not undermine the Afghan security force effort,” he said.

The deputy commander of the ISAF, British Marine Lt. Gen. Jim Dutton, told a group at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in October 2009 that training and equipping the Afghan military and having Afghan troops on the ground remains a priority. However, he said there’s a need to “resource or even over source with enough troops to get this right” with the ongoing counterinsurgency effort.

The generals agree the answer to solving the nation’s problems is a stable Afghanistan with a functioning military capable of maintaining the fledgling democracy and the rule of law.

“Our plan is to put coalition forces in with as many Afghan security forces as are available into an area and then gradually — as Afghan security forces become more capable and, more importantly, larger in number — we’re then able to pull the coalition forces back,” Dutton said. “That’s some time away, but that is the aspiration.”
Out of Africa
EU fighting wave of illegal immigrants

With 15 of the world’s 20 most developed countries located in Europe, and all 20 of the world’s poorest countries located in Africa, it is no surprise that many Africans head for Europe.

These people are searching for a better future, even if it costs them their lives — which often happens. Many fall victim to extreme weather when crossing the Sahara or the Mediterranean Sea. More than 10,000 people have drowned trying to cross the Mediterranean to Europe since 1996, the Kenyan newspaper The Daily Nation reported. In the first half of 2009 alone, more than 500 died.

Young Africans are desperate to leave their homelands because of poverty, unemployment, crime and violence, according to the U.N. office on Drugs and Crime. Of those 20 poorest countries noted by the U.N. Development Programme, many are close to Europe, making it a handy escape.

Most of the people who survive the passage end up in detention centers in Italy, Spain’s Canary Islands, Malta and Greece — the closest entry points into the Continent. The countries are now on the front lines of the war to curb illegal migration and human trafficking and smuggling into Europe. A big European Union concern is that terrorists are part of the wave of immigrants.

“The scale of illegal immigration into Europe and the difficulties that many European states face in integrating new arrivals can create ethnically or religiously defined underclass communities that serve as incubators of terrorist activity,” stated a 2009 NATO report on migration in the Mediterranean region. “Although the vast majority of undocumented migrants are simply seeking employment, some may be associated with criminal and terrorist networks.”

However, those who smuggle or traffic migrants do not care about the affiliations of those they transport. Their main concern is delivering “the goods” and getting paid.

“Don’t take anything with you! We will provide you with water, food and cigarettes. In particular don’t bring any documents. Don’t let the Italians identify your nationality.” These are the instructions many migrants get from smugglers before leaving Libya for the Italian island of Lampedusa, the International Organization for Migration reported. Thousands of African migrants have landed in Lampedusa, located between Tunisia and Sicily. Having no documents makes it very difficult for EU authorities to deport them, because officials don’t know where to send them.

Powerful criminal organizations run by Nigerians and North Africans with strong networks in Europe often traffic or smuggle migrants. These networks make about $300 million annually for their clandestine operations, the U.N. estimated, although they have to pay expenses such as bribing officials, forging documents, purchasing boats and fitting them with GPS systems for navigation.

Spain and Italy are doing a better job of policing the western Mediterranean, the British newspaper The Observer reported. Though this is a welcome development in the two countries, it has had unintended consequences elsewhere: a shift in migrant traffic to the east, and more headaches for Greece.

“The main effect of more efficient patrols in the western Mediterranean is that we now have more people coming through the eastern Mediterranean,” Martin Baldwin-Edwards, head of the Mediterranean Migration Observatory at Athens’ Panteion University, told The Observer in September 2009.

Forced to cope with the country’s porous land borders and some 11,433 miles of rugged coastline, Greek immigration officials are overstretched. The surge of migrants has left their detention centers overflowing.

To staunch the human tide, the Hellenic Coast Guard patrols have been equipped with high-speed boats and
infrared tracking devices. France and Spain have dispatched helicopters to the area to help.

The Greek island of Samos has become a new favorite entry point into the EU because of its location about one kilometer off the coast of Turkey. “They’re coming in by the boatload from Turkey at all hours of the night and day,” Nikoloas Zacharis, vice prefect of Samos, told The Observer. “It’s uncontrollable.”

About 150 people a week make the journey to Samos, the BBC reported. Some try to reach the EU on Jet Ski-type watercraft. Traffickers race across the water from Turkey and drop the migrants close to a beach. Others attempt to swim the straits, not understanding the currents.

Most, however, set off in overcrowded inflatable dinghies. As soon as they see the Coast Guard, they puncture the dinghy. With that, they are no longer illegal immigrants, but drowning people the Coast Guard must rescue. One young couple had their baby with them as they tried to make the journey. When they sank their dinghy, it put the infant at risk. Fortunately, the baby survived. But the case illustrates the desperation of the migrants and the risks they are willing to take to reach Europe.

“The situation has reached crisis proportions, partly because detention centers are now so overcrowded,” Nikos Koplas, a lawyer working with refugees seeking asylum, told The Observer. “Locking them up is not the way forward. The answer lies with the EU.”

But with 22 million people already out of work in Europe because of the economic downturn, the influx of new immigrants is becoming a growing challenge, the BBC reported.

The EU is seeking solutions. Some proposed measures include strengthening border security and a directive to make it easier to return migrants to their homes. There are also motions to discourage mass amnesties for illegal migrants. Another potential solution is issuing a “blue card,” similar to the U.S. green card, to attract more skilled workers to the EU.

Overwhelmed by the influx of immigrants and the strain on their governments, Greece, Italy, Malta and Spain are asking other EU nations for help. The union is considering voluntary initiatives that would spread the migrants to the rest of the Continent and alleviate the disproportionate burden placed on the four southern European countries.

While protecting their own countries from illegal migration, the EU’s southern front nations serve the interests of the entire union. Recognizing that these nations incur more costs, and as a sign of solidarity, the EU set up a budget of more than $6 billion to help offset such costs through 2013.

The flow of illegal immigrants in the EU continues, but measures by European nations have slowed the flood. Because if left unchecked, illegal migration leads to a host of problems.

If they make it to the EU, fear of detection forces most illegal migrants into an underground existence that keeps most of them living in poverty on the fringes of society. As their numbers swell, undocumented migrants become a burden on the local economy and the social welfare, education and health care systems. Some of them turn to crime and may become susceptible to extremism.

Italy and France, destinations for many illegal migrants, also want the EU to take decisive action to help North African nations stem the flow of illegal migrants. A story posted on the neurope.eu Web site stated, “Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and French President Nicolas Sarkozy made the appeal in a joint letter in which they also called for a strengthening of the EU’s border patrol agency, Frontex, and a greater sharing of responsibility, on immigration between EU member states.”
The European Commission has adopted measures that now allow law enforcement agencies across the European Union to use the Eurodac fingerprint database to fight terrorism and serious crime.

The database, the European Dactyloscopie, already gives EU nations access to the fingerprints of applicants for asylum and people who have entered the union illegally. But the new measures aim to make the database more efficient by integrating the suggestions of the European Parliament and the European Council, a commission news release stated.

“This improvement in the fight against terrorism and criminality will go hand in hand with the protection of fundamental rights, including the protection of personal data.”

— Jacques Barrot
European Commission Vice President

“Problems relating to cross-border law enforcement cooperation cannot be effectively dealt with at a national level, or on the basis of bilateral arrangements between member states,” said Jacques Barrot, the commission’s vice president responsible for justice, freedom and security. “Only coordinated action at an EU level can ensure such cooperation.”

Barrot said not allowing law enforcement authorities Eurodac access to combat terrorism is a shortcoming the commission wants to correct with this proposal.

“This improvement in the fight against terrorism and criminality will go hand in hand with the protection of fundamental rights, including the protection of personal data.”

The release also states the commission’s measures regulate the procedures through which law enforcement authorities can consult the database and each other, and the conditions under which to make such requests. At the same time, the measures have guarantees aimed at ensuring the protection of personal data and safeguarding the right to asylum.

Even though law enforcement officials in many EU nations may access their national databases, which contain the information of applicants for international protection, it is very difficult — and burdensome — to exchange such information with other EU nations. There are several union-level methods in place to facilitate exchanges. But the new measures avoid multiple cooperation requests by identifying, directly at the EU level, the nations that hold the fingerprints in question. Comparison of fingerprints can then take place between the requesting country and the nation with the file.

The Eurodac database also allows EU nations to identify asylum applicants and people apprehended trying to illegally cross their borders. By comparing fingerprints, member states can determine whether an asylum applicant, or an illegal foreign national, has previously claimed asylum in another country, or whether an asylum applicant entered a union nation unlawfully.
Europeana’s digital promise:
Centuries of culture just a mouse click away

Europeana — Europe’s digital library — is the database of databases for Europe’s cultural treasures.

Linking and cataloging cultural databases from the European Union’s 27 member nations, it contains more than 4.6 million digital items accessible through an Internet site. The database is an example of how EU nations are working to preserve their cultural heritage.

A core team from the National Library of the Netherlands runs the project, which launched in November 2008. The team works with 100 representatives of heritage and knowledge organizations and information technology experts throughout Europe. The goal is to expand to 10 million digitized works online by the end of 2010. Anyone can access the database and conduct searches in all official EU languages at www.europeana.eu.

The online multimedia portal has image, text, audio and video files from European museums, galleries, libraries and audiovisual collections. These include works from acclaimed collections such as France’s Louvre Museum, the British Library, the Swiss National Library and even obscure mountain monasteries, to name a few. The collections include incunabula (books printed before 1501) from Spain, prints of Belgian villages from the early 20th century, children’s books from Poland, audio of Mozart’s works from Austria, and Romanian art.

One obstacle Europeana faces is that many cultural treasures aren’t available in digital form, so they can’t be displayed on a computer. The EU noted in its August 2009 news release that less than 1.5 percent of the items in Europe’s national libraries are in a digital format. Other cultural institutions also have a long way to go.

“It is unacceptable that a huge part of cultural heritage remains inaccessible to EU citizens, while, technically, it could be just ‘one click away,’” Viviane Reding, EU commissioner for information society and media, said on theBookseller.com in October 2009. “We should create a modern set of European rules that encourage the digitization of books.”

The main priority for expanding Europeana is funding digitization to provide more content. This is a responsibility of EU countries, and several use money from EU funds for specific digitization projects.

The EU set aside more than $179 million to organize the system and find technical solutions to improve accessibility in a multilingual environment. Future funding from the EU and member states has yet to be coordinated.

“We have to find means to encourage member states to provide more funding for digitization,” said Helga Trüpel, vice chairwoman of the European Parliament’s Committee on Culture and Education, in an October story on the Penki news Web site. “My big political goal is to achieve the balance between making books available and rewarding the authors.” Since EU member countries have different copyright laws, a method for compensating participating authors must be worked out.

The basis for selection of database content is cross-border relevance and its contribution to Europeana. France has contributed 47 percent of the items, and Germany 15.4 percent. All EU nations have contributed to the database, but content for many is low. Slovakia has rehabilitated an old military complex as a large-scale digitization facility using page-turning robots. The country has contributed less than 1 percent of content.

The database could serve in other capacities, like helping partner nations better understand each other’s cultures. Knowledge of the cultures of other nations may even lead to “providing assistance in troubled areas of the world, which can help diminish the risk of asymmetrical threats,” states a 2008 NATO report.

The Web site was an instant hit. On its first day online, the Europeana system crashed from heavy use. Now restructured, and with a fourfold server capacity upgrade, the system can withstand the heavy traffic. Officials said they can add more capacity if peak-hour requests exceed 10 million hits per hour.

To access the site, visit www.europeana.eu.

Editor’s note: Additional information from European Union Web sources appears in this article.
EU aims for stable, prosperous Eastern Neighborhood

Aims to boost east’s prosperity and stability

The European Union seeks to strengthen ties with Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan while bolstering its European Neighborhood Policy. The region is part of the EU’s Eastern Partnership and an area Russia considers part of its neighborhood.

A primary EU goal is to help the countries initiate reforms that will bring them greater prosperity and stability, said Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the EU’s commissioner for external relations and European Neighborhood Policy, in a January 2009 news release.

Besides closer political and economic ties, the partnerships promise new steps to boost energy security in the region and Europe, Ferrero-Waldner said.

“A very special relationship with the EU is on offer to countries which choose to pursue reforms, particularly in improving democracy, human rights and rule of law,” she said.

The three nations have shown more willingness to work with the EU since the Russian intervention in South Ossetia in August 2008, the Agence France-Presse news agency reported the following month.

“These countries are sovereign nations, and they have the right to choose their own destiny,” Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt said in the AFP report. “They have expressed their view for a closer relationship with the EU. They have their right to choose their own future, not to be restricted by the wishes of everyone else.”

How quickly the three nations seek further association with the EU depends on each country, EU spokeswoman Christiane Hohman told the Azerbaijan Today online news outlet. She said EU association agreements with each country could take place in 2010, but that negotiations would proceed at their own pace.

The neighborhood partnership helps, in part, to set up free economic zones and agriculture and visa agreements. In August 2009, the EU announced it had reached an agreement with Georgia on easing visa rules and sending back illegal immigrants, the AFP reported.

The EU’s European Neighborhood Policy, started in 2003, applies to the union’s immediate land or sea neighbors: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine. The EU develops relations with Russia through a separate strategic partnership.

Neighborhood policy goals encourage:
- Greater commitment to foster economic integration and improve market access. In ongoing trade
negotiations, the number of products excluded from full liberalization should be limited.

• More ambitious developments in managed migration, making it easier for some categories of visitors to get visas, such as students, business people, nongovernmental organization workers, journalists and officials using existing opportunities.

• Further engagement in tackling frozen conflicts in the neighborhood, using the full range of instruments available to the EU.

• Intensified EU support for partner countries’ reforms in energy, climate change, environment, fisheries, transport, maritime policy, research, information society, education, employment and social policy.

• More people-to-people contacts, more exchanges in education (including enhanced academic and student mobility) and between youth, researchers, civil society, cultural groups, business, trade unions, and regional and local authorities.

• Stronger political and regional cooperation.

The EU has also established a new cross-border cooperation program with local authorities in Black Sea countries, and it supports the activities of civil society organizations. Through its Black Sea Synergy Initiative, the union will work alongside the neighborhood program to increase cooperation in the region to:

• Stimulate democratic and economic reforms.

• Support stability and promote development.

• Focus on practical projects in areas of common concern.

• Respond to opportunities and challenges through coordinated action in a regional framework.

• Develop a climate more conducive to the solution of regional conflicts.

The Black Sea program began in 2007 and includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Turkey and Ukraine. It started with a number of initiatives looking at transport, energy, the environment, maritime management, fisheries and migration, fighting organized crime, information society and cultural cooperation.

In a joint statement issued in 2008, EU foreign affairs ministers and those of the Black Sea nations said, in part, that the Black Sea Synergy effort was a long-term regional cooperation plan to offer new opportunities, increased stability and prosperity to European and Black Sea citizens. Three immediate areas of concern the accord seeks to address are migration, security and cross-border cooperation.

This article includes information from the European Commission and European Neighborhood Partnership Web sites.
Spain and Mexico agreed to share resources to fight terrorism and organized international crime in an accord that also includes provisions for Spanish police to help train their Mexican counterparts.

Announcement of the accord came during the ninth meeting of the Mexico-Spain Binational Commission, held in October 2009 in Mexico City. The two-day meeting also covered economic, financial, legal and consular affairs, education, culture, science and technology.

Mexican Attorney General Arturo Chávez Chávez met with Spanish Justice Minister Francisco Caamaño Dominguez to sign the deal.

“Mexico’s commitment to assist Spain’s fight against terrorism is unwavering,” Chávez said.

Caamaño said the agreement helps Spain and “confronts those who do not respect freedom and basic human rights.”

The agreement builds on earlier accords between the two nations.

In a statement from the Mexican foreign ministry, Chávez said one of the priorities of President Felipe Calderón’s administration is to promote bilateral and multilateral cooperation to combat transnational crime.

The accord allows for more exchanges of information and intelligence to combat terrorism, drug trafficking, illegal immigration and human trafficking, fiscal offenses, money laundering, cybercrime and illegal arms trading.

As part of the deal, Spain agreed to train 10,000 Mexican ministerial federal police investigators, Spain's EFE news agency reported. Training will take place in Mexico and Spain. Experts from Spain’s National Police Force and Guardia Civil gendarmerie will collaborate in training Mexican police in forensics and techniques to counter money laundering and terrorism funding.

Spanish Secretary of State for Security Antonio Camacho Vizcaíno also met with Chávez. They agreed to update and extend current collaborative agreements that have produced successful results. “Spain and Mexico... will promote joint operational work and experience exchange, as well as reinforce cooperation in the area of training now in progress,” Vizcaíno said.

The collaboration is working. In 2007, for example, Mexico extradited Basque separatist group ETA members to Spain to stand trial. In 2005, Mexico extradited Ricardo Miguel Cavallo — a former Argentine naval officer hiding in Mexico — to Spain because the country had charged him with genocide and terrorism. Spain then extradited Cavallo to Argentina in 2008 to stand trial.

Part of the binational commission’s work is to analyze the bilateral relationship, identify challenges, propose solutions and find new areas for mutually beneficial cooperation. The results will assist with the creation of cooperative projects between Mexico and the European Commission and will define the agenda of the binational meeting in late 2010, the Mexican government said in an October 2009 news release.

Mexico and Spain have a privileged and strategic partnership, Chávez said. “Mexico values its cooperation with Spain in sharing information to attack phenomena that damage our societies.”

Other issues the two nations will tackle include child pornography, kidnapping and extortion. Additionally, the two countries agreed to work to eliminate counterfeit documents that foreigners often use to enter Spain from Mexico.

Increased collaboration to solve the common challenges of terrorism, transnational crime and illegal migration is beneficial to all nations. Closer ties allow developed nations to pass on their expertise and knowledge to help developing countries.

“The challenges of our time are increasingly collaborative in nature,” U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said in August 2009. “They require our full engagement, all nations working together — rich and poor, north and south, developed and developing.”
The success of military operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan against al-Qaida and the Taliban is helping drive a wedge between the two insurgent groups. That’s a good thing, counterterrorism officials say.

But there is a downside. Some insurgents packed up and moved elsewhere to continue their militant actions. The Taliban expansion into the once relatively calm northern Afghanistan is the main example.

European Union and Central Asian nations worry the exodus of militants will cause problems in areas where extremists have had little or no major influence in the past. That probability is reason for EU concern, but even more so in Russia and Central Asia.

“If the conflict against the Taliban ... deepens in Afghanistan, then toward which direction would they escape? God save us, but they would...

Adding to the concern is the possibility the Taliban could move to attack U.S. and NATO forces along the Northern Distribution Network. The supply line stretches from Europe to the Caucasus, into Central Asia and into Afghanistan. Container carriers using the long route are susceptible to attack. Therefore, it is “absolutely possible” Afghan militants will target the nations through which the supply line flows, independent military analyst Leonid Bondarets said in a September 2009 story on EurasiaNet.org. “The Taliban is fighting coalition forces and they will do all they can to destroy them,” he said. NATO troops and local police have already come under attack in Tajikistan. And Uzbekistan tightened border security after militant-related incidents in the eastern part of the country in May 2009, the story pointed out.

There are also long-established concerns that could lead to more instability in the area. One is the opium trade. Drug dealers in Afghanistan, the world’s largest opium producer, are using Tajikistan as a major supply route to smuggle narcotics into Russia and Europe, Erik Brattberg and Mark Rhinard wrote in a September 2009 report on EuropeanVoice.com. Authorities presume a considerable share of Afghan heroin also passes through Tajikistan, as well as bordering Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, they said.

Brattberg and Rhinard, researchers at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs in Stockholm, said the EU “should help by building effective capacity among local authorities by sharing expertise in law enforcement and criminal justice and, secondly, by setting up grass-roots counter-radicalization capabilities in order to build an early warning network beyond the merely operational intelligence capabilities already in use.” They said the EU also should focus on improving border security in regions that separate Afghanistan from Pakistan and from Tajikistan. And they want the union to redouble efforts to strengthen institutional capacities in Tajikistan for fighting drug production and drug-related crime.

Because of the re-emerging Taliban threat in Afghanistan, Central Asian nations are working to tighten controls along their porous borders and to improve avenues of cross-border communication to better counter the threat of extremists and cross-border crime. Uzbekistan, for example, is digging trenches and putting up fences along its borders with Kyrgyzstan to stem the influx of religious extremists. Kyrgyzstan stationed more troops along its boundary with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. And the Russian-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization is talking about creating a rapid-reaction force to counter the threat of militants entering the region from Afghanistan, the researchers said.

The Taliban threat has also led to a surge of regional cooperation. In September 2009, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Russia took part in a joint operation to shore up security along Central Asia’s southern frontier. Border troops from the five nations worked together to stem the infiltration of weapons, ammunition, narcotics and illegal migrants into the region, a Kyrgyz Border Service news release stated. They also worked to detect and suppress the illegal activities of criminal groups.

“I think the reason why this operation attracted so many
countries is that they have to coordinate their actions and co-operate in the fight against terrorism and outside threats. It's especially vital for Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan,” political analyst Mars Sariev, based in Kyrgyzstan, said in a September 2009 story on EurasiaNet.

“The situation on the southern front, especially at the intersection of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is potentially very dangerous,” Sariev said. “The position of law enforcement agencies in these countries, in that region particularly, is not that strong.”

So the “potential for negative processes” to emerge is very real, Sariev said. The joint operation addressed such issues. Additionally, various organizations are stepping up to support the Central Asian neighborhood.

Members from the U.N. Development Program’s offices in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan met in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, in mid-September 2009 to discuss future cross-border cooperation. This was the first such joint meeting involving senior country office management, program office and project staff members. They pledged strong support for the initiative, a development program news release stated.

Attendees “jointly identified key cross-border issues, shared their best practices in managing ongoing cross-border projects and agreed on ways forward for further cooperation and collaboration,” the release stated. The group agreed to break down ongoing and future efforts into local-border-community or national-, bilateral- or regional-level collaboration.

In another cross-border collaboration step, the U.N. agency’s Border Management in Central Asia assistance program provided the Kyrgyz border service equipment donated by Hungary. The binoculars and document verification equipment will help border guards check vehicles crossing the border, as well as passports and identification documents.

The EU is also trying to step up its support to the region as it tries to keep on track its strategy for Central Asia, adopted in June 2007.

“There is now a shared understanding of the benefits of greater cooperation on security matters, border management and controls … The strategy is succeeding in forging a new kind of partnership with the five Central Asia republics,” Benita Ferrero-Waldner, EU commissioner for external relations and European Neighborhood policy, stated in an EU news release in September 2009.

Tajikistan shares a nearly 870-mile border with Afghanistan and is close to Pakistan’s Swat Valley. That makes it susceptible to “spillover from these conflict areas and to infiltration of Islamic militants,” Ferrero-Waldner said. “Tajikistan is also key to efforts to stem the flow of illegal drugs to Europe from Afghanistan. Greater cooperation with the EU can play a part in helping to prevent the spread of instability.”

The EU, which has its own problems with militant groups, cannot afford to ignore the spillover problem in Central Asia, Brattberg and Rhinard said. “It is clear that tackling these problems ‘at home’ also means tackling problems in the neighborhood of Central Asia.”

Tackling the Taliban in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia is a key EU priority — though it means dealing with “formidable challenges,” Brattberg and Rhinard said.

But the EU cannot waver: The Taliban and al-Qaida have vowed to target European nations. Because Germany supports operations in Afghanistan, extremists threatened to disrupt German elections and caused the country to implement massive security measures during its world-famous Oktoberfest celebrations. The Heritage Foundation reported in October 2009 that “the terrorism pipeline between Pakistan and Britain poses the most important terrorist threat to Britain today.”

European governments also worry they cannot stop terrorist groups from recruiting some of their citizens. Recruits travel to Central Asia for training and return to their countries to carry out attacks. German officials said at least 30 recruits traveled to Pakistan for training in 2009, the Washington Post newspaper reported in October 2009. The story also said that in 2009, Belgium and France put people on trial for going to Pakistan for training by terrorist groups.

Now is the time for the union to “muster the political will necessary if the 27 member states are to increase the effectiveness and impact of the existing EU Strategy for Central Asia,” Brattberg and Rhinard said.

“It is not only Central Asia’s future that, to a large degree, depends on this,” they said. “Increasingly, Europe’s does, too.”

Soldiers with Kyrgyzstan’s State National Security Committee take part in anti-terrorism exercises outside Bishkek. The Kyrgyz president fears the conflict in Afghanistan may push the Taliban into Kyrgyzstan.
Soft Targets
Defending them takes an international effort

The re-election of German Chancellor Angela Merkel in September 2009 — seen as a good thing for the European Union — came with an al-Qaida warning.

An operative known as “Abu Talha the German” warned in a video message that “bitter times await the Germans” because the nation continues to support the war in Afghanistan. Merkel’s re-election likely means German forces will remain in Afghanistan.

However, the terror group’s threat to strike Germany will not influence the country’s democratic process, German Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble said in a story posted on Der Speigel Online. “We will not allow ourselves to fall into a state of anxiety, which is what the terrorists hope to achieve with attacks.”

Any terrorist attack on Germany will most likely be against “soft targets.” These are undefended or lightly guarded sites that are becoming the targets of choice for terrorist groups, reported Stratfor, a global intelligence company. Soft targets include churches, shopping centers, sports arenas, nightclubs, theaters, bars, restaurants and hotels where it may be easy to kill or injure a large number of people.

Such threats are not new to Germans, most of whom are used to strict security measures at home. The 2009 Oktoberfest celebrations in Munich provided a good example of that. Armed police were visible everywhere and people had to enter the city center through a single checkpoint. Overhead, a no-fly zone was in effect.

Terrorists are increasingly aiming at soft targets because a small group of their dedicated operatives can inflict much chaos and destruction. Plus, such attacks become the instant focus of international news media, as was the case during the November 2008 attacks in Mumbai, India.

“We have seen that there is a global trend now to attack Western hotels,” Rohan Gunaratna, head of the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research in Singapore, told the Agence France-Presse.

During the Mumbai assault, terrorists attacked hotels, but also hit public transportation systems. In July 2009, terrorists attacked Western hotels in Jakarta, Indonesia. American counter-terrorism officials warn that an al-Qaida training manual lists “blasting and destroying the places of amusement, immorality and sin... and attacking vital economic centers” among its priorities.

Attacks on soft targets do not net terrorists the same “political and ideological mileage” as hitting defended military targets — such as the US. outpost attack in Afghanistan in October 2009 that left eight Soldiers dead — Stratfor reported. Attacks on defended military targets may or may not receive international media attention. However, condemnation of attacks on soft targets is almost universal.

But heinous as they may be, these types of attacks have caused an awakening in anti-
terrorism thinking and a spur in counterterrorism measures. For example, many global hotel chains now provide counterterrorism training to their staffs. Some have beefed up internal communications to include terrorism updates. Others are increasing physical security at their hotels by providing visible guards, prominent security cameras, anti-vehicle barriers and evacuation plans. Some are building new hotels away from main traffic areas for increased protection.

Terrorist attacks have also encouraged international collaboration. The U.N. Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee helps nations apply U.N. guidelines to counter terrorist activities at home, in their regions and around the world. The committee encourages nations to exchange practices they use to counter terrorism. It urges nations to work together to investigate, detect, arrest, extradite and prosecute terrorists.

“Terrorism is a global challenge that requires a global and integrated response rooted in the rule of law and respect for human rights,” Jean-Paul Laborde said. The special advisor to the U.N. undersecretary general for political affairs addressed an international group attending a workshop on national counterterrorism focal points in Vienna in October 2009.

Some countries and international agencies already share information to fight terrorism. The international police agency Interpol and the EU’s Europol manage large databases and help nations with analysis and counterterrorism actions. The two agencies are helping to implement U.N. Resolution 1822, which monitors international sanctions against al-Qaïda and the Taliban. One goal is to improve transparency among countries and identify terrorists on a list all nations can share.

“What we are looking for is a credible list in the fight against terrorism,” Austrian Ambassador Thomas Mayr-Harting, chairman of the U.N.’s al-Qaïda and Taliban sanctions committee, said in a story on talkradionews.com. “There is a whole technique in this process. We write to the countries involved and we wait for their responses.”

The cooperation process can be slow. But India is one nation already exchanging counterterrorism information with the EU. There is also a mutual legal-assistance treaty under review, India’s Business Standard Web site reported. India and the EU also want to increase the ties between Europol and its Indian counterpart, the Central Bureau of Investigation.

“We really want to explore what we can do more together, learn from each other. We need to work on several fronts,” Gilles de Kerchove, the EU’s counterterrorism coordinator, said in a July 2009 report by the Press Trust of India.

The aim is for India and the EU to share intelligence and research and to increase the skills of their counterterrorism security forces. The U.N. encourages other nations to follow suit.
Jumping Hurdles
Croatia Continues EU Membership Bid

Marko Papic, Stratfor Global Intelligence

Croatia continues its progress through the European Union accession process, despite an ongoing border dispute with neighboring Slovenia. Overcoming hurdles is not uncommon in the process and Croatia now expects to enter the union by 2011.

Slovenian Prime Minister Borut Pahor said in September 2009 that his country would stop blocking Croatia’s membership talks with the union. Slovenia’s previous actions were due to a border dispute between the two former Yugoslav republics.

The dispute concerns pockets of land along the Adriatic Sea that could play an important role in determining access to the sea. Croatian Prime Minister Jadranka Kosor, according to reports, sent an official statement to her Swedish counterpart — who held the rotating EU presidency until December 2009 — affirming that any mention of Croatia’s borders in its EU application materials does not legally prejudice the dispute it has with Slovenia. This essentially satisfied Slovenia’s demand to force Croatia not to use the EU accession process as a way to make a claim on the border dispute.

With Croatia succumbing to Slovenian pressure, the Croatian accession process to the EU can now continue. Croatia’s entry into the union will most likely be the last one before 2013, when the current six-year EU budget ends. Because of Croatian-German ties, Croatia’s accession will be a boost for Germany under the new decision-making rules dictated by the Lisbon Treaty. However, the Slovenian-Croatian dispute will spell trouble for subsequent Balkan entries, particularly if Croatia decides to play the same role as Slovenia in threatening to blackball its eastern neighbors.

To become EU members, countries must complete, or “close,” 35 negotiating chapters that cover a wide array of policy issues, from core EU concerns, such as free movement of goods and workers, to taxation, transportation and energy.

Croatia was progressing at a brisk pace until Slovenia blocked its accession negotiations in 2008 over the border dispute, thus preventing nine new chapters from opening and five from closing. As of late November Croatia had opened 28 of the chapters and closed 15. With the dispute abated, Croatia can continue negotiating the remaining chapters, with the European Commission hoping it can conclude negotiations by the end of 2010, paving the way for Croatia to enter the union by 2011.

The Slovenian veto of Croatian membership is not an unusual development in a long line of EU accessions. The 1973 Austrian free trade agreement with the European Economic Community (an early EU incarnation) — Austria’s first step toward its eventual membership in 1995
The city of Rovinj, Croatia, is in an area involved in a border dispute with Slovenia that had delayed Croatia’s EU accession process.
— was blocked by Italy in the early 1970s due to Rome’s insistence that Vienna stop interfering in the affairs of its northern Bolzano-Bozen province (or South Tyrol, as Austria refers to it).

The United Kingdom had to give up most of its trade privileges with the Commonwealth before its own accession to the community in 1973, while Slovakia, Lithuania and Bulgaria had to promise to close down certain Soviet-era nuclear reactors.

The bottom line is that the acceding country has no choice but to accept the demands of the countries already in the union, no matter how small or geopolitically irrelevant that country may seem. For example, in the future, regional powerhouse Turkey will have to recognize the tiny island of Cyprus if Turkey ever reaches the point of accession, despite the fact that Cyprus is not normally a key player in world affairs.

The border issue with Slovenia, however, became a serious political issue internally for the Croatian government, with Kosor likely to come under heat for succumbing to pressure from Slovenia. Kosor replaced her boss, Ivo Sanader, as prime minister of Croatia when he suddenly retired from politics in July 2009. It is possible Sanader retired so that Kosor would take the combined political heat of the recession and acquiescing to Slovenian demands, allowing the former prime minister to launch a presidential bid in 2010 when his party brings Croatia to the EU doorstep.

Overall, Croatian entry into the union generally has wide approval among the EU member states’ governments and even the expansion-wary public. All the latest Eurobarometers — EU public opinion surveys — indicate acceptance of Croatia’s accession is widespread, even in Slovenia, with Croatia being the only

The border dispute concerns pockets of land along the Adriatic Sea that could play an important role in determining access to the sea.
western Balkan country to consistently garner 50 percent approval for expansion from the European public. Europeans trust Croatia more than its Serbian and Bosnian Balkan neighbors. Many from Western Europe have visited the country because of its burgeoning tourism industry. Croatia joined NATO in April 2009, further establishing its credibility as a member of the Western alliance system.

But hurdles still remain. The EU has stated that Croatian entrance is still contingent on the resolution of the border dispute. The basis for the Slovenian veto, thus far, is Croatia accepting that its application materials to the union do not prejudge the dispute. But the actual dispute still remains and Slovenia could use its veto if it feels Croatia is not cooperating in border dispute negotiations that will now run parallel to Croatian accession talks.

However, Croatia has a powerful patron and traditional ally in Berlin. One of the first foreign policy stands by a united Germany in 1991 was a strong support for Croatian independence and support for the Croatian war effort, without which Croatia might not exist as an independent state today. Germany lobbied hard for Croatia with its EU allies, as well as with the skeptical United States, which initially was not enamored with the idea of a dissolved Yugoslavia. For Germany, independent Croatia was a domestic issue (with the presence of a formidable Croatian diaspora in Bavaria) and a geopolitical one, since an independent Croatia would afford Berlin easier power projection into the Balkans with its traditional ally as a conduit. But Germany remains a powerful ally to Croatia, one other EU hopefuls do not have.

For Germany this is not just about exerting political pressure to help its ally. Croatia will come in handy for Berlin now that the Lisbon Treaty took effect on Dec. 1, 2009, and changed the EU’s decision-making process. Under the previous qualified majority voting system, EU decisions could be blocked if the opposing countries constituted either 26 percent of the votes or 38 percent of the population. Because the union weighed votes in such a way that they benefited small member states (small countries got proportionally more votes per population than large ones), the population-blocking mechanism was an important device by which large states could block legislation. Germany, with its population of 82 million (about 17 percent of the EU total), needed only two other large member states (France, the U.K., Italy, Spain or Poland) to join it to make a vetoing bloc on the basis of their population, thus blocking a legislation that is otherwise agreed upon by the other 24 member states.

Lisbon reformed these rules by introducing the requirement that at least four member states have to vote against legislation to block it. The intent is to force large countries to make a coalition of more than three states with the sufficient blocking population. But if Germany can count on Croatian support to aid its opposition to key votes, it will not have a problem continuing to use its population advantage to block legislation, provided it can still ally with two large member states. Before the treaty, Germany could not really count on any EU member state to provide it with that nearly assured extra vote, a luxury some other member states have. For example, Greece can always count on Cyprus, Finland on Estonia and Italy on Malta, most of the time. As of November 2009, Greece has also agreed to support the Croatian accession.

Finally, Croatian accession will mean that with future Balkan memberships to the EU, Croatia will be a key hurdle for Serbia and Bosnia to overcome. While Croatia has publicly shunned Slovenia’s vetoing tactics and promised it would not use the same strategy when Serbia and Bosnia attempt accession to the EU, there is no guarantee this will in fact be the case.
Good Grades for Sale
Corruption undermines education in Central Asia

Farangis Najibullah, Radio Free Europe

Jovid always dreamed of becoming a police officer, but now he finds himself taking exams to become a tax collector.

“My family couldn’t afford the amount of bribe we would have had to pay to get a place at the police academy,” the 18-year-old high-school graduate said.

Seeking to ensure an affordable future for their son, his parents — farmers in Tajikistan’s northern Maschoh region — instead paid a $1,000 bribe to ensure their son could enroll to study tax law at a Tajik finance university.

“We had to sell several of our cattle to raise the money,” Jovid said. “The rest we borrowed from relatives. We didn’t have any other choice. I wish it was possible to enter the university with my knowledge, but things don’t work like that here.”

Jovid said the money went to middlemen, who promised to pass it on to the professors who make enrollment decisions based on exam results. But it is a common practice throughout Central Asia, where people say it is a fact of life most university entrants must pay bribes to enroll in institutions of higher education.

PAYING TO LEARN, EARN

In Turkmenistan, there is even a name for such bribes, “elaklyk,” which literally means “giving thanks.” Throughout the region, there are unofficial price lists for different universities and colleges, ranging from $600 to $15,000.

For instance, applicants have to pay at least $2,000 to get a place in the English-language department in Tajikistan’s provincial universities. In Turkmenistan, entrants may pay much more. Depending on the number of people competing for university placement, prices in the most popular schools can be more than $40,000.

The amount of the bribe often depends on the profitability of the future profession. The most popular among universities are law schools, because people believe lawyers will earn more money in a relatively short period of time.

Alymbek Ata, whose son applied to enter Kyrgyzstan’s Osh University, said he accepts bribery as “today’s real-
"I don't believe this issue will be solved as long as we have the current officials in place," said Faridun Rahnavaard, an analyst from Dushanbe, Tajikistan.

Some suggest that raising wages for teachers and university professors could help eliminate corruption. State university professors throughout Central Asia receive meager wages, ranging between $70 and $400 a month.

There are also concerns that the continuation of unfair practices will deny the children of nonwealthy families the opportunity to build better futures through education.

Regardless of their knowledge level, some young people already consider entering universities as beyond their reach, leading them to instead become migrant laborers.

Editor's note: Additional information gathered from the Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty Central Asian services and the International Crisis Group.

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**FEW OPTIONS AVAILABLE**

Central Asian students who cannot enter the educational system have little choice but to turn elsewhere.

"It is not surprising that young people increasingly seek solutions outside mainstream society through alternative options of religion, violence, extremism or migration," the International Crisis Group reported as early as 2003. The independent, nonpartisan group is a source of analysis and advice to governments and other groups.

"Religion serves both as an escape from everyday problems and a channel through which to criticize the present system," the crisis group reported. "Radical Islamist groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir have been successful in recruiting the disillusioned, providing simplistic answers to questions about the grim reality of their lives. Equal numbers have moved away from Islam to new Christian churches that offer a Western-oriented alternative."

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**ARREST TEACHERS OR EMPOWER THEM?**

Meanwhile, education authorities insist they are fighting the rampant corruption. Several professors — including a teacher at the National Institute of world languages in Turkmenistan, a teacher at Tajikistan’s Khujand Medical College, and two university professors in Bishkek and Osh — lost their jobs in connection with bribery.

Prosecutors in the three countries have opened criminal cases against the professors, who now face corruption charges. Public opinion, however, is unmoved by these individual cases. Few expect that weeding out a handful of offenders can really end the problem. Some even accuse the education officials themselves of being involved in corruption.

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**ROT IN THE SYSTEM**

The problem of bribery in the education system has been a topic of political debate in Central Asia in recent years. Officials warn that corrupt practices and widespread bribery have severely damaged the quality of education.

High school teachers complain that students skip lessons and don't take their studies seriously, which raises fears they are not properly prepared as they take the next step in their education. At the university level, corruption does not stop with the entrance exam. Once in the classroom, students routinely pay bribes to get better grades and to pass exams. It is common for professors to have different fees or “stavki,” to pass their exams.

Emil Sarybaev, who studies medicine at Osh University, said some students opt to pay bribes instead of attending classes.

“There are five or six students in my group who don’t show up for lessons but who take care of any problems with the professors. They pay about $500 to $600 to pass an exam,” Sarybaev said. “I can’t even imagine what kind of doctors they will become, or how they would treat patients in Kyrgyzstan. I’m afraid that they won’t be able to treat patients — they will kill them.”

Local experts in the region warn that Central Asia is in danger of ending up with a generation of specialists not properly trained in their fields. Many people in the region have already lost their trust in university graduates, particularly in the medical field, leading them to seek out older doctors or graduates of foreign medical schools.

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**FUTURE OPTIONS AVAILABLE**

Depending on their chosen professions, students in Turkmenistan may have to pay tens of thousands of dollars in bribes for university placement.
Imagine being poor and not having identification, an education, a job, social support, access to health care or legal representation. Imagine facing verbal abuse, forced evictions, property destruction, police intimidation and physical assault on a daily basis, not because of something you did or did not do, but simply because of your ethnicity.

That is the stark reality for many of the 10 to 12 million Roma people living in Europe today. Roma is an umbrella term for groups sharing similar cultural characteristics and a history of persistent marginalization in European societies. Names for these groups include the Roma, Sinti, Travellers, Ashkali, Kalé and others.

“Roma are one of the largest ethnic minorities in the EU, but too often they are Europe’s forgotten citizens,” said Vladimir Špidla, the European Commission member responsible for employment, social affairs and equal opportunities. “They face persistent discrimination and far-reaching social exclusion,” he said, commenting on a 2008 EC report on the Roma.

Random acts of violence against the Roma throughout the European Union in 2009 again brought light to the centuries-old problem — that being Roma is a social disadvantage. That is what 77 percent of Europeans said in a 2006 poll conducted for the EC by a team from Belgian TNS Opinion. The group is the world’s largest custom market research company.

“The EU and member states have a joint responsibility to end this situation,” Špidla said. “We have the tools to do the job — now we need to use them more effectively.”

Living mostly on the margins of society, the Roma are among the most deprived communities in Europe, Amnesty International reports. A U.N. Development Program, or UNDP, report on the situation in five Central European countries found that “by measures ranging from literacy to infant mortality to basic nutrition, most of the region’s Roma endure living conditions closer to those of sub-Saharan Africa than to Europe.”

Linguistic and genetic evidence suggests the Roma people migrated from India to various parts of Europe between the 14th and 16th centuries. Because of their different appearance, customs and language, the Roma were initially viewed with curiosity. But that quickly gave way to intense hostility and xenophobia. They were enslaved until the 19th century in what is now Romania and were treated as outcasts elsewhere in Europe.

During World War II, the Nazis killed as many as 1.5 million Roma. After the war, most Roma found themselves living in the former Eastern Bloc. They were subject to discriminatory practices such as forced sterilizations to limit family sizes in Czechoslovakia and bans on their music and language in Bulgaria.

Twenty years after the fall of the Iron Curtain, many Eastern European countries are still struggling to find solutions to their Roma problems; most of those countries are now part of the EU. Some Roma migrated legally to Western Europe, which led to friction between them and local populations. Until problems concerning the Roma emerged in their countries, Western Europe
A Roma boy sits outside the blazing wooden shack that was his home in a Sarajevo, Bosnia, suburb. The Roma refused to move into city housing projects by June 1, 2009, so officials evicted them. The Roma burned their shacks.
had associated the issues with former communist regimes.

“Most of these people are European citizens. And the Roma have, since the Middle Ages, been part of Europe. Yet they still represent the largest ethnic group facing extreme poverty, social exclusion and discrimination on our territory,” EC President José Manuel Barroso said at the first-ever European Roma Summit in September 2008. “Most of their population, which is in the millions, lives in conditions which are simply not acceptable in 21st-century Europe.”

The perception
Marginalized by society, some Roma resort to crime or begging to feed their families. The lure of a better life leads some Roma into the human-trafficking business across Europe. Some are trafficking Roma children, who end up on the streets of European cities begging or committing petty crimes such as picking pockets and robbing people at automated teller machines.

In Madrid, for example, police estimate that 95 percent of children under age 14 picked up for stealing are Roma, the BBC reported in September 2009. More than 1,000 Romanian Roma live in the many camps outside the capital city.

But poverty and lack of opportunity are not unique to the Roma. Unique to the Roma is the overwhelming extent to which these problems affect them and the disproportionate discrimination and mistreatment to which other groups subject them. Yet, some people see the Roma as unwilling fellow citizens.

“Gypsies [Roma] don’t work, but have eight or nine children, and then get all this money from the state to live on,” Hungarian farmer Imre Madach said during an interview with the United States’ National Public Radio, or NPR. “And this state sucks the blood out of the Hungarian working people in high taxes to pay them. It’s just not fair. So, of course this sharpens the social tensions.”

The farmer’s opinion, common in Europe, was stated after a particularly vicious nighttime attack. Someone gunned down Maria Palogh, a single Roma mother, and her 13-year-old daughter, Ketrin, in their home in Kisleta, Hungary, in August 2009. The mother died, and the daughter was critically injured. In a similar attack, Robert Csorba and his 5-year-old son, Robika, were shot dead in February 2009 while fleeing from their home — set ablaze by a Molotov cocktail — in Tatarszentgyörgy, Hungary.

NPR reported at least nine arson attacks, eight shootings and two assaults involving hand grenades on Roma communities in Hungary since 2008. Violence against Roma flared up in the Czech Republic, Romania, Ireland and elsewhere in 2009.

In Italy, there were waves of arson attacks, mob violence and forced evictions against Roma (largely from Romania) living in camps in 2007, 2008 and 2009. Italian authorities adopted “security” measures that appear to be discriminatory and that disproportionately affect the Roma, Amnesty International reported. Similar accounts of discrimination are widely reported in Ireland, England, France, Spain and Greece, too.

In Kosovo, more than 200 Roma families have lived in lead-contaminated camps in North Mitrovica since 1999, Amnesty International reported. Despite reports in 2001 by the World
Health organization and others that the degree of lead contamination in the blood of both children and adults is one of the highest in the world, the Roma continue to live in the camps.

“There is no country where the situation of the Roma is good,” Špidla said in an August 2009 story on the EUobserver Web site.

Instead of condemning those practices and working to end them, some political parties use anti-Roma rhetoric for political gain.

Far-right political parties and extremist organizations usually exploit the anti-Roma sentiment. The Ataka (Attack) party in Bulgaria, the Bulgarian National Union, the New Right party in Romania, the Slovak National Party in Slovakia, the Jobbik (Movement for a Better Hungary) Party in Hungary and the associated Hungarian Guard are some of these groups. So are the Northern League Party in Italy and the Workers’ Party in the Czech Republic.

Another political scheme that preys on the Roma is vote buying. In the summer of 2009, some Bulgarian and Slovakian political parties bought Roma votes with cash, chickens, sugar, cooking oil and other staples, reported London’s The Economist newspaper, the Boston-based globalpost.com Web site and The Slovak Spectator newspaper.

**Breaking the cycle**

Reports of Roma abuse and social exclusion have long been a concern of international organizations. The United Nations, EU, UNDP, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, human rights groups and nongovernmental organizations are working with nations to put an end to the discrimination and to integrate the Roma into mainstream society.

Although efforts have so far met with limited success, it is crucial to acknowledge and build on them. These include:

- **The Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005 to 2015.** Launched by the EC, World Bank and Open Society Institute, the initiative brings together governments and NGOs to draw up national action plans for improving education, health care, housing and employment opportunities for the Roma. A central pillar of the measure is the Roma Education Fund. Managed by the World Bank, it aims at closing the educational gap between Roma and non-Roma, including the desegregation of education systems. The fund administers the largest Roma university scholarship program and supports research, studies and evaluations that contribute to effective policies for Roma inclusion in national education systems.

- **The European Roma Rights Centre.** This group protects Roma human rights and engages in strategic litigation. Its greatest achievement is the 2008 European Court of Human Rights ruling on a case in the Czech Republic that determined the segregation of Roma children in schools constitutes unlawful discrimination.

- **EU Roma Summit.** Organized by the EC and held in Belgium in September 2008, it was the first time high-level EU institutions, national governments and civil society organizations met to discuss the situation of Roma communities and to find ways to help them. The 2nd EU Roma Summit will take place in Córdoba, Spain, on April 8, 2010, which is International Roma Day.

- **The EU Platform for Roma Inclusion.** Launched in April 2009, this forum creates an EU-level framework for cooperation among governments, universities, research institutions and NGOs to offer Roma people real opportunities in mainstream education, employment and housing. All 27 EU member states — and candidate and potential candidate countries — participate. The Roma Education Fund, European Roma Policy Coalition, Open Society Institute, European Roma and Travellers Forum and the Network of European Foundations represent civil society groups. Participating international organizations include the OSCE, World Bank, UNDP, Council of Europe and the Decade for Roma Inclusion 2005 to 2015.

    The initiatives are necessary first steps in the effort to fully integrate the Roma into mainstream society and empower them to lead productive and successful lives, George Soros, founder of the Open Society Institute and the Roma Rights Centre, said at the opening of the first EU Roma summit. Špidla supports a joint commitment to resolve the issue.

    “In the 21st century, the situation of the Roma is a stain on Europe’s conscience,” he said. “The problems are multiple and complex, but we have the tools to improve inclusion — with legislation, funding and sharing policies that work.

    “We now need a joint commitment at local, regional, national and European level to put these tools to better use and guarantee a better future for Roma communities across the EU,” he said. “The situation will change only if all are committed.” 

    Mariska, mother of Roma murder victim Maria Balogh, reacts at her daughter’s funeral in Kisleta, Hungary, on Aug. 7, 2009. Hungary’s estimated 600,000 Roma fear attacks by right-wing extremists.
Three Cups of Tea: One Man’s Mission to Promote Peace … One School at a Time

by Greg Mortenson and David Oliver Relin
New York: The Penguin Group, 2006 and 2007; 368 pages
Photos courtesy of Central Asia Institute

One of the key characters in this marvelous book on schools told Greg Mortenson, co-founder and executive director of the nonprofit Central Asia Institute, “The first time you share tea with a Balti, you are a stranger. The second time you take tea, you are an honored guest. The third time you share a cup of tea, you become family.”

*Three Cups of Tea* enlightens us simultaneously on three levels of analysis. The foundational level is a remarkable and entertaining tale of how a climbing junkie transitions into a humanitarian hero. The subsequent level is an enlightening study of a region of the world few have visited or read about. And the most important level provides a lucid primer for those struggling to help the Muslim world counter ideological support for terrorism.

For the reader interested in a book about altruism, Mortenson’s efforts — not unlike those of Jody Williams in her personal campaign to ban land mines — are at once heroic, frustrating and bungling. Still, he built more than 78 schools in one of the most remote and dangerous areas of the world. For lovers of anthropology, the tale begins in the tiny village of Korphe, high in Pakistan’s beautiful and impoverished Karakoram Himalaya region. This area is rich in generous people. For those who have worked in the region, and for the reader, the descriptions vividly evoke its vastness, splendor, and penetrating, unforgettable cold.

For the professional needing context and inspiration in dealing with the long war against terrorism and extremism, *Three Cups of Tea* provides profound lessons. Foremost, that we must “give time to time” and follow local rhythms, while not forcing things at a Western pace. A devout imam also reminds people: “Look into our hearts and see that the great majority of us are not terrorists, but good and simple people.”

Mortenson and Oliver Relin identify the region’s seminal problems: the lack of education and the noxious influence of Wahhabi and Deobandi madrasas. Some critics will hedge over style or a minor gaffe, like the “red tracers” of Kalashnikovs in a firefight described in the book.

But readers quickly get past this, and the impact of *Three Cups of Tea* remains.
Author Greg Mortenson, in gray smock, stands with a teacher and his students at a school he built with help from members of a Central Asian mountain community.
Resident Courses
Democratia per fidem et concordiam
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PRogram in Advanced Security Studies (PASS)

The Marshall Center’s flagship course, the 12-week, twice yearly program is a rigorous and intellectually stimulating course that provides graduate-level study in security policy, defense affairs, international relations and related topics. It consists of core studies and electives, including assigned readings, seminar discussions, debates, panels, role-playing exercises and field studies. Participants must be proficient in one of the three languages in which the program is taught: English, German or Russian.

Pass 10-10 Sept. 24-Dec. 17 (Nominations due July 30, 2010)
Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS)
The five-week, twice yearly program addresses the different aspects of threats to nations and is for mid- and upper-level management military, government and police officials in counterterrorism organizations. The focus is on combating terrorism while adhering to the basic values of a democratic society. The five-module course provides a historical and theoretical overview of terrorism, the vulnerabilities of terrorist groups, the role of law, the financing of terrorism and security cooperation.

PTSS 10-7 June 25-July 30, 2010 (Nominations due Apr. 30, 2010)

The Senior Executive Seminar (SES)
The seminar is a forum that allows for the in-depth exploration of international security issues. Participants to the winter and fall sessions include high-level government officials, general officers, senior diplomats, ambassadors, ministers and parliamentarians. The SES format includes presentations by senior officials and recognized experts followed by discussions in seminar groups. The 2010 sessions concentrate on the broad topics of narcotics trafficking and terrorism, and their impact on security in Europe and beyond.

SES 10-9 Sept. 8-16 (Nominations due July 9, 2010)
“Deepening Cooperation on Counter Terrorism.”

The Stability, Security, Transition, & Reconstruction (SSTaR)
The program is a three-week, twice a year course that addresses why and when stability, security, transition and reconstruction operations are required in the global security environment and how a nation can participate productively. Its four modules focus on the challenges inherent to SSTR, the basic organizational and operational requirements of successful such operations and the capacity-building resources available to participant nations.

SSTaR 10-8 July 13-30 (Nominations due May 14, 2010)

Seminar on Transatlantic Civil Security (STACS)
The seminar is a three-week, twice a year class that provides civil security professionals from Europe, Eurasia and North America an in-depth look at how nations can effectively address domestic security issues with regional and international impact. Organized into four modules — threats and hazards, prepare and protect, response and recover and a field study — it focuses on the development of core knowledge and skills.

STACS 10-6 June 8-30 (Nominations due Apr. 13, 2010)
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