Author: Mark G. Czelusta
- Date: June 2008 -
While Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld did not invent transformation, he made the effort a singular priority. But by 2007, defense language shifted from “transforming” to “recapitalizing” the military. Rumsfeld was out of office and the organizations he created to facilitate transformation were reabsorbed by the larger Pentagon bureaucracy. If Rumsfeld’s transformation is indeed dead, does this mean that transformation, as a greater process is dead as well? Answers to such questions require one to understand first that “Rumsfeld’s transformation vision” is actually the result of multiple influences that predate his time in office.
Second, “Rumsfeld’s transformation vision” is actually an umbrella term for a new way of war, a process, and a defense strategy. And third, in spite of Rumsfeld’s reputation for aggressive leadership, the military services shaped, and at times, limited the effectiveness of his program. This advanced research project discusses transformation’s historical roots, and derives a coherent description of what is commonly called, “Rumsfeld’s transformation vision.” Looking at how the services executed transformation, the author examines how each service completed its tasks in support of the Transformation Planning Guidance. While transformation is not dead in 2008, it remains an unguided process. Assuming that transformation is something that is worthwhile, the author provides several recommendations for reinvigorating the effort.
