■ WOLVES AMONG SHEEP?
Refugees pose little terrorism threat

■ A LUCRATIVE ENTERPRISE
Demand drives human smuggling

■ LESSONS FROM HISTORY
Europe’s experience with migration

■ MIGRANT DEMOGRAPHICS
The vulnerability of women and children

PLUS
The role of international law
Fixing a broken system
Germany welcomes refugees

MIGRATION
Balancing Human Rights and Security
The flood of migrants into Europe, many moving through the Balkans to Germany, often face the rain and cold in search of a better life. THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

7  The Complexities of Migration
   By Dr. Carolyn Haggis and Dr. Petra Weyland, Marshall Center
   Faculty Overview

10  Refugees in Europe
    By Dr. Anne Hammerstad
    Integrating asylum seekers — not freezing immigration — is critical to pre-empting conflict.

18  A Practitioner’s Solution for Europe’s Migration Challenge
    By Kostas Karagatsos
    The European Union should appeal to its legal system to handle migration flows.

22  Terrorism and Mass Migration
    By Dr. Sam Mullins, Marshall Center
    Violent extremists rarely emerge from the ranks of Europe’s refugees.

30  Alumni in Their Own Words
    By Ana Breben of Romania, Rear Adm. (Ret.) Ivica Tolic of Croatia, Maj. Bassem Shaaban of Lebanon,
    and Lt. Cmdr. Ilir Çobo of Albania (co-authored with Suard Alizoti)
    Four Marshall Center alumni detail how migration has impacted their countries.
48 Countering Migrant Smuggling  
By Rear Adm. (Ret.) Alberto Cervone  
A solution to the immigration problem lies in addressing underlying economic causes.

44 Garmisch-Partenkirchen Responds to Europe’s Migrant Challenge  
By Dr. Petra Weyland and Dr. Carolyn Haggis, Marshall Center  
The mayor of the famous German resort town shares stories about integrating refugees.

48 Gender, Migration and Security  
By Julie L. Arostegui, J.D.  
Female migrants to Europe suffer from unique problems.

54 A Legal Look at Migration  
By Melina Lito  
International migration laws must not infringe on fundamental human rights.

60 A Burden on the Balkans  
By Dr. Valbona Zeneli, Marshall Center, and Mr. Joseph W. Vann  
Tackling the European migration crisis requires a holistic approach to prevent further instability in the Balkans.
Welcome to the 25th issue of *per Concordiam*. This edition addresses a pressing challenge in Europe — the migration crisis. In 2015, more than 1 million migrants made the difficult and often perilous journey to Europe. These migrants fled crisis zones in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia, left government repression in Eritrea, and escaped dismal economic prospects in West Africa and the Western Balkans. Of course, migration is not a new security challenge; we devoted a 2012 edition of *per Concordiam* to the topic. In this issue, we expand our discussion and home in on how states should balance security with the imperative of protecting human rights, including those of migrants.

Not surprisingly, the topic was repeatedly discussed at the Marshall Center this year, in both resident and nonresident programs. Rear Adm. (retired) Alberto Cervone, a former faculty member of the Marshall Center, and Prof. Dr. Wilhelm Schmidbauer, chief of the Bavarian State Police, spoke to participants of the Program on Applied Security Studies (PASS) in the fall of 2015. Cervone covered the migration-security nexus from a policy perspective while Schmidbauer shared operational insights. As part of the Countering Narcotics and Illicit Trafficking (CNIT) program, Cervone returned to address human smuggling. During our Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS), conversations focused on participants’ concern that foreign fighters may infiltrate migrant flows into Europe. Prof. Sam Mullins of the Marshall Center tackles this question directly in this issue, reassuring us that despite recent events in Paris, the likelihood of infiltration remains relatively low.

Although considerable attention has been paid to Europe and the staggering number of people arriving daily, it is important to remember that this is only a fraction of those displaced globally; states closer to conflict zones continue to shoulder the greatest burdens and are overwhelmed. A participant at our Senior Executive Summer (SES) in September 2015 summarized the security environment for his country as follows: “I’d rather have a strong enemy as my neighbor than a weak friend.” It’s a statement that highlights the interdependence of states’ security and one that was much debated in the forum.

The message in this issue is clear: The only way to respond effectively to a humanitarian crisis of this scale is with stronger international partnerships, multidisciplinary approaches and genuine interagency cooperation. If there is a silver lining to the current crisis, it is that, in some cases, rhetoric is finally shifting into action. In the wake of the terrorist attacks in France, intelligence sharing has reportedly quickened between North America and Europe and among European countries themselves. In times like these, the vital importance of a place like the Marshall Center — where security sector practitioners from around the world meet for frank dialogue, exchange best practices and forge professional networks — is increasingly evident.

Migration directly impacts many of you personally and professionally. We invited four Marshall Center alumni to share their thoughts and perspectives in this issue. You’ll find their personal commentaries in the article “Alumni in their Own Words.” We hope to hear from more of you and invite you to contact us at editor@perconcordiam.org

Sincerely,

Keith W. Dayton
Director
Julie L. Arostegui, J.D. is a lawyer and expert on international human rights, gender and security. She serves as an international advocate, advisor, trainer, researcher and writer for the civil society, political, security and justice sectors. She has worked with nongovernmental organizations and government agencies and has been a guest lecturer at the Marshall Center.

Rear Adm. (Ret.) Alberto Cervone was a professor at the Marshall Center from 2008 to 2011, where he lectured and led several courses, including Mediterranean Security and International Migration and Security. He retired in November 2011 after 42 years in the Italian Navy and continues to collaborate with the Marshall Center.

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Dr. Anne Hammerstad is an author and expert in displacement, conflict and humanitarian politics. She is an honorary senior research fellow at the University of Kent, a senior research associate at the South African Institute of International Affairs and has worked as a researcher and academic in India. She earned a bachelor’s from Oslo University, a master’s from the London School of Economics and a doctorate from Oxford University.

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Dr. Valbona Zeneli joined the Marshall Center in August 2011 as a professor of national security studies and is also the Black Sea and Eurasia program director. She is a member of the teaching faculty for the Program on Applied Security Studies, the Program on Countering Transnational Organized Crime, the Program on Cyber Security Studies, the Senior Executive Seminar and the Seminar on Regional Security.
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FACULTY OVERVIEW:

THE COMPLEXITIES OF MIGRATION

By DR. CAROLYN HAGGIS, professor of transnational security studies, and DR. PETRA WEYLAND, professor of Middle Eastern affairs, Marshall Center

In June 2015, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) issued its headline-busting report titled “Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2014.” It revealed that at the end of 2014, “59.5 million individuals were forcibly displaced worldwide as a result of persecution, conflict, generalized violence, or human rights violations.” This was the highest level of displacement ever recorded. If these 59.5 million were a nation, it would be the 24th most populous nation in the world. While media attention has focused on large-scale flows to Europe, the overwhelming majority of forcibly displaced people remain in developing regions close to migrants’ countries of origin.

As UNHCR statistics show, migration is a major challenge facing the world today. It is a byproduct of armed conflict, civil wars, persecution of ethnic and religious minorities, poverty, climate change and hopelessness in the face of widespread corruption. Unless we find solutions to these challenges, migration flows will continue and likely accelerate.

Given the magnitude of the challenge and indications that it worsened in 2015, this edition of *per Concordiam* examines migrant flows from the viewpoint of sending, receiving and transit countries. For sending countries, the current large-scale flows mean they are losing precious human resources: their youth and many highly educated and skilled citizens with the means to make the journey. The scale of this conundrum in the Western Balkans is highlighted in an article by Dr. Valbona Zeneli and Joseph Vann. For receiving countries, they must cope with hundreds of thousands — sometimes millions — of people needing food, medical care, housing, schooling, jobs and language training, all while providing for their own citizens. Transit countries must also meet the needs of migrants and face the extra challenge of coordinating unpredictable flows of people with neighboring countries.

The migration challenge is analyzed from a historical perspective in the article by Anne Hammerstad, as well as from a legal perspective by Melina Lito and Kostas Karagatsos. Julie Arostegui introduces a look at migration through the lens of gender, reminding us that security and insecurity vary according to the roles one plays in society.

Since most *per Concordiam* readers are security sector professionals, the interrelationship between migration and security is much discussed in this edition. Two noteworthy pieces are written by academic scholars connected to the Marshall Center. Sam Mullins, professor of counterterrorism, writes about the link between jihadist terrorism and migration. And retired Rear Adm. Alberto Cervone, the Marshall Center’s first Italian faculty member, discusses how transnational criminal organizations have flourished under current restrictive migration policies.

To better understand how governments and citizens are coping with unprecedented migratory flows, we reached out to four alumni to learn about their countries’ experiences. These commentaries, captured in the article “Alumni in their Own Words,” are a highlight of this issue.

Finally, since many *per Concordiam* readers have spent time in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, the picturesque Bavarian town that houses the Marshall Center, we interviewed Mayor Dr. Sigrid Meierhofer to learn how this corner of Germany has been impacted. Dr. Meierhofer’s overall message was one of optimism: The refugees represent an opportunity, not a security threat.

As all of the articles in this edition underline, what is needed are integrated, multidimensional solutions to the challenges posed by mass migration, not quick fixes. Politicians cannot address these challenges alone, nor can security professionals, the UNHCR, the International Organization for Migration or the International Committee of the Red Cross. Ultimately, the outcome rests with citizens of all countries.

Given the Marshall Center’s location and its long-running focus on European security affairs, this issue also analyzes the migration challenge from the perspective of European unity and identity. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Europe embarked on the unique project of tearing down barriers, offering its citizens the freedom to move without hindrance. Twenty-five years later, Europe is asking fundamental questions about its future. To what degree should human rights, a cornerstone of the European project, be curtailed to enhance national and regional security? Can key European principles of democracy, peace, unity and economic liberty withstand the influx of millions who come from different political, social and economic environments? The answers to these questions are not obvious, and the migration challenge has mercilessly revealed the incompleteness of the European Union project and the complexity of forging common responses. Today, the viability of the Schengen Area is in serious doubt, and anti-EU sentiments are spreading.

We hope you enjoy this edition as much as we enjoyed putting it together.
Both migration and terrorism are the consequences of failing states and violent conflicts in the Middle East and Afghanistan. These conflicts have complex political, ethnic and religious roots, and they take place right on our doorstep. The distance from Aleppo, Syria, to Passau, Germany, is just 3,000 kilometers — approximately the same distance between Athens, Greece, and Paris, France, or Marbella, Spain, and Berlin, Germany. And Benghazi, Libya, is closer to Athens than Munich is to Hamburg.

We should not forget that most refugees are victims of war, terror and persecution. They are running from terrorist groups in states that no longer control their territories. Because Europe is not far, they come here to find refuge under the rule of law. In the Geneva Convention on Refugees, all EU member states committed themselves to granting protection to refugees. Our readiness to live up to that standard will be the measure of our society.

The challenge lies in reconciling the refugees’ need for protection with our citizens’ need for security by establishing pragmatic rules, applying constitutional procedures and practicing intelligent management. So far, however, managing the flow of migrants has been difficult for Europe and Germany, not only because of the large number of refugees, but because of our structures and lack of transparency in our procedures. Therefore, European nations need to work together to improve registration processes and create mechanisms for an equitable distribution of refugees.

In Germany, the refugee registration system does not work properly. Different authorities collect the same data and the same information repeatedly without the ability to exchange it. Many refugees have not yet filed requests for asylum with the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees or were not yet able to do so. This makes it difficult to know who has entered Germany, when they arrived, and where they are staying. This situation is the result of our legal regulations and inadequate structures and capacities. But we are finally taking a decisive step forward. Parliament has streamlined registration procedures and facilitated the exchange of data between authorities. Going forward, data will be fed into an interagency database, and refugees will receive documents as evidence of identity that contain essential information. This will lead to more transparency and make it easier to know who is staying where in Germany and which benefits they are receiving. These new regulations will soon be implemented.

This, however, will impact only the perceived security if it has any impact at all. Refugee management is no substitute for police and intelligence work. Even the most thorough hearings at the Office for Migration and Refugees cannot uncover terrorists — that would be an unrealistic expectation. Those intending to commit terrorist acts arrive
in a country under false names, either with quality forged passports or authentic stolen passports, as was the case in the Paris attacks. The terrorists used Syrian passports and registered as refugees, although they were Belgian and French citizens. The prevention of such abuse is the responsibility of law enforcement and intelligence services.

But security goes far beyond police work. Mostly, we need to prevent the emergence of poorly integrated parallel societies in Europe and in Germany. Today’s failure to integrate refugees and immigrants provides the breeding ground for tomorrow’s terrorism. That is the most important lesson learned from the Paris attacks. After all, the terrorists were Belgian and French citizens.

Therefore, we need to integrate immigrants and long-term refugees into our society as quickly as possible. Jobs and education play a key role in the integration process. The Federal Employment Agency and the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees cooperate with many local and federal state authorities. They offer language training, education and advanced training, job placement, and advice and support. Much needs to be done in a very short time. Labor market data indicate that the longer people are inactive, the harder it is to integrate them successfully. So we need to build a sustainable infrastructure right now. Time is of the essence. ☐
An elderly French couple listens to a social assistance worker in May 1940 as they flee the German offensive during the early days of World War II. An estimated 10 million French people fled south during this period. AFP/GETTY IMAGES
A large-scale migration and refugee crisis is unfolding in Europe. During the course of 2015, more than 1 million people arrived aboard overflowing and often unseaworthy vessels crossing the Mediterranean Sea to European Union member countries Italy and Greece. Almost 3,800 people died in the attempt. Most of the new arrivals have headed farther north into the EU, with Germany expecting to receive 1 million asylum applications in 2015.

Global displacement stands at over 60 million people, counting refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced people and others in refugee-like situations. This is the highest number since World War II. Many have drawn on this statistic to suggest that the population movement into the EU is unprecedented in scope and manageability.
The numbers are indeed high and the EU’s response — poorly coordinated and piecemeal, driven in part by fear and hostility, in part by sympathy and generosity — has made it less manageable than it needs be. The chaotic nature of the influx has led many to feel that Europe is overwhelmed. The challenges are indeed great, but it is worth noting that the continent has dealt with larger flows, even in recent history: Twenty years ago, 3 million people were displaced at the end of the wars in the former Yugoslavia, the vast majority of them having fled within Europe.

Europe’s long history of migration and displacement shows that mass population movements are catalysts for change — sometimes for the worse, leading to conflict and violence, and sometimes for the better, with the newcomers contributing to the prosperity and strength of host communities. If Europe’s migration and displacement history offers a lesson for today, it would be that sympathetic and pragmatic approaches to admitting and integrating refugees usually pay off in the longer term, while xenophobic and fear-driven attempts at “stopping the flow” through harsh security measures increase the risk of conflict and instability. This article is not meant to provide a historical blueprint for how to respond to today’s crisis — that would be impossible. But by taking a historical view, we can add nuance and perspective to today’s challenges, encouraging a less panicked and more measured response.

FROM MIGRATION TO REFUGEE CRISIS

Although hundreds of thousands of migrants and asylum seekers had been using the migration route across the Mediterranean to Italy for several years, it was only in the summer of 2015 that Europeans really started to pay attention. There are several reasons for this. From June onward, the flow of people shifted as landings dropped in Italy and soared in Greece. Furthermore, the new arrivals did not stay in Greece, but headed north on the “migrant trail” through the Balkans, most hoping to reach Germany.

A demographic shift accompanied the geographical one. The vast majority of those traveling from North Africa to Italy were young men. Now, growing numbers of families with children were arriving on the Greek islands. There was also a marked shift in nationalities and their motivation for making the journey to Europe: The arrivals in Italy had hailed from a range of different countries, some steeped in conflict, others merely poor, allowing European governments to label them as irregular economic migrants. That label simply did not fit those arriving in Greece. Of the more than 800,000 people who made their way from Turkey to the Greek islands in 2015, 57 percent were Syrians. Another 33 percent came from Afghanistan and Iraq. It dawned on European governments that their migrant crisis was to a large extent a refugee crisis.

Since then, European political discourse has been dominated by two broad questions: What does the influx of refugees mean for European economies and security, and how should Europe respond to the influx? How the latter question has been answered is closely related to how the first question is perceived. Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel has concluded that the refugees, particularly Syrians, present Germany with both a humanitarian duty to provide asylum and an economic opportunity to draw much-needed young recruits to Germany’s aging labor pool. In Sweden, a sense of solidarity and obligation toward refugees has led to a generous asylum policy.

Hungary, on the other side of the spectrum, has sealed its borders against illegal migrants whom the Hungarian government perceives as a threat to national sovereignty, border security and Hungarian culture and identity. Most of the other countries on the migrant trail from Greece to Germany have moved the refugees on from one border to the next as fast as they can, with little coordination and much recrimination among neighboring states. The British government’s response has been disappointingly self-centered and detached. Most of the rest of Europe has juggled anti-migrant concerns with an acknowledgment that European states have a legal and moral duty to provide protection and assistance to refugees arriving on their territory.

The terror attacks in Paris on November 13, 2015, which killed 130 diners, concertgoers and football fans, brought a new fear to the forefront — that of the terrorist masquerading as refugee. The police found a tattered Syrian passport next to the body of one of the suicide bombers at the Stade de France. The passport, deemed to be fake, had followed its owner into the EU from the Greek island of Leros, after which it was registered again in Serbia. Its owner has not yet been identified, but may have been an Iraqi. Most of the other Paris attackers were French and Belgian nationals who had traveled to IS-held territory in Syria. The discovery of the passport led to calls in the United States for an immediate halt to immigration and resettlement programs for Syrian, as well as other Muslim, refugees.

This is a short summary of the main issues raised by mass migration movements to host countries, not just today but throughout history. What is the economic impact of population influxes? Can new arrivals be absorbed into host communities? Will they affect communal cohesion, identity and culture? Can they cause instability and even violent conflict?
REFUGEES AND THE ROMAN EMPIRE

If one thing is constant about European history, it is the ebb and flow of populations into, across and out of the continent. Ancient Rome was founded by a group of refugee-warriors led by Aeneas, fleeing from the ruins of Troy to establish a new empire, or so Roman legend would have it. Centuries later, other refugees contributed to the empire’s fall. The 18th-century historian Edward Gibbon’s *History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* describes how the Western Roman Empire buckled and dissolved under the pressure of large population movements, Visigoths and Vandals among them, pushing in from the east, some as refugees, others as conquerors.

The sacking of Rome by the Visigoths in 410 is still held up as a warning to Western civilization not to admit barbarians at the gate. “This is exactly how civilizations fall,” historian Niall Ferguson exclaimed in a *Boston Globe* column on the Paris terror attacks. He went on to argue that Europe has let its defenses decline and crumble and grown decadent while opening “its gates to outsiders who have coveted its wealth without renouncing their ancestral faith.” In other words, by allowing in refugees and migrants from conflict-ridden, Muslim-majority countries — the barbarians at the gate — stable and prosperous Europe is undermining its own security.

The Visigoths were in fact Arian Christians by the time they sacked Rome. By then, many Germanic tribes had been living within, or in close contact with, the Roman Empire for centuries. While some “barbarian” groups attacked the Roman Empire, others defended it. Roman armies relied on Germanic recruits for their many wars, whether internal strife between Roman factions or in defense of the empire’s borders.

Lex Paulson recently argued that the Visigoths’ sacking of Rome could best be described as the result of a mismanaged refugee crisis. Roman leaders first welcomed the Visigoths, who were fleeing the onslaught of the Huns, but then turned against them a few decades later. The Visigoths reciprocated the hostility and grew to become a powerful enemy as the Western Roman Empire weakened, riddled by corruption, intrigue, coups and civil strife.

INDUSTRIALIZATION AND MASS EMIGRATION

Fast forward to the 19th century, when the Industrial Revolution set off Europe’s next
migration period, this time in the form of mass emigration. Between 1820 and 1920, about 60 million Europeans left the continent, some fleeing political or religious persecution, many more escaping poverty and social injustice, and almost all traveling to North America.

At the turn of the 20th century, more than a million Europeans were leaving the continent every year. As a proportion of population, the figures were even more staggering: from 1900 to 1909, 107 of every thousand Italians emigrated, as did 83 of every thousand Norwegians.

Many American citizens worried that the new arrivals from countries such as Germany, Sweden and Italy were overwhelming the country, and that their foreign traditions, religion (in the case of Catholics) and languages made them incapable of assimilating into the American way of life. As the U.S. turned isolationist after World War I, immigration became severely proscribed, bringing the era of European mass emigration to a close.

AN AGE OF MASS DISPLACEMENT

As militarism and nationalism led Europe into World War I, the continent’s migration patterns changed from voluntary emigration to forced displacement. The demise of the Ottoman Empire led to chains of displacement, and forced population exchanges took place between the newly created nation state of Turkey and its neighbor Greece, with many lives lost in the process. The Russian Revolution caused displacement on such a scale that the League of Nations appointed Fridtjof Nansen, the Norwegian explorer and humanitarian pioneer, as the world’s first high commissioner for refugees. “Nansen passports,” internationally recognized travel documents, enabled 450,000 Russian — and later Armenian, Assyrian, Greek and Turkish — refugees to find safety. Among the Nansen passport holders were Igor Stravinsky, Anna Pavlova, Marc Chagall and Sergei Rachmaninoff.

As authoritarian and totalitarian regimes took hold of parts of Europe in the inter-war years, refugee numbers also grew. Jewish refugees fled pogroms in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and Nazi persecution in Germany. A few lucky ones were allowed into Western Europe and North America. Those with international standing in the arts and sciences were welcomed: Albert Einstein was among the many Jewish scientists who moved to the U.S. in the years before World War II, as were several nuclear scientists who teamed up to create the first atomic bomb.

For ordinary Jewish refugees, there were few places to flee. There was no Nansen Passport available for them, and anti-Semitism abounded. Not unlike the fear of radicalized Muslims hiding among today’s Syrian refugees, many believed that Jewish refugees were Bolsheviks, radicals and subversives, and even Nazi agents. In the period from 1933 to 1945, the United States’ already small official immigration quotas for Germans went unfilled almost every year, as suspicious immigration officers rejected most applications from German Jews.

Public opinion supported the restrictive stance. In an opinion poll from 1938, 82 percent of Americans opposed taking in large numbers of Jewish exiles from Europe. Another poll that same year asked if the U.S. should take in more Germans, Austrians and other political refugees. “With conditions as they are, we should try to keep them out,” 67.4 percent answered.

AN INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE-PROTECTION REGIME

World War II created the largest population upheaval in modern European history. In May 1945, at least 40 million people were displaced in Europe. They included survivors of the Holocaust, prisoners of war and millions of Poles, Ukrainians and citizens of the Soviet Union fleeing the totalitarianism of Stalin’s
regime. But the largest single group of refugees were the 13 million ethnic Germans, most of whom had fled or been expelled from eastern European countries and the Soviet Union in the closing months of the war.

The plight of these millions of displaced people and revelation of the horrors of the Holocaust spurred the U.S. administration to spearhead creation of an international regime for refugee protection. After various interim measures and organizations, the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees was adopted in 1951, accompanied by a new agency, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

The refugee convention confirmed the right of refugees to seek asylum and the obligation of states not to return them to danger. It remains the cornerstone of refugee-protection law and asylum-determination procedures today. Because it is illegal to return a refugee to danger — a practice known as refoulement — all asylum applications must be investigated, and only if their claims are deemed unfounded can the asylum seeker be expelled. The unacceptable alternative of the 1930s was that states could return refugees to their persecutors at will, in the name of political expediency, economic cost or public opinion.

New legal protections for refugees were accompanied by practical efforts to reduce Europe’s massive population of displaced persons. The U.S. initiated large-scale resettlement and immigration programs to take pressure off war-devastated and unstable European states. Tens of thousands of Germans benefited from resettlement in the first couple of years after the war, despite frequently voiced concerns that there could be Nazi sympathizers among them who could pose a threat to national security. Cooler heads prevailed, and displaced Germans avoided collective punishment for the crimes of the Nazi regime. Between 1950 and 1959, 575,000 Germans emigrated to the U.S.

A decade after the war ended, a new refugee crisis erupted in Europe. When the Soviet Union invaded Hungary in late 1956 to crush a popular uprising, 180,000 Hungarian refugees fled to Austria and another 20,000 went to Yugoslavia. Most of the refugees arrived in the space of a few weeks. Again, refugee resettlement was used as a tool to avoid refugees overwhelming host countries or becoming a source of domestic (Austrian) or international (NATO-Soviet Union) tension. While the UNHCR organized emergency aid for the refugees, a large-scale resettlement operation was quickly executed. By mid-1958, 140,000 Hungarian refugees had been resettled in 35 countries, led by the U.S. (38,000) and Canada (35,000).

The early postwar years provide valuable lessons on how to handle today’s Syrian refugee crisis in Europe. First, the collective punishment of Syrian refugees for the actions of Islamic State terrorists would not only be unjust and unfounded, but politically counterproductive. It would give official sanction to xenophobic impulses and prepare the ground for radicalization of disaffected European youth of immigrant backgrounds. This would play straight into the hand of the Islamic State, whose stated aim is to create us-versus-them animosity between non-Muslim Westerners and Muslims.

Second, refugee resettlement, done promptly and supported by a broad coalition of states, is an effective tool for stabilizing countries of first asylum. This was the case for Germany after the war and Austria in 1956. It is the case again now, not just for Europe’s own struggling frontier states, but for Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. Syria’s neighbors are showing the strain of hosting 4 million Syrian refugees over several years. To relieve their burden through a mix of economic assistance and refugee resettlement is in the interest of international security and of avoiding even larger refugee movements in the future.

**POST-COLD WAR DISPLACEMENT: YUGOSLAVIA**

In the 1980s, a trickle of dissidents arriving in Western Europe from the Communist bloc developed into streams of asylum seekers from all corners of the world. Asylum figures increased rapidly until, in 1989, 283,000 applications were lodged in the EU. This presaged even steeper rises in asylum figures in the early post-Cold War period, coupled with a sharp increase in other types of displacement. By 1995, there were 7.7 million refugees, internally displaced people and asylum seekers in Europe as a whole. Almost 3 million of them were within the 28 countries constituting today’s EU.

It has been commonplace to discuss today’s Syrian refugee influx as the largest in the EU’s history. Between April 2011 and October 2015, over 680,000 Syrians have sought asylum in Europe (not just the EU), most arriving in the past two years. These large and growing numbers, combined with the swift and chaotic manner of their
arrival, have led to a humanitarian emergency in Greece and other places along the migrant trail.

But the number of Syrians in Europe is still smaller than the number of displaced people resulting from the breakup of Yugoslavia between 1991 and 1995. By the end of the Balkan wars — the largest conflict in Europe since World War II — almost 3 million people had been displaced, the vast majority within the borders of Europe.

In 1995, the 28 countries that today form the EU hosted 1.35 million displaced persons from the former Yugoslavia. Not all were asylum seekers or had refugee status; many had “humanitarian leave to remain” — a category of temporary protection introduced to cope with the large refugee populations. Others were hosted as prima facie refugees by countries neighboring the Balkan war zones.

Many Balkans refugees have since returned to their homelands; some were forced to return after the Dayton Agreement. Those who stayed have integrated relatively well into their host countries, although in some countries they still lag in terms of employment, income and education.

9/11: THE ANTI-ASYLUM FALLOUT
In the first half of the 1990s, 2.4 million people applied for asylum in the EU, leading to a race among member states to make themselves unattractive to potential asylum seekers. The efforts had an effect. The next 15 years saw considerably lower asylum application levels: 1.6 million in 1995-1999, another 1.6 million in 2000-2004, and 1.2 million between 2005 and 2009. Despite the drop, concern over “unmanageable” numbers did not go away. By the turn of the millennium, “asylum seeker” had become a dirty word, synonymous in many European minds with economic immigrants abusing the asylum system.

This hostility toward asylum seekers came to the fore after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001. Within days of the attacks, governments announced draconian measures to “close the asylum loophole” in their immigration and border control regimes. Speaking to the House of Commons in November 2001, then-British Home Secretary David Blunkett said: “We have a right to say that if people seek to abuse rights of asylum to be able to hide in this country and organize terrorist acts, we must take steps to deal with them.”

In fact, none of the 19 al-Qaeda hijackers had been asylum seekers. All had entered the U.S. legally, although some had overstayed their visas. The post-9/11 clampdown on asylum was the culmination of hostility toward asylum seekers that had built up during the 1990s. Draconian measures that had been deemed unacceptable by democratic societies before 9/11 became justified in the name of national security.

Evidence of refugees or asylum seekers committing terrorist acts in the industrialized world remains scant. A small minority of asylum seekers, or more often the children of asylum seekers, has become radicalized after arriving in their host countries. One of the assailants in 2013 at the Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, had arrived in Norway as a 9-year old refugee from Somalia. The Tsarnaev brothers, the Boston Marathon bombers, arrived as children in the U.S., where their parents sought asylum. But such cases are few and far between, and there is even less evidence of resettled refugees committing terrorist acts, most likely because resettlement programs include strong screening mechanisms.

In the case of the Paris terror attacks, the link between the refugee influx to Europe and international terrorism remains unclear. It is unlikely to provide a strong argument against letting in refugees, but shows the importance of coming to grips with the chaotic conditions of the migrant trail from the Greek islands through the Balkans and into northern Europe. The fake Syrian passport found at Stade de France shows that it is possible for terrorists to make use of the migrant trail to get into the EU, but it does not explain why they would do so. Most of the perpetrators of the Paris attack were French nationals, with strong links to Belgium. They traveled back and forth to Syria seemingly without needing to use the dangerous and time-consuming migrant trail. Indeed, it would make little sense to do so, considering how many border posts and passport controls migrants have to get through on their way through the Balkans and Eastern Europe.

While the identity of the fake passport’s owner remained unknown at the time of writing, it is reasonable to assume that one reason for choosing the refugee route via Greece is that it was an act of provocation from the Islamic State. The decision to take this arduous route was made with the knowledge that it would cause a backlash against Syrian and other Muslim refugees.

WARM HEARTS, COOL HEADS AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
If we are to learn from both history and the Paris attacks, we should focus our efforts on streamlining and increasing quotas for the orderly resettlement of Syrian refugees, combined with increasing political and financial support to frontier states such as Greece, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. Syria’s neighbors are reeling under the weight of massive refugee burdens. The refugees themselves are running out of resources and opportunities in their host states. Unable to find education for their children or employment for themselves, they are desperate to move on. At the moment, the only route to restarting their lives is the chaotic and dangerous migrant trail across the Aegean Sea and through Europe.

This state of affairs benefits nobody, apart from organized criminals, corrupt police officers and possibly terrorists. In the 1950s, Europe’s states signed onto the U.N. Refugee Convention partly out of remorse over the horrific failures of refugee protection in the preceding decades, but also in the name of international security, recognizing that refugee crises left to fester would cause instability and conflict.

This lesson should not be forgotten today. We are humbly and legally obliged to help refugees. To do so competently is also in Europe’s security interests. History shows that walls, panic and recrimination are likely to increase political and security problems arising from mass population movement. On the other hand, international collaboration and solutions that give refugees room to rebuild their lives and become productive members of society are likely to benefit refugees and host societies alike, particularly in the long term.
A PRACTITIONER’S SOLUTION FOR
EUROPE’S MIGRATION
CHALLENGE
An EU embassy-based system in third-party countries would reduce harm to migrants and refugees

By Kostas Karagatsos
I

n the past couple of decades, refugees and economic migrants originating from Africa and Asia have surged toward Greece and Europe. Going back to 1994, when I was an ensign of the Hellenic Coast Guard, I dealt with refugees and economic migrants on Lesvos Island, 10 nautical miles from the Turkish coast. Most of the mixed migratory flows consisted of economic migrants, not refugees. At that time, economic migrants were entering Greece illegally from Iran, Iraq, Palestine and Afghanistan. Refugees were largely Hutus and Tutsis, the two tribes in conflict in the Rwandan civil war.

The situation remained largely unchanged for several years, but after 2000, civil wars and political-religious persecutions boosted the number of refugees arriving. In 2011, after the Arab Spring and the start of the civil wars in Syria and Libya, the number of refugees targeting Europe sharply increased. Today, refugees represent a majority of these mixed migratory flows.

Migration as a phenomenon is not new; it has been ongoing for thousands of years and will likely continue for various reasons: civil wars, persecutions, poverty and natural catastrophes. But Europe must define what type of migration is acceptable and what isn’t. The real problem in Europe is illegal migration. We can’t make illegal migration legal, but we can better regulate migration and encourage the use of legal channels.

As we honor the 30th anniversary of the Schengen Agreement, signed in Luxembourg in 1985, Europe is debating the pact’s continued validity. I firmly believe that the problem is not Schengen; it’s a great accomplishment for Europe, and any thoughts of abolishing Schengen would simply be wrongheaded. The European Union, supported by Schengen, comprises an area of freedom, security and justice for European citizens and third-country nationals who enter legally.

After 21 years of dealing with migration and sea border management — much of that time in senior level positions in the Greek Ministry of Shipping and Maritime Affairs and at the EU border control agency Frontex — I have only one proposed solution to Europe’s current migration problem: Isolate refugees and economic migrants from organized criminal networks. This should be done by organizing asylum for refugees and residence permits for economic migrants in EU embassies in certain third countries. The key is to promote the use of legal, rather than illegal, channels for migration.

At first glance, this policy change seems ambiguous and risky and underestimates the dangers and challenges of implementation. For example, some would assert that it’s difficult to separate refugees from economic migrants. But we are doing it already in the EU with the help of screeners, debriefers and interpreters. Some would say we need to arrange for the appropriate infrastructure in EU embassies, as well as hire experienced staff to handle the submissions and documentation. This can be done with the cooperation of third countries and staffers with appropriate experience.

Additionally, there is concern that such a policy would create a “pull factor” for more refugees and economic migrants to travel to Europe. However, it can be argued that they are coming anyway, illegally and in the thousands. Furthermore, since Europe cannot integrate and accommodate half of Africa and Asia, this policy could not apply to all refugees and economic migrants willing to come to Europe. Therefore, criteria must be applied, such as those described in the European Agenda for Migration 2015 announced by the Commissioner on Migration and Internal Affairs Dimitrios Avramopoulos in May 2015.

THE FOLLOWING EXAMPLE SHOWS THE ADVANTAGES OF SUCH A POLICY:

A refugee from Mali flees his country to join his family in France. He must use organized criminal networks to reach an African departure country (e.g. Morocco, Algeria, Libya, or Egypt). When he arrives in the last-departure African country, the refugee will be forced to risk his life aboard an often unseaworthy vessel to make the perilous journey across the Mediterranean, and if he doesn’t die at sea, he will reach southern Europe (Spain, Italy or Greece).

Being a refugee destined for France, he will not ask for asylum in any of these three countries to avoid being stuck there as his claim is examined. Instead, he will again engage organized criminal networks and use their “facilitation services” to reach France. The refugee will again risk his life at sea, or even later at the “green (land) borders,” and be fully exploited by the organized criminal networks to reach his destination.
THERE IS A BETTER AND MUCH SAFER WAY. THE FOLLOWING IS WHAT THE JOURNEY WOULD LOOK LIKE USING MY PROPOSAL TO PROMOTE MIGRATION THROUGH LEGAL CHANNELS:

The refugee flees Mali and goes to the French Embassy in Dakar, Senegal, where he applies for asylum and waits until his claim is examined. If the refugee is granted asylum, he gets a one-way flight from Dakar to Paris. By doing so, he avoids being exploited by organized criminal networks outside or inside Europe and would not risk his life in a perilous sea voyage from Libya. This example could apply to Asian countries as well, although the details would differ.

The plight of refugees is a top priority for Europe now. The Mediterranean has become the deadliest sea in the world; during 2015, more than 3,000 migrants drowned there. The policy I propose could also apply to economic migrants but with one basic difference: the reinforcement of the EU return mechanism for overstayers or those who enter the EU illegally. This action should not give the impression that Europe “closes its doors” to economic migrants, but sends the message that migration has to be regulated so that such migrants enjoy the privileges of freedom, security and justice as Europeans do.

This policy will not yield immediate results; it will take time. But I am fully convinced that this is a strong message Europe must send. The exclusive use of suppression and law enforcement measures hasn’t dealt effectively with the migration problem.

We need to make great efforts to rescue refugees/economic migrants in danger at EU maritime borders where we cannot always react in time. It would make a powerful statement to end this revenue stream for organized criminal networks by steering refugees/migrants toward legal channels.

In the coming months, the issue of migration will test the unity and tolerance of Europe’s social fabric as well as the decisiveness, flexibility and political willingness of EU politicians and high-ranking officials to devise viable and enduring solutions. □
TERRORISM
Terrorists rarely exploit refugee networks to conduct attacks

By Dr. Sam Mullins, Marshall Center
In October 2014, RT news reported that “U.S. intelligence sources” had “encrypted locked communications of the caliphate’s leadership,” revealing that “Islamic State militants [were] planning to insert operatives into Western Europe disguised as refugees.” Fears of this alleged Islamic State (IS) Trojan horse strategy intensified in January 2015 after a self-confessed smuggler for the group, operating in Turkey, claimed to have sent 4,000 IS fighters to Europe by loading them onto cargo ships filled with refugees. The intent, he asserted, was to stage attacks in retaliation for coalition airstrikes. The following month, an article published online by another professor for IS member, apparently based in Libya, advocated infiltrating Europe using immigrant boats from North Africa.

As the number of refugees has continued to rise, so, too, have security concerns. By October 2015, the number of Syrian refugees was estimated at about 4 million, and although most of them are in Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon or Turkey, many thousands are now making their way to Europe. Three-quarters of a million migrants and refugees (about 40 percent from Syria) had already arrived, placing a tremendous strain on the nations concerned and further stoking fears of terrorism. Meanwhile, although the United States has so far pledged to take in just 10,000 Syrian refugees, a September 2015 U.S. Homeland Security Committee report expressed concern that those admitted to Europe will eventually gain passports that will enable easy trans-Atlantic travel, thus potentially allowing terrorist “sleeper cells” to enter the country.

Fears that terrorists are deliberately infiltrating refugee flows further escalated in the wake of the November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris. At least two of the attackers are believed to have entered the European Union via Greece, posing as asylum seekers. Given how closely these issues appear to have became enmeshed in the media and the minds of politicians, security professionals and the public, it is important to assess the threat of terrorism objectively as it relates to mass migration. This article begins with an examination of the historical track record, drawing on data from my book “Home-Grown” Jihad: Understanding Islamist Terrorism in the US and UK. This is followed by a discussion of more recent developments and implications for counterterrorism.

THE HISTORICAL RECORD

As Daniel Byman pointed out in an October 2015 Lawfare article, “[t]errorism and refugees share a long and painful history.” In the context of the West, the gradual rise of homegrown jihadist terrorism is at least partly tied to the growth of immigrant diaspora populations, many of whom have fled from conflict and persecution in their countries of origin. In the 1990s, following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, jihadists from the Middle East and North Africa, many of whom were unable to return home, took advantage of the situation to expand operations in Europe and North America. Influential jihadi preachers, fundraisers and facilitators were able to claim asylum and then use the opportunity to recruit and expand their networks within the host countries. Notable examples included Abu Qatada in London, Sheikh Anwar al-Shabaab in Milan, Abdul Rahman Ayub in Sydney and Mullah Krekar in Norway. Numerous jihadi terrorists affiliated with groups such as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and the Algerian Armed Islamic Group also came to the West posing as asylum seekers. For the most part, they served in various nonviolent support roles; however, some planned and conducted attacks. The most notorious of these was Ramzi Yousef, who arrived at JFK Airport in New York City in September 1992, promptly filed for asylum and was allowed into the U.S. Four months later, assisted by locally-recruited accomplices, Yousef fulfilled his aim of bombing the World Trade Center before fleeing the country.

Changes in the global jihadi landscape have been reflected to varying degrees in the militant activities of different diaspora populations in the West. For instance, since the end of the war in Algeria, fewer Algerians have become involved in jihadi terrorist activity in the United Kingdom. Yet, as Pakistan took on greater significance for groups like al-Qaeda and the Taliban, larger numbers of British-Pakistanis have turned to terrorism, and a similar pattern has unfolded in Canada. Meanwhile, in the U.S., about two-dozen Somalis, several of whom were refugees and at least four of whom became suicide bombers, returned to Africa to fight for al-Shabaab after the invasion of Somalia in 2006.

It is clear from the historical record that mass migration, and the flow of refugees in particular, have in a very broad sense facilitated the spread of jihadi terrorism, and at times have been directly exploited by terrorists seeking safe haven, new opportunities and access to intended targets. However, these observations, by themselves, are potentially misleading. To get a more accurate sense of the relative threat posed by the intersection of mass migration and terrorism, it is necessary to examine the number of “refugee terrorists” relative to the overall number of refugees and the overall number of terrorists.

Regarding the former, the example of Algerians in the U.K. is illustrative. Prior to the 1990s, relatively few Algerians lived in Britain, but by 2004 the estimated number had risen to between 25,000 and 30,000, according to a study by the Information Centre about Asylum and Refugees in the U.K. By comparison, just 44 Algerians are known, with some degree of certainty, to have been involved in terrorist activity in the U.K. between 1980 and 2013. This works out to less than 0.2 percent of the British-Algerian population. The 2010 U.S. Census estimated the country’s Somali-born population at about 85,000, yet only 36 were involved in terrorism up until 2013, working out to 0.04 percent. If these examples are representative, we can expect far less than 1 percent of the current wave of refugees to become involved in terrorism.

It is also apparent that the vast majority of jihadi terrorists operating in Western countries did not arrive as refugees. For example, data I have compiled on jihadi terrorism indicate that 15 percent of jihadi terrorists who became
active in the U.K. prior to 2013 arrived as asylum seekers or refugees. In the U.S., it is just 5 percent. In these cases, “refugee terrorists” are clearly the minority. Moreover, during the same time, 48 percent of British and 61 percent of American jihadis came from abroad, as opposed to being born in these countries. These disparities clearly demonstrate that claiming some form of refugee status is not a particularly common method of entry to the West for jihadi terrorists. Indeed, the historical record suggests that terrorists who come from abroad are more likely to enter a given country using a valid visa.

Furthermore, several future jihadi terrorists who did come to the U.K./U.S. as refugees originally did so as children traveling with their families or were otherwise legitimate claimants at the time they completed the application, only to radicalize later on. They did not, therefore, deliberately infiltrate mass migration flows to conduct acts of terrorism. In many respects they were homegrown terrorists. The Tsarnaev brothers, who had been living in the U.S. for 10 years before they bombed the 2013 Boston Marathon, are a case in point. In fact, as documented in my book, the average length of time spent living in the West for foreigners who became jihadi terrorists after 9/11 was 9.1 years in the U.K. and 10.7 years in the U.S. Although those who claimed asylum typically became involved in terrorism sooner than this — with respective averages of 1.8 and 5.3 years after entering the country — the fact remains that relatively few jihadi terrorists have entered the West disguised as asylum seekers with the pre-existing intention of committing acts of terrorism. Instead, they are far more likely to be radicalized while living in a Western country.

In sum, recent history suggests that although mass migration and terrorism are indeed connected, refugee terrorists are the exception to the rule. They have accounted for a small minority of jihadi terrorists operating in Western countries. Those who did come as refugees were not necessarily involved in terrorism before they arrived; cases such as Ramzi Yousef have been exceptionally rare, while the evidence for “sleeper cells” is close to nonexistent. The only clear example of this was Ali Saleh Kahal al-Marri, sent to the U.S. by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in September 2001 (although notably, he was in possession of a valid student visa). Altogether, refugee terrorists represent an infinitesimal fraction of the total number of refugees who have come to the West from jihadi conflict zones. Nevertheless, history can only tell us so much. It is therefore necessary to re-examine the threat in light of more recent developments.

**RECENT DEVELOPMENTS**

The current instability in Syria and Iraq and the rise of IS have undoubtedly been game-changers for the “global Salafi jihad,” with 30,000 jihadist foreign fighters from about 100 countries making their way to the conflict zone, coupled with a significant uptick in terrorist plots and attacks. When viewed in light of IS’ various threats against the West and the fact that many foreign fighters are already believed to have returned home, the inescapable conclusion is that the terrorism threat has increased substantially. However, the question here is whether the threat has increased as it relates specifically to the flow of refugees.

From May to October 2015, only three cases were reported in detail involving alleged jihadi terrorists “disguised” as refugees. However, the first of these cases now appears to have been discredited, while there are still questions relating to the remaining two. In May 2015, Italian police arrested Abdel Majid Touil, a young Moroccan suspected of playing a role in the attack on the Bardo National Museum in Tunis in March. Touil journeyed to Italy among a boat full of refugees from Libya and was tracked down and apprehended after his mother reported his passport missing, according to the *Guardian*. However, he was in Italy before the attack took place and the case against him appears to have collapsed, with Italian authorities dropping the investigation and refusing to extradite him due to lack of evidence.

**BY OCTOBER 2015, THREE-QUARTERS OF A MILLION MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES (ABOUT 40 PERCENT FROM SYRIA) HAD ALREADY ARRIVED, PLACING A TREMENDOUS STRAIN ON THE NATIONS CONCERNED AND FURTHER STOKING FEARS OF TERRORISM.** ~ The Telegraph

and almost as likely, if not more so, to be born there.

In August 2015, German police acting in collaboration with Spanish authorities arrested another Moroccan named Ayoub Moutchou at a residence for asylum seekers outside Stuttgart. As an alleged recruiter for IS who had been living in Spain, Moutchou was described by The Associated Press as “a key element in communications between the group’s members in Iraq, Syria and Turkey and sympathizers in Europe, [who] had begun making contacts aimed at carrying out attacks.” However, it has not been confirmed that Moutchou originally entered Europe along with refugees or that he personally held refugee status. The third case involved a Tunisian named Mehdi Ben Nasr, who had been convicted of terrorism offenses in Italy and was deported to his native country using a valid visa.
to re-enter the country on a migrant boat, which landed at Lampedusa on October 4, 2015, but was identified and expelled a week later. His case is perhaps the clearest example of a refugee terrorist to date, although his reasons for returning to Italy are unclear and, in any case, he was unsuccessful.

In addition to these cases, a number of prominent officials have asserted that jihadists are indeed posing as refugees to enter Europe. For instance, in July 2015, Michèle Coninsx, the EU’s top prosecutor, told the press that she had received information that migrant boats to Europe were carrying IS fighters as well as refugees. More recently, The Telegraph reported that German authorities are investigating 10 cases of refugees accused of taking part in terrorism or war crimes. Refugees suspected of ties to terrorism have since been arrested in Austria, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, the Netherlands and Finland, while another was shot dead during an attempted attack in France. However, the most damning evidence so far is the aforementioned discovery that two or more of the Paris attackers came to Europe disguised as refugees. If this is verified, it would seem our worst fears have become reality. Yet, we should not let the gravity of an incident shape our understanding of the probabilities involved. The evidence thus far is summarized in the table below.

**The “Refugee Terrorist” Threat: Historical and Contemporary Examples**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of U.K.-Algerian terrorists (by 2013)</th>
<th>Number of Algerians in the U.K.</th>
<th>U.K.-Algerian terrorist proportion to population</th>
<th>Number of U.S.-Somali terrorists (by 2013)</th>
<th>Number of Somalis in the U.S.</th>
<th>U.S.-Somali terrorist proportion to population</th>
<th>Number of refugee terrorists (by December 2015)</th>
<th>Number of refugees in Europe (by December 2015)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>44</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>85,000</td>
<td>0.004%</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1 million</td>
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While hardly voluminous, recent examples seem to confirm that some jihadi terrorists are exploiting the current mass migration crisis to enter or move around within Europe, and of course the consequences of this may be dire. Nevertheless, in the context of now more than 1 million migrants, many from Syria and other places of concern, the number of refugee terrorists discovered so far has been minimal. To further gauge the level of threat, it is useful to examine the recent wave of jihadist terrorism plots and attacks in the West. According to Thomas Hegghammer and Petter Nesser, writing in *Perspectives on Terrorism*, from 2011 to June 2015 there were 69 such plots, 30 of which were inspired by or in a very small number of cases linked to IS, and 19 of which (28 percent) were executed. More revealingly, just 16 plots (23 percent) involved foreign fighters and only 11 of these individuals had been to Syria, a “blowback rate” of just 0.3 percent (1 of 360) of the estimated 4,000 Europeans who have gone to the region. While the assault on Paris in November 2015 demonstrated the potential impact such attacks can have, it has not drastically altered the quantitative assessment.

Therefore, although these figures are not the final word on the subject and do not pertain to refugees specifically, they do tell us that, to date, of the hundreds of European foreign fighters who have returned from Syria and Iraq, relatively few have been involved in planning or conducting terrorist attacks at home. In fact, the quantitatively greater threat has come from radicalized groups and individuals who have not experienced training or combat overseas. The terrorism threat associated with returning foreign fighters disguised as refugees or otherwise is undoubtedly greater in terms of potential impact; however, it is of relatively low probability, at least in the short-term.

Given that domestic jihadi terrorists have been responsible for the majority of recent plots in the West, an arguably more likely scenario is that refugees from Syria and elsewhere will be targeted for recruitment by Western extremists after they arrive, rather than traveling with the pre-existing intention of committing acts of terrorism. Indeed, Holger Münch, head of the German Federal Police, told The Telegraph that he had received reports of “around 40 attempts at contact from Salafists who wanted to recruit young refugees.” Emphasizing the potential risk, he further elaborated that there is a danger “that young men whose hopes are not fulfilled in Germany will eventually join Salafist groups, get taken in by their ideologies, become radicalized and commit violent acts.”

**Reasons Not to Overreact**

Although by no means inevitable, refugee populations may be particularly vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment to terrorism, given their inherently marginalized and difficult situation. Sadly, and somewhat ironically, the level of risk is being exacerbated by right-wing extremists who are responsible for an increasing number of violent attacks against refugees. Such actions play directly into the “us versus them” narrative promoted by jihadist recruiters, who will be only too happy to receive the victims with open arms. As Byman succinctly puts it, the “danger is that radicalized European Muslims will transform the Syrian refugee community into a more violent one over time.”

It seems that IS is more concerned that refugees will become successfully integrated into life in the West. This was made abundantly clear in September 2015, when the group released 14 videos over three days warning Muslim populations not to emigrate to the *Dar al-Harb* (“land of war” or disbelief), instead urging them to stay and join the...
“caliphate.” As Aaron Zelin has pointed out, “the migrant flow [to Europe] is anathema to ISIS, undermining the group’s message that its self-styled caliphate is a refuge.” Furthermore, IS is chiefly concerned with events inside their territory. Given how important sheer manpower is to their ability to take and hold ground, why would IS send away skilled fighters in large numbers to carry out attacks that can be left to sympathizers who are already in the West, at no cost to the organization? Indeed, as they come under increasing pressure, it appears that IS has established specialist units to prevent and deter potential deserters, according to an October 2015 article in The Telegraph. And, according to multiple news sources, it seems they are becoming increasingly reliant on the recruitment of child soldiers, as well as gradually accepting female combat roles.

It would also make little sense for terrorists to deliberately draw attention to tactics that are clearly best kept secret. The case of the IS smuggler interviewed in January is telling. Not only had he apparently received permission to disclose his activities to the press, but also claimed to have sent an unfeasibly large number of fighters to the West. It is clearly in IS’ interests to exaggerate the threat associated with refugees for multiple reasons, not the least of which is that it magnifies its own perceived reach and capability, increases Western opposition toward accepting refugees and enables them to present the caliphate as an attractive alternative. All of this calls into question the credibility of the Trojan horse strategy, given that IS’ No. 1 priority seems to be to attract people to its territory, rather than send them away.

Of course, the November 2015 attacks in Paris, for which IS has claimed responsibility, potentially weaken this line of argument. As noted above, prior to November, most plots or attacks attributed to IS were inspired by the group rather than directly supported or controlled by them. The Paris attacks, if indeed directed by IS, seem to represent a shift in strategy indicating a greater willingness to invest resources toward attacking the West. In other words, IS now seems to be putting its money where its mouth is. Even so, this does not alter the fact that the vast majority of refugees are simply not terrorists. Even if every single IS fighter (perhaps as many as 30,000 according to some estimates) were to come to the West disguised as refugees, they would represent little more than 4 percent of recent migrants to Europe. Such a scenario is less than plausible.
A child refugee walks through a camp at the Slovenian-Austrian border in October 2015. After registering migrants, Slovenia passes them on to Austria, where they continue to Germany or other Western European countries. EPA
Despite the hysteria about IS infiltrating refugee populations, the evidence so far has been scant, and there is ample reason to believe that jihadists and right-wing politicians alike are exaggerating the threat to further their own interests. The greater danger appears to be the potential radicalization and recruitment to terrorism of small numbers of refugees over the mid- to long-term (i.e., after they have arrived), which may be facilitated by Western-based jihadists and exacerbated by the actions of right-wing extremists. This is not to say that no jihadi terrorists will take advantage of the current crisis to slip undetected into the West. But such cases are likely to remain relatively rare.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR COUNTERTERRORISM**

Both historical and more recent events clearly demonstrate that refugees coming from jihadi conflict zones are not primarily a concern for counterterrorism and are far more appropriately viewed as humanitarian, economic and political challenges. Terrorists in this context are very much the proverbial needle in a haystack. However, this does not mean they can be ignored. The screening of refugees upon arrival in the EU, though not entirely ineffective, remains woefully inadequate. Their transit from countries like Greece and Italy to Germany or elsewhere is often chaotic and poorly managed, and recipient nations are struggling to provide accommodation and other basic services. From a counterterrorism perspective, there is clearly a need to improve the collection, processing and sharing of refugee information upon their arrival. For example, the above mentioned Homeland Security Committee report notes the need to improve capabilities for checking fraudulent passports and for front-line access to Interpol databases. The subsequent transit and resettlement of refugees must also be monitored more effectively. However, despite some progress, the sheer scale of the crisis and limitations in resources and funding — not to mention unproductive bickering between nations — mean there are no obvious near-term solutions for the practical, technological and financial difficulties involved.

Given this reality, counterterrorism resources are perhaps best invested in developing human intelligence sources within smuggling networks in source or “hub” countries such as Turkey, as well as at key reception and transit points within Europe where organized criminals and extremists are known to operate. Sharing such intelligence between relevant nations and agencies will enhance the chances of detecting potential terrorists. Unfortunately, information sharing on these issues, though improved, remains a perennial challenge. For instance, the closest thing to a global foreign fighter database that exists is maintained by Interpol, but according to the Homeland Security Committee, as of September 2015, it included just 5,000 names from an estimated 25,000-30,000 suspects worldwide. Improved information sharing is therefore arguably the greatest and most fundamental counterterrorism priority.

Another task for security services relates to the resettlement of refugees. As noted above, they may be particularly vulnerable to radicalization, and European extremists have already attempted to recruit them. Monitoring and disrupting these activities is vital. Likewise, authorities must maintain a close eye on right-wing extremists, allocate sufficient resources to protect refugees from attacks and aggressively pursue prosecutions where appropriate. Combined, these measures will help reduce the risk of radicalization and terrorist recruitment within host nations, particularly where there is efficient short- and long-term provision of social, health, information and other services that are necessary for resettlement and reintegration.

Although counterterrorism authorities clearly have a role to play in handling the influx of refugees to the West, it must be reiterated that this is not primarily a counterterrorism problem. It is crucial that this is communicated effectively to all relevant stakeholders, including politicians, policymakers, security officials, and not least of all, the media and the public at large. Gaining a more accurate understanding of the links — or relative lack thereof — between mass migration and terrorism in the West will help inform decision-makers while simultaneously defusing fearmongering that is making the situation worse.

Finally, given that jihadi terrorists are generally not entering the West disguised as refugees, we must gain a more systematic understanding of how they are doing so. Many, it seems, are using legitimate passports. If indeed this is the case, it speaks yet again to the need for more effective information sharing on terrorism suspects, monitoring the travel of Western citizens, canceling travel documents when necessary and strengthening border controls, all balanced against the need to protect civil liberties.

The good news is that despite many gaps in Western security and a significant increase in jihadi terrorism in recent years, the success rate in countering the threat remains impressive. As alluded to earlier, foreign fighters are far more likely to be known to security services compared to “freelance” or “lone actor” terrorists, who are relatively isolated from broader extremist networks. And, although such individuals have been responsible for the majority of attacks in the West, they are also generally lacking in capability. No one should be complacent, yet we should not forget that contrary to popular belief, the odds are ultimately stacked in our favor, not that of the terrorists.

**IN SUM, RECENT HISTORY SUGGESTS THAT ALTHOUGH MASS MIGRATION AND TERRORISM ARE INDEED CONNECTED, REFUGEE TERRORISTS ARE THE EXCEPTION TO THE RULE.**
In the autumn of 2015, the Marshall Center asked several alumni to share short, personal commentaries about how the migration challenge has played out in their countries. Views of the alumni — Ana Breben of Romania, retired Rear Adm. Ivica Tolić of Croatia, Maj. Bassem Shaaban of Lebanon, and Lt. Cmdr. Ilir Čobo of Albania — are featured. Their observations show that each country has been impacted differently by migrants. Refugees and displaced people make up a large percentage of people living in Lebanon, while Romania has remained largely immune to the crisis. Each of the four alumni recommends steps to meet the challenges ahead. A rough consensus emerges, including the need for a comprehensive approach with international cooperation and coordination. In terms of striking the right balance between security and human rights, all acknowledge the difficulty and a few reveal which, in their estimation, demands precedence. Here are Marshall Center alumni in their own words:
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At the time of writing, in November 2015, Romania was not a destination country for migrants. It was not even a transit country. In fact, it has found itself in the special position where all major transit routes bypass it. But that does not mean Romanians are not aware of the acute migration challenge confronting most of our neighbors. People see and care about the human tragedies, but still somehow don’t feel directly affected. Even so, most are asking the same question as every other European: How much bigger could this get? Migration has always been a continuous and dynamic phenomenon, and sometimes it leads to crises. And you don’t have to be a specialist to understand that what is happening now might only be the beginning of a bigger influx of people coming from unstable regions neighboring Europe.

While not a destination or transit country, Romania has been a source country of migrants for some time. Romania suffered from a rough transition to a market economy, and the associated problems drove significant waves of citizens towards more developed countries. According to a Migration Policy Institute report, which draws on United Nations data, Romania is 15th in the world in terms of migrants’ country of origin (it is 108th in terms of migrants’ country of destination). Despite this, now seems to be a time when Romanians should pay attention to a possible reversal of paradigm, as masses of people on the move are gathering near our borders. Neighboring countries are starting to take drastic measures against this flow of people, and the risk of illegal crossings at Romanian borders is getting higher. Authorities should take steps to prepare, in addition to the traditional focus on border control. As it is a measure to gain Schengen accession, Romania is technically prepared to secure its borders.

The Romanian government has already taken some steps. It has been supporting countries on the “migration trail” such as offering humanitarian aid to Serbia, sending financial help to countries neighboring Syria, and sending police specialists to take part in joint investigation teams. The government has also worked on improving its legal framework. In fact, those migrants who manage to get legal status enjoy the same social and economic rights as all Romanian citizens, although they are drastically restricted in political and some civil areas. But many of them have real linguistic barriers. Romanian is an uncommon language, and some migrants have not even mastered English. And there are financial problems; state financial aid is very low, and an increase in the number of migrants would put great pressure on the social security system. They also have difficulties with bureaucracy and trouble accessing information about their rights. Unless they’ve had prior contact with Romania, most migrants seem to dream of moving to a more prosperous country.

Those migrants who remain in Romania usually say they find a friendly environment and complain about the same things the natives do. Surveys show that until November 2015, Romanians were not fearful of migration. Still, we need to take into consideration that migrants make up under one percent of the total population.

Romania’s next step should be to invest in education. To create unity, education is the right place to start. In fact, one of the main concerns of the few migrants in the country is the difficulty of learning Romanian if they are not lucky enough to live in a major university city. And without cultural unity, there is a risk of tension when people share the same space.

Over the long-term, integrating migrants might be a necessity for all European countries, including my own, and it only leads to more diversity and tolerance. But for that to happen smoothly, it is necessary for each country to establish fair and efficient integration policies and procedures, offer economic opportunities, and send a firm message against any form of extremism. As recent events have demonstrated, border security is not enough.
Human solidarity and humanitarian support are inherent to the Croatian people. We have shown that with our reception of refugees and migrants on several occasions. For example, during the 1990s, Croatia received more than 500,000 refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina, of which the largest number were Bosnian Muslims. All of them were temporarily accommodated in hotels on the Adriatic coast. They were recorded at the border, and illegal entry into Croatia’s territory was forbidden. At the same time, Croatia took care of about 280,000 of its citizens who were internally displaced, as well as 30,000 Croat refugees expelled from Serbia. This crisis took place during war, and those refugees and internally displaced people were at great risk of losing their lives.

Today, conflicts in North Africa and the Middle East have caused catastrophic destruction and damage. Migrants and refugees, seeing no visible termination of the conflicts on the horizon, have started to move toward Europe. They are organized and determined in their efforts to reach the wealthiest European Union countries. Earlier this year, the main migration route from Serbia led migrants to Hungary. Representatives of Croatian institutions said that Croatia was prepared and ready to receive migrants, if need be. This assertion of readiness proved inaccurate. In mid-September, after the border closed between Hungary and Serbia, more than 4,000 migrants per day were arriving in Croatia. Tovarnik, a small Croatian village near the border with Serbia, was flooded with migrants. It did not have any organized reception center or camp facilities with sufficient capacity. Migrants stayed at the railway station and on the streets. Improvised solutions were found but the scope of the crisis was underestimated and required more comprehensive preparation. At the time of writing (mid-October 2015), more than 160,000 migrants had passed through Croatia.

The fact that Croatia is not the final destination of the migrants at this point is to our advantage. However, Croatia must foresee that this may end. It remains possible, and moderately likely, that Germany will stop receiving migrants, and Hungary, Austria and Slovenia will close their borders. In such a case, what should Croatia do? We must also consider what Croatia should do if Germany and other EU countries return migrants who were registered here. This has been announced as an option. Finally, we must ask whether Croatia should accept the EU quota for asylum seekers, given the country’s fragile economic situation, large number of unemployed, and the problems of society in general that may have a negative impact on the “integration and employment” process.

The migrant challenge is not only a Croatian problem, and it has shown that the EU, as an entity, works only in theory. When faced with this challenge, the EU has been unable to find a
common solution. At the time of writing, there had been no specific measures to address the crisis, and each member state has been taking an individual approach. The external border of the EU does not exist; there is no common security and defense policy, no common foreign policy, and no common policy toward migrants and asylum seekers. The combined joint naval forces of the EU in the Mediterranean are conducting solely search and rescue operations and are not protecting Europe’s external borders or implementing the Law of the Sea.

This approach motivates the migrants and does not stop their uncontrolled flow into Europe. Such practices and procedures, the absolute permeability of the external borders of the EU, the unimpeded passage through member states, and the “welcome policy” of some member states encourage migrants to risk moving to the EU. It is absurd that in some EU states the police are escorting the migrants and directing them to illegal border crossing points.

The EU is divided on the issue of migrants, and relationships among member states are fraying as a result. Each state sees the problem from its own perspective and is approaching it in accordance with national interests and policies. Some states see the crisis as primarily a security issue, while others see it primarily as a humanitarian one. The answer is certainly somewhere in between. We should not neglect the security aspect of migration issues but also need to remain humanitarian-minded. Laws and regulations related to migration policy and asylum cannot be ignored. The movement of migrants to their final destination has to be controlled and comply with international and national laws. Allowing the abuse of border crossings by individual states is reckless and could be dangerous.

The fundamental issues of the migrant crisis will have to be resolved beyond the EU’s external borders, at the origins of the crisis or as close to the origins as possible. There must be a common, long-term strategy for stabilization of the crisis areas of the Middle East and North Africa. The stabilization strategy must be comprehensive, leveraging political, diplomatic, economic and security tools. The EU must refrain from imposing solutions and must recognize that a single solution will not be applicable in all situations and scenarios. Countries neighboring the conflict areas must be helped as well.

In the short term, the inflows to Europe via the Mediterranean and Balkan routes will continue. In response, the EU must adopt a common strategy to address the migrant crisis. More decisive measures should be taken to protect the EU’s external borders. The joint force of the naval and police forces should switch its focus from search and rescue operations to protecting the EU’s external borders. All EU member states should comply with the Dublin Protocol. They should deny illegal border crossings and permit border crossings only at official border crossing points, in accordance with applicable procedures and in acceptable numbers. The same commitments should be requested from candidate countries for EU accession and countries with aspirations to become EU members. The EU must prioritize and solve the challenges of how to enhance its internal decision-making system, efficiency of administration, and common security and defense policies. European society has been divided over the migrant challenge, and consideration should be given to how to repair the damage.

At the national level, deportation proceedings should be activated against all migrants who have no grounds to seek asylum or refugee status. For those who have refugee status, they should be provided accommodations in refugee camps as a temporary solution until conditions for their return are met, or they should be transited to countries that will allow their permanent settlement. Each member state should organize task forces for migrant crisis response, capable of running 24/7 operations. The task forces should have representatives from the ministries of interior, defense, justice, finance, health, transportation and communications and also include some nongovernmental organizations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Events in Croatia over the past few months have shown the need to improve our assessment tools, including some institutional execution capabilities. Also, we have to improve coordination at the national level, with neighboring countries and at the EU level. This will require reorganization of the governmental system to enhance the decision-making process (fast-track decision-making), interagency collaboration and real-time information exchange.

Humanity and solidarity are positive principles that rest at the heart of European civilization. However, they should not be used to question the existing order, ignore legal obligations and suspend procedures.
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The Republic of Lebanon is one of the smallest countries in the Middle East and in the entire Arab world. The Lebanese population also is one of the smallest, at close to 6 million. In spite of its size, the Lebanese community is unique in the Arab world for containing 19 ethnicities.

Since its independence in 1943, Lebanon has hosted refugees of various nationalities — mainly Armenians, Kurds and Palestinians. By the beginning of the 21st century, refugees also arrived from Iraq and especially Syria.

The situation in Lebanon is growing more critical because of instability in the Middle East. This instability is widening and its influence is touching more countries in the region.

Since February 2011, a bloody struggle has been taking place in Syria, causing mass displacements of Syrians from the hot zones to neighboring countries. The official Lebanese position was “No Interference,” and the country took measures to allow only civilians to cross its borders. If a fighter wants to cross, he or she must disarm and abandon all military activities.

The Lebanese authorities have been dealing with displaced Syrians on a humanitarian basis, supplying them with basic needs, such as food, medical services, educational services and utilities. Most importantly, Lebanon has provided them with a safe place to live. But the conflict in Syria has persisted beyond expectations, causing hundreds of thousands of displaced people to spread all over Lebanon, adapting to the new situation and making a living where they now reside.

The number of displaced Syrians in Lebanon is increasing year by year, and the following chart clearly shows this rise:

The numbers above were assembled by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, but they do not include those who crossed the borders illegally and did not register as displaced. By the end of September 2015, this augmented number of refugees and displaced people represented a large percentage of the
Lebanese population. Hosting such a large number of foreigners normally creates challenges, if not threats, to the hosting society. Lebanon is experiencing this.

These huge numbers are beyond the capacity of the Lebanese authorities to manage. The international community has played a supportive role, but despite all the donations and aid, the gap between what has been provided and what is needed is still wide.

The main concern is how to maintain stability while respecting human rights. Early on, Lebanon faced several security incidents and a significant increase in crime, including suicide bombings, murder and robbery. Overall, however, the security situation stayed under control. This changed on August 2, 2014, when terrorists of the Al-Nusra Front and ISIS attacked the border town of Arsal, 120 kilometers from Beirut. Terrorists entered the town and killed civilians. They also kidnapped members of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the Internal Security Forces (ISF).

Many of the attackers crossed the Lebanese-Syrian border, but most came from Syrian displacement locations within Lebanon itself. The LAF launched a rapid counterattack and drew the terrorists out of town to the border area, but the price was heavy with 19 killed and 28 kidnapped.

In spite of this high price, not a single act of revenge occurred. The LAF and the ISF continued practicing their duties normally with one single concern: “Stability must be restored and maintained to protect all residents, including the displaced Syrians.” For this purpose, the LAF has put more effort into keeping the terrorists away from the displaced civilian Syrians by:

- Closing all illegal crossings on the Lebanese-Syrian border.
- Conducting continuous search operations in the gathering locations, seeking wanted individuals and arms.
- Keeping an eye on suspicious intentions.

On the other hand, the LAF has considered the basic needs of the displaced Syrians and tried to support them under the purview of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC). The CIMIC Directorate, operating under the LAF Army Staff for Operations, made great efforts to build a good relationship with the displaced, especially those who live in gathering places around Arsal.

CIMIC has provided the displaced with food rations, winter clothes for the children, and books and stationery for students. CIMIC has also provided medical equipment to the Ministry of Social Affairs to benefit the displaced and helped deliver aid in extreme weather, such as the Alexa storm of 2013. This positive relationship has helped maintain order at refugee gathering locations without the use of force.

To control the number of displaced Syrians and distinguish the real displaced from the fake ones, the Lebanese government, since June 2014, has decided that any Syrian who returns to Syria cannot re-enter Lebanon as a displaced person. Instead, he or she can only re-enter as a visitor and must clearly state the purpose of the visit with all necessary legal documents.

In spite of its small size, population and limited resources, Lebanon will continue to defend freedom and human rights without neglecting internal stability. According to the famous statement of Pope John Paul II: “Lebanon is more than a country; it is a message.” ☭
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The issue of migration, and particularly that of Syrian migration, is on the agenda of Western Balkan countries. Macedonia, Serbia and Albania are affected by the large migratory wave from the Middle East, and the triangle among these countries remains the main transit area for migrants taking the eastern route to Europe. Public debate has been quite emotional, running the gamut from solidarity to rants driven by a self-protection instinct.

Although still not de jure, the Western Balkans region is an integral part of the historical, geographical, social and cultural reality of Europe. The difficulties and challenges facing the Western Balkans and EU countries as a result of mass migration are fundamentally the same. However, problems in this part of Europe are more complex. Regional stability has often faltered, and conflicts with territorial, nationalist and racist origins have erupted. Combined with ethnic, social, political and economic issues, these conflicts have continuously produced flows toward Europe, transforming the Western Balkan countries into a permanent source of migration. There have also been noteworthy migrant flows between countries in the region. During the conflict in Kosovo in 1999, for instance, Albania and Macedonia were impacted; about 800,000
On its own soil, Europe should integrate migrants, who represent real potential for development. At the same time, Europe must reinforce the instruments of border control. Above all, Europe has to get involved for the definitive elimination of terrorist threats.

Ethnic Albanians from Kosovo went to Albania while thousands more went to Macedonia.

Countries in the Western Balkans have concurrent, multiple roles when it comes to migration: They are transit countries as well as host and source countries. This has given them experience managing the humanitarian crises and problems that come with migratory flows. Despite the systemic weaknesses of these countries, the philosophy and instruments adapted by the region have proven to be relatively effective in countering threats to security as well as guaranteeing human rights.

At the moment, the number of Syrian refugees in the Western Balkans is still manageable and the regional security situation cannot yet be considered vulnerable. The increasing tendency to interrupt this flow with walls and wire fences is neither efficient nor humane. The force of desperation driving these migrants cannot be stopped by wire fences or walls. To discourage the movement of people without providing a substantial solution is simply killing hope, faith and freedom, and does not guarantee security. This degradation of the already-chaotic situation makes the countries affected vulnerable to xenophobia, organized crime and terrorism. The only beneficiaries of a blockade of the migrants are the traffickers who exploit every opportunity for profit, while the migrants themselves experience additional difficulties.

Migration is not new, and it will not go away so long as there are discrepancies in welfare and security across countries and societies. Managing the migration phenomenon will be one of the most demanding challenges that lie ahead. To better deal with this reality, which sooner or later could involve all of Europe geographically and politically, the causes and consequences of migration should be treated and managed. There needs to be a durable solution involving Europe as well as countries of origin.

European countries have sufficient energy, tools, assets and the appropriate experience to effectively manage the crisis. However, the implementation of an effective and strategic approach is above all a political issue. Policy should be inspired by solidarity and the philosophy and basic values of the EU. Europe must assume its responsibilities and become the decisive factor in solving the problems of the Islamic world. Bridges of trust and collaboration between civilizations should be rebuilt, and peace should be restored in the Middle East. Europe should make great efforts to ensure that Muslims, wherever they come from, may find a future in their homelands. On its own soil, Europe should integrate migrants, who represent real potential for development. At the same time, Europe must reinforce the instruments of border control. Above all, Europe has to get involved for the definitive elimination of terrorist threats.

Coordination among concerned countries of the Western Balkans and with international stakeholders is needed. The Balkan states are a natural part of the European continent. Cooperation is needed to unify political will and synchronize the instruments of state security. Albania, Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro and Macedonia have the obligation to deepen their partnership to guarantee common development on a European course. These countries must transform from being consumers of security into producers of security. Isn’t this a key criterion for integrating the region into the EU?

The challenge of balancing security and human rights is daunting, but many successful leaders have said: “We have been in a situation where we had two paths to choose between. We chose the most difficult path, and it was also the right one!” This is exactly what must happen today. Migrants need humane treatment, and this should be a priority of the entire civilized world.
Refugees leap from a half-sunken catamaran as it arrives on the Greek island of Lesvos in October 2015. Thousands have died making perilous journeys across the Mediterranean Sea on overcrowded boats. REUTERS
Migrant Smuggling

Success will require addressing the formidable drivers of irregular migration

By Rear Adm. (Ret.) Alberto Cervone

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tates see irregular migration as a threat, but believe efforts to stem the flow should focus on those who profit from human smuggling. Repressing this crime is imperative, but the adaptable, elusive and resilient smuggling networks are hard to disrupt because they are desperately needed by irregular migrants. Smugglers are opportunistic exploiters of this strong and obstinate demand, not its creators. The securitization of migration and the severe criminalization of migrant smuggling are useful to assert state control, but they are insufficient, produce perilous unintended consequences and turn attention away from refugees. The current migration emergency in Europe shows that a reduced price per person smuggled has boosted migrant flows and confirms that the problem of unauthorized migration can only be solved through comprehensive migration policies.

NATURE OF MIGRANT SMUGGLING

Migrant smuggling is the for-profit facilitation of unauthorized cross-border movement of economic migrants or asylum seekers. In the current political and media dialogue, it is often presented as one of the “dark sides” of modern globalization, but it has always existed. Helping people circumvent migration barriers, for money, has historically been portrayed as a morally acceptable or even meritorious endeavor. There have been many well-respected, unauthorized transfers of people across international borders for profit. Examples include Danish fishermen who accepted money to help Jews escape Nazi persecution during World War II; Chinese smugglers who moved workers needed by the United States economy but banned by the Chinese Exclusion Act, through Canada in the early 20th century; and Soviet dissidents who were smuggled to the West during the Cold War. Perception of migrant smuggling is much less favorable now. Independent of the type of migrants involved, politicians and the public in destination countries have generally become negative, even belligerent,
Migrant smuggling exists because more people wish to migrate than potential receiving countries will legally admit. This unrealized aspiration is reflected in a 2011 study conducted by the International Organization for Migration and Gallup polling, which found that roughly 630 million of the world’s adults desire to move to another country permanently, while only a few million people in the world are permitted to migrate legally each year.

Immigration is often unwanted by receiving countries, even when it is required for economic and demographic reasons or mandated by humanitarian obligations. Countries generally try to limit work visas, family reunifications, resettlement of refugees and asylum concessions, especially when the people involved are ethnically and culturally different from the native population. To restrict unwanted arrivals, nations build legal, procedural and physical barriers that make illegal border crossing difficult. This pushes would-be migrants, who are strongly motivated and don’t have alternatives, to resort to criminal help to circumvent barriers and achieve illegally what they could not legally. As countries intensify border control, smugglers become increasingly necessary, and the conflict between the two contenders escalates, with negative consequences such as accidents and migrant deaths, increased smuggling fees and a shift of the trade to more organized and sophisticated criminal groups.

Mafia-like, hierarchically structured criminal organizations do not dominate the migrant smuggling world. Complex criminal networks coexist with semi-legal ones. Smugglers are often ordinary people with respected roles in their communities. They frequently have a presentable facade, such as a normal commercial activity, and only engage in the illegal business part time. Smuggling organizations usually follow the enterprise model and are loose, horizontal networks of small groups or individuals. They are parts of a process, rather than of a single organization. A multitude of competing providers offers highly differentiated services to match the varied needs of clients. These networks are adaptable and constantly modify routes and methods. They consequently have no longevity, and groups can easily dissolve and regenerate, making them difficult to disrupt.

Migrant smugglers often have the high level of technical and legal specialization needed to develop new techniques and methodologies to counter increasing government efforts. They adopt an incredible range of solutions to exploit normative loopholes and weaknesses in border security. Some smugglers produce falsified documents or specialize in teaching asylum seekers to tell credible fabricated stories; some organize false tourist groups, weddings of convenience and opportunistic work contracts, while others provide auxiliary services. This illegal activity could not prosper without widespread corruption of state officials who look the other way in exchange for money or even openly extort money from migrants. In ungoverned or weakly governed areas, protection or extortion money may have to be paid to local militias.

Smuggled migrants are usually young, male and single, but women are increasingly participating, and entire families are frequently within the flow of Syrian refugees. Needing to pay high smuggling fees, migrants are often middle class and educated, or at least skilled workers, with specializations in modern technologies in demand in transit countries, where they often need to work to earn money to continue their journey. They don’t see themselves or the smugglers as outlaws — to the contrary. They are convinced they have a legitimate right to try to improve their lives. This attitude toward immigration rules, and rules in general, derives from their experiences in their countries of origin, where rules are often arbitrary and used to impose authoritarian dominance in violation of their basic rights. Violating such rules is a matter of survival, not a demonstration of delinquency or anti-social behavior, and therefore seems irrelevant to them. Also, they are aware of a de facto tolerance of illegal entry and stay in many receiving countries.

SCOPE, PROFITS AND FEES
Because migrant smuggling is a clandestine activity, precise assessments of its scope are not available. However, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reports that migrant smuggling is continuously expanding. The practice exists in most of the world, but the business is most profitable in the developed countries of North America, Europe and Oceania. The director of the European Police Office (EUROPOL) told The New York Times in November 2015 that an estimated 30,000 people were involved in migrant smuggling to European Union countries in 2014, with 80 percent of irregular migration to Europe facilitated by smugglers or criminal groups.

The UNODC estimated the annual profit of human smuggling in its largest market, from Mexico to the United States, to be $6.6 billion. Until the recent surge, migrant smuggling to Europe was much less profitable. But, according to Stephen Castles, Hein de Haas and Mark J. Miller in their 2013 book The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World, from 1997 to 2003 when the average flow of irregular migrants was 300,000 per year, it still produced $300 million annually only from Turkey to the EU. And in a May 2015 policy brief, the Global Initiative against Organized Crime estimated that the current North African irregular migrant trade is worth $255 million to $323 million per year. According to a report released by
EUROPOL in February 2016, in 2015 alone, migrant smuggling to EU countries earned criminals an estimated 3 billion to 6 billion euros, set to double or triple in the following year if the scale of the migration crisis persisted, making it the fastest growing criminal activity in Europe.

In September 2015, The Washington Post reported that the main reason for the huge surge in migrant numbers, and for the route to Europe shifting from the central Mediterranean to the Balkans, is the huge cost reduction to use the latter, compared to the more dangerous and expensive route through Libya. The shift was especially important for Syrians, who now pay $2,000 to $3,000 (most of it just to cross Turkey and land in Greece) instead of the $5,000 to $6,000 required to reach Libya and take a boat to Italy.

The central Mediterranean route is now used mainly by Sub-Saharan Africans, who pay $800 to $1,000 per person to cross Libya and another $1,500 to $1,900 for the boat trip across the Mediterranean, according to a Global Initiative Against Organized Crime report. That’s in addition to smuggling fees to reach Libya and frequent ransoms or extortion money paid to bandits and corrupt officials along the way. Migrants who can pay more don’t have to risk their lives on rickety boats but instead travel by air by counterfeited documents that cost $6,000 to $10,000 to reach Europe from Sub-Saharan Africa.

An Italian police investigation completed in November 2015 provides a good example of a system to smuggle migrants to Europe. According to the Italian news agency Adnkronos, 500 Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis paid 15,000 euros each to enter Italy with work visas, produced with the complicity of circuses that purportedly hired them. A range of options is available to those who cannot pay much but are ready to risk severe conditions, even death or being stranded in remote and inhospitable foreign lands. For example, using one such cheap and risky option, dozens suffocated in the hold of a Libyan ship in the Mediterranean in August 2015. Smuggling fees are seldom paid upfront. Generally they are paid to a third party that holds the money until the crossing is achieved, forcing smugglers to take on expenses in anticipation of future income and resulting in economic risks.

**HIGH DEMAND AND UNEXPECTED EFFECTS**

Migrant smuggling is demand driven, and has an important, even vital, humanitarian function in cases of genuine asylum seekers. Large numbers of asylum seekers arriving in the EU are granted a form of international protection, as happened to 47 percent of the 390,000 people who received first instance decisions in 2014, according to a July 2015 report from the European Asylum Support Office. This means roughly 183,000 people avoided abuses, violence or even death, which would not have been possible without the contribution of smugglers acting in self-interest and in violation of immigration rules, but becoming instrumental to the safety and even survival of many people who had no other option. Smugglers provide less existential but still highly desired results to economic migrants. They offer them access to a better life and a chance to take advantage of opportunities in destination countries.

The relevance of these effects does not mean that illegal migrant smuggling should be tolerated, but rather demonstrates that there is something wrong with the migration policies of developed countries. These countries do not provide enough opportunity for legal migration, with insufficient numbers of work visas and insufficient resettlement for refugees. Rather, current practices simply tolerate illegal immigrant workers in the informal economy and wait, knowing that people in need of international protection will apply for asylum after payment to smugglers.

Paradoxically, smuggling, by imposing monetary costs, reduces the number of people who can afford it, and mistreatment of migrants and exposure to severe risks deters more would-be migrants from attempting the illegal transfer. These costs also mean the affluent, educated and middle class can afford to migrate, and the poor are generally excluded. So although this illegal activity is called “facilitation” of regular migration, it also has a regulating effect, limiting irregular migrants to those who can pay smuggling fees.

Have smugglers caused the recent growth of migrant flows to Europe? There are many factors that have contributed, but initiatives taken by smugglers are not among them. Smuggling rises when governments toughen restrictions, but in the current situation, restrictions have been softened. For a number of reasons, countries along the booming “Balkan route” decided to let migrants freely enter and cross. Not only were borders opened, but buses and trains have been provided for free or a small fee, while the main destination country, Germany, has accepted hundreds of thousands. External forces, therefore, minimized the smuggler’s role and expense per person and multiplied the number of migrants.

**SECURITIZATION AND CRIMINALIZATION**

Even though migrant smugglers produce some positive effects — as instruments of salvation for hundreds of thousands of refugees per year — they are generally portrayed as despicable criminals, demonstrated by the fact that one of the two protocols that supplement the U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime is dedicated to countering migrant smuggling. Politicians and the media in destination countries often describe them by using harsh language, referring to them as abusers, traffickers, enslavers and “merchants of death,” as European political authorities have repeatedly done. Migrant smugglers are not blamed for being unscrupulous offenders of migration rules, but essentially for causing suffering and death. The emphasis is not on violation of entry rules, but on more repugnant crimes that have a higher impact on public opinion.

Smuggled migrants are exposed to violence and abuses, and travel conditions are often extremely dangerous and inhumane, but human rights violations are not implicit in migrant smuggling as they are in human trafficking — a form of enslavement by means of coercion or deception. Smugglers’ fortunes depend on a good reputation and positive previous
deliveries, but the secrecy required of illegal activity causes a scarcity of information and compromises the quality of service. Studies show that migrants are unable to make informed cost/quality decisions, causing equalization at the lowest level of cheap and bad services. What is certain, anyway, is that migrants generally have positive opinions of smugglers and see them as indispensable to the realization of their dreams.

Migrant smuggling attracts contempt in destination countries because politicians and the media, supported by public opinion, often frame migration itself as a threat, especially if it is irregular. According to Jef Huysmans in his 2006 book, The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU, this happens through a process of “securitization” and the adoption of “policies of fear.” Immigrants are seen as a disturbance to normal life and the consequent unease is framed as a threat to the character of established society, which justifies recourse to exceptional means and reinforces the image of the state as provider of security, Huysmans says.

If migrants are feared and criminalized, it is obvious that the smugglers who help them are seen as the principal culprits of this undesired situation and are themselves even more securitized. They are perfect targets for repressive action, but the securitization of migration and migrant smuggling is not free from undesirable consequences. Applying restrictive and militarized approaches makes illegal activities harder, but also causes the already mentioned unintended negative consequences.

An additional reason for securitizing migration is the connection between terrorism and migration, created by the recurrent involvement of migrants and their descendants in terrorist acts, the suspected participation of terrorist groups in smuggling and the fear that terrorists disguised as migrants could be smuggled into Europe like a Trojan Horse. This impression was reinforced by the November 2015 terror attacks in Paris.

FIGHTING CRIMINAL NETWORKS

The Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the U.N. Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and ratified by 142 countries so far,
constitutes the basic framework for countering migrant smuggling. It defines the offense, requires its criminalization and enunciates actions that signatory countries are committed to implement with the objective of preventing and combating the crime, protecting the rights of smuggled migrants and promoting cooperation among states. To fight migrant smuggling, signatory countries need to reinforce their intelligence, investigation and prosecution capacities, which require ad hoc specialization in the field and willingness to work in cooperation, not only among signatories, but also with countries of origin and transit, which are often weak links in the chain.

The EU recently introduced new initiatives, such as a military operation code-named Sophia in the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy that targets smugglers in the Mediterranean with the special task of identifying, capturing and destroying their boats. To coordinate and improve intelligence-based law enforcement activities, EUROPOL created a Joint Operational Team named JOT Mare, while Frontex, the joint EU agency for the coordination of border control, monitors maritime borders, counters irregular migration and its facilitators and saves lives at sea. The results of past actions, which the new initiatives are expected to improve, have not been negligible, showing that the criminal-justice system has positively evolved. Many migrant smugglers have been arrested by EU law enforcement agencies, including the 10,234 in 2014 that Frontex counted, but migrant smuggling has grown because it produces huge profits in poor areas with few economic alternatives and because irregular migration has powerful drivers that must be addressed through comprehensive migration policies.

EU institutions recognize the need to address the root causes of irregular migration. In May 2015, the European Commission released two communications, “A European Agenda on Migration” and the “EU Action Plan against Migrant Smuggling (2015 – 2020),” which not only introduced new initiatives to prevent and combat migrant smuggling, to protect vulnerable migrants and to enhance cooperation with countries of origin and transit, but also show a clear understanding of the nature of the problem and express determination to address its causes and give priority to the consequent actions.

Among the new initiatives, some deserve special mention, such as the reinforcement of dedicated intelligence structures and methods, the implementation of procedures to more rapidly detect bogus asylum claims and to return irregular migrants to countries of origin (to deter new departures), the creation of seconded European migration liaison officers in EU delegations in key third countries, proactive financial investigations, stepping up of EUROPOL support to detect Internet content used by smugglers, enhancement of border and shipping controls using new procedures and technology, and new information campaigns to counter the narrative of smugglers. The EU is presenting the fight against criminal smuggling and trafficking networks primarily as instruments to prevent the exploitation of migrants and also as a deterrent to irregular migration. The fundamental objective is transforming migrant smuggling from “low risk, high return” activities into “high risk, low return” ones, dismantling the smugglers’ business model.

To address the root causes of irregular migration, which inevitably implies exploitation by criminal networks, the EU identified the need for increased cooperation at bilateral and multilateral levels with nonmember countries (especially Turkey), countries of origin and transit and those influential in conflict areas. Conflict resolution and prevention do not have sole priority; addressing poverty, underdevelopment, and assistance to internally displaced people and refugees in the proximity of conflict areas to prevent further migration are also important. Policies to prevent irregular migration cannot overlook the main drivers and should consequently promote new legal pathways to Europe and severe enforcement of labor rules. All efforts must avoid violating migrants’ human rights or putting their lives at risk, assuring the protection of those in need, as mandated by international law.

CONCLUSION

The progressive growth of irregular migration and, consequently, migrant smuggling has shown that these phenomena are out of control. The main problems are the suffering and deaths of migrants, the excessive burden endured by receiving countries and the expansion of the criminal underworld that profits from illegal activities and undermines the security of transit and receiving countries.

The EU’s recent decisions demonstrate its understanding that preventing migrant smuggling means addressing irregular migration and that this requires implementing comprehensive and effective migration policies. Such policies must include new instruments to repress criminal activities, but also address root causes of irregular migration and the reasons why irregular migrants resort to criminal networks.

These solutions, based on initiatives in migrants’ areas of origin, increasing legal pathways to migration, deterring illegal behaviors and suppressing exploitative labor in receiving countries, must be accompanied by a commitment to protect the migrants. They were conceived for Europe, but their principles extend outside of it. It is important to moderate “the politics of fear,” keeping regular and irregular migration and migrant smuggling in the right perspective and avoiding excessive securitization.

Implementing these new policies will not be easy, because they require a difficult balance among conflicting factors: economic interests, humanitarian considerations, moral issues and the fears and legitimate concerns of established populations. Governments will encounter popular resistance to the imposition of some solutions and will risk electoral backlash and violent reactions by extremist and domestic minorities. Information campaigns and open discussion with civil society will be necessary to create a social atmosphere receptive to the required changes.
On October 9, 2015, two members of the Marshall Center faculty met with the mayor of Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Dr. Sigrid Meierhofer, to discuss how the city has been impacted by, and is responding to, Europe’s migration challenge. A translated, condensed and edited transcript of the conversation is below.

By DR. PETRA WEYLAND and DR. CAROLYN HAGGIS, Marshall Center

Marshall Center (MC): Madame Mayor, thank you for taking the time for this interview. As the large majority of per Concordiam readers have lived in Garmisch-Partenkirchen while attending a course at the Marshall Center, it would be interesting to hear how their temporary home is coping with one of the world’s major problems.

Dr. Sigrid Meierhofer (SM): Garmisch has hosted refugees for a very long time. The first influx of refugees was after 1945. Nowadays, we have had refugees for the past three or four years living in different points in town, and we haven’t had any problems at all.

MC: Are there different categories of refugees in Garmisch?

SM: Garmisch has established registration and screening facilities for refugees. A certain number of refugees come to us directly after crossing the border, and they get registered here. These facilities are also intended to house the refugees for a limited period of time, currently 10 weeks. These facilities are in the former Abrams Complex.

MC: This is for those who are housed in Garmisch immediately after their arrival in Germany. What about others?

SM: Then there are refugees who have already been registered and assigned to Garmisch, currently 300. So, the initial registration facilities serve as contingency facilities only, for a limited time, usually a few weeks. However, the refugees who have been assigned to us stay with us until they either receive a temporary residence permit or have to return to their countries of origin. The amount of
time this process takes varies. Many people feel that it takes too long, so this will certainly have to change. Once they receive a residence permit, they are no longer allowed to stay in those facilities. From that point on, Garmisch-Partenkirchen is responsible for them and must find appropriate accommodations for them. In my opinion, this is going to be the biggest challenge for us over the next few years.

MC: It seems that this is where the problems begin.
SM: You’re absolutely right. But right now, we’re only at the beginning. The first refugees came to us two or three years ago. So far, the process of establishing their legal status has been very slow, and therefore, we only have a few refugees who hold resident permits and for whom we have to find accommodations. But this number will increase drastically in the very near future.

MC: What role do local authorities play?
SM: Once they have received the temporary residence permit, the local authorities are responsible for them. Before that, responsibility lies in the hands of the county. This means that until their legal status is established, the county is responsible. Once their status has been established and they’ve received the temporary residence permit, we are responsible.

MC: Is it true that once they’re allowed to stay in Germany, they are told to go and find themselves a place to stay or else they need to rely on the help of volunteers?
SM: Yes, that’s correct. In cases where they don’t find a job and an apartment, we — the local authorities — are responsible for them. But so far, with the support of volunteers, many of them have managed to find a job that provides them with a steady income and eventually an apartment. But assuming they don’t find an apartment, we would be responsible for them because every municipality has to take care of the homeless.

MC: What about jobs for the refugees?
SM: We have problems finding new employees for our hotels and...
restaurants. These are jobs that don’t require high qualifications — at least most of them don’t — and that’s where the refugees really would be able to help us out and fit into our concept.

**MC:** Aren’t some of them already working in that field?
**SM:** That’s right, and I believe this number will grow. However, the most important prerequisite for all jobs here is the German language. Chancellor [Angela] Merkel said the same thing at the recent refugee summit: Our main objective right from the beginning must be to make sure that the refugees learn the German language. We want them to be able to attend German classes with qualified teachers. Great job, and I’m very grateful for their commitment. But a service as essential as this can’t be provided only by volunteers. We need an official program that provides the financial means to organize German language classes with qualified, professional teachers.

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**MC:** What about employment of refugees in senior citizens’ homes, where there is a vast shortage of personnel?
**SM:** Yes, they are allowed to employ a certain percentage of unskilled staff. There are strict regulations for that. Of course, that is a possibility. However, this is a field where knowledge of the German language is essential because much of the older generation speaks little or no English. Without German, no communication can take place. So, it is possible to employ unskilled workers in that field, but only up to a certain percentage. I can’t give you exact numbers, but there are strict regulations regarding the percentage of trained personnel in retirement and nursing homes and the percentage of unskilled workers they’re allowed to hire in addition to that. Of course, these unskilled helpers will have no authority to make any decisions and will never be left unsupervised.

**MC:** So according to current legal regulations in Germany, the two biggest issues Garmisch faces are accommodation and finding jobs for the refugees?
**SM:** Absolutely correct. At the moment, the necessary legal prerequisites are being put into place to accelerate the legal processes, which means that probably sometime next year, the number of refugees we are responsible for will rise significantly.

**MC:** Will you also get more financial support from the federal government?
**SM:** Yes, but nothing’s been decided yet. They’ll have to do that; there’s no way around it. We don’t have the means to finance something like that. I don’t have a few million euros sitting around somewhere. We have budget problems as it is because we organize many events and activities using volunteers, out of our own pocket, many of which are renowned all over Germany and the world, such as the Skiing World Cup, the New Year’s ski jump event and the Richard Strauss Festival, to name the biggest. That’s why we also need financial support.

**MC:** Are refugees a security risk for Garmisch?
**SM:** That’s a question that I can definitely answer with “no.” There have been a number of rumors regarding rapes and things like that,
and that’s why I invited the chief of the Garmisch-Partenkirchen police to speak in front of the municipal council, and he denied all of those rumors. Nothing has been reported. Of course, in the bigger facilities there are sometimes frictions among refugees, but so far there haven’t been any legal offenses there and absolutely nothing has happened outside of those facilities.

MC: For Marshall Center participants, one of the most important issues they are grappling with is how to respond to “foreign fighters.” In conversations, many of these security sector practitioners have raised fears that ISIS fighters may pose as Syrian refugees entering Europe.

SM: Of the Syrian refugees that have come to us, almost all have a very high level of education. Many of them are academics such as lawyers, doctors and teachers. I can’t really imagine that there are any sleeper cells among them, but of course, there’s no guarantee.

MC: Are refugees an opportunity for Garmisch?

SM: Yes, I think it is if we manage to integrate these refugees here. We successfully managed a refugee influx after World War II in 1945, but of course circumstances were different then — same culture, same language, same philosophy of life, same religion. Today, that’s different. Now we have a different religion and different culture. This is going to be more difficult. Germany is going to be more diverse. This is new for Germany; other European countries already know this because they had colonies in Africa. Germany lost its African colonies at the end of World War I. For example, Cameroon was originally German. We lost the colonies, and because of that, we don’t have experience integrating Africans coming from the colonies. All the other European countries know that, especially Great Britain, but also France, Spain and Portugal. For us, it is new.

MC: Immigrants have lived in larger German cities for a long time, so they’ve been diverse for a while, making integration easier. But Garmisch-Partenkirchen, where everyone knows each other, is relatively mono-cultural with a large Catholic population with many clubs and societies centered on the church. On the face of it, it seems as if this environment would make it more difficult to integrate newcomers. On the other hand, one gets the feeling that this makes it easier, because neighbors stand together.

SM: Exactly, there are plenty of volunteers, and that is a great experience. They are contributing tremendously and doing a big job. And, because of that, we can say that Garmisch and Partenkirchen are closer than they’ve ever been.

MC: It seems that they’re making a positive impact.

SM: Absolutely. This feeling of togetherness, the “we can do this together” spirit, is a very important effect. Before, we sort of used to have two opposing poles in Garmisch-Partenkirchen — here Garmisch, there Partenkirchen, here supporters of the Olympics, there opponents of the Olympics. The respective positions had become rather entrenched. None of this matters anymore. All of them work together. The churches are very involved, and the Muslim community here in Garmisch also plays a big part in the integration process. That definitely is a very pleasing effect.

MC: How would you define your role as the mayor?

SM: Of course, I’m watching the whole situation, and my goal is the integration of this group into our society. I’m trying to get an overview of the situation. I want to know which initiatives are underway. It’s important for me to know that everyone is being taken care of. But all of these efforts are mostly covered by honorary workers, and I cannot tell for how long this is still going to work. This is why the German government must act quickly and arrange for more financial help to ensure long-term support. We can’t do this on our own.

MC: Madame Mayor, is there anything else you would like to share with our readers?

SM: Don’t be afraid. Everything is being handled very well, and the people of Garmisch-Partenkirchen are a great support. So far, there have been no problems, and everything is peaceful. That’s my message.

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Notes from the interviewers:

According to a local newspaper report dated August 13, 1946, Garmisch County had to accommodate about 24,500 refugees one year after the end of World War II, many of them from what was then Czechoslovakia. Garmisch also had to accommodate returning prisoners of war and 5,000 Americans.

The Abrams Complex was built between 1938 and 1942. Until the end of WWII, it served as a hospital for the German Wehrmacht. In 1945, the U.S. Army took over the complex and called it General Abrams Barracks. Later, it served as a housing unit for U.S Army Garrison Garmisch personnel. On January 1, 2014, it was returned to German authorities. Since then, it has been used intermittently as a contingency and registration facility for refugees.
Gender, Migration and Security

Migration policies must empower women and men

By Julie L. Arostegui, J.D.
Sex is defined by biological differences between men and women. Gender refers to the roles, personality traits and behaviors that society ascribes to men and women, as well as the different power relations between them. Gender mainstreaming recognizes the role of gender integration in all aspects of peace and security, as well as the understanding of differences that policies and programs might have on men and women. It means identifying the different insecurities facing men, women, girls and boys and the way in which gender relations and power inequalities fuel insecurity. Understanding gender leads to better policies and outcomes. It is key to the effectiveness and accountability of the security sector and is necessary to comply with international and regional laws. The ultimate goal is to promote gender equality in society by ensuring that both men and women are represented in all processes and that all programs integrate the human rights of everyone.

**WHY DOES IT MATTER?**
Conflict is no longer merely about securing borders and maintaining sovereignty; it is also about human security. Nations cannot be secure if their people are insecure. Where there is inequality and discrimination, violence, poverty, lack of education and economic opportunity, political oppression and other destabilizing factors, there is risk of conflict. Security, development and human rights are interrelated and critical for establishing lasting peace and resilient societies.

Migration has become a normal pattern in today’s globalized society and can offer opportunities for growth and development for individuals and societies. Migrant workers contribute to the economies of their host countries, and the financial remittances that they send home help boost the economies of their countries of origin. On the other hand, migration can be an indicator of human insecurity because migrants often seek opportunities to escape poverty, as in the case of labor migration, or to flee persecution or conflict, as in the case of refugees and internally displaced people. In addition, it can lead to increased national, regional and global instability. The influx of refugees from Syria and Iraq into Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Europe is drastically increasing national populations, straining resources and overwhelming social support systems, creating tension between countries and increasing xenophobia.

To understand patterns of migration, normalize it and increase human security, it is critical to understand the root causes of migration as well as its impact, taking into account all groups. Men and women have different experiences and are affected differently. Gender roles and cultural traditions greatly influence the migration process, especially for women.

In 2013, the United Nations announced that the number of international migrants had reached a historic 232 million, with the largest numbers residing in Europe (72 million) and Asia (71 million). According to the International Labour Organization, about half of migrants globally are workers. Forty-eight percent of the migrant population consists of women. According to U.N. Women, during 2014 approximately 59.5 million people were forcibly displaced worldwide as a result of persecution, conflict, generalized violence or human rights violations — the highest figure on record. Eighty percent of those are women, children and young people.

The world is experiencing a migrant and refugee crisis. Over 1 million migrants entered Europe in 2015. The number of migrants that arrived by sea in the month of October 2015 alone was roughly the amount that entered in all of 2014. More than 3,600 have died during the treacherous sea voyage. Most are fleeing wars in Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as conflicts in Africa. The flow of refugees into Europe, however, is still small compared to the numbers in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, which have taken in millions of Syrian refugees.

Governments are obligated to international human rights frameworks that protect migrants, trafficked people, refugees and displaced people, as well as women-specific frameworks such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, U.N. Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, and the Beijing Platform for Action.

Effective policies and security operations establish a safe and secure environment that is conducive to economic development, education and health care, and the growth of a vibrant civil society. These goals can only be achieved if women and men are equally involved in shaping policies and programs. Gender and human rights must be mainstreamed into all migration interventions.

There is growing recognition that migration stems from both economic and sociocultural factors. The gendered dimensions of the migratory process reflect roles in society. People’s experiences of gender are central to the patterns, causes and impacts of migration. Migration can also change traditional gender roles. It can lead to a greater degree of economic and/or social autonomy for women, and the opportunity to challenge traditional or restrictive gender roles. Women who migrate, either with or without family, may move into new roles as workers and breadwinners — roles not allowed in their home countries. Both men and women may develop skills or earn higher wages. Men left behind when their wives migrate may need to take on more caretaker duties for the family, roles often traditionally left to women. Sons who have left dominant patriarchal families may return with more skills and independence. Roles and relationships within families may change.

However, migration can also entrench restrictive gender stereotypes of female dependency and lack of decision-making power. Gender also affects how migrants
contribute to, and benefit from, their destination communities, and thus the role they play in achieving social and economic development goals.

**FEMALE MIGRANTS**

A record number of women are migrating to seek work and better lives. For some, migration yields these benefits, and for others, it carries dangerous risks such as exploitation in domestic jobs and vulnerability to violence and human trafficking.

Patriarchal power structures, which give men preferential access to the resources available in society, affect women’s ability to migrate, when to migrate and where they will go. In many countries, women do not have equal rights to own land, have limited access to credit, face barriers to education and adequate health care, are excluded or marginalized from political life, and subjected to exploitation and violence. Single, divorced and widowed women have few safety nets. Women may wish to migrate for better opportunities or to escape abusive relationships. However, a woman’s ability to migrate may be affected by individual and family factors such as age, birth order, race/ethnicity, urban/rural origins, marital and parental status, role in the family, education and occupational skills. Community norms and values also come into play.

National policies of origin countries can influence who migrates through prohibitive, selective or permissive rules of exit that may affect men and women differently. Such policies are frequently conditioned by the status and roles of men and women in society. For example, some countries have implemented policies to protect women from exploitation that effectively prevent them from participating in labor migration.

The immigration policies of receiving countries affect men and women differently. Women are often classified by their relation to men, e.g., wife or daughter, and therefore considered “dependent” while men are “independent.” This can place them in a “family role” rather than a market role, separating their immigration status from their work status. For instance, some countries allow women to enter as dependents, following their wives; however, this is much less common.

Where immigration status is based on marriage to a citizen, most countries require the marriage to be validated after what is usually a multiyear probationary period. Although this may at first glance seem a fair requirement, such policies can have a gendered impact, leading women to stay in abusive relationships to obtain immigration status.

Ironically, immigration laws that purport to be concerned with the protection of borders and “national security” may increase insecurity by making migrants, especially women, more vulnerable. In addition, as a result of rigid immigration and visa policies, undocumented migration, often involving smuggling or trafficking, has increased.

When female migrants are allowed to work, gender-based hierarchies in the destination country often influence incorporation of men and women into the labor force. While women are increasingly well-educated, worldwide labor markets still channel them disproportionately into what are considered traditional female occupations, such as domestic work, child care or garment manufacturing. Even in professions considered skilled, relatively few women reach upper-level positions in management and leadership. This is despite clear indicators that when women participate equally in public and private life, everyone benefits. A recent study by McKinsey & Company shows that as much as $28 trillion, or 26 percent, could be added to the global annual gross domestic product by 2025 if women participated equally in labor markets.

Once in destination countries, migrants, whether workers or refugees, often face discriminatory employment practices and social attitudes. There are common problems that affect both male and female migrants such as low wages, unfair dismissal, bondage (withholding of travel documents and/or imposition of loans or fees that must be repaid through work), long work hours and dangerous work conditions. Migrants overall, especially irregular migrants or those in lower skilled professions, are susceptible to exploitation. Women and children, because of their positions in society and the labor market, are especially vulnerable to abuses, including harassment, sexual violence and human trafficking.

In displacement situations, where people have been forced to leave their homes as a result of armed conflict, generalized violence, human rights violations, or natural or human-made disasters, and either go to other countries (refugees) or migrate within their own countries (internally displaced people, or IDPs), women and girls face heightened risks from the breakdown of normal protection and support. Within refugee or IDP camps, women and girls are exposed to abuse and sexual violence as they struggle to take care of themselves and provide for their families. They often are abducted, raped and assaulted by soldiers and individuals within the camps. Outside of the camps, refugees must find safety and security living in a foreign society.

In 2015, Germany took the lead in responding to Europe’s refugee crisis. Nonetheless, the response is severely lacking when it comes to protecting women. Refugee camps offer few guarantees for women. There is no law assuring the safety of women refugees, and no clear standards for how refugee camps should handle cases of abuse or assault, whether by partners or strangers. Furthermore, there is no agreement on who is ultimately responsible for women’s security. State and local governments point to private companies contracted to run refugee centers, and those companies throw responsibility back on the government.

**MALE MIGRANTS**

It is important to consider the impact of migration on men
and boys. Men, although generally in a stronger societal position than women, have their own reasons for migrating. Some, as heads of households, seek work and greater economic opportunity, either with or without their families. Others may be escaping political or ethnic persecution. Today, many men and young boys are fleeing compulsory conscription into the militaries of autocratic regimes, such as in Eritrea, or recruitment by extremist groups, such as the self-proclaimed Islamic State or Boko Haram. Some young men migrate to challenge patriarchal systems, where sons are subordinate to the wishes of their fathers. If they return home, they often do so with more life experience and personal resources, enabling them to act more independently.

Men also face challenges and vulnerabilities when migrating. Often, men cannot assume the same responsibilities that they did previously in their communities and must accept lower skilled and/or lower paying jobs. This may be due to crisis situations, discrimination or prejudicial policies in the destination country. There is often a devaluation of education credentials with discriminatory results when foreign degrees are not recognized as equivalent to those obtained within the country. For instance, in the U.S., medical and legal degrees from other countries are generally not recognized, and immigrants often must either obtain a new degree, which is economically prohibitive for many, or seek other, generally lower, positions. Though this can apply to both men and women, men have been affected in greater numbers because they are often better educated in their countries of origin.

These changes in professional and social status can present economic and psychological challenges for men. They may feel shame or lack confidence when losing their jobs or working in lower positions. When men have left their families behind, they may experience a decrease in status in their destination countries, while family members at home enjoy an
increase in status due to the remittances they are receiving. When families migrate, roles may reverse, with men spending more time at home, while women find work.

These challenges can exacerbate already difficult situations and lead to increased domestic violence rooted in men’s experience of social downward mobility, lack of status and socioeconomic pressures. For instance, in some cases women have reported an increase in abuse from their husbands as families languish in refugee camps. One Syrian woman in a German refugee center described being beaten and nearly strangled by her husband. Although he had been abusive in Syria, it was worse in the camp. According to her, in Syria her husband had a job and friends and spent time outside the home, but in the camp he had little to do but drink and become violent.

These are indicative of the many ways that the trauma of migration, especially in crisis situations, affects individuals. Psycho-social support receives little attention, but to stabilize and secure societies — including migrant societies — it is critical to recognize the different types of trauma that men, women, boys and girls experience.

Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, male Muslims have faced increased discrimination in the U.S. and around the world. This discrimination is increasing again with the spread of the Islamic State and extremist attacks in Paris, Beirut and Afghanistan, among others during the writing of this article, and the refugee crisis in Europe. The marginalization of many migrant communities, especially of Muslim youth in the West, not only inhibits development as they are excluded from economic and social opportunities, but also increases the risk of radicalization.

Moreover, in a reversal of roles, refugee women and children are sometimes regarded as harmless while men are viewed as dangerous and potential terrorists. Some in Europe and the U.S. would ban refugees from the Middle East altogether, leaving millions of people to suffer.
many women in most societies are often the root cause for women migrants’ greater vulnerability at all stages of the migration process.

Respecting human rights principles and international norms is critical to establishing sustainable peace and security. The 2014 U.N. secretary-general’s report on “International Migration and Development” (A/69/207) emphasized the need for a comprehensive, rights-based, gender- and age-sensitive approach. The benefits of migration can be fully realized only when migrants are protected from discrimination, abuse and exploitation during every step of the process.

When designing policies, governments should ensure that the vulnerabilities of migrants, in particular the most vulnerable groups, are taken into account and ensure equal access for all migrants to education, health care, housing, social protection and justice, as well as equal pay and the right to join trade unions. Governments, international agencies and nongovernmental organizations must promote the rights of migrants throughout the process, including providing pre-departure information on legal rights, facilitating remittances, ensuring access to basic services and supporting solidarity between different migrant groups to address issues of exclusion and isolation.

Immigration and emigration policies should enable women, as well as men, to take advantage of opportunities that safe and regular migration may offer and foster the positive impacts of migration for the social and economic development of migrants, as well as the receiving and sending countries. This would include measures to ensure regular channels for women’s entry to avoid more risky irregular channels and agreements between sending and receiving areas that protect women’s rights.

The different needs and experiences of men and women must also be considered in refugee and IDP policies and humanitarian interventions. This includes taking into account the particular needs of women and girls in the design of camps and settlements, such as the need for separate facilities; providing access to legal documents and services, especially for victims of abuse; including women in planning; and training peacekeeping personnel to respect the rights of women.

States must support implementation of international rights frameworks that offer protection for female migrants. This includes not only those relating to migrants, trafficked peoples, refugees and displaced persons, but also women-specific frameworks such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, U.N. Resolution 1325 and the Beijing Platform for Action.

It is important to highlight the role of women as proponents of change and contributors to society, not just victims. Female migrants contribute significantly to the economic and social development of countries of origin and destination.

Ambassador William Lacy Swing, director general of the International Organization for Migration, has highlighted four key challenges the world faces. These include the crucial need for coordinated and efficient response mechanisms and innovative solutions to address the challenges posed by increased humanitarian crises that lead to migration; urgent action to reduce the rising number of migrant fatalities along the migratory route; the need to change public perceptions of migration and encourage political accountability; and the opportunity to integrate migration into the post-2015 development agenda laid out in the Sustainable Development Goals.

If these challenges are to be overcome, and if women, men, girls and boys are to benefit from the empowering and development potential of migration, there must be a shift to a gendered human rights approach to migration.
A LEGAL LOOK AT MIGRATION
In November 2015, an investigation of the terrorist attacks in Paris revealed that the main organizer — a Belgian citizen on at least one terror watch list — and other attackers had potentially sneaked back into Europe hidden among the thousands of refugees passing through Greece. According to an article in The Telegraph at that time: “The Schengen border-free zone of European countries now finds itself in an existential crisis, with migrants and terrorists alike travelling with ease to every corner of Europe.” Similar uneasiness has also appeared in the United States, where some politicians are pushing to block the admission of Syrian refugees amid growing concerns that their presence will increase terrorist threats. Additionally, there have been uncomfortable debates about admitting Christian versus Muslim refugees or banning Muslims from the country entirely.

Similarly, in September 2015, the Hungarian Counter-Terrorism Center reported that terrorists were crossing borders masked as refugees, causing serious national security concerns. “Danger of migrants traveling illegally and even without documents is a real, existing problem, along with the terrorist threat,” the center reported. The Hungarian government estimated in October 2015 that more than 156,000 migrants had already entered the country illegally that year to reach richer EU countries and apply for asylum. Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, the United Nations high commissioner for human rights, commented in a news release on Hungarian efforts to stem the tide: “I am appalled at the callous, and in some cases illegal, actions of the Hungarian authorities in recent days, which include denying entry to, arresting, summarily rejecting and returning refugees, using disproportionate force on migrants and refugees, as well as reportedly assaulting journalists and seizing video documentation. Some of these actions amount to clear violations of international law.”

With this background in mind, the time is ripe to discuss legal protections for migrants, the duties of states under international law and what that means for the security sector. Should a state prioritize national security or the right of the migrant to flee from violence and conflict in his country of origin? As people move from one territory to another, national security considerations can increase, especially given migrants’ vulnerability to human trafficking, smuggling and terrorism, resulting in part from socio-economics, political instability and the breakdown of the rule of law and good governance.

This discussion examines the rights of migrants to move freely, including on grounds of family reunification; the obligations of states to avoid discrimination based on color, race and other factors; the recommendation not to distinguish between citizens and noncitizens; and the rights of refugees not to be returned to a country of persecution. While security sectors must deal with pressing concerns arising from the rapid flow of migrants and refugees, including terrorism and transnational organized crime, measures put in place must not violate rights and responsibilities laid out in international migration law.

According to the primer “International Migration Law” from the International Office of Migration (IOM), most international migration law has developed only recently with the rise of globalization. Historically, migration had been regulated mainly at the national level. No single convention or treaty captures the rights of migrants and the responsibilities of other stakeholders, but these laws are usually pieced together from other sources, including treaties, conventions and customary international law. In recognizing that migrant rights are human rights, migration law can be defined by the rights and obligations laid out in various instruments including but not limited to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Refugee Convention), the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), the Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Convention against Torture. At the center of it all is the state’s supreme right to sovereignty and territorial integrity. As highlighted in the IOM primer, “state sovereignty is the traditional starting point when considering international migration law. States have authority over their territory and population. They can decide who can and who cannot enter their territory. States can secure their borders and decide on conditions of entry and stay as well as removal.”

THE UDHR AND THE ICCPR
Building on the UDHR, which states that “everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his own country,” the ICCPR guarantees the right to leave a country, with limitations on grounds of national security or public order. Moreover, a lawful alien can indeed be expelled from a state, but has the right to a court hearing unless national security priorities require a different process.

In addition to these provisions that speak directly to the flow of people from one country to another, the ICCPR also obligates states to respect the rights of people within its territory “without distinction of any kind, such as race,

THE ICERD
Moreover, the ICERD and the interpretations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) discuss the distinction between citizens and non-citizens. Under the ICERD, “this Convention shall not apply to distinctions, exclusions or preferences made by a State Party to this Convention between citizens and non-citizens.” The CERD recognizes “the possibility of differentiating between citizens and non-citizens,” but its guidance indicates that such distinction would violate nondiscrimination provisions, especially if it is not proportional to achieving a legitimate aim.

Similarly, under the ICERD, states commit not to discriminate in enforcing the right to leave the country of nationality. The CERD has noted that:

“Article 5 of the Convention incorporates the obligation of States parties to … eliminate racial discrimination in the enjoyment of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights. Although some of these rights, such as the right to participate in elections, to vote and to stand for election, may be confined to citizens, human rights are, in principle, to be enjoyed by all persons. States parties are under an obligation to guarantee equality between citizens and non-citizens in the enjoyment of these rights to the extent recognized under international law.”

The CERD recommends legislative reforms that will align the nondiscrimination provision and “ensure that legislative guarantees against racial discrimination apply to non-citizens regardless of their immigration status,” and that “measures taken in the fight against terrorism do not discriminate, in purpose or effect, on the grounds of race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin and that non-citizens are not subjected to racial or ethnic profiling or stereotyping … and to promote a better understanding of the principle of non-discrimination in respect of the situation of non-citizens.” Finally, the CERD recommends that states “take resolute action to counter any tendency to target, stigmatize, stereotype or profile” non-citizens based on race, ethnicity or nationality.

THE REFUGEE CONVENTION
Under the 1951 Refugee Convention, in contrast to a migrant who leaves his country of origin voluntarily, a refugee is a person who is forced to leave out of a well-founded fear of persecution or a lack of protection in his or her own country. Under the convention, when a refugee enters the host country without authorization, the state “shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence,” but give the refugee an opportunity to “show good cause.” When a person has claimed refugee status, the state cannot restrict freedom of movement, except in cases in which the refugee has been granted temporary admission. States “shall not expel a refugee lawfully in their territory save on grounds of national security or public order.” A refugee has a right to submit evidence in defense of himself or herself, “except where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require.”
The 1951 convention also stipulates that a state cannot expel a refugee “when his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” This principle of non-refoulement is a key provision. “A refugee should not be returned to a country where he or she faces serious threats to his or her life or freedom. This protection may not be claimed by refugees who are reasonably regarded as a danger to the security of the country, or having been convicted of a particularly serious crime, are considered a danger to the community.” The principle of non-refoulement is highlighted also in the Convention against Torture, which says states cannot expel “a person to another state when there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.” The other state’s human rights record is key in determining whether these substantial grounds exist.

The CRC
Finally, the CRC protects migration for the purposes of family reunification, mainly “applications by a child or his or her parents to enter or leave a State Party for the purpose of family reunifications” and obligates states to deal with such requests “in a positive, humane and expeditious manner: … States Parties shall respect the right of the child and his or her parents to leave any country, including their own, and to enter their own country.”

Arguably, just like there has been evolution in the nature of conflict, there has been an evolution in security concerns that affect most states, from the traditional threats of nuclear weapons, illicit flows of small arms and light weapons, and biological and chemical weapons, to emerging threats arising from transnational organized crime, terrorism and international migration. Such threats are interconnected and difficult to detect and prevent.

According to the U.S. National Security Council
A cemetery worker on the Greek island of Lesvos adjusts the headstone on the fresh grave of a migrant who drowned attempting to cross the Aegean Sea from Turkey. REUTERS
(NSC), terrorists increasingly use transnational organized crime groups for funding, weapons and other logistics: “While the crime-terror nexus is still mostly opportunistic, this nexus is critical nonetheless, especially if it were to involve the successful criminal transfer of [weapons of mass destruction] material to terrorists or their penetration of human smuggling networks as a means for terrorists to enter the United States.”

The U.N. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children supplements the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Trafficking in persons is defined as the recruitment, transfer or harboring of an individual through force, fraud, coercion, deception or abuse of vulnerability, for purposes of exploitation, including for prostitution, sexual exploitation, forced labor or the removal of organs. According to the NSC, trafficking includes “illegal entry of a person or persons across an international border, in violation of one or more countries’ laws, either clandestinely or through deception, whether with the use of fraudulent documents or through the evasion of legitimate border controls.”

The IOM considers international terrorism to be a migration issue because it involves crossing borders: “It touches on a range of matters directly affecting migration policy, including: border integrity (entry and/or residence with illicit intent), national security, integration, ethnic/multicultural affairs and citizenship.” In this threatening landscape, by fleeing war-torn communities and being forcefully displaced, migrants and refugees can be vulnerable to exploitation and deception that leads to trafficking in persons and smuggling. But, current events show that migrants and refugees can also be the offenders and perpetrators that spearhead the spread of extremist ideology.

International migration law makes it clear that states absolutely have a right to decide who enters their territory and when, as well as a right to secure their borders, but their rights are limited in that they cannot violate fundamental human rights.

First, as per the ICCPR, while the obligation to respect people’s rights without discrimination can be set aside in the interest of national security, states still cannot discriminate on the basis of race, color, sex, language, religion or social origin. These provisions imply that any security sector initiatives that would try to regulate the presence or the treatment of migrants and refugees on these factors would violate the nondiscrimination provisions. Instead, the security sector has a responsibility to assist the state in preventing ethnic profiling and xenophobic attitudes, as the CERD has interpreted.

Second, any security initiatives that would deny entry to refugees may violate international migration law. Granted, the state has discretion not to admit a refugee if to do so would jeopardize national security or public order, but this discretion is limited by the principle of non-refoulement. Considering that many of the present-day refugees are leaving their countries of origin to escape rising extremism and severe breakdowns in national security, rule of law and governance, denying their admission would arguably be a violation of the non-refoulement principle.

Third, any initiatives that would try to distinguish between citizens and non-citizens for security purposes would have to be handled delicately. When states are targeting terrorism or addressing other national security concerns, they still have an obligation to promote equal treatment for citizens and non-citizens and make efforts to deter ethnic stereotyping and profiling.

Fourth, the freedom of movement within and outside national borders is affirmed, but the duty to admit migrants and refugees is not stipulated within international migration law. According to the IOM, “under international law, there is no corresponding right to enter the territory of another country. This creates a major limitation on the right to freedom of movement and is an example of a gap in international migration law.”

**CONCLUSION**

While states can make policies and introduce initiatives that prioritize national security, international law reigns supreme, at least in principle. The IOM asserts: “A fundamental principle is that international law prevails over national law. This means that a State cannot rely on a provision of national legislation to avoid responsibility under international law.” However, the obligation of a state’s security sector to be bound to these provisions is limited to whether or not the state is party to the relevant instruments. International law is only as strong as states make it through ratification. These instruments protect migrants and refugees so long as their countries of origin and host countries have ratified these instruments. That said, some aspects of international migration law — mainly the principle of non-refoulement — are matters of customary international law and therefore states are bound to them, regardless of ratification of the 1951 Refugee Convention.

With the increasing flow of migrants and refugees, national security risks increase and security sector initiatives and measures that strengthen border control can deter and prevent admission to safe host countries. As some have pointed out, while a migrant has a right to leave his country, the host country does not have a similar obligation to admit him. However, under international migration law, there are limitations to states’ discretion. Similarly, while there is room in the law for the security sector to regulate based on national security considerations — including terrorism and transnational organized crime — there are limitations on this power insofar as it cannot be based on discrimination. □
The current refugee and illegal migrant crisis in Europe has taken several years to boil to the surface. As European Union governments struggle to accept and relocate refugees, their attention seems to be shortsightedly focused on the immediate issue of how this crisis is affecting EU countries. Unfortunately, the situation is much larger than just the EU. As member states and other European countries clamp down on accepting asylum seekers and refugees, they trap refugees and illegal migrants in entry and transit countries. Based on current migration patterns, this will be most severely felt in the Western Balkans and could have serious unintended consequences for Europe in the form of a second wave of refugees. What is needed is a holistic and proactive approach to understanding and resolving this challenge.

If European leaders and policymakers fail to appreciate and take preventive measures to deal with this crisis, it has the potential to destabilize the entire Western Balkan region. The results could prompt a second and larger wave of asylum seekers, including a large number of Western Balkan nationals.

As European policymakers work to address this crisis, it is vital that they broaden their focus to include other serious migrant-related pressures gripping Southeast Europe and especially the Western Balkan countries of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. For new policies to be effective, European leaders need to account for the economics of the much bigger refugee and economic migrant picture and, more importantly, its causes.

The current refugee and migration crisis is perhaps the largest since World War II. It has quickly become one of the most contentious European security issues. Left unaddressed, it has the potential to threaten the social fabric of the European region. This problem has grown so quickly that it has outstripped the ability of governments to comprehend it and react with carefully planned solutions. Instead of appreciating what this crisis means for Europe, leadership has responded slowly, disjointedly and reactively. There is little evidence of either an appreciation of how to deal with the problem in a coordinated fashion or of the impact of the crisis in the short and long terms.

Migration has forced Europe to face an unprecedented humanitarian, social and political crisis, as acknowledged by German Chancellor Angela Merkel when she remarked that this situation was “Europe’s biggest challenge: a collective problem that needs collective solutions.” According to the International Organization for Migration, over 1.2 million irregular migrants and refugees arrived in Europe in 2015, the majority from Syria, Africa and South Asia.

Judging from statistics in the first weeks of 2016, odds are that the number of irregular migrants crossing Europe will be higher in 2016. In the first three weeks of January, 37,000 new migrants and refugees arrived in Europe, 10 times the number in the same month.
in 2015. The burden of accepting refugees has fallen disproportionately on a few Western European states. Germany and Sweden have accepted the majority of refugees, while other EU member states have been less welcoming. According to Eurostat data, there were almost 900,000 registered asylum seekers in the EU. Germany received the most, totaling almost 500,000 at the end of 2015.

Absorbing a large number of refugees and migrants into any country is not easy. This has become a clear and painful lesson for all of the major destination countries. Wrestling with the moral and ideological response was easy compared to the reality of making it work. As we witness destination countries struggle, it is important to remember that these countries have more resilient economies and institutions than many others — especially those in the Western Balkans. These EU destination countries enjoy well-developed infrastructure and a long history of adhering to the rule of law, as well as good governance and strong institutions. However, EU nations have been surprised at how little they were prepared to manage and absorb the influx of refugees, asylum seekers and illegal economic migrants.

Understanding the economic and political strain that the crisis has placed on established EU countries becomes an important lesson for all. As the political climate of EU countries changes and citizens push back against accepting more refugees, EU leaders will seek ways to close their doors or limit the flow. The consequences of these actions will likely cause a chain reaction by trapping large numbers of refugees, asylum seekers and illegal migrants within non-EU countries that serve as entry and transit points for all involved in this migration crisis. This cause and effect relationship must be seriously considered by policymakers. If ignored, it creates the potential for millions of refugees to destabilize already stressed economies in the Western Balkans and makes for an easily predictable new refugee crisis.

Although EU population demographics indicate a need for foreign workers to bolster an aging workforce, its collective unemployment rate was just under 10 percent in early 2016. It is far from ready to expand the unemployed sector by adding refugees to the pool of job seekers. Although elevated, the EU unemployment rate is much better than the Western Balkan rate, which
ranges from 17 to 35 percent. This makes the Western Balkans the last place to host refugees.

Further complicating today’s migration challenge, many refugees and asylum seekers are non-Europeans and have different religious and cultural identities than previous waves of migrants. This will likely make resettlement more challenging at the local level and may dissuade localities from accepting more refugees. Accepting fewer refugees in individual localities will impact refugee placement in the aggregate. As EU countries restrict inflows, some may see this as a “fix” to the crisis. However, this would be an illusion and a huge mistake. Unless there is a practical solution that stymies the outflow problem, the number of refugees will continue to grow and become trapped in entry and transit countries.

Unfortunately for the Western Balkans, the migrant crisis is mostly about geography. The “Balkan Route” is well-known and has long existed as the land route to the Middle East and Southwest and Central Asia. It is also known as a major smuggling route for moving illegal cargo into and out of Europe. This creates an added dimension to the problem, because human smuggling and trafficking networks have been quick to capitalize on the plight of refugees and migrants for profit.

According to the latest figures from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Western Balkan route is by far the most used gateway into Europe for irregular migrants. It has become a corridor from Greece to Macedonia and then through Serbia to the borders of Hungary and Croatia. Balkan countries are European countries, and the effects of the migration crisis make it an inherently European problem. This is why an overarching, comprehensive European strategy with well-thought-out supporting polices that call for a “collective” European response is needed. Western Balkan countries need to be players at the table because

Asylum applications (non-EU) in the European Union and Germany, 2000–2015

Source: Eurostat
of their geography and the fact that their economies are too fragile to incur the political and economic costs of dealing with large numbers of refugees and migrants. This point is made clear by the recognition that of the problem and the need for a long-term strategy. There should be no illusion about the significance of the economic and psychological costs of this refugee crisis; they likely will be felt for a generation or more.

Complicating matters further, the Western Balkans is a major source of illegal economic migrants seeking jobs in EU countries. According to Eurostat data, Kosovo, Serbia and Albania have been among the top 10 countries of origin for those applying for asylum in the EU in the last three years. From January to October 2015, more than 130,000 irregular migrants from these three countries applied for asylum. For example, the total number of asylum seekers in Germany includes a staggering percentage from the Western Balkans. These numbers have risen to levels not seen since the 1990s. In 2014, the number of asylum seekers from the Western Balkans peaked at almost 110,000, compared to fewer than 20,000 in 2009. In 2012, there were almost 33,000 asylum applications submitted by Western Balkan citizens (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Macedonia) — 53 percent more than in 2011. This accounted for 12 percent of asylum seekers in Europe.

This has been the case for several years and deserves urgent attention. The cause is clear: Western Balkan migrants are economically motivated to escape from a region known for high levels of corruption, poor rule of law, and weak governance and institutions. The average annual income for a person in the Western Balkans is $5,300, less than a third of the EU average. As destination countries begin to close their doors because of political pressures, an increasing number of refugees and illegal migrants will be trapped in the transit countries of the Western Balkans. In a region that is already severely challenged economically, the impact of the refugee populations on the fragile existing infrastructure will be serious.

As large numbers of migrants become stalled in the Balkans, the potential grows for catastrophic political instability. It will produce one major outcome — more migrants and refugees. The other unmistakable fact that cannot be overlooked by European policymakers is that the next wave of refugees and migrants, like those in the past, will flow north. The EU must urgently act to develop a comprehensive long-term strategy that involves the Western Balkans. □
Since the numbers of immigrants and asylum seekers are now counted in the millions, the refugee crisis sits high on the European Union’s daily security agenda. The devastating situation along the southern Mediterranean shore has penetrated the EU’s island of relative prosperity. Therefore, political, economic and security consequences are discussed frequently. In “The Mediterranean Migration Crisis: Why People Flee, What the EU Should Do,” a June 2015 Human Rights Watch report, author Judith Sunderland offers a humanitarian perspective on the Mediterranean refugee crisis, demanding that the EU make this problem its top priority.

She starts by illustrating the environments most of the refugees flee from — namely Afghanistan, Eritrea, Somalia, Syria, and the transit country Libya — which together accounted for over 60 percent of the refugees in the first half of 2015. The report contains interviews with newly arrived asylum seekers that graphically describe the factors pushing people from their countries: a civil war with indiscriminate killing in Syria, never-ending military conscription in Eritrea and anarchy in Somalia, along with personal stories of violence and persecution.

But a common theme runs through these stories: Push factors clearly outweigh pull factors. Almost unanimously, refugees say they would have preferred to stay in their home countries or neighboring countries, but simply couldn’t. A young Nigerian depicted his situation in Libya: “You see them [smugglers] pump up the [inflatable] boat, put one hundred people on it, and you know it’s risky. I wouldn’t have taken that risk except for the problems in Libya. I would have stayed in Libya, but every day it gets worse.”

Sunderland claims that, as of June 2015, the EU had done almost nothing to systematically address the humanitarian needs of the refugees. Instead, the EU’s countermeasures largely focused on “trying to prevent or discourage people attempting to make the dangerous crossing.” This resulted in downgrading Italy’s search and rescue mission, Operation Mare Nostrum, to the EU mission, Operation Triton, with only one-third of the previous budget and far fewer assets. The leadership of Frontex, the EU’s border agency, further confirms that the EU’s answer to the crisis might better be described as humanitarian protectionism.

Sunderland therefore demands several policy changes from the EU to treat refugees according to international law. Highlighted in the report is the 1951 Refugee Convention, which grants everyone the right to leave his or her country and seek asylum, as well as the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which enshrines the “right to asylum.” To meet these legal obligations, not to mention moral ones, Sunderland investigates several policy areas and suggests potential improvements.

Improvements in budgeting and coordinating the search and rescue efforts in the Mediterranean are the most urgent issues. The chief demand of the report is that the EU create methods for legal immigration to spare refugees the dangerous and expensive odyssey they undertake to embrace their legal right to apply for asylum. The EU should increase the number...
of humanitarian visas, improve family reunifications and deepen coordination with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to support U.N. resettlement programs.

Once the refugees reach the EU, the report stresses, it is the responsibility of member states to guarantee access to full and fair asylum procedures that follow commonly accepted EU law and to end the patchwork of current practices. Additionally, if the asylum application system fails, it is important to ensure an “effective remedy” that recognizes the harm some migrants face if forced to return home. The report also shines a spotlight on children, who need special protection and care.

The humanitarian perspective taken in this report makes it a valuable contribution to the current discussion, which is often too focused on the EU’s superficial political interests rather than on the refugees themselves. It explains the array of push factors in great detail, and thereby succeeds in adding a human element to the statistics.

The catalog of suggested policy improvements may, at first glance, seem difficult to adopt in the current political reality of factional infighting on every level. But at least it points the EU in the right direction. Policymakers should take note of these claims when making decisions. Otherwise, refugees could be trapped between the crises in their homelands and the EU’s defensiveness.
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