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  The HAYAT program engages youth

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Welcome to the 24th issue of per Concordiam, which focuses on countering violent extremism and includes discussions of the risks associated with transnational terrorism and the role of female foreign fighters. The authors — Marshall Center faculty and alumni, politicians, practitioners, and academics in the field — explore a variety of complex and far-reaching approaches to dealing with this global threat to peace and stability.

Dr. Harald Weilnböck of the Radicalisation Awareness Network leads the issue with a thought-provoking viewpoint article suggesting that legislative, law enforcement and intelligence experts work in tandem with mental health experts and preventive practitioners from social services and schools to produce viable security strategies that could result in effective legislation.

Valkamiya Ahmadu and Mubin Shaikh present case studies of efforts to counter violent extremism in Nigeria and Canada, respectively. Judy Korn and Alexander Brammann of the Violence Prevention Network examine counterradicalization and deradicalization efforts in Germany that work specifically with violent extremists in prison. Julia Berczyk, also writing about the German experience, presents the HAYAT program’s pioneering deradicalization work with potential, current and returning jihadists that uses an innovative family counseling approach.

One of the more recent developments in fighting violent extremism and terrorism is recognizing the important role of women. Dr. Edit Schlaffer and Dr. Ulrich Kropiunigg present a study that examines the roles of sisters and mothers and how they can build female capacity to counter violent extremism. And Dr. Anita Peresin, a Marshall Center alumna, reports on her recently completed research project that examines the role of women who have recently left their homes in Western countries and performed hijra (Arabic for “emigration”) to the newly proclaimed “caliphate.” She explains that these people will require different types of treatment if they return to their home countries — a fact that must be reflected in counterradicalization and counterterrorism policies.

We encourage readers to seek a deeper understanding of the topic of violent extremism, which poses a danger to global security. Fighting violent extremism must be done with determination, but also with insight. All of us can assist one another in developing a better understanding of this complex issue. As always, the Marshall Center welcomes comments and perspectives on violent extremism and will include your responses in future editions of the journal. Our email address is editor@perconcordiam.org

Sincerely,
Keith W. Dayton
Director
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A BETTER WAY TO COUNTER VIOLENT EXTREMISM

The prevention and security communities must combine efforts to defeat terrorism

By DR. HARALD WEILNBÖCK, Radicalisation Awareness Network

The security community and the radicalization prevention community — two very different worlds — have started talking to each other, which is why I have been given the opportunity to write for this Marshall Center security publication. Arguably, this would not have happened 10 years ago. However, to achieve effective and sustainable solutions for a societal challenge as complex as violent extremism, practitioners from the security and prevention communities will need to cooperate even more intensely.

Clearly, significant readjustments of our security paradigm are needed. A new Marshall Plan for European security — something the Marshall Center could promote as one of its historical legacies — could change how we think about and approach security by bringing the security and prevention communities together. Or we could continue spending billions and still make things worse.

THE PRACTICE OF PREVENTION

How do I come to this conclusion? We prevention practitioners from the social services, mental health and similar fields have often been asked to formulate the criteria and methods of good practice for working with young people who are at risk or already recruited into forms of violent extremism. Lately this has focused on so-called foreign fighters that include ISIS and right-wing extremists traveling to war zones like Ukraine, as Miroslav Mares points out in a 2015 report in the Bundeskriminalamt’s (German Federal Criminal Police) EWPS Journal, while neglecting other forms of violent extremism. We prefer to call this work disengagement, rehabilitation, resocialization or simply relational work, rather than deradicalization.

We have done so in detail and in a solidly evidence-based way through the framework of the Radicalisation Awareness Network and have articulated and presented these criteria, principles and methods in various instances, including in my book The Narrative Principle: Good Practice in Anti-Hate Crime Interventions within the Radicalisation Awareness Network. In so doing, we have also attempted to be clear about the required contextual conditions for the intricate work of disengagement/rehabilitation to be successful and sustainable.

To give one current example: Prevention practitioners assert that one should not criminalize travel to Syria or to any comparable places such as Ukraine because in a free and human rights-based society, people’s freedom to go wherever they want must be respected. However, joining a terrorist organization may and should be criminalized. Furthermore, one should not criminalize support for certain ideologies — while you can and should penalize incitement of group hatred and violence against others — because in a free society everybody is entitled to his own beliefs.

The United Nations Human Rights Council states: “Freedom of opinion and freedom of expression constitute the foundation for every free and democratic society,” and any restrictions relating to extremism and terrorism must be “clearly and narrowly defined.” Without respect for these freedoms and civil liberties, good-practice disengagement and prevention are not possible. And if we cannot employ good-practice disengagement and further develop a sustainable prevention infrastructure, then European societies will soon be in pretty bad shape because we will then probably just continue with what was once confidently called the Global War on Terror but has turned into a quite desperate and futile, costly and ineffective War on Global Terror.

Although these requirements of good practice were developed as requested, the security sector and legislators in most countries have not listened, as shown by recent policy writing and legislation on travel to Syria. However, Denmark and Finland, where strategies for prevention and rehabilitation are outstandingly successful, are telling exceptions.
Most people involved in writing security legislation don’t understand what the prevention people are saying. It’s still an us-versus-them, security-versus-prevention mindset. Rather than working together and producing viable solutions, there is polarization (also a characteristic of violent extremism).

**A FRESH START**

Let’s try to start over and do this right. Maybe we prevention practitioners need to explain better why travel to war zones like Syria or support for any ideology should not be criminalized? The practical answer to this question is that criminalizing travel is counterproductive in that it keeps young people who went to banned places from returning home. And even more important, it keeps families and friends from seeking help from authorities and social services when a young person seems to be on the verge of traveling to a war zone, since people generally loathe to subject their loved ones to law enforcement scrutiny. These quite evident and easily anticipated effects make very clear the negative impact that criminalization may have, not only on disengagement, but on the overall objective of reducing radicalization.

In addition, it must be made clear why it is that criminalizing travel and/or ideologies basically pre-empts any sustainable prevention and/or rehabilitation work, even with those clients who find their way into intervention programs. This is because the first-line prevention practitioners who facilitate this sensitive work need to be able to offer a maximally trustworthy space. They need to have a maximum of integrity before their clients, not only personal integrity but also systemic integrity — the integrity of the system and society that the practitioners implicitly represent. In the eyes of young people who are susceptible to or have engaged in violent extremism, these practitioners are always representatives of and role models for society (but not necessarily of the state).

Speaking of trustworthiness, remember that practitioners of this kind of intervention work with the most hard to reach and difficult to engage young people, those who are highly distrustful and feel alienated from society for various social, political and personal reasons. The deradicalization process that includes disengagement, rehabilitation and reintegration, to which these young people would need to commit, is challenging and emotionally demanding. In addition to trust, it requires personal dedication, sharing experiences, opening up, utmost honesty, and exchanging ideas about sensitive issues of violence, victimization and gender, as well as confronting deep-rooted beliefs. This is not easy for anyone, particularly not for the young people we are most concerned about, which is why practitioners require a maximum of trustworthiness and personal and systemic integrity.

A society that criminalizes travel to certain places or support for certain ideologies clearly lacks sufficient respect for civil liberties and human rights and therefore is not seen as fully trustworthy. The young people will look at this and say: “They want to brainwash me! They are all brainwashers in the service of a corrupt system.”

Human rights is only one factor that undermines trust on the part of our most at-risk young people and thus renders it almost impossible to practice good disengagement. There is also the issue of sense versus nonsense. If practitioners seek to reach and engage the most distrustful and difficult-to-engage young people, they must make sense. However, actions such as criminalizing travel and ideology not only are human rights issues, but also they do not make sense. Criminalization in general, and in the areas of ideology, extremism and religion in particular, has never been effective, but rather has often been quite counterproductive and contributed to further radicalization and support for violent extremism instead of advancing sustainable solutions. Criminalizing travel makes no sense — in other words, it is nonsense and the young people we need to reach most urgently are very tough on nonsense.

Making things even more difficult, security policies are often not made primarily to solve security problems. Rather, sometimes such policies’ inherent purpose is to cater to certain constituencies or simply conform to institutional traditions of “how things were always done.” Or, as noted in a February 2015 countering violent extremism (CVE) report by the Soufan Group, these measures are occasionally based on what “briefs well in presentations to policymakers.” In a word, sometimes security measures are about politics, anxiety and power rather than sustainable solutions to intricate security challenges. And most young people are smart enough to sense this.

Under such circumstances, it is virtually impossible to engage those young people who we most urgently need to work with because they will not have sufficient respect and trust to commit to a deradicalization intervention. Of course, prevention practitioners can still try to distance themselves from this or that policy or, if necessary, from the current security paradigm altogether. However, that could entail the practitioners themselves being criminalized and put under surveillance by security legislation, as has happened in Germany quite recently during the time of the so-called extremism clause. The most excellent practitioners can work best when overarching security policy at least strives to meet the do-no-harm principle and/or the above mentioned no-nonsense, no-dishonesty criteria.

**NEW MARSHALL PLAN**

How can these adverse circumstances be overcome and good-practice programs in prevention and rehabilitation employed to build resilience on a European and global scale? We have already had success in developing good practices on a micro level and midlevel. Now we need to focus on the macro level — the overall security paradigm.

In February 2013, the Institute for Inclusive Security paid tribute to then-U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s legacy “in promoting a new security paradigm,” referring to Clinton’s work on women/gender, prevention and peace building. The institute states that “like Secretary of State George Marshall before her, she’s championed a bold new security paradigm” that will “bear fruit in seasons to come.” It maintains that “Clinton’s unique contribution: the elevation of women as a powerful force for a more stable world” is undoubtedly...
significant. The “elevation of women” rests on the clear insight that any polarization, such as gender polarization, may be the kernel of radicalization and violent extremism.

In the spirit of George Marshall’s plan to rebuild Europe after World War II, a new Marshall Plan on global security should be built starting with what Clinton promoted. The new Marshall Plan would not only be inspired by the idea of gender polarization, but it would take it to another level and look at polarization even more comprehensively. Hence, it would first and foremost strive to overcome the polarization between security/legislation practitioners and prevention/rehabilitation practitioners.

This, however, is a quite challenging task; it means bringing together two worlds and two mentalities that are quite different. It seems fair to say that the professionals from these two polarized areas tend not to understand each other, and distrust, dislike and hold prejudices about each other. Hence, to build intensive dialogue and cooperation between security and prevention, people will require systematic preparation and facilitation. Perhaps the peace-building and mediation methods used for preventing and mitigating radicalization could be useful.

I propose establishing a targeted, high-level working group that brings key practitioners and experts from the security/legislation and prevention/rehabilitation fields into a process of intense exchange and cooperation with an objective of creating a commonly owned security paradigm from which a sustainable national security action plan could be produced and concrete policy recommendations formulated. This joint working group could draw interagency support and expertise from other fields such as education, health care and local government as needed. Most important, the group and its activities would be as transparent as possible and regularly liaise with the media.

Methodologically, the group’s working process would follow a synthetic bottom-up approach rather than moving analytically top-down. It would thus delve into the field(s) as much as possible, consult with additional first-line practitioners and examine real-world scenarios, including investigating promising practices from different regions/countries. The examination of already existing interagency approaches such as in Aarhus, Denmark, and the current Finnish police prevention pilot should be a priority because such methods seem furthest developed in view of producing the desired co-owned strategies and action plans.

Most important, this working group would be given high political authority. This means that it would anticipate — and would be given the means to mitigate — the challenges of communicating its results and recommendations.
to politicians of different parties and to the public. Thereby, the group would make great efforts to work inclusively with a nonpartisan expert body. Policymakers, politicians and key administrators would need to contact the group regularly. The party representatives, while remaining independent in their decision-making, would be answerable to the group about how and whether its recommendations are implemented. Such a working group arguably would be more sustainable than traditional ways of introducing expert knowledge into the political process and would be more productive than any one-time, commissioned expert committee that writes a report that may not even be publicly accessible.

But is such an effort really necessary to overcome the polarization and create a new CVE protocol? Is a new Marshall plan for security needed? Some observations seem to suggest that this is the case. One need only think of the intricacies of political and media discourses and the automatism in which subjects like violent extremism have been treated by political discourses in many legislatures, or how issues like violent extremism trigger calls for stiffer sentences, criminalization of travel and so forth, while all available evidence suggests that these measures are ineffective or counterproductive. Hence, to get beyond this deadlock and successfully research and communicate on politically laden challenges such as violent extremism, strong efforts and special settings seem to be required.

PRINCIPLES OF CVE

Having highlighted the macro-level issues of security policies’ impact on prevention, we can focus on what has thus far been discovered on the micro level. The principles of good practice in disengagement/rehabilitation have been established through research, which was then substantially buttressed and further substantiated through recent activities within the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN). It allowed for intensive but affordable practitioner exchange across many European Union members.

Through extensive analysis, RAN has concluded that good practice in disengagement/rehabilitation (deradicalization) and downstream prevention require the following:

• Develop successful trust building between participants and facilitators and constant development of mutual trust, confidence, and personal commitment.
• Offer a safe space of confidentiality from which no personal information or report writing may issue.
• Present an open process, i.e., no fixed curriculum or session plan. This is by definition maximally participatory, exploratory and self-directed, and requires methodological flexibility on the part of facilitators.
• Allow voluntary participation.
• Proceed without formally and openly assessing the participants since this would hamper trust-building. Any necessary assessments should not be done by the facilitators but by other providers within the institution.
• Follow a narrative mode of interaction that facilitates processes of personal storytelling, which relate personally lived-through experiences and subjectively perceived actions. Narrative approaches steer away from (counter-) arguments, rational discussion and ideological debates. Good practice doesn’t counter; it builds.
• Convey an atmosphere that combines being accepting/supportive and challenging/confrontational in a way which is sensitively adjusted to the person and the situation that accept, respect and support participants as individuals, but address opinions and behaviors that pertain to violent extremism and group hatred.
• Focus on social skills and emotional intelligence, particularly in areas of conflict, anger, shame and anxiety; therefore, group settings are preferable as much as possible.
• Base sessions on face-to-face work relationships while keeping Internet, videos or media in small roles. (Contrary to the general belief, my research indicates that countermessaging campaigns are largely ineffective in disengagement and prevention.)
• Facilitate, ideally, with external, nongovernmental practitioners who have license to act independently within and across statutory institutions within the context of firmly delineated institutions (prisons, schools, etc.)
• Build close cooperation between intelligence and prevention professionals to play a crucial role in this interagency framework.
• Maintain an open process that leads to accounts of the clients’ actual life-world context, biography, family, and topics of victimization, gender identity, power and violence, and experiences of extremist recruitment.
• Occasionally touch upon political and religious issues, as well as on personal and social grievances. These grievances may also address certain media narratives/films, fictional or documentary, that can be used as one element in the intervention.
• Allow participation by representatives from the family, significant others or suitable community and civil society members.

ISSUES OF GENDER
Among the subjects that may arise and are deeply explored in the intervention process, gender issues have proven to be of particular importance. European practitioners’ experiences throughout RAN’s working groups, as well as from the Women/Gender in Extremism and Prevention Network (WomEx) and similar national practitioner networks, have taught us the following:
• There are hardly any violent extremist, terrorist or hate crime offenders who are not also sexist and homophobic, manifesting highly conflictive gender identity issues (hyper-masculinity, sexism, homophobia).
• Conflictive gender issues not only coincide with violent extremist behavior and group hatred but are key psychological driving forces behind them.
• Women and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender communities are prime victim groups of virtually all forms of violent extremism (right-wing, al-Qaida/ISIS related, radical Christian fundamentalist).
• Most violent extremist organizations are based on ideologies and practices of gender inequality, which is why they forcefully counter the emancipation of women.
• Women also play a crucial role in violent extremism as perpetrators, ideologues and supporters.
• Young men and women join extremist groups mostly because of social and gender-related motives aside from ideological or religious issues.
• Violent extremist and terrorist organizations launch gender specific appeals to recruit women and to recruit both women and men along specific ideas of being female and being male.
• Women and girls tend to be overlooked by prosecution, law enforcement and prevention as potential or actual extremists.
• It is often more effective to focus on personal gender identity concepts of masculinity or femininity than to engage in narrower ideological or religious debates.
• Besides gender specific approaches, and in combination with them, successful strategies of preventing and responding to violent extremism and group hatred also require gender focused approaches.

WomEx’s key conclusion is that accounting for gender perspectives in group hatred and violent extremism is more than adding a missing piece to the puzzle; it means that CVE needs to be approached in a more holistic way to secure success. Therefore, gender not only needs to be mainstreamed, it is advisable that gender-sensitive methods for both men and women are introduced into preventive and response strategies to effectively defuse the strong, effective charge that propels the highly gendered subcultures of violent extremism and group hatred.

IT’S ALL ABOUT YOUTH
Arguably, the most important aspect of CVE practice, aside from fundamental research on good practice, is that any prevention strategy needs to be effective with young people. It should not only be able to engage youth in general, but really needs to have an impact on those groups of young people who are of particular concern. These young people face multiple challenges (social/familial, psychological, educational/professional and existential) and, as a result, may tend to be more affected by group hatred (group-focused enmity) and different sorts of violent extremism. Our societal institutions often seem to have lost most lines of communication, rapport and mutual trust with these young people. Many prevention programs, while following good practice in principle, have not been able to reach and impact them.

One approach that seems to have had more success and yet corresponds with good-practice guidelines is “Fair Skills.” Fair Skills is being tested in Eastern European countries and largely operates on a peer-facilitation basis, using youth culture as a medium. The approach combines youth cultural workshops (rap, breakdancing, comics/cartoons and digital music production), moderated by peers from youth cultural scenes, with post-classical methods and exercises in civic education (anti-bias, human rights pedagogy, mediation and conflict transformation, gender awareness and communicational soft skills), and adds psychologically based self-awareness group work to allow for exchange of personal and life-world issues, as well as of social and political grievances.

If CVE practice manages to bring together the security and prevention worlds, focuses its policymaking on empirical evidence about good practice principles of disengagement and prevention work, emphasizes gender issues and succeeds in reaching out to young people of concern, then we will be able to create an effective strategy for security and resilience in our societies.
RETURNING FROM THE
Islamic State
GERMANY’S HAYAT COUNSELING SERVICE SHARES ITS EXPERIENCE WITH DERADICALIZATION

By Julia Berczyk, HAYAT-Germany

The phenomenon of people traveling to participate in foreign conflicts is by no means new or intrinsically tied to the Islamic State (IS) or other violent jihadist networks. David Malet reflects upon how local insurgencies—the conflicts often portrayed as threats to the transnational community—mobilize international networks in his analysis of historical foreign fighter insurgencies, *Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity in Civil Conflicts*. Malet argues that throughout modern history, there have been strong similarities in recruitment strategies for distant wars that are independent of respective conflict type. International combatants have fought for various causes, ranging from international communism to local ethnic group interests. Yet, law enforcement agencies all over the world increasingly focus on foreign fighters traveling to Syria and Iraq because of a considerable increase in their number, as well as the perceived threat they pose upon their return. The German government estimates that about 700 German residents and citizens have traveled to the region to support jihadist groups such as IS.

But how do we prevent individuals from traveling abroad, and how do we respond to those who return, apart from engaging law enforcement, increased security regulations and other repressive measures? This article reflects upon the work and experiences of the counseling service HAYAT-Germany and emphasizes the indispensable role of nonstate actors, integrative measures and professional networks to counter the perceived threat posed by returning foreign fighters.

FAMILY COUNSELING AND DERADICALIZATION

HAYAT, which means “life” in Turkish and Arabic, is the first German counseling program for individuals, as well as relatives and friends of people involved in radical Islamist groups or on the path to violent jihadist radicalization, including those who travel to Syria, Iraq and other war zones.

HAYAT was established in 2011, tying in with the experiences of the first German deradicalization and disenrollment program for highly radicalized neo-Nazis: EXIT-Germany. EXIT
developed methods and approaches to work with the relatives of radicalized persons to eventually prevent, decelerate and invert the radicalization process. Transferring this unique knowledge and experience into the realm of Islamic extremism, HAYAT is now available to parents, siblings, friends, teachers, employers and anyone who has a relationship with a person potentially on the path to [violent] radicalization. Moreover, HAYAT is working directly with radicalized people to demonstrate the prerequisites and possibilities of desistance from radical behavior, ideologies and groups.

Since January 2012, HAYAT has also partnered with the German Federal Office for Immigration and Refugee Affairs (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, BAMF), which established a national advisory center on radicalization (Beratungsstelle Radikalisierung). This hotline takes calls from relatives and other concerned persons, provides an initial assessment and then redirects calls to local, non-governmental partners like HAYAT.

During this first contact, HAYAT experts conduct an analysis and risk assessment of the respective situation to determine the level of counseling needed and to answer the most important questions first: Is the person in question in danger of becoming violently radicalized? Or is it a harmless case of conversion to Islam? Once the counselor has gained a clear picture of the situation, an individual counseling process and step-by-step plan is designed, including various measures to prevent further radicalization or to stop and reverse the process.

With our experience and expertise, HAYAT guides people who don’t want to lose their radicalized relative or friend and hope to understand and win him/her back. In short, we:

- counsel, provide contacts and listen
- make clear distinctions between a strong, lived faith and an ideology of inequality that can result in violence and terrorism
- help identify alarming signs and show the limits of what is possible
- provide new perspectives and shepherd cases for as long as necessary

Many parents turn to HAYAT for advice, among other things, in case their children are about to travel abroad to places like Syria, have already departed or may even have returned home. At HAYAT, we pursue three main goals in these cases:

- Try everything possible to dissuade them from traveling abroad.
- If they are already abroad, try to stop them from engaging in combat and persuade them return.
- Help them return and integrate into a safe social environment that respects universal human rights.

HAYAT relies on a nationwide network of partners and considers itself a bridge between families and institutions such as schools, social service agencies and, if applicable, courts, police or places of work. With this network, HAYAT assists in communicating with various parties with the primary goal of catering to the specific needs of the person and his family.

The demand for counseling has increased at HAYAT due in part to the emergence of IS. As of June 2015, HAYAT has provided assistance in 156 cases, of which 106 are still active. There is an increased security relevance in 48 cases. Among these, 38 relate to the conflict in Syria/Iraq. Four out of these 38 cases deal with returnees from the conflict in Syria/Iraq, and the HAYAT team is also aware of other returnee cases that are not directly linked to the program.

THE RETURNEES
People join jihadist groups for different reasons. Grievances, lack of recognition and appreciation, struggles within the family, the search for higher meaning in life, the fight for justice, and experiences of discrimination and exclusion are only some of many contributing factors that are exploited by violent ideologies. Our experience at HAYAT indicates that independent of social, national or religious background, any family in Germany can be affected.

Just as people joined these militant groups for different reasons, they also leave them for different reasons. By May 2015, about 230 foreign fighters had returned to Germany, according to the Verfassungsschutz, Germany’s domestic security agency. Contrary to public perceptions and statements by security services, not every returnee is dangerous, per se, will conduct a terrorist attack or motivate others to do. Moreover, not every returnee has been involved in violence, is brutalized or represents an imminent threat to society. In fact, the Verfassungsschutz notes that a majority of returnees seem to have engaged in no combat.

Based on our practical experience (as well as that of other experts in the field, such as Peter Neumann of Kings College London), we can identify three different types of returnees: the endangerer, the traumatized and the disillusioned. (We may see a new category in the future that would need differentiation and special attention: children of German citizens born or raised within the IS.) The endangerers pose a threat upon their return, for example, by plotting an attack or by recruiting new jihadists. The traumatized need therapeutic counseling and aftercare since an untreated trauma could sooner or later result in returnees posing a threat to themselves, those around them or even national security. Finally, the disillusioned have recognized, often soon after their departure, that the reality of jihad does not match original perceptions and expectations. Although they
have not yet dropped out of the movement, they doubt the practices and/or doctrines of the jihadists. They want to return home because they see no future in the IS. Overall, these different types do not necessarily share the same experiences or motivations for returning or adopt the same goals once they have returned.

Our counseling at HAYAT demonstrates that an individualized approach to dealing with returnees is of utmost importance, even in cases in which two individuals have traveled together to join IS. To use a real example, two friends traveled to the war zone together but parted ways upon their arrival and had very different experiences. They separated for reasons related to their individual motivations for joining IS in the first place, but their different experiences and careers within the IS also led them to develop different perspectives on what “real life” there looks like. To the public, they would be perceived upon their return as imminent security risks — more than 80 percent of Germans think returnees pose a grave security risk, according to a June 2015 Der Spiegel article. However, during the counseling process, we gained insight into their original motivations, experiences, mindsets, feelings and future plans and realized these two friends were intrinsically different people.

Hence, the response to returnees needs to be individualized. It also needs to minimize the potential threat posed upon their return. Independent of the type of returnee, there can only be individual approaches and counseling demands. Yet, the most challenging and problematic cases are those that are not on the radar of security agencies. Upon their return, these individuals, and those close to them, avoid seeking some sort of assistance, fearing they will be treated as criminals if they open up to a third party, which might also make them hesitant to contact HAYAT.

CHALLENGES AND OPTIONS
It seems as if the IS increasingly lacks money and fighters. More and more IS members are attempting to desert, Stephan Rosiny of the German Institute of Global and Area Studies told Deutschlandfunk in March 2015. These deserters have good reason to fear arrest or execution if their escape plans are discovered. Moreover, IS propaganda warns against leaving the “caliphate” out of love for their families, says a March 2015 report on

Students at a Berlin high school listen to a presentation about depictions of Muslims in the media. Such a curriculum is meant to help students resist joining violent jihadist groups.
Indeed, many IS fighters do manage to return to Europe. European governments have adopted various hard and soft policies to deal with this problem. Criminalizing departure, confiscating passports or denying returnees re-entry may serve as examples of a hard approach. However, even though repressive means are vital, they are only one side of the coin. On the other side, soft approaches, such as aiding the desertion process, are integral to minimizing the threat returnees might pose.

Moreover, repressive security legislation should not hamper people’s genuine attempts to leave violent extremist groups. We must differentiate between types of returnees and realize that putting all of them in jail might actually promote radicalization. We need to understand that jurisprudence alone is not a solution to a societal phenomenon, and politicians and society as a whole can no longer act as if they have nothing to do with the causes of radicalization and why some young people join militant Islamist groups. Returnees cannot be “parked” in jails forever, and their return or reintegration into society is only a matter of time. While there is no need for pity, there is a need to facilitate leaving jihadist groups and to provide those individuals genuinely willing to do so with alternative means of recognition, purpose and emotional and ideological support.

**COOPERATION WITH CIVIL SOCIETY**

A proper assessment of the threat posed by returnees requires knowledge of their activities in Syria/Iraq, their reasons for joining jihad in the first place and their motivations for returning, as well as information on when and where they return. Security services often find the latter information hard to access. Families and friends are reluctant to cooperate with them since it might result in the arrest of their relative or friend.

Civil society actors such as HAYAT can play a crucial role in obtaining information and assessing the situation. Such counseling services often possess access to and knowledge of individual returnees since they have earned the trust of their families and friends. Moreover, security services lack the resources to observe returnees 24/7. Practitioners such as HAYAT have different ways of gaining knowledge. For that reason, networking and cooperation between the authorities and civil society actors are indispensable. Sharing information and resources with the
consent of families is invaluable to conduct a proper analysis and evaluate the progress of each case. It may be more beneficial to increase collaboration and efforts on soft approaches than to attempt to control each and every returnee solely through repressive means.

Investment in preventive, supportive and reintegration efforts is necessary. HAYAT identifies three different levels in a deradicalization process. At the pragmatic level, emphasis must be placed on assistance to help the returnee gain a new perspective, for example, in finding a job, education or housing. At the ideological level, any deradicalization process must emphasize the delegitimization and invalidation of extremist group narratives. Returnees need not only refrain from violence, but also adjust their former worldviews. The effective level addresses the need of individuals for emotional support and alternative reference groups. Family, friends and mentors need to take a stance in opposition to the radical group. A disillusioned returnee’s social surroundings need to reinforce stability and optimism.

To sum up, a returnee should be investigated for crimes he/she has potentially committed, and if necessary, prosecuted. But for those individuals genuinely willing to leave jihadist groups, we should not hinder them from defecting and returning, especially by repressive means such as criminalizing their return or withdrawing residency permits. Disillusion should not be countered with a lack of prospects; otherwise, we run the risk of instigating reradicalization and creating endangers.

In contrast to many other European countries, where state-led programs often prevail, in Germany we find highly professionalized and engaged civil society actors in the field of deradicalization and prevention. This country is equipped with the necessary expertise and practical knowledge. However, we still lack the financial investment in the personnel needed to cope with the high demand for counseling. Providing long-term assistance is extremely time-consuming, especially when it comes to returnees. Sustainable structures, as well as networks consisting of psychologists, social workers and attorneys, are key to meeting the needs of different types of returnees. But to create such alternative opportunities, civil society needs to be better equipped.

NOTE: This article is based on an article first published as “Returning from the ‘IS’ – experiences from the counseling service HAYAT-Germany” in Janusz Biene’s and Martin Schmetz’s Kalifat des Terrors – Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven auf den Islamischen Staat, an e-book appearing on the Sicherheitspolitik-Blog of the University of Frankfurt. It is available online at http://www.sicherheitspolitik-blog.de/files/2015/07/Kalifat-des-Terrors.pdf

For more information on HAYAT and its work, visit its website at: http://www.hayat-deutschland.de/
Ozana Rodrigues, mother of Brian De Mulder, who left for Syria after being indoctrinated by the Islamic extremist group Sharia4Belgium, poses with a photo of her son outside the Antwerp courthouse in Belgium in January 2015, where the trial of the group was underway. REUTERS
Mothers Against Terror

By Dr. Edit Schlafer and Dr. Ulrich Kropiunigg, Women without Borders/SAVE

Families are best placed to address radicalization before it escalates into violence.
Radicalization is a process that often takes place at home under the noses of parents and close family members. Parents are often unaware of what is going on with their adolescent or young adult child until it is too late.

When a son or daughter “changes,” it isn’t necessarily a warning sign. Adolescence is a time of change. Parents sometimes feel secure and relieved when their child turns away from drugs and embraces Islam instead. From then on, there is no smoking, no drinking, no sleeping until noon. Other parents may ponder the seriousness of certain behavior patterns but assess them as harmless and within the undefined borders of adolescent “storm and stress,” as one mother of a foreign fighter put it. She was concerned and torn between tolerance and helplessness. “He wouldn’t talk with me as much as he used to. He stopped seeing his friends and spent more and more time in his room.” These were warning signs, but they were overlooked until the son went to Syria and soon after was killed.

What were the driving forces in his case? What pushed and pulled him away from his family? Interestingly, in general terms, we are much more informed about pull factors and recruiting methods than the deep dynamics that cause a child to turn radical in the first place. A clue might lie in what a Belgian mother was involuntarily forced to observe: “The recruiters gave him a sense of personal value that he didn’t have in his life. This is what brought him to Syria.”

MOTHERS ARE NEGLECTED

Experts have studied the underlying social and psychological factors that motivate individuals to adopt extremist ideologies, yet comprehensive conclusions have not translated into policies. The counterterrorism approach has largely consisted of reactive strategies, relying heavily on military and security forces to carry out actions meant to punish and deter. While this strategy has recently been scaled up, the incidence of terrorism is growing more critical. Theoretically, we know push and pull factors and many other root causes, but these theories have not been applied on a practical preventive level.

One reason is that countering violent extremism (CVE) research has left out a key actor: mothers.

As a group, mothers hold valuable data on what makes individuals vulnerable to radical influences regardless of economic, political and socio-economic factors. In particular, mothers of radicalized youth view their children’s coming-of-age journey as navigating the uncertainty of adolescence and young adulthood, and as a result, provide unique insights into responses incomprehensible to outsiders. Furthermore, mothers are also strategically placed to serve as a buffer between radical influences and those targeted next. They are the starting point for building resiliency within their children’s early years of development, as well as the
Nigerian women hold a protest demanding the release of schoolgirls abducted by the militant group Boko Haram in April 2014. REUTERS
first to recognize and address signs of distress such as anger, anxiety and withdrawal. This dual capacity to pre-empt and respond to radical influences makes mothers essential participants in an effective security paradigm.

It is widely recognized that individuals are influenced by their social contexts: their hopes, aspirations, struggles and reactions are largely shaped by the environment in which they emotionally and psychologically develop. In examining these social and emotional variables, we can gain a clear picture of the common factors that lead people to adopt extremist ideologies, and therefore develop targeted prevention strategies. “If we really want to identify and support resilience in communities under threat, we cannot do so from a distance. We need to listen to and observe its residents and learn about its history, culture, social structure, values, needs, resources, and daily experiences, in order to determine precisely what resilience means for them,” notes the article “Building Community Resilience to Counter Violent Extremism” published in Democracy and Security in 2013.

A NEW RESEARCH MODEL

Based on this understanding of the deficits of ongoing CVE approaches, and of the unique position of mothers, the nongovernmental organization Women without Borders/Sisters Against Violent Extremism (SAVE) developed an applied research project to collect evidence on mothers’ potential to protect at-risk youth. The organization’s “Can Mothers Challenge Extremism” study examined mothers’ perception of the threat of violent extremism and their understanding of their role in the radicalization and deradicalization process. The study draws on the subjective understanding of mothers on the causes, factors and realities of violent extremism as they experience them in their families, communities and, most importantly, in the lives of their children. The study focused on sons because, while daughters are increasingly joining extremist groups, boys remain the majority of those involved.

THE STUDY

The three-stage study was designed to collect, analyze and apply data from mothers living in Nigeria, Pakistan, Northern Ireland, Israel and Palestine — regions affected by violent extremism. In the first stage, 200 in-depth interviews were conducted in each country to gain an overall picture of the social and emotional environments of adolescent and young adult sons. The questions were grouped into seven areas: family background, the children’s lives, the mother’s role in her child’s upbringing, proximity to extremism, societal factors — especially in contexts affected by violence, existing coping mechanisms for violent extremism individually and collectively — and future strategies.

In many communities, extremism and violence are taboo; therefore, gathering data requires breaking through social barriers. Some women were reluctant to talk at first, particularly mothers whose children were already involved in extremist activities. Guilt, shame and fear initially inhibited them. They eventually opened up once they understood...
that they are valuable contributors and allies. Many subjects expressed relief after speaking out. From these interviews a number of themes emerged, and these were used to develop a questionnaire. Three key areas were explored: 1) how mothers see their role in reducing the attraction of extremist ideologies, 2) who they would turn to in a situation characterized by confusion, fear and alarm, and 3) what they need to be effective in recognizing and responding to the warning signs of radicalization.

The interviewing team focused on over 1,000 respondents — about 200 in each country — to complete the questionnaire. The questionnaire used a Likert scale to assess levels of agreement with 43 statements and questions. Another three topics addressed were: 1) What are the sources of extremist influences? 2) Whom do mothers trust? 3) What do mothers need?

STUDY RESULTS

Overall, a consensus emerged regarding perceptions of a mother’s role in countering extremist influences. The data from both the interviews and the surveys strongly conveyed mothers’ concerns about the risk of their children becoming radicalized. A majority of mothers expressed confidence in their own abilities to prevent their children from becoming involved with violent extremism in the first place and to recognize early warning signs. Moreover, in many of the interviews, the mothers expressed a sense of urgency and eagerness to collaborate with similarly concerned mothers in combating the growing problem of extremist recruitment.

A MOTHER’S FEAR

The mothers believe that extremist agendas are disseminated primarily through the Internet, radical religious leaders, political organizations and television. These sources are not surprising, but the overall picture that emerges is noteworthy. These four diverse sources are given almost equal significance, indicating that on an average day, youth are confronted by radical messages from many different angles: the media, the Internet, schools and social networks. The breadth of these sources indicates that some communities have very little protected space, leaving youth highly vulnerable. Therefore, the pervasiveness of extremist messages, reported by the mothers in the study, provides the most intricate details of this picture.

I HAD KNOWN WHERE TO TURN, MAYBE I COULD HAVE STOPPED HIM.”

A mother at a Women without Borders seminar whose son was killed fighting in Syria

A MOTHER’S TRUST

Where do mothers turn when they have concerns about their children’s safety and well-being? What people or institutions do they trust to provide support? The primary answer was other mothers, at 94 percent. Fathers were listed next, at 91 percent, followed by other relatives, at 81 percent. In a crisis, the family circle is the primary source of support. Teachers, listed fourth with a trust score of 79 percent, and community organizations, at 61 percent, are the first institutions they turn to outside of immediate social networks. Religious leaders earn a 58 percent trust score, suggesting a level of some ambivalence. State organizations earn among the weakest trust scores, with police at 39 percent, the army with 35 percent, and local government with 34 percent. International organizations earn similarly weak trust scores of 36 percent. The national government, however, earned the lowest trust score overall: 29 percent.

The most important piece of data, corroborated by other evidence in the study, is that mothers trust themselves along with other mothers first in protecting their children. This is notable because the existing security approach currently focuses implementation within national and local authorities, two groups that seem to evoke significant distrust. Moreover, the lack of trust in the state is a critical finding and reveals a trust gap between the private and the public spheres as they relate to security. This fundamental problem was recently addressed in a 2014 Terrorism and Political Violence article titled “The Stagnation in Terrorism Research,” which argues that government and private citizens need to collaborate to combat radicalization. Therefore, a key step in countering terrorism is finding ways to enable cohesion and trust within communities. This is a finding that was likely only to come from mothers themselves.

WHAT DO MOTHERS NEED?

How then do mothers assess their own needs? What kind of support do they need to protect their children from radicalism? First, the data indicate strong radicalization concerns. This emerged during our interviews and during the survey. Of all needs provided in the survey, 86 percent of mothers considered increasing their knowledge about the warning signs of radicalization to be of highest importance. This was followed by training in self-confidence, parenting skills and computer

widely acknowledged, gaining a clear picture of the initial entry into extremism has important implications for effectively addressing radicalization at its origin. Mothers’ insights help to elucidate the most intricate details of this picture.
skills. Moreover, a majority of mothers favored connecting with similarly concerned mothers and speaking up together against radicalization.

This reveals two important conclusions. The first is that mothers are confident in their own security potential if equipped with the right tools and knowledge. Second, their awareness of their needs indicates they are already confronting radical influences and feel as if they are responding less than effectively.

Overall, these findings suggest that there is an immediate need for a more diversified approach to counterterrorism — namely one that includes the expertise and strategic position of mothers. In a preventive paradigm, their voices and capacities are essential to develop new strategies and partnerships. But this requires mothers to be recognized as key allies; as long as they are excluded, so is this most valuable point of intervention. The gap in the existing security paradigm, seeking to address recruitment at the root, requires the involvement and active engagement of mothers.

**THE MOTHERS SCHOOL MODEL**

In the wake of these significant conclusions, the final stage of the “Can Mothers Challenge Extremism” study applied the acquired knowledge and developed a comprehensive model that addressed the most important needs expressed by the mothers. Specifically, the findings indicated that mothers hold significant, underrecognized potential in countering violent extremism, yet needed specific support to optimize their capacities. With this data, Women without Borders created the Mothers School (MS) model to address these needs and strengthen community resilience, starting at the center of the home.

The MS model seeks out mothers as an embedded security ally and arms them with the skills to be an effective foundation of community resilience. This model targets and optimizes a pre-existing, underutilized resource and is inherently a grass-roots approach. The curriculum, implemented through trusted community partners, includes specific exercises that facilitate dialogue, exchange information and use critical reflection through context-based techniques that apply to participants’ daily lives. This model creates a formalized space for mothers to improve their knowledge of early-warning signs and strategize how to be effective barriers to radical influences. Together they can deconstruct social barriers and have open dialogue about their children’s struggles, as well as their own.

MS has been a pilot project in Indonesia, Kashmir, Nigeria, Pakistan, Tajikistan and Zanzibar, and evaluations show that it has been embraced. Mothers report that participating in MS with similarly concerned women builds self-confidence, improves parenting skills and provides them more credibility in their homes and communities. As one MS participant from Kashmir stated: “We always think that such discussions can only be among the educated and elite people from high profile societies. But, now we believe after exploring, our skills were with us always but unfortunately on sleeping mode, that we can also become friends with our children and help them to deal with any kind of support so that they don’t feel the need to look for any violent alternatives.”

The pilot findings also indicate that the MS curriculum provided the mothers with substantive information and targeted skills, better preparing them to identify and respond to radical influences.

**THE MS CURRICULUM**

The central components of the curriculum are building confidence and self-esteem, increasing knowledge and reflection on parent-child dynamics, and delivering specific training in countering radicalization. The curriculum includes 10 modules spanning three stages, guiding participants through a process of gradual awareness-building. These stages move successively from the self, to the family, to the community, and then to one’s role in security.

The first four workshops aim to collectively create a safe and comfortable environment in which barriers can be deconstructed and productive dialogue can take place. The exercises guide them through critical reflection on themselves, including identifying their strengths and weaknesses, along with analyses of their communities and their roles within them.

Feedback from MS participants suggests that the workshops are meeting these needs. As one mother stated: “Once you encourage someone here who shares her sad story or about the problems in their lives, just a word of encouragement makes them feel strong. They think they are not alone. They get the feeling of acceptance.”

The crucial adolescent phase is a small window of opportunity for two key actors. Radical recruiters appeal to disaffected youth at this time of heightened vulnerability with promises of honor, community and paradise. But it is also a pivotal point for mothers to instill counternarratives and positive alternatives. The next stage progresses from addressing barriers to emphasizing targeted skill training. Primarily, it aims to address the need of improving parenting skills and focuses on education and analysis grounded both in theory and on the social political realities of the community.

For example, one mother explains how she applied this knowledge in her home: “It is a common belief that you don’t give much importance to the children and listen to them every time, and instead you should be strict so that a fear is maintained and they have respect. But, in this class, I came to know that the fact is something else. ... It is just a notion and it is very important to acknowledge the problems of our children.” Another mother asserted, “Instead of making the problems an excuse, we should also develop positive thinking so that our children don’t feel burdened and depression due to us.”

The last stage focuses on how to establish and continually reinforce resilience in the home. Mothers are provided with specific instruction on recognizing and reacting to the early warning signs of radicalization, including instruction...
on the role the Internet plays in spreading extremist messages, as well as how to engage fathers in looking out for, and addressing concerning behavior. At the conclusion of this stage, the mothers have an increased awareness of the threat of radicalization to their children, and a deepened understanding of their own role, as well as a broad tool kit of strategies.

**MOVING FORWARD**

As the study findings convey, mothers are instrumental in implementing targeted intervention at the prevalence phase. And they are a valuable source of information, not only about the intricacies of youths’ social and emotional environment, but also as a reflective lens. Mothers of radicalized youth provide a perspective most salient to developing a new security approach. Mothers are the common thread to youth who vary in background, religion and political involvement. As the emotional link to their children, they have the unique ability to piece together common denominators.

To give prominence to this key data, Women without Borders brought a group of mothers from Europe and Canada to share their insights about the radicalization process of their children, who had all departed for Syria. In sharing their experiences with security stakeholders in a strategy meeting, they painted a picture of their children’s personalities, struggles and the changes observed in the early stages of the radicalization process. As one mother whose son died in Syria in 2012 explained: Recruiters “mislead children because it tells them they are selected, that they are chosen. These ideas tell them that Allah will take care of them.” Another mother shared: “My son was very immature. He had no real information about religion and no real intellectual perspective about religious questions. This is why he was radicalized so quickly.” These mothers were able to present to government officials, policymakers, counselors, educators and journalists how their children were lured away and what, in hindsight, were the warning signs.

For example, one mother noted: “Having a bottle of wine at dinner suddenly became a problem. Then we couldn’t have friends over because he was afraid of how they would dress.” Another mother said of her daughter, “She hid the voting card when it came in the mail. She started denouncing democracy.” These signs, in retrospect, are clear indicators of their children’s new influences, but the mothers explained how fear, confusion and even false hope prevented them at the time from understanding their gravity. Most importantly, the mothers felt they lacked support that could have helped save their children. “I hid my concerns from everyone. … I was too afraid to talk. … If I had known where to turn, maybe I could have stopped him.” Another mother shared how authorities failed to take her concerns seriously when she tried to warn them that her daughter was trying to leave for Syria: “In France, the authorities don’t have connection with the parents. They don’t have the will; so we all work for the same goals in different spheres and don’t make any progress.” Indeed, clearly defined solutions evolved out of this conference, including improved communication and collaboration between local authorities and families, and scaling-up of counseling services and counseling referral mechanisms. These strategies are likely to be among the most effective as well as cost-efficient.

The conference’s positive feedback from the mothers and the government and community representatives supports the need to explore ways to formally include mothers’ insights into security dialogues. Security stakeholders not only found this conference uniquely informative, but the mothers returned to their homes inspired and equipped to help other at-risk families.

**THE NEXT STEP**

In establishing a robust security architecture, closing the information gap is the first step. This is accomplished in large part by including mothers’ insights in the prereadalization phase, followed by the development of prevention strategies that address these early concerns, and the use of mothers as the primary implementers. Enabling mothers through capacity-building is a key element in this bottom-up approach. However, for these initial fortifications to have an impact on curbing violent extremism, mothers must have support within civil society.

**CONCLUSIONS**

Mothers sit on the front line. We would argue that their position is even more vital than that of local authorities who are tasked with reacting to, rather than pre-empting, processes of radicalization. So, in the absence of our ability as a global society to eliminate the myriad causes and sources of radical messages, our only option is to build resiliency from within. Addressing the internal, emotional forces that leave one vulnerable to extremist ideologies, such as anger, resentment, resignation, or lack of purpose and belonging, requires individual attention and support from trusted, willing individuals. Violent extremism, understood as a symptom of these emotional deficits, is inherently beyond the scope of the government or local authorities. In fact, it demands the involvement of civil society.

Mothers are at the center of the home; they are the first to recognize changes in their children, such as anger, anxiety and isolation. They have unique access and a continuous connection with their children, which remains consistent throughout their growing interactions with the outside world. They are a crucial element to building resilience into the social fabric. Indeed, tapping into mothers’ preventive potential and establishing capacity-building mechanisms for mothers as key security allies is an essential part of an effective and cost-efficient security architecture. This is a tall order and deserves recognition and support. Overall, it is not only the mothers, but the world at large that stands to gain the most from this effort.
A description of best practices for successful deradicalization programs
“It was intoxicating — I could decide over life and death.”
“You simply couldn’t, you had to obey, others made the decisions.”
“I would have done it. I didn’t give a damn about the man. I would have beaten up the woman, too … all of them.”
“What about the kid?”
“That’s not fair. There are simply too many of them.”
“Did you hear the child scream?”
“I did not want to."
“What do you think, how did the little boy feel when he saw his dad fighting to stay alive?”
“Shocked … furious … helpless … desperate … terrified. But I don’t feel sorry for these people — that’s what you’re getting at, right?”
“What do you think, with all these emotions pent up, what’s the boy going to do some day?”
“One day he is going to bash someone’s head in …” Silence.

This is a dialogue from a coaching session with an inmate in Germany. The young man was sentenced for racially motivated crimes as well as assault and battery, intimidation, defamation and armed robbery. His tattoos reflect his right-wing extremist ideology: swastikas, SS runes, the Iron Cross. What is interesting, and by no means a rare occurrence, is that he first showed signs of behavioral disturbances as a child. He committed petty crimes and ended up in community homes. At that point he started developing a racist ideology, which, in conjunction with racially motivated offenses, marked the end of a negative development process, and was not, as one might assume, its beginning. He seemed a hopeless case — obstinate, unable to reintegrate into society, a danger to himself and others.

Extremist ideologies that are supposed to give life meaning are many and wide-ranging. In Syria and northern Iraq, tens of thousands of young people from all over the world join ranks to set up the self-proclaimed caliphate in an orgy of bloodshed.

“Things were getting serious. We wanted to fight against the oppression of Muslims.”
“So this is why you decided to go to Syria?”
“That is where I learned to use explosives, how to handle arms. I was given my own Kalashnikov. My brothers, who had come with me from Germany, were looking forward to the battles.”
“You wanted to fight for your Muslim brothers?”
“They kept telling us how great it would be to finally slaughter the first infidel with a blunt knife, to cut off his head”. “Didn’t you feel good about it?”

“It kept haunting me, coming up in my dreams. I was not prepared for that. We came to devastated villages. Among the ruins I saw dead people. I kept throwing up again and again.”

Many of them return disillusioned and traumatized. However, the radical ideology which made them leave their home country hardly ever ends with these negative experiences.

THE ORGANIZATION

The Violence Prevention Network is a nongovernmental organization of experts experienced in extremism prevention. Since 2001, it has been active in the deradicalization of extremist perpetrators, helping reduce the number of ideologically motivated serious crimes and felonies.

Over the years, the Violence Prevention Network has gained expertise in working with ideologically motivated perpetrators, and the organization has become a leading authority in this field. The team consists of women and men of different professions and denominations. This diversity is a basic prerequisite for successful pedagogical work. The Violence Prevention Network has developed an approach called Verantwortungspädagogik, or “teaching responsibility,” which allows the team to address people who have joined anti-democratic structures without humiliating them, helping them instead to reintegrate into democratic society.

The concept of teaching responsibility is based on cooperation that helps people acquire the personal competences needed to break away from inhumane ideologies. The cooperation takes place in an atmosphere of respect. People feel appreciated while being asked questions that eventually make them see their ideology in a different light.

The Interior and Justice ministries of the German federal states, numerous other authorities and federal ministries have been working with the Violence Prevention Network for years because of the organization’s unique expertise and solid reputation. It set up the European Network of Deradicalisation, is a founding member of the European Commission’s Radicalisation Awareness Network, and cooperates with numerous European nongovernmental organizations in the field of extremism prevention and deradicalization. The group participates in comparative studies and is continuously evaluated by an independent external institution for quality assurance. The Violence Prevention Network is supported by an Academic Advisory Board of renowned experts.

THE APPROACH

To deal with radicalization of adolescents and young adults, the group developed a three-step method: prevention, intervention, and disengagement assistance for those who want to get out.
The team, which specializes in working with radicalized young people, knows how to address radicalized members, maintain a dialogue, trigger changes in their behavior and encourage them to turn away from contemptuous ideologies.

Violence Prevention Network offers advanced training for professionals who work with the same target groups and are confronted with specific challenges.

**THE FIELDS OF WORK**

**Imprisoned radicalized youth and extremist adults**

Violence Prevention Network’s program, “Taking Responsibility — Breaking Away From Hate and Violence,” offers anti-violence and competence training for young people with right-wing extremist tendencies or those on the brink of Islamic radicalization, regardless of their background. Stabilization coaching is offered to juvenile delinquents for up to one year after their release from prison.

An essential part of the program concentrates on the families of these young offenders. Their involvement is crucial to the training process. Having worked with families, and in particular, offenders’ parents for years, and having motivated and mobilized them, Violence Prevention Network team has accrued much experience.

Since 2001, more than 900 juvenile delinquents from Germany with extremist tendencies have participated in the program. Only 13.3 percent have become repeat offenders and have been imprisoned again — a recidivism rate 70 percent below the Germany-wide average. Continuous evaluation validates the network’s high success rate.

**Prevention through community work**

Another project, MAXIME Berlin, is an intercultural/inter-religious prevention project for the development of tolerance and democracy. The group transfers insights gained from its work in prisons to Berlin’s secondary prevention program. The program’s practical approach helps reverse radicalization tendencies at an early stage. In addition to the anti-violence and competence training applied knowledge testing, MAXIME Berlin offers workshops for enablers and for high school students.

In January 2015, the Bahira counseling center was started in cooperation with the Central Council of Muslims in Germany and the DITIB-Şehitlik Turkish Islamic Community Neukölln. This counseling center focuses on the prevention of Islamist-motivated extremism within Muslim communities. Bahira center is located in a mosque and helps raise the Muslim community’s awareness and ability to prevent radicalization. At the same time, it is a place that parents and young people go for advice.

**Counseling parents**

Since 2013, Violence Prevention Network has been operating in Hesse, Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg as part of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees’ joint project: Advice Center for Radicalisation – Advice for Family Members in the Context of Islamism. The project is aimed at making parents more aware of their responsibilities as educators and enhancing their communication and conflict resolution skills to create a sustainable and resilient relationship between parents and their children.

The goal is to initiate deradicalization processes through stable relationships. Working together with parents helps build their strengths and gives them the opportunity to talk about their anxieties, their self-reproaches and their helplessness. Sound expert information and well-proven counseling approaches create an atmosphere that helps parents understand how children became radicalized and what parents can do to build sustainable and resilient relationships with them. They also realize that a reversal process may take a long time, and setbacks are to be expected.

**Tailored programs**

In coordination with the ministries of Justice and the Interior, Violence Prevention Network has been active in deradicalizing Islamist extremists on the basis of personalized measures since 2007.

In the summer of 2014, the Hesse Counseling Center was established as part of the Hesse Prevention Network against Salafism. The center works toward the prevention, intervention and deradicalization of young people through parents and professionals. In close cooperation with local law enforcement, efforts are made to keep low the number of those willing to leave the country, to help them break away, and, in the long run, to facilitate deradicalization.

Crossroads, a Berlin-based advice and intervention project, started offering programs for radicalization prevention and the deradicalization of young people with right-wing
extremist tendencies in the summer of 2014. The group targets young people on the road to radicalization, as well as those who already turned, and helps them reconsider and get out of the “scene.”

Together with the Berlin Senate Administration for Internal Affairs, Violence Prevention Network has been implementing deradicalization measures since April 2015. The Compass Counseling Center addresses Islamist extremists and tries to dissuade them from using violence and from joining the wars in Syria and Iraq. Work with returnees is another part of their concept.

**TARGET GROUPS**
The goal of Violence Prevention Network is to help radicalized individuals or those who have committed ideologically motivated crimes break away from their faulty ideology and leave the radicalization process. The clients of Violence Prevention Network include right-wing extremists, people with an Islamist ideology, and radicalized Islamists at different stages of radicalization such as: (1) ideologized people with a grievance, (2) ideologized people with an inclination toward violent behavior, (3) ideologized radicals and (4) radicalized people with a high potential for violence.

In addition to preventive actions, measures of secondary and, in particular, tertiary intervention are part of Violence Prevention Network’s toolbox. Preventive measures serve to strengthen ambiguity tolerance, help break up an ideologized interpretation framework, recognize early warning signs and facilitate the prevention of radicalization processes.

Intervention measures at the beginning of the radicalization process and targeted deradicalization work are used to make people doubt an ideology-driven way of life, their views on society and their goals and actions based on inhumane ideologies. Clients trying to find a way out are offered an opportunity to turn their backs on extremist ideologies.

Different degrees of ideologization and radicalization require different approaches. Youth welfare services and schools are often confronted with confused adolescents, making them easy victims of radicalization. In juvenile detention centers, radicals target young people who justify their acts of violence with their ideological motivations, although their worldviews are often inconsistent and unstable.

People with adamant, unshakable ideological views are usually particularly dangerous. The stronger the ideology, the more militant and increasingly radical they can become. Unlike ideologized people who act in the heat of the moment, because their ideology makes them believe that violent acts are justified under certain circumstances, highly ideologized people know how to keep their emotions under control and use violence as a means to achieve an end. The triggers for radicalization are often difficult to identify and the process itself can either take years or escalate quickly. Recruitment efforts by extremist groups take place in youth welfare institutions, schools, communities, penitentiaries and on the Internet.

**PRINCIPLES OF DERADICALIZATION**
Deradicalization calls for a personalized approach, depending on the degree of radicalization and individual history. There are, however, general principles that determine whether deradicalization efforts can be successful:

1. Effective prevention and deradicalization depend on the dialogue between extremists and deradicalization practitioners. This is about building trust, not about using the right arguments. Statements made by extremists do not need to be “countered” — extremists feed on being countered. If you do not offer resistance, if you do not preach and if you do not try to use convincing arguments, a door will open and discussion will become possible. Instead of entering into a controversy that tends to reinforce the radicalization process through counterarguments, the point is to ask the right questions about perceptions, mindsets, beliefs and behavior. The dialogue and the long-term working relationship open the way for self-reflection and questions.

The reasons for radicalization are as different as the individuals, and each case needs to be scrutinized independently. Experience, however, shows that in most cases young radicals are looking for answers to the questions occupying their minds. To admit these thoughts, to offer alternative interpretations, and then ask your own questions is perceived as irritating and breaks up a radical’s usual patterns of thinking.

In this line of work, the goal is to encourage independent thinking and individual assessments, and not make individuals replace their inhumane ideology with humane values without second thoughts.

2. One of the key factors is relationship. People who feel disregarded and see no meaning in their lives need someone to talk to who is interested in who they are, not only in their radicalization. They need to experience being appreciated. This is the pre-condition for self-confidence, independence and self-responsibility.

3. Law enforcement measures that are not combined with deradicalization and rehabilitation approaches won’t be successful once offenders are released from prison. Bottom line: Lock them up for life or give them a chance to change. Otherwise many of those who leave prison will be highly radicalized. This is a bitter lesson to learn, as we have noted in Brussels, Paris and Copenhagen.

4. Last, but not least, a closing remark: The terrorist organization calling itself the Islamic State is more powerful than any other terrorist organization before and is a phenomenon able to inspire youth around the world. We need, more than ever, close cooperation between professionals — such as researchers, media experts, deradicalization experts, security services — and government officials. We all have the required expertise in our fields of work and should be open-minded enough to share our knowledge and cooperate closely to cope with this challenge and to save lives.
The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) has received considerable attention for its barbarity against women and its systematic degradation, abuse and humiliation, including formally approved physical and sexual violence and slavery, in the territory under its control. In spite of that, more than 550 Muslim women have recently left their Western countries and performed a hijra, the Arabic word for exodus or migration, to the newly proclaimed “caliphate.” These women represent about 10 percent of all ISIS’ Western foreign recruits. Apart from that, authorities from different Western countries continuously report new cases of women who are being arrested at airports on suspicion of trying to travel to Syria or who express willingness on their social media accounts to make the pilgrimage.

Understanding their motivations to join ISIS and the importance of their experience in ISIS-controlled territory is necessary to assess the capacity of some ISIS women to become female terrorists, incited and trained to commit violence in the “Islamic state” or in their Western countries of residence. Women who successfully went through different stages of the complex model of foreign fighter’s radicalization will require different types of treatment if and when they return to their home countries, something that needs to be recognized in counterradicalization and counterterrorism policies.

Who Are These Female Recruits?
It is impossible to create a profile of women at risk of being radicalized by ISIS based on age, location, ethnicity, family relations or religious background. They are mainly between the ages of 16 and 24. In most cases, they are second- or third-generation descendants of Muslim immigrants, but the number of converts is also growing. Generally, a significant number had good prospects for education and life in the West and hail from well-established, moderate and nonradicalized families.

An important question is what term should one use to refer to ISIS’ Western women, considering their motivation and the roles they play in the Islamic state? Should we label them naive, manipulated victims, muhajirat, female foreign fighters or female terrorists?

While many terrorist organizations have used women to carry out terrorist attacks, especially suicide bombings, such use of ISIS’ women has not yet been confirmed, but is also not strictly forbidden.

A broad definition of foreign fighters as noncitizens who travel to conflict states to participate in insurgencies and who are mainly motivated by religion and ideology could apply to these female migrants from the West, some of whom, once they arrive to Syria or Iraq, learn how to use weapons and can be seen carrying Kalashnikovs. However, a strict interpretation of Shariah law bars women from combat, and so far there is insufficient evidence of ISIS using women in that role.

European women drawn to ISIS in Syria and Iraq pose a potential threat if they return home

By Dr. Anita Peresin, senior advisor, Office of the National Security Council, Republic of Croatia
In terms of self-identification, Muslim women who moved to the so-called caliphate call themselves muhajirat, indicating discontent with their previous social environment in the West, their desire to move to a place of ideal perfection (the caliphate) and their religious motivation for seeking that change. Notwithstanding how adolescents understand ISIS’ ideology, the concepts of caliphate and the role of women in it, ISIS also uses naive and easily manipulated teenage girls to play a role in the territory under its control, inducing them to embrace a cause that they often do not clearly understand.

With the above-mentioned limitations in mind, none of the labels noted earlier apply generally to all the Western female migrants. Proper labeling will depend on their evident motivations, roles and activities in ISIS-controlled territory. Although it is hard to quantify the extent of alienation of female migrants in their respective countries of residence, there is sufficient concern about this trend to necessitate learning what motivates women from the West to move to a war-torn area and join a notorious terrorist group.

Motivations
Women are joining ISIS for a number of reasons: religious, ideological, political and personal. First, women are responding to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who called upon...
them to help create conditions for the growth and normal functioning of the newly proclaimed state in which some women see a chance to take part in the state-building process and creation of a new society in contrast to the “decadent and morally corrupt Western society, which has no respect for women.” With that in mind, women talk about joining the state, not a terrorist group, and expect to be given an important role in creating the new, ideologically pure state, where they could live “honorably” under a strict interpretation of Sharia law.

Those motivated more by political reasons believe that they have joined a humanitarian mission to relieve Syrian suffering after viewing horrific images of the conflict. This, together with the feelings of alienation and inequality, racism, religious restrictions, xenophobia or negative attitudes toward Muslim immigrants in the West, is used by ISIS recruiters to boost the aspirations of Muslims to live and practice their religion in a more congenial environment.

When it comes to personal reasons, women have expressed a number of motivations: a desire for adventure, a feeling of alienation, dissatisfaction with their lives, a search for alternatives, romantic disappointments and adolescent rebellion. As is the case with some men, some women are bored, and the possibility of being part of a movement that claims to be shaping history seems attractive. Others are attracted to the prospect of marrying foreign fighters whom they view as heroic, sacrificial figures.

The motivation of female migrants also changes over time. Someone who was initially motivated primarily by one set of factors may thereafter gradually change her thoughts based on experience. Others assumed roles in the Islamic state different from what they had expected after the initial exposure to ISIS’ social media campaign.

Social Media Campaign

Its focus on foreign fighter recruitment can be considered the most effective ever conducted by a global terrorist group. A carefully planned and conducted media campaign in a variety of languages and on various platforms such as Twitter, Facebook and Instagram focused on female supporters who had already joined the group with the aim of demonstrating that living conditions of ISIS women, both material and intangible, were better than in the West.

Individual ISIS supporters, empowered to take part in creating and distributing the narrative, share official propaganda about ISIS’ victories in battles, promote ISIS ideology and regularly post personal details about their experiences in the group. By presenting their normal daily activities, such as cooking, making Nutella pancakes, playing with kittens or posting pictures of romantic sunsets in Syria, online promoters are offering a picture of life under ISIS rule that is positive and attractive to would-be followers, even if it is contrary to reality.

Social media posts also give a variety of practical and motivational tips and guidance to would-be migrants. They advise them how to travel, what and what not to pack, how to communicate with families back home, and how to adopt different roles in the land of jihad, covering the competencies of housewives and facilitators. Women are taught not only how to cook meals from an ISIS recipe book, but also how to use weapons, administer first aid, and work with computers to design and edit programs to spread ISIS propaganda.

This is the first time that a militant organization has given strict guidance to women on their roles, preparing them for the “honor of jihad.” That raises the question of whether women are discovering what they expected in ISIS-controlled territory.

Life Under ISIS Rule

From ISIS propaganda, it is clear that the main attraction by which ISIS lures Western Muslim women is the opportunity to become wives of ISIS fighters and mothers of a new generation of jihadists. Additionally, they are needed for domestic female supporting roles, like cooking or nursing soldiers, or to take professional positions left unfilled by men, to control the civilian population and to recruit others.

To ensure that thousands of male Western foreign fighters will not leave ISIS territory, the group created a strategy to retain them with jobs, a house and a family. In addition to being promised a salary, they are promised a wife, often more than one. Western female migrants who enthusiastically make themselves available to marry ISIS foreign fighters are apparently regarded as better mothers and supporters of jihad than local women, who are often reluctant to marry foreigners. Western foreign fighters might also prefer Western women, who are culturally and linguistically closer to them.

The fact that these Muslim women left the West also demonstrates that they see ISIS as ideologically superior to the Western worldview. ISIS promotes having Western women in its ranks as a validation of its power, strength and the acceptance of its ideology throughout the world. What we know about the reality of life for Western Muslim women on the territory controlled by ISIS primarily comes from women’s social media posts.

On one hand, ISIS female online recruiters and promoters emphasize their satisfaction and assert that everything is functioning as in a normal society. They report they are treated better than in the West and express a sense of belonging. On the other hand, there are women who succeeded either in escaping or in contacting their families in a desperate attempt to receive help to return home. They talk about shocking experiences and an awareness of having made the biggest mistake of their lives, based on mistreatment by their husbands or dissatisfaction with their role within ISIS. Other frustrations also emerged, including complaints about being banned from combat, the strains of widowhood, and the harsh physical environment of Syria.

Even if well-treated, women are exposed to a very different type of life than in the West, in relation to the way they must dress, restrictions on their movement and other social controls, especially if they are unmarried. According to ISIS propaganda, women coming alone are welcomed and settled in an all-female hostel with a guaranteed monthly allowance, but are supposed to marry shortly after arriving in Syria.
THERE ARE WOMEN WHO SUCCEEDED EITHER IN ESCAPING OR IN CONTACTING THEIR FAMILIES IN A DESPERATE ATTEMPT TO RECEIVE HELP TO RETURN HOME. THEY TALK ABOUT SHOCKING EXPERIENCES AND AN AWARENESS OF HAVING MADE THE BIGGEST MISTAKE OF THEIR LIVES, BASED ON MISTREATMENT BY THEIR HUSBANDS OR DISSATISFACTION WITH THEIR ROLE WITHIN ISIS.
However, many ISIS online recruiters openly advise women to try to arrange a marriage before they arrive in Syria or Iraq. Finding an appropriate husband is an important precondition to make their position easier.

Migrating to the ISIS-controlled area does not mean that the life of muhajirat will be easy. Expected hardships in marriage and in other worldly matters are presented as a means by which Allah tests women’s patience and faith.

Some women explained that foreigners are not always well-accepted by the local population and reported problems with local people who are generally unwelcoming. They report cases of mistreatment and discrimination in places such as hospitals. The better living conditions and benefits that foreign fighters enjoy create division and resentment among the local population, complicating relations. Additional tensions could be caused by unfulfilled expectations of some Western women. ISIS propaganda mostly shows women carrying guns but enjoying traditional female activities.

Indeed, another question is whether women are satisfied with the strict rules and limited female roles, having imagined engaging in combat as featured on social media accounts. The role of ISIS women is most clearly described by ISIS itself. In an Arabic document posted on a jihadist forum in January 2015, ISIS, in contrast to what is promoted online to Western women in English, clarified that the designated role of women under its version of Shariah was primarily domestic: to raise the new generation of jihadists. On the other hand, this manifesto does not exclude a combat role for women, but permits it only in extreme cases such as enemy attack, lack of men or a fatwa issued by an imam. Considering the threat that
the returning women of ISIS could pose to the West, it is important to assess their attitudes toward violence and their intentions to participate in combat.

Tendency Toward Violence
Many posts published by ISIS women in the social media support and celebrate brutality and violence toward enemies, call for beheadings, and justify such brutality according to their reading of Islamic law or indicate a personal desire to inflict violence. Some women also display militancy, expressing a willingness to become a martyr as a fighter or suicide bomber.

Despite these expressions, ISIS’ online promoters are clear. As one said: “Women may gain more ḥajr [reward] by spending years of sleepless nights raising children with the right intentions and for the sake of Allah than by doing a martyrdom operation.” Whether or not women want to fight for ISIS, “for the sisters it is completely impossible for now. Inshallah (God willing) in the future.”

Posted pictures and statements show that some women are trained to use weapons, but purportedly for their own protection. Also, members of two all-female brigades, Al-Khansaa and Umm al-Rayyan, responsible for patrolling the streets, are armed. They accompany male fighters at checkpoints and on home raids to search women, look for male fighters who might have concealed their identities under a veil or niqab, and enforce ISIS’ strict rules of dress and morality.

Members of Al-Khansaa, set up in Raqqa in February 2014 and composed mostly of British migrants, are presented in the media as being brutal with women who do not obey their strict morality. They have been accused of cruel punitive methods, such as disfiguring 15 women’s faces with acid for not wearing a niqab or torturing a mother with a spiked clamp for breastfeeding in public.

The main role of these all-female brigades is expected to include strict control over people’s behavior, essential for ISIS to impose the fear and obedience necessary to establish authoritarian rule over its territory and to generate civilian compliance. Such extended roles will fulfill the expectations of some women, giving them more power, but also making them more dangerous for the West if and when they return.

The Future of ISIS Women
A key concern is what the future of ISIS’ Western women will be, especially if the so-called Islamic state collapses and the group loses control over its core territory. Disappointed, disillusioned and perhaps aware of having made a big mistake, some disenchanted women would probably not be interested in adopting violent jihad in the future.

The future activities of most Western female migrants will be closely intertwined with the future plans of their husbands, and with the future of ISIS as a group or the territory of the proclaimed caliphate. If the latter should collapse, many of those who remain fully committed to global jihad are likely to seek to help embattled Muslims elsewhere, migrating to other fronts where ISIS may have found new allies. Others could be discouraged from returning home by the fear of arrest in their home countries; they would look for other places to live and continue their mission.

Some Western migrants will try to achieve more militant roles in the Islamic state if the situation on the ground worsens for ISIS. Other scenarios envisage a more active role for the women of ISIS in their home countries as recruiters, facilitators or direct perpetrators of violent acts. The fall of ISIS could strengthen their commitment and motivate them to continue the jihadist struggle in their home countries. Their motivation, together with the military training they received in Iraq or Syria and their experience of living in a war zone, means that they must be considered a potentially serious security threat to the West if and when they return.

Special attention should also be focused on children who have grown up there, since they have been exposed to the same scenes of violence and have been indoctrinated and trained in using weapons, just like their parents. On social network accounts, some women have already posted threats against the West by urging women to commit terror attacks on the domestic front.

Not all ISIS female sympathizers are active on social media, and this makes them less visible to security services. As such, they could pose an even more significant security threat. Compared to women who succeeded in joining ISIS, radicalized females who didn’t make the hijra and who lack military training could be instructed to perform simpler attacks against unprotected and softer targets.

Conclusion
Explaining why a growing number of Muslim women from the West have left their countries to join ISIS in Iraq and Syria is a complex task and depends on a combination of different motivational factors and expectations. ISIS, for its part, has evident strategic reasons to attract women from the West, in consideration of their importance for the future of the movement. However, the realities of life in the “caliphate” for many women neither matches the romanticized and utopian image presented online, nor fulfills their expectations that they would assume significant military roles.

In consideration of their strong motivation, current engagement and potential role in the future, ISIS’ Western women could pose a considerable security threat to the West. Some will come back disillusioned and, as such, will probably be easily reintegrated into society. Others, who will arrive with military training and the intention to remain active in the global jihadist network, could pose a more significant threat as potential female terrorists ready to plot against their home countries or to inspire others to do so. This group should be monitored, seriously assessed for risk, categorized and properly treated.

As of mid-2015, ISIS’ Western women posed no direct physical threat to the West. Nevertheless, we cannot rule out a possible shift in roles in the future. As Umm Ubaydah, one of ISIS’ best-known female recruiters, posted online: “Maybe the time for us to participate is soon.”
The wind of insurgency rocking Nigeria’s North East Geopolitical Zone emanates from the terror group Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad, aka Boko Haram, and has experts comparing Nigeria to Syria, Iraq, Tunisia, Somalia, Afghanistan and a host of other countries that have been engulfed by Islamic extremism. Like any growing democracy, Nigeria is not immune to challenges. In a country of 170 million spanning the ethnic, cultural and religious spectrum it would indeed be peculiar if agitation and struggle were not part of the landscape.

During Nigeria’s 16 years of transitioning into a democratic state, certain conflicts have come to define the administrations of successful governments by putting them in the spotlight of trying to resolve certain issues. These issues range from resource control in the Niger Delta to communal and ethno-religious conflicts in virtually every corner of the country and include kidnapping, armed robbery and the proliferation of small arms.

For instance, when former President Olusegun Obasanjo was elected in 1999, he tackled militancy in the Niger Delta and kidnapping and armed robbery in the South East and South West zones of Nigeria. His successor in 2007, President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, continued in the same vein. He fought militancy in the Niger Delta, sought peace by establishing an amnesty program and dealt with the early emergence of Boko Haram. Subsequently, President Goodluck Ebele Azikiwe Jonathan inherited these crises, but Boko Haram absorbed the focus of his administration.

By Valkamiya Ahmadu

The CLEEN Foundation establishes programs to empower citizens

Counter VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN NIGERIA

Nigerian hunters in Adamawa take part in a December 2014 operation against the extremist Boko Haram group.

AFP/GETTY IMAGES
BACKGROUND

The emergence of Boko Haram in the early 2000s was like gunpowder waiting to ignite. Its ideology was clear: “Western education is sin,” meaning education imported from the West often challenges local culture and belief systems. Therefore, cultural norms were seen to have been permeated by Western culture. Former Boko Haram leader Mohammed Yusuf was a charismatic preacher whose message quickly gained popularity and appealed to various followers, from elites and professionals to impoverished youths. Yusuf offered his foot soldiers motorcyles and prepaid phone cards. This helped him gather information and establish a strong loyalty base for speaking out against the police and political corruption.

Following Yusuf’s death in 2009, under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau, the group escalated from hit-and-run grenade attacks to direct confrontation with security agencies using suicide bombers and making improvised explosive devices. Not only have many lives been lost and much property destroyed, Nigeria has also been experiencing a surge in the number of internally displaced people — nearly 2.1 million according to the July 2015 report of the National Emergency Management Agency. The Goodluck Jonathan administration’s efforts to crack down on Boko Haram were met with strong criticism as ineffective. The group’s recent successes, as seen by its increasing military capabilities and conquest of military bases with weaponry, reinforces perceptions of their power. The reach of its network, initially limited to Nigeria, now extends to Cameroon, Chad and Niger, and is reaching out to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.

The Goodluck Jonathan administration’s efforts to crack down on Boko Haram were met with strong criticism as ineffective. The group’s recent successes, as seen by its increasing military capabilities and conquest of military bases with weaponry, reinforces perceptions of their power. The reach of its network, initially limited to Nigeria, now extends to Cameroon, Chad and Niger, and is reaching out to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.

Based on the above, there is indeed need to double efforts to counter insurgents, especially as they try to entice the unemployed, uneducated population wallowing in poverty with a so-called better alternative.

CHALLENGES

The polarization of the crisis by past administrations contributed to the rise of Boko Haram. Many felt the insurgents were being sponsored to destabilize the Jonathan administration. The abductions of the Chibok girls were met with doubts. It wasn’t until the government was pressured, from inside and outside the country, that it felt the need to act. We are still grappling with determining how many have been kidnapped since the start of the crisis. The credibility of the Nigerian Army was put into question when issues such as poor funding, lack of equipment and training for officers affected morale and its motivation to fight insurgents.

The Jonathan government’s approach was kinetic, which consisted of the deployment of military personnel, the establishment of a multinational joint task force, and subsequent declaration of a state of emergency in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states. It also took a soft approach to counterterrorism and implemented the following:

- Adopted the national counterterrorism strategy and the national security strategy
- Established Almajiri schools in select northern states
- Established the Victims Support Fund to assist those affected by the war
- Used the criminal justice system to prosecute war crimes suspects
- Established the Terrorism Prevention Act as amended in 2013

However, little appears to have been gained since the declaration of war. The proposed 2015 defense budget, at $4.8 billion, is 20 percent of the national budget, leaving many to question the government’s ability to bring lasting peace to the region.

Under the present administration of President Muhammadu Buhari, the war against the insurgency seems to be reinvigorating as confidence is being restored to the Nigerian Army. A leading role is played by the Nigeria Chief of Army Staff, who is seen to be leading the war. Some of the successes recorded in mid-2015 include the dislodgement of the group has been recaptured by the Army. This intensity stems from the three-month deadline set by the president to fight and win the war.

CYLEEN FOUNDATION STUDY

To this end, the CYLEEN Foundation, a nongovernmental organization formerly known as the Centre for Law Enforcement Education, launched a series of projects to gather empirical evidence on the causes of insurgency in the country’s North East Zone. The findings would inform pilot intervention programs aimed at addressing the contributing factors, evidence-based policy and legislative advocacy.

In 2013, the foundation, whose mission is to promote public safety, security and accessible justice, was the first organization to launch an in-depth study on youth and radicalization in northern Nigeria, titled “Why Do Youth Join Boko Haram.” The study covered six states across northern Nigeria, including four states that suffered numerous attacks (Borno, Yobe, Kaduna and Kano) and two others (Gombe and Sokoto) that were relatively peaceful and unaffected by Boko Haram attacks. The findings helped achieve a number of significant milestones, including increasing awareness among stakeholders of the root causes of insurgency. It also contributed to the development of the Nigerian government’s soft power countering violent extremism program, launched in March 2014 by the Office of the National Security Adviser. The research was adopted by security agencies to undertake a comparative analysis. Some of the findings include:

- Ignorance of Islam: It was unanimous in all the states surveyed that ignorance of Islam’s religious teachings is the leading factor influencing the adoption of extreme religious views, especially by youth. It was discovered that the activities of independent or roaming preachers, who claim to be Islamic scholars, oftentimes find impressionable young people to be easy targets for their poisonous ideological recruitment. In Borno, for instance, 93.2 percent of the respondents were of the view that ignorance of the full teachings of their religion is a factor that influences...
the adoption of extreme religious views by young people. In Kano and Sokoto, 37 percent and 33.2 percent of the respondents, respectively, were of the view that ignorance of the full teachings of their religion is a contributory factor to the adoption of extreme religious views by young people.

- Unemployment and poverty: The unemployed and the poor remain marginalized and highly vulnerable to behavior that’s detrimental to peace and security in Nigeria. In Borno, for example, high unemployment and poverty rates were identified as the second most important reason for youth engagement in religious-based violence. The large army of jobless youths and Almajiris — child beggars — tells the story of this segment of the Nigerian population whose future appears bleak, thereby disposing them to social disruptions, religious conflicts and violent extremism.

- Children with poor upbringing: The growing number of children without adequate parental guidance has contributed to the problem of youth extremism in northern Nigeria. Widespread poverty has contributed to a growing population of Almajiris. Most of these children live in appalling conditions, roaming and begging for alms or hawking wares in major cities throughout Nigeria. The Borno and Yobe regions have witnessed the worst cases of youth extremism.

WOMEN PREVENTING EXTREMIST VIOLENCE

Women Preventing Extremist Violence (WPEV) in Nigeria is a flagship project of the United States Institute of Peace in collaboration with the CLEEN Foundation. It identifies and nominates local civil society organizations (CSOs) in the states of Kaduna and Plateau to offer training on the following:

- Understanding radicalization and its prevention
- Learning skills to prevent extremist violence
- Building relationships of trust with local police
- Creating one’s own WPEV plan (tailoring CSOs to address local needs)

The forum provided an avenue for the CSOs to talk about some of the challenges they encounter, such as building trust with law enforcement. A discussion about collaborating and enhancing a working relationship led to pledges from law enforcement and CSOs:

- Maintain continuous dialogue in terms of community policing to bridge the gap between the police and the public.
- Establish interagency collaborations with the public.
- Improve community-based engagements with local constituencies to help them police proactively, rather than reactively, which often results in conflict.
- Establish police reform awareness and sensitization programs.
- Create civil society-led police officer training.
- Maintain regular channels for complaints.
- Make available emergency communications services such as 911.

The women have continued their work and passed the workshop on to other CSOs in other states. They have also conducted quick interventions, particularly with young children who are seen to be drawn toward extremism. There is an improved partnership with local law enforcement agencies through forums to deliberate on security issues that affect the state as a whole.

THE GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY NEXUS

Another CLEEN Foundation study looked at the relationship between governance and security by raising questions about how the character of governance affects or influences security in six states in the North East Zone — Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe. The aim was to create a platform for a bottom-up approach to governance through constructive engagement by building the capacity of citizens to hold the government accountable. Some of the findings were similar to the research on youth and radicalization. Drivers of conflict included unemployment, public sector corruption, socio-economic depression, tribal/religious conflicts used as tools by government and politicians to create insecurity, and an overly tolerant attitude toward religious preachers whose unregulated activities are often not discussed because of Nigerian sensitivity surrounding religious issues.

The CLEEN Foundation’s flagship strategies of engagement include discussions of necessary issues that bring stakeholders together. Following completion of the study, CLEEN collaborated with the Nigeria Stability Reconciliation Programme to organize a validation workshop on the research findings to determine the way forward during a two-day summit in Gombe.

The CLEEN Foundation has established training and mentoring programs to fill an identified critical gap. One such program is the mapping of human rights defenders in the North East Zone of Nigeria. The project is designed to:

- Improve the capacity of human resource departments to report on human rights issues and ensure victims speak for themselves about the impact of the insurgency on their communities.
- Increase awareness of human rights violations occurring in communities and encourage them to demand justice.
Project beneficiaries have begun to collate, document and analyze data and take action against human rights violations. To build a close network of human rights defenders, they have shared their findings among stakeholders through a link-serve between regional human resource departments. While this is ongoing, work still needs to be done. A periodic platform for discussing the current issues also needs to be organized.

THE WAY FORWARD

The way to fight insurgency is by winning the hearts and minds of the people; without this, no progress can be made. It is noteworthy that the current administration, under President Buhari, as part of his priority to restore security to the Northeast, began with a change of guard in the appointment of new service chiefs as well as the national security advisor to restructure the military command. Also the pledge made by the administration of $100 million to the Lake Chad Basin Commission of the Multinational Joint Task Force to launch a full onslaught against the insurgency is a welcome development that is yielding tangible results. However, there is still much to be achieved:

1. Political will: There is a need to sustain political will to ensure that the war against insurgents is won. The Review of the Kinetic Approach (change of strategy to proactive measures) must be adopted, and welfare incentives to security agents are of utmost priority, as this is the only way to sustain troops’ commitment to the war.

2. Transparency and accountability: Monitoring defense and security spending by oversight agencies must be stepped up, because Nigeria’s defense spending over the last five years has doubled despite less accountability on the part of the federal government to justify the spending. As the federal government doubles efforts to restore peace to the region, state governments, particularly those in the Northeast, must complement the activities by providing good governance and must be held accountable to their citizenry.

3. The Victims Support Fund: Set up by the past administration, this fund needs to fulfill pledges to access the camps for internally displaced people. Some of these camps are overcrowded, with cases of abuse and worrisome living conditions. It is imperative that the government set up makeshift schools and hospitals to address some of the immediate challenges before beginning long-term resettlement, as well as provide vocational skills to displaced people by way of engagement.

4. Development: Developmental issues such as education, empowering youth, creating an enabling environment, eradicating poverty and establishing industry to revive the economy of the North East — particularly in the worst-hit states of Borno and Yobe — must be addressed for there to be productive change. The security provided by the $2.1 billion World Bank loan is a step in the right direction, but a clear and justifiable plan with efficient monitoring must be in place to ensure that end users receive the money.

5. Capacity building: Nigeria’s military needs more counterinsurgency training to help it carry out its duties with sensitivity to human rights, and to establish a more open approach to civil-military relations.

6. International assistance: It is critical that international partners fulfill pledges made in support of the war. Providing capacity building for Nigerian troops, assistance in intelligence gathering and equipment (lethal and nonlethal) will complement the efforts of the Nigerian government.
National ministers and senior government and military officials from 40 nations met at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies for a five-day seminar titled “21st Century Converging Threats: Nexus of Terrorism, Drugs and Illicit Trafficking.” The Senior Executive Seminar examined and discussed transnational crime and terrorism, and strengthening professional relationships among participants to counter these threats. The event included not only lectures from international experts specializing in countering terrorism and organized crime, but also smaller group discussions designed to build trust and understanding among participants to find common ground for cooperative responses.

Keynote speakers and panel discussions with subject matter experts helped participants evaluate the myths and reality of convergence between global terrorism and organized crime and then explore emerging trends in criminal/terrorist tactics and technology.

It should come as no surprise that the Islamic State (IS) was discussed extensively, as it was in previous senior executive seminars. Gen. Hussein Hazza’ Majali, former interior minister and minister of municipal and rural affairs of Jordan, offered his perspective. Calling IS a terrorist organization, Majali said it was different from other extremist groups because it’s the first to hold territory. He told participants that IS leverages an impressive business model to finance and gain territory across ungoverned spaces. He also warned that the organization continues to evolve. The IS recruiting focus has shifted from disenfranchised youth to educated professionals and other cooperative states and nonstate actors attracted to IS resources such as oil.

Lessons learned from countering the insurgency in Afghanistan were also explored in great detail with perspectives offered by Afghan Minister of Interior Affairs Noorolhaq Olomi; Italian Brig. Gen. Carmelo Burgio, who command the Combined
Training Advisory Group-Police responsible for training the Afghan National Police; and John Sopko, special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction.

The lessons they shared were to maintain international and interagency cooperation and information sharing; cooperate with the private sector and nongovernmental organizations; keep pace with the adaptive nature of nonstate actors; find the balance between security and civil liberties; and have adequate resources to implement security strategies.

During the weeklong seminar, the 74 attendees participated in smaller working groups for four workshop sessions, allowing them to discuss the convergence and nexus of terrorism, drugs and trafficking. These groups reached a consensus that the issue of convergence may be overstated.

Many felt that terrorism and crime converged and diverged at various times. When it occurred, it was more a “marriage of convenience” rather than a deliberate strategic alliance. In fact, participants downplayed the importance of defining “nexus,” “convergence” and “hybrid.” Most were more interested in focusing on effective responses and whole of society responses to issues such as corruption and radicalization.

The issue of the large migrant exodus to Europe raised concerns in workshop sessions and in coffee break discussions. Many thought the international community was dealing with the symptoms of the problem and not the real reasons why people were leaving. Keynote speakers and participants recognized a deeper problem than the migrant exodus — the economic vacuum left behind in Iraq and Syria and the failure of their reconstruction efforts.

Among other keynote speakers who addressed participants were NATO Supreme Allied Commander Gen. Philip Breedlove, who also commands the U.S. European Command; Chairman of the European Union Military Committee Gen. Patrick de Rousiers of France; and U.S. Africa Command Deputy for Military Operations Vice Adm. Michael Franken.

The importance of the Marshall Center’s international participants in shaping understanding can’t be emphasized enough. The problems examined during the Senior Executive Seminar can be exacerbated or difficult to solve when viewed from a “Western-only” perspective. The need to understand local cultures, history and circumstances is important. Bringing together this international executive group was vital to examining the issues objectively and without stereotypes.

Accordingly, many participants equated good governance in Africa and the Middle East with strong, even repressive, governance. In their opinion, liberal, democratic norms touted by the West were less helpful in solving major problems. To most of the workshop members who contributed to the debate, security and stability seemed to matter more than personal freedoms.

The Senior Executive Seminar in 2016 is scheduled for September 12-16. It will be offered only in English. Governmental and military leaders interested in attending should contact the U.S. or German embassies in their respective nations or email the Marshall Center registrar at registrar@marshallcenter.org.
DEEPENING PARTNERSHIPS

The U.S. Air Force and Marshall Center focus on building military skills

By MAJ. DEAR BELOVED, U.S. Air Force/Marshall Center Fellow

In December 2013, for the first time, three U.S. Air Force (USAF) Regional Affairs Strategist (RAS) officers completed the Program for Applied Security Studies-Capacity Building (PASS) course at the Marshall Center (GCMC). This landmark development came at a time when the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force/International Affairs (SAF/IA) chose exceptionally qualified officers to complete a shorter six- to 12-month regional certification program, in lieu of the traditional three-year process of Naval Postgraduate School, Defense Language Institute training and in-country immersions. The unique combination of professors, curriculum and students at GCMC provided an advanced environment for RAS officers to build international relationships along with diplomatic and cultural skills that transfer worldwide.
The time is ripe for deeper cooperation and partnership between the SAF/IA and the GCMC. This partnership will be a force multiplier that expands the engagement capacity of the United States in the global arena. The GCMC can provide the USAF with an effective and cost-efficient alternative to RAS training. Key aspects of the GCMC and SAF/IA programs, as well as specific regions of shared interest in Europe, Eurasia, the Middle East/North Africa (MENA) and Sub-Saharan Africa, provide ample justification for this approach.

The GCMC plays an important role in implementing U.S. strategy in Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia. Through a German-American partnership, it helps build expert security policy capacity, creates and sustains networks of policy practitioners and brings decision-makers together when needed. The GCMC receives its policy guidance from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, whose memorandums from 2013 and 2015 outline the mission focus:

1. Address regional security issues in Europe, Eurasia, Central Asia and Israel;
2. Conduct transnational efforts with partners to address counterterrorism-related transnational threat activities;
3. Conduct a counternarcotics and illicit trafficking program in consultation with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs;
4. Engage with the U.S. European Command priority countries of Russia, Turkey, Poland and Israel;
5. Engage Central Asia on regional security and defense cooperation;
6. Select high quality participants with significant potential for success;
7. Address threats and challenges to stable governance, such as border security, man-made and natural disasters, regional conflict, border security and cyber security.

The GCMC College of International Security Studies (CISS) directs a number of programs and hosts approximately 750 students or participants annually. The CISS strives to build a common baseline for global challenges and opportunities, capacity building, governance strategies and approaches, and cultural understanding with an emphasis on Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia. The expertise of the CISS staff transcends its traditional European focus and extends to all regions of shared interest in Europe, Eurasia, the Middle East/North Africa (MENA) and Sub-Saharan Africa, providing ample justification for this approach.

The CISS strives to build a common baseline for global challenges and conflict areas. Discussion flows freely on subjects ranging from global warming and piracy to frozen conflicts in the Caucasus.

Of the 10 resident programs that CISS currently offers, those most applicable to AF RAS officers include PASS, the German-American Master of Arts Program International Security Studies (MISS) and the Program on Security Sector Capacity Building (SSCB). The GCMC also integrates the Partner Language Training Center Europe, which offers intermediate, advanced and specialized language instruction. Languages include, but are not limited to, Russian, German, Arabic, French and Farsi. The mix of U.S., German and international faculty allows for a great deal of flexibility to meet specialized needs. The language center can be integrated with other GCMC programs and can assist in refreshing or completing RAS language proficiency requirements.

PASS, the GCMC’s flagship program, is a broad and comprehensive program supported by a corps of experienced professors. PASS brings civilian government officials, members of security and military services, and government academics together in a rigorous and intellectual environment for seven weeks. PASS consists of four segments that include two fixed segments of challenges and opportunities, as well as approaches and strategies. During the other two segments, students select focused national security topics in areas such as cyber warfare, terrorism, counternarcotics or illicit trafficking. Finally, PASS ends with a three-day exercise in intensive crisis management.

The partnership and combined efforts of these two well-established organizations will enhance national security gains into the foreseeable future. Deeper cooperation between SAF/IA and the GCMC means shared costs and greater effectiveness in security cooperation and international engagement.

U.S. participation in the PASS course remains limited to a few students each year to maintain an effective balance of international participation. PASS is service-independent and any service may apply for slots. However, U.S. Army foreign area officers (FAOs) have attended the PASS course in higher numbers than any other service. A small number of USAF RAS officers could be nominated to attend, and the establishment of an equitable formula for U.S. participation could be developed. In a short period and at minimal cost, SAF/IA could leverage the international network and aggressive PASS curriculum to enhance the skills of international affairs officers.

In addition to PASS, the GCMC hosts the MISS postgraduate program. MISS focuses on the development of international security policy professionals and...
capitalizes on GCMC policy-oriented programs and seminars. With a focus on regional security in Europe and Eurasia, this program would directly enhance the development of USAF regional affairs strategists in these regions. As of now, only U.S. Army officers partake in MISS, particularly 48C and 48E FAOs, and there are no funded slots for AF officers. Nonetheless, MISS remains open to AF officers who fulfill the entry requirements and have requisite funding. Ultimately, MISS can provide SAF/IA with a focused alternative to Naval Postgraduate School that purposefully develops select international affairs officers who might later serve in key policy offices such as the SAF/IA Pentagon Directorate.

For those at more senior ranks, the CISS leads the SSCB. While less robust than PASS, SSCB provides a forum for partner and allied countries to come together and share ideas on security sector institutional capacity building. This program holds the potential to serve as a midlevel upgrade for RAS officers who have completed at least one RAS assignment. The network gained through attendance at SSCB serves as a force multiplier for RAS officers and provides an opportunity for them to share security cooperation insights in an international setting. In addition, focused events on organized crime and terrorism, as well as cyber conferences hosted in partner nation countries, provide a good forum for connecting with international counterparts.

The SAF/IA directorate seeks to enhance international cooperation, capability and capacity while maintaining and building trust with existing and new partners for mutual security interests. SAF/IA enables conflict prevention and joint and coalition operational success through sustained security cooperation in air, space and cyberspace domains. As such, SAF/IA holds special responsibility for selecting, training and assigning the service’s international airmen to include U.S. attachés. Key SAF/IA themes for security cooperation in Europe are: access and influence, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, and centers of excellence, which overlap with GCMC priorities.

SAF/IA maintains close relationships with USAF component commands, U.S. combatant commands, U.S. Embassy country teams, the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Department of Commerce and commercial industry. SAF/IA also maintains enduring relationships and global partnerships with nearly every country around the world. SAF/IA directorates manage over 2,600 active foreign military sales cases worth $134 billion in 90 different countries, along with 75 exercises, 173 military personnel exchanges and 393 international agreements.

RAS officers comprise a key enabling part of SAF/IA. According to 2014 data, the USAF had over 300 positions for RAS officers, mostly for...
officers of the rank of major and lieutenant colonel. Many of these positions are in-country assignments in the air attaché and security cooperation arenas.

RAS officers are actively engaged in equipping partners, sharing information, building cooperative relationships (air, space and cyber), overseeing technology transfer and disclosure, security cooperation, exercises, humanitarian initiatives and partner Air Force engagements. Additionally, the RAS career field is growing. The number of annual accessions has doubled in recent years, which, in turn, increased training needs.

All new RAS accessions must achieve a standard initial level of qualification. The majority follow a traditional path to qualification through attendance at the Defense Language Institute and Naval Postgraduate School for two to three years, followed by a regional immersion. The remaining officers, who already meet a portion of the qualification requirements, forgo certain aspects of the traditional path and follow a shorter timeline based on individual circumstances. This could include attendance at an accredited university program and enrollment in an advanced language course.

RAS officers who are already partially qualified upon selection are best positioned to take advantage of what the GCMC offers. It will provide RAS officers with a top-level view of national decision-making, global governance and international law, while growing new relationships with current and future leaders in countries across several continents. The seeds of cooperation are planted at the junior level and cannot be reproduced later with ease. For the three USAF officers who attended the PASS course in fall 2013, the SAF/IA and GCMC will benefit from them for the remainder of their careers. RAS officers who graduated from GCMC programs will be in a position to provide the GCMC with high-quality nominations, and the RAS officers will produce force-multiplying results earlier in their assignments.

A focus on the global and strategic nature of the GCMC means that regardless of the region where the RAS officer is assigned, the training received will be both applicable and relevant to the SAF/IA. The higher payoff will come from sending officers who best fit into the overlapped functional and regional interests of the GCMC and SAF/IA.

The GCMC’s priorities are all-inclusive of Eurasia, with stated emphasis on Europe, Central Asia, Russia and Turkey. SAF/IA adheres to nine regions: Eurasia, Latin America, Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, the Middle East and North Africa region, Sub-Saharan Africa, Europe and China, which means that overlaps exist with the GCMC-defined regions of Eurasia, Europe and MENA. A quick glance at the number of PASS attendees by region since 2008 shows the greater areas of overlap.

A close partnership between the GCMC and SAF/IA will capitalize on areas of shared interest and enable a number of options. A process with established formulas should be established to make PASS and SSCB selections more equitable between the joint services, and concurrently the quantity of SAF/IA nominations for PASS and SSCB should increase for Europe, Eurasia, MENA and Sub-Saharan Africa RAS officers and trainees. For MISS, one or two RAS candidates should be competitively selected for annual acceptance, and SAF/IA should explore making this program an integral part of the officer’s intermediate development education if selected. If personnel and costs allow, GCMC and SAF/IA should consult on tailored language certification courses to support the USAF RAS language training and refresher requirements.

The partnership and combined efforts of these two well-established organizations will enhance national security gains into the foreseeable future. Deeper cooperation between SAF/IA and the GCMC means shared costs and greater effectiveness in security cooperation and international engagement. In light of increased RAS training requirements, as well as the shared regional overlaps in Europe, Eurasia, MENA and Sub-Saharan Africa, the GCMC program presents the perfect addition to the SAF/IA portfolio of training partners. □
The Ukrainian crisis matches Western soft power against Russian brute force

By MARTIN SOKOLOV, Marshall Center

"The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must." — Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War

Following the end of World War II, peace in Europe hinged on Washington, Berlin and Moscow. NATO’s task in Europe was to keep Washington in, Berlin down and Moscow out. This was the best way to preserve peace in the European continent. Thus, the world was split, with Moscow and Washington being the strongholds of communism and capitalism, while the Iron Curtain in Europe divided the two ideologies. Ultimately, the idea of democracy prevailed, and not only Berlin, but Europe, was unified while the USSR collapsed.

When the Cold War ended, the world no longer appeared polarized. Radical ideologies and corresponding threats continue to exist everywhere but nuclear annihilation is no longer an omnipresent threat. Furthermore, the decades after the Soviet collapse were especially fruitful for European countries. Western Europe gained new markets to the east, and post-communist states endeavoured to join the European Union. One of the first actions undertaken by post-Soviet states was to apply for EU and NATO membership, a goal they had nurtured for years, if not decades. In the liberal world order, it was within their rights to pursue that goal.

However, we now understand in retrospect that post-Soviet Russia did not accept the Western liberal world order and perceives the incorporation of its former “allies” into NATO and the EU as involuntary. In fact, Russia, itself, is not post-Soviet, but the last remnant of the old Soviet order. Thus, while NATO and the EU were expanding, Moscow was planning, calculating and accumulating power. Since 2014, we have been witnessing a new standoff between the East and the West, a clash between democracy and authoritarianism. But Berlin is no longer the focal point of the confrontation: The first important clash in Europe took place in Kiev, where Moscow lost the battle but managed to start a war — a war played under Russia’s rules and along its borders.

The questions we must ask is how and why did it come to this? And what about Ukraine? I would argue that, since this is a Cold War scenario, Cold War-thinking is required. Another name for this is “realism.” However, the more important issue to comprehend is the difference between what the two sides have to offer Ukraine and other post-Soviet states. This is where Thucydides comes in, as he successfully distinguished between hegemony and...
A Ukrainian woman takes part in a March 2015 rally in the eastern city Mariupol that urged the international community to preserve the country’s territorial integrity. EPA
Arkhe, terms that we tend to use as synonyms nowadays but in the ancient Greek language mean completely opposite things. (Arkhe is the root of monarchy, anarchy and many other words.)

The realist school is based on the concept of power; more power means more security, and since states are the main actors, they are the ones who pursue it. Thus, states habitually strive for relative gains, because they can never be certain of the intentions of other actors. In the context of the Cold War, more power and influence for the U.S. meant less for the USSR; more allies for one side meant fewer for the other. This is best illustrated in Thucydides’ *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, and more specifically the “Melian Dialogue” within the book.

Thucydides’ history describes the decline of Athens’ hegemony into a failed arkhe. Here it must be emphasized that there are striking differences between ancient Greek and modern English understandings of hegemony. In the 20th century, we came to understand a hegemon, be it a global or regional one, as a state that cannot be matched in terms of military capabilities, a state that was omnipotent. However, for Thucydides, the correct term for this overwhelming sense of power was *arkhe*, not hegemony. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union exercised *arkhe*, or control, over the Warsaw Pact.
countries. Throughout the Cold War era, states that wanted to defect from the Soviet bloc were confronted with military power as soon as they took actions to do so — tanks rolling down their streets manifesting the “right of might.” On the other side of the Iron Curtain, Western European countries did not challenge the U.S. Perhaps if they had tried, they would have been confronted by U.S. power, but they did not need to do so. The free world was full of individual rights, political liberties and blue jeans, in other words, U.S. hegemony.

Thucydides carefully and precisely distinguished between the two forms of influence. For Greeks of the fourth and fifth centuries B.C., hegemony was associated with time, which itself was the gift of honor. Time was bestowed by free consent from the Greek states and communities as a reward for achievements and was retained by consent, not force. Nowadays, we refer to this as soft power: the power of a state to attract allies and be given the right to lead. On the other hand, arke is the scenario in which a state conquers and occupies territory by force.

Regarding fifth century B.C. Athens, the transition from hegemony to arke occurred in the case of the island of Melos. Athens had enjoyed the trust of its allies, and when it needed their assistance, it was granted. However, when the Athenians began to fear the Spartans, they went to the Melians, faithful Spartan allies, and demanded unconditional surrender. The Melians tried to persuade Athens to allow them to remain neutral. However, the Athenians issued an ultimatum that if Melos did not join them, they would be conquered, stating: “The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”

The Melians refused to join Athens and were severely punished. The more important result, however, was that the Athenian Empire doomed itself. Although it continued to exist on the map, its influence was based on fear rather than respect. Needless to say, when an empire is based only on fear, a diminishment of its military capabilities spells ruin for that empire.

During the Cold War, Moscow based its power and influence on fear and extortion, and once it could no longer compete with the West, the USSR fell apart and all its trusty allies turned to the West. It is the sovereign right of a state to choose its form of government, its allies and whether to participate in a union. Almost all the USSR’s republics took the first opportunity to westernize, with Ukraine remaining one of the few European post-Soviet states that is neither an EU nor a NATO member.

Russia, however, did not recognize that its neighbors had made sovereign and democratic choices by joining the EU and NATO, but viewed EU and NATO expansion as coercive and a form of arms race waged by the West. Thus, when Ukraine was given the opportunity to join the West, the country was transformed into a “new Berlin” — a place where East and West would clash again.

It is important to note that Russia has an abundance of soft power capabilities available to influence its former USSR partners — common culture, language similarities and Russian minority populations. It has been relatively easy for Moscow to wage propaganda warfare in these countries. However, once Ukraine was invaded, counterpropaganda ensued. Fear of further Russian aggression grew. Moscow’s opportunity to become a regional hegemon was destroyed by its own actions and it has no options other than to apply arke immediately or lose more “allies.”

The question remains: What is Ukraine’s fate? The country has fallen victim to one-sided power politics. Whether the U.S. was seeking to expand its influence in Eastern Europe through NATO is irrelevant; its new Eastern members eagerly chose Alliance membership. What is relevant, however, is how Russia viewed this expansion, and it concluded it was hostile. Therefore, to Moscow, the only option is to seek arke and confront the West the only way it knows how — through brute force. The Kremlin deploys its propaganda in an echo chamber: It is utterly useless outside Russia’s borders and its immediate region.

The harsh reality is that Ukraine will have to suffer for its sovereignty and liberties. In the eyes of the Russian arke, it is a mere relative gain that must not be surrendered to the West. What is ironic is that the EU and NATO have already won. The values represented by these entities hold too much appeal for any amount of brute force to tarnish. The separatist states newly formed at Ukraine’s expense are not capable of enduring in the contemporary world, outside Russia’s borders.

It is merely a matter of time before Ukraine becomes part of the Western hegemon and Russia’s fears become self-fulfilling and its dream of a successful arke collapse in upon itself. □
An analysis of Ukraine’s national security confirms a high threat level related to transnational cyber crime and attempts by foreign governments, organizations and individuals to use modern information technologies against the state. Therefore, the development of a national cyber security system is vital to guarantee Ukrainian national security.

The number of computer attacks worldwide on national infrastructures is increasing. This results in the modification and leakage of data and the obstruction of critical infrastructure processes. Such consequences have caused a modification in foreign policy and defense doctrines in many countries, making a cyber attack equal to a military attack.

The NATO Strategic Concept 2010, adopted during the Lisbon Summit, focuses on possible cyber attack threats. In fact, it discusses categorizing a cyber attack as being equal to a traditional military threat. Informational security is a high priority for the Alliance. NATO cyber defense policy considers international partnership in cyber security to be one of the key elements of NATO’s strategy in this domain.

This statement was confirmed by the Chicago NATO Summit Declaration, issued by the heads of state and governments at the May 2012 meeting of the North Atlantic Council. In particular, Article 49 confirms readiness to cooperate with foreign partners and international organizations on issues of cyber protection and

The information revolution abolishes state borders in the classic sense, making the distinction between the actions of state and nonstate actors nonevident. This forms a new security environment where the “network” displaces traditional society.
underlines the necessity of strengthening Alliance capabilities in cyber defense.

Cyber attacks are often aimed at the information systems of state bodies and the health care, energy, financial and transportation sectors, causing dangerous and unpredictable consequences. Moreover, the conflict in Eastern Ukraine confirms the thesis that hybrid warfare is, in many aspects, supported by a wide range of cyber warfare instruments. One interesting aspect is that governmental informational resources and data bases are often targeted by terrorists, who consider such assets a means for establishing and enforcing their own capabilities to control certain territory and populations and to sustain economies and pseudo-governance.

Ukraine’s National Security Strategy, adopted this year by the National Security and Defense Council and approved by presidential decree, declares that a key threat to national security is “vulnerability of critical informational infrastructure and governmental informational resources to cyberattacks.” From our point of view, this threat requires adequate counteraction. Unfortunately, Ukraine is still in the process of deploying its National Cyber Security System (NCSS) that was foreseen by a previous version of the National Security Strategy dated 2012. The idea to organize the NCSS first emerged in 2010. The decision by the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine mentioned “challenges and threats to national security of Ukraine in 2011” and the need for a “joint national system to counteract cyber crime.”

While executing this task, it became clear that the issue of national security in the informational sphere requires a complex approach that takes into account not only criminal threats, but a full range of threats that vary depending on their origin, the tools used, the targets and, of course, their final purpose. As a result, the idea of a national cyber security system appeared. The NCSS combines sets of administrative, legal and technical measures related to informational security, and data protection of potential vulnerabilities in the defense, law enforcement and intelligence sectors.

This includes the following groups of cyber threats: cyber war, cyber terrorism, cyber espionage and cyber crime. These classifications demand that the NCSS include several subsystems: the defense cyber security system, the law enforcement system and the national security system (focused on cyber terrorism and espionage).

Nevertheless, we must take into account the in-depth transformation of social ties and relations caused by the penetration of modern information technologies into all spheres of life. The information revolution abolishes state
borders in the classic sense, making the distinction between the actions of state and nonstate actors nonevident. This forms a new security environment where the “network” displaces traditional society.

For example, an individual hacker can work for himself, a transnational organized crime group, an extremist group of politically motivated “hacktivists” or one, or even several, governments. Or, a single virus can be used for intercepting credit card numbers, accessing restricted information (state or commercial) or gaining control over sophisticated defense systems. The same synopsis applies to botnets.

The situation is not so clear if we discuss targets of cyber attacks. For example, banking systems can be attacked for the ordinary purpose of theft, to destabilize the financial system as a whole — as happened several times in South Korea — or to apply political pressure, as was the case with the cyber attacks on PayPal, MasterCard and Visa, all in retaliation for these companies’ decisions to block the accounts of WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange in 2010.

We are facing a complex, innovative threat that requires fresh approaches to find solutions. The NCSS is primarily a system of interaction among the main cyber security players, combining intelligence, law enforcement and government agencies that regulate telecommunications and information security. It aims to detect, prevent and suppress cyber threats; reduce the likelihood of their occurrence; and minimize the harm caused by their implementation. This system requires close cooperation with the private sector — telecommunications and Internet service providers, owners and operators of critical information infrastructure objects, and private companies specializing in information security.

The NCSS should be organized not only by classical threat definitions, but also by functionality and should include the following subsystems: an advisory system, responsible for general management, strategic decisions supporting the state’s cyber security leadership and coordination of different authorities; and a cyber threat monitoring system, which should combine technical means, computer emergency readiness teams (CERTs),...
information from Internet service providers, banking institutions, law enforcement and antivirus companies, and include intelligence data obtained by special services, intelligence agencies and financial monitoring. This information from different sources should be concentrated and processed in a single place, in real-time, for immediate decision-making. Cyber protection of critical information infrastructure facilities should include a set of technical protection measures, personnel security clearances, and counterintelligence protection relating to terrorism and other illegal actions.

Efficiency assessment and decision-making should be considered essential conditions for the NCSS to properly perform. The absence of a single institution responsible for the general coordination of cyber security measures complicates, slows, and in some cases, makes it impossible to take the necessary steps to respond to cyber attacks, especially given their high degree of latency. The main public sector actors in the field of cyber security are the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior, the State Service for Special Communication and Information Protection, and the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU). Deployment of the NCSS must be accompanied by appropriate adjustments in the process of defense and security sector reform.

In 2015, Ukraine’s Cabinet of Ministers created a draft cyber security law, which will enter the term “cybersecurity” and other terminology that uses the prefix “cyber” into national legislation. It is expected that upon adoption of these amendments, the new law on cyber crime will be developed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The new law should significantly improve the institutional capacity of national law enforcement agencies, and the ministry will ensure its final implementation of the Budapest convention. The Ministry of Defense also developed amendments to Ukrainian law on defense that include the issue of cyber security in the military sphere.

There is no doubt that the State Service of Special Communication and Information Protection should be a key element of the NCSS. However, its present functions, determined by law, should be deeply revised to give it cyber defense supervision and control authority over critical facilities infrastructure. Unfortunately, the agency has no authority in this area and is responsible only for government informational resources. However, on a positive note, the Computer Incident Response Team CERT-UA is housed within this unit.

Finally, the (SSU) has recently established a new functional counterintelligence unit to protect state interests in information security. Today, the law gives the SSU sufficient power not only to participate in the NCSS, but to act as its forming element. Thus, the SSU is a law enforcement agency. As the leading agency fighting terrorism, it protects not only national sovereignty, constitutional order and territorial integrity, but also the state’s economic, scientific and technical capabilities and citizens’ rights. In addition, it is responsible for protecting national information capabilities and the national communication system.

As the state authority, and a specially authorized body in the field of counterintelligence activities, the SSU’s objectives include the development and implementation of measures to prevent, eliminate and neutralize any threats to the interests of the state, society and the rights of citizens. This legislative framework already allows the SSU to take comprehensive measures in the area of cyber security.

Ukraine is in the process of developing and institutionalizing a national cyber security system. Adoption of a cyber security strategy is an important step in this process. At the same time, Ukraine is reviewing and revising its cyber security capabilities for national security and defense. In this context, the Ministry of Defense’s already-completed defense review might be useful, together with the expertise of international cyber security experts. □
The Defense Institution Building Program at U.S. European Command works with partner nations to help them move toward intellectual interoperability with NATO. As the International Security Assistance Force mission in Afghanistan wanes and most armed forces are shrinking toward peacetime forces and budgets, NATO and partner nations need to maintain meaningful peacetime connections and continue training and exercising with each other to prepare for the next conflict. Part of that preparation is to improve interoperability at the strategic level to create intellectual interoperability.

Many of our partners regularly undertake defense reviews. As their defense leaders work through political direction and mandates, operational realities and funding cuts, it often seems that little can be achieved. It’s as if every streamlining initiative is connected to another in a cascading matrix toward the same bottom line: no money and smaller, less capable forces.

Allow me to offer another perspective on improving the current state of strategic planning. Instead of seeing nonstop cutbacks and “salami-sliced” operating budgets, take a wider-lens viewpoint to gain a positive outlook on the strategic planning process.

STRATEGIC PLANNING PROCESS

Ends, ways and means — in business, these terms mean what the organization wants to bring to market, the manufacturing and operational processes that create the product, and the resources needed to succeed. In the military, we refer to these as mission, operations and resources. Both set priorities and mitigate risk to meet the desired end state.

Mission is first. In business, the key to success is understanding where a product or service falls in the supply and demand cycle. Market analysis discerns customer needs and desires and generates an evaluation of the product or service and the source of its demand in the marketplace. The military equivalent could be a threat assessment or defining a desired capability to achieve a specific end state. In both cases, an external analysis is performed to better understand the political, economic, social, technical and environmental macro trends in effect at that time and expected over the ensuing two to five years. Military planners identify potential threats and align or create the capabilities needed to counter them based on similar external trend analyses.

Next, we make it happen. Once a product or service is conceptualized,
Troops from NATO and allied partner nations take part in Noble Jump 2015 in Poland. Joint exercises like Noble Jump improve interoperability. REUTERS
how does it materialize? What does it do? How does it work? What is the process? If it is a product, then what raw materials get cast, smashed, drilled and pounded into place to create the finished product? How many are produced in an hour, a day or a year? If it is a service, what raw materials of time, human capacity, physical space and intellectual property come together to create a deliverable expertise? In the military, which weapon platforms combine with software and human skill to produce a capability desired to help ensure national security?

Finally, we pay for it. Resources — a reliable funding stream — are required to bring the product, service or military capability into existence. Employees must be recruited, trained, retained, retired and removed as needed based upon the needs of the operation. And soldiers must be trained with the knowledge, skills and abilities needed to operate the platforms. Logistical pipelines for fuel, replacement parts, lubricants and raw materials must hum in a chorus of productivity.

These three key elements of business or military activity compete against each other for time, attention, money and space. This is a constant problem. If the market demands gold-plated cars, it is not just a question of paying for the gold with the resources available, but also of whether gold is a viable metal for manufacturing cars. And if an entity develops software to run that car, are there enough qualified software designers available who understand not just the code that needs to be written, but how to design software that fulfills market demand? If the military requirement is to fly refueling missions within a 500-mile radius, the challenge is more than whether there is enough fuel for the plane. It is also whether a suitable plane exists — in good condition, with the required up-to-date technology — and if a runway that can accommodate its weight is available, plus a host of other operational issues that will determine whether the mission can be accomplished.

FINDING THE RESOURCES

Resource issues might include a runway in need of repair or the availability of operationally ready refueling planes to support additional flight training time. Where does the money come from? If there is no more money, how can more be generated? Will the public accept a tax increase? Can unused military assets be sold on the open market? Can expenses be minimized to free up cash? In short, there is no such thing as a 99 percent capability.

These questions lead to more questions: Can the operation be adjusted to be more cost-efficient? Does that car have to be gold plated? Do we need software designers for every bit of code writing, or can we use lesser-paid code writers to handle the boilerplate sections? Does our refueling plane need its own airport, or can we use a civilian airport? There are constant re-evaluations and tradeoffs to be made in determining the desired results, the operational procedures to achieve those results and the ability to acquire the necessary resources.

This requires compromise and consensus building. Give a little here and take a little there until the capability is acceptable, the operations are workable and the resources are manageable. These are hard but necessary choices. How does a country restructure its budget to reduce the personnel costs of too many older officers? How can the maintenance costs of advanced new platforms be included in a wish list to hardware providers? How does one stop perpetuating support for corrupt leadership and move toward merit-based, fiscally sustainable prudence?

EFFICIENCY IN COOPERATION

For each country struggling to balance its budget, there are different answers. The solution begins with turning away from old, outdated attitudes and methodologies and moving toward an affordable future within the NATO community. Rather than a country seeing itself as dependent on a greater whole, each country should see itself as a responsible, contributing member of an alliance. That requires an in-depth analysis to balance ends, ways and means. As such, when a country commits a capability to NATO, that commitment is undergirded by an affordable, operational plan.

The process is not linear, but can start anywhere, particularly where quick successes can be achieved to jump-start the process of change. For example, perhaps a country wants to improve its medical trauma care. In many countries, civilian hospitals treat injuries like mild traumatic brain injuries or provide long-term amputee care. While this specialized medical knowledge is core to military medical care, it can also benefit the local population in emergency trauma care. For a small investment in the armed forces, the country could buy...
this specialized capability for the general population.

Or perhaps a country wants to become NATO interoperable. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO created and has maintained accession processes to guide aspiring countries to membership. There are membership action plans, individual partnership action plans, annual national programs, and Partnership for Peace planning and review processes. NATO standardization agreements detail the operational capabilities necessary to join or operate effectively with Alliance forces — for example, English language capability or the ability of troops to understand and utilize a particular piece of hardware. This operational objective focuses efforts to meet the goal of NATO interoperability, but could cost more than some aspirants’ coffers will allow.

Another country may want to pay for new programs. If generating more revenue is not feasible, what cost-cutting measures can be implemented within the defense department to harness efficiencies? Can excess equipment be repurposed? Can military real property assets be reallocated to other government agencies or liquidated to private entities? Can retirement benefits be reworked to cost less? Where are the pockets of opaque financial transactions that can be made transparent? More cash means more capacity to recruit new troops or prepare to join NATO. This would lead to a more ready and able military force that supports a country’s security needs.

CONCLUSION
The ends-ways-means triangle represents a natural tension among desired mission readiness, operational requirements and resource availability. In this case, tension is good. This tension forces each major decision to be weighed against other possible courses of action. Additionally, planners are compelled to prove an action’s value. Military models see the ends as immovable, though business models do not. If operations cannot produce a particular desired effect with the resources available, then the “ends” must be re-evaluated and potentially adjusted to achieve the goal within the parameters of available operational and resource capabilities. The mission accepts risks if the “ends” are to reach NATO interoperability, but the ways and means are not yet available to achieve that goal, then what steppingstone toward the NATO interoperability goal could be attained in the near term? The constant adjustment among the three requires a continual rebalancing of each.

In the business community, the outside variable is profit. Will the dance among the three — product, operations and resources — create something that the market wants and will buy? The outside variable for the military is whether the combined efforts of ends-ways-means can produce security sector services that are of value to the nation and are attainable.

The process is not linear, or even hierarchical; it is circular and possibly even three dimensional. It should not be seen as shaving away each of the points on the triangle until parity is reached, but rather as interactively creating a holistic picture that is balanced, realistic and achievable. The tension inside the triangle is necessary for checks and balance to the strategic planning process, and can help create elegant solutions to security challenges. The process of thinking through and making choices is something in which most Western ministries of defense routinely engage, which means that this decision process undergirds intellectual interoperability in the Alliance.

As governments contribute fewer resources to military spending, balancing ends, ways and means is key to every military’s strategic success. It is also at the heart of NATO intellectual interoperability.
AN EYE ON THE ARCTIC

SHRINKING ICE CAPS REQUIRE NATIONS TO COOPERATE IN SHARING POLAR RESOURCES

By per Concordiam Staff

The Rossiya, a Russian nuclear icebreaker, returns from planting a Russian flag on the ocean floor at the North Pole. Russia claims resource rights in parts of the Arctic outside its 200-mile exclusive economic zone. THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
In September 2014, the MV Nunavik, a Canadian icebreaking cargo ship, landed at Sachs Harbor in Canada’s Northwest Territory, having just finished transiting the fabled Northwest Passage through the Arctic Ocean. The Nunavik, owned by Fednav shipping company, was the first cargo ship in recent memory to complete the passage unaided by icebreakers.

The passage of the MV Nunavik is a milestone in the opening of the Arctic. The Arctic ice cap has been gradually shrinking since the 1950s, but the process has been accelerating since the mid-1990s, says the U.S. National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC). Less ice makes more of the Arctic accessible for longer periods, which means the region’s rich natural resources will be easier to reach and shipping lanes will be open longer, promising potential transportation savings of hundreds of million dollars annually. But the activity needed to access these resources could degrade the environment and damage wildlife habitats.

The opening of the Arctic has drawn the attention of the five littoral countries — Canada, Denmark (through Greenland), Norway, Russia and the United States — and the neighboring Arctic states of Finland, Iceland and Sweden. But it also has attracted countries such as China, whose growing export-driven economy hungers for energy and would benefit from shorter sea routes. Potential rivalries over Arctic riches have raised concerns of a new Cold War developing in the region.

**Natural abundance**

The Arctic holds plentiful untapped energy, but nobody is certain exactly how much. The most recent assessment by the U.S. Geological Survey in 2008 estimated the region contains 90 billion barrels of oil, 1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids, amounting to 13 to 20 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil and natural gas reserves. Even more oil, up to 160 billion barrels, could reside mostly offshore under permanent or seasonal ice caps.

Even in ideal conditions, drilling offshore is riskier and costlier than drilling on land. In extreme Arctic offshore conditions, the difficulties are multiplied. Even onshore, extraction costs could be double what they are in Texas, the U.S. Energy Information Administration reported in 2012. Royal Dutch Shell, the first company to receive offshore Arctic drilling permits from the U.S. government, ran into numerous problems in the Beaufort and Chukchi seas off Alaska in 2012 and had to shut down operations. This confirmed to critics that “the company and its federal partners had not shown that they had the equipment, skill or experience to cope with the unforgiving environment there,” *The New York Times* wrote in January 2013.

**Environmental concerns**

The NSIDC says the ice cap is shrinking 3 to 4 percent per decade. If aggressive climate change models are accurate, the polar ice cap could shrink to the point that the region’s ecological balance is threatened. Some models predict summers will be partially ice free by 2050. Scientists believe that a shrinking ice cap accelerates global warming because the snow and ice provide a cold, reflective layer against solar heating.

Environmentalists are equally concerned about an oil spill in such a remote area of the world. In cold water, the oil won’t break down as quickly as in warmer waters. If the oil spreads under
the ice, no one knows how it will behave, said Dr. Simon Boxall, an oceanographer at the University of Southampton in the United Kingdom.

Energy experts think such challenges can be overcome, pointing to successful operations in other hazardous areas. “The oil and gas industry is renowned for developing technologies and methods needed to safely explore for and produce oil and natural gas in the heat of the Middle East, the storms of the North Sea, and the ultra-deep finds in the Gulf of Mexico and Brazil,” Randall Luhti, president of the National Ocean Industries Association, told the National Journal’s “Energy Insiders” in August 2014. “Certainly development in the Arctic will require extra care, and perhaps added technological innovation, but yes, it is possible to do it safely.”

**Energy economics**

The plunge in oil prices since late 2014 have made the Arctic less attractive as a source of energy, at least in the short run. Oil prices need to exceed $80 per barrel to make offshore drilling in the Arctic cost effective, said Foster Mellen, a global oil and gas analyst with the consulting firm Ernst & Young. Prices were about half that level in the fall of 2015 and were projected to stay low through at least 2016.

By early 2015, several energy companies began backing away from Arctic projects. Alaska Public Media reported: “Chevron decided to stop seeking government approval to work north of Canada. And over in Greenland, Statoil gave back three of
its four licenses to drill offshore.” Even Russia has pulled back. Plans for a major natural gas terminal in the town of Teriberka were shelved as uneconomical after the country’s international energy partners pulled out, *The New York Times* reported in August 2015. Shell, however, restarted drilling in the Chukchi Sea in late July 2015 after receiving approval from the U.S. government.

But Western nations and their energy companies may have to move into the Arctic regardless of oil prices to stake their claims in an international race for control of one of the Earth’s last frontiers. “If the West fails to tap these riches quickly, then Russia will have no such reservations,” *The Telegraph* noted.

Russia already has begun ambitious projects in the Arctic. According to *Financial Times*, Russian gas company Novatek is developing a $27 billion liquid natural gas project in the Arctic, and Russian oil company Rosneft and ExxonMobil have been jointly drilling in the Kara Sea off

The Kulluk conical drilling unit, operated by Royal Dutch Shell, broke free from tow lines in heavy weather off Alaska and grounded on Sitkalidak Island in December 2012. The company had to shut down operations. PETTY OFFICER 1ST CLASS SARA FRANCIS/U.S. COAST GUARD
Western nations and their energy companies may have to move into the Arctic regardless of oil prices to stake their claims in an international race for control of one of the Earth’s last frontiers.

Russia’s northern coast.

The Council on Foreign Relations, a U.S. international relations think tank, says Russia has emerged as the dominant player in the region as a result of investing tens of billions of dollars in infrastructure. In 2013, Russia began reopening shuttered Arctic military facilities and building new ones. China also is interested in claiming a stake by improving relations with regional powers such as Norway and Denmark. Online news site Business Insider says that China invests heavily in Greenland mining and has struck a deal with Russian petroleum company Rosneft to collaborate in offshore Arctic oil, and Chinese naval vessels are venturing into Arctic waters. The U.S. has taken notice. In September 2015, U.S. President Barack Obama announced plans to revitalize America’s Arctic presence with the construction of new icebreakers and charting initiatives to replace outdated maps and charts of the Bering, Chukchi and Beaufort seas.

Northwest Passage

The MV Nunavik arrived in the port of Bayuquan, China, with its cargo of 23,000 tons of nickel ore 26 days after leaving Deception Bay, Canada. The Northwest Passage route is 40 percent shorter than the route through the Panama Canal and, according to Fednav, saves enough fuel to reduce carbon emissions by 1,300 metric tons. The Nordic Orion, a Danish-operated bulk carrier that made the passage in 2013 with an icebreaker escort, saved 1,000 nautical miles and $200,000 transporting coal from Vancouver, British Columbia, to Pori, Finland, according to Canada’s The Globe and Mail. These shipping lanes are not only shorter than the Panama Canal route, but deeper: The Nordic Orion was able to load 25 percent more cargo, boosting efficiency. Russia also has been developing its own Arctic route — the Northern Sea Route, which skirts the Siberian coast — relying on its unique fleet of nuclear-powered icebreakers. China has shown great interest in using the route to ship exports to Europe.

Regional cooperation

As the Arctic becomes more accessible to energy exploration and shipping, nations of the Arctic littoral and other interested parties will need to improve cooperation. The United Nations has been invested with special responsibility through the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, by which the five Arctic states have agreed to settle any overlapping claims to territorial resource rights.

Several multilateral organizations focus on Arctic issues. The International Maritime Organization is a 171-member-state, UN-chartered agency “with responsibility for the safety and security of shipping and the prevention of marine pollution by ships.” The Arctic Council, established in 1996 by the eight nations with territory above the Arctic Circle, is an intergovernmental forum to promote cooperation on the environment, but some view it as the ideal format to address resource rights, trade routes and militarization.

As the Pew Foundation concluded in a 2014 review of development risks: “The Arctic is remote, extreme, and vulnerable. To achieve a balance between responsible energy development and protection of important biological and cultural areas, it is essential that appropriate standards and protections be in place first.” Regardless of format, international cooperation is essential to preserve the Arctic’s unique environment and avoid conflict while taking advantage of emerging opportunities. □
Using Communities to COUNTER TERRORISM

BOOK EDITORS: Rohan Gunaratna, Jolene Jerard and Salim Mohamed Nasir, Imperial College Press, 2013

REVIEWED BY: Melanie Schweiger, Marshall Center

Countering Extremism: Building Social Resilience through Community Engagement provides the reader with a wide range of case studies, primarily from Europe and Asia, on how governments and civil society groups have tackled domestic extremist movements. While the cases vary, ranging from Germany’s postwar denazification program to the Middle East’s attempt to counter al-Qaida, one pattern was prevalent in all counter-terrorism approaches mentioned: They emphasized the importance of community engagement and the need for community resilience.

The book urges governments to understand the advantages of a society-based approach. Although an analysis of recent terrorist groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) doesn’t appear in the book, Rohan Gunaratna’s more recent published work views close cooperation with the public to be a positive game changer concerning ISIS.

One reason the book treats cooperation between the state and communities as a key to overcoming terrorist threats lies in the intentions of most extremist groups — to provoke ethnic and religious divisions between populations. Therefore, social resilience and awareness-building are crucial to confront mistrust and religious radicalization at its roots. The most effective way to spread awareness is through mass media, workplace forums and seminars, youth and grass-roots organizations, and school curricula.

Nevertheless, the book notes that effective counterterrorism strategies need to include both
bottom-up and top-down approaches. Terrorist groups infiltrate social groups, nongovernmental organizations and other organizations for various purposes, hence the community must report members of suspicious organizations to the state; the government, in response, must address the same problems through awareness workshops.

Subsequent chapters address policies that have been implemented in Pakistan, the United Kingdom, Singapore, Germany, Australia and the Middle East. Singapore, for example, struggled with message fatigue, meaning that the public wearied of the government’s obsession with communicating the terrorist threat. In South Asia, on the other hand, radicalization was exacerbated by the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan after September 11, 2001, thus demonstrating the complexities of foreign intervention.

In such cases, the book favors counterterrorism education within schools and youth organizations. Such approaches should then be coupled with an open dialogue and discussions of the fundamental ideologies of terrorist groups. This has been particularly successful in the Middle East, where such discussion forums were used to correct misinterpretations of the Quran and to list ways of recognizing extremists. Awareness building in such environments has additional, positive side effects, such as fear management and trust building between the community and state organizations. In the UK, mistrust between intelligence agencies and society has been a major hurdle to counterterrorism cooperation and had to be overcome with open and transparent communication.

This also includes continuous evaluation of policy language on the governmental side. The book points out that radicalization is deeply linked to stigmatization of particular ethnic groups by the government. The process of radicalization starts with what he calls pre-radicalization, triggered by stigmatization, and then evolves into self-identification, indoctrination and finally “jihadization.” If governments communicate their policies more sensitively, this radicalization process can be effectively interrupted.

Overall, the book makes great efforts to provide policymakers with a broad overview of community-based counterterrorism approaches. However, timely relevant topics such as online extremism have not been successfully analyzed. The one chapter about the Internet describes only how it can be used as a tool to connect people, but did not offer serious policy recommendation and lacked a thorough overview of online threats.

Yet, the chapter on fear management was very informative. More of such chapters would have enriched the book with valuable content and background knowledge for policymakers. Nevertheless, Countering Extremism is an important and commendable book for policymakers dealing with capacity building.
Resident Courses
Democratia per fidem et concordiam
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