Concordiam
Journal of European Security and Defense Issues

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Welcome to the 23rd issue of *per Concordiam*, an issue focused on cooperative security in Europe and the challenges posed to the European security order. Today’s challenges are complex and far-reaching, and their impact is felt throughout Europe. Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, including the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, support for insurgencies in eastern Ukraine, and a threatening posture toward NATO allies and partners, casts a shadow on the achievements of the established political order in Europe based on trust and cooperation. As a result of Russia’s actions, provisions and mechanisms for collective defense and mutual reassurance within NATO and enhanced assistance for partners such as Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova returned to the security agenda at NATO’s summit in Wales and likely will be pursued in subsequent meetings.

The current strategic framework and fiscal austerity will cause Europe to take more responsibility for its own security. Challenges in Europe, including the situation in Greece and its possible impact on the European architecture as well as repercussions of conflicts and instability in the Near East and North Africa, coincide with the United States rebalancing to the Asia Pacific region and other nations reducing their defense budgets because of fiscal constraints. These limitations will require a more focused effort in managing and maintaining adequate defense capabilities in Europe. Since it is difficult for nations to increase defense budgets in times of fiscal austerity, they may strive for more efficient, interoperable and cooperative approaches to mutual security. Some synergy and efficiency may be achieved as nations coordinate their force structure, armament and doctrine to provide credible security at a reduced cost within NATO and the European Union. This level of coordination is a particular challenge for a union of 28 sovereign nations reluctant to transfer oversight of their militaries to a multinational headquarters.

At the Marshall Center, we recognize these developments and their impact on security across Europe and search for cooperative approaches to mitigate threats and increase security. In December 2014, the Marshall Center’s outreach team partnered with Lithuania to hold a multilateral conference in Vilnius focused on Russian aggression and its impact on the Baltics and Visegrad Four countries. We have also integrated new resident programs on Europe’s security focused on its eastern and southern flanks. We will enhance our cooperation with EU bodies and agencies as we assist in the search for viable approaches to security that are based on trust and cooperation and that are capable of defending peace and stability.

This edition of *per Concordiam* explores European security problems and possible solutions from various regional and topical perspectives. The authors, Marshall Center faculty members and alumni, politicians, practitioners and academics in the field of security and defense, are united in their goal to make Europe a strong partner in a trans-Atlantic alliance that successfully withstands challenges.

As always, we welcome comments and perspectives on these topics and will include your responses in future editions. Please feel free to contact us at editor@perconcordiam.org

Sincerely,

Keith W. Dayton
Director
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A TASK OF GENERATIONS
RUSSIA AND THE WEST

By WOLFGANG ISCHINGER, chairman of the Munich Security Conference

Western leaders have been more than willing to point out that there can be no military solution to the crisis in Ukraine. This is true, albeit from their own perspective. Moscow has successfully used military force, causing significant injury to the vision of a Euro-Atlantic security community. The current European security system could not prevent either the annexation of Crimea or the destabilization of eastern Ukraine. And despite the Minsk agreements, people continued to die through acts of war in 2015 in the country that hosted the 2012 European football championship.

Today, it is not only Ukraine that feels under threat but also other countries, such as Moldova, Georgia and the Baltic states. It is not impossible to imagine that a gray area might emerge between EU/NATO and Russia. From Moscow’s standpoint, these countries form a cordon sanitaire, even though we have always wanted to avoid allowing differing levels of security across Europe. So far, NATO and the EU have demonstrated a considerable degree of solidarity and have responded with economic sanctions alongside a program of military reassurance within NATO. But the unity of the West is likely to be tested, again and again.

The current crisis does not represent a short-term worsening of conditions; rather, we are watching a fundamental shift in East-West relations unfolding before our eyes. The situation is unlikely to change anytime soon.

As Russia sees it, the EU wanted to bring Ukraine closer and convince it to sever ties with Russia. But it is not correct that Kiev was forced to choose between the EU and Russia. What is true is that the EU was not prepared to accept Russia’s droit de regard in the negotiations with Kiev regarding an association agreement. Who are we to demand that Kiev accept that a third party will have a say in negotiations about the future direction of the Ukraine?

A Polish Air Force MIG-29 and two Italian Air Force Eurofighter Typhoons from Zokniai Air Base in Lithuania patrol over the Baltics in February 2015 as part of the NATO air policing mission. NATO ramped up Baltic air patrols in response to provocative Russian military activity in the region. REUTERS
German Chancellor Angela Merkel underlined this point in the Bundestag at the end of November 2014, quoting her own speech from the previous year: “The EU has repeatedly offered to speak with Russia to work out the mutual benefits of cooperation. It is my deep conviction that we must continue with these efforts to ensure that there is no either/or for countries in the Eastern Partnership between moving closer to the EU and Russian efforts to establish a closer partnership with these countries.” Even if Ukraine’s EU Association Agreement had led to challenges for Russia’s trade relations with Ukraine, the chancellor emphasized, it could not serve as legitimization for annexing Crimea or as justification for Russia’s involvement in the fighting around Donetsk and Luhansk.

Moreover, Russia’s opposition to the EU is a relatively recent phenomenon. Russian President Vladimir Putin declared at a 2004 press conference: “If Ukraine wants to join the EU and if the EU accepts Ukraine as a member, Russia, I think, would welcome this because we have a special relationship with Ukraine.” Ten years later, Russia is not even willing to accept an association agreement between the EU and Ukraine.

Which of Russia’s complaints deserve serious consideration? The most significant is the suggestion that the West has built a common European home, but without giving Russia its own room, as American historian Mary Elise Sarotte phrased it, utilizing a metaphor previously employed by former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. During debates surrounding NATO expansion in the 1990s, the German government insisted on a two-pillar strategy: Yes to NATO expansion, accompanied by a more intensive partnership with Russia. We insisted that the two aspects needed to be balanced and complement each other. Without NATO expansion, the countries in Central and Eastern Europe would have continued to feel unsafe. And yet without a strong NATO-Russia partnership, Russia would be locked out of the “common home.” The outcome was the development and implementation of a dual strategy.

Regrettably, this dual strategy was abandoned during the George W. Bush administration. His government chose to discontinue the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission that had been such a key bilateral channel under Bill Clinton. More important, the Bush administration withdrew from the antiballistic missile treaty and began to plan for a missile defense shield.

Then Washington pursued further NATO expansion, supporting Kiev and Tbilisi in their efforts to obtain membership even though there was no consensus on the issue in either Ukraine or Georgia. Tensions between Russia and Georgia escalated a short time later, with Russian troops occupying a number of Georgian territories. From Russia’s perspective, the West had continued to ignore Moscow’s security interests; only a clear message would put a stop to that.

This sentiment is widely felt throughout Russia. In the summer of the Russia-Georgia war in 2008, Gorbachev wrote in The New York Times: “Indeed, Russia has long been told to simply accept the facts. Here’s the independence of Kosovo for you. Here’s the abrogation of the antiballistic Missile Treaty, and the American decision to place missile defenses in neighboring countries. Here’s the unending expansion of NATO. All of these moves have been set against the backdrop of sweet talk about partnership. Why would anyone put up with such a charade?” Given the widespread belief that the West has steadily exploited Russia’s weakness after the fall of the Soviet Union, Putin’s policy of restoring Russia’s status as a world power is exceedingly popular. If the West has made one error, it is that of abandoning the original NATO dual strategy.

None of the above should be taken as an excuse for Russia’s use of force or the revisionism that shapes Putin’s current foreign policy. But if we want to deal productively with Moscow, then we need to understand the perceptions and emotions that form the backdrop to Russia’s actions. This sense of being unfairly treated by the West makes it extremely difficult to rebuild a constructive relationship with Moscow.

Today the problem is that Russia is a superpower only in the military sense (above all because of its nuclear arsenal) and in terms of its energy resources. In the 21st century, superpower status not only depends on military capabilities, but also on the ability to persuade and acquire partners, to get involved and get others involved to shape alliances. According to this definition, the Russia of today is definitely no superpower.

When Barack Obama was elected president of the United States, his administration decided to rebuild the country’s relationship with Russia from the ground up. Obama reworked the missile defense plans, turned them into a NATO project and invited Russia to collaborate. This strategy produced positive results, including a new START agreement and greater cooperation in relation to Afghanistan and Iraq. Nevertheless, both sides remained dubious about the others’ intentions. Instead of becoming a game-changer and serving as the roof of the “common home,” the missile defense system emerged as a form of “game-breaker.”

What also changed, however, was Russia itself, as observed by Michael McFaul, former U.S. ambassador to Moscow: “Russian foreign policy did not grow more aggressive in response to U.S. policies; it changed as a result of Russian internal political dynamics. The shift began when Putin and his regime came under attack for the first time ever.” In a 2014 essay, former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott analyzed it
like this: “Putin’s aggression only makes sense against the backdrop of what has been the defining theme of his presidency: turning back the clock. For years, that has meant repudiating the transformational policies of his immediate predecessors and reinstating key attributes of the Soviet system within the borders of the Russian Federation.”

How should the West respond to Putin’s revisionism? What might a strategy look like that would neither discard the fundamental norms shared by large parts of the Euro-Atlantic area nor add fuel to the fire? I propose a new dual strategy.

We need strategic patience, and we must attempt to negotiate from a position of strength, not one of weakness and indecisiveness. In his first speech upon assuming office, NATO’s new Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg stressed that better ties with Russia are more likely to be achieved if the Alliance is strong. It is vitally important to constantly reiterate our obligation to provide mutual assistance, as outlined in Article 5, as well as the indivisibility of security among NATO members. However, we should also avoid getting caught up in new discussions about Ukraine’s NATO membership. There is a simple three-step test to measure whether a country should be invited to become a member: Is there consensus within the respective country regarding the application for NATO membership? Do all NATO partners agree to invite the country? Would this NATO membership enhance European security? Only if the answer to all three questions is affirmative should the country in question be invited. Today and tomorrow, Ukraine would not pass this test.

We also need to expand on the second pillar in the dual strategy. Our goal cannot be to play the role of the enemy against whom all Russians must unite. Sadly, Russians today rarely hear the voice of dissent. When the conflicting parties so obviously live in different worlds, it becomes difficult to find a solution. But we should try to make clear that it is not the West that is attempting to avoid a collaborative relationship.

In my opinion, we should launch a diplomatic process under the umbrella of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. This would bring Russia back to the table and allow us to consider new ways of approaching the idea of a common European home or comprehensive Euro-Atlantic security community. This is, of course, a long-term goal, but it is important to keep the idea active.

One shorter-term goal could be to improve military transparency. The past few months have seen a series of close calls between Russian combat aircraft and planes from the West. Neither Russia nor NATO has an interest in an accidental escalation with potentially far-reaching consequences. Even at the peak of the Cold War, both sides endeavored to mitigate the risk of misunderstandings and to avoid this route to a possible nuclear war.

The Nuclear Threat Initiative recently published its report “Building Mutual Security” containing several important proposals. Key questions include: Why are intercontinental ballistic missiles still kept on high alert? Why can longer advance warning periods not be agreed upon? And in a similar vein, would it not be possible to create more transparency on military exercises? The size of Russian exercises held in the last few years has frequently been kept barely under the threshold that would require NATO observers to be present. Finally, negotiations on conventional arms control could be ramped up again to improve security and reinforce mutual trust.

Recent developments, unfortunately, are not heading in this direction. For example, Russia has ended its cooperative work with the U.S. to secure nuclear material on Russian soil. This program will now end in 2015. On the other hand, Russia’s involvement in the Iranian nuclear issue points to the possibility of increasing Western-Russian cooperation in areas where common interests prevail. We could also offer Russia an economic partnership. Chancellor Merkel recently talked about the possibility of establishing a common economic area including Russia. As a first step, the EU could work with the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). This new dual strategy centers on the idea of “congagement” — a blend of containment and engagement proposed by the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt.

Sanctions are not an end in themselves. Their purpose is to give Russia incentives to cooperate in efforts to stabilize Ukraine. It is not about punishing Moscow or making the Russian people suffer. Destabilizing Russia is not an option. All of us want and need a stable and prosperous Russian Federation. But we also want a Russia that abides by the rules and works with us to strengthen the architecture, institutions and rules of European security.

In the early 1970s, hardly anyone believed that it was a good idea to start the negotiations that eventually led to the Helsinki Accords. In the 1980s, hardly anyone could imagine that most Central and Eastern European states would soon become democracies. Today, hardly anyone might believe that it makes sense to restart negotiations with Russia.

To be clear, the task at hand is hard and may take a generation: further building an effective and legitimate regional system of governance in times when demand for it is high and supply low. In the past few decades, our societies, in Germany in particular, have taken peace and security in Europe very much for granted. But we must hang on to the fading dream of a comprehensive Euro-Atlantic security community rather than let it descend into a long nightmare. □

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The U.S. pivot to Asia forces Europe to rethink the way it projects power in the world

By Prof. Dr. Sven Bernhard Gareis, Marshall Center

In April 2014, U.S. President Barack Obama visited Japan, the Philippines, South Korea and Malaysia. His tour was intended to send a clear message: The president is serious about the pivot to the Asia-Pacific announced in 2011. There had been rising doubts about his willingness to bring about this shift in foreign policy. In October 2013, Obama had canceled a planned tour of Asia because of struggles over the United States’ budget, raising concerns about the seriousness of his commitment throughout the region, mostly from China. At the 2013 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit on Bali, the “family picture” — a photograph traditionally taken at the end of a meeting of political leaders — shows Chinese President Xi Jinping at center stage among the 21 APEC representatives, including Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Squeezed into the far right corner is U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, looking almost marginalized. Subsequently, there were calls for a more substantial U.S. involvement in Asia, not only from the Republican opposition, but from all sides.
In Europe, where hopes are high that the U.S. is not going to give up on its best ally, critical voices have called for an economic “pivot to Europe.” Faced with Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, East European allies have demanded an increased U.S. military presence — something that is very unlikely to happen. During the Libya conflict in 2011, the U.S. was reluctant to take the leading role. In the Syrian and the Middle Eastern conflicts, the U.S. is also keeping a low profile. Same thing in the Ukraine crisis: The U.S. is keeping its military commitment low — also to avoid inflaming relations with Russia. Following the NATO Wales summit, there were words of reassurance for eastern NATO allies, and 18 fighter aircraft were deployed to Poland and Lithuania — not an impressive feat, considering these jets are not needed anywhere else.

One of the main reasons for Obama’s pivot to Asia may have to do with a new world order, because the days of American patronage — what U.S. commentator Charles Krauthammer called the “unipolar moment” — are over. In an accelerated process of geopolitical shifts of power, emerging actors such as China, India and Brazil started pursuing their interests with more determination and claimed their right to shape the international system with increasing self-confidence. By contrast, the incumbent world power, weakened by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and tied down by its enormous debt burden, needs to pool its resources and rely more heavily on regional partners and alliances to maintain its position of power. And, more than anything else, it needs to set strategic priorities to monitor China, which is developing fast and presents a challenge to U.S. global dominance. The U.S. has to relocate political and military capabilities from other parts of the world to the Asia-Pacific region. In this context, “America’s Pacific Century,” a term coined by former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, is not necessarily an expression of self-assured strength, but rather an acknowledgment that the U.S. is no longer able to exercise its hegemonic power in all regions of the world simultaneously.

EUROPE’S STATUS

Even if the U.S. remains interested in a close partnership with its old allies, the pivot to Asia undoubtedly presents a challenge to Europe. But, at the same time, it offers an opportunity. For decades the “old continent” has enjoyed the comfort of regional and global security guaranteed largely by the U.S. As consumers of security, European allies were free to focus on economic development and increasing prosperity, and, on top of that, they were able to profit from the enormous peace dividend from the drastic reductions in armed forces and defense budgets after the end of the East-West conflict. The new geopolitical power shifts will force Europeans to defend their own interests, develop strategies and use the instruments required to enforce their claims. While trying to manage the Ukraine-Russia crisis, they are beginning to understand the magnitude of this challenge. In spite of weaknesses, Europe needs to overcome internal disagreements, take appropriate measures and impose effective sanctions to prevent Russia from further destabilizing Eastern Europe.

Cohesion in foreign and security policy is a requirement not only within Europe, but beyond. Europe is a global economic and trading power with close links to the Asia-Pacific region and its fast growing markets. Therefore, Europe has a vital interest in security and stability in Asia, without, however, being able to exert any political influence in the region. Europe must underpin its economic interests through more political unity and a stronger regional, as well as global, commitment to overcome a world order dominated by U.S.-China relations.

So, what does this mean for Europe’s common foreign and security policy, and what are the consequences of Europe’s future role on the stage of world politics?

THE U.S. AS A PACIFIC POWER

A point that tends to get overlooked when Europeans assess the state of trans-Atlantic relations is that throughout its strong commitment in Europe during the East-West conflict, during the subsequent transformation processes in the post-Soviet states and the difficult pacification of the West Balkans after the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the U.S. was always a Pacific power, too.

As a result of close economic ties with China in the early 19th century, the U.S. developed strong political interests in the region, which led to increasing political commitment and, from time to time, military commitment. Ever since the U.S. was forced into World War II after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, it has shaped the political landscape in the Pacific region. During the Cold War, the results of this commitment were mixed: success in the Korean War (1950-53), disaster in Vietnam, extreme pragmatism in the rapprochement with China (early 1970s). All of this led to a peculiar stability characteristic of that era — power and countervailing power, and deterrence based on massive threats of force. Since the end of the East-West conflict, the U.S. has pursued a policy of flexibility and strong bilateral relations, guaranteeing enduring peace, a type of Pax Americana. The U.S. became a dominant power which, in spite of criticism, is seen as indispensable by many Pacific states. That the U.S. is considered to be a guarantor of order in the West Pacific can be explained by the “containment” of Japan — a side effect of the U.S.-Japanese defense alliance — because there is still a certain degree of distrust of Japan and its power potential in the region, and by the strong U.S. presence in the Korean Peninsula that has repeatedly kept North Korea from playing with fire.

No longer restricted by the ties of the bipolar world order, the Asia-Pacific region has become the economic powerhouse of the world, which has brought unprecedented economic growth and prosperity to the region in the last two decades. At the same time, the situation in the region seems paradoxical: The close economic ties and interdependencies among the states did not translate into any security structures that would help overcome, or at least mitigate, territorial disputes between neighbors, historical grievances, strategic rivalries and security dilemmas. This, as well as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the war on terrorism that has absorbed most U.S. forces,
makes the Asia-Pacific very complex. The U.S. has not yet developed a consistent strategy for the region. Relations with China, the greatest emerging power, remain highly ambivalent, alternating between partnership and rivalry, but always characterized by interdependence.

**CHINA AS A CHALLENGE**

A recurring theme in U.S. official statements and documents is interest in a prosperous China that is able to solve its internal problems. But there is more to it than just interest: The rise of China is the main reason for the pivot to Asia. And indeed, carried on the wings of its continuing economic success, China has opted for a more comprehensive, self-confident, proactive and often tougher approach in its foreign policy at the regional and global level. The People’s Republic has begun to assert its interests in energy and natural resources more forcefully, pushing for access to new forums such as the Arctic Council and representing a serious alternative, especially in Africa, to the traditional donors of multilateral development aid such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund. It is with growing concern that many states look at China’s increasing military spending — approximately $160 billion in 2015 — and China’s simmering disputes with Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines over groups of islands in the East and South China seas, because any confrontation in this globally connected region would have drastic consequences for Europe, too.

From a classic power-centric perspective, China is a new actor seeking to exploit changes in the structure of the international system for its own benefit and enter into competition and, possibly, confrontation with the established great powers of the current international system, above all, the U.S. In contrast, however, China presents its version of a “harmonious world,” which, as former Chinese President Hu Jintao declared in 2005 before the United Nations General Assembly, is characterized by respect for different cultures, by cooperation and by mutual benefit. His successor, Xi Jinping, keeps repeating that cooperative solutions are needed to solve international problems. With its concepts of “peaceful development” and a “harmonious world” China claims an exceptional role for itself by choosing methods and pursuing strategic goals that are different from what many Western actors see as standard behavior in international relations.

The U.S. is China’s most important trading partner, the largest consumer of Chinese products, and is essential for China’s strong export-oriented industry. According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, China has consistently invested its gigantic trade surplus in U.S. bonds, about $295 billion in 2013, out of an overall trade volume of nearly $530 billion. This is how China helps finance U.S. budget deficits and keeps the U.S. banking system solvent so that banks can continue granting credit to customers who will then be able to keep buying Chinese goods. On the other hand, both countries are openly distrustful of each other when it comes to power interests. The U.S. sees China as the only serious challenge to its global dominance. China, in turn, is concerned that the U.S. might slow down or even disrupt its economic growth and assumes that the pivot to Asia is nothing but a poorly disguised attempt to contain China.

Indeed, this concern does not appear to be completely...
unfounded. At the 2010 Regional Forum of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in Vietnam, Clinton declared that a multilateral solution to the territorial dispute in the South China Sea was in the national interest of the U.S. This statement touched a sore spot with the Chinese, who felt that their sovereign rights were disregarded. Obama’s announcement in November 2011 that the U.S. will permanently station Marines in Australia, starting with 2,500 troops, and his decision to keep two-thirds of all U.S. carrier battle groups assigned to the Pacific, alarmed Beijing. And when he stated during his visit to Tokyo in April 2014 that the U.S. would not interfere in the Sino-Japanese dispute about the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, but that it would support Japan on the basis of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement if the dispute escalated into a conflict — Obama’s message was perceived as highly ambiguous by China. The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement that was concluded with the Philippines shortly afterward permits the U.S. to use Philippine military bases. The People’s Republic sees this as an example of hedging against China, as it does the Trans-Pacific Partnership proposed by the U.S., a free trade agreement that will include most Pacific states, but not China.

China’s role in the U.S. rebalancing process was the subject of a detailed analysis by David Lai and Steven Camaron, who, with good reason, conclude: “Chinese leaders had just two options for interpreting these statements. They could have either naively assumed that the United States would execute a costly foreign policy initiative in the region without choosing to put special focus on the region’s most influential member, or they could have more logically assumed that the United States was making plans to impede China that it desired to hide. By refusing to acknowledge that China’s rising prominence was what made the region more deserving of U.S. attention, the administration appeared hostile and deceitful despite its peaceful promulgations. This rhetorical mistake closed many doors to peaceful negotiation and has contributed to the region’s growing polarization.” This could lead to a dangerous situation with all the prerequisites for a substantial security dilemma.

The U.S. should employ political and diplomatic finesse if it wishes to stage a powerful return to the Asia-Pacific. For some time, Washington has been under pressure from strong nationalist movements — not only in China, but also in Japan, South Korea, Vietnam and the Philippines — concerning disputes over islands of mostly symbolic value in the South and East China seas. If the U.S. wants to play a stabilizing role in the region, it will have to exert a moderating influence on its allies and not encourage them, even indirectly, to provoke China in those disputes, which could possibly trigger reactions that cause more harm. Acts of defiance by China such as setting up an Air Defense Identification Zone over the East China Sea at the end of 2013, or the stationing of an oil rig in coastal waters claimed by Vietnam in May 2014 result from a position of insecurity. China realizes that such acts of aggression will not lead to sustainable results because it lacks the capabilities to enforce them over long periods, which means that, in the end, they are counterproductive and harmful to its long-term interests.

The relationship between the U.S. and China, often seen as the most important one of the 21st century, is a perfect example of interdependence, with all the opportunities and risks involved. A situation like this requires both sides to step cautiously and use their power with consideration to allow a smooth transition from Pax Americana to a stable regional order based on constructive cooperation. This would not only benefit a region not interested in power games between the U.S. and China, but would also accommodate the Europeans, who have many economic interests in the Pacific region but very little political leverage.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPE**

What does all of this imply for Europe? The first question that comes up in this context is whether there is such a thing as a common perspective in the global concert of powers. The European Union is without doubt a global economic power whose 28 member states account for more than a quarter of worldwide economic output. But is the EU politically more than the sum of its parts? Does it pursue a common policy? Does it act coherently as a great power in the international arena? There is room for doubt because in its external relations and in the great game, Europe is more of a potential power than a real power. This is true of its relations with the U.S., but, even more so, of its relations with China.
Europe has long become accustomed to and felt comfortable with the U.S. playing the role of “European Pacifier,” as Josef Joffe once expressed it so aptly. Therefore, the exclusive nature of the trans-Atlantic link has always been more in Europe’s, and particularly in Germany’s, interest and has not reflected the real challenges the U.S. has been confronted with as a global power. Nevertheless, the ties to the old continent have always been strategically important to the U.S. because of similarities in political culture and shared values, interests and worldviews. Therefore, the U.S. is going to remain a European power, although at a reduced level of commitment. So when the U.S. decided to focus more on the Asia-Pacific region, Europeans remained calm and matter-of-fact. The pivot to Asia has been a gradual process rather than an abrupt fundamental change, and in view of the global power shift and the emergence of states like China, it seemed the right thing to do and was to be expected.

As far as Asia, and in particular, China are concerned, Europe’s interest in the region is great; its political influence, however, is low, although the EU is a dialogue partner in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum. At the Asia-Europe Meeting, EU representatives meet with those from all important East and Southeast Asian states. In 2004, the EU entered into a strategic partnership with China; there is the EU-China Summit as an established forum for regular consultations between high-ranking officials from both sides. The EU-China Dialogue on Human Rights was set up in 1997, consisting of a dense network of more than 50 expert dialogues on matters from economic and social issues to cooperation in customs matters.

However, the People’s Republic can at any time cancel EU-China dialogues and summits at its discretion, reduce their number (since 2012 the Dialogue on Human Rights has been held only once per year instead of twice), or impose conditions — just because it can and because there is very little Europe can do about it. Compared to the united front and coherent political agenda China presents in its foreign policy in spite of its weaknesses, the EU looks rather inconsistent in its approach. It lacks a common strategy, political will and, inevitably, the instruments required to systematically pursue its interests in a bilateral relationship with China. The People’s Republic, a pragmatic and flexible actor, long ago learned from the U.S. how easy it is to deal with Europeans according to the old Roman principle of divide et impera. And indeed, China prefers bilateral contacts with important EU member states over dealing with the EU.

If you do not have awareness of your capabilities, the Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu said, your defeat in any war, or in more civilian terms, in any competition, is inevitable. If Europe wants to keep up with China’s ascension, Europe will have to make better use of its potential by turning it into real power and influence.

In his speech to the graduating cadets of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, Obama asserted his country’s claim to global leadership quite forcefully: “America must always lead on the world stage. If we don’t, no one else will.” The book Paradox of American Power by political scientist Joseph Nye discusses the fact that the U.S. needs partners to be able to remain a leader — and these partners are welcome to show more self-confidence. Karl-Heinz Kamp is right when he states: “Even if in terms of power politics the European Union is a toothless tiger, it nevertheless has influence in regions where skepticism over Washington’s superpower attitudes is strong.” Europe can make good use of this influence in Asia to promote the integration of those values that still define the Western world into the world order, and to hold its ground in the region next to the U.S. and China.

OUTLOOK

Some 20 years after its fortunate and peaceful reunification, Europe has “grown up” and has the capabilities to take care of its own security. A security threat that would require a massive U.S. presence is not on the horizon, not even the Ukraine-Russia crisis. And because of the commonalities mentioned before, the trans-Atlantic link is going to remain relevant in the future. Still, the partial withdrawal of the U.S. from Europe sends two messages. One of them reads: “Europe has learned to stand on its own feet and to provide for its own security. And while there is a high degree of respect for Europe in the U.S., there is also the conviction that for the foreseeable future, Europe is not going to present any challenge to U.S. dominance at the global level.

The second message is: Europe will have to adapt to its new role. The words of admonition spoken by U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates shortly before he left office still resonate: “The non-U.S. NATO members collectively spend more than $300 billion U.S. on defense annually which, if allocated wisely and strategically, could buy a significant amount of usable military capability. Instead, the results are significantly less than the sum of the parts.” Europe will have to work harder to forge a credible common security and defense policy and cannot always rely on the U.S. Europe will not be left alone at home, but becoming more self-reliant and carrying a larger share of the burden within NATO is for its own good. The litmus test will be its contribution to the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, set up as a result of the NATO summit in Wales.

In the future, Europe will have to demonstrate more unity and more coherence in its foreign policy. This also implies becoming a more independent actor and pursuing its own interests in relation to the U.S., as well as in relation to China.

This type of policy, however, has always been particularly difficult to adopt. In its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) the EU still relies exclusively on intergovernmental coordination processes. But Europe is good at handling crises. Indeed, it has done little else since the end of World War II — always changing its mode of operation for the benefit of a stronger European community. The rise of China and the partial withdrawal of the U.S. serve as a wake-up call for Europe to lend more weight to its CFSP. The new global concert of powers puts Europe at a crossroads: Either accept the new geopolitical challenges and grow by continuing the integration process and becoming a smart power in a multipolar world, or turn into a relatively insignificant bunch of small- and medium-size states. □
The European Union and NATO are quite different organizations. The EU, previously the European Community, and before that, the European Coal and Steel Community, was established in 1958 with Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands as “the Original Six.” Since then, successive treaties have grown the EU to 28 states and greatly enhanced cooperation and integration in business, free movement of goods and services, economic policy and lately, foreign and defense policy.

The EU’s European External Action Service (EEAS) was launched in 2010. EEAS has extensive foreign policy implementation capabilities combined with crisis management, intelligence gathering and, increasingly, military proficiency. EEAS is headed by the EU High Representative Federica Mogherini. Its Common Foreign and Security Policy is decided by EU foreign ministers representing each member state at the Foreign Affairs Council, chaired by Mogherini.

NATO also has grown — now 28 states from the original 12 that signed the Washington Treaty in 1949. To this day, the central element of the treaty is Article 5 — an armed attack on one member is considered an attack on all members. It provides for collective defense, deterrence and response. There is a significant overlap between the EU and NATO. It is easier to point out who is not in both organizations. With the exception of the Republic of Cyprus, every member of the EU is a member of NATO or Partnership for Peace (PiP).

Cyprus wishes to join PiP. EU members Sweden, Finland, Ireland and Malta are all in PiP. NATO members Canada and the U.S. are clearly not in the EU, and Albania and Turkey aspire to join the EU. Indeed, along with Greece, Turkey joined NATO in 1952, but its EU ambitions have yet to be fulfilled more than six decades after joining the Alliance. NATO member Norway decided not to join the EU but follows most EU laws and participates in the EU’s common passport region called the Schengen Zone. Moreover, Norway participates in many aspects of EU defense.

History of cooperation

Until the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, the assumption was clear: Europe’s defense was conducted by NATO. Europe’s early efforts at a separate non-NATO defense collapsed. The European Defence Community, planned as early as 1948, fell apart because of France’s fears over sovereignty. The military replacement, the
Western European Union (WEU), proved incapable of dealing with Yugoslavia’s collapse in 1991. This was an emergency in Europe’s backyard and one that NATO was not supposed to handle. In other words, through NATO was considered an unsuitable vehicle to fulfill this foreign policy and military objective, the WEU failed.

It was not until 2002 that the EU and NATO formed a set of arrangements whereby the EU could access NATO assets and capabilities to conduct crisis management operations and share secure information. This set of arrangements within the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), in which the EU could operate when NATO declined to do so, became known as the “Berlin Plus” agreements. There have been only two operations under Berlin Plus, both successful. The first, in 2003, was Operation Concordia in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, where the EU took over NATO’s Operation Allied Harmony. The ongoing European Union Force (EUFOR) operation Althea, the EU military deployment in Bosnia and Herzegovina to oversee implementation of the 1994 Dayton Agreement, has been in place since 2004.

**Different experiences, different capabilities**

For more than six decades NATO has established a well-organized and well-executed command, training and logistical structure. But NATO is limited in its aims and objectives. One could argue that the primary purpose of NATO is to deter, and if necessary, respond if Russia attacked a member. And yet, the first and only time Article 5 has been invoked was as a result of something that NATO was totally unprepared or designed for — an asymmetric suicide attack by al-Qaida on New York and Washington, D.C., on September 11, 2001. In turn, NATO led the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan for the next 13 years. ISAF was an out-of-area operation that would have been unthinkable on September 10, 2001. Mindful of these changing challenges, in her NATO commissioned report on the future of the Alliance, “NATO 2020: Assured Security: Dynamic Engagement,” former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright addressed “new” security issues, saying that “the boundary between military and non-military threats is becoming blurred.” Such threats include energy security, cyber security and asymmetric terrorist attacks. One can add to this a multitude of emerging security challenges and threats that cross the divide between the military and the civilian spheres — climate change and extreme weather events such as hurricanes, floods and fires; food and water security; the resilience of critical infrastructure such as electricity, water treatment and transport; and pandemics and the spread of diseases.
And we are at the start of a technology revolution enabling access to incredible capabilities. Unmanned aerial vehicles (drones), unmanned ground vehicles, 3D printing, nanotechnology, the development of cyber-physical systems, “Big Data,” and the progression of what has become known as “Internet of Things” will revolutionize industry and empower individuals. But technology is neutral. It can be used for great good, for example by medical professionals pioneering new forms of robotic surgery, or great harm, such as ISIS using a drone to commit another atrocity. It could be argued that NATO, as a traditional military organization, has a substantial challenge addressing these developing and overlapping areas. Huge progress has been made, including the establishment of NATO’s Emerging Security Challenges Division, headed by Assistant Deputy Secretary-General Dr. Jamie Shea. But the extent to which NATO will proceed in areas considered “nonmilitary” remains to be seen. Indeed, some NATO members see such progression as crossing a “military boundary” that would make them highly uncomfortable.

While NATO may be constrained with moving beyond such a boundary, the EU faces quite different challenges. Transport, critical infrastructure, the economy, health, emergency planning, cyber security, combating organized crime, preventing human trafficking, and border protection are examples where the EU has made substantial progress. Moreover, as the world’s second biggest economy, the EU has unrivaled economic power to pursue foreign policy goals. Indeed, sanctions aimed at Iran, North Korea or Russia are of little value without the full acquiescence and engagement of the EU.

**EU defense deficiencies**

Despite recent economic recessions, the EU and the U.S. are by far the most important global economies. The EU is of vast and increasing foreign policy importance. But perhaps surprisingly, in terms of military defense, the EU is somewhat uncoordinated. The EU consists of 28 separate defense policies. Eighty percent of EU procurement is made domestically, resulting in a huge loss of cost and technological efficiencies. The EU has 1.6 million armed personnel — even more than the U.S. — but 70 percent cannot be deployed. EU states have just 42 air-to-air refueling aircraft, consisting of 12 different types. By comparison, the U.S. has 550 refueling aircraft of only four types. The EU has 30 different helicopter training programs, 15 different armored personnel carrier programs, five types of tanks and four kinds of multirole aircraft. Examples of this inefficiency and duplication have been highlighted by Graham Muir of the European Defence Agency (EDA). Indeed, such examples are so numerous that they would fill this entire journal, and the EDA is doing excellent work to address this issue. But the EDA faces tough national resistance based on the myth that EU states have “sovereignty” over national defense. This myth was brutally exposed by the 2011 military intervention in Libya to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973.

Libya was indeed the first occasion when the U.S. was content to let EU states lead a military intervention. However, Washington was frustrated that Europeans, despite 20 years of defense integration and investments of 180 billion euros annually on defense (more than China and Russia combined) could not do basic tasks such as targeting and intelligence gathering. Indeed, after just a few days of operations, the Europeans ran out of precision guided munitions. Moammar Gadafi’s Libya, a country with a tiny defense budget and a barely functioning army, could not be defeated without significant U.S. support. In a speech in the Netherlands in January 2013, Dr. Shea noted that U.S. drones, missiles, surveillance and air-to-air refueling were absolutely vital. Indeed, the EDA admits publicly that Europe continues to lack key enablers such as air-to-air refueling, intelligence, satellite communications, surveillance and reconnaissance.

This is the “European Enigma”: It’s an economic superpower that rivals the U.S. and possesses a high representative who is U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s first phone call when he seeks allied opinion. The EEAS stations diplomats in nearly every country of the world. The Continent holds seats at the G7 and G20, and plays one of the most important roles on the world stage. But it is a Europe that is unable to undertake a military operation without U.S. support against a state with a barely functioning army.

**EU strengths**

While the EU is incapable of fighting a traditional war against a state, its military capabilities in new and emerging situations should not be underestimated. EEAS increasingly operates highly effective civilian and military missions across the world. In addition to EU Althea in Bosnia, these have included Operation Artemis and EUFOR operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in Chad. Current EU military operations include the EU Naval Force for counterpiracy in Somalia, EU Naval Force Atalanta, and the EU Training Mission in Mali in support of counterterrorism. Nestor, an EU capacity-building effort, supports the maritime capacities of five countries in the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean.

The EU sponsors 11 ongoing and nine completed civilian training missions, including the EU Police Mission to train law enforcement in Afghanistan. The EU has established 19 rapid deployment battle groups consisting of two to six countries each, the largest being the Nordic battle group comprising Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania and Norway. Special forces European battlegroups are another example of the
EU’s developing role in nontraditional warfare. Moreover, with the Europol European Cybercrime Centre, the EU has developed an unparalleled ability to tackle cyber-related crime such as fraud, intellectual property theft, serious organized crime and terrorism. Not only does Europol consist of EU members, it also has operational agreements with and seconded officers from 12 other states, including the U.S., Norway and Australia. Europol is uniquely able to bring together expertise and data from 40 countries.

It could be argued that while the EU is unready to fight a traditional war, it is, conversely, ideally placed to engage in crisis management, upholding and supporting UN mandates, special forces operations, cyber security, and military, civilian and police training. A March 2015 trip the author made to Brussels to consult with EEAS officials raised some interesting points: The EU is arguably better in dealing with issues, usually civilian related, that cut across military and nonmilitary boundaries. It is perfectly logical that an organization such as the EU — which is not a military organization but offers a military component — possesses a much wider toolbox than a purely military organization.

Not only is there potential for NATO and the EU to work together, but there may indeed be a perfect synergy. NATO could take the lead in dealing with traditional military threats, such as an Article 5 situation or a direct military engagement against a foreign power — something that European states are unable to do. But in nontraditional areas of overlap between the military and the nonmilitary, the EU could take the lead in helping NATO.

Another area of potential cooperation could be to combat what has become known as “hybrid war,” perhaps best exemplified by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Hybrid war consists of deniability, subterfuge and propaganda. Cyber is a perfect element of a hybrid war because it is deniable and can have far-reaching ramifications. For example, a cyber attack on a water treatment facility could have catastrophic consequences but is also deniable. Likewise, the cutting of gas supplies or raising its cost exorbitantly because the target has no other
source of energy could be blamed on “lack of supply” or “economic” reasons.

Russia doesn’t appear to be the only entity engaged in hybrid war. ISIS, although a nonstate actor, is another example of an advisory that has adopted “hybrid” tactics such as the sophisticated use of social media to attempt to influence EU populations.

And it is not just Ukraine that has experienced Russia’s preference for hybrid war. An Estonian government officer was kidnapped by Russia in September 2014. Russia claimed the officer, Aston Kohver, was on its side when he was illegally detained. However, if Kohver was on the Estonian side, one could argue that the kidnapping constituted a Russian invasion of a NATO state. But again, the situation included deniability, subterfuge, contradiction and confusion—all elements of hybrid warfare.

In March 2014, Gvidas Venckaitis, attaché at the Lithuanian Embassy in London said to the author: “Russian propaganda is another emerging threat which has to be addressed at both NATO and the EU level. Russian state-controlled and sponsored international ‘media channels’ such as RT [Russia Today] or Sputnik need to be clearly identified as propaganda. The question of licensing such ‘media’ should be ultimately posed. … There should be more discussions on EU media regulatory framework, for example the Audiovisual Media Services Directive. We are pleased to note that the EU External Action Service is eager to play a greater role in this respect.”

Lithuania is an EU and NATO state that has been pushing a robust response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine via both the EU and NATO. Venckaitis suggested the EU and NATO work together to address emerging threats such as cyber security, energy security and hybrid war: “First and foremost, we must not forget about the conventional security threats that unfortunately continue to exist. Russia names NATO as an adversary bloc in its military doctrine and systematically increases the expenditure of military procurement and modernization of warfare. In this light, NATO allies should act accordingly. First of all, the member states have to reach the agreed 2 percent of GDP expenditure on defense. Deterrence of a potential aggressor is of key importance in these geopolitical circumstances.”

Communication

The North Atlantic Council (NAC) is NATO’s principal decision-making body and meets with the EU’s Political and Security Committee (PSC), formally or informally. Formal meetings are challenging because Cyprus and Turkey have no diplomatic relations at all. Because of this, PSC and NAC formal meetings are very rare. Since 2011 the PSC and NAC have had three informal meetings, one about Libya and two others in 2014 about Ukraine. Regarding Ukraine, NATO focused more on military events and the EU on civilian safety.

Lithuania is keen to develop and expand the work of the PAC/NSC and believes meetings have been beneficial. Venckaitis stated: “Security challenges that the European countries are facing today demand as much information sharing between NATO and the EU as possible. Lately, we
have observed a significantly growing number of staff-to-staff talks between NATO and PSC. … Regular meetings between NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg and EU High Representative Federica Mogherini also bear witness to the closer cooperation between NATO and the EU.”

Poland stresses a similar message. Retired Navy Capt Piotr Gawliczek of the Polish National Defence University interviewed several leading military and political figures on behalf of the author. Capt. Gawliczek said: “Poland wants to make the EU the real subject of international security. Polish officials claim that the EU has to have a real-term security strategy and underline that the EU should take advantage of the opportunity created by this year’s CSDP summit in June to start working on it. Poland argues that changes in the European security environment, especially the qualitative change on the eastern flank, require a strategic adjustment of Euro-Atlantic structures — not just NATO’s but also the EU’s.”

In regard to NATO and the EU working together, Capt. Gawliczek stated: “From the Polish point of view, it is essential to achieve CSDP growth in harmony with NATO without challenging NATO’s role in the European security system or the U.S. military’s position in Europe. Therefore, Polish diplomacy acts in various forums — the Visegrad Group, or V4, and the Weimar Triangle — to bolster the CSDP. Through the Weimar Triangle, Poland is trying to enhance key EU defense capabilities, such as improving EU-NATO relations, establishing permanent civilian-military planning and command structures, and developing EU battlegroups and their defense capabilities. The V4 Battle Group will begin operations in 2016 and remains the most important common project in the field of defense.”

Like Lithuania, Poland therefore believes strongly that it is not a question of “EU or NATO” but “EU and NATO.”

A European army?
Article 41 (7) of the EU’s 2007 Treaty of Lisbon states that when an EU country is the target of armed aggression on its territory, other EU member states shall aid and assist by any means possible. In other words, the EU has its own Article 5. Nevertheless, the EU is incapable of a collective defense against an aggressor country in any conventional sense, short of threatening and ultimately using the nuclear capabilities of the United Kingdom and/or France — the EU’s nuclear powers. Short of that dramatic escalation, Article 41 (7) is ineffective. This may be why European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker stated in March 2015 that “a common army among the Europeans would convey to Russia that we are serious about defending the values of the European Union.”

Indeed, this process is starting, albeit gradually, with the development of the EU battlegroups — rapid deployment of troops based on an infantry battalion or armored regiment. Operation Artemis, located in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and intended to stabilize the area during the 2003 Ituri conflict, was the first test of the concept and proved highly successful. NATO Secretary-General Stoltenberg said that he welcomed increased European investment in defense, but “it’s important to avoid duplication, and I urge Europe to make sure that everything they do is complementary to the NATO alliance.” U.S. Air Force Gen. Philip Breedlove, NATO’s supreme commander in Europe, agrees that NATO “would like to avoid … any duplication because we need to smartly invest,” he said at a NATO news conference in March 2015. In short, the NATO position is: Support is welcome, but there is enough replication and duplication.

Professor Trevor Salmon of the College of Europe reinforces this perspective. Prof. Salmon reminded the author that the U.S. Bartholomew Memorandum of 1991 stated that Europe acting within NATO parameters was welcome, but was dubious of Europe acting without NATO. Salmon adds that the notion of a European defense may ultimately question the leadership of the United States. Salmon points to President George H.W. Bush’s visit to Rome in 1991 when he asked if Europeans wanted the U.S. to remain committed. Few today question U.S. commitment to Europe.

Former Director General of the Council of the European Union Sir William Nicoll takes a firm line on the EU’s role as a military power. Nicoll told the author: “I do not know why the EU thinks that it needs a military capacity. Its decisional structure is demonstrably not suited to the prompt and emergency actions which a military capability depends upon. This suggests that the EU should subcontract its military interests to NATO and not seek to inject its bureaucratic systems into NATO’s missions. … I am far more concerned about the current tensions between NATO partners and Russia.”

Dr. Shea points to the possibility of a “New Transatlantic Bargain” that is not the “in together out together” philosophy. Libya is a case in point: Only eight allies participated, with some declining to participate even though they had the capabilities. Sweden was involved in the air campaign despite being outside NATO. In the future, we may have more coalitions in which all 28 NATO states pay for a multinational structure that not all of them use at any one time. Each would see a collective benefit.

NATO and the EU will continue to work together. Both organizations bring separate attributes to one another. However, perhaps we too should start to consider a “NATO/EU Hybrid Response.” How can NATO and the EU bring the best attributes of one another to defeat adversaries, be they states or, increasingly, nonstate violent actors such as ISIS? How do we in NATO and the EU perhaps stop looking at what prevents the two organizations from collaborating and instead focus on what empowers the two organizations to collaborate even more? A proactive, adaptable hybrid response that addresses new and traditional challenges with military and nonmilitary attributes perhaps needs to be considered. As Madeline Albright said, the boundary between military and nonmilitary threats is indeed blurred. It will remain so for many years to come.
Russia has taken advantage of European disunity to wage asymmetric warfare

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Russian military trucks, painted white, cross into a separatist-held region of Ukraine in August 2014 as part of what Russia claimed was a humanitarian aid convoy.  

AFP/GETTY IMAGES
Russia’s belligerent attitude toward Ukraine surprised Europe. For most, a 21st-century war within European borders was unimaginable. This is the consequence of diverging strategic views in Europe, Russia and the United States, resulting in different levels of confrontation. And it is aggravated by internal strategic divergence among European states.

Although Russia sees Europe as its most important partner in many areas, it considers the spread of Western values in Eastern Europe part of a strategy to establish a neocolonial power relationship. It is convinced that, if the West is unable to achieve objectives using instruments of soft power, it will use military power to overthrow established regimes and impose puppet governments. This is unacceptable for Russia, which will fight to maintain not only its regional geopolitical influence, but its independence from external pressures on its internal affairs.

Russia has been preparing for three possible scenarios of military conflict: first, a major war with NATO and Japan; second, a regional border conflict scenario over disputed territories; and third, an internal military conflict as a result of terrorism. The possibility of a direct military conflict with NATO in the short term is not conceivable. However, Russia has been facing severe pressure of infringement on its strategic national interests. NATO has politically and militarily neutralized most of Russia’s potential natural allies, as exemplified by NATO’s expansion into the former Warsaw Pact space. According to a 2013 Russian collaborative report on defense sector reform edited by Alexander Nagorny and Vladislav Shurygin, the monetarist economic ideology imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and other multilateral organizations not only sought to weaken Russian society, but resulted in underfunding the armed forces and thus, operational degradation.

At the same time, the Afghanistan and Iraq wars and other American/NATO military interventions caused Russian President Vladimir Putin to conclude that the West is dangerous and unpredictable. In Russia’s view, the trans-Atlantic community, especially the U.S., uses instruments of irregular warfare such as nongovernmental organizations and multilateral institutions (IMF, World Bank) to destabilize Russia. As a result, the view that it constantly faces outside threats became mainstream in Russia.

In the face of these threats, Russia considers itself a fragile country. Putin and his inner circle understand that the economy is too dependent on oil and gas. As a result, there is not enough energy for expansion. At the same time, they feel regional influence needs to be retained by all means. Putin believes that external factors outside Moscow’s control can influence internal events and result in Russia’s collapse. This explains why Russia is interfering with Ukraine’s attempt to move toward the West. At the same time, Putin is convinced that defending private interests and those of his inner circle is tantamount to defending Russia’s national interests. Thus, any attempt to make Russia more transparent, democratic or tolerant is considered a personal attack against not only him and his allies, but also against the Russian state. Russia’s answer to these threats is asymmetric. It is not hybrid.

ASYMMETRIC WARFARE
Since the beginning of Russia’s Crimean incursion, it has been difficult to find a term that defines how the operation was conducted. In the very beginning, some called it fourth generation warfare, referring to William Lind’s idea that warfare evolves. The first generation of modern war (1648-1860) was marked by line and column tactics. Battles were formal and the battlefield relatively orderly. This generation was significant in the establishment of a separate military culture, resulting in the separation of “military” and “civilian.”
The second generation addressed the contradiction between military culture and the disorderliness of the battlefield. Centrally controlled firepower was used in synchrony with the infantry: the artillery conquers, the infantry occupies. The third generation built on the second and is commonly known as Blitzkrieg, or maneuver warfare. Finally, the fourth generation represents the return of conflict between cultures. According to Lind, the state is losing its monopoly on violence and war and finds itself fighting nonstate adversaries. Therefore, since fourth generation warfare is basically about nonstate actors fighting a culture war, this concept is too narrow to characterize how Russia is conducting warfare.

One of Putin’s closest advisors, Vladislav Surkov (under the pseudonym Nathan Dubovitsky), coined the term “non-linear war” in a 2014 article describing what would be the “fifth world war,” the one where all fight against all. The idea is that traditional geopolitical paradigms no longer hold. The Kremlin gambles, counting on the idea that old alliances such as the European Union and NATO are less valuable than the economic interests Russia has with Western companies. Besides, many Western countries welcome obscure financial flows from the post-Soviet space, and the Kremlin bets that these economic and financial interconnections will allow it to get away with aggression. Although this concept may explain Russia’s idea that there is a war of civilizations, it fails to reflect how it is conducting warfare, retired Russian Maj. Gen. Alexander Vladimirov wrote in a 2012 article for the website Ruskiy Kadet.

The most common term used to describe Russia’s new generation warfare is “hybrid,” a label that NATO adopted. The seminal work on hybrid warfare is Frank G. Hoffman’s 2009 article “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges” in Joint Forces Quarterly. Hoffman shows that a hybrid strategy is based on tactically employing a mix of instruments that are difficult to fully understand and establish a proper counterstrategy for. The main challenge results from state and nonstate actors each employing technologies and strategies that are most appropriate for their own field, in a multimode confrontation. It may include exploiting modern capabilities to support insurgent, terrorist and criminal activities, as well as use of high-tech military capabilities combined with terrorist actions and cyber warfare operations against economic and financial targets.

Therefore, it still largely presupposes the application of kinetic force — military power — to defeat the enemy.

There are two problems. First, hybrid warfare presupposes application of kinetic force. Russia’s new generation warfare does not. Second, it is a conceptual mistake to try to fit Russia’s new strategy, the result of extensive military academic deliberation, into Western concepts. The word hybrid is catchy, since it may represent a mix of anything. However, as a military concept, it is the result of American military thought. Its basic framework differs from that developed by Russia. Therefore, it is a methodological mistake to try to view a theory developed independently by the Russian military in a theoretical framework developed in another country, reflecting a different culture and strategic understanding of the conduct of warfare.

An often ignored aspect of Russian military art is the idea of asymmetry in warfare. As Putin put it in 2006, “We should not go after quantity. … Our responses must be based on intellectual superiority. They will be asymmetrical, not as costly, but will unquestionably make our nuclear triad more reliable and effective.” In its classic definition, asymmetry is a strategy of a weaker opponent to fight a stronger adversary. The main idea, as Carl von Clausewitz put it, is that war “is not merely a political act but a real political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, a carrying out of the same by other means. … The political design is the object, while war is the means, and the means can never be thought of apart from the object.” Since the objective of war is to achieve political gains, the instruments of warfare may be military or
Russian strategy aims at debasing support for NATO and the EU; in the first case, to remove NATO’s Article 5 mutual defense assurance; in the second, to weaken the geopolitical influence of the West.

Nonmilitary. A direct attack followed by territorial occupation and annexation might not be necessary; therefore, warfare may be direct or indirect.

In the first case, this means to disarm and destroy the enemy. In the second, it means to wear down the enemy by a process of gradual exhaustion of capabilities, equipment, troops and moral resistance. One of the best examples is the Vietnam War. The Viet Cong and its North Vietnamese ally were able to resist American forces until they withdrew. Since the Vietnamese communists achieved their political objectives, even without directly defeating American forces, they won the war. Although for Clausewitz, indirect warfare was a matter of resistance, the Russian strategy

ABOVE: Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tspiras, right, attends a wreath-laying ceremony at the Tomb to the Unknown Soldier in Moscow in April 2015 before meeting Russian President Vladimir Putin. Russia hopes to seed division within the European Union through bilateral economic and energy deals with member states. EPA
is based rather on Sun Tzu’s idea that “warfare is the art (tao) of deceit. ... Attack where he (the enemy) is not prepared; go by way of places where it would never occur to him you would go.”

Another important aspect of Russian asymmetric warfare is Mao Zedong’s strategy of using regular and irregular forces together. Mao viewed guerrilla and conventional forces as different parts of the same mechanism for defeating the enemy. Therefore, attacks were both symmetric and asymmetric, dispersing the enemy’s strength. However, the most valuable lesson the Russians learned from the Chinese regards the ideological aspect of warfare. This was exemplified during the Sino-Japanese War. Since the ideological dimension of war is fundamental to victory, especially during stabilization operations, winning the hearts and minds of the population is decisive. Mao had a clear advantage, since he had a clear ideology to offer, while the Japanese did not, retired Japanese Lt. Gen. Noboru Yamaguchi wrote in a 2012 article for Hybrid Warfare.

RUSSIA’S ASYMMETRIC STRATEGY

This is the basis for the Russian strategy of creating an alternative reality. The idea is that society’s support for the strategic objectives of war — the legitimization of war — is fundamental to achieve victory. The success of military campaigns is more dependent on the relationship between military and nonmilitary factors — the political, psychological, ideological and informational elements of the campaign — than on military power as an isolated variable, retired Russian officers Sergei Chekinov and Sergei Bogdanov wrote in a 2010 analysis for Military Thought.

Therefore, the objective of asymmetric warfare is to avoid direct military operations and interference in internal conflicts in other countries. In a 2003 article for the Russian-language journal International Trends, Victor Kremenyuk laid out the specifics of fighting weaker adversaries relying on the following strategy: Employ small units of specially trained troops; take preventive actions against irregular enemy forces; spread propaganda among local populations; provide military and material support to friendly groups in the country being attacked; scale back combat operations; and employ non-military methods to pressure the opponent.

Chekinov and Bogdanov describe the main instruments of asymmetric warfare employed by Russia:

- Measures making the opponent apprehensive of the Russian Federation’s intentions and responses;
- Demonstration of the readiness and potential of the Russian forces in a strategic area to repel an invasion with consequences unacceptable to the aggressor;
- Actions by Russian forces to deter a potential enemy by guaranteeing destruction of his most vulnerable military and strategically important targets to persuade him that an attack is hopeless;
- Impact of highly effective, state-of-the-art weapons systems;
- Widespread employment of indirect force and noncontact commitment of forces;
- Seizing and holding enemy territory only undertaken if the benefits are greater than the “combat costs,” or if the end goals of the war cannot be achieved any other way;
- Information warfare as an independent form of combat along with economic, political, ideological, diplomatic forms;
- Information and psychological operations to weaken the enemy’s military potential by other than armed force, by affecting his information flow processes, and by misleading and demoralizing the population and enemy military personnel;
- Significant damage to the enemy’s future economic potential;
- A clear understanding by a potential adversary that military operations against Russia may turn into an environmental and sociopolitical catastrophe.

It is interesting to note that much of what has been written by Russian military experts about Russia’s strategic challenges reflects how it has conducted warfare. When analyzing Russia’s most important strategic challenges, Nagorny and Shurygin established the techniques and instruments the West would employ against Russia. Although their analysis is based mostly on “Color Revolutions” as the result of what they see as a strategy of controlled-chaos being deliberately employed by the West, it reveals more about the Russian strategy itself. They have formalized nine points of a strategy that, although they could be used by the West against Russia, in reality reflect much of the Russian asymmetric strategy used in Ukraine:

1. Promotion and support of armed actions by separatist groups with the objective of promoting chaos and territorial disintegration;
2. Polarization between the elite and society, resulting in a crisis of values followed by a process of orientation to Russian values;
3. Demoralization of the armed forces and military elite;
4. Strategic controlled degradation of the socio-economic situation;
5. Instigation of a socio-political crisis;
6. Intensification of simultaneous forms and models of psychological warfare;
7. Incitement of mass panic with the loss of confidence in key government institutions;
8. Defamation of political leaders who are not aligned with Russia’s interests;
9. Annihilation of possibilities to form coalitions with foreign allies.
In the field, this strategy means employing high-precision non-nuclear weapons, together with the support of subversive and reconnaissance groups. Strategic targets are those that, if destroyed, result in unacceptable damage for the country being attacked. According to Chekinov and Bogdanov, these include top government administration and military control systems, major manufacturing, fuel and energy facilities, transportation hubs and facilities (such as railroad hubs, bridges, ports, airports and tunnels), and potentially dangerous objects (hydroelectric power dams and hydroelectric power complexes, processing units of chemical plants, nuclear power facilities, storages of strong poisons and so forth). Russia’s objective is to make the enemy understand that it may face an environmental and sociopolitical catastrophe, and therefore avoid engaging in combat.

These are the key elements of Russian new-generation warfare. It combines direct/symmetrical actions with asymmetrical instruments, aiming to achieve the tactical objectives established by political leaders. Since the Russians understand they are not strong enough to win a war against NATO, their strategy relies on asymmetric methods. Most important is that this strategy is based on attacking an adversary’s weak points. As a result, each campaign is unique.

**COUNTERING ASYMMETRIC WARFARE**

The biggest challenge for European security and defense is Europe’s unpreparedness to deal with this strategy. Russian military authors place significant importance on disorganizing military control, state administration and the air defense system. The strategy can also mislead the enemy, sway public opinion the attacker’s way and incite anti-government demonstrations and other actions to erode resistance. In Europe, the Russian strategy has focused on stimulating the lack of political convergence towards common security interests. According to Mark Galeotti, this includes single-issue lobbies with divisive messages, well-funded fringe parties, media such as Russia Today, think tanks and business lobbies. The objective is not necessarily to gain direct support for Russia, but rather for Russia’s agenda.

Russian strategy aims at debasing support for NATO and the EU; in the first case, to remove NATO’s Article 5 mutual defense assurance; in the second, to weaken the geopolitical influence of the West. In other words, Russia uses democratic tools to fight against democracy. The only way to deal with this sort of warfare is with more democracy. This means more neutral information, analysis and education. Politicians need to be more honest, transparent and connected with common people. Economic policy should also take the interests of the population into account, and should not be designed merely to support the interests of the banking sector. Unfortunately, even in Europe, this seems to be a difficult task sometimes.

Russia’s strategy is based on exploiting opponent’s weaknesses. Some argued that the Baltic region is the most important soft spot for European security. It is not. From the defense perspective, the mismanagement of the European economy in the name of specific economic ideologies and the interests of the financial system is the most serious threat to European security. Rising unemployment combined with low social security jeopardize the legitimacy of the state and of the EU as democratic institutions. A concrete indicator of this trend is the significant rise of Euroskepticism and the increasing popularity of nationalist and populist political parties with radical platforms. It also undermines the EU’s soft-power, reducing its influence in the global arena.

However, the pure military aspect cannot be ignored. European countries have been forced to drastically cut defense budgets as a result of bailing out the financial system. For example, Spain’s 41.4 billion euro bailout was the equivalent of almost five years of its defense budget. In 2014, Spain’s defense spending fell 3.2 percent, including an 8.4 percent decrease in new investments. In the United Kingdom, the banking sector’s bailout was equivalent to 21 years of the British defense budget, which is equivalent to the annual cost of servicing its public debt. France is expected to cut its defense budget 10 percent over five years, including a 12 percent reduction in personnel through 2019, making nearly 34,000 people unemployed. This not only reduces operational capability, but also increases social discontent.

The U.S. defense budget is also being cut because of sequestration. Since the U.S. already pays 75 percent of NATO’s budget, it is clear that Europe is expected to take increased responsibility for its own security. At the same time, Russia has made huge investments in modernizing its armed forces and soon might be more militarily powerful than Europe (without the U.S.). Although that eastern neighbor could be considered Europe’s most serious security threat, there is still terrorism, instability in Africa and, very importantly, the Arctic to contend with. It is important to remember that Russia has not only been modernizing, but developing its military capabilities in the Arctic at a rapid pace.

Some European officials propose increasing the capacity of the EU armed forces. However, since this is not possible without money, its operational future is unsure. Moreover, many members of the EU are also members of NATO. A second question is: Would a larger EU armed force duplicate NATO’s capacities? The answer is probably yes. Besides addressing pragmatically the problem of legitimacy and other fine points, the EU needs to assess and coordinate a realistic assessment of its resources and interoperability, reconcile ambitions and capabilities, and provide budgetary and procurement guidance. Finally, the EU needs to address the problem of divergence by trying to establish a common understanding of the main threats to European security. □
IMPROVING the NEIGHBORHOOD

NATO AND THE EU HAVE A JOINT ROLE TO PLAY IN STABILIZING EASTERN EUROPE, THE CAUCASUS AND NORTH AFRICA

By Daniel Ionita,
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Drastic security changes at Europe’s eastern and southern borders are strong evidence that the peace and security of Europe as we know it cannot be taken for granted and require a strong involvement of all member states. Europe’s immediate neighborhood is facing explicit challenges. In the East, problems include forcible change of internationally recognized borders, military buildup (especially in the Baltic and Black Sea regions) and the consolidation of the ring of protracted conflicts around the Black Sea, which also includes eastern Ukraine. In the South, the issues include porous borders, insufficient migration control, illegal trafficking, terrorism, nonstate actors, organized crime and lack of opportunity and institutional capacities. The crisis in Ukraine has just added a new facet to a broader and deeper crisis, illustrated by the existence of protracted conflicts in Moldova, Georgia and the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan, forming a ring of insecurity around the Black Sea. The Crimea episode wrecked a quarter century of efforts to build a consistent relationship between Russia and the West. The post-Crimea security environment poses long-term risks to Euro-Atlantic and European security by its lack of predictability and highlights the urgency to consolidate the eastern flank of NATO. Strategic challenges in the Black Sea region cannot be overcome without an increase in attention and engagement by the Euro-Atlantic community. A wide range of risks and threats, both traditional and asymmetrical, together with opportunities, make the Black Sea region a special case that requires a comprehensive analysis and a decisive response.

Shipwrecks in May 2015 line the coast of the northwestern Libyan port city of Zuwarah, where migrants leave the country in the hope of reaching Europe. Partnerships with NATO and the EU could help stabilize migrant fluxes. AFP/GETTY IMAGES
All these challenges impact our common security. They must be tackled with adequate instruments to solidify collective security, allowing both NATO and the European Union to adapt to the new context. Furthermore, appropriate measures should be taken to encourage positive transformation of our neighborhood into peaceful, stable, democratic and economically developed regions. This obviously requires a coherent, multidimensional response, because no single international actor is able to provide a complete answer to today’s challenges. In addition, the current economic and financial situation reinforces the need to act in coordination to avoid unnecessary duplication.

Against this background, it is essential to adapt and strengthen both NATO and the EU Common Security and Defence Policy, to work together to develop adequate capabilities and effective synergies, and to invest more in partnerships and partners.

**NATO’S ROLE**

In this respect, trans-Atlantic relations remain key to ensuring the security of the allies by means of collective defense and therefore should be strengthened from a comprehensive perspective.

The decisions adopted at the Wales Summit on consolidating NATO’s military capabilities and increasing the level of interoperability and the expertise of allied armed forces are highly important and prove the Alliance’s ability to adapt. The allies have undertaken the responsibility of increasing defense budgets toward the 2-percent-of-GDP threshold over the next 10 years, as well as providing 20 percent of the money for investments in upgrading capabilities and military research. Romania is among those allies that have already announced plans to increase defense budgets.

Implementation of the Readiness Action Plan by the 2016 Warsaw Summit, for the whole eastern flank, remains the number one priority. It is a further testimony of NATO’s commitment to increase the security of its eastern allies. The underlying principle remains “28 for 28,” both for reassurance and adaptation measures, to certify allied commitment to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

**THE EU’S ROLE**

Whereas other relevant actors have equipped themselves with new strategic visions, the EU has continued to rely mainly on the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) and on some regional strategies. To uphold its ambitions and objectives of becoming a truly global actor, an updated, a comprehensive ESS, providing the EU with a coherent strategic identity, is needed.

This strategic document should project the image of a dynamic and relevant EU able to safeguard its own interests and promote democratic values, both as a capable leader and as a reliable partner. It must take into account the interests and concerns of all member states and foster cooperation and solidarity. The plan must focus on articulating an approach to our neighborhood — both eastern and southern. This must be our top priority, and our approach to it is a matter of security and global credibility.

**NATO-EU COOPERATION**

NATO-EU cooperation should be better reflected through systemic cooperation. More than a decade after institutional relations between NATO and the EU were established, there is still much to be done to strengthen them. In-theater cooperation, crisis management complementarity and joint capabilities development are just some of the areas where this partnership should develop its full potential. The EU and NATO must also intensify consultations on new threats from hybrid warfare, terrorism, the rise of nonstate actors with radical agendas and the exponential increase in cyber attacks. Hybrid warfare is a matter of concern, recognized as such by NATO. This affects both organizations and their membership, so there should be broader dialogue on the challenge it presents.

To keep member states free and their populations and economies safe from external shocks, we must equip ourselves with reliable and cutting-edge capabilities. Initiatives such as the EU’s pooling and sharing, or NATO’s Smart Defence, are making use of consultations within the EU-NATO group on which capabilities play a major role.

In a restrictive financial environment, it is all the more important to coordinate and avoid all duplication. In that sense, the European
Defence Agency plays a key role. Member states should shield cooperative projects from budgetary cuts under the agency aegis and place it at the core of their efforts to improve their capabilities. Equally, increased transparency among defense planning processes would increase mutual trust among EU states and lead to greater convergence and interoperability.

**COMMON CAUSE**

From a political perspective, given the current international security circumstances, two organizations sharing a majority of members, common values and interests must maintain an intense level of consultation and coordination with regard to their stance and policies toward neighboring countries and partners.

Relations with countries in the neighborhood should evolve based on their sovereign choices, depending on their respective needs, aspirations and achievements, with no outside pressure or interference. Because more predictability would serve both our and their interests, we need to be more active in assisting them in their reform processes and bring their standards closer to our own.

In this process, interaction with the neighbors of our neighbors is vital for building confidence and strengthening the prospects for regional cooperation in sectors such as transport infrastructure, development assistance, trade, humanitarian aid, energy, migration, environmental protection and human rights.

In this respect, Romania has proposed to establish and develop a belt of trust and security around the partners encompassed by the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), geographically contiguous, from the Atlantic through the northern shores of Europe, and continuing through the Middle East. The concept aims to build trust at the borders of the EU while broadening

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Pro-Russian armored military vehicles approach Donetsk, Ukraine, in April 2015 in preparation for the Victory Day parade in May. Russia has denied accusations that it has deployed more air defense systems to Ukraine. Security risks in Ukraine call for greater EU and NATO cooperation. EPA
participation, starting from a platform of
dialogue — the security trust — that is inclu-
sive, informal and predictable.

Three security trusts could be envis-
aged: one for the Black Sea region, one for
the Persian Gulf/Middle East and one for
Sub-Saharan Africa. It should begin with a
comprehensive package of sectors attractive
to each region, beginning with economics,
because the EU’s prosperity represents its
main attraction. These security trusts could
be formal or informal, but participation
should be high to facilitate decisions.

The concept of security trusts is designed
to enrich and improve the ENP with features
that could prevent or reduce possible
harm from security developments near EU
borders. These dialogue platforms can focus
on the EU’s immediate neighborhood and
on the neighbors of our neighbors, with the
potential involvement of other global actors
interested in resolving crises in the region.

However, this dialogue will not include
a military dimension, but should consider
a range of multidimensional formats with
stakeholders in the region. The aim is to
bring all interested stakeholders (regional
and global) transparently to the same
table to address issues of divergence and
convergence.

**STANDING FIRM**

To maintain a functional relationship with
Russia based on principles, commitments,
common interests and, above all, respect
for international law, NATO and EU poli-
cies toward Russia have to be realistic and
consider Russia’s concrete actions. Respect
for internationally recognized borders and
the territorial integrity of states is a mini-
um requirement for further engagement.

Russia’s use of the Baltic and Black seas
as a testing ground for allied cohesion and
persistent aggressive rhetoric is unacceptable
and highlights that, despite the visible effects
of coordinated sanctions, the Kremlin is
reluctant to take a constructive stance. The

crisis in Ukraine undermined drastically
the trust between the West and Russia, and
the healing process, if any, will take time
and, in some cases, will be painful. But lack
of action is not an option. Now more than
ever in the past 25 years, we need vision and
political courage to make good decisions.

Adaptive measures should be taken
with North Africa and the Middle East, as
well as with the Balkans. Supporting the
development of partner states’ capabilities
is an essential step in adequately address-
ing the dangerous spread of radicalism
and terrorism, but could also pertain to the
flow of refugees or illegal trafficking. Close coordination and enhanced cooperation are needed in security sector reform, including the defense sector. Once national authorities have an agreed vision or understanding of their needs, we can provide guidance and training for police and courts, support defense reforms and offer train-and-equip missions to build these countries’ institutional capacities.

Without engaging in competition with Russia, the aspirations of partners such as Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia for deepening relations with NATO and the EU should be supported. Our eastern partners see this opportunity not geopolitically, but as an honest engagement toward common values, democracy and achieving stability and prosperity. It would be a strategic mistake to disregard their commitment and their desire to become part of Europe, whole and free.

From an EU perspective, the Eastern Partnership proved its relevance in maintaining the partners’ engagement in the economic and political reforms so necessary for their societies. For Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine, implementation of their Association Agreements/Deep Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements plays a cornerstone role. Accordingly, increased attention should be given to those willing to pursue a European path, making use of initiatives such as Train and Equip, supporting security sector reform, and deepening involvement in the missions and operations of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy.

Relations with eastern partners must remain a priority for NATO, too. Against this background, we should reflect more upon developing a NATO eastern policy and work closely with the EU in implementing it. By the two organizations taking a concerted approach, we will be better positioned to provide the eastern partners with meaningful support.

POSSIBILITIES OF EXPANSION
We should not be reluctant to keep the door open for agreeable partners, because the European Treaties clearly foresee all European states becoming part of EU. This change will not come overnight, but European countries that embrace European values and undertake necessary reforms should share in this prospect.

At the same time, a NATO open door policy remains increasingly relevant in this context. Aspirants are waiting for a clear message. Montenegro, as a NATO aspirant, has made tremendous efforts and achieved significant results. Georgia’s aspirations should also continue to be on NATO’s agenda, because Tbilisi is contributing extensively to the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan and the EU operation in the Central African Republic. At the same time, we should continue to support partners in the Western Balkans to meet integration criteria: Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina remain key to ensuring the security of the allies by means of collective defense.

Alongside NATO, the EU is an integral part of European security at large and Romania remains keen that the EU maintain a high profile in solving crises, as part of further increasing the relevance of the Union in issues pertaining to regional and international security.

Nevertheless, member states of both organizations must understand that providing adequate funding has become imperative in this fast-changing and volatile security environment, and nations are reaching the limits of doing more with less.

RECOMMENDATIONS
• Follow through with commitments made at the 2014 NATO Wales summit for increased defense expenditure and modernization.
• Develop a coherent, updated strategic external action framework for the EU.
• Improve systemic cooperation within the privileged EU-NATO relationship.
• Urge NATO and the EU to act strategically in their immediate and extended neighborhood.
• Take a firm stand against violations of international law and encourage the EU and NATO to jointly make full use of their evolving instruments to support their partners’ development.
• Maintain an open-door policy for potential EU and NATO partners.
• Keep previous international commitments as a prerequisite for building trust with neighbors.
Rethinking the European Neighbourhood Policy
The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has been surprised by two major events in recent years: the Arab Spring and the Ukraine crisis. Both events have shown the necessity and the limits of a functional ENP. During the past decade, the ENP has achieved much progress in democratic transformation and stabilization. This, however, has not attracted attention in the broader discussion on European security. The annual progress reports of the European Commission, as well as the overview of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) from 2007-2011, show an impressive record of activities and achievements. The enormous progress in political, economic and societal reforms, especially in Moldova, Georgia and Tunisia, have been overshadowed by the worsening situations in Syria, Libya, Ukraine and Egypt, the stalemate in Belarus, and Russia’s aggressive policy toward its neighbors.

The “ring of friends” that the ENP should help create seems to have been transformed into a “ring of fire.” Nevertheless, until recently the European Union has turned a blind eye to the ENP’s strategic implications for European security architecture. Rethinking the ENP in strategic terms is key to achieve the goal of establishing a ring of friends or getting as close as possible to sustainable stability in the neighborhood.

A NEW NEIGHBORHOOD POLICY?
In March 2015, the European Commission launched an open consultation and review of the ENP. This is the first step of the comprehensive review, which European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker has asked the new commission to undertake within the first year of its tenure. The open consultation and review is a good opportunity to bring a strategic dimension into the ENP.

During its first decade, the ENP focused on the efforts of neighboring countries to transform and stabilize their economic and political systems and has placed little emphasis on the regional security environment. Conceptual flaws and incoherent implementation weakened the ENP. “Adjusting the ENP to the changing reality on the ground, sharpening its tools, and rebuilding its credibility” should be the priority of the revision process, according to scholar Stefan Lehne in a February 2014 Carnegie Europe article.

The Office of the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European Commission have devised a comprehensive set of questions that seeks to explore how the ENP can become a more effective vehicle for promoting both the EU’s interests and those of its partners, and a framework more conducive to developing fuller partnerships in which both sides find their aspirations better reflected,” according to a Joint Consultation Paper. The identified shortcomings, conceptual flaws, inconsistencies and lessons learned are related to the concept of the neighborhood itself and the underlying assumption that all neighboring countries seek closer integration with the EU and thus are eager to pursue internal reforms. Neither assumption is valid any longer — if they ever were.

The ENP does not include all EU neighbors. Russia is a “strategic partner” and has been excluded from the ENP. Western Balkan countries have been dealt with under the auspices of the stability pact and those seeking EU membership as candidate countries under EU enlargement policy. Turkey, as a candidate country with a long history of difficult relations with the EU, is also considered under enlargement policy. Relations with other neighboring countries such as Switzerland, Norway and Liechtenstein are as fellow European Free Trade Area members. Geographic proximity
to the EU is more or less the only characteristic that the 16 ENP countries from Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, the Middle East and North Africa have in common.

The false assumption that all countries of the ENP are seeking closer integration with the EU stems from the inception of the ENP. The ENP and its methodology were derived from the EU’s enlargement policy. But accession is not part of the ENP package. Romano Prodi, once president of the European Commission, described ENP as “everything but institutions.” So the approach has been doomed to fail from the beginning because it won’t work for countries that do not want closer integration or association with the EU. For those countries that do want closer integration, it has been the main source of frustration owing to lack of prospective membership, or a “golden carrot.”

Future discussions should focus not only on opportunities and limits, but also strategic implications of a new ENP. Rethinking the ENP in terms of security will give the EU a chance to overcome its two main conceptual flaws and reconsider the aspects of an incoherent implementation.

It might be that an “ENP 2.0” will be less a framework and enlargement policy “light” and more a tool in the context of a broader foreign security policy. The review should aim for a more assertive, differentiated, flexible, regional, political, security-related ENP, or in other words, a more strategic neighborhood policy. This description does not intend to put everything into the new ENP, but to sharpen its profile and its tools.

How can the profile and tools be sharpened? The European perspective and the neighborhood perspective need to be distinguished. Countries that want European integration and association should be covered by a different set of programs than those who do not. The neighborhood should be differentiated according to region — Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, the Middle East and North Africa.

**OPPORTUNITIES AND LIMITS**

The High Representative of the EU and the European Commission stated recently in a paper: “Today’s neighborhood is less stable than it was ten years ago.” The ENP was introduced in 2004 under the heading of “Wider Europe” to stabilize the EU neighborhood. “A ring of stable democracies” or a “ring of friends” was its aim. The ENP is the EU’s primary tool to give life to Article 8 of the Treaty of the European Union, which states: “The Union shall develop a special relationship with neighboring countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighborliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterized by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation.”

The main objectives of the ENP have been strengthening good governance, democracy, rule of law, civil society and a working free market economy by providing tailored programs and initiatives within the context of individual action plans, regional, neighborhood-wide and cross-border cooperation. Financial support of 11.2 billion euros was provided from 2007 to 2014, primarily within the framework of the ENPI. The ENPI is the successor of the cooperation programs, TACIS for Eastern European countries and MEDA for the Mediterranean rim countries. It was replaced by the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) in January 2014. The ENI has approved funding of 15.4 billion euros for 2014-2020.

The 16 ENP countries are Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia to the south, and Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine to the east. Individual action plans negotiated
with 12 of the 16 countries have a strong economic bias, reflecting the desire of these countries for stronger economic ties with the EU. For 11 of 16 ENP countries, the EU is the most important economic partner and for the other five — Belarus, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine and Syria — it is the second most important.

Political cooperation, which mainly supported transformation processes and political reforms, has been much more difficult. The ENP has been based on the concept of jointness, conditionality and differentiation. The EU negotiated individually with each ENP country and each was involved in drafting its joint action plan, as well as in assessments of their implementation and progress. Nevertheless, conditionality has been applied to the economic and political sections of the action plans. The concept “more for more and less for less” was introduced into the ENP revision process following the Arab Spring in 2011. Conditionality has been applied inconsistently, and a real benchmarking process has not yet been successfully implemented. From 2004 to 2014, a different speed and a different level of cooperation and integration among the 16 countries emerged, making it difficult to talk about a single neighborhood policy when it’s actually more like 16 bilateral policies.

The ENP has two regional dimensions: the southern neighborhood, or Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EUROMED), formerly known as the Barcelona Process; and the eastern neighborhood, or Eastern Partnership. These multilateral cooperation initiatives have not evolved into a working regional dimension of the ENP. After the Arab Spring in 2011, the EU launched the Partnership for Democracy and Prosperity to support countries in the southern neighborhood, particularly those in North Africa. It did not materialize into a real regional approach. The same can be said for the efforts of the Eastern Partnership, with its so-called road maps — the Prague, the Chisinau and the Vilnius road maps. In both cases, the regional dimension served more as a supportive or complementary element to bilateral relationships with the EU, and they have been more multilateral clusters than true regional partnerships.

A MORE STRATEGIC ENP

The keywords for a more strategic ENP are “differentiation” and “regional focus.” Some countries are interested in a closer relationship with the EU or desire EU membership, e.g. Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, while others do not. The EU should consider and establish a more differentiated framework for these two groups. Additionally, the EU should sharpen the profile of its programs to support democratic reforms, human rights, justice and security sector reforms for those countries desiring a deeper EU relationship, preparing them for closer cooperation and integration. This would entail establishing three different clusters of bilateral relationships: (1) associated countries with further integration ambitions, (2) associated countries without further integration ambitions, and (3) non-associated countries. With this differentiation, the EU can improve its application of conditionality, “more for more and less for less.”

Protracted conflicts are part of the security environment in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. The EU needs to find a way to deal with these within the framework of the ENP or determine how to use the ENP as part of its broader foreign and security policy. This will certainly require taking a more differentiated approach towards the regional focus of the ENP. The division into southern and eastern neighborhoods should be fundamentally reconsidered. Sharpening the profile of the southern and the eastern dimensions could give them more flexibility and more regional ownership.

In particular for the Eastern Partnership, a regional stability pact with a regional strategy should be considered. This would give the countries of the Eastern Partnership the opportunity to continue internal reforms, establish closer regional cooperation and develop a working regional infrastructure. This effort requires the EU to develop a more assertive policy toward Russia, but also requires cooperation with Russia in the long term. The regional dimension of the Eastern Partnership could be sharpened by establishing two subregional dimensions: an Eastern European cluster and a Caucasian cluster. This requires bringing Turkey into the Eastern Partnership. The ENP and its Eastern Partnership are not standalone efforts, but rather part of a broader EU foreign and security policy.

The southern dimension is also a complex issue that could be dealt with in a more differentiated, more focused and more flexible way. Splitting EUROMED into a North Africa cluster and a Middle Eastern cluster will place the focus more on important regional perspectives. It supports closer cooperation with the African Union, as well as with U.S. agencies dealing with African issues, and tackles transnational security issues like illegal migration, international terrorism and illicit trafficking. Building a Middle East cluster can improve cooperation with the Gulf Cooperation Council, as well as with the United States, Russia and Turkey, and could make the ENP part of the EU’s broader efforts to stabilize the Middle East.

What does this strategic approach mean? Maybe it’s time for variable geometry within the ENP. A focus on regional cooperation between North Africa, the Middle East, Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus requires bringing in neighboring countries that are not part of the ENP, but are neighbors of neighbors. The ENP must be integrated into a comprehensive European foreign and security policy, which would separate it from the EU’s enlargement policy. In organizational terms, the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy and the EU Commissioners for Enlargement and Development will share responsibility for the ENP.

CONCLUSION

Strategically rethinking the ENP means making it more differentiated and more regional. This new approach can improve “ENP 2.0” functionality, allowing it to adjust to the rapidly changing environment in the EU neighborhood, sharpen its tools and reestablish its credibility. The review of the new ENP should be closely linked to the revision of European foreign and security policy that is currently taking place, and possibly can lead to a new European security strategy. Making the ENP an integral part of the EU’s overall foreign and security policy makes sense as an EU comprehensive approach.
Poland updates its defense strategy and reconfirms its role in NATO

BY COL. MARIUSZ FRYC, PH.D.
POLISH NATIONAL SECURITY BUREAU
Polish soldiers participate in NATO Noble Jump 2015 exercises in Zagan, Poland, in June 2015, to test and train the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force.
strengthening the eastern flank of NATO within the framework of consolidating the Alliance’s collective defense and increasing its own national defense potential are priorities for Poland’s security policy and defense strategy.

Aiming to defend not only its own territory but also that of other NATO countries, Poland is determined to counter complex militarily threats, including the recent emergence of hybrid warfare.

In the allied dimension, Poland continues to struggle to implement the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) approved at the September 2014 NATO summit in Wales to cope with new security dangers posed by the Russian Federation. By enhancing NATO’s military posture and readiness, Warsaw acts to ensure a continuous rotational military presence on the eastern edge of the Alliance. This takes the form of joint and combined exercises, the assembly of a new quick reaction “spearhead force” (Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, VJTF) with forward deployed multinational commands enabling its activation and employment, as well as raising the readiness of the Multinational Corps Northeast Headquarters in Szczecin to lead NATO operations on the eastern flank of Europe.

In the internal dimension, Warsaw continues to improve a system of managing and directing defense, strengthening deterrence and vigilance, integrating civil-military efforts to build up the system of strategic resilience against military aggression, and pushing for increased defense spending to the level of 2 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) in 2016.

Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and its subsequent concealed combat support of pro-Russian separatists in Donbas with the intention of destabilizing the Ukrainian state and establishing favorable conditions for a secession of Ukraine’s eastern areas represented clear evidence of Moscow’s violations of international law and its desire to fundamentally reshape the security order in Europe.

Since that time, Russia has continued a confrontational policy against the West. With an intention to intimidate, it has conducted unprecedented psychological warfare and manipulation of information against nations, performed aggressive and provocative sorties in European airspace and sponsored ground exercises on a scale comparable to the largest Soviet Army maneuvers. By doing so, Russia has undermined the foundations of the post-Cold War order and security systems governing relations between European states. What is more, by massing military potential along Ukraine’s eastern border and permanently supplying pro-Russian separatists with military hardware, logistics, training and intelligence, Moscow has posed a challenge to the European states’ defense systems as well as to international security institutions. These strategic changes have led to a fundamental shift in national security philosophy. In Central Europe and the Baltic region in particular, this has meant moving from a less-military-oriented security strategy to a defense-centric one.

Russia has undermined the foundations of the post-Cold War order and security systems governing relations between European states.

THE INTERNAL DIMENSION

In Poland, unpredictable and confrontational Russian policy has caused a rapid increase in a sense of insecurity. Among a wide range of military challenges associated with Russian behavior is the possibility of a politically unclear and militarily blurred threat below the threshold of regular war. Such a scenario creates a risk that Poland might not achieve a political-military consensus on how to respond collectively within NATO.
All of these challenges, including different types of hybrid approaches, resulted in an intensification of Polish pro-defense activities in domestic and foreign affairs. Most have been aimed at strengthening national defense capabilities as well as international crisis response mechanisms. All undertakings have been framed in the Strategic Plan to Strengthening Polish Security and approved by the National Security Council in December 2014. Most of the urgent activities, both military and nonmilitary, have been associated with directions provided by the National Security Strategy signed in November 2014.

STRENGTHENING THE EASTERN FLANK
An essential component of Polish security policy is to consolidate NATO members around collective defense. A strategic decision made by NATO at the Wales summit in 2014, especially regarding strengthening the eastern flank of the Alliance, to some extent eased security uncertainty among Central European countries, including Poland. At the next NATO summit in Warsaw in 2016, Poland will seek to implement the arrangements covered in the RAP described in Wales. The Polish view is that implementation will reduce NATO’s response time to military threats, including hybrid ones.

Another priority step for the government in Warsaw is to ensure a continuous rotational NATO military presence in Eastern Europe in the form of joint and combined exercises. In 2014, multinational exercises in Poland attracted about 7,000 soldiers from NATO countries. In 2015, that number will grow to nearly 10,000. However, due to the increasing degradation of security at Poland’s eastern border, as well as Russia’s rejection of restrictions from the treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Poland wants to make NATO’s military presence on the eastern flank permanent.

At the Wales summit, the Alliance also decided to change its long-term military posture and capabilities. In developing the NATO Response Force (NRF), the Alliance decided to set up a VJTF to make the NRF more responsive and capable. The creation of this new quick reaction spearhead force, consisting of several thousand ground troops supported by air, maritime and special forces, was fundamental to Poland. Poland’s ambition is to declare VJTF readiness at the upcoming Warsaw summit.

Currently, a NATO Force Integration Unit is being created in the city of Bydgoszcz. It will be responsible for reinforcing allied units on Polish territory. Along with similar units created in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania, the unit in Bydgoszcz will be charged with coordinating exercises, joint planning and, if necessary, synchronization and reception of the VJTF as part of a strengthened allied response.

Proper functioning of the spearhead force requires necessary preparations in organization, training and doctrine. Warsaw is keen to use the VJTF preventively, rather than reactively during a crisis. To properly deal with this issue, Poland wants the Multinational Corps Northeast in Szczecin to be responsible for commanding the VJTF and leading defensive operations on NATO’s eastern flank. Starting in June 2015, the corps adopted a new command and control structure and is going to reach high readiness force status. The corps will also be enforced by incoming soldiers from France, Greece, the Netherlands, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

Poland also intends to build robust national military capabilities in the eastern and northeastern parts of the country. In coming years, units near the borders with Ukraine, Belarus and Russia are expected to be systematically enforced by increasing the number of troops, providing them with new equipment and weapon systems, and investing in infrastructure. The first effects of this process should be visible by 2016-17.

In terms of strategy, Poland will also seek to upgrade NATO contingency plans into permanent defense plans. In addition, at the next summit, Warsaw wants to engage its partners to start work on a new NATO strategic concept encompassing changed circumstances in European security.

CLASSIC MILITARY DETERRENCE
In Poland, development of reliable, classic military deterrence capabilities was deemed a major priority for defense policy and military strategy. In 2013, the process was labeled “Polish Fangs.” The transformation and modernization efforts in defense systems have been aimed at improving select military skills in the realms of land, air, sea and cyber-space. The goal is to deter an adversary and dissuade it from conducting military actions against Poland. The essence of the classic military deterrence is to be achieved — as pointed out in the National Security Strategy — by developing military forces capable of precisely striking selected strategic targets at long distances and by properly dealing with a broad spectrum of asymmetric threats.

On land, the ability to deter potential enemy actions is to be achieved by maintaining ready and capable special operations forces (SOF). In 2013, Polish SOF achieved command status within NATO. In 2015, Polish units formed a component command of allied SOF as an element of the NRF. Plans call for equipping land forces with highly mobile long-range rocket systems. Deliveries of the first modules are scheduled for 2017. By the end of 2015, the Polish Armor Branch will receive the last 42 Leopard 2A5 tanks from the total number of 119 (versions 2A5 and 2A4) as part of a contract signed with the Bundeswehr in 2013. Between 2014 and 2019, the Army is also expected to get 307 wheeled Rosomak armored personnel carriers. The Ministry of Defense also intends to buy 30 attack helicopters through 2022.

In the air, deterrence will be pursued by lethal unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) MALE class (Medium Altitude Long Endurance). Owing to the deterioration in eastern Ukraine, the Defense Ministry decided to accelerate the purchase of
A strategic decision made by NATO at the Wales summit in 2014, especially regarding strengthening the eastern flank of the Alliance, to some extent eased security uncertainty among Central European countries.
these drones (Zefir program) and equip troops with them in 2017. In 2015, it also began to integrate and equip F-16 multipurpose fighters with long-range (about 370 kilometers) air-to-ground missiles (AGM-158 JASSM). The fighters are scheduled to achieve initial operational capabilities in the first half of 2017. The ministry has also asked the U.S. government about acquiring weapons that are able to strike targets 1,000 kilometers away.

At sea, three new submarines with long-distance cruise missile launching capabilities will provide deterrence starting around 2022 (Orca program). A naval deterrence capacity will also be expanded by setting up a second Coastal Missile Squadron of the Naval Missile Unit. The squadron will be armed with Naval Strike Missiles with a range of 200 kilometers. In cyberspace, forces plan to carry out deterrence actions as well as conduct national and coordinated operations with allies.

**ELIMINATING STRATEGIC SURPRISES**

Poland has consistently expanded its ability to eliminate strategic surprise. These capabilities ensure the ability to protect the public and defend critical infrastructure against military threats, including ones characterized as selective, limited and of unknown authorship, resulting in politically vague situations that may hinder an international security consensus.

The process began in Poland in 2012 with the release of the Report from the National Security Strategic Review. Based on its conclusions, the country plans to improve three strategic capabilities within the Armed Forces Modernization Plan for 2013-2022: air defense, including missile systems; C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) systems and mobility of land forces, especially through the use of helicopters.

In terms of air defense, the plan would equip forces with six medium-range anti-aircraft batteries with the ability to combat ballistic and cruise missiles (Wisla program) and 11 anti-aircraft batteries with short ranges (the Narew program). Poland has preselected an upgraded Patriot system (Patriot Next Generation) for Wisla. Capabilities will be strengthened by setting up an American anti-missile base that is part of the European Phased Adaptive Approach program. An Aegis Ashore system consisting of three modules equipped with 24 SM-3 IIA missile interceptors will be installed in Redzikowo. In 2018, the base will achieve full operational capability and will expand airborne protection over northern Europe against medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles from the Middle East.

In 2015, the Ministry of Defense planned to conclude a tender to acquire 50 multipurpose combat support helicopters. First deliveries are scheduled for 2017.

The National Security Strategy assumes that the capacity needed to eliminate strategic surprise will be strengthened through the computerization of combat and support systems. The Armed Forces Modernization Plan envisions implementation of an integrated, network-centric battlefield management system. It will ensure comprehensive information awareness at all levels of command and control in national and allied operations in time of peace, crisis and war.

**THE STRATEGIC RESISTANCE SYSTEM**

Another means of leveraging the country’s defense capabilities is by improving strategic resistance against military aggression. The concept of anti-access/area denial strategy is aimed at thwarting a potential enemy’s armed incursion into the territory of the state, or — in the case of a successful incursion — to make the adversary’s operations highly unprofitable. This strategy envisions preparing an appropriate system of armed forces and anti-access defenses to prevent the enemy from paralyzing state functions by indirectly applying political, military, economic and psychological pressure. Special Forces will be the core of the strategic denial system, undertaking defense missions and also irregular operations in areas overrun by the enemy.

National Reserve Forces will perform an important resistance function. The National Security Strategy supports reforms to create consistent reserve units that can reinforce regular combat and security forces. During war, reserve units would focus on both regular and irregular defense tasks and, in time of crisis, on supporting local administration and emergency response operations.

Finally, the system assumes an improvement in civil protection formations (including National Civil Defense) and activation of paramilitary organizations to ensure the safety of citizens and state structures as well as to disseminate security knowledge and defense awareness among society.

**IMPROVING SECURITY MANAGEMENT**

The ability to respond quickly and effectively to emerging military threats, including hybrid ones, requires a properly organized security management and defense administration system. In Poland, these structures are
still the subject of fundamental modifications. In January 2014, the Armed Forces implemented a new command and control structure. The catalyst was the need to plan and conduct joint and combined operations. As the result of the reform, two strategic commands have been established: the General and Operational Commands of the Armed Forces. Along with the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, these three structures ensure appropriate strategic and operational leadership, command and control of the forces and effective coordination and synchronization of national efforts with allied efforts.

The next stage includes introduction of legislative amendments to the rules and procedures to defend the state in time of war. The new regulations define, among others, the war time frame and specify the competencies of defense institutions and responsibilities of the supreme commander of the armed forces. The new rules will be verified during a Country-2015 exercise. To test functionality of the system, participants will include the most important state authorities and military leaders. Emphasis will be on execution of state power under political-military pressure and hybrid threats occurring below the threshold of open and regular war.

**ESSENTIAL PLANNING**

The National Security Strategy also outlines development of a Political and Strategic Defense Directive. On July 16, 2015, this key planning document was put into action. It describes specific operational tasks for all state structures. It instructs security and defense leaders how to act during time of crisis, the threat of armed aggression and war. And as previously declared by national security leaders, it likely incorporates operational conclusions from the Russian and Ukrainian conflict and new forms of hybrid threats that may make collective response ineffective.

In 2015, the Ministry of Defense is going to issue the Main Directions of Development of the Armed Forces for the years 2017-2026. It will provide essential guidance for modernization and transformation. It’s likely the planning process will be aimed at achieving the “Third Wave of Modernization” characterized by obtaining a technological leap in the field of information. Therefore, plans will emphasize development of Armed Forces capabilities in cyberspace through the creation of cyber military structures to conduct both offensive and defensive operations. Other improvements include increasing robotics proficiency by equipping troops with adequate unmanned combat and support systems and precision weapons systems supported by satellite defense technology.

**INCREASED SPENDING**

During the NATO summit in Wales, national leaders agreed to stop reductions in defense spending and use their financial resources more efficiently. The first step is stopping cuts in defense spending, followed by a gradual increase in defense budgets to reach levels of 2 percent of GDP in the next decade.

In Poland, defense spending will amount to 33.024 billion zloty (8 billion euros). This sum equals 1.95 percent of GDP. However, this total will increase to 2.27 percent of GDP with additional funding of 5.363 billion zloty (1.3 billion euros) as a repayment for acquisition of the F-16s.

Additional increases in defense spending are expected next year. In July, the new budget regulation was implemented raising defense spending to levels no lower than 2 percent of GDP starting in 2016.

**CONCLUSION**

Strengthening the Alliance’s collective defense and developing its own defense capabilities is the essence of the Poland’s security policy and defense strategy. These efforts are based on the country’s strategic foundation that assumes a shift away from out-of-state engagement to defense of the homeland and NATO tasks.

Until Russia’s annexation of Crimea, development of Polish defense capabilities was driven by a long-term vision aimed at responding to classic military aggression. The hybrid armed conflict in eastern Ukraine, with its application of asymmetrical methods, irregular forces and tactics, information warfare, economic blackmail and psychological intimidation, reshaped and extended the Polish security and defense approach. The selective, limited, irregular and masked military threats, below the threshold of regular war, that hinder NATO’s collective response became the nation’s key security concern.

To deal with a full spectrum of threats, including hybrid ones, Poland set up security measures to strengthen the eastern flank of NATO, increase its military deterrence posture, resist strategic and tactical surprise and improve the security management and defense administration system. Poland’s adaptation to the new security situation has brought some short-term positive effects, resulting in an easing of security concerns. However, this huge endeavor is a long-term and complex process requiring strong political will, determination to follow the strategy, adequate defense budgets and necessary investments in industry, military research and development to succeed.
he United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) focuses on much more than nuclear weapons. Its mission requires continuous planning for employment of multiple bombers to maintain a credible and capable force. USSTRATCOM is an organization with many arrows in its quiver. It exercises multiple methods to deter nuclear and conventional attacks, assures U.S. allies and partners, and supports multiple geographic combatant commands (GCC) in their wide-ranging missions.

The results of these efforts are clear. USSTRATCOM B-52 Stratofortress and B-2 Spirit long-range, multirole bombers have conducted joint and combined operations in nearly every region of the world. In addition to demonstrating USSTRATCOM’s ability to rapidly respond to threats in any GCC Area of Responsibility (AOR), recurring deployments have strengthened relationships among the U.S., its allies and partner nations. The partnerships fostered during these operations have advanced global cooperation and security, and bolstered key relationships among USSTRATCOM, the GCCs, international allies and partners. The U.S. and our global partners have demonstrated that by working together, we can achieve far more than we could separately.

USSTRATCOM bomber missions and deployments to each GCC during 2014 and 2015 have demonstrated U.S. global strike capability and capacity. The first Pacific deployment in April 2014 featured two B-52 and two B-2 bombers conducting nonstop flights from their home stations to training ranges in the Hawaiian Islands. This mission directly supported the objectives of United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) and demonstrated credible and flexible military options to meet presidential and U.S. national security obligations to U.S. allies in the region. A second Pacific deployment in August 2014 expanded on the success of the Hawaii mission with three B-2 bomber flights to Andersen Air Force Base, Guam.

These same B-2 maintenance and support crews also conducted realistic operations and support training at Diego Garcia, British Indian Ocean Territory, and flew numerous sorties throughout the Pacific. USSTRATCOM and USPACOM have demonstrated their commitment to regional security and stability throughout the Asia-Pacific region, and these flights are a visible example of that commitment.

Bomber operations in Europe are as important as those in the Asian theater of operations. The bomber assurance and deterrence mission to Europe began with a deployment in June 2014 that included three B-52s and two B-2s flying in close coordination with the United States European Command and NATO partners. This deployment provided opportunities for aircrews to become familiar with patrol procedures, air traffic control routes, air bases and operations in the region.

Capitalizing on the coordination and familiarity gained during the first mission, a second European long-range flight of USSTRATCOM B-52s in October 2014 provided opportunities to further improve interoperability with U.S. allies and partners. USSTRATCOM Commander Navy Adm. Cecil D. Haney said, “The participation of U.S. bombers in Exercise Noble Justification, which was specifically requested by NATO leadership, provides truly unique opportunities for our bomber crews to strengthen and improve interoperability with our allies and partners while working toward mutual goals. It is important that we continue to train our strategic bomber force in a variety of joint environments, to ensure we remain proficient in key skill sets and ready to respond to a variety of potential threats, 24 hours a day, seven days a week.”

In an April 2014 meeting with the House Armed Services Committee, Adm. Haney emphasized the increasing importance of such exercises when he described the global security environment as increasingly complex, dynamic and uncertain, as evidenced by recent events in Ukraine and North Korea. This year, bomber flights supporting the training mission Polar Growl demonstrated the ability to rapidly project military power while generating decisive effects. Bombers from multiple bases conducted simultaneous, long-range sorties over the Arctic and North Sea regions. These bomber missions provided a unique opportunity to train with multiple GCCs, our allies and partners in joint and coalition training exercises.

Concurrent with operations in Europe, USSTRATCOM bombers also coordinated with the United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) to conduct missions in Africa.
The ability to synchronize activities simultaneously in two strategically important regions clearly demonstrated USSTRATCOM’s capability and capacity to support multiple theaters and maintain its commitment to reassuring our allies and partners on two continents.

In recognition of the continuing strategic importance of the Western Hemisphere, USSTRATCOM also conducted important missions in South America. USSTRATCOM bombers deployed in support of the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), which sponsored the multinational exercise Panamax in August 2014. This annual exercise demonstrates the interoperability and combined training of 17 South American nations. For the first time in the history of the exercise, USSTRATCOM bomber operations provided a distinct capability as a valuable long-range intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) platform, which augmented overall Panamax aerial command and control. The B-52 sortie lasted about 15 hours and originated from Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana. Air and ground support crews integrated with forces defending the Panama Canal against multiple threats and greatly contributed to the success of the exercise.

The ISR capability that USSTRATCOM brought to Panamax highlighted that the B-52 is capable of far more than delivery of large payloads of conventional or nuclear ordnance over long distances. It is also flexible enough to integrate into a variety of mission types. The B-52 has proven to be a highly flexible, multirole weapon system.

As in other theaters, coordination with partner nations was key to the success of the exercise. In the words of Rear Adm. Benjamin Calle of Colombia, the Combined Forces Maritime Component commander: “Multinational forces have a major responsibility in protecting the Panama Canal and remaining a force in this region. This exercise is making sure that we do that by enhancing our interoperability forged through partnerships.” To this end, USSTRATCOM is continually working to improve coordination and sharpen its multirole capabilities in the USSOUTHCOM AOR.

These operations spotlight a key objective of USSTRATCOM: Deter strategic attack on the U.S. or its allies and partners wherever in the world they may occur. Friends and potential foes witnessed the scope and scale of U.S. capabilities through its strategic bomber force and are reminded of the U.S.’ strategic commitment to defend friends and allies from aggression. USSTRATCOM stands ready to rapidly execute assigned missions with flexibility and demonstrated global reach.

In the coming years, USSTRATCOM will continue to partner with GCCs, allies and partner nations to integrate planning and synchronize bomber missions. These missions have proven highly effective in support of joint and combined exercises and have greatly advanced joint and combined coordination and integration throughout the Pacific, European, African and South American continents.
The G7 in a Multipolar World

THE EXPULSION OF RUSSIA PROVIDES AN OPPORTUNITY TO REINVENT THE ORGANIZATION

By Alessandro Scheffler Corvaja, research associate, Bundeswehr University, Munich

Leaders from the Group of Seven countries attend the third working session of the G7 summit in Krün, Germany, in June 2015.
In preparation for the June 2015 G7 summit, the group’s foreign ministers convened in Lübeck, Germany, in April to discuss the potential nuclear deal with Iran and conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East. For many commentators, like those at Der Spiegel, this meeting confirmed what they had already argued when the G7 — previously the Group of Eight (G8) — suspended Russia in early 2014 after its annexation of Crimea: that the group is irrelevant and needs Russia to address most of the world’s problems.

In Lübeck, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier argued that while no one wanted to isolate Russia permanently, it could not be readmitted as long as the conflict in Ukraine continued. But with Russia suspended for more than a year now, it seems unlikely that the prospect of renewed membership will lead Moscow to modify its policies toward Ukraine. Are the G7’s days thus over? Or should the group forget about Ukraine and get Russia back on board?

The return of the G7 has been long overdue, and was the right decision, both as a diplomatic measure and because Russian-Western relations had turned the forum into a highly ineffective talk-shop. Rather than thinking about how and when to readmit Russia, the G7 should start charting its future. The reconstituted G7 will face the challenge of redefining its role in a multipolar world where it is has ceased to be the premier forum of global governance. For the G7 to retain its relevance, Western countries should use it as a forum to coordinate value-based global governance initiatives in larger forums such as the United Nations or the Group of 20 (G20). While the group will thus become less important on geopolitical issues, it can carve out a role for itself in the areas it was founded to address: economics and finance.

THE G7 RETURNS
The G7 was founded in 1975 as a forum for the major industrialized economies of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States in reaction to the oil crisis. Though it was a group of the largest economies, it was also a specifically “Western” forum, aimed at producing answers to specific challenges these states faced as a group. While originally only a meeting of finance ministers and heads of central banks, the group quickly expanded to include heads of states and governments.

Russia joined the club in 1998, and it became the G8. Accepting Russia — whose economic significance at the time was not even close to justifying membership — was an explicitly political move aimed at supporting the democratization efforts of then-Russian President Boris Yeltsin. Russia, a young democracy, was offered equal membership in the most exclusive Western organization and recognized as a significant partner. This invitation — extended at a time when the Russian government faced a severe legitimacy crisis at home — was meant to reward Russia for progress made since 1990, but also to encourage it to proceed with democratic reforms. It was inexorably linked to the hope that Russia would at some point become “just another” Western country and thus a natural member of the group.

After 16 years, the Ukraine crisis was not needed to make it clear that these hopes had not been realized. In economic terms, but also in its domestic and foreign policies, Russia has failed to become a pluralistic society. It has failed to protect and promote freedom of the media, free and fair elections, minority rights, rule of law and protection of investments. After the end of the liberalization era, one could increasingly observe how positive trends in these fields were reversed. At the same time, Russian President Vladimir Putin never misses a chance to stress how much he despises “the West” and its societal model.

Russia is not a power that merits
the special partnership embodied in the G8 — especially given the rise of other aspiring democracies in the world. If we accept that Russia is — and will remain in the foreseeable future — anything but “just another” Western country and actually appears to have embarked on becoming the premier antagonist of the West, it is clear that Russia should have been ejected from the G8 some time ago. Doing so would have probably saved the group from becoming what it ultimately became: an ineffective exercise for the exchange of allegations and animosities between Russia and the West. The strongest sign of how useless the G8 had become was that media commentary centered on how neither Russia, nor the West, would actually lose much of anything apart from prestige.

THE G7: TOO SMALL FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

The G8 became an increasingly useless exercise as Russia and the other powers grew apart, mainly because the hope of integrating Russia into the Western “club” of liberal democracies had materialized neither in the geopolitical nor the economic or societal sphere. But more than just being ineffective in producing compromises between Russia and the West, the G8’s struggle for relevance was also defined by a much bigger development on the global stage — the dawn of a multipolar world and the so-called Rise of the Rest.

Although the G7 is still called the “group of seven leading industrial nations,” those nations’ leadership is now more contested than when the G7’s predecessor was established in 1975. To be sure, the G7 can still draw on impressive economic power. It includes seven of the 10 countries with the largest gross domestic product (GDP). But the G7, or G8 for that matter, will represent an ever-smaller share of the global population and economy in the future. Countries such as Brazil, China, India and Mexico boast large populations and are already among the world’s largest economies.

When Russia was accepted into the G8, the group’s glory had already begun to fade. The G8 had always faced legitimacy problems, and many had questioned if such an unrepresentative grouping should be the “global board room.” But the ongoing globalization of the world economy also casts doubts on whether it could actually still be that board room. After all, its members were becoming increasingly inept at addressing their own challenges.

Recognition that questions of international finance could not be dealt with sufficiently in this format had already led to the founding of the G20 in 1999. The G20 boasts two-thirds of the world’s population, 85 percent of its GDP and more than 75 percent of global trade and will continue to grow in all three aspects. The G20 has increasingly replaced the G7/G8 as the premier forum of global governance. A turning point was when the U.S. decided to turn to the G20 instead of the G8 to manage the fallout of the financial crisis in 2008-2009.

A NEW ROLE: COORDINATOR FOR GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

If the G7 will no longer be a forum...
for cooperation between the West and Russia, and it cannot become the center of global governance, what is its future? The G7 will need to change if it wants to remain relevant. To do so, it should concentrate on its original strength: being a group of like-minded democracies based on common values. Rather than being the premier forum for global governance, the G7 can find a new role as a coordinator for other, more representative forums such as the G20. This will allow the leading market-oriented democracies of the world to speak with one voice on a global level.

Such a role would closely mirror the G7’s founding period; it was first convened to solve the oil crisis and the unravelling of the global economic order after the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system. As forums such as the G20 are more focused on finance and economics than politics, the same should hold true for the G7. And if heads of state and government were not always included, it would also make the group’s meetings less controversial.

While the G7 will — and to a degree already has — shift from being “the network” to becoming a “network among networks,” a continuance of this trend might increase its relevance and effectiveness. But it can do so only if it accepts its more modest role. By proposing models of global governance based on Western values, the G7 can reach out to emerging democracies in the G20. Such a role will become especially important in establishing global economic and trade architecture. With initiatives such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the West can establish “gold standards” to serve as models of engagement with the G20 countries.

CONCLUSION
After Russia’s annexation of Crimea and support of separatists in eastern Ukraine, the Western members of the G8 decided to re-establish the traditional format of the G7. While many have seen this mainly as a means of punishing Russia, the return of the G7 should be considered a great opportunity. The old G8 had long run out of steam and primarily become a forum for allegations while struggling to retain its role as the premier forum for global governance.

With the re-establishment of the G7, the largest liberal democracies now regain a forum for informal, intimate exchange, something that had become increasingly impossible with the inclusion of an ever more adversarial Russia. Given the emergence of other global powers and formats for global governance, its role must also change.

The G7 will not be the primary forum for global governance that it once was, but it may become the forum in which the largest liberal democracies coordinate their actions and thus speak with one voice in new forums such as the G20. In this way, the G7 can become the key driver of a global governance based on liberal values.

Note: This article is based on a paper published by the author as part of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Working Group of Young Foreign Policy Experts. For the original paper, please see: Working Group of Young Foreign Policy Experts, “The German G7 Presidency (I),” Facts & Findings 156, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, October 2014.
MOSCOW’S DISINFORMATION WAR

By per Concordiam Staff
Europeans take steps to counter Russian propaganda masquerading as news

In the French newspaper *Le Figaro*, a pro-Russian supplement is tucked inside. On the surface, it appears to be part of the newspaper, but its overt positive spin on Russian foreign policy and President Vladimir Putin reveals it’s a ploy to persuade readers to believe falsehoods. The Russian propaganda machine running rampant in Europe seeks to confuse and manipulate current news events to offer misleading but convincing theories that show Russia in a positive light. The aim of such media manipulation, in many instances, is to destabilize Ukraine and discredit European leaders who oppose Russia.

In response to this informational onslaught, the European Commission in March 2015 tasked the European Union’s foreign policy chief, Federica Mogherini, with developing a strategic communication plan that would decode these manipulative reports and bring Russia’s information campaign to light. Potential solutions discussed include creating a website spelling out factual deceptions, strengthening media oversight and robustly promoting a pro-Europe narrative. In the meantime, the commission has formed a task force named “Mythbusters” to identify falsehoods in Russian media and issue corrections.

Information warfare is unfamiliar territory for the EU. It is particularly difficult to confront in the Baltic states, with their Russian-speaking minorities, and in Ukraine, where Russian media campaigns have been most intense. EU leaders stressed “the need to challenge Russia’s ongoing campaign of public disinformation about the conflict in Ukraine,” the German press agency Deutsche Presse-Agentur reported.

The most prominent recent Russian propaganda included two big denials: that Russia had shot down Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 in July 2014 and that the Russian military had entered Crimea just before Moscow seized the territory. When the Malaysian airliner crashed, Russian media reported it had been shot down by Ukrainian forces. Evidence strongly suggests that pro-Russian rebels armed with Russian weapons were responsible. Putin also brazenly refuted claims that his soldiers were in Crimea prior to its unlawful takeover, but later awarded participants with medals.

Russian media has repeated claims that multitudes of Ukrainians have crossed the border from southeastern Ukraine into Russia. But the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees could provide no confirmation. In March 2015, Ukrainian news outlets reported that a congress was held among Transcarpathia’s Ruthenes, a small Slavic group in western Ukraine, Slovakia and Poland. It was reported that they were “demanding recognition of their national identity and autonomy of their land,” *The Economist* reported in April 2015. It was later learned that the congress was a fiction of Russian news agency TASS. Disinformation doesn’t need to be a blatant lie, but simply manipulation of facts and twisting of details to place Russian explanations within the realm of possibility. Russian-run media outlets frequently sandwich propaganda between legitimate news stories to blur legitimacy lines.
Russian propaganda reporting can be bizarre and outlandish. For instance, several Russian media news sources, including the daily newspaper *Moskovskij Komsomolets* and the Russian Defense Ministry’s channel Zvezda, erroneously reported that Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko “lost touch with reality” when he gave a Ukrainian soldier amputee a soccer ball. Some reports are eccentric enough that the Ukrainian media has turned them into comedy. The *Kyiv Post* published the “Top 10 Kremlin myths and lies used to justify Russian invasion of Ukraine’s Crimea,” and a photograph has gone viral of a Russian woman who has appeared in numerous Russian media reports using different names each time. However amusing the reports are, their intent is not. The Russian government is deeply invested in this hybrid warfare, with the goal of discrediting the EU and Eastern European governments. Russian propaganda circulating in Ukraine and Eastern Europe is aimed at inducing hatred toward Ukrainians to justify aggression, security experts say.

**RUSSIAN NEWS AGENCIES EXPAND**

And the means by which Russia can spread its disinformation is growing. RIA Novosti, once considered a balanced Russian news outlet, in late 2014 was transformed into an “aggressive propaganda vehicle of the Kremlin,” according to the Brussels-based think tank Egmont Institute. The name was changed to Rossiya Segodnya, which means Russia Today, not to be confused with RT, the Russian-owned TV network. RIA Novosti will remain in use in Russia.

Rossiya Segodnya combines the former RIA Novosti news service and the international radio service Voice of Russia. And in November 2014, Voice of Russia changed its name to Sputnik. It will focus on radio and Internet presence and will “give alternative interpretations for which there is definitely a demand for in the world,” Dmitry Kiselyov, head of Sputnik News, told Agence France-Presse in November 2014. It is expanding its radio reach to 30 more cities worldwide.

Russia Today is broadening its TV news services to broadcast in the world’s biggest capitals. This growth is particularly worrisome to security experts. “Facts are reported [by Russia Today] with a total lack of due accuracy and impartiality, and undue prominence is given to pro-Russian views and opinions,” the Egmont Institute wrote in November 2014. The disinformation has been so outrageous that a correspondent quit, saying: “It was the most shockingly obvious misinformation and it got to a point where I couldn’t defend it anymore,” The Heritage Foundation reported in October 2014. Some of the boisterous reporting has alleged that the September 11, 2001, attacks in the U.S. were planned by a U.S. deputy defense secretary and that the U.S. created Ebola. “Russia Today’s propaganda machine is no less destructive than military marching in Crimea,” Lithuanian Foreign Minister Linus Linkevicius said in March 2014, *The Wall Street Journal* reported.

Russia has also hired an army of covert Internet trolls and messengers to post pro-Russian and pro-Putin comments and social media posts, according to EU Observer. “It’s [a] very serious threat,” David Clark, senior research associate at the Foreign Policy Centre, told *Newsweek* in March 2015. “Propaganda played a significant role in the Ukraine conflict. Behind the scenes it’s plausible that Russia has thousands of people working on social media and on news websites, making interventions and tweeting in order to put the Russian message across.”

Citizens are speaking out against the propaganda. Ukrainian Serhiy Balbeko created a website called Fake Control to dispel the lies. “I got the idea to run this project with a few of my friends because we realized the amount of disinformation that was coming from media, from social networks, from news and press and some others,” he told Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Balbeko explained that they scrutinize photographs, research public information on events and conduct interviews to debunk misinformation.
Although a collaborative effort is essential, European states must act individually as well. In September 2015, Estonia plans to launch a TV channel designed for those who primarily speak Russian, *The Economist* reported in March 2015. Similarly, the EU country with the largest percentage of Russian-speaking citizens, Latvia, is publicly funding a channel targeting these viewers. Denmark started a think tank, the European Endowment for Democracy, dedicated to evaluating options to thwart the Kremlin’s disinformation campaign and is drafting a report for Mogherini to consider in her recommendations.

The effectiveness of Russia’s disinformation campaign is unknown, but a spring 2014 Pew Research study reveals that Europeans have a growing unfavorable opinion of Russia. The survey found that from 2013 to 2014, Europeans increasingly viewed Russia negatively, with the negatives rising from 54 percent to 74 percent.

Europeans eagerly await and support efforts to confront this disinformation. “The Kremlin’s use of disinformation has been laid bare after the shooting down of a Malaysia Airlines passenger plane on 17 July. Europeans must confront the grotesque propaganda machine on which President Putin’s authoritarian rule depends,” William Horsley, former BBC European Affairs correspondent and co-founder of the Centre for Freedom of the Media at the University of Sheffield, wrote in August 2014.

European leaders agree: “We’re up against … a very systematic and pretty sophisticated campaign of misinformation. We know that it’s corrosive … we have to up our collective and individual games,” an EU diplomat stated.
Two Mi-17 helicopters were taking off, their blades chopping the air. The huge aircraft were moving forward, one behind the other. The engines easily lifted the heavy, metal aircraft that loomed as large as a Hindu Kush mountain.

The two aircraft, carrying 30 commandos, were performing a night mission in Azra village in Logar province, 100 miles south of Kabul. A small but treacherous group of terrorists were asleep in their beds. Just days before they had forcefully taken hostage an impoverished farmer and his family. They chose this particular location to rest and prepare for their next operation because they assumed they would be out of reach of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).

The terrorists were weary from a day of planning the assassination of the district governor. They didn’t detect the distant, faint, rhythmic sounds of helicopters flying through the night sky — a sound that has become commonplace over the years. Over the next few hours, Afghan commandos assaulted the house, neutralized the threat, captured the surviving terrorists, gathered or destroyed the terrorists’ weapons and equipment, and departed via helicopters — all before the sun came up.

In years past, these kinds of operations were mostly coalition planned, led and executed by supporting coalition aircraft manned by coalition pilots and aircrew. Today, they are conducted entirely by Afghans. Aerial support for these complex operations comes from the Afghan National Army (ANA) Special Operations Command’s Special Mission Wing (SMW), hundreds of officers strong.

The core members of the SMW have been flying and maintaining the Mi-17 helicopters in Afghanistan for decades, but the unit’s direct roots date back to 2005 when they were part of the Ministry of the Interior’s National Interdiction Unit. In its current form, the SMW was stood up in July 2012 as a joint military-police effort.
A coalition soldier instructs Afghan troops in the use of mortars at Tactical Base Gamberi in December 2014.

CAPT. JARROD MORRIS/U.S. ARMY
OFFICER’S ACADEMY
The SMW isn’t alone in providing a sense of increased professionalism in Afghanistan’s security sector. The National Academy of Army Officers — Afghanistan’s equivalent to Sandhurst Academy in England — opened its doors to academic activities in January 2013. Along with other military educational institutions, the purpose of the academy is to provide training for young Army officers and consequently deploy them as platoon commanders in the ANA. The academy’s total capacity is 1,200 people, which makes up three battalions.

The first battalion consists of 270 students who are graduates of the 12th and 14th grades and universities. These young people have been gathered from among the 2,500 students who have successfully passed exams. An entrant must be a citizen of Afghanistan, have a national identification card, and be between 18 and 26 years old.

Noncommissioned officers (NCO) attending the academy must have served on active duty for at least three years, reached the rank of command sergeant major and possess proper academic qualifications. Physical health is a necessity, and drug addiction is a disqualifier. With the exception of military school graduates and NCOs serving in the ANA, applicants must voluntarily request, sign and complete all relevant forms.

Volunteers must not be affiliated with any group, organization or political party. Entrance to the academy is determined by competitive exams and merit, although the academy reserves 10 percent of the spaces for women.

The British government has provided most of the initial help with startup. But once the academy’s administrative and academic structures are firmly in place, about 126 trainers from Australia, Denmark, New Zealand, Norway and the United Kingdom will arrive to continue developing the academy.

FIRST FEMALE CHIEF
Improvements in police professionalism are visible everywhere. A sign of the times is the appointment of Gen. Jamila Bayaz, the country’s first female district police chief. She oversees the Kabul police district, which protects some of the most important neighborhoods in all of Afghanistan. If the presidential palace, government ministries and the country’s central bank weren’t enough, the general is also responsible for providing security for some of the nation’s most important bazaars and money exchanges.

A career police officer whose exemplary service helped her rise to the top of the police hierarchy, Gen. Bayaz is part of an elite corps of women in a force that remains nearly 99 percent male. Her promotion to district police chief in April 2014 — a role in which she commands 400 officers — marked an important milestone in the security of the country.

“I decided to join the police force in 1978 after graduating from high school and getting accepted to both the Faculty of Engineering and the Academy of Police,” said the general, one of 1,600 female Afghan police officers. “I strongly felt a pull to wear the police uniform and serve the Afghan people as a police officer. It has been an honor working my way up the ranks by demonstrating high performance and earning the trust of my colleagues.”

EMERGENCY CALLS
Technology has also forced change. The country established the first Afghan National Police 119 Emergency Call Center (ECC) in 2008. The system provides safe lines for citizens to report not just terrorism and crime, but also governmental misdeeds.

“The 119 Emergency Call Center is the only source which provides ‘voices’ to the community,” said Afghan Gen. Mohammad Humayoon Ainee, who heads the organization. “Every day, 119 ECCs receive more than 1,000 phone calls from the community who are reporting various cases, mostly emergencies, which the police provide immediate services to the community on a daily basis, 24 hours a day.”

COMBAT SCHOOL
Training for both police and soldiers occurs at the ANA Combat Service and Support School.

The school’s commander, Col. Ahmad Parviz Baryalai, has watched the institution evolve since its establishment in 2005. Today it educates soldiers and police officers in logistics, human resources, finance and other fields. International partners have provided mentoring. A new course of study is dedicated to the use and maintenance of mine-resistant, ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles. Afghan forces recently took possession of more than 250 MRAP vehicles from coalition partners.

‘Afghan National Police receive training together with their Afghan National Army brothers. They learn methods of using weapons, machinery, radio communication, artillery, finance and human resources,’ Col. Parviz said.

POLICE AND SPORTS
The Afghan National Police was created in 2002 with a focus more on combating terrorism nationally
than fighting crime locally. But the past few years have brought a greater focus on police-community relations.

More than 30 years of almost continuous conflict have left their mark on relations between Afghan police and the communities they serve. But during the past three years, thousands of Afghan youth spread over 15 provinces have interacted with police officers on the friendliest of terms as teammates in sporting contests.

The nongovernmental Sport and Youth Development Organization (SYDO) sponsors dozens of teams that pair citizens with police officers to train and compete in tournaments. Sports include volleyball, football, basketball, badminton, taekwondo and karate. This exercise in creative policing and community outreach has helped build trust among the more than 2,000 police officer participants and the community.

“One measurable indicator of that trust is increased willingness to report crime and security incidents, but we do not mean to imply that this is the only impact of the program,” SYDO President Zia Dashti said. “The benefits associated with this program also include educating people about the values of participatory democracy, team building and learning to hold themselves and the Afghan government responsible for the state of affairs in their respective communities and nationally.”

SPECIAL OPERATIONS
Special operations in Afghanistan goes beyond the Special Mission Wing. In the past few years, Afghanistan's special operations forces' efforts have achieved growth and success. Headquartered at Camp Morehead, a few miles south of Kabul, ANA Special Operations Command (ANASOC) leads more than 10,500 special operators. Its mission is to organize, staff, train, lead and equip the Army's special operations forces to support the government's national security objectives. In 2012, ANASOC inaugurated the country's first division-size special operations unit. In 2013, the command celebrated the inauguration of the 1st ANA Special Operations Brigade in Paktya province.

Its commander, Maj. Gen. Sayed Abdul Karim, not only believes ANASOC forces will help Afghans enjoy security and prosperity, but can aid other regions dealing with instability.

“If we keep building and improving our forces ... one day in the future, we will be part of multinational forces to go somewhere else in the world if there is a conflict,” Gen. Karim told CNN in 2014. “That is what I hope for.”
RUSSIA’S ROMANTIC ATTACHMENT TO ITS SOVIET PAST HAS COLORED ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH UKRAINE
The crisis in Ukraine has taken a toll on Eastern Europe’s future regional security, as well as global security. Not only has it resulted in major changes in international politics, such as the exclusion of Russia from the G8 and a deterioration of Russian-American relations to levels seen at the end of Cold War, but it also has made a significant impact on a wide range of humanitarian and regional security issues. What started as a Ukrainian struggle for regime change has led to a civil war with Russian involvement and the internal displacement of up to 1.2 million people.

While political theorists attempt to identify causes for the crisis in major shifts in the global political landscape, such as the European Union’s and NATO’s continued eastern enlargement, these approaches are often shortsighted and fail to take historical and ideological causes into account. As we look at the underlying conflict lines in eastern Ukraine and different arguments on both the Russian and Ukrainian sides, it becomes clear this conflict can be characterized as a clash of conflicting identities and narratives.

Identities serve as orientation points for civilizations, helping them interpret reality through different narratives. This is why people interpret the same event differently. It is because they view a story — a material reality — through a certain, constructed, cultural lens influenced by norm structures, traditions, narratives and morals. For example, an American usually perceives Israeli nuclear weapons differently than an Iranian does, based on different interpretations of the Israeli state.

These different narratives serve as a foundation for national identities. By establishing multiple shared narratives regarding certain events in history and ongoing processes in the present, identities give a pervading definition of self-perception. This is why identities primarily give an answer to the question: “Who am I?” However, for identities to answer this question, they also have to define: “Who are the others?” That being said, identities not only serve as a point of self-definition, but also define a perception of populations and other societies that exist outside of the subject’s own community. Conflict can emerge when two identities are incompatible with each other, which happens when narratives oppose each other on essential issues.

The crisis in Ukraine has unveiled essential differences in Russian and Ukrainian identities, mostly concerning conflicting narratives of their shared history and also ongoing events. During the course of the crisis, the conflicting parties use historical narratives to appeal to national identities to support their causes and legitimize courses of action. Since a national identity not only supplies a sense of self, but also defines other populations, two conflict lines emerged in the current crisis: first, a conflict between how Russia views itself and its past and how Ukraine defines Russia and its past, and second, a conflict between how Ukraine views itself and how Russia defines Ukraine.

THE CASE OF RUSSIA

Russia’s self-perception, its national identity and historical narratives, plays a big role in understanding its actions in the Ukraine crisis. Russia’s national identity is largely linked to its Soviet past. The collapse of the Soviet Union caused a severe identity crisis in Russia, fueled by the regional disintegration of former Soviet republics such as Ukraine and other nations that are now part of the EU and/or NATO. For many Russians, this meant losing considerable influence in its former republics.

This chaos of the 1990s has led many Russians to mourn the collapse of the USSR for many reasons, whether it be personal...
incompatibility with the new economic system or nostalgia for and pride in the Soviet Union’s former great power status. Contemporary Russian identity is largely framed by the presidency of Vladimir Putin, who introduced a new concept of Russian national pride. It emphasizes Russia’s great cultural achievements, for example, by celebrating authors such as Tolstoy and composers such as Tchaikovsky. Accordingly, it has become common to refer to Russia’s glorious past, whether it means stressing cultural achievements, the glories of the Russian Empire or the great power stature of the Soviet Union and its influence over Eastern Europe. Putin’s new “conservative values” program gave Russia’s population the strong self-identification it so desperately sought after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Russia’s national pride can be observed in its newly adapted neighborhood policy. By embracing its former “glorious past,” it emphasizes the concept of Russkiy mir, or the Russian world. This refers to regions that share a history with Russia, mostly during Soviet days. Part of the Russian narrative is that these regions are not necessarily Russia itself, but part of the Russian orbit. By stressing cultural commonalities like language, religion or history, Russia draws a picture of Eastern Europe as being inseparably connected to Russia. The next step in this logical causality is the assertion that these shared narratives give Russia a legitimate claim to influence the region.

The Russkiy Mir Foundation, often referred to as Russia’s “soft power” agency, states: “The Russian world is much more than the territory of the Russian Federation and the 143 million people living within its borders.” So, by perceiving certain parts of Eastern Europe, including specific parts of Ukraine, as the “Russian world” and by viewing Russian-speaking Ukrainians, for example, as ethnic Russians, Putin’s actions in eastern Ukraine are rendered legitimate from a Russian perspective. The narrative includes protecting ethnic Russians from a supposedly fascist, anti-Russian government in Kiev that wants to ban the Russian language from its society. Putin has shown to be prone to this narrative by referring to Ukraine as “not a real state” and by his statement that the “historical South of Russia” was added to Ukraine “with no consideration for the ethnic makeup of the population.” After all, the bottom line for Russia’s action in Ukraine is the idea that eastern Ukraine is a vital part of the Russian world, with a 94 percent Russian-speaking population.

THE CASE OF UKRAINE
However, the process of forming a Ukrainian identity resulted in creating narratives that disagree, to a great extent, with Russian perceptions of the Soviet Union, Ukrainian independence and the future of Eastern Europe. Even though the process of developing a Ukrainian identity was slow, the young generation of Ukrainians predominantly defines itself as “Ukrainian” and emancipated itself from a Russian-dominated identity, imposed on Ukrainians from Russia.

It is often suggested that Ukraine, or at least part of it, does not have a strong national identity because of its Russian past and large Russian-speaking population. After all, 94 percent of eastern Ukrainians list Russian as the easier language of communication. However, it is a false conclusion to assume that Russian speakers in eastern Ukraine feel they are ethnic Russians. When asked their nationality, 72 percent of eastern Ukrainians said “Ukrainian,” and 93 percent considered Ukraine their motherland, according to a poll conducted by the Razumkov Centre. So even though the Russian language still plays a big role in Ukrainian society and a large part of the Ukrainian population prefers friendly relations with Russia, this should not be misinterpreted as a Russian self-perception in Ukraine.
This contrasts with the Russian perception of Ukraine as a part of the larger Russian world. That concept holds true language-wise, but it is here where the two identities collide. While Russia defines a Russian population based on its language, it conflicts with Ukrainian self-perception, which defines itself by national feeling. The basic underlying difference is the narrative of defining the affiliation of a population: The Russian narrative is that language is the crucial variable in defining a population, while the Ukrainian narrative emphasizes a collective national identity.

Moreover, the Ukrainian national identity narrative is based on independence from Russia. This is mostly based on a different narrative and interpretation of the Soviet past, which is not seen as a time of glory in Ukraine, but rather as a time of oppression and subjugation. The case of the Holodomor is one example of the conflict between Ukraine and Russia. While Ukraine has officially recognized the Holodomor as genocide against the Ukrainian people, Russia still rejects this position. This symbolizes the negative attitude of Ukraine toward the Soviet era, which is why it is an important aspect of Ukrainian national identity to emphasize Ukraine’s opposition to Russia as a successor of the Soviet Union. However, there are also tendencies in Ukraine’s identity that point toward being fundamentally anti-Russian and characterize Russia as “the opposite of Europe, democracy and civilization.”

It should be noted, however, that hostile identities alone do not cause conflict. They are merely the foundation on which conflict can be constructed. For these latent conflict structures to turn violent, it requires purposeful action by so-called “conflict entrepreneurs” to exploit the different identities and render violent action reasonable. This happened on both sides of the conflict through different measures such as creating victimhood — either of ethnic Russians or independent Ukraine — or the dehumanization of the other. The point being, once identity structures are exposed to violent conflict, it is hard to create a sustainable peace agreement without one party experiencing loss of face.

For a peace agreement to succeed in the region, all conflicting parties have to be genuinely committed to creating a peaceful coexistence. The culture of violence created during the past year has to be deconstructed by emphasizing the importance of a peaceful solution. Beyond that, attempts to resolve conflict cannot solely focus on one point, like an immediate cease-fire, but also have to deal with the identity structures that represent the frame of the conflict. This means that both sides have to adapt more peaceful rhetoric with respect to the other to work together toward finding a common approach to peaceful coexistence. This can be achieved through more vital cultural exchanges between Ukrainian and Russian civil societies that contribute to mutual understanding, deconstruction of hostile sentiments and peaceful management of disagreements.

**CONCLUSION**

To sum up, the crisis in Ukraine is based on two different narratives of how Eastern Europe looks, or is supposed to look. While Russia adapted conservative romanticism in respect to its great power status and wants to regain its former influence in the region by unifying the Russian-speaking population under Moscow’s umbrella, Ukraine views the collapse of the Soviet Union as a manifestation of independence and has since developed a strong sense of self-perception. Even the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine feels more drawn to Ukraine than to Russia.

That being said, this crisis predominantly stems from Russia defining Ukraine very differently than Ukraine defines itself, which can be observed in conflicting narratives on the same issues. One of the overarching conflict lines, for instance, concerns the concept of Russkiy mir and the Russian claim to have legitimate spheres of influence in post-Soviet countries with Russian-speaking populations — which conflicts with the Ukrainian self-understanding of independence. This makes Russian involvement in eastern Ukraine a mission to protect ethnic Russians, from Moscow’s perspective, and an illegitimate interference with Ukraine’s sovereignty, from Kiev’s perspective. As long as both nations fail to find a common narrative and establish nonhostile identities toward one another, these conflict lines will remain entrenched.
Good handbooks on the European Union’s foreign policy are hard to come by. Many an author has lost himself in endless accounts of summits, declarations and deployments, providing more of a history than a structured analysis of key challenges. When the work is more focused, it often appeals only to EU insiders and provides hard reading for newcomers to the field.

With their volume, *The European Union — A Global Actor?*, Sven Bernhard Gareis, Gunther Hauser and Franz Kernic are making a particularly welcome contribution to the handbook literature on this subject. The book strikes a golden balance of providing an easily understandable and comprehensive overview of the major issues while at the same time going deep enough to serve as a reference handbook on individual problems for more experienced readers.

The book is split into three parts. Part 1 offers an overview of the history and institutions of European foreign policy, including particularly excellent chapters on the External Action Service and the Common Security and Defense Policy. Part 2 assesses the EU’s relations with important global and regional organizations such as NATO, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the United Nations, as well as with regions as diverse as the Maghreb, Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. Part 3 addresses current issues such as human rights, counterterrorism, border security and environmental protection. This final section also includes two laudable analyses of the effectiveness of EU sanctions and of the European social model’s attractiveness throughout the world.

The overall question the editors lay out in their introduction is whether EU foreign policy is heading toward that of a “strong political Union” that pursues the common interests of its member states or whether this “Europeanization” will wither in favor of specific national interests. In the latter case,
the EU would remain a “loose association” and lend itself to easy division by external actors.

While most other analyses of the EU tend toward either an uncritical appraisal or a harsh dismissal of its foreign policy prospects, this book’s balanced conclusions are of particular merit. To answer the question in the title, the editors clearly show that the EU has become a major actor in global policy. Yet at the same time, the EU continues to struggle with the fact that it is often limited to pursuing whatever minimum consensus its member states can reach.

It is here where the creation of a more effective foreign policy must begin: While institutions can always be improved, it is consensus among member states that really keeps them running. The authors argue for maintaining the Common and Foreign Security Policy’s emphasis on political and economic tools rather than military engagement, thereby maintaining consensus and strengthening this particular brand of “European” power. To achieve this aim, the EU desperately needs a grand strategy embodying this consensus, “clarifying the common goals and objectives as well as determining the joint procedures and adequate instruments to achieve them,” the authors write.

Overall, Gareis, Hauser and Kernic offer an excellent assessment of the major issues facing EU foreign policy. Although its focus on current affairs imposes a limit on the book’s shelf life, readers will gain a good impression of the challenges of our age.

If any criticism is to be made, it would likely refer to the chapter on EU-Russian relations. While the author offers a great — even if not entirely unbiased — assessment of Russian energy policy toward Europe, this is clearly too mono-dimensional a treatment of the complex and multifaceted relations between the EU and its large eastern neighbor. □
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