SUPPORTING CIVIL SOCIETY
Militaries Offer Help at Home

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  Making society shockproof

- THE FIGHT AGAINST EBOLA
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Welcome to the 21st issue of *per Concordiam*. This issue examines a significant and important aspect of civil security: the role of armed forces. Although some view civil security with an internal focus, the challenges in this field are increasingly global in nature. Many civil security concerns, such as pandemic disease, energy security and environmental security, now demand interagency coordination and transnational cooperation. The recent Ebola outbreak in West Africa and its subsequent transmission to Europe and North America highlight the transnational element of civil security.

There are several internal and external challenges associated with civil security; this issue promises to be an important contribution to understanding the way in which states and societies develop the resiliency needed to deal with those challenges. Several articles focus on the role of armed forces in civil security and the importance of building resiliency. In our Viewpoint article, United States Deputy Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense Robert G. Salesses shares his experience and perspective on the role of military forces in civil security. Our Marshall Center professor, Dr. John L. Clarke, provides perspectives from his recent book, *What Should Armies Do?*

Several Marshall Center alumni have also contributed to this issue. Natia Kalandarishvili and Irina Tsertssvadze provide policy recommendations about the European Union’s Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), which is part of the Association Agreement between the EU and the Republic of Ukraine signed in the summer of 2014; the DCFTA affects not only Ukraine but also Georgia and Moldova. Maj. Gen. Julius Oketta of Uganada provides an African perspective on civil security challenges related to the Ebola outbreak, while Edmunds Akitis of the European Commission’s Emergency Response Unit describes the European Union’s Civil Protection Mechanism, focusing on assistance to Ukraine. These articles showcase some examples of how Marshall Center alumni inform and influence national and regional policy discussions.

The Marshall Center remains committed to expanding programs to address transnational threats and regional challenges to security. Taking the importance of civil security into account, the Marshall Center established the Seminar on Transnational Civil Security (STACS) in 2007. Since the inception of STACS, we have held this seminar 10 times with several hundreds of participants from around the globe, and civil security dialogue continues through alumni and regional outreach events. As we adapt to today’s transnational threats and challenges, we will continue to modify our programs to keep them relevant to today’s military and civilian security professionals. As always, we at the Marshall Center welcome your comments and perspectives on these topics and will include your responses in future editions. Please feel free to contact us at editor@perconcordiam.org

Sincerely,

Keith W. Dayton
Director
Edmunds Akitis has served with the European Commission’s Emergency Response Unit in Brussels since February 2014. He is a member of the Swedish Emergency Management Agency’s Field Staff Roster and an expert in risk and vulnerability analysis. He holds a master’s degree in homeland security from San Diego State University in the United States.

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Ambassador Gazmend Turdiu heads the program department at the Secretariat of the Regional Cooperation Council. His distinguished career in the Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs includes serving as secretary general, director of the Department for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation, and director of the Department of Europe. He was the Albanian ambassador to Switzerland in 1992 and to Germany in 2003. He holds a civil engineering degree from the University of Tirana.

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The role that armed forces play in a nation’s
domestic matters, including their traditional role
in homeland defense, is an increasingly important
and complex issue. This is due in large part to the
more dangerous, uncertain security environment
around the world and reductions in available fund-
ing at all levels of government. Many homeland
defense and civil security challenges that confront
nations today require policymakers to call upon
the full range of their nation’s resources to manage
them, often in close cooperation with neighboring
nations, partners and allies. Although many of these
challenges concern public health, safety and secu-
ritv, and natural disasters — challenges involving
departments responsible for health and/or home-
land security matters — some problems require a
military response. Indeed, the role of the military
in planning, exercising and preparing to support
domestic response activities appears to be growing.

Military forces that have been relatively well-
funded, especially in Europe, have characteristics
that make them well-suited to assist civil authorities
not only in an immediate crisis, but also in the area
of consequence management. This is evidenced by
the robust chemical, biological, radiological and
nuclear training program at the NATO School in

Oberammergau, Germany. Well-supported military
forces have their own logistics and communications
capabilities, are able to transport resources to where
they are needed, can communicate among units
and with civil authorities, and can provide their
own security while deployed. Further, these forces
bring a broad range of capabilities, notably medical

British soldiers distribute sandbags to a flood-affected town
in southwest England in February 2014.
and engineering, that are often in great demand when supporting civil authority response activities. As a result, armed forces have become one of the first institutions that policymakers turn to when confronted by the kinds of civil security challenges prevalent today.

Political leaders often seek out military forces at the onset of a domestic crisis because of their high level of readiness and ability to deploy on short notice. Not only are they called upon to assist with domestic responses, they can also assist with humanitarian response and security efforts outside their home nations. One example is the U.S. Department of Defense’s response to the recent Ebola crisis. To assist in the treatment and management of this deadly epidemic in West Africa by addressing it at its source, at the request of recipient nations, a number of countries, including France, the United Kingdom and the United States, have deployed military units, including medical and engineering experts, to the region. They have established treatment facilities and assisted local governments in managing this deadly epidemic.

Domestically, military forces are often ordered to engage in civil support tasks undertaken in support of the civilian agencies (like the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency) responsible for leading and overseeing federal response activities. These tasks include assistance to federal, state and local authorities during disasters, as well as to public health officials and law enforcement authorities. Such military response tasks may involve, in the case of the U.S., both active and reserve forces at the federal level under the command of the president and secretary of defense, and National Guard forces, which are organized state militias under the command of the governors of the 54 states and territories. The U.S. is fortunate to have the National Guard, as these forces are often the first to respond to an incident with their tremendous capability to assist civil authorities.

The types of roles, missions and tasks for which it may be appropriate to employ military forces domestically can be grouped into several categories: natural and man-made disasters, nondisaster events, public health emergencies and support to law enforcement.

NATURAL AND MAN-MADE DISASTERS
Providing assistance to civil authorities in the event of a disaster is a U.S. Defense Department mission. It is called Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). Military forces, usually in concert with defense agencies like the Defense Logistics Agency and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, provide logistical support, including food, lodging, water purification, energy generation and repairs to damaged infrastructure in the aftermath of a man-made or natural disaster like Superstorm Sandy, which pummeled the U.S. East Coast in 2012. U.S. Transportation Command played a significant role in disaster response, providing strategic airlift to move critical resources and capabilities from the West Coast to the East Coast. It delivered almost 300 power restoration vehicles and more than 400 technical personnel to help restore electricity to millions of residents. Local reserve military units also responded, providing immediate support to local communities.

Military forces are especially useful in preparing for and responding to a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) incident. Some military units have the ability to detect, identify and assess contamination, and then advise local responders. In the U.S., we have invested significantly in a highly trained 18,000-person force – ready to assist civil authorities – that possesses lifesaving capabilities such as search and rescue, decontamination and medical response to ensure availability of a broad array of capabilities to address any CBRN incident. It is trained and ready to assist civil authorities.

NONDISASTER EVENTS
Military forces also provide essential services in a nondisaster setting, such as widely attended gatherings and sporting events like the Olympic Games. Military units can provide an impressive range of support to civil authorities in charge of these events, including logistical and medical support. It is important to note that, in most instances, U.S. law provides that military forces are reimbursed for their expenses in supporting these kinds of events.

PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES
Civil authorities can issue requests for military assistance in the event of a public health emergency, which could range from moving patients to staffing mobile hospitals to providing direct care. In the fall of 2014, for example, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services requested that the secretary of defense make available
a 30-member response team of military medical professionals in the event of a worsening Ebola situation inside the U.S. The secretary of defense approved the request, making the team able to deploy on 72-hours notice to augment medical teams from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

SUPPORT TO LAW ENFORCEMENT
Military forces also play a role in supporting law enforcement. In the tradition of the U.S. and consistent with our laws, federal military personnel are prohibited from performing direct, civilian-type law enforcement activities. Military forces can, however, provide a range of support to law enforcement entities. Some examples include assisting U.S. Customs and Border Protection agents with counterdrug detection and monitoring U.S. borders, providing explosives-detection capabilities and technical assistance at national security special events and enabling the U.S. Coast Guard to conduct its law enforcement mission in the maritime domain. In each case, U.S. military forces generally do not perform direct, civilian-type law enforcement activities, but rather serve as national security “force multipliers” to enable law enforcement professionals to perform their core law enforcement missions more effectively.

Clearly, nations possess their own traditions regarding the domestic use of their militaries. The appropriate level of domestic involvement by the military is a topic that the U.S. struggled with as early as 1787, as can be seen in Federalist Paper No. 8. Europe, too, has had its own debates about the role of standing armies in civil security.

That said, many European countries have had significant experience deploying their armed forces within their borders in support of civil authorities. They have been deployed to perform border security tasks (Italy, 1960 and 1995; Austria, 1995 to present), provide essential services in the event of labor unrest (France, 1988, transit strike; UK, 2002, firefighting), and provide security against organized criminal groups (Italy, 1992). The protection and security of key installations such as government buildings may also fall to military forces. They also perform a similar role in providing security at major events such as the Olympic Games (Greece, 2004) and G-8 summits (Italy, 2009). European armed forces have frequently been called into action for disaster relief and humanitarian actions such as floods (Germany, 1995 and 2002; Austria, 2006). French and Greek armed forces are deployed nearly annually to help fight forest fires. Other deployments of this sort include avalanche rescue support (Austria, 1999) and the rescue of illegal immigrants at sea (France, Italy, Malta, Spain and the U.S. in 1994 and 1995).

Likewise, U.S. military forces have an extensive history of domestic deployments upon request from civil (and federal) authorities. As mentioned earlier, U.S. military forces have been deployed on numerous occasions to assist local authorities with managing the consequences of disasters, fighting forest fires, providing border and critical asset security and supporting law enforcement counterdrug activities. Most recently, U.S. forces have been called upon to assist other government agencies by providing temporary housing for thousands of unaccompanied immigrant children who crossed the nation’s southwest border with Mexico.

Indeed, the range of tasks that military forces may expect to perform has long been broad and continues to widen, given the current security and fiscal environments. Military forces have become, in many instances, a resource of choice for political leaders faced with intractable (often fiscal) problems and in need of an immediate solution to a complex situation. Clearly, there are civil security tasks that the military can, should and must perform, but in the U.S. view, it is crucial that — regardless of what missions they are ordered to perform — military forces remain strictly under civilian control. In the case of the U.S., federal military forces remain under the command of the president and secretary of defense (both civilians) and always at the request of other federal authorities (e.g., the secretary of homeland security or the secretary of health and human services). State military forces are under the command of the state’s or territory’s governor (also a civilian).

Another key to employing military forces appropriately in support of civil authorities is to ensure they are bringing a unique capability to the situation and doing so in a way that bolsters the safety and security of the people of the U.S. In turn, the military forces assisting in these missions receive a benefit, especially with regard to increased readiness.

Indeed, the armed forces are a tremendous asset in any effort to help communities in a time of need. They have unique capabilities and can react quickly. Furthermore, in recent years, many of our nations’ military members at all levels have developed well-honed diplomatic and communications skills, having served multiple tours overseas where they interacted daily with communities and their leaders. Their engagement on the domestic front offers them opportunities to practice those perishable skills and gain an appreciation of how civil authorities think and act, and how they “fit in,” which, in turn, can make the mission more successful and increase military readiness. Military forces and their supportive families are truly a national treasure and a great investment for the nation. That will ensure that they are always prepared to assist their fellow citizens in time of need. □
Armed Forces at HOME

Militaries are typically employed in six different domestic scenarios.
Major changes since the Cold War ended have altered in important ways how we look at armed forces. Professional armies, now the majority throughout NATO, are expensive, and the threat environment for many countries has improved significantly over those two decades. As a consequence, taxpayers may look askance at defense spending, wondering why it is still necessary to pay so much for a capability that no longer seems necessary. In times of austerity, defense expenditures may make tempting targets for politicians anxious to cut budgets.

What can armies, navies and air forces do, what should they do and what must they do in a domestic context? With the tremendous pressures on governments to save money, these questions are likely to become even more trenchant in the near future.

Armies are convenient targets — and relatively easy to cut. In most European countries, defense expenditures are discretionary, unlike entitlement programs. Their constituencies, though often powerful, particularly in the defense industry, are small, and military forces, particularly contemporary professionalized forces, lack popular support. Absent a sense of external threat, militaries are often unappreciated. These professional armies, as is the case in most European countries, are generally small and have little lobbying power and few friends in high places. They are vulnerable. But they are also available for nearly any task that arises.

Thus, “let the army do it” is a phrase often heard in many countries when a task such as earthquake recovery exceeds the abilities of local and regional, and often even national, authorities. Military forces are often thought of as sitting idle in their bases, looking for something to do. Because engaging the military in a civil security task is often viewed as cost- and risk-free, political leaders can be tempted to “let the army do it.” That said, for many tasks it is appropriate to let the army do it — but not for all tasks at all times.

There is a growing trend in every state for military forces to perform more and varied functions distinct from their traditional tasks. Indeed, some countries such as China have armies that are vertically and horizontally integrated into the economy, often running major businesses. But armies are also asked to perform more mundane tasks, such as trash collection and firefighting, often to the detriment of their primary mission of military readiness.

While there are benefits to military forces engaging in civil support tasks, there are also opportunity costs. Soldiers engaged in these tasks often cannot be readily redeployed. They cannot be in two places at one time and would require significant time to extricate themselves from a civil support task to carry out other missions. Moreover, contemporary professional soldiers are expensive, particularly when compared to conscript soldiers.

Soldiers can expect increasing calls from civilian authorities. The specific roles, tasks, missions and functions expected of military organizations can constitute a catalog of requirements that demand a taxonomy that clearly categorizes expected tasks. There are six identifiable categories of defense support to civil authorities (DSCA).

**CATEGORY I:**

Defense support for emergencies and disaster relief (DSDR)

When major emergencies strike, the first responders almost always include soldiers. Military forces bring a level of capability to complex emergencies that is frequently in demand from the beginning. Military forces can do things more rapidly, and often more comprehensively, than the usually much smaller civilian emergency response teams. Armed forces often have unique capabilities for dealing with specific kinds of emergencies, such as toxic chemical spills, that are frequently lacking in other response forces. It is therefore not surprising that responding to domestic emergencies and disasters is one of the principal missions of many European armed forces. European military forces have been exceptionally active in responding to requests for assistance from civilian leadership.

Military forces have a number of characteristics that lend themselves to early, rapid and effective response to emergencies and disasters. Perhaps the most salient capability is the most
Following heavy flooding, the Italian Carabinieri and civilian firefighters jointly conduct search and rescue operations near Genoa in November 2014.
elementary: the ability to support oneself. While elementary, this capability is often critically important, particularly in the early stage of a catastrophe. The military’s ability to self-deploy and sustain itself can be decisive. Military forces have their own logistical arrangements, particularly with respect to transportation, lodging and subsistence support, as well as their own medical capability. Of great importance is the military’s ability to provide for its own security as well as furnish it to other organizations. The fact that many military units are in a state of readiness also contributes to rapid response.

Typical tasks involve providing essential services to an affected population. In a catastrophe, access to life essentials such as water, food, shelter and medical care may be hindered. The military is often the only organization capable of rapidly delivering relief supplies on a necessary scale. Further, military units may be employed to provide manpower-intensive support such as earthquake search and rescue and flood control and engineering support including generating and transporting energy, running public utilities and water purification, as well as repairing damaged transportation infrastructure such as roads and bridges.

Emergency military response can also involve highly specialized capabilities. These may include translation services for providing public information during disasters, mortuary services, air traffic control and port services. Military forces are also capable of providing command and control capacity, often critical for staging and deploying follow-on support. These facilities are frequently rendered ineffective in the early stages of a disaster, and communities often lack sufficient command and control facilities.
CATEGORY II: Defense support to law enforcement (DSLE)
Soldiers are not policemen, but European military forces have traditionally provided aid to law enforcement agencies — an activity that appears to be growing in importance as law enforcement personnel labor under an increasing range of threats and decreasing funding. Armed forces provide such support in two ways: by providing technology, training or logistical support to enforce the law and by serving in lieu of police officers, allowing them to perform other tasks.

In the first instance, armed forces, with their high technology equipment and the training to use it, offer law enforcement agencies access to capabilities often beyond their reach. Given the increasing sophistication of the technology employed by organized criminal groups and terrorist organizations, this advanced technology can be critical. For example, law enforcement agencies charged with border security often use ground surveillance radar provided by the military. Similarly, aviation support, particularly helicopters, is at the disposal of law enforcement agencies with limited air mobility capabilities.

Military forces can provide highly specialized training to law enforcement, such as how to handle chemical and biological agents and operate in a contaminated environment. Firearms training, often using sophisticated military weapons, is another area in which the military can provide DSLE.

Soldiers may also provide security for police officers. In the same manner that police are often asked to provide security for first responders operating in difficult or insecure environments, soldiers may be called upon to provide security for law enforcement organizations operating in areas such as city slums or in difficult terrain used by criminals to hide their activities.

More controversial is when the military provides intelligence support to law enforcement. Military forces have a wide range of intelligence collection assets that they can share with law enforcement. Examples include intelligence acquisition systems for detecting movements of illegal immigrants or drug smugglers. Few question these activities when they occur in international waters. But employing military intelligence to collect information domestically can raise constitutional concerns.

In all of these DSLE activities, the military must be, and must be seen to be, in support of civil law enforcement authorities. When the military provides support for police officers, there is always a danger of law enforcement becoming overly militarized. The military must be careful to avoid taking over these operations, unless that is the intent. Soldiers must be seen, if at all, to be in the background, usually unarmed, and sometimes in civilian clothing.

In the second type of DSLE operation, soldiers perform law enforcement functions in lieu of police officers. For example, military forces might replace police officers in carrying out low-level perimeter security or traffic control functions at a major sporting event. Similarly, armed forces might conduct patrols as part of security efforts to protect critical infrastructure or key assets.

DSLE tasks pose a number of challenges for both the military and the civilian leadership that directs them. Asking the armed forces to perform these functions runs the risk of militarizing law enforcement. The trend toward beefing up police forces can be exacerbated when soldiers carry out police tasks.

Legal issues can arise. Some European countries, notably Germany, prohibit employing soldiers on DSLE tasks. Others, such as France and Italy, have an active history of doing so. But the legal hurdles are significant. Authorizing military personnel to use force, particularly deadly force, in support of law enforcement activities is hazardous. Soldiers are trained to use force in the first, not last, instance — the opposite of police training. Arrest authority is another area fraught with problems. In some DSLE operations, it may be necessary to authorize soldiers to arrest and detain suspects, but doing so may expose soldiers to legal liability unless their authority is clearly established in law.

Likewise, issues of financial reimbursement can be problematic. Normally, military forces can expect to be reimbursed for DSLE, usually by the controlling authority for law enforcement (in most instances, the Ministry of Interior). However, this...
is not true in all instances in Europe. Some states, notably France, expect their armed forces to fund some of these functions from their own resources, arguing that there is training value from participating in DSLE tasks.

Finally, it should be noted that the presence of militarized police forces, such as the French Gendarmerie, Italian Carabinieri and Spanish Guardia Civil, mitigates the need for some DSLE activities in some European states. These hybrid forces often provide many of the requirements of DSLE, and their versatility lends itself to a wide range of DSCA tasks.

**CATEGORY III:**

**Defense support for national special security events (DSSE)**

Excluding security, armed forces provide a broad range of capabilities to civil authorities before, during and after national special security events (NSSE).

An NSSE is an event of sufficient size and importance to warrant a significant degree of government support to ensure its successful execution. Many of these events, such as sporting events, are privately sponsored, but the government is obliged to provide the necessary support. Typical NSSE events include Olympic and world championship games; summit meetings of heads of state, including G-7 and G-20 meetings; senior political and business leader meetings; and political conventions.

Military forces provide an extensive array of assistance. In addition to security, military organizations offer comprehensive logistics support, including transportation, subsistence and lodging, as well as specialized skills such as interpretation and command and control facilities. In Austria, Italy and Switzerland, the military has even secured ski paths for skiing championships using mountain troops skilled in the task.

The military’s ability to provide medical support for participants and spectators for many kinds of NSSE is important. Military forces have a unique surge capability that enables them to provide support and treatment in the event of mass casualties. This can be particularly important if a major NSSE is targeted by terrorists using a weapon of mass destruction. Usually, only the military would be capable of evacuating, decontaminating and treating casualties from such an incident.

In addition to legal issues, the receiving organization is usually required to reimburse the government for the full cost of the DSSE support. In other instances, such as skiing championships, the military may rely on volunteers from the military.

Military support for high visibility special events is a growing trend. DSSE can be vital to its success. These operations have also found favor with military leaders, who have come to value the exposure and visibility that these events provide for their forces. In an era of declining budgets, it’s safe to predict that this trend will continue.

**CATEGORY IV:**

**Defense support for essential services (DSES)**

Soldiers have often been called upon to provide essential services to the public when those services cannot be provided by others or because those services have traditionally been provided by the military. Civil authorities in many countries have not hesitated to call upon their militaries to provide help.

Essential services are those that are critical to the functioning of the state and must be performed or the state and its citizens will suffer, sometimes grievously. Emergency responses such as law enforcement, fire and ambulance services are examples of essential services. As no clear definition exists, states have come to freely characterize services as essential, often because of the potential political consequences of their failure to provide them. In some instances, these services have normally been provided by other elements of the state and, in others, by private businesses.

The requirement to provide such services may come about for a variety of reasons, including a major disaster, industrial action or strike, rendering the normal provider incapable. Other essential services, such as explosive ordnance disposal, may be something for which the military has traditionally been responsible. Lastly, specialized, one-time services may be necessary if no existing state institution possesses the resources.

The list of essential services that military forces have provided is extensive. DSES operations may require support ranging from trash collection to acting in lieu of the government in extreme circumstances. In the latter instance, the military, because of its inherent command and control capability, must be prepared to exercise continuity of government and continuity of operations services in the event of a breakdown in a government’s ability to function because of a natural catastrophe or attack.

Other DSES tasks may include search and rescue operations. In many European countries, such as Finland, the armed forces possess national search and rescue capabilities. Military forces often have equipment such as helicopters and the necessary training to accomplish this task. Other types of DSES tasks include establishing and maintaining asylum camps in the event of mass immigration due to conflict or disasters in neighboring countries.

By far, the most common reason for DSES employment of armed forces is in response to industrial action. On numerous occasions in the past two decades, militaries have provided essential services such as firefighting in place of striking firefighters. That happened in the United Kingdom and Greece in 2010.

As with other DSCA tasks, a legal basis must be clearly established in advance of execution. For those tasks that appear commercial in nature, the military should be considered only when sufficient commercial solutions such as contracting are not available. Financial
considerations are also important. As a general rule, ministries of defense ought to be properly compensated for carrying out DSES tasks of a commercial nature.

Nevertheless, the demand for DSES operations is likely to continue to increase in Europe. The perception is that the military is sitting in barracks and thus available, at no cost, to conduct these operations. Military leaders understand the benefits — particularly with respect to creating a positive public perception of the military.

CATEGORY V:
Defense support for counterinsurgency (DSCI)
In most DSCA operations, military forces are almost always deployed in support of and subordinate to the civilian government or its representatives. Sometimes, however, the military can, and often must, assume a leading role.

These are instances, brought on by uniquely destructive natural disasters, industrial accidents or the like in which the civil authority cannot exercise its authority, in part or in whole. Or there may be a military, terrorist or criminal movement, or a combination thereof, that poses a direct threat to civil rule or denies the central government control over parts of national territory. In these instances, a special case can be made for the military assuming leadership.

The guiding principle is that the military assumes the lead only as long as it takes to reestablish civilian control. Military leaders must strive to create conditions that allow for the resumption of civilian authority at the earliest opportunity, even if that control may be tenuous and dependent on continued military support.

DSCI, the first of these special cases, becomes necessary when an insurgency, criminal empire or terrorist movement grows so large or powerful that it is able to exercise sovereignty over portions of national territory or is audacious enough to threaten the national government.

Counterinsurgency operations, by their very nature, are overwhelmingly military and thus directed by military authorities under the guidance of civilians. Although law enforcement plays a major role, the military assumes the primary role because the requirements of counterinsurgency often exceed those of domestic counterterrorism forces — predominantly law enforcement. Insurgencies often threaten the very existence of the state or, in lesser cases, the legitimacy of state control in sections of the country.

Armies must be prepared to carry out counterinsurgency operations. The current drug-money-fueled insurgency in Mexico is evidence that this can happen even in well-developed countries.

CATEGORY VI:
Defense support for civil disturbances (DSCD)
As a consequence of war, insurrection or natural calamity, states may find it necessary to impose law, order and stability through means other than normal law enforcement. In times of great unrest and disorder, law enforcement bodies may be overwhelmed, forcing civilian leaders to call on the military to restore and maintain order.

Defense support in times of great crisis may require the imposition of martial law. Martial law refers to the armed forces carrying out basic law enforcement functions, as well as a host of other essential services. Most European countries have not experienced martial law in the postwar period, not even those that have had military governments, which governed according to the rule of then-existing law. Martial law goes well beyond this, with soldiers carrying out police tasks.

It might become necessary to impose martial law if there is a general breakdown of law, order and stability, rendering existing law enforcement organizations incapable of carrying out their duties, such as in the aftermath of a major natural or industrial catastrophe, or in response to a major terrorist attack with a weapon of mass destruction. While this concept is not embedded in many constitutions, the basic structure is usually present, particularly in countries with militarized police forces.

In the event of a complete breakdown, military forces may well be required to perform a broad range of essential functions, such as providing food, water, lodging or clothing. Military forces are often the only organizations able to respond because of their inherent logistics capability and ability to self-deploy.

Under DSCD, military forces carry out their leadership functions only until such time as an acceptable level of law, order and stability can be re-established. But it may also prove necessary for armed forces to continue to carry out DSSE functions until affected services can be restored.

As always, issues of legality and funding must be carefully considered. Rules of engagement, particularly as they pertain to the use of deadly force, must be thought through, because there is likely to be widespread criminal and antisocial behavior. For example, looting, particularly of food and consumer electronics, is likely to be a major problem. The use of force to prevent these activities may, in the context of the crisis, be inadvisable.

CONCLUSION
DSCI operations are among the most challenging DSCA tasks that military forces are likely to face. They are also among the rarest. Nevertheless, being prepared to respond to these challenges remains a fundamental requirement for armed forces now and in the future.

Research has shown that soldiers are far more likely to be employed in response to a domestic contingency than they are to be employed overseas. Given the current fiscal challenges in so many countries, the armed forces can anticipate being called upon with increasing frequency to perform an ever-growing list of tasks, missions and functions.

But a note of caution is appropriate: Leaders at all levels should not lose sight of why we have armies in the first place — to defend the state and its people. Although armies are uniquely flexible instruments, care must be taken in how they are employed, lest they be rendered incapable of fulfilling their most basic function.
Joint training initiatives improve security in the Balkans

By Col. Orlin Nikolov, commander, Crisis Management and Disaster Response Centre of Excellence, Sofia, Bulgaria

Today, all aspects of life are changing, influenced by globalization, rapid technological advances and increased industrial production that contributes to environmental degradation and natural resource depletion. The nature of conflicts is also changing. These geopolitical changes require better prepared militaries. Therefore, military organizations must improve their effectiveness within the context of highly complex, unpredictable and demanding operating environments.

Maximizing the use of intellectual capital has become of paramount importance. Cooperation and interoperability between the civilian sector and the military, especially regarding crisis management, terrorist threats and protection of strategic infrastructure, is a top priority for the European Union, NATO and each member nation.

South Eastern Europe Exercise and Training Network

The NATO Education and Training Network was established to support multinational and interagency cooperation in regional defense and security. NATO and the EU develop multinational projects and deliver needed military capabilities that can be used not only for military purposes, but also for emergency and crisis management in support of civilian authorities. The network uses simulated environments in computer-assisted exercises as a complex combination of live, virtual and constructive simulations to enhance readiness and joint warfighting capabilities of Southeast European countries.

In the Balkans, the South Eastern Europe Exercise and Training Network (SEEETN) develops interoperability by linking systems, forces and headquarters at regional and national levels. It connects existing simulation centers and simulation training, allowing for common capabilities in a wide range of simulations and software for the purpose of preparing armed forces in the region. Work is underway to improve synergy among nations in the region and with NATO and the EU in areas where both have pilot projects. SEEETN will bring exercises and training to those who need it and will transform the armed forces intellectually, culturally and militarily.

Multinational Solutions

Multinational organizations such as NATO must be more flexible, efficient service providers for member nations. If NATO is to
enhance its ability to anticipate emerging security challenges and adapt capabilities accordingly, it must make more effective and efficient use of available resources. Reforming the command structure by making it leaner, more effective and less costly is a priority. But changing our mindset is the biggest challenge. Twenty years after the end of the Cold War, our focus has still not fully shifted from planning to action and implementation.

With growing interdependence and financial limitations, even the strongest NATO allies are no longer able to cope with the full spectrum of challenges. Therefore, maintaining domestic and collective defense requires collaborative solutions. This reflects a new strategic culture.

Over the past decade, European defense budgets have declined steadily. The current financial crisis is exacerbating the situation and causing deeper cuts. European armed forces have increased cooperation in developing defense capabilities. However, a number of capability gaps remain, as illustrated by the recent operation in Libya. Overcapacity is also a continuing problem at the European level. Therefore, joint acquisition, construction and development of defense capabilities, such as NATO’s “Smart Defense” initiative and the EU’s “Pooling and Sharing” program, should be implemented to the fullest extent and at an early stage in multinational initiatives.

Lessons learned from NATO operations, particularly those in Afghanistan and the Western Balkans, make it clear that a comprehensive political, civilian and military approach is necessary for effective crisis management. The Alliance will engage actively with other international actors before, during and after crises to encourage collaborative analysis, planning and operations to maximize coherence and effectiveness.

Joint Initiatives

Coordination achieved by the South-Eastern Europe Defence Ministerial (SEDM) initiative, launched in 1996 in Tirana, is helping resolve political-military issues in the region. Participating countries are Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Italy, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Turkey, Ukraine and the United States. Georgia and Moldova are observers. As a mechanism intended to play an important role in making Southeast Europe secure, stable and prosperous, SEDM has considerable potential.

Its objectives are to reform armed forces in accordance with NATO and EU standards and continue the processes of Euro-Atlantic and European integration, as well as develop peace support capabilities and military cooperation while increasing confidence and transparency. SEDM includes the following regional initiatives:

- Multinational Peace Force Southeastern Europe (also known as South-Eastern Europe Brigade or SEEBRIG)
- Southeastern Europe Simulation Network (SEESIM)
- Satellite Interconnection of Military Hospitals
- Defense/Military Support to Counter-Proliferation of WMD, Border Security and Counter-Terrorism
- Cooperation on Defence Industries, Research and Technology
- South Eastern Europe Military Education Cooperation
- Female Leaders in Security and Defence

In 2007, the militaries of Southeast Europe (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia and Turkey) signed the terms of reference for the format of the Balkan Countries’ Chiefs of Defence Conference on Military Cooperation, committing to improve and promote military cooperation at all levels and to counter potential asymmetric threats in the region. The presidents of the EU Military Committee, the commander of NATO/U.S. European Command and the commander of the Joint Command of NATO forces in Naples participate in the program.

NATO has a number of Centers of Excellence and training centers, including those under the Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative. There are 11 PfP centers, located in Austria, Finland, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine and the U.S.

Educational institutions such as the NATO Defense College in Rome or the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany, provide ample opportunities for education and training of representatives from the EU and other international organizations. The exchange of views enhances mutual understanding and builds a strong sense of a shared purpose.

NATO is expanding its exercises to include EU representatives as observers and participants. Building joint capabilities for education and training and creating joint interoperability exercises will significantly improve joint training and fill program gaps. The aim is to establish a joint global network of training capabilities using the full spectrum of live, virtual and constructive simulation. In the context of financial limitations, it has become increasingly important to increase capabilities and interoperability, preserve resources and to reduce the risk through the standardization of tactics, techniques and procedures.

In this regard, NATO seeks to develop distributed and network capabilities for training and education to be integrated with and contribute to the growth of existing national capabilities. A number of new NATO network services initiatives — NATO Education and Training Network, NATO Training Federation, Distributed Training and Education (DTE) and others — interface with national forces and assets that carry out joint operations. New education and training capabilities include training in NATO’s established centers, joint distributed education, training and exercises (live), training simulations (virtual), and modeling and simulation (M&S) as part of computer-based training (constructive).

These operational requirements depend on interoperability and integration between NATO and national headquarters and forces. Increased capacities such as unmanned aerial vehicles, tracking devices for forces and assets, cyber security, air command and control systems, and anti-ballistic missile defense require new methods of education and training. Therefore, training should be made available from the
highest offices of NATO command structures to the lowest levels of NATO force structures.

SEE nations are focused on the same goals. Most participate in NATO Science and Technology and Allied Command of Transformation M&S activities. For example, the Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulations (JCATS) and Joint Theater Level Simulation (JTLS) systems are used by NATO and more than 20 countries around the world. Using JCATS and JTLS to connect Southeast Europe simulation centers with others will provide a joint constructive simulation environment. Tools developed by the NATO Communication and Information Agency (NCIA), with its technical and scientific capabilities, may play a large part in building SEEETN.

Over the past four years, focus has turned to building capabilities — training, modernization and participating in missions and operations. Exercises with main battle units have increased, during which operational procedures for crisis management with international organizations and government agencies and nongovernmental organizations have been evaluated and improved.

Bulgaria developed a complementary set of experiments to be conducted in conjunction with Exercises Phoenix 2010, Energy Flame 2011 and SEESIM 12 that included several NATO structures such as Supreme Allied Command of Transformation (SACT). The exercises showed SACT that Bulgaria has a serious crisis management program in place and is working hard to improve it. Phoenix 2010 provided an opportunity for NATO leaders to observe how 17 Bulgarian ministries and governmental agencies handle a crisis. SACT also used the exercises to test and validate different programs in an exercise environment, including:

- Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Crisis Emergency Planning
- CIMIC Joint Planning, Execution and Coordination Tools
- CBRN simulation systems and instruments
- Civil-Military Fusion Center
- Strategic communication, the results of which were used in SEESIM 12
- Civil Military Legal Overview Virtual Information System
- Joint Exercise Management Module
- Exercise Scenario Resource Portal
- Distributed Training and Exercises and testing NATO Training Federation

SEESIM

The SEESIM 2012 and 2014 computer-assisted exercises were the sixth and seventh in a series within the SEDM framework and among the most important for the development of permanent capabilities in the region.

The purpose of the SEESIM exercises is to promote cooperation, coordination and interoperability of civil-military operations and reinforce real world crisis response among SEDM nations and the various SEDM initiatives by using M&S. The specific aim is to develop the capabilities and procedures of national and regional coordination, cooperation, and mutual assistance among the SEDM nations in the face of devastating emergencies, such as natural disasters or terrorist attacks.

The main objectives are:

- Standardize and improve national, SEEBRIG HQ and regional processes and procedures in emergency response situations and improve interoperability among the SEDM nations and SEEBRIG HQ.
- Provide a training environment to promote SEDM and NATO objectives of transparency, confidence-building and good neighborliness.
- Serve as a focal point for facilitating the integration of SEDM initiatives.
- Encourage development of national simulation capabilities.

The collaborative effort to support SACT experimentation serves as an example of smart defense. Joint Force Trainer is supported by the Capability Engineering Division of the Capability Development Directorate with representatives from the Joint Warfare Center, Joint Force Training Center and the NCIA also participating. In addition, industry is supporting Joint and Coalition Warfighting in the development of key technology critical to meeting several SACT objectives.

It seeks to show how NATO technology and processes could affect multinational exercises such as SEESIM. The results may also provide insights on how NATO can bolster the use of exercises to sustain interoperability and discover new roles for the NATO Training Centers.

The DTE experiment during SEESIM 12 provided insights on NATO’s potential roles in multinational, non-NATO-led exercises. Tools and processes were introduced that otherwise would not have existed in the SEESIM 12 exercise setting. Similar to the SEEETN initiative, DTE sought to “deliver to NATO and partners a persistent, distributed combined joint training capability.”

For the SEESIM 14 exercise, the host nation (Croatia) had to find solutions for:
Ukrainian soldiers take part in exercise Rapid Trident near Yavoriv, Ukraine, in September 2014. The annual U.S.- and Ukrainian-led exercise enhances interoperability among U.S., NATO and Partnership for Peace military forces while promoting regional stability and security and included units from Bulgaria and Romania. AFP/GETTY IMAGES
EXERCISE RESULTS

The change in the geopolitical environment has had serious consequences for militaries. Military organizations confront the ongoing challenge of how to improve effectiveness within the context of highly complex, unpredictable and demanding operational environments. It has become of paramount importance to maximize the use of organizational intellectual capital.

In light of real-life challenges, SEE countries recognize the need to develop a distributed and networked exercise and training capability to integrate and enhance existing national capabilities and prepare forces to conduct different kinds of missions.

Distributed exercises are a key element in the armed forces transformation, enabling the participants to establish a multinational federation using network technologies and sharing a common toolset and approach. At this stage, one of the major tasks of the Bulgarian Armed Forces is to develop specialized centers with a broad spectrum of capabilities for Ministry of Defense interaction with other ministries, civil agencies and organizations within the framework of civil-military cooperation.

In 2012, the Bulgarian Armed Forces created an integrated M&S system, including four centers using JCATS for constructive simulation, distributed integrated training system for live simulation, and Virtual Battlespace 2 (VBS2) for virtual simulation.

First, we try to reduce costs associated with deploying to the field or traveling to an overseas training facility. Second, we “train as we fight.” In real world operations, it is extremely likely that the various components, tactical and strategic level headquarters will be geographically separate while conducting operations, so separation is maintained to test communications, distributed working practices and operational battle rhythm.

The chiefs of defense initiated the SEEETN project to address this training need. SEEETN will provide services such as email, Web access, VoIP, VTC, exercises, shared scenarios, M&S tools, and so forth, distributed via Wide Area Network or a specially designed education and training network.

SEEETN will provide the backbone by hosting the core services and functionality for each component. The core capability should be easily extendable and reconfigurable to reach and provide services to national headquarters, NATO Centers of Excellence, NATO schools, governmental and nongovernmental agencies and appropriate national exercise facilities. SEEETN will institute a common set of standards, protocols, interface middleware and procedures for M&S, exercise and training integration. It is also expected that SEEETN will demonstrate operational capabilities by supporting chiefs of defense initiative events while continuing to support education and training requirements.

CONCLUSION

NATO and the EU share common values and strategic interests and are working side by side in crisis management operations. NATO’s Strategic Concept commits the Alliance to prevent crises, manage conflicts and stabilize post-conflict situations, including by working more closely with the EU and United Nations. The opportunity for closer cooperation between NATO and the EU, as well as with other actors, is an important element for the development of an international comprehensive approach to crisis management and disaster relief.

The realities of today’s financial limitations require significantly increased cooperation between NATO and the EU to create new capabilities. It will be imperative for NATO to work closely with the EU, not only to avoid duplication of effort, but also to ensure that projects are coordinated and complementary. NATO-EU cooperation will demonstrate Europe’s readiness to shoulder its fair share of the security burden, even when budgets are tight.

Creating the common multinational framework and expertise will increase training and educational capabilities. Creating new capabilities will provide opportunities to participate more strongly in the crisis management process and develop potential to operate in any kind of crises, which I see as a primary future mission of armed forces. That will help equalize standard operating procedures, doctrines and concepts, and will erase boundaries and accelerate the transformation of, and close cooperation between, NATO and the EU.
A number of crises are unfolding in different parts of the world. The European Union is engaged in managing and mitigating many of these situations (e.g., the Ebola virus). But closer to home in Europe, there is a crisis in which a joint, coordinated approach by the international community is of utmost urgency. Increasing security concerns in Ukraine, in the region and in Europe, if not dealt with now, will have an adverse impact on all of our lives in the near future.

A humanitarian crisis exists in Ukraine, even though Ukraine itself is not calling it such. The crisis has evolved from Ukraine’s military conflict with Russia and entails three components: internally displaced people (IDPs) within Ukraine, Ukrainian refugees in neighboring countries and returning refugees and IDPs.

This conflict is viewed from different angles by various stakeholders. It is vital to understand many issues and the complexity of the situation as a whole. The crisis is evolving, and the international community is responding.

**Main stakeholders**

The State Emergency Services (SES) of Ukraine is the main counterpart of the EU Civil Protection sector and, until December 24, 2012, was part of the Ukrainian Ministry of Emergencies. Now under the Ministry of Interior, it is the main institution specifically tasked to protect the population and territories during emergencies, including firefighting, industrial accidents and flooding.

Additionally, the SES has been tasked with the IDP situation — a task that Ukraine is struggling to manage, given that the country has no prior institutional knowledge. It lacks information management, coordination and capacity, and it needs to create new structures because leadership is frequently changing — all creating confusion. These issues are substantial enough to be the subject of a separate study.

Vice Prime Minister and newly appointed Speaker of Parliament Volodymyr Groysman coordinates humanitarian issues for the Ukrainian government and chairs the commission for humanitarian aid within the State Emergency Services. However, the coordination needs to be reinforced, because government institutions are overwhelmed or not yet functioning as they should. The most significant assistance is being provided through networks of volunteers, civil society and the international community (the United Nations, Doctors Without Borders, the Red Cross and others).

The EU Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO) has played an important role by supporting the Ukrainian government and plans to continue to do so. ECHO aims to save and preserve life, prevent and alleviate human suffering and safeguard the integrity and dignity of populations affected by natural disasters and man-made crises. The EU, one of the world’s largest providers of humanitarian assistance, has enshrined these ideals in the Treaty of Lisbon, and it is supported by EU citizens as an expression of European solidarity with those in need.

Through a global network of field offices, ECHO ensures rapid and effective delivery of EU relief assistance through two main instruments: humanitarian aid and civil protection. By bringing together the two under one roof in 2010, the European Commission created a more robust and effective mechanism for disaster response both inside and outside the EU.
UKRAINE: Overview of population displacement

Growth in the number of displaced Ukrainians in 2014

IDPs per 1,000 oblast population
- 0 to 2
- 3 to 4
- 5 to 6
- 7 to 8
- 9 to 10
- 11 to 20
- 21 to 50

External Displacement
- People seeking legal status
- Asylum applications

Map showing the number of displaced Ukrainians in various oblasts.

Crimea

BLACK SEA

UKRAINE:
Overview of population displacement

Growth in the number of displaced Ukrainians in 2014
The EU announced in December 2014 that it will provide an additional 3.3 million euros in shelter, food and non-food assistance, and health services “to help the most vulnerable … meet their basic needs and prepare for the approaching winter.” This brings the EC’s humanitarian aid to Ukraine to more than 11 million euros since the crisis began.

ECHO provides humanitarian assistance through partner organizations, such as the UN, the Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and international nongovernmental organizations. Assistance is based on needs assessments carried out by ECHO or partner organizations in consultation with authorities and other relevant stakeholders. ECHO is visible in Ukraine and has been holding regular meetings since February 2014 with partners and donors to provide coordination and leadership.

ECHO coordinates civil protection assistance through the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM), which can be activated by an official request from any country in need. The UCPM was established in 2001 and has since undergone qualitative and quantitative changes. Civil protection assistance is provided by participating states (28 EU member states, Iceland, Macedonia, Montenegro and Norway) and can take the form of in-kind assistance or expertise. The operational heart of the UCPM is the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC), which monitors emergencies around the globe 24/7 and coordinates crisis response.

There are two channels of ECHO aid: humanitarian aid delivered to beneficiaries through partners and civil protection assistance to the government of the affected country. It is important to differentiate between civil protection assistance, which is generally immediate crisis response covering two to three weeks, and humanitarian aid, which covers months or years.

**ECHO and Ukrainian cooperation**

Ukrainian authorities have requested emergency assistance four times in the past: for an oil spill in the Black Sea in 2007, for massive flooding in western Ukraine in 2008, for an outbreak of the H1N1 respiratory infection in 2009, and for the potential collapse of a dam holding back industrial waste in Kalush in 2010. In each of these cases, the UCPM was promptly activated and in-kind assistance and/or technical advice and expertise were provided.

Ukraine is intensively covered by the capacity-building activities of the regional Programme for the Prevention, Preparedness and Response to Natural and Man-Made Disasters (PPRD-East). PPRD-East I (2010-2014) is one of the six flagship initiatives of the Eastern Partnership. The primary target group is National Civil Protection/Disaster Management Authorities. The initiative aims to enhance the national civil protection capacity of the six Eastern Partnership countries and bring them closer to the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. It is financed through the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) at 6 million euros for four years, and managed by Development and Cooperation-Europeaid (DEVCO) with the active technical support of ECHO. PPRD-East II (2015-2018) started in January 2015, and Ukraine is a participant.

**The IDP crisis**

ECHO has been active in Ukraine since February 2014 and has played a key role in coordinating and facilitating information sharing with partners and donors. It conducted a number of field visits...
together with various partner organizations and government counterparts. Since the beginning of the conflict, ECHO opened an office in Kiev and has deployed humanitarian and civil protection experts. It has provided support to the Ukrainian Red Cross via the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and partner organizations. ECHO also supports, through its humanitarian partner organizations, capacity building for local actors dealing with humanitarian issues and IDPs to ensure sustainability and better coordination of activities by national, regional and local authorities.

**Activating and deploying the UCPM in Ukraine – a timeline**
- **February 25, 2014**: Based on the situation in Ukraine, ECHO’s ERCC activated the UCPM.
- **April 16, 2014**: The ERCC received a request for assistance from Ukraine to conduct a preparedness mission and help Ukrainian authorities build a modern civil protection system in the country. Owing to circumstances, the terms of mission, scope and timing are still being finalized.
- **October 7, 2014**: The ERCC received a second request for assistance from Ukraine for various medical supplies.
- **October 9, 2014**: A list of in-kind materials to support the needs of people affected by the conflict during winter was circulated to UCPM participant states. As of late 2014, only Latvia had offered technical assistance through the UCPM.
- **October 10, 2014**: An amended request (following unsuccessful attempts to form a team of civil protection experts) for experts was posted in the Common Emergency Communication and Information System, which facilitates day-to-day and crises communications.
- **October 16, 2014**: A UCPM expert team was deployed for four weeks to support the government of Ukraine in the management of IDPs.

A number of countries are helping bilaterally to address immediate, mid- and long-term needs based on geographical or sector choices, but it is possible to address Ukrainian needs in a more coordinated way. ECHO has been an active advocate to ensure better coordination among member states and convened a number of meetings in late 2014 to assess the situation and strengthen overall EU coordination. It may be that political pressure and hidden agendas are obstructing technical assistance.

Interestingly, the cooperation between and coordination of the two aspects of ECHO — humanitarian aid and civil protection — has been very good, though it has been exercised in difficult environments and circumstances. Much can be achieved with dedicated experts and common efforts.

**Population displacement in Ukraine**

The conflict in eastern Ukraine has damaged infrastructure and security, resulting in a humanitarian crisis and substantial displacement from the eastern regions to Kiev, Lviv and Kharkiv. Other regions affected by the humanitarian crisis are Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia. At the end of October 2014, about 442,000 Ukrainians were internally displaced and an estimated 488,000 had fled to neighboring countries, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Those numbers were expected to grow day by day.

The Ukrainian government must manage IDP, refugee and returnee issues, including coordinating programs and information exchange, performing contingency planning and allocating resources — all demanding tasks. However, regional governments are addressing problems, coordinating efforts and supporting people in need quite well. The main challenge is a lack of resources — technical and manpower — and overall coordination and communication within and among respective decision-making bodies.

Even though a cease-fire was agreed to on September 5, the numbers of IDPs continued to increase dramatically. The numbers will increase more, and the situation will likely deteriorate if the conflict becomes frozen. There is a notion that Ukraine has conceded the loss of the Donbass and that the Donetsk and Luhansk regions will not be part of Ukraine, at least for some time. However, that is not an option for the Ukrainian government. It has launched its response plan for IDPs and recovery efforts for Donetsk and Luhansk regions, requesting 159 million euros to meet the basic needs of IDPs and 732.8 million euros for recovery efforts. And the EU is there to assist.

On October 20, 2014, the Ukrainian parliament adopted a law on the rights and freedoms of internally displaced people. The law, developed with support from the UN and civil society, extends a specific set of rights to IDPs, providing protection against discrimination and forcible return, and assistance in voluntary returns. The law also simplifies access to social and economic aid.

The government of Ukraine decided not to set up IDP camps, but has tried instead to accommodate the IDPs with host families and within available government buildings (schools, sanatoriums), but many were adapted for winter conditions. It is also necessary to look beyond this winter because IDPs will need to find work in their new locations and/or will be considering returning to their homes.

There are also shortages of basic nonfood items and medicines. In fact, needs have arisen in every sector. Ukraine can use any help and support. In a mission from October 16 to November 13, the European Union Civil Protection Team (UCPT) addressed a portion of the need and helped the Ukrainian government with Regional Winterization Response Planning. Planning was based on scenario development, taking into account all scenario drivers (resources, information management, etc.), risk factors (severe weather, increasing numbers of IDPs, etc.), but UCPT was not mandated to perform socio-economic impact analysis. Some sources suggest that Ukraine needs technical assistance rather than advice. Some sources argue that money is needed for people to cover basic needs. I fear
Background on Union Civil Protection Mechanism

- Since its launch in 2001, the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) has monitored over 300 disasters and has received more than 180 requests for assistance. When the mechanism is activated, the European Commission ensures the coordination of assistance.

- In 2011, the UCPM assisted in the aftermath of the devastating earthquake and tsunami that hit Japan, helped evacuate European citizens and third-country nationals from Libya, and facilitated the delivery of emergency assistance to Turkey following a major earthquake.

- In 2012 and 2013, the UCPM was activated to deliver aid to Syrian refugees in Jordan and to fight destructive forest fires in Greece, Portugal, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Albania.

- In 2013 there were 16 requests for assistance. The UCPM responded in the aftermath of overwhelming disasters around the globe, such as Typhoon Haiyan that hit the Philippines.

- In May 2014, the UCPM responded to requests for assistance from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia after devastating floods in the region. Twenty-two participating countries responded.

Ukraine and the UCPM

- The administrative arrangement between the Directorate General for the Environment (now DG ECHO) and the Ukrainian Ministry of Emergencies and Affairs of Population Protection from the Consequences of Chernobyl Catastrophe (now State Emergency Services) was signed in December 2008 and mainly focuses on establishing cooperation during disaster response.

- The UCPM was activated during three recent emergencies in Ukraine: an outbreak of respiratory infections (2009), the potential collapse of a dam in Kalush (2010) and floods (2010). Ukraine has also been given a few places in the Mechanism Training Programme.

- Ukraine is a beneficiary of the Programme for the Prevention, Preparedness and Response to Natural and Man-Made Disasters (PPRD-East), one of the six Flagship Initiatives of the Eastern Partnership. The program was launched at the beginning of 2011 and is financed through the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) at 6 million euros for four years and managed by Development and Cooperation-Europeaid (DEVCO) with the active technical support of ECHO. (More information is available at: http://www.euroeastcp.eu).

- Ukrainian State Emergency Services and ECHO have shown interest in strengthening cooperation, possibly in disaster prevention. Based on new UCPM legislation, which came into effect in January 2014, some UCPM activities can be extended to partner countries from the eastern neighborhood, including Ukraine. The new initiative opens opportunities for joint EU-Ukraine disaster prevention and preparedness projects, civil protection exercises and exchange of experts.

that direct financial support to the authorities, rather than to the affected people, might foster corruption. According to Ukrainian news agency Ukrinform, “A year after the events on Independence Square in Kiev, Ukraine remains the most corrupt country in Europe.”

The UCPT visited all the affected regions and evaluated the situation. A number of UCPM participating states have provided support bilaterally, mostly medical aid for the injured and financial assistance. Latvia has provided nine power generators through the UCPM that are very helpful to Ukrainian authorities, but more assistance is needed in every sector.

What’s next?

Ukrainians expected winter to be difficult. Politics have hindered the European response. International efforts to help Ukraine with donations of in-kind, nonfood items and financial contributions should be increased.

The international community must continue to support Ukrainian capacities in contingency planning, information management and coordination. It is vital to consult with and train SES and its regional departments to improve interagency coordination on civil protection matters. There should be coordination of efforts between SES and UCPM to identify needs in case of disasters and improve preparedness and response.

SES needs better coordination with international partners and nongovernmental organizations on the ground. Its activities should be aimed at protecting and evacuating people from the temporarily occupied (or infected) territories and areas of counterterrorism operations.

The Regional Winterization Response Plan should be reassessed and revised regularly. Long-term capacity building for the Ukrainian government should be developed and implemented. It is vital to help Ukraine integrate into EU policies and mechanisms. Infrastructure damaged as the result of terrorist attacks needs to be restored.

Ukraine’s legal framework in the field of civil protection needs revision by following a more detailed approach and gradually introducing EU requirements into national legislation. External and internal risks that hinder the development of the Ukrainian civil protection system should be addressed and eliminated. This is a difficult task, but with common efforts and determination by the Ukrainian government, a modern and reliable Ukrainian civil protection system can be developed.
On July 22, 2011, a car bomb blasted Oslo’s government quarter, killing eight people and injuring 10. Right-wing extremist Anders Behring Breivik’s improvised explosive device filled the streets with glass and debris. The attack demonstrated that even in presumably secure countries, severely adverse events can happen. Thus, our societies need to ensure the security of their citizens. Civil security research is one way to do that.

Within the last few years a new term has gained prominence in security research: resilience. People, societies and infrastructure shall become resilient, rather than secure. But what does resilience mean? And is there a difference between security and resilience? This article makes a point that, yes, there are indeed differences.1

Mainly, resilience means systematically and holistically approaching security problems by linking necessary expertise from all fields of science and practice. The key word is holistic (Scharte et al. 2014b: 119). Conversely, security is often linked with robust and rather static solutions. Could this new approach be called “holistic security” and has much of this already been done? Of course, but the new term allows us to reset the political agenda and bring resilience, thus also security, into important discussions on topics like sustainability right from the start.

THIS ARTICLE ANSWERS FIVE QUESTIONS:
• Why do we need resilience?
• What is resilience?
• How is resilience implemented into civil security research programs?
• How can engineering science help make our societies more resilient?
• What challenges need to be addressed on the way toward more resilient societies?
WHY DO WE NEED RESILIENCE?

Terrorist attacks, natural disasters and accidents can cause serious and irreversible damage. Terrorist attacks can paralyze transport infrastructure, natural disasters can render living in whole regions impossible, and accidents in power plants can result in the collapse of our energy supply. This is why we need security. And the same holds true for resilience, because resilience is the wider picture when talking about security. Furthermore, owing to the increasing complexity of our modern world and never-ending change, adverse effects of hazards tend to multiply (Coaffee et al. 2009: 122-132). Our systems are extremely susceptible to cascading effects because they are closely linked and intertwined.

Growing complexity, dependency and interconnectedness are also the reasons why security alone is not sufficient anymore. Current risk analysis often concentrates on specific components of systems, as well as known and expected threats. Finding ways to safeguard these components against specific threats is normally understood as building security (cf. Linkov et al. 2014: 407). Resilience goes further, comprising the dynamism needed to adapt to changing conditions. In a world that is facing ever more potentially devastating threats, and at the same time growing intrinsically more vulnerable because of complexity and interconnectedness, security is no longer sufficient.

DEFINING RESILIENCE

In the past 60 years, the term and concept of resilience have been widely used in the sciences, including developmental psychology, ecology, social sciences and engineering (CSS Analysen 2009: 1, Flynn 2011: 1, Kaufmann & Blum 2012: 237ff, Plodinec 2009: 1).

As a scientific concept, resilience was first used in developmental psychology. Its breakthrough came in the 1970s with the seminal work of Emmy Werner. In her famous longitudinal study, *The Children of Kauai*, she found that children who grow up in difficult conditions can develop positively (Luthar et al. 2000: 544, Ungericht/Wiesner 2011: 188f). Resilience in terms of developmental psychology refers to the ability of individuals to cope with adverse events.

The work of Canadian ecologist Crawford S. Holling marked a quantum leap in resilience research. His 1973 article, “Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems,” broadened the field of application to ecology and led to a paradigm shift. For the first time, resilience did not refer solely to individuals, but to entire ecosystems. This idea was crucial for the further development of the concept. According to Holling, the foremost threat to an ecosystem’s ability to survive comes from abrupt, radical and irreversible changes triggered by unusual and unanticipated events (Holling 1973: 1f, Walker/Cooper 2011: 145ff). In nonresilient systems conceived only with stability, the deterministic features that previously enabled an equilibrium to be maintained prevent the system from responding flexibly, causing it to collapse (Holling 1973: 18ff, Kaufmann/Blum 2012: 239).

In the 1980s, resilience was finally used in connection to disasters, especially by engineers referring to technical infrastructure. Resilience encompasses the ability to deal with disasters, preventing them from turning into uncontrollable catastrophes (Plodinec 2009: 1). At the same time, American political scientist Aaron Wildavsky “translated” resilience into the social sciences. He defined resilience as “the capacity to cope with unanticipated dangers after they have become manifest, learning to bounce back” (Wildavsky 1988: 77). Since then, a central aspect of his rationale on resilience has evolved. He understood anticipation and resilience to be opposites. Modern concepts define resilience as a comprehensive, holistic approach to problem solving, the aim of which is to increase the overall resistance and regenerative capacity of technical and social systems. This implies anticipation and prevention, as well as response and adaptation (CSS Analysen 2009: 1).

A recent definition emerged from the U.S. National Academies: “Resilience is the ability to prepare and plan for, absorb, recover from or more successfully adapt to actual or potential adverse events” (The National Academies 2012b: 2). Adverse events can be caused by nature or humans, by chance or with purpose. This understanding is called “all hazards approach” (The National Academies 2012: 14). To better understand the wide-ranging concept, Charlie Edwards’ 2009 publication *Resilient Nation* borrows extensively from classical disaster management cycles (Edwards 2009: 20). Similarly, *Resilien-Tech* drew on both Edwards and disaster management cycles to develop a resilience cycle that provides an easily understood visual depiction of this complex concept.

The cycle is composed of five resilience phases: prepare, prevent, protect, respond and recover. The first phase, prepare, involves making thorough preparations for disasters, especially early warning systems. By reducing underlying risk factors, it is possible to prevent some adverse events from occurring, hence prevent. When an adverse event does occur, the next stage is to ensure that physical and virtual protection systems operate flawlessly to minimize the negative impacts — protect. It is necessary to provide rapid, well-organized and effective disaster relief. This requires the system to maintain its functionality as far as possible — respond. Once the adverse event is over,
it is important that the system recuperate and learn relevant lessons from what has happened to be better prepared for future hazards — recover.

Based on the resilience cycle, and drawing heavily on the work of the National Academies, here is a definition:

“Resilience is the ability to repel, prepare for, take into account, absorb, recover from and adapt ever more successfully to actual or potential adverse events. Those events are either catastrophes or processes of change with catastrophic outcome which can have human, technical or natural causes” (Scharte et al. 2014: 17).

Building resilience can be successful only if technological and societal approaches are linked and combined (Bara/Brönnimann 2011: 33, CSS Analysen 2009: 1).

In this sense, resilience is a holistic way of thinking about security. Regardless of how this objective is achieved, resilient societies are characterized by the fact that the human, economic and environmental damages of adverse events are minimized. Resilient societies are distinguished by their ability to respond dynamically to constant changes in their environment and adapt to unforeseen events. Rather than a static condition, resilience is a property of dynamic, adaptable systems that are able to learn from past events.

RESILIENCE IN CIVIL SECURITY RESEARCH PROGRAMS

If we are talking about research funding, we cannot make a selective, clear-cut distinction between resilience and security. At the same time, societies would not have opportunities to become resilient if it were not for security research. The development of sophisticated technologies, methods and tools for addressing imminent and specific security problems is a precondition for resilience.

Civil security research programs were established in Europe about eight years ago. The Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development (FP7) started in 2007 and for the first time, security became an independent research topic. In unison, the first German civil security research program was launched by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) (Thoma et al. 2012: 322, 328). Both of these programs did not initially deal with resilience specifically but security. The European Commission implemented “Secure Societies” as one of seven societal challenges into the framework program Horizon 2020 (H2020), which started in 2014. The BMBF launched its second civil security research program in 2012. Besides classical security research, these programs specifically addressed resilience.

The European Commission tries to pursue several objectives with its societal challenge, Secure Societies. Two of these directly relate to resilience. Those are “Protecting and improving the resilience of critical infrastructures, supply chains and transport modes” and “Increasing Europe’s resilience to crises and disasters” (2013/743/EU: 1029). Two more indirectly relate to resilience. When it comes to resilience in “Fighting crime, illegal trafficking and terrorism, including understanding and tackling terrorist ideas and beliefs,” thoughts need to be directed to new technologies and capabilities to “avoid an incident and to mitigate its potential consequences” (2013/743/EU: 1029). The European Commission also fosters “Enhancing standardization and interoperability of systems, including for emergency purposes.” This objective contains the “integration and interoperability of systems and services, including aspects such as communication, distributed architectures and human factors,” clear aspects of resilience (2013/743/EU: 1030).

In the Horizon 2020 Work Programme 2014-2015, a part titled “Secure societies – Protecting freedom and security of Europe and its citizens” has four primary goals. The first is enhancing the resilience of the society against human-induced as well as natural threats (European Commission 2014: 7ff). This specific call is divided into five
parts. Taken together, they represent a holistic understanding of resilience. All phases of the resilience cycle are addressed, including prevention and preparedness. Protection, response activities and recovering, including adaptation to changing environments, are indirectly mentioned in parts two, three and four (European Commission 2014: 9). Two examples very clearly demonstrate that the European Commission uses the concept of resilience supported in this article. Within the crisis management topic seven called “Crises and disaster resilience – operationalizing resilience concepts,” resilience concepts shall be developed “for critical infrastructures … but also for the wider public to integrate and address human and social dynamics in crises and disaster situations” (European Commission 2014: 18). And the topic “Critical Infrastructure resilience indicator – analysis and development of methods for assessing resilience” states that proposals “shall demonstrate that a set of common and thoroughly validated indicators, including economic indicators, could be applied to critical infrastructures in order to assess its level of ‘resilience’ ” (European Commission 2014: 29).

Within the BMBF’s second civil security research program, resilience is defined as “a system’s tolerance or capacity for resistance with respect to disruptive external influences” (BMBF 2012: 50). In principle, this definition could comprise all relevant aspects of resilience. Looking more closely, the BMBF shares exactly the same understanding of resilience as we do. The program focuses its “security research on the entire resilience cycle” (BMBF 2012: 7). Although resilience is no research topic on its own, it plays a vital role in societal aspects of security research, urban security, security of infrastructure and protection and rescue of people (BMBF 2012: 11, 14, 17).

In July 2014, the BMBF published a call on the topic of increasing resilience in crises and disasters (“Erhöhung der Resilienz im Krisen- und Katastrophenfall”). This call uses our definition of resilience, as well as the resilience cycle, and is aimed at funding research projects to improve society’s capacity to prepare and prevent and/or respond and recover from adversities. Although it calls resilience a “key component of civil security” — which is not in line with a holistic understanding of resilience where security would rather be a key component of resilience — the call is about increasing resilience with the help of “holistic solutions.” It strives to support projects by empowering people affected by a disaster. They are no longer just victims, but actors in preventing and responding to disasters. The focus of the call clearly lies on societal resilience and the resilience of rescue/disaster relief forces (BMBF 2014). In this regard it depicts just one very important part of the bigger resilience picture. In comparison to that, Horizon 2020 concentrates more on technologies for improving resilience. European and German civil security research programs show that resilience has found its way into security research. The next step needs to establish a new way of engineering thinking — resilience engineering.

THE NEED FOR RESILIENCE ENGINEERING

How can engineering science help us make societies more resilient? Engineers develop solutions: They observe problems and identify their causes. Then they create mechanisms either to eliminate the problems or counterbalance their negative effects with positive ones. The greater the task at hand, the more a society depends on the scientific expertise and the creative ingenuity of engineers. Thus, a resilient society requires a kind of resilience engineering.

Resilience engineering consequently provides ways to deal with the ever-growing complexity of modern systems, specifically with regard to many different types of hazards (Woods/Hollnagel 2006:6):

Resilience engineering means technological and interdisciplinary research and development on customized approaches and methods for improving functionality, resistance, adaptability and educability of systems with high societal value.

It involves the consistent incorporation from an early stage of technological solutions to all kinds of security problems into every aspect of the planning and implementation of major social projects — from the individual to the overall system level. Its goal is to maintain the critical subfunctions of systems in a controlled manner, even when severe damage forces them to operate outside normal parameters, thus allowing catastrophic total system failure to be averted. It requires customized technology for increasing the resilience of individual infrastructures. At the same time, the effectiveness of these solutions and their impact on the system as a whole must be optimized, and they should be complemented by smart solutions from other fields such as economics, ecology and the social sciences.

An engineering approach to measure, evaluate and improve the resilience of cities is being...
developed at Fraunhofer EMI. This approach uses resilience as a holistic concept. Additionally, it relies heavily on the results of the FP7 project, “Vulnerability Identification Tools for Resilience Enhancements of Urban Environments.” Primarily, the approach tries to identify suitable technological indicators for measuring urban resilience with a special emphasis on the resilience cycle. These indicators are then formalized by a newly developed algorithm based on the overall concept of resilience. The objective is to use the indicators as well as the algorithm for the creation of a comprehensive software tool. This software shall be made available to urban planners, enabling them to implement resilience into their planning processes from the beginning. Since resilience cannot be understood purely technologically, the approach will include open interfaces that allow for the long-run implementation of findings from the social sciences.

A first step toward this more sophisticated resilience management tool is an already existing approach for the assessment of susceptibilities, vulnerabilities and averaged risk. The following example is applied to the scene of the Oslo bombings. First, averaged statistical-historical terror event data frequencies are interpreted as susceptibilities. Then, cumulated consequences attributed to a combination of sets of hazard loadings and affected objects are interpreted as averaged vulnerabilities (cf. Siebold et al. 2009, Fischer et al. 2014, Vogelbacher et al. 2014). The sums of the products of these averaged susceptibilities and vulnerabilities then determine the averaged risks. This allows urban planners to assess threat scenarios in detail using validated engineering-simulative methods (cf. Fischer/Häring 2009, Riedel et al. 2010). They then can select the most efficient countermeasures to mitigate the risks. This is of particular interest for increasing the resilience of urban areas.

This newly developed tool for risk assessment was applied in a kind of à posteriori investigation in Oslo. The buildings toward the middle of the government quarter were tremendously susceptible to terrorist threats and were the ones most severely damaged by the car bomb. An à priori risk analysis of this quarter would have uncovered that fact and probably helped save lives. This dramatically shows the importance of implementing security and resilience thinking into urban and other planning from the very beginning. Resilience engineering is a key component to the holistic concept of resilience.

MORE RESEARCH IS NEEDED
One very important challenge is to make sure that there is a persistent and well-supported effort to investigate technologies, methods and tools for resilience engineering. As shown, the European and German security research programs already take resilience into consideration. They have funded, and are currently funding, a wide array of projects which in some way or another focus on solutions for making our societies more resilient. Nevertheless, this is a huge technological, economical and societal task.

Research must continue. First, we need advanced methods for modeling and simulating complex socio-technical systems that are critical to society. This is a crucial part of what was defined above as resilience engineering. Such modeling and simulation tools will allow infrastructure operators, as well as urban and other planners, to identify weaknesses, plan countermeasures, correct faults and do everything in their power to prepare the system as fully as possible for adverse events. A wide variety of modeling techniques already exists today (cf. e.g. Renn 2008 and 2008b). However, as systems become increasingly more complex, the interdependencies among previously discrete subsystems multiply, and even more comprehensive, ultra-advanced methods are required to reliably model how systems will behave when unforeseen events occur (Al-Khudhairy et al. 2012: 574ff, Linkov et al. 2014). The aim is to produce multimodal simulations that use an integrated approach to model technological and social systems and the complex interactions among them.

Second, resilience has to pay off. Today, increasing security of relevant systems is often costly and to some, a dispensable add-on to their normal functioning. Thus, a case should be made for the long-term value that resilience can bring to society. We need to adopt a wider perspective, abandoning short-term and short-sighted cost/benefit optimization in favor of strategic, long-term thinking. Future research should therefore incorporate economics from the outset. In view of the greater challenges confronting us, systems that collapse at the first sign of trouble because they were designed according to radical cost-cutting principles hardly constitute a sustainable model. In a sustainability-based approach, the extra initial outlay required to create resilience soon pays for itself, not only in terms of reduced human suffering, but financially as well (The National Academies 2012: 13).

Third, resilience should be established as a key component of sustainable development. Sustainability means finding a way of living together that meets the needs of the people alive today without jeopardizing future generations’ abilities to meet their own needs (A/42/427). The United Nations has identified seven key components of sustainable development. These are decent jobs, a sustainable energy supply, food security and sustainable agriculture, sustainable urban development, access to clean drinking water, sustainable use of oceans, and resilient societies (UN.org 2014,
In conclusion, resilience is different than security. To call it a holistic and sustainable security approach captures the most important of these differences. If we look at our ever more complex and interconnected world and at grand challenges like climate change, it becomes perfectly clear how desperately we need resilience. The concept itself is defined as the ability to repel, prepare for, take into account, absorb, recover from and adapt ever more successfully to actual or potential adverse events. Current civil security research includes many aspects of resilience research already. To address the manifold challenges we face today, we need the scientific expertise and creative ingenuity of engineers. Thus, we need to establish resilience engineering within civil security research. Resilience engineering means technological and interdisciplinary research and development on customized approaches and methods for improving functionality, resistance, adaptability and educability of systems with high societal value. Besides resilience engineering, security research must investigate the most advanced tools for modelling and simulation of complex systems, make a business case out of resilience and ensure that resilience is used as a key component of sustainable development. If we succeed in these tasks, our societies will be well prepared for tragedies like the Oslo bombings and look forward to a resilient and sustainable future.

1. It is mainly based on the results of the project “Resilience by Design – a strategy for the technology issues of the future (Resilien-Tech).” The results of the project are published in Thoma 2014.
2. Thoma et al. 2014 gives a comprehensive overview about current security research.

Sources


MAJ. GEN. JULIUS OKETTA, head of mission for the African Union Support to Ebola Outbreak in West Africa, Uganda

By per Concordiam Staff

Maj. Gen. Julius Oketta of Uganda spoke in October 2014 about the African Union Support to Ebola Outbreak in West Africa (ASEOWA), which he heads. He arrived in Monrovia, Liberia, in September to prepare for further deployments. The following interview has been edited for length and format.

per Concordiam: Please tell us about your background in the military and the Ugandan Parliament.

OKETTA: I went through the rank and file and then command from platoon to division commander. I was the chief of logistics and engineering for the Army, and then head of the procurement and disposal unit of the Ministry of Defense. I have become a member of parliament, one of the 10 members representing the Army.

per Concordiam: Have you participated in any other United Nations or African Union missions other than the current mission to fight Ebola?

OKETTA: I am currently a member of the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund in New York. I’m also a participant of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) Pandemic Response Program, which has been participating in training all of us for a long time. I am the national director of the National Emergency Coordination Center in Uganda, and I have been coordinating several Ebola responses in the country and other disasters like landslides, floods and many others with all the U.N. agencies and AFRICOM.

per Concordiam: What is the current status of ASEOWA? How many people have been deployed, and when is deployment expected to be completed?

OKETTA: The AU [African Union] mission will deploy 200 medical personnel including 54 doctors and nurses. This is broken down into two phases. Phase one is 100, and phase two is also 100, which will come to rotate, because when they work, the doctors work for six weeks. Then the nurses work for nine weeks; then we rotate them, from the 100 that are in reserves. Our initial operation is for six months. If we are not done, the AU will renew the period of staying here.

per Concordiam: What are some of
the specific things ASEOWA will do to coordinate Liberian, Sierra Leonean and Guinean militaries and police forces?

OKETTA: One is medical response. Our personnel will be working in the ETUs [Ebola Treatment Units], for example the ones being constructed by the U.S. government in Liberia. Some of our team will be put in charge of those ETUs, and some will be working with the community care units. So in this mandate of medical support, we will work alongside the Ministry of Health of Liberia and be filling in the gaps. The second area of my work is humanitarian. Our teams are working to help identify orphans in families that have been affected by Ebola. Area number three is logistics. In logistics, we are making sure that all our health personnel are properly protected. We’ll make sure that we coordinate with the CDC [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention], the World Health Organization and other partners to make sure that the logistics required for the personnel security — before, during and after the treatment of the Ebola cases — are available to make them feel more confident and concentrate on their work. Number four is about information management. Ebola can only be contained if the information, the right information, goes to the core community members.

per Concordiam: What kinds of precautions are you taking to ensure people under your command are protected from
Ebola when they’re in these areas?

OKETTA: We assume we know very little, or nothing at all, about the behavior of Ebola. And therefore, all of our team has to undergo transition training. In the initial phase they have to go through the suits, then the second phase they have to go through the dummy exercise, then the third phase is to go into the real Ebola Treatment Unit exercises.

per Concordiam: Have you given the people under your command, be they military or civilian, any words of encouragement or inspiration about this mission?

OKETTA: As it was stated by U.S. President Barack Obama, the one thing is not to exaggerate issues, but to get the facts about Ebola. So we need them to know the facts about Ebola, about the do’s and the don’ts, the directions, knowing the time, keeping the cushion by keeping distances, and the rest of it. So all these processes and experiences that have led other people to make mistakes and get infected, and the experience of groups of people who did the right thing and they never got infected, are already related to the workers, and they all understood this and realized that actually facing the truth and doing the drills is the only way out.

per Concordiam: How has your experience in national emergency management prepared you to wage the fight against Ebola?

OKETTA: The late Dr. Matthew Lukwiya in northern Uganda was a friend of mine, and when Ebola started he was the first person to show us how to deal with the threat. Unfortunately, he didn’t know he was infected, so he died. And since then I took a special interest and have been very close with the local, national and international medical people in knowing how to deal with Ebola. So in all the cases of Ebola in Uganda, I participated, because I saw that one day, one morning, I could wake up and Ebola is in my door. So how do I help by not spreading it to others? You cannot do it unless you know more about it. So that is how I took interest in these contagious diseases impacting the community.

per Concordiam: What was your involvement in responding to some of the Ebola outbreaks in Uganda that started back in 2000? What lessons did you learn from them?

OKETTA: In northern Uganda, I participated physically with the soldiers in supporting the civil authorities because they were totally scared, and then in all other areas in the country I coordinated the operations in supporting the minister of health and making sure that these teams are supported, i.e., coordinating with the military that they should provide force helicopters, their personnel and overseeing that they are doing the right thing. And it ended up really well; we never lost any personnel of the army, and the civilians were content. I think as leaders, or as the military for that matter, you are always the first and the last in the battlefield against anything in the community.

per Concordiam: What is the most important advice you could give national military and police forces that are faced with a threat such as Ebola or a similar pandemic?

OKETTA: First of all, leadership starts with the overall preparedness of the country — preparedness, preparedness, preparedness. And with preparedness, they should build medical capabilities. I mean the medical capabilities in the military should be consistent with the country’s national plan, for instance a plan of contagious diseases. And in preparation they should build an early warning system. If you have a good early warning system, it will give you a timely response.

per Concordiam: Given your experience, what is your impression of how Liberian, Guinean and Sierra Leonean forces have done in the face of the Ebola threat thus far? What is your assessment of the military and security response up until your arrival?

OKETTA: I would say at the initial stage, the Ebola threat did not come out very clearly in the three countries. The initial act of response was not very effective. Secondly, when it was detected, there was not a timely response; there was delay in reaction. Then, thirdly, when this question came up outright, the military of this country immediately jumped in to supplement the gaps while the presidents of the various countries gave their mobilization messages of incoming support from other friends.
Once the communities in this area accept our word that it is true — that death is being caused by this and they stop certain traditional practices — that will be the first battle won.”

**per Concordiam:** In mid-September, eight Ebola relief workers were killed and dumped in a latrine in Guinea. This shows that there’s still quite a bit of fear and mistrust in the midst of the Ebola threat. Do you see that mistrust and fear subsiding or is it growing?

**OKETTA:** It is subsiding now because we came and we are accepted at every level. Before now, on-site our response has been slow. Slow in giving information about Ebola, slow in trying to find out where the Ebola cases are, slow in dealing with the cases, or the suspected cases. And in every community, once that thing happens, there are people who unconsciously say bad messages without knowing they are saying bad things. So we came to support the government in the sectors, and we are very grateful for the international community to insist on the right messages. And I’m telling you right now there’s a bit of change because the civil society, the youth, the women — many of them have now come on the government side to accept the messages about what Ebola is. So the issue of negative response to medical health workers and other people is now reducing. All the people who are staying in denial have now started coming out. But there’s still a lot to do in the remote areas, where people still believe in their tradition of cleaning dead bodies, and dealing with the monkeys, the bats — those elements that are suspected to be the cause of this thing. So we are now advancing in with the different task forces, which have been established to go in those communities, meet those traditional leaders like the clan leaders, the witch doctors, to convince them that this is not the truth, so that we win their hearts and minds to accept the messages. And when we win their hearts and minds to accept the messages, they will turn to their people and say, “Ladies and gentlemen, the truth is this, stop this.” And at that point, we shall have succeeded in ending this threat of Ebola.

**per Concordiam:** At this point, how confident are you that ASEOWA and other forces such those of the United States and West Africa can contain, and eventually eliminate, the Ebola threat?

**OKETTA:** I am very confident that the multicultural forces of the world that are gathered in this region are going to contain Ebola shortly with the deployment of two strategies: One is for the people to accept the message that Ebola is there, and the way it affects people is true and they should comply with the health practices. Once the communities in this area accept our word that it is true — that death is being caused by this, and they stop certain traditional practices — that will be the first battle won. Battle number two is to stop denial — they start coming out, on any simplest signs, to report themselves to the doctors to be checked. We think within a short time these two strategies can make the battle won, sustained and managed forever.
The New NATO

THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE HAS FORCED THE ALLIANCE TO ADAPT STRATEGICALLY TO NEW THREATS

By per Concordiam Staff

The days when NATO could boast of the special partnership it had established with post-Cold War Russia have ended. The cause of the shift wasn’t just the annexation of Crimea and the Russian military incursions into eastern Ukraine in early 2014, as disturbing as those actions were to the North Atlantic Alliance. In the fall of 2014, new provocations, seemingly every week, mocked NATO’s desire to improve relations with Moscow.

The kidnapping of an Estonian counterintelligence agent by border-jumping Russian operatives, cyber attacks on NATO and Western websites, aggressive military flyovers near the Netherlands, and submarine infiltration into Swedish territorial waters: All signaled to the Alliance that Russia was determined to adopt the role of adversary in European affairs.

The NATO summit in Wales in September 2014 provided a timely opportunity for Alliance members to reaffirm their commitment to defend Europe from potential outside threats, a sentiment that had waned after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. NATO leaders emerged from the meetings determined to create a leaner, quicker and harder-hitting multinational force for deployment in case of crisis.

“I don’t think we can ever arrive at a Europe whole, free and at peace without Russia as a partner. And so for the last 12 years we’ve been trying to make Russia a partner,” NATO Commander Gen. Philip Breedlove said during a speech before the Atlantic Council in Washington in September 2014. “We’ve been making basing decisions — force structure decisions, economic decisions — along the fact that Russia would be a constructive part of the future of Europe.
Lithuanian soldiers take part in Saber Strike, a NATO defensive exercise in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia that involved 10 countries. In June 2014, the Alliance launched one of its largest maneuvers in the ex-Soviet Baltic states after Moscow annexed Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula.
A Polish sailor hoists a flag on a minesweeper in the Baltic Sea during the BALTOPS 2014 military exercise, which attracted 30 ships and 52 aircraft from 14 nations. NATO reactivated the maritime group in April 2014 to enhance collective defense in response to the Ukraine crisis. EPA
And now we see a very different situation, and we have to address that.

**CONFRONTING THREATS**

“Hybrid warfare” is the name NATO leaders have given the aggressive strategy displayed by Russia in Ukraine — manipulation of surrogate protest movements, infiltration by unidentified troops wearing nondescript uniforms, cyber disruptions and, last but not least, overt military escalation. In response, NATO nations have reached a consensus on the need to bolster Article V, the stipulation that NATO members defend one another in the event of attack.

Breedlove described the transformation of NATO as a complementary three-part process that would reassure allies, particularly along NATO’s eastern and northern flanks, that they could resist hybrid warfare in all its guises:

- Recreate the long-standing NATO Response Force as a “Very High Readiness Task Force.” Ideally, this spearhead force could bring heavy power to bear in as little as 48 hours.
- Establish an operational or tactical headquarters in NATO to address collective defense. Dedicated to Article V, the headquarters would operate 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.
- Solidify a forward presence in border nations to hold military exercises, station rotating combat troops and provide command and control. In an emergency, these bases could absorb the Very High Readiness Task Force.

**THE PRICE OF SECURITY**

Breedlove emphasized that NATO’s proposed boost of manpower and firepower must be affordable and sustainable for at least the next two decades. This desire to commit long-term financial resources to guarantee Europe’s safety was reiterated by newly appointed NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg. In the past, Alliance members have agreed in principle to spend at least 2 percent of gross domestic product on defense, but few have maintained that promise through tough financial times.

“All the heads of states and government decided that now the time has come to at least stop cutting defense spending and gradually start to increase it during the next decade,” Stoltenberg, until recently Norway’s prime minister, announced in October 2014. “What we have seen is NATO has cut its spending on defense over the last years, whilst other countries around us … increased a lot. Therefore, the time has come to reverse that trend.”

Some countries haven’t waited for collective action to upgrade their forces. Lithuania, for example, decided in October 2014 that it was placing 2,500 troops on continuous high alert to defend against unconventional warfare of the sort that emerged in Ukraine, Agence France-Presse reported.

As if to confirm the country’s fears about hybrid warfare, Russia simultaneously launched a new media and informational campaign to influence Russian speakers living in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Many Baltic leaders view the campaign as a ploy to stir up resentment among the ethnic Russian minorities in those countries.

“We must immediately increase our readiness for unplanned military actions during peacetime,” Lithuanian Maj. Gen. Jonas Vytautas Zukas said in the Agence France-Presse article.

Even nonaligned countries, such as Sweden, have questioned the prudence of depleting defense budgets in light of recent provocations that included the Russian Air Force conducting a simulated bombing run toward Stockholm.

“This kind of incident deepens the sense of insecurity not only in Sweden, but also the rest of the Baltic Sea region,” Anna Wieslander, deputy director at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, told Reuters in October 2014.

**LOOKING TO THE FUTURE**

Leaders are quick to point out that NATO’s reformulation represents a strategic adaptation to changing circumstances. Although the new rapid response forces will remain “nonoffensive,” they will build upon the unprecedented interoperability forged during the long mission in Afghanistan.

In addition, the Alliance’s proliferating centers of excellence, including those dedicated to protecting the cyber realm and diversifying energy supplies, assure allies that nonconventional threats to security will not be ignored.

And constructive partnerships with such non-NATO members as Georgia and Serbia — partnerships that often include joint training exercises and participation in peacekeeping operations — have continued.

As Breedlove said in late 2014: “I think the largest changes to NATO in the history of man are going to take effect in the next year to two, and they will set the stage for what our alliance is able to do across the next several decades.”
NATO has stood as the primary guarantor of European security for more than 65 years. With the end of the Cold War, however, the most substantial security threat dissipated. Nevertheless, the current instability of Europe's security environment necessitates a renewed focus on NATO and operational readiness. Such increased readiness is demonstrated by the Alliance's collective security presence, command and control, and quick deployment of responsive forces. A robust capacity from all member nations and interoperability are key components.

The United States supports partner nation capacity building and increased NATO interoperability. Central to this approach is the NATO Response Force (NRF), a high readiness and technologically advanced multinational force made up of land, air, sea and special forces components that the Alliance can quickly deploy wherever needed. To certify the NRF in 2014, the Alliance conducted a series of exercises (Noble Arrow, Noble Justification and Noble Mariner) across the European theater. These separate component-level air, sea and land exercises...
contributed to the overall joint certification exercise Trident Juncture and qualified NATO Joint Force Command (JFC) Headquarters in Naples, Italy, to command and control the NRF in 2015.

**Noble Arrow and Noble Justification exercises**

Allied JFC in Brunssum, Netherlands, and Headquarters Air Command in Ramstein, Germany, led the NRF Air Component Command (ACC) live-fly exercise Noble Arrow for three weeks in October 2014. The exercise trained participants in the orchestration and conduct of air operations in a realistic and high threat environment to provide component-led force integration training.

U.S. Air Forces Europe (USAFE) participated in Noble Arrow alongside 13 other NATO nations (Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom) and two partner nations (Finland and Sweden). The multinational exercise enabled ACC to demonstrate its ability to activate the NRF, establish and maintain command and control of assigned forces, and liaise between forces and host nation agencies. Moreover, Noble Arrow optimized interaction to ensure the best training value and interoperability of the allied forces.

The exercise provided force integration and combat readiness training with integrated tanker refueling and fighter missions. It validated the readiness of forces to respond rapidly and cooperatively to any NATO contingency.

USAFE assets employed operational firepower alongside other NATO nations, conducted air refueling missions, and notably, developed and maintained Alliance and regional relations. U.S. Air Force bombers from U.S. Strategic Command supported Noble Justification’s maritime forces by practicing the command, control and employment of simulated conventional weapons operations. Bomber flights were specifically designed to provide opportunities to synchronize the capabilities of the U.S. and its allies and partners. These operations emphasize NATO’s combined capabilities and demonstrate power projection capabilities in the European theater.

**Leadership posture**

Gen. Philip M. Breedlove, commander of Supreme Allied Command Europe and U.S. European Command, stated in September 2014: “It is indeed a momentous time in Europe. But with the support of our partners and allies in Europe and NATO, we will face these challenges like we have in the past — together — and work toward our version of a Europe whole, free and at peace.”

To address any threats or destabilization, the U.S. and its NATO allies will continue to increase the capability, readiness and responsiveness of NATO forces. Fighting together requires training together. Gen. Breedlove added: “NATO’s focus is NRF readiness, command and control and forward presence that are both affordable and sustainable. In order to improve responsiveness, the NRF is expected to test their readiness through irregular and off-schedule exercises, command and control of allied interoperability, and forward presence through strategic exercises and basing.”

The general made the comments in the context of reassuring NATO allies: “This is NATO power, not just air power, but NATO power, assuring our allies that we’re there, and we can be there rapidly if required. We brought assurance to those forward nations.”

The current European security environment may be in flux, but NATO will continue to prepare its response forces for unpredictable events. “Successful certification demonstrates the highest achievable measures of proficiency for these parts of the NRF,” said Canadian Forces Lt. Gen. D. Michael Day, deputy commander of JFC Naples. “These exercises are not just important to the life cycle of the NRF, but also act to assure NATO members and their allies of the Alliance’s unity, ability and commitment to respond to any threat to NATO members’ integrity and sovereignty.”

While U.S. Air Force participation in Noble Arrow and Noble Justification was limited to flying air refueling and fighter and bomber missions, its contribution to NRF certification exercises demonstrates a steadfast commitment to the defense of NATO and its ability to resolve emerging threats for decades to come.
On June 27, 2014, the European Union signed Association Agreements with Georgia and the Republic of Moldova and completed the signature process with Ukraine — each providing for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA).

This was an important moment for the EU and the countries concerned. The agreements significantly deepened political and economic ties between the signatories with a long-term perspective of closer political association and economic integration.

The association agreements aim to integrate these countries gradually into the EU’s internal market, the largest single market in the world. This entails creating a DCFTA between the EU and each of these countries.

Much work remains on domestic reforms. The EU and each country will cooperate on strengthening the rule of law, advancing judicial reforms, fighting corruption, ensuring respect for fundamental rights and freedoms and strengthening democratic institutions.

A broad consensus exists in Georgia that integration with the EU is in the nation’s interest. Despite differences on internal issues, there is little disagreement between parliamentary parties on EU matters, and in general, public opinion is pro-European. Recent polls by a U.S.-based democracy advocacy organization, the National Democratic Institute, reveal nearly 80 percent of Georgians believe the country should join the EU rather than the Russian-backed Eurasian Customs Union.

In October 2010, Georgia’s Parliament adopted constitutional changes that shrunk the powers of the president in favor of the prime minister and Parliament. Such constitutional changes and the ratification of the association agreement with the EU increased dramatically the role of the Georgian Parliament.

The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009 brought new lawmaking powers to the European Parliament and allowed EU member state parliaments to take on an increased role in the European integration process. This approach is also required for candidate countries or those interested in candidacy.

To achieve the goal of closer integration with the EU, each candidate or potential candidate country must develop national EU coordination mechanisms and far-reaching comprehensive reforms in the organizational structure of its government.

Georgia has a strategic opportunity to provide guidelines for accomplishing its integration goals. In identifying the main challenges of coordination within the Parliament, between the Government and Parliament and within the Government, the authors of these guidelines wish to stimulate the process of European association.

MAIN GOALS

The proposed guidelines aim to enhance and improve the existing EU association coordination process between the Parliament and the Government of Georgia. They also aim to offer advice for strengthening intra-parliamentary coordination.

The main goal of this project is to set forth a guideline for a process to upgrade coordination between civil servants working for the Parliament and the government of Georgia on the EU association process. As envisioned, the authors hope that the proposed guidelines can assist the successful
implementation of the association agreement. This proposal identifies a number of realistic opportunities for closing existing gaps in the coordination process within the civil services.

INSTITUTIONAL SETTING
The existing EU Integration Coordination System of Georgia, from an institutional point of view, has been well planned. Georgia is unique among EU Eastern Partnership countries in having established a Governmental Commission on EU Integration in July 2004 that serves as the main instrument for vertical coordination.

In the current institutional setting and existing EU Integration Coordination System of Georgia, roles of the legislative and executive bodies are accurately defined. Connections between them exist on different levels of governance, but gaps make the system incomplete from the developed countries’ perspective.

To identify those gaps and maintain a balance between those working for Parliament, government and civil society, we have analyzed interviews of representatives of the legislative branch, as well as experienced practitioners (members of Parliament, chairs of the thematic committees, parliamentary experts, experts working in the government, representatives of the previous government, as well as the members of the current government at the deputy minister level and members of civil society, who are/were involved in the EU association process).

Our findings are based on observations made during our years of working for the Georgian civil service and input from other individuals involved in Georgia’s European Integration process since the 1990s.

Within the government, the major problems identified are:

1. The absence of a system for exchanging information and the lack of a centralized coordination guidance within the parliament and the Government. Establishing such will assist in highlighting the intergovernmental priority agenda with thematic working groups and define the responsible governmental bodies for vetting priorities.

   Recommendations:
   • Establish a legal framework to regulate the process of exchanging information on EU integration between the Parliament and the government of Georgia. There are several examples currently used in EU member states that could be applied.
   • Establish an “EU debate” format in the parliamentary plenary by which the prime minister will every three months report to the Parliament on the EU association process.

2. A lack of clarity on costs and funding of setting up an investment agenda in every sector covered by the association agreement.

   Recommendations:
   • Mandate that the Office of the State Minister of Georgia on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration address the Committee on European Integration via public hearings or written reports at least every three months about the implementation of the association agenda.
   • Oblige line ministries to address the parliament’s relevant committee every three months via monthly public hearings or written reports on the progress of European integration.
   • Strengthen government participation in the Parliamentary Cooperation Committee’s work and activities, and increase involvement in the process of working on official documents and resolutions.

CHALLENGES IN THE CURRENT PROCESS
1. The unstructured exchange of information between the Parliament and the Government of Georgia and among the different parliamentary committees dealing with European association is the main weakness of the current coordination process.

   Recommendations:
   • Establish a legal framework to regulate the process of exchanging information on EU integration between the Parliament and the government of Georgia. There are several examples currently used in EU member states that could be applied.
   • Establish an “EU debate” format in the parliamentary plenary by which the prime minister will every three months report to the Parliament on the EU association process.

2. Representatives of the Government have a limited knowledge and understanding of how the integration process is developing within the Parliament because they are not very involved in parliamentary activities concerning EU association.

   Recommendations:
   • Mandate that the Office of the State Minister of Georgia on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration address the Committee on European Integration via public hearings or written reports at least every three months about the implementation of the association agenda.
   • Oblige line ministries to address the parliament’s relevant committee every three months via monthly public hearings or written reports on the progress of European integration.
   • Strengthen government participation in the Parliamentary Cooperation Committee’s work and activities, and increase involvement in the process of working on official documents and resolutions.

Georgia’s President Giorgi Margvelashvili, center, flanked by Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili, second left, Parliament speaker David Usupashvili, right, and Catholicos-Patriarch of All Georgia Ilia II, celebrate the signing of an association agreement with the EU in Tbilisi in June 2014. REUTERS
3. A timetable does not exist detailing when specific regulations must be adopted to meet EU requirements. DCFTA is an exception; a case in which the Ministry on Economy and Sustainable Development of Georgia has worked on the implementation agenda. This raises a problem especially for the implementation of the association agreement in various sectors, because different institutions may advance their work according to conflicting schedules.

Recommendation:
- Create an online source to provide access to a matrix of regulations and directives in the chronological order of when they are required. Concerned stakeholders could then easily determine when various obligations or requirements are due and ensure a mutually supportive approach. The institute that would be established for law approximation should be assigned as the responsible authority for creating this online resource.

4. The current process does not provide for civil society feedback in parliamentary activities.

Recommendation:
- Create or strengthen scientific-consultancy councils staffed by subject matter experts. Such councils can be created from representatives of the line ministries and civil society, as well as the business sector, by establishing a procedure for soliciting input and opinions from outside experts on issues related to draft bills.

**CHALLENGES OF EXISTING INSTITUTIONS**

1. The existing Governmental Commission on EU Integration cannot make legally binding decisions.

Recommendation:
- Take into account the importance of the decisions made during the Governmental Commission on EU Integration’s meetings to make key decisions legally binding.

2. Parliamentary experts do not always participate in the interagency and thematic subworking groups within the Governmental Commission on EU Integration. This lack of participation inhibits awareness of current issues and limits their ability to provide accurate and timely input.

Recommendation:
- Invite selected experts from the parliamentary thematic committees to participate in the Governmental Commission on EU Integration working groups.
- Create a “liaison officers institute” consisting of one person from each of the 15 standing committees to serve as the contact person for the related line ministry to ensure that the committees of the parliament have current information.
- Establish dedicated subworking groups responsible for monitoring the association agenda according to specific sections of the association agreement with the participation of the parliamentary experts from the thematic committees (15 standing committees) and line ministries (19 ministries).
- Make the Committee on European Integration the main coordinating body for the EU association process within the Parliament. It should be the responsible body to have the totality of information from the thematic committees, while communicating with the Government on specific issues.

3. The process of association with the EU lacks a common translation service in the Government for EU-related documents to be translated from English into Georgian and vice-versa, and there is no official glossary of EU terminology. This causes problems in law approximation, a critical part of the coordination process.

Recommendation:
- Require the Legislative Herald of Georgia to translate the EU acquis into Georgian, translate Georgian legislation into English, and assume responsibility for the standardization of legal terminology and methodology of legal translation.
- Create a digital EU glossary and provide public access (responsible bodies should be the government of Georgia in cooperation with the Legislative Herald of Georgia and EU delegation in Georgia).

4. Experts from thematic committees of the Parliament are not regularly involved in the process of drafting laws in the relevant ministries.
Recommendation:
- At the onset of the decision-making process, involve experts from the thematic committees in the law-drafting process of the government before the draft bill is presented to Parliament.

5. Strengthening the EU information campaign is a challenge and plays an essential role in the EU association process. The recommendations in this regard could be discussed with the EU-NATO Information Center.

Recommendation:
- Plan annual conferences with the participation of experts from Parliament and the Government to include representatives of civil society and the business sector. These conferences will serve as a base for updating the third-level staffers (the directors of the departments, heads of the units and divisions) on implementation of the association agenda.
- Publish an EU affairs bulletin twice a year to review the implementation of the association agenda. The publication would be distributed among the relevant institutions. The responsible body should be the government, in coordination with selected think tanks and academic institutions. This will contribute to the exchange of information on many levels. Examples of this approach exist in several EU member states.

CHALLENGES OF HUMAN RESOURCES
1. Neither the Parliament nor the Government of Georgia has the ability to retain experienced experts with the necessary institutional memory and knowledge of the process of EU integration, and this remains a critical problem for effective coordination.

Recommendation:
- Review Parliament’s human resource strategy and develop a plan that enables committee experts to expand competence in EU-related fields and strengthens the Committee on European Integration. The same should be done within the government of Georgia with the assistance of the Civil Service Bureau.
- Involve the training centers of the Parliament and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the process of strengthening the capabilities of experts working on European association, including developing a concrete action plan for those who should be retrained.
- In cooperation with the Civil Service Bureau, create a system of promoting and keeping the necessary civil servants trained in EU integration issues in their governmental jobs.

2. Neither the Parliament nor the Government has an official database of the civil servants experienced in EU issues who have left civil service but could be of great value as contributors or advisors in the EU association process.

Recommendation:
- The government should expand the database that reviews existing governmental documents to include those who have been involved in EU integration since the early 1990s. The database should be kept current.

TECHNICAL CHALLENGES
1. Currently, the minutes of EU integration-related meetings between the Parliament and government are not uploaded to the online intra-governmental system designed to ensure availability of information for the involved stakeholders.

Recommendation:
- Create an online information exchange system to link EU-related documents to the government and parliament. Lithuanian and Czech examples should be taken into account.

2. Neither Parliament nor the government has access to the electronic resources of the European Database and neither has any procedures to train personnel on accessing existing databases such as the IPEX, EUR-LEX, Legislative Observatory and PRE-LEX.

Recommendation:
- Begin negotiations with the above-mentioned entities for free access to their portals.
- Initiate training on accessing useful EU databases in partnership with the Training Center of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

CONCLUSION
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine have made remarkable progress in the EU integration process by signing their association agreements. The proposed guidelines are intended to provide a model for managing expected challenges for those countries from the Eastern Partnership Initiative or others that seek closer ties with the EU. As for Georgia, the process of integration into European institutions and implementation of the association agreement will depend to a large extent on an effective cooperation system and coordination between the legislative and executive branches of the government, as well as civil society and the business sector, and on the creative application of the best practices of the current EU member states and candidate countries.

Adopting the previous recommendations to deal with challenges and strengthening the coordination system will improve the exchange of information between the two governmental bodies and strengthen these institutions.
A war of WORDS

The Ukrainian conflict includes aggressive use of propaganda and misinformation

By Viacheslav Dziundziuk, National Academy of Public Administration, Ukraine

Just a year ago, the word “hybrid” had exclusively peaceful connotations for the vast majority of Ukrainians, conjuring up images of hybrid automobiles, for example. Now, the word has deleterious, even bloody associations. The reason: In 2014, Ukraine was given a practical lesson in hybrid warfare.

Interestingly, despite the current ubiquity of the term “hybrid warfare,” and active use of the concept by the research and expert community, the concept is not an official one — no Ukrainian or international legal or official documents offers a definition. One definition is a military strategy that combines conventional, low intensity and cyber warfare.

Hybrid warfare includes these three components, but the above definition does not mention one more critical ingredient: information warfare.

The famed military theoretician and strategist Karl von Clausewitz wrote that war could not be understood without a broader grasp of the political and social context in which it takes place. It is clear that, in today’s world, it is impossible to achieve any political or social objectives, or form the context for any actions, including war, without information support. The ultimate, most aggressive form of such a policy is information warfare.

The importance of information in politics — according to Clausewitz, war is the continuation of politics by other means — has long been understood. For example, the phrase “He who controls information, controls the world” is often attributed to Winston Churchill, but was actually coined by the 19th century financier Nathan Rothschild after Napoleon Bonaparte’s defeat in the Battle of Waterloo.
Information warfare
The weapons of information warfare have been honed over time. In the past, traditional mass media such as the Soviet newspaper Pravda or the Nazi German Volkscher Beobachter were key examples, and the Internet and social media were added into service at the end of the 20th century. The Kosovo conflict is considered to be the first Internet war, in which various groups of Internet activists used the World Wide Web to condemn the actions of Yugoslavia and NATO, distributing a narrative about the horrors of war, citing select facts and opinions of politicians and public figures. It delivered propaganda to a wide audience, scattered around the globe. The same tactics are actively deployed in today’s war against Ukraine — a hybrid war initiated by Russia.

Analysts claim that Russia has been preparing for today’s war with Ukraine over the last decade. The creation of mass media networks under total state control, some of them planting commissioned articles in foreign media outlets, shape a specific public opinion. This method has clearly been used for a long time within Russia, but it is only now that a full-scale information war is being waged internationally. Clearly, Russia Today, the international, multilingual information TV network, performs the function of propaganda, rather than merely providing objective information.

Dissonance appeared between the reality that exists in the physical world and the alternative reality that exists in the minds of gullible viewers of the Russian mass media.
Russia’s information warriors and pro-Russian forces in Ukraine are pursuing three key objectives: The first is what I call “preparation by artillery,” softening the opposition by trying to delegitimize Ukraine as an independent country. The second objective is the creation of an alternative reality and the third is spreading panic. The first two objectives are relevant for those who loyally support Russia’s actions in Ukraine, as well as the actions of Russia-supported separatists, while the third objective is aimed at persons living in Ukraine, who do not support separatist trends.

Preparation by artillery

“Preparation by artillery” began in advance of the current events in Ukraine and consists of shaping a single identity, shared by Russians and Ukrainians, consisting of both ethnic and religious aspects of the so-called Russian world. Through numerous articles in the printed media, TV stories, scientific conferences, round tables and other events, Russia has promoted the idea that Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians were one people, with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, in essence, one single nation with a common historical root: Kievan Rus. Emphasis was placed on a common history, while certain shared symbols were imposed, such as the so-called St. George’s Ribbon, which became the symbol of separatism in Ukraine.

Meanwhile, the Russian mass media actively promotes the idea that Ukraine is a nedogosudarstvo — an incomplete, deficient state — with no right to exist in its current form. For instance, as early as 2008, Ukrainian Pravda reported that Vladimir Putin told then-U.S. President George Bush at a closed session of the Russia-NATO Council: “You understand, George, that Ukraine is not even a state! What is Ukraine? Part of the territory is Eastern Europe, and part — a significant part — was a gift from us!”

Russians have been told that they make up the most authentic and spiritual nation, especially compared to the “stagnating West,” beyond comparison with failed, doomed states such as Ukraine. Another Putin quote, uttered during a live TV exchange with Russian citizens in December 2010, was the claim that Russia could have emerged as the victor in World War II even without any Ukrainian assistance. “We still would have won, because we are a country of winners.”

By the beginning of 2014’s “hot” war in Ukraine, the vast majority of Russians and some Russian-speaking Ukrainian citizens were convinced that Russia had a unique historical mission that consisted of eliminating historical injustice and recreating the “Russian world,” including the territory of Ukraine, which would and could never be an independent state.

Alternative reality

The creation of an alternative reality by Russian media began when it became evident that the Maidan demonstrations that formed at the end of 2013 would not dissipate of their own accord and could not be easily dispersed. This is when a dissonance appeared between the reality that exists in the physical world and the alternative reality that exists in the minds of gullible viewers of the Russian mass media.

In any case, the Russian media have disregarded accuracy or diligence in reporting. There can be no comparison with Soviet propaganda, which strived not to be too obvious in its deception. Stock photographs of military action from all over the world are presented as recent images from Ukraine, interviews are given by nonexistent experts or straw men, and concepts and terms are confused to produce ambiguous connotations. The Russian mass media, for example, make ubiquitous use of the term “the junta in Kiev,” which bears no relation to reality, because a junta is intended to mean a paramilitary gang that has taken power by force, following a coup d’etat.

To shape this alternative reality, the Russian mass media appears to follow the maxim “worse is better.” Take, for example, the story on pan-Russian TV channel Perviy Kanal about the young boy allegedly crucified in Slavyansk. According to the false story, when the Ukrainian military entered the town, they rounded up all the local residents in the main square, where they supposedly publicly executed the wife and young son of a rebel. The boy was crucified on the local bulletin board, while the woman was lashed to a tank and dragged through the streets until dead. To debunk such myths, a special website was created in Russian and English: www.stopfake.org.

The alternative reality, created by the Russian mass media, can be summarized as follows: as a result of an anti-constitutional coup d’état in Kiev, a junta came to power, which unleashed a war against objectors residing in Novorossiya, or New Russia. Mass genocide was conducted against the peaceful Russian-speaking population; benderovtsy and zhidobenderovtsy from the ultra-right-wing Praviy Sektor and Natsgvardiya, the latest generation in a line of Nazis and fascists, have shown particular cruelty.

In this phrase, we see the main cliches that have been driven into the mass consciousness of Russians and pro-Russian residents of Ukraine: the “junta in Kiev,” Novorossiya, “genocide of the Russian-speaking population,” “benderovtsy,” “zhidobenderovtsy,” Praviy sektor and the Natsgvardiya. All these cliches are negative, except Novorossiya, and all deserve some explanation.
• Novorossiya: the southeast areas of Ukraine, which according to Putin and Russian propaganda, have a different language and culture than the rest of Ukraine, and for this reason must have a special status, up to and including the formation of an independent state.

• Benderovtsy originally referred to members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, a World War II era nationalist group, headed by Stepan Bandera. The Soviet Union began using this term to paint all Ukrainian nationalists with the same, extremely negative, association. Russian propaganda currently uses the term synonymously with “Nazis” and “fascists.”

• The term zhidobenderovtsy was the invention of Russian propaganda to designate ethnic Jews who support Ukraine in the war with Russia (a salient example is Igor Kolomoisky, billionaire governor of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast). The term is a blatant oxymoron even under the logic of Russian propaganda, as the benderovtsy are by definition Nazis with an inherent hatred of Jews, whom they attempted to eliminate.

• Praviy sektor is a political party and public organization that first appeared as an open movement of activists from radical Ukrainian organizations—mostly with right-wing views—that crystallized at the end of November 2013 during the Euromaidan. According to Russian media, Praviy Sektor, together with the Natsgvardiya, is a “punitive” organization that exploits any opportunity to annihilate peaceful Russian-speaking residents and “rebels” fighting for Novorossiya.

Spreading panic
If the tools for creating an alternative reality are the traditional media and Internet resources, the spreading of panic among people living in Ukraine is performed mainly via social media, because the main Russian media in Ukraine are forbidden since they were declared to be in violation of Ukrainian legislation. Panic is associated with two main themes:

• “Ukrainian soldiers were betrayed/are being slain in huge numbers.” Information supporting this thesis has regularly been released since the beginning of military action and follows the same pattern: A soldier from the war zone calls his wife, sister, mother, brother or friend and reports that a group has been abandoned by their commanders without munitions or food and have been surrounded by the enemy for a long time — many have been killed and no one is doing anything to save them. It would be unjust not to confirm that several such incidents did indeed take place, but the phenomenon has not been as universal as Russian-backed reports attempt to indicate. The next step includes appeals to the mothers and wives of warriors to “collect” them from the war zone, or not allow others to go there, which on several occasions provoked protests that sealed off recruitment centers and blocked roads.

• “Russian troops are going to occupy our area in the coming days.” This topic is popular in eastern and southern areas where separatism is typical for the local population. One version includes messages reporting greater activity by separatists in one town or other, numbering in the thousands and ready at any moment to seize administrative buildings and create another “popular republic.”

The goals of spreading panic are: first, to undermine confidence in the current Ukrainian authorities; second, to reduce the ability for rational thought and boost fatalistic thinking; third, to reinforce tensions between pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian residents of Ukraine.

Conclusion
Generally speaking, information war, as a whole, is aimed at building an alternative reality, within which the enduring image of an enemy is formed — an enemy whose qualities and actions deny him the right to be considered human and who, therefore, must be annihilated without mercy or hesitation. Therefore, the strategy behind hybrid war coincides with that of information war, rather than total war. In other words, the goal of military action in a hybrid war is not to capture or hold territory, but chaos, constant fighting and endless provocation by creating engineered military incidents — one more characteristic element of information and hybrid wars. Such incidents are intended exclusively for reproduction by TV cameras — the action often ceases immediately after the news cameras leave while the instigators vanish from the scene, according to a June 2014 article in Ukrainian Pravda.

This also means that a hybrid war can never be won if there is no victory in the information war. Ukraine is currently losing this war to Russia, although actions already taken do offer grounds for cautious optimism. Russian TV channels can no longer broadcast in Ukraine, terrorist and separatist websites are blocked, and volunteers are building special sites and social media accounts to debunk disinformation. Such responses are sufficient to minimize the information threat in the short term, if not eliminate it altogether. ☐
The Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) was founded in 2007 as the umbrella organization for regional cooperation in Southeast Europe (SEE). Its primary mission is to promote European and Euro-Atlantic integrations in the region. It supports and coordinates cooperation among the countries in the region as well as between the region and the countries, organizations and institutions that support the European and Euro-Atlantic perspectives of Southeast Europe.

RCC is the successor of the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe, created in 1999 to assist SEE states to overcome the consequences of a decade of conflicts and to foster peace, cooperation, democracy building and economic reconstruction. The Stability Pact was an internationally driven and led approach that brought the SEE countries together and engaged them in a comprehensive cooperative process.

As security, political, economic and social conditions improved throughout the region and SEE countries enhanced institutionalized relationships with the European Union, it became possible for them to lead regional cooperation. Hence, the Stability Pact transformed into the RCC, which inherited its mission of promoting integration of SEE countries into European and Euro-Atlantic structures. It retained the same participation of regional and international community actors, but with a substantial difference: Unlike the Stability Pact, the RCC is a regionally owned and led organization.

The RCC operates under the political guidance of the Southeast Europe Cooperation Process and has 46 participants that include countries, international organizations and international financial institutions. The organization receives operational guidance and supervision from the RCC board — a group formed from participants that contribute financially to the RCC budget as well as the EU, which is represented by the Office of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and by a representative of the European Commission.

The day-to-day work of the RCC is supported by the RCC secretariat in Sarajevo and its liaison office in Brussels, in coordination with European Council and European Commission structures.

WHAT IT DOES

Following the changes and developments the region went through over the years, the focus of the work of the RCC has continuously evolved and adjusted to the needs and challenges of the region, but it has always included the promotion of confidence building; consolidation of peace, stability and security, democratization of institutions and the societies of the SEE; respect for minority and human rights; and last but not least, economic development and prosperity.

The organization develops and maintains close working relationships with all relevant actors and stakeholders, including governments, international organizations, international financial institutions, regional organizations, civil society and the private sector, as well as with relevant regional task forces and initiatives active in specific thematic areas of regional cooperation.

The areas of cooperation include economic and social development, energy and infrastructure, justice
and home affairs, security cooperation, and building human capital. Cross-cutting issues such as parliamentary cooperation, media development, civil society activities and gender mainstreaming are also covered.

Further improvements in Southeast Europe, particularly in the Western Balkans, and the maturity the organization achieved over years, led to significant developments in the RCC.

At the political level, the start of normalisation of relations between Belgrade and Pristina and their EU-facilitated agreement on regional representation enabled Kosovo* to become an RCC participant and the RCC to become the first all-inclusive organization in SEE. This event paved the way for similar ongoing adjustments to all other regional structures and mechanisms.

At the operational level, with the adoption of the RCC Strategy and Work Program 2014-2016 and the endorsement of the Southeast Europe 2020 Strategy (SEE 2020) in November 2013, the RCC was transformed from a program implementation-level organization to a strategy implementation-level organization. These two documents constitute the basis upon which the RCC structures its work with stakeholders in the region and abroad. In line with its mission of promoting European and Euro-Atlantic integration, the RCC is particularly focused on the EU enlargement process in the Western Balkans, supporting reforms that will prepare them for EU membership.

GROWTH AND EMPLOYMENT

The SEE 2020 strategy came into being as a timely response to the need for a more coordinated, regional answer to ongoing economic and financial troubles. The EU has already addressed the issues of acting in a coordinated and concerted manner. Over the past several years, the EU has developed a number of strategies, including Europe 2020, that may have been of different geographical scope, but target issues of sustainable growth, poverty and integration.

Although with a confirmed European perspective, and despite its economic underdevelopment coupled with the hard consequences inflicted by the economic crisis, the Western Balkans region is not yet part of the main European growth framework. While the achievement of accession criteria and the preparations for future membership suggest that Europe 2020 policy goals and implementation methods are relevant to enlargement countries, its strategy and targets, including 75 percent employment and 3 percent of gross domestic product invested in research and development, are not automatically applicable to the SEE and the Western Balkans. It needed to be adjusted to the region’s situation and needs and turned into a realistic, credible and implementable document.

Against this background, the RCC took a new role and new responsibilities. Peace, stability and reconciliation used
to be the number one priority at the time of the RCC’s inception and the RCC’s key role was to build confidence through regional cooperation. These matters remain high on our agenda, but the key priority has shifted to promoting economic development, job creation and competitiveness, without which stability and security would be at risk.

In November 2011, the region’s economic ministers tasked the RCC with coordinating the drafting of a strategy that, through a concerted action, would push forward the European integration agenda of SEE candidate and potential candidate countries. The RCC delivered.

The SEE 2020 strategy “Jobs and Prosperity in a European Perspective” was endorsed on behalf of the respective regional governments by the Ministerial Conference of the South East Europe Investment Committee in Sarajevo in November 2013. Its creation was the result of intense consultations with over 1,500 representatives of governments, regional initiatives and mechanisms, the private sector and civil society organizations.

Since then, cooperation in SEE has been based on clearly defined objectives and measurable targets. It is focused on areas of highest potential for joint action and results, and its implementation by sector is properly coordinated by agreed mechanisms that also monitor delivery of results. The regional governments have clearly recognized their common interests in trade, investment, transport and energy and have decided to cooperate in these areas. SEE 2020 makes such cooperation smarter, more targeted and more strategic.

SEE 2020 Strategy is inspired by the EU’s Europe 2020. The two strategies have some common elements but differ when it comes to integrated growth and economic governance. This is the difference between accession countries and EU member states — the need to integrate their economies and improve economic governance and government efficiency, SEE 2020 focuses more intensely on economic growth and employment since these are the most critical issues for SEE countries.

DETAILS OF SEE 2020

As the SEE 2020’s strategy suggests, it aims at narrowing the existing differences between the economies of the enlargement countries and the EU average, so that EU candidates and potential candidates are better prepared to face the challenges of the accession process. To address the core challenges, SEE 2020 is based on these five pillars:

- Smart growth — emphasizing education, innovation, research and development, culture and the creative sector
- Sustainable growth — ensuring economic sustainability through enterprise creation and increased export, as well as energy efficiency and climate control
- Inclusive growth — supporting employment generation, social inclusion, good health and well-being
- Integrated growth — promoting closer regional integration in terms of trade and investment
- Good governance for growth — highlighting effective public services and the fight against corruption.

The RCC will continue to help implement SEE 2020 at the national level, coordinate joint efforts at the regional level, and monitor and report progress. The RCC Secretariat acts as the catalyst for processes that should generate growth and employment in our region and bring candidate and potential candidate countries of the region closer to the EU.

In this context, in January 2014, the RCC began working closely with the regional governments to prepare for the National Action Plans. Given the remarkable challenges, time constraints and insufficient institutional capacities at the local level, the RCC engaged qualified technical assistance to support governmental institutions. The six SEE 2020 beneficiary economies (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia) analyzed the present situation, prepared economic profiles and identified priorities in their government development plans that, while being implemented locally, would produce a positive effect at the regional level in one or more
of the five pillars of the SEE 2020 strategy.

A similar process and working method was established with the regional mechanisms that, with their expertise and their focus of operations (for instance trade and competitiveness, energy, transport, environments, etc.), are acting as “regional dimension coordinators.” As a result, 15 Regional Action Plans were prepared, covering the five SEE 2020 strategy pillars.

IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING

In parallel, the RCC has worked closely with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development to prepare a comprehensive monitoring system with a rich grid of quantitative and qualitative indicators that would enable the RCC and all stakeholders to assess progress achieved, but also the problems encountered and the areas where the individual economies or the region as a whole would lag behind. This would enable a thorough analysis and eventually propose policy adjustments and make it possible that for a strategy target to be reached while keeping the right balance between ambitions and realities.

National action plans, regional action plans and the monitoring system of the SEE 2020 strategy implementation have been presented in the form of the “Southeast Europe 2020 Baseline Report: Towards Regional Growth,” endorsed in June 2014 at the first meeting of the Governing Board of SEE 2020. RCC will report annually on SEE 2020 implementation progress, starting with the first report due in June 2015.

While making sure that SEE 2020 implementation remains a substantial and value-added process, the RCC is also ensuring full transparency. All documents related to SEE 2020, from the draft strategy document to the most recent baseline report, with all other implementation reports, are available on the RCC website (www.rcc.int).

To make this even more transparent and useful, the RCC has prepared the SEE 2020 Scoreboard, an interactive tool available to everyone through the website, enabling interested parties to receive statistical information from each of the SEE economies or from the overall region. This tool makes it possible to compare the results achieved year after year for each of the Western Balkans economies, compare them, or receive information by regrouping their statistical data as wished.

The success of the RCC and of SEE 2020 will be measured by the degree of economic growth and its sustainability, and by the progress of SEE countries toward EU accession. Our job will be done when the entire region becomes a part of the EU.

*This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.
Moldova and its people have traveled a difficult road since breaking from the Soviet Union in 1991. The newly independent country got off to a rough start, as a separatist conflict was already brewing and broke into open warfare in early 1992. The violence was relatively short-lived, but a frozen conflict remains, and Moldova lacks control of over 10 percent of its territory. The country has struggled with problems many other post-Soviet nations face: underdevelopment, corruption, decaying infrastructure, nationalism, ethnic unrest and excessive emigration. But Moldova, rated the poorest country in Europe, has lacked resources to tackle many of these problems.

The future could be brighter. A much anticipated Association Agreement was signed with the European Union on June 27, 2014, and the Parliament ratified the agreement in record time five days later. The government is eager to move forward with European integration not only because of the economic benefits, but also because it fears Russia will try to foil that process. As hard as the government has worked to implement reforms and meet other EU requirements, Moldovan leaders say that Russia and its sympathizers within Moldova have been working to block the agreement and draw the country into Russia’s sphere of influence.
Young protesters in Chisinau, Moldova, set fire to posters depicting a doctored image of Russian President Vladimir Putin in April 2014 after Russia annexed Ukraine's Crimea region.

THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
**ECONOMIC FREEDOM**

Moldova's economic situation has slowly improved as market-oriented reforms have taken root, and trade with the EU has increased. The economy grew 5 percent in 2013 and is expected to grow as a result of the Association Agreement. The agreement went into effect on September 1, 2014, and includes Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTA) that lower or remove tariffs on multiple goods, open services markets and make Moldova more attractive to investors.

The country's economy is primarily agricultural and service oriented — the majority of industry inherited from the Soviet era is located in separatist Transnistria. Moldova has suffered from protectionist agricultural trade policies in the EU, Russia and Ukraine, according to Anders Åslund of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, an expert in transitioning post-Communist economies. “Being dominated by agriculture, it has been more vulnerable than any other post-Communist country,” he wrote in *The Moscow Times* in 2012. The new agreements remove EU trade barriers, and the EU is already Moldova's largest trading partner, accounting for 54 percent of total trade in 2013. Russia's share has plummeted to about 25 percent.

As with Ukraine, the Kremlin wants Moldova in its own economic club, the Moscow-run Eurasian Union, and is willing to use whatever tools available to succeed, including trade embargoes, threatening natural gas cut-offs, support for separatism and political interference. “Moldova presents a striking contrast to neighboring Romania,” an April 2014 *Foreign Affairs* article noted. “Although Romania has grown swiftly within the European Union, Moldova has languished outside of it, a hostage to Russian foreign policy.”

Russia has tried to exploit Moldova's trade vulnerability through embargoes on Moldovan agriculture. Moscow embargoed wine — Moldova's biggest export — in September 2013 as a less than subtle warning against initialing the EU Association Agreement in November of that year at the EU Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius. (Simultaneous pressure caused Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych to back out of Ukraine's EU agreement at that same summit, sparking the protests that led to his downfall and Ukraine's ongoing crisis with Russian-backed separatists.) And in June 2014, Russia announced an embargo on Moldovan fruit in retaliation for signing the agreement.

The DCFTA's and Russia's punitive trade policies should accelerate the trade realignment. Nicu Popescu of the EU Institute for Security Studies predicted that the Association Agreement and DCFTA would fundamentally change the environment and be “politically and economically irreversible,” according to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

**RUSSIAN LEVERAGE — ENERGY, JOBS AND FROZEN CONFLICT**

Russia, of course, still has a trump card — natural gas. As with much of Eastern Europe (and some of Western Europe), Moldova is dependent on Russian gas, which makes up 65 percent of its energy supply. All of its gas is supplied by Russian state gas company Gazprom. Then Romanian President Traian Basescu told U.S.-based security consultancy Stratfor in 2014 that Gazprom is more dangerous than the Russian Army as a policy weapon.

To diversify Moldova's gas supply, a new pipeline was opened in September 2014, connecting Moldova to the Romanian gas network. However, the pipeline has a limited capacity and supplies gas to only one border district. The government hopes to extend the pipeline to Chisinau in two years, according to Business New Europe. As of October, gas deliveries were stalled because the Moldovan government had yet to reach an agreement on supplying Romanian gas with MoldovaGaz, the monopoly gas supplier, which is 50 percent owned by Gazprom and 13.4 percent by the Russian-backed separatist government in Transnistria, further complicating efforts to get out from under Gazprom's thumb.

Russia can apply pressure through Moldovans who have migrated to Russia for work. Not only is Moldova the poorest country in Europe, with the World Bank estimating a 2013 per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of less than $4,700, it also has the highest emigration rate. About one-quarter of Moldova's citizens and half its workforce live abroad and send home remittances, which World Bank data indicate represent about 25 percent of GDP. As many as 300,000 work in Russia, and according to The Associated Press, Russia has hinted that it may consider expelling them, causing economic deprivation in Moldova.

The frozen conflict with Russian-backed Transnistria remains an impediment to Moldova's efforts to transition into a normal European society. When Russia annexed Ukraine's Crimea territory, Transnistria asked to be annexed as well, a move Moldova said was meant to escalate tensions. *Foreign Affairs* said that Russia obstructs settlement talks “every step of the way,” though Moscow has recently hinted that it would facilitate reintegration if Chisinau were to turn its back on the EU and join the Eurasian Union. With its nostalgia for Soviet symbols, monuments and military parades, Transnistria has been called a Soviet theme park, but Stratfor calls it “the kind of legally murky, ill-defined smugglers’ paradise that [Russian President Vladimir] Putin wants to see multiply in eastern Ukraine.”
‘LITTLE GREEN MEN’ AND ‘HYBRID WAR’
In late 2014, Moldovan leaders reported increasing Russian efforts to influence parliamentary elections and reverse economic integration with the EU. “Pro-Russian parties [primarily the Communists and Socialists] are hoping that sanctions and the threat of unrest will convince many Moldovans to vote against the pro-Western government and derail EU plans,” The Associated Press reported.

Vladimir Filat, former Moldovan prime minister and head of the ruling pro-European coalition’s largest party, told U.S. online newspaper The Daily Beast that Russian intelligence forces have spread throughout the country. They have burrowed into political parties and nongovernmental organizations while pro-Russian media bombard Russian-speaking Moldovans with Kremlin talking points 24 hours a day with the goal of destabilizing the country before the elections, Filat said.

For example, after frequent visits by Russian politicians, a recent referendum in the Gaugauz autonomous region, supported by the pro-Russian Communist Party, called for Moldova to reject the EU and instead join the Eurasian Union. Gaugauzia has increasingly been making noise about separation. There have been reports that numerous nonuniformed Russian personnel have been moved into Transnistria, reminiscent of the “hybrid warfare” tactics used in Crimea before invasion and annexation.

U.S. Gen. Philip Breedlove, NATO Supreme Commander, agrees. “On the flipside, to the little green men thing, we have clearly now seen the script play out in Crimea. We’ve seen the script play out in eastern Ukraine. We’re beginning to see some of the script in Moldova and Transnistria. And so we’re beginning to understand this whole track of how this hybrid war will be brought to bear,” he said in a speech to a multinational audience in Washington in September 2014.

CONCLUSION
Moldova has made a commitment to economic and political reform necessary to become part of the European community and rebuild its economy. A 2013 appraisal of progress by the European Commission found that Moldova did more than any of the other Eastern neighbors to push through reforms. In Åslund’s view, Moldova is the most democratic of the six countries in the EU’s Eastern Partnership.

Russia appears to be stoking fear and uncertainty to keep Moldova from moving forward. Successful implementation of the EU program will help alleviate many of the country’s problems. The Association Agreement will provide Moldova with markets for its exports, boosting foreign direct investment and domestic employment, Åslund said. This will also encourage the return of emigrants from Russia and elsewhere. Said Foreign Affairs: “Moldova today is balanced on a knife’s edge between a future as an impoverished, militarized Russian colony or as a beneficiary of EU integration and European values.”
The main roles and missions of military forces in today’s Western democracies are defined by politicians and include national defense and safeguarding national security interests globally.

Europeans understand that being prepared for territorial defense, i.e., defending national sovereignty, is no longer as critical as during the Cold War. Militaries have been given an important role in international crisis management to stabilize crisis areas and safeguard national security interests. Whether this common understanding is reflected in defense spending is a subject for another discussion.

On the first page of his book, What Should Armies Do?, Dr. Clarke raises the question: Do we need military forces — and if yes, what for? By doing so he captures what journalists, politicians and citizens have been thinking in the aftermath of the Cold War.

Warlike situations — the destabilization of whole regions not only causing tremendous human suffering but also touching global security — lead to a new understanding of the role of military and security forces.

History shows that military force alone never solves a crisis. A comprehensive approach is essential to establish and maintain peace and stability in a region. Here, military forces have a role to play, mostly to provide a minimum level of security. To do so, the traditional capabilities of military forces are no longer sufficient. In the aftermath of fighting, the military has to mitigate the catastrophe by providing at least the basic needs to the population until civil organizations can take over. That in turn means that military forces have to have capabilities reaching far beyond waging war.

These capabilities are especially important if nations use their military forces in different roles, such as supporting civil authorities.

At a time when nations are increasingly reluctant to send military forces abroad to take part in international crisis management, how can we make best use of this tremendously expensive instrument?

Of course, to demonstrate political dominance and control over military forces, these questions must be answered by governments, not military leaders. Politicians have to educate taxpayers about the roles of the military.

In terms of European militaries, a reader of Dr. Clarke’s book may get the impression that force reductions are caused just by financial shortfalls and the political attempt to cash the peace dividend after the fall of the Soviet Union. That is partly...
true. But equally important is the threat perception in Western Europe.

Despite developments in Ukraine, the territorial integrity of NATO nations doesn’t seem to be threatened. In such a scenario, it might seem reasonable to reduce and restructure military forces. Such a decision must be based on a prudent threat analysis and a clear definition of security needs. Each nation has to define the role and mission of its military.

With that in mind, it seems to be a common understanding that militaries have to fulfill missions in at least three general fields: territorial defense, international crisis management, and defense support to civil authorities (DSCA).

Dr. Clarke’s book offers an excellent overview of the roles, tasks and missions of militaries in the United States, Western Europe and beyond. He systematically lists what roles military forces may take in the future and the capabilities needed to fulfill these roles. He discusses the pros and cons of deploying and employing military forces at home and abroad.

The book is no recipe for the future use of military forces, but offers a variety of options, especially in the DSCA field. Precise and well-structured descriptions of DSCA missions provide guidelines for the employment of military forces in the clear understanding that each nation has to decide which option is appropriate and how military roles have to be adapted to national needs.

While Dr. Clarke, a U.S. citizen, provides a more or less U.S. point of view, I would like to offer European, and more specifically German, considerations.

Societies that have endured former governments using militaries as tools to suppress citizens will have major problems accepting fully equipped soldiers in the streets taking over law enforcement roles. The same is true if military surveillance is used domestically. Populations should never reach the conclusion that their governments are using military forces against them.

European societies hold strong feelings that crises cannot be solved by military operations alone. Maybe that is one reason why Europeans prefer diplomatic, economic or social approaches to crisis management. Though often indispensable in the early stages of a crisis, the use of military force is only one tool.

As Dr. Clarke explains, military forces have many capabilities qualifying them as first responders at major accidents and disasters. Whenever other responders are no longer capable of handling a situation, military forces, with their short reaction times, may step in. Many nations have clear regulations and procedures about the role and status of military forces in this field.

Involving military forces in long term consequence management may cause different problems. First, as Dr. Clarke states, military forces are not trained and equipped for consequence management, and being involved there makes them unavailable for their main tasks.

One also must consider that military forces doing consequence management take away jobs and income from civil enterprises/organizations. An increased military role might easily result in massive protests, including from unions.

Dr. Clarke correctly states that “… military should avoid any engagement that goes beyond its statutory or customary role that is not of an emergency nature or that does not require a unique capability that only the military possesses. ... In sum, the military should be called upon when other options have failed or are not available, in circumstances that are clearly not of routine nature.”

This book is a must-read for political decision-makers and/or their advisors who are in charge of the deployment and employment of military forces, both internally and externally. It may serve as a foundation in this field and a starting point for discussions in the never-ending transformation of military forces. □
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CNIT 15-8
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*Next course date to be determined.
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The three-week seminar aims at systematically analyzing the character of the example crises, the impact of regional actors, as well as the effects of international assistance measures. SRS 15-5 will concentrate on two traditionally unstable regions, looking at actual conflicts in the regions and efforts to achieve stability.

STACS 15-6
June 10 - July 1, 2015

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STACS provides civil security professionals involved in transnational civil security an in-depth look at how nations can effectively address domestic security issues that have regional and international impact. The three-week seminar examines best practices for ensuring civil security and preventing, preparing for and managing the consequences of domestic, regional, and international crises and disasters. The STACS will be offered once in FY 2015.

SES 15-9
Sept. 14 - 18, 2015

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This intensive five-day seminar focuses on new topics of key global interest that will generate new perspectives, ideas and cooperative discussions and possible solutions. Participants include general officers, senior diplomats, ambassadors, ministers, deputy ministers and parliamentarians. The SES includes formal presentations by senior officials and recognized experts followed by in-depth discussions in seminar groups.

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SSCB 15-2
Jan. 22 - Feb. 12, 2015*

*Next course date to be determined.

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