The Scourge of Illicit Trafficking
ON THE COVER
Illicit trafficking spans Europe and Central Asia and includes not just the smuggling of illegal narcotics but the exploitation of women and undocumented laborers. Defeating global problems such as drug and human trafficking demands a multinational approach.
The Opening of Albania
By Nikoll Ndoci, director of Migration and Readmission, Albanian Ministry of the Interior
Managing borders in the Western Balkans is a multinational task.

The Threat of Methamphetamine
By Marnix van Gelderen, Marshall Center alumnus
Producers in North America and Asia have spread this highly addictive drug around the globe.

COOPERATION
42 Base of Operations: The Internet
Violent extremists lurking online are a threat to Europe and Central Asia.

46 Arteries of Prosperity: Railroads and Pipelines
An increase in European-Chinese trade is enriching Central Asian states.

SECURITY
50 Examining Immigration Policy
The European Union proposes a more centralized approach to dealing with migration.

54 The Need for NATO
By Marshall Center Macedonian Alumni Association
Reforms inspired by NATO and the EU have increased stability in the Western Balkans.

POLICY
58 Exporting Caspian Gas
The Trans-Adriatic Pipeline is designed to diversify European gas supplies.

62 Open Skies
Multinational aerial military inspections make the world safer.
Welcome to the 17th issue of *per Concordiam*. This issue centers on illicit trafficking, including drug and human trafficking, which are two primary sources of illicit revenue for transnational organized crime. Many of the articles in this issue describe illicit trafficking in different regions and corresponding institutional responses, including the use of interagency partnerships at the national level and the formation of international partnerships.

Transnational organized crime presents more than a significant national security threat — it also weakens regional and global security. There is a growing recognition that transnational organized crime is flourishing in a time of rapid globalization. Improvements in communication, transportation and international commerce permit criminal networks to flourish in ways that can outpace any single nation’s capacity to counteract them. Criminal networks can leverage commercially available information technology to communicate, take advantage of increased throughput on improved transportation networks, and exploit new open borders between countries. The threats posed by criminal networks are increased when considered in the context of their linkages with corruption and terrorist networks. Therefore, regional, transnational and collaborative approaches to combating these threats must be adopted and refined over time.

The development of a Marshall Center academic program on Countering Narcotics and Illicit Trafficking (CNIT) forms part of our collective response to the threats posed by transnational organized crime. In April 2014, the CNIT program at the Marshall Center conducted a two-week-long resident strategic studies course on illicit trafficking. Our goal is to familiarize military and law enforcement practitioners and their policymaker counterparts with threats to national, regional and global security posed by transnational organized crime. Equally important will be discussions on ways to counter these illicit networks and their sources of support. We aim to develop a strong, collaborative network of CNIT alumni who can actively participate in periodic community-of-interest meetings at the Marshall Center. Our goal is for participants to share effective methods, learn from each other and discuss emerging trends related to transnational crime and illicit trafficking.

In addition to helping participants understand the threat, our goal is that the CNIT program provide a forum for military and law enforcement leaders and policymakers to explore ways to counter illicit trafficking through the development of new policies and strategies. Improving cooperation between agencies at the national level and striving for whole-of-government approaches to counter illicit trafficking can lead to improved international cooperation. As international cooperation increases, we anticipate improving coordination for investigations and increasing levels of prosecutions of transnational criminal networks. Working together as nations and organizations, we can reduce the level of transnational organized crime throughout Europe, Asia and the world.

We welcome your comments and perspective on these topics and will include your responses in future editions of the journal. Please feel free to contact us at editor@perconcordiam.org

Sincerely,

Keith W. Dayton
Director
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per Concordiam magazine addresses security issues relevant to Europe and Eurasia and aims to elicit thoughts and feedback from readers. We hope our previous issues accomplished this and helped stimulate debate and an exchange of ideas. Please continue to share your thoughts with us in the form of letters to the editor that will be published in this section. Please keep letters as brief as possible and specifically note the article, author and magazine edition to which you are referring. We reserve the right to edit all letters for language, civility, accuracy, brevity and clarity.

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Drugs and Terror

Corruption and permissiveness enable the confluence of criminal and terrorist groups

By Michael A. Braun, SGI Global, LLC

Drug traffickers and terrorist groups are converging at a faster rate than most world leaders comprehend. The nexus is not an entirely new phenomenon; executives of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) have testified before the U.S. Congress on many occasions in the past 40 years regarding the important part that drugs play in funding terrorist and insurgent organizations.

When experts debated the confluence of drugs and terror before the September 11, 2001, attacks on the U.S., they were usually discussing terrorist and insurgent groups based in the Western Hemisphere: the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the Colombian National Liberation Army (ELN), the remnants of the United Self Defense Forces (AUC) in Colombia, and the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) of Peru. Alarming, those groups have now been joined by the likes of Hezbollah, Hamas, the Taliban and al-Qaida, to name a few.

The DEA has conservatively linked more than half the 51 U.S. designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) to one or more aspects of the global drug trade. That number is likely far greater, considering the myriad ways to make billions of dollars annually in the industry. Illicit revenue can be generated by taxing farmers, the movement of drugs and precursor chemicals across borders, and the finished product, as well as providing security services to cartels at clandestine laboratories, cache sites and airstrips, and the actual manufacture, transportation and distribution of drugs.

Corruption and permissive environments are the most important enablers of this growing phenomenon. To understand this trend, we must first understand why so many terror groups are turning to drug trafficking and other transnational crime.

Why Drugs?

FTOs are increasingly turning to the global drug trade to fund their operations, and to a lesser degree, other transnational criminal activity because the world community has been successful in combating terrorism. Generally speaking, there are three reasons for this trend:

• State sponsorship of terrorist organizations has declined;
• Security forces continue to disrupt the flow of private funding to terrorist organizations;
• Security forces have disturbed the ability of groups such as al-Qaida to effectively direct and manage their cells and nodes around the globe. Consequently, operational cells have been left to their own devices to plan, fund and execute their operations, with many of them resorting to drug trafficking.

Terrorist organizations engage in numerous transnational crimes. However, international drug trafficking generates far more revenue than other activities. The United Nations estimates that the global drug trade generates about $325 billion annually. By comparison, human trafficking — the second most lucrative illicit global market — generates approximately $32 billion each year and the illicit global arms trade generates about $10 billion.
Although these statistics are debated and disputed by experts, most of them agree that the profits made from the global drug trade are massive and dwarf all other sources of contraband revenue.

**Strategic Implications**

FTOs and drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) work aggressively to create permissive environments in areas of geographic importance to their operational success. They both rely heavily on the hallmarks of organized crime—corruption, intimidation and violence—to carve out strategically important territories that may cover entire countries, a region within a country, or lucrative border regions encompassing land held by two or more countries. Geographic regions destabilized by drug cartels and terrorist organizations are referred to as “ungoverned” or “undergoverned space.”

FTOs and DTOs thrive in permissive environments and invest hundreds of millions of dollars annually to disrupt good governance in these territories by relentlessly undermining the rule of law. They employ calculated corruption campaigns targeting law enforcement, prosecutors, judges and prison officials, military and intelligence forces, and politicians at all levels. A few examples of permissive environments include the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of South America, a no-man’s land where the borders of Paraguay, Argentina and Brazil meet; vast regions of West and North Africa; Afghanistan and its remote eastern and western borders; Bolivia; Venezuela; and certain areas of Mexico.

Hezbollah operatives based in the TBA routinely ship multi-ton quantities of cocaine to Europe, the Middle East and elsewhere via West and North Africa. The recent U.S. Department of Treasury findings against the Beirut-based Lebanese Canadian Bank, resulting from a complex, long-term and still active international conspiracy investigation by the DEA, paints a troubling picture of Hezbollah’s meteoric rise in the global cocaine trade. DEA evidence revealed that Hezbollah laundered as much as $200 million dollars a month through the Lebanese Canadian Bank. The source of that money: Hezbollah’s cocaine trafficking.

DEA Special Agents and the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan, supported by International Security Assistance Force military and U.S. Department of State assets, raided a notorious heroin trafficker’s compound in remote eastern Afghanistan near the Pakistan border. The trafficker was reportedly one of the five founding fathers of the Taliban Ruling Shura in Kabul. His drug ledgers seized in the raid revealed that he had sold more than $170 million dollars of heroin in less than one year—81 metric tons of the poison.

These are just two examples that clearly show the bottom line—no other transnational crime trumps the global drug trade for generating cold hard cash, and corruption and permissive environments make it possible. However, when an area is occupied simultaneously by FTOs and DTOs, it creates even more dangerous threats that are more strategic. This milieu has created opportunities for operatives from FTOs and DTOs to come together—dangerously close together.

For example, the FARC, designated an FTO by the U.S., the EU and many other countries, has established a solid foothold in places such as Guinea-Bissau in West Africa, along with other Colombian drug cartels and powerful Mexican drug syndicates. These groups are vying for this extremely valuable piece of global drug trafficking real estate, which serves as an important transit point for billions of dollars of cocaine destined for the ever-expanding markets of Western Europe, Russia and other countries.

Remarkably, few terrorism experts seem to be troubled by the fact that places like Guinea-Bissau and the TBA are also occupied by AL-Qaeda, Hezbollah and Hamas. It is likely that operatives from these FTOs and DTOs, who often occupy the same space at the same time, are developing relationships, forming alliances and sharing lessons learned.

In many places, operatives from FTOs and DTOs frequent the same bars, hotels and brothels. And what else are they doing? Based on more than 38 years in U.S. federal law enforcement and the security sector, I assure you they are talking business and sharing lessons learned. They are developing close interpersonal relationships, tempered and honed in the harshest and most dangerous environments, that will undoubtedly evolve into strategically important interorganizational relationships tomorrow when many of the ruthless young operatives who have been dispatched to these ungoverned regions ascend into key leadership positions within their respective organizations.

We have long known that groups such as AL-Qaeda and Hezbollah sometimes work together when their interests converge. However, what do we do when they have the ability to collaborate closely with a group such as the FARC that already dominates the world’s cocaine trade and possesses longstanding ties with groups such as Mexico’s Sinaloa cartel?

The threat posed by corruption and permissive environments is compounded by relationships between these groups that typically emerge out of necessity. In Guinea-Bissau, for example, the Colombian and Mexican cartels have teamed with indigenous organized crime groups and others such as Tuareg nomads who have controlled smuggling routes through the Sahara for centuries. The Latin drug cartels forged these relationships out of necessity as they built a cocaine transshipment infrastructure in West Africa. Historically, indigenous organized crime syndicates
in places such as West Africa are unsophisticated, but they are now learning from the most complex global organized crime cartels that have ever existed, the Colombian and Mexican DTOs.

The Latin cartels are paying indigenous organized crime groups with cocaine for their services to help smuggle multi-ton drug shipments through West and North Africa into Europe. This has resulted in the creation of new cocaine and crack cocaine markets in West Africa, where homegrown groups can set and control retail market prices with the product they have received as payment, expand into surrounding countries, and further corrupt already weak governments.

Similar to what we witnessed in Colombia several years ago, we are beginning to see what I refer to as “synergistic destabilization of government” in Afghanistan and other parts of the world where FTOs and DTOs occupy the same space at the same time. When terrorist groups stage successful attacks against a government and its security forces, the DTOs benefit as well; and when drug cartels destabilize government through physical attacks, or through well-planned corruption campaigns, the FTOs benefit just as much as organized crime. Unless confronted head-on, it is a vicious, never-ending circle that further degrades already weak governance and most often results in a total security collapse — all precisely planned and promoted by those who stand to gain the most by creating degenerate environments.

Conclusion

Although the confluence of organized crime and terrorist groups and insurgencies is widely recognized, agencies that deal with law enforcement, security and intelligence remain behind the curve in confronting this threat. In a global environment where nations struggle to counter numerous threats, persistent criminal activity thriving in corrupt environments weakens the legitimacy of governments and judicial systems and faith in their own officials. Coupled with terrorists and insurgents feeding on illicit activity, and in some cases morphing into exclusively criminal organizations themselves, the potential for further destabilization of weak states and catastrophic attacks developing in ungoverned and weakly governed spaces challenges law enforcement, security, and military officials globally.

Despite the need for extensive cooperation between intelligence, law enforcement, and military officials, institutional divides persist. Within many of these agencies, separate counterterrorism and counternarcotics directorates pursue separate goals, objectives, policies, and most troublesome, unique funding streams. These directorates remain “stovepiped” 12 years after the 2001 terrorist attacks, as the convergence of drugs and terror continues to accelerate.

It is not in the best interest of global security to allow these threats to concommingle and collaborate anywhere in the world. Terrorist organizations will become stronger by developing alliances with, and learning from, organized crime groups that are far more sophisticated organizationally and operationally. International partners who have a real stake in this fight should do everything in their collective power to disrupt and ultimately dismantle these powerful threats in places such as Guinea-Bissau and the TBA. But we are not doing so. As the bad guys come closer together, the good guys seem to be drifting further apart.

Confluence represents a clarion call to law enforcement, security and military leaders around the world, as well as to policymakers. Global crime, often referred to as transnational crime, is a cross-border activity that demands strong cross-border cooperation to counter effectively. Too often, law enforcement and security agencies find the numerous obstacles to such cooperation daunting. In the past, law-enforcement and security agencies have proven themselves capable to take on global criminal networks when they have sufficient political will and resources behind them. Colombia and the way they worked with its global partners to confront the powerful drug cartels provides such an example.

Law enforcement and security agencies must exchange information to develop concerted investigations, takedowns and prosecution of these networks. Cross-border cooperation is, simply put, hard work. It requires the investment of time, creativity and political motivation to overcome obstacles presented by borders and differing legal and administrative systems. Developing networks of prosecution across borders is another critical piece in the equation. In the United States, the military provides valuable support to civilian law enforcement authorities via legal authorities that permit such activity, in areas such as airlift, analytical support, manpower and specialized training.

Transnational organized crime and organized criminal groups will constantly find new areas of crime to engage in and new sources of profit. The same is true for terrorists and insurgents. Law-enforcement and security agencies must constantly study criminal behavior, exchange ideas and best practices and cooperatively develop new policies and strategies. With the right commitment of determination and resources, law-enforcement initiatives can turn confluence into an opportunity to dismantle these criminal networks and, as a bonus, take on the corrupt officials who allow them to flourish.
A Multinational Approach to Stopping Drugs

German police have a history of partnerships to combat heroin and methamphetamine trafficking.
The very open borders that make Europe the envy of the world also provide opportunities for criminals who traffic in drugs. Stopping the flow of narcotics such as heroin and methamphetamine has required a multinational approach on the part of Europeans and their allies.

In Germany, the responsibility for thwarting drug trafficking resides with the Federal Criminal Police Office, the state Offices of Criminal Investigations and the criminal police stations of the local police headquarters. The Federal Criminal Police Office is the central agency for all criminal police forces as well as for information and intelligence exchange.\(^1\)

Since Germany is a federation of states, it is the responsibility of the states — the “Länder” — to authorize the objectives and responsibilities of their police forces; the states are in charge of law enforcement and threat protection, not the central government. But after September 11, 2001, new counterterrorism legislation was passed that granted certain federal agencies, such as customs and the federal police and in particular the Federal Criminal Police Office, limited investigative powers to enhance national security.

The State Office of Criminal Investigations is the law enforcement agency in charge of prosecuting certain serious offenses, specifically the illicit trafficking of narcotics in cases that go beyond the area of responsibility of a local police headquarters and are of state, national or international importance.\(^2\)

Consequently, the authority tasked with combating serious drug-related crime originating and/or committed in Bavaria is its State Office of Criminal Investigations. Only cases of illicit international narcotics or medical drugs trafficking that require investigation abroad may lead to shared jurisdiction with the federal criminal police.\(^3\)

OPENING BORDERS

On June 14, 1985, Germany, France and the Benelux countries signed an agreement in the border town of Schengen, Luxembourg, to establish a border-free travel zone throughout which authorized travelers could move freely without passport controls. This was the first step toward the abolition of controls along the common internal borders and toward the freedom of movement of people and goods within the Schengen zone. To reconcile free movement with security, border controls were relocated to the common external border. In addition, the Schengen Information System was set up — a highly specialized data bank enabling Schengen states to exchange data on certain categories of people and objects.

The Schengen zone doesn’t correspond exactly with the countries of the European Union (EU). Twenty-six states fully implement the Schengen Agreement, and some states — the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark — have maintained certain opt-outs. Four EU countries — Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia and Cyprus — are not yet participating. Bulgaria and Romania are experiencing structural and technical problems with border security and have so far been unable to protect the EU’s external border to the required extent. On the other hand, four non-EU countries — Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Switzerland — associate with Schengen by treaty. It appears that Croatia will implement the agreement in 2015, and Cyprus still has to solve its border issue with Northern Cyprus.

Although the abolition of 26 internal borders between Schengen states permits law-abiding citizens to enjoy free travel throughout Europe without controls, that same freedom of movement lets criminals transport illegal goods across the common external border.

THE BALKAN ROUTE

At the end of the 20th century, ethnic conflict in the Balkans attracted worldwide attention. The Balkans cover almost 550,000 square kilometers in Southeast Europe and have a population of about 55 million of different ethnic, cultural and political identities. In each Balkan country, democracy, the rule of law and new state structures are threatened by corruption and organized crime.
The shortest routes connecting Europe to Asia all run across the Balkan Peninsula. It has always served as a link between the continents, but also as a smuggling route for all kinds of illegal goods going from Asia and the Near and Middle East to Europe and vice versa. At present, these routes are used for the illegal trade and trafficking of narcotics, particularly heroin. The so-called Balkan route is a network of different subroutes. The most frequently used are:

- **Classic Route**: starting in Turkey and going through Bulgaria, Macedonia, Kosovo, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina to Western Europe;
- **Northern Route**: also starting in Turkey, then crossing the Black Sea and Ukraine or Bulgaria and Romania, and going toward Hungary, Austria and the Slovak Republic;
- **Southern Route**: going through Greece, Macedonia and Albania to Italy.

All these routes pass through at least one EU member state, so the gateway to Western Europe is wide open once criminals manage to cross the external border without detection.

Heroin smuggled into Western Europe is grown and produced in Afghanistan. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, three-quarters of the heroin trafficked worldwide comes from Afghanistan. Of approximately 106 tons that reach Europe every year, about 85 tons are transported along the Balkan route — 60 tons along the classic route and 25 tons along the southern route to meet the average demand of about 80 tons in western Europe.

**A STRATEGIC APPROACH**

To fight drug smuggling and illegal trafficking along international routes, Working Group South East was set up in 1972, initiated by the United States. One reason for this was that after the crackdown on heroin production and distribution rings in southern France, evidence emerged that morphine-base transports going from Turkey to illegal heroin laboratories in southern France were crossing into southern Germany. It was assumed Munich would serve as a meeting point for the organizers and a base where drug couriers were to be recruited. Some feared that after the so-called French Connection in Marseille was busted, illegal heroin production would move to Bavaria. Since about two-thirds of the heroin meant for consumption in the U.S. had come from France, it was necessary to avoid the emergence of a new large criminal network in Munich and Bavaria.

The Federal Criminal Police Office, the lead agency for international cooperation, left it to the Bavarian State Office of Criminal Investigations to set up the institutional framework for the cooperation desired by the U.S. As a result, a German-American working group to fight drug trafficking was founded. Initially, the German side was represented by members of the Bavarian State Office of Criminal Investigations, the Munich Customs Investigations Office, the then-Munich city police, the then-border police, the Federal Criminal Police Office and the State Office of Criminal Investigations of Baden-Wuerttemberg. On the U.S. side were representatives from the Customs Service, the Armed Forces, and the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, which today is called the Drug Enforcement Administration.

Over time, representatives from countries bordering Bavaria joined the initiative and, step by step, Working Group South East turned into an efficient international expert body of customs and police officers, including those from Southeast Europe. From the very beginning, the Bavarian State Office of Criminal Investigations has held the chairmanship and been responsible for the administration of this cooperative endeavor. The most recent participants come
from Switzerland, Bulgaria, Hungary and other states on the Balkan Peninsula or bordering it.

To fight illegal drug trafficking, the Working Group promotes exchanging information and sharing experiences and plans and coordinates joint enforcement operations along the southern route. The state police forces are kept up to date by the Bavarian State Office of Criminal Investigations and make regular random checks in the border area. These checks are called “dragnet control” and have proven effective in fighting drug trafficking in Bavaria.

Narcotics trafficking along the Balkan route continues to be a highly topical issue, as a recent case still under investigation by the Bavarian State Office of Criminal Investigations proves: Police seized a block of what looked like concrete that had been transported on a truck driven by an Albanian national. The block actually contained 684 kilograms of marijuana.

Apart from its commitment in Working Group South East, the Bavarian State Office of Criminal Investigations participates in other international and national committees dedicated to combating illegal narcotics trafficking.

CRYSTAL METH

A few years ago, the work of the narcotics squad of the Bavarian State Office of Criminal Investigations pointed to another transnational drug issue that was brought to our attention at an early stage: the crystal meth problem.

Crystal meth is a form of methamphetamine, part of a group of amphetamines composed of light crystalline substances (crystals up to 7 centimeters). Methamphetamine was first synthesized in Japan in 1893. From 1938 on, it was sold in Germany under the product name Pervitin.

During World War II, Pervitin, also called tank chocolate, was consumed by German soldiers as a stimulant to ward off fatigue. The drug reduces fear and enhances alertness and endurance, so it alleviated hunger and thirst and made soldiers more aggressive. Some Japanese kamikaze pilots used meth before they took off on their suicide missions. Pervitin was also used to set records that initially seemed impossible to achieve. With the help of the drug, Austrian climber Hermann Buhl was the first to climb the Nanga Parbat (8,126 meters) in the Himalayas in 1953.

For their own safety, police officers need to be aware of the negative effects of the drug: It is a strong stimulant, inflates self-confidence and can make people delusional and insensitive to pain. Crystal meth users tend to be violent. As one addiction specialist noted: “The longer they’ve been on the drug, the more aggressive they become.”

Crystal meth consumption quickly results in severe psychological dependence. Compared to amphetamine, concentrations of methamphetamine in the body are higher and accumulate over shorter periods, particularly in the brain. Crystal meth is highly addictive and ruins the body quickly.

Crystal meth addiction is easy to recognize. Users’ physical appearance declines rapidly, characterized by extreme weight loss and tooth decay. U.S. publications often show rotten teeth — “meth mouth” — which is partly a result of crystal meth addiction.

THE CZECH CONNECTION

Crystal meth is relatively easy to produce. Since 2009, its production has been in the hands of Vietnamese criminals running meth labs. These people, residents of the Czech Republic since the days of the Iron Curtain, sell the drug at so-called Vietnamese markets.

The profit margin for drug dealers is huge: Production of 1 gram of crystal meth costs between 3 and 4 euros, but...
once the drug is smuggled into Germany, it can sell for as much as 200 euros, although the average sales price in Bavaria is about 80 euros.

After initial difficulties and years of “awareness raising” among the Czech authorities, the issue was put on the political agenda. In February 2013, participants in the “Hof Dialogue” between Germany and the Czech Republic confirmed that drug-related crime along their common border was a top priority for interagency cooperation in exploring root causes.

Although the then-Czech government was committed to the issue, the October 2013 elections changed the composition of the Czech Parliament. It remains to be seen whether the joint declaration will still be relevant.

Jakub Frydrych, director of the National Anti-drug Central Office of the Criminal Police and Investigation Service of the Czech Republic, has declared his nation’s 38,000 crystal meth users the biggest drug-related problem. The number of meth addicts in the Czech Republic increases by about 2,000 each year, with much of that growth concentrated in the region of Bohemia that borders Saxony and Bavaria.

Crystal meth-related crime in the Czech Republic accounts for 54 percent of all drug offenses. According to estimates based on the quantities of medication containing pseudoephedrine sold in pharmacies, about 1.5 to 2 tons of crystal meth were produced in the Czech Republic in 2009. Crystal meth production on the basis of precursors purchased abroad (ephedrine and pseudoephedrine in their pure form, medication

### Amount of Seized Stimulants

2011

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<th>METRIC TONS</th>
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Amounts are noted for the countries with the largest seizures.

### Quantities of (Meth-) Amphetamine Seized in Germany, 2003-2012

(kilograms)

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<td>1283</td>
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Source: Federal Criminal Police Office
containing pseudoephedrine) does not figure in these estimates. Czech authorities estimated 2011 meth production within its borders at 4 to 4.5 tons, rising to about 6 tons in 2012-2013.

**SUMMARY**

Combating illicit drug trafficking and smuggling calls for cooperation at the political level among all states concerned, but it also requires cooperation in practical terms among their law enforcement agencies, particularly in transnational investigations and enforcement operations such as “controlled transports.”

But even if cooperation is good, one factor remains critical and should never be underestimated — time. Fighting drug-related crime is a long-term effort. Actions limited to days or months are insufficient. The example of Working Group South East proves that it takes a long-term commitment to achieve success.

Major drug crimes are difficult to detect, investigate and control. Producers, sellers and users usually maintain a conspiracy of silence. Therefore, police checks are required to find out whether crimes have been committed, which means that the drug squads’ clear-up rate always depends on the resources available. And the allocation of resources, in turn, depends on strategic and political priorities.

Because of users’ dependence on drugs and the craving for them, drug-related crime not only leads to further offenses directly or indirectly related to acquiring drugs, but entails enormous costs for national health care systems. Drug abuse can lead to death.

Another factor not to be overlooked: Consumption of certain narcotics may lead to a resurgence of diseases thought to be under relatively good control. In the U.S., for instance, crystal meth consumption in the city of San Francisco led to a dramatic increase in HIV infections among the male homosexual population. The same thing seems to be happening in London.

Drug abuse requires action. Efforts to combat the consumption of narcotics need to include society as a whole and, of course, the police. For decades, the Bavarian State Office of Criminal Investigations has been successful in containing the problem.

Europe’s open borders offer new freedom and opportunities to its citizens, but they also offer opportunities to criminal syndicates and offenders unthinkable in the days of regular border control. Nations need to strike the right balance between freedom and security, because if we give up security for the sake of freedom, we will lose both.7

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2. Cf. Art. 7, 3, 2 BayPOG.
5. A tactical enforcement action: random checks and searches of vehicles and persons in the border area and on “through roads,” i.e. international transit routes with cross border traffic, irrelevant of incidents and occurrences, Art. 13, 1, 5 BayPMG (Cf. Fn 3).
6. Dr. Hartel-Petri, doctor in charge of the addiction medicine ward at the Bayreuth county hospital.
7. An intentional inversion of Benjamin Franklin’s (1706 - 1790) quote: “Those who surrender freedom for security will not have, nor do they deserve, either one.”
A woman and child beg for money in Athens, Greece. Trafficked children are often used to elicit handouts from strangers.
Walking the streets of big cities in Greece, you can easily notice old, almost abandoned houses with red lights glowing from atop the doors. No one is standing out front and no name is written under the doorbell. Windows are always closed, and doors are half open. You cannot see what is going on inside but you can surely guess. On the next corner, a boy sits on the threshold of a block of flats. His face is dirty, his clothes are torn, and he isn’t wearing shoes. When he begs for a penny, he doesn’t look you in the eye. These examples occur in almost every big city in Greece. The only thing that varies is the intensity of the phenomena.

The situation in the Greek countryside is slightly different. Brothels and child beggars are not so conspicuous, but if you stroll by fields where crops are cultivated, you catch sight of dozens of men, women and sometimes children working there. They start at dawn, finish by sunset and rarely complain. These agricultural villages are usually too small to accommodate all the workers, so many live in tents and greenhouses near the fields.

The crime of trafficking in human beings (THB) is globally recognized as a form of modern-day slavery. The definitions of human trafficking and slavery may differ, but the results are largely the same. Human trafficking includes deception and/or coercion to move people from one place to another for purposes of exploitation. Deception frequently involves promises of better working conditions, high pay, humane living conditions and even marriage. Trafficking knows neither limits nor boundaries; it can take place within the victim’s country (relatively uncommon) or outside it.

Coercion, on the other hand, usually appears only after individuals are already being trafficked to the place where they will be exploited. Coercion can include traffickers withholding a victim’s travel documents and raw violence, both psychological and physical. In addition, exploitation takes several forms and can be sexual and work-related. Some people are forced to beg. In more extreme cases, people are compelled to donate organs. Governments across the globe have taken legal and administrative steps to combat this phenomenon, which seems to have grown to epidemic proportions during the past decades. Greece is hardly immune.

Greece occupies a crucial position in the world. It connects three continents — Europe, Asia and Africa — and is an external border country for the European Union. Greece borders three non-EU countries — Albania, Turkey and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia — and one EU country, Bulgaria. Greece’s southern provinces, including the island of Crete, are close to two African countries, Egypt and Libya. These
attributes render the country highly susceptible to waves of illegal immigrants attempting to enter Europe and the EU. Some hope for a better life and some engage in crime, although those two motivations are not mutually exclusive.

Similarly, people from inside the EU and Europe try to get to other, more developed countries for the same reasons. Thus, Greece, in spite of its financial crisis, has been a country people strive to reach either as a gateway to the EU or as a destination in itself. Greece’s location and attributes also make it a transit and destination country for human trafficking.

Human trafficking first gained attention in Greece in the 1990s when greater numbers of immigrants began to enter the country. Soon after the new millennium, human trafficking increased slightly, and the Hellenic government decided to take action. A whole set of actions were approved and implemented, ranging from legislative provisions for tackling human trafficking to the establishment of special police forces and new governmental services.

**LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS**

In 2002, when government officials realized THB had reached worrisome levels in Greece, they rendered human trafficking as a unique offense in the Hellenic criminal code that deals with organized crime. Since then, the country, in conjunction with legislative initiatives promoted by the EU and the United Nations, incorporated a series of laws and presidential decrees to combat THB.

Seven Hellenic ministries now cooperate in handling trafficking cases: the ministries of Justice, Interior, Foreign Affairs, Public Order and Citizen Protection, Health, Education and Religious Affairs, and Labor. Other measures include offering protection and assistance to victims instead of prosecuting and deporting them, involving nongovernmental organizations, and signing bilateral agreements.

A new law has brought about significant changes: It is now a criminal offense to threaten violence during human trafficking; young victims must be interviewed in the presence of a psychologist; victims are compensated as victims of organized crime; and a National Rapporteur bureau within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs coordinates and implements the national anti-THB strategy.

Since enactment of the first human trafficking law, the Hellenic Police have established special Human Trafficking Forces. Fifteen such forces now exist, with personnel specializing in combating THB. Special training by national and international organizations and cooperation with international authorities further enhances success. However, police continue to face challenges despite the level of effort given to THB cases.

**VICTIMS AND PERPETRATORS**

THB offenders can be categorized into those engaging in sexual exploitation and those engaging in other forms of exploitation. The first group represents the majority and includes Greeks, as well as people from Eastern Europe and the Balkans. The latter group also contains Greeks collaborating with people from victims’ countries of origin. Greek offenders are invariably responsible for transporting and hosting victims and for dealing with requests for potential “clients.” Foreign offenders usually recruit victims and communicate with them after they are trafficked. Their main task is to keep victims “enslaved” and unable to react. Recently, the trend has been for women who were previously exploited to become offenders themselves.

Perpetrators use different strategies to discourage victims from either reacting to their exploitation or reporting it to the police. One common method is shifting victims between different parts of the country to keep them disoriented and make them harder to trace. Additionally, offenders tell victims that they cannot escape from their slavery because of the offenders’ “connections” with local authorities that keep police from helping victims. It is also quite common for offenders to gain compliance by threatening the lives of victims’ families. A new trend is for offenders to tell victims they owe a huge debt to the traffickers and that they have to work it off without pay.

Victims typically range in age from 13 to 65 and leave their home countries in the hope of improving their lives. They usually come from Eastern Europe and the Balkans, and more recently, from Asia and Africa. Most are ill-educated, unable to read and write well, and financially desperate. Women are generally put to work in brothels as prostitutes, men are assigned to the fields, and children are the ideal
“bait” for begging. Of course, one may see men begging or children and women working in the fields, but this triggers suspicions of trafficking and is usually avoided by criminals.

Traffickers usually deprive victims of travel documents so that they cannot escape. Further, they usually believe threats from their traffickers against their relatives. Many victims receiving low pay for their services don't even believe they are being mistreated. This impedes the identification of victims since, even when they are spotted and interviewed, victims often deny they have been trafficked and exploited. Complicating the situation further is victims' inability to speak Greek, making them reluctant to approach authorities for help.

**GOVERNMENT RESPONSE**

In light of these problems, the Greek police and government have established the National Centre of Social Solidarity (EKKA) in the Ministry of Labor and coordinated its work with the police. Greece has also adopted national and international action plans for human trafficking, named “ILAEIRA.”

EKKA, along with more than 12 Hellenic and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that have signed a memorandum of cooperation with the police, contribute substantially to THB cases. EKKA and the majority of the NGOs operate 24-hour-a-day hotlines. They provide shelter to victims and offer the services of sociologists, psychologists, social workers, lawyers and doctors. When victims are hesitant to approach the police, EKKA and NGOs are often the first to collect THB complaints. Their staffs handle victims with extra care while involving the special police forces.

Similarly, in cases in which victims turn directly to the police, they are immediately assigned to a psychologist and an officer to establish a trusting rapport. Many victims come from countries in which they believe the police cannot be trusted. Soon after the interview begins, victims are given sheets informing them of their rights in 13 foreign languages. The Greek government provides protective shelters and escorts victims to court when legal proceedings take place.

ILAEIRA is one of the police’s greatest achievements. The plan, introduced in 2007, enjoys the support of international and European law enforcement agencies such as Europol and Interpol, and promotes coordination of state and international organizations in handling THB cases. The project is also supported by the International Organization for Migration and more than 12 state and international NGOs. The contributions of Europol and Interpol have been indisputable.

The Hellenic government has taken sizable steps toward effectively handling and combating human trafficking. Its efforts can be proven by statistics, cases investigated and resolved, and the number of lives saved. The country’s arsenal of legislative, governmental and law enforcement measures directed at the crime indicates that Greece recognizes human trafficking as a major threat that needs to be defeated. □
A “New Silk Road” (NSR) strategy was introduced by the United States in late 2011 to promote stability in Afghanistan and surrounding countries following the drawdown of coalition forces in 2014.¹ That is not the only use of the term, however; other “New Silk Roads” include China’s quest for an alternative (primarily overland) trade route to Western Europe and the collection of “shadow networks” linking Central Asia and Western Europe used by drug traffickers.²

The U.S. strategy’s goal is to promote stability through economic development using Afghanistan as a thoroughfare. To this end, it explicitly includes transportation, energy, and crime-fighting elements. The main component of the plan (of the 40 or so identified)³ related to law enforcement is the Central Asia Counternarcotics Initiative (CACI). The transportation routes (which could enable trafficking in the future if security continues to be an issue) are intended to be built on the existing Northern Distribution Network, which has been used as a supply route for coalition forces operating in Afghanistan.⁴

CACI has met with resistance from Russian leaders concerned that it extends U.S. influence in the region.⁵ In fact, Russia is actively working to implement an alternative to CACI via the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which it says “should be considered as the primary guarantor of counter-drugs security in Eurasia.”⁶ In spite of such diplomatic obstacles, the U.S. has
A Kyrgyz man leads a horse along a road on the Suu-Samyr plateau, a stretch of the ancient Silk Road from Bishkek to Osh.
stepped up its partner-nation engagement via the Department of Defense’s Section 1004 Counter-Drug Assistance program, training more than 800 officers in Central Asia in 2012 “after training none at all in 2011 and only handfuls in previous years.”

CHINA’S QUEST
China is seeking to secure an alternate trade route that does not rely on Russia in order to supplement its use of the Trans-Siberian Railway, which is running near capacity. Ultimately, its goal is to access European markets through a rail link via Istanbul.

There are significant technical, legal, and political barriers to such a route. Current plans call for routing the line through countries such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia—or alternatively, Iran. These countries lack mutual trust and have difficulty working together, complicating efforts to negotiate agreements regarding customs inspections, transfer of cargo at “break of gauge” points (where railway tracks of different widths meet), and signaling and rail law harmonization. In addition, corruption levels are high in many of these countries.

Newly established routes have been touted in the media, but these alternatives rely on Russia-controlled lines. Although desirable, they are less than ideal from China’s strategic perspective.

But China has other interests as well. Viewed holistically, China’s pursuit of its transportation, energy, and security interests in the region could constitute a competing alternative to the U.S. NSR plan. The most significant difference for the U.S. is that China wishes to bypass Afghanistan in favor of a route through Iran, while the U.S. wants to use the new routes to promote economic development in Afghanistan. China’s economic pragmatism leads it to seek the most secure route for its goods, but the U.S. has other interests at stake.

SHADOW NETWORKS
Illicit trafficking of weapons, humans, exotic species, illegal narcotics, and precursor chemicals used in drug manufacture occurs along many of the same routes as legitimate commerce.

Shadow routes exploit “undergoverned spaces.” Such spaces in the Caucasus and Central Asia are ripe for instability if the money coming in from new rail and energy projects produces incentives for corruption and more opportunities for criminals to exploit. Investment in these areas can lead to problems over the short term, even as it helps to prime the region for future economic growth.

Regardless of whether the U.S. or China takes the lead in the region (or Russia maintains its hold, or—more likely—some combination evolves), any increase in legitimate traffic along these routes will make it harder to combat illicit trafficking unless it is accompanied by the development of sound legal structures and the deployment of capable forces.
well-trained, and well-equipped personnel to enforce them. Such structures and personnel will take time to develop (if they can be realized at all), particularly in areas plagued by corruption.

**IMPLICATIONS**

The outlook for the U.S. NSR strategy appears bleak because the countries that are supposed to participate do not trust each other, rendering its projects vulnerable to competing alternatives. The prospects for China’s search for an alternate trade route to Europe are somewhat better because although China’s strategy faces many of the same issues as the U.S. NSR, its noninterference foreign policy makes it a more attractive partner to countries in the region. No matter how it comes about, any increase in the number of routes to and from Europe and/or the volume of traffic on them will likely make it harder for law enforcement to detect traffickers.

If new transportation and/or energy projects are realized in the Caucasus and/or Central Asia, the influx of capital from them could set the stage for economic development over the long term. In the short term, though, politics may become more corrupt and/or contested and criminal organizations (especially transnational ones) will likely seek to exert greater influence.

Adapted from the article “The New Silk Road(s): Strategic Context and Implications,” published by EUCOM Strategic Foresight, October 2015

“EUCOM Strategic Foresight (ESF) is a "foresight/futures" organization that provides EUCOM, the broader U.S. government, and allies/partners with emerging and actionable insight into the complex European operational environment.

2. The term has also been used to describe a “dark net” website that deals in contraband, most prominently in illegal drugs; however, this usage is sufficiently different from the others that it is not discussed here. Please see previous ESF products for more information regarding the workings of the (now-defunct, but replaced) Tor-enabled “Silk Road” site, including the following: Henke, Brian and Regan Damron. “Trends in Online Anonymity: Implications for Security and Stability.” EUCOM: Strategic Foresight Quick Look, September 27, 2012.


Both of the above are available on the EUCOM Strategic Foresight Portal at the following URL: https://partners.eucom.mil/J2/Home/ESF/StrategicForesightPages/home.aspx


9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.


DRUGS

TURKEY tackles
The Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the U.S. and the Ottoman Empire was signed February 25, 1862 (Yale University, 2011). Since the establishment of the Turkish republic, treaties between Turkey and the U.S. have mainly addressed defense and military issues. The Treaty of Commerce and Navigation was one of the first Turkey-U.S. treaties on drug enforcement and criminal justice relations, between the U.S. Treasury Department and the Turkish Ministry of Interior, signed October 3, 1928. That treaty was the main instrument of cooperation and information exchange for both countries’ law enforcement officers until 1979. The three main points addressed are:

- Exchange of information and documents on illicit trafficking, including photographs, fingerprints, criminal records and other evidence;
- Immediately forwarding information about suspected movements of narcotic drugs that might concern Turkey or the U.S.;
- Mutual cooperation in police and investigative work.

According to the treaty, “cooperation should, therefore, consist in the exchange of photographs, information regarding suspected persons, fingerprints, and in exchanging information with regard to the methods employed by smugglers, in order to locate the scene of their activities.”

James W. Spain, who served in Turkey in the 1970s as a U.S. Foreign Service officer, stated that, although Cyprus was a dominant issue affecting Turkey-American relations, poppy cultivation was a main cause of increased tensions in the 1970s (Spain, 1975). Turkey was a major poppy cultivator while the U.S. was experiencing high levels of heroin consumption in the late 1960s and 1970s. After Turkey agreed to regulate opium production in the mid-1970s, Turkey and the U.S. signed a new treaty of Extradition and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters in 1979. It improved information sharing, mutual assistance and effective cooperation in criminal matters and drug offenses, and it specifically addresses cocaine, cannabis and hallucinogenics. This agreement remains the basis for cooperation of law enforcement officials of both countries.

Establishment of the DEA

Long before the U.S. established the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in 1973, the country had operated offices overseas to combat drug trafficking. The first such foreign office opened in 1951 in Italy. According to a 2007 U.S. Department of Justice report, the DEA conducted one of its first joint operations with Turkey in the early 1960s.

“U.S. foreign drug agents worked with their foreign counterparts to investigate morphine trafficking out of Lebanon and Turkey to France for heroin production. This international coordination resulted in the Turkish government banning morphine production and led to the dismantling of French heroin trafficking organizations,” the report said.

The DEA’s rules and objectives can differ from country to country, depending on local policies, cultures, norms, laws and agreements between governments and international treaties. When working with foreign law enforcement officials, DEA foreign objectives are based on five main principals (U.S. Department of Justice, 2007):

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Turkish police confiscate marijuana in Eastern Turkey. AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE
• Conducting bilateral investigations;
• Establishing and maintaining good working relations;
• Promoting and contributing to institution building in partner nations;
• Sharing intelligence and supporting intelligence gathering;
• Providing training.

DEA OFFICES IN TURKEY

The U.S. government established an anti-drug trafficking office in Turkey in 1961 that still operates to this day. Anti-drug offices were opened in Ankara and Izmir in 1971, but Izmir’s closed in 1978. Upon its creation in 1973, the DEA inherited these offices. According to the 2007 U.S. Justice Department report, the DEA’s Turkish offices “account for three percent of the DEAs authorized foreign workforce” of more than 750 officers in 59 different countries.

DEA offices in Turkey cooperate with three law enforcement institutions: the Turkish National Police (TNP), the Gendarmerie and Turkish Customs. However, according to interviews and the authors’ experience, almost 90 percent of that cooperation is with the TNP Department of Anti-Smuggling and Organized Crime (KOM). This high-level cooperation benefits from the technical capacity of the police in drug enforcement, lower cultural barriers at the TNP and the staff’s language proficiency. Additionally, the TNP is Turkey’s most experienced organization in counternarcotics, law enforcement and international cooperation.

Afghan and Pakistani law enforcement personnel attend international counternarcotics seminars in Turkey sponsored by the Turkish National Police and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. UTSM AND TADOC

The number of DEA staff working in Turkey totaled about 20 in 2006. The regional director for the DEAs Middle East Region is located in Ankara and is responsible for DEA offices in Athens, Greece; Cairo, Egypt; and Istanbul. The establishment of the DEA regional office in Ankara is critical since Turkey is not only a transit route for heroin and chemical precursors but is also a strategic regional hub to foster police cooperation for joint operations among countries such as Albania, Bulgaria, Iran, Romania and Ukraine.

DEA IMPREST FUNDS

Imprest funds are defined by the U.S. Justice Department as “fixed or petty-cash funds held in the form of currency and coins that are advanced to designated cashiers, who in turn advance the funds to employees for mission-related expenses.” In other words, it is discretionary cash for officers’ use. DEA agents use imprest funds to provide cash incentives for informants and to cover the cost of investigations and other official expenses. The total amount of imprest funds in DEA foreign offices was approximately $3.18 million in 2007. Many of the foreign offices (except those in Italy) have imprest funds, although Turkey is allotted the least at $105,000.

ESTABLISHMENT OF KOM

Turkey’s Department of Anti-Smuggling was established in 1980. Renamed the Department of Smuggling, Intelligence and Operations in 1983, the department’s main objective is combating illicit trade and trafficking, including firearms, tobacco and illicit drugs. In 1995, it became the KOM Department, when its purview evolved to include organized crime, money laundering and corruption. The KOM Department coordinates and maintains drug enforcement operations in Turkey. Although Gendarmerie and Customs combat illicit drug trafficking, KOM is Turkey’s primary drug enforcement organization. KOM’s foreign objectives are:

• Establishing and maintaining good working relations with international organizations;
• Conducting investigations of transnational organized crimes and drug trafficking;
• Providing international training;
• Sharing information with liaison officers.

The Turkish International Academy against Drugs and Organized Crime (TADOC), an in-service training academy established in 2000, is one of the main units of KOM. The academy, which provides national and international training on drugs and organized crime, has joint activities with more than 10 international organizations and more than 85 countries, including the U.S. Through the NATO-Russia Council, KOM/TADOC works with the DEA Academy and the Russian Federation’s Domodedovo International Police Academy to develop cooperation with Central Asian countries.

In addition to cooperation in training, since 1997 Turkey has successfully completed 22 controlled delivery operations and arrested 75 suspects in joint operations with the DEA. KOM has also carried out 23 operations with German police (KOM Report, 2012), indicating good working relations between these institutions.

Moreover, KOM and DEA have worked together to fight terror financing by implementing a program to list several members of the Kurdish separatist groups Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and Kurdish Communities Union (KCK) under the Kingpin Law with the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC). By the end of 2011, nine PKK/KCK
members were listed by OFAC as drug traffickers of a terrorist organization (KOM, 2013, pp.84).

OBSTACLES TO COOPERATION
In 2006, the U.S. Justice Department analyzed 10 DEA offices in five countries: Colombia, Italy, Mexico, Thailand and Turkey. The research aimed to assess the DEAs international activities through analysis of the agency’s international operations, cooperation activities and personnel composition. According to the report, the DEA was more successful in some countries than others, owing to limitations and obstacles. Conflict regions, authoritarian regimes and unstable countries had the most negative effect on cooperation. Interviews with DEA agents working in the U.S. and Turkey supported some of the report’s findings.

According to the interviews, experiences and analysis, the level of cooperation in drug enforcement varies, depending on countries, organizations and individuals. Generally, there are five types of obstacles:

- Culture (country, people and organization);
- Language;
- Bureaucracy;
- Opposition to the U.S. and liaison officials;
- Legal and organizational differences.

These obstacles can be overcome through trial and error and a “getting to know you period,” which make it easier to adjust the policies and procedures of each law enforcement agency. However, it is sometimes difficult to convince appointed or elected officials of the importance of police cooperation in countering organized crime, especially drug trafficking.

It is also important to stress that the work experiences of DEA agents in different parts of the world, from South America to the Middle East and East Asia, provide them with invaluable knowledge and professionalism to create better cooperation. The agents interviewed emphasized the crucial role of individuals and their attitudes. In fact, they highlighted that the biggest mistake liaison officers make is failing to understand the culture of the organization, and its officers, with which they need to cooperate. Informal relations, rather than formal treaties and agreements, are the most important parameters in creating better law enforcement cooperation. A good example of cooperation between Turkey and the DEA follows:

“During our fieldwork in Turkey, a foreign official told us that DEA provided intelligence helps to speed up local investigations. Turkish officials also told us about recent operations for which the DEA had provided invaluable assistance. For example, a foreign official spoke of a case in which a DEA-paid informant provided information about a heroin shipment, resulting in the seizure of several tons of heroin. In another instance, foreign officials in Turkey were aware of a Turkish shipment of 41 kilograms of cocaine from Bolivia to Iran, but the smugglers were not going to take the narcotics through Turkey. The vessel used for the shipment was from Denmark, and the DEA assisted in the seizure of the narcotics by facilitating communication between Turkey and Denmark officials.” (U.S. Department of Justice, 2007)

Historical documents and treaties, the milestones of cooperation, indicate a long mutually beneficial experience between the U.S. and Turkey. Mutual cooperation increases the success of drug enforcement efforts. It is evident that the cooperation level between the U.S. and Turkey should be improved in law enforcement matters through liaison officers, formal treaties, training and projects.

Drug producers + traffickers are responsible for massive worldwide pollution. Environmental catastrophe.
The impact of drug trafficking and production on civil society in terms of health and criminality has been addressed by political bodies and law enforcement with varying success. A global threat that has not been previously considered, and which is not assessed properly, is the environmental damage caused by drug production and trafficking. This article will try to expose some of the current and short-term consequences. The long-term consequences, mainly mutagenic effects, have yet to be fully understood.

Drug trafficking causes air, water and soil pollution through, among other things, deforestation, extensive use of pesticides and fertilizers, chemical waste and increased energy use. In Colombia and Afghanistan, forests are destroyed to plant coca and opium fields. In the United States, traffickers burn sections of national parks to grow marijuana. Large amounts of chemicals resulting from amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS), namely methamphetamine, Ecstasy and synthetic drugs, are released into nature. Individuals, and especially law enforcement officers, who are confronted with chemicals each day might suffer from carcinogenic, mutagenic and teratogenic effects (effects on a fetus).

This article summarizes information received from international agencies such as Interpol, Europol and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), environmental organizations (World Wildlife Fund Sweden, or WWF) and open sources. Exposing and estimating the costs and the magnitude of environmental destruction linked to drugs are critical to promote research, awareness and political engagement.

For the sake of consistency, and as noted by environmental organizations, it should be pointed out that so-called legal nonsustainable land-use practices and pollution, including those by the pharmaceutical or transportation industries, are the main source of environmental damage worldwide. Yet, hidden and illegal pollution has grown consistently. To date, there are no precise figures to allow a clear comparison and analysis between both types of pollution.
environmental destruction. Louise Carlsson, a biologist at WWF Sweden, stresses that legal exploitation conceals the fact that many of the so-called official permits are obtained through corruption. ¹

Nevertheless, it is clear that the extent of illegal damage, such as that caused by drugs, is underrated. Members of criminal organizations are seldom prosecuted for environmental crimes, because of the high cost of proceedings and the low priority assigned to such crimes. Crimes such as trafficking of human beings, drug trafficking, organized crime and especially terrorism yield greater sentences.² Also, effective prosecution is hindered by lack of research. As a result, environmental crime flourishes and remains a high profit/low risk endeavor.

Drug trafficking causes air, water and soil pollution through, among other things, deforestation, extensive use of pesticides and fertilizers, chemical waste and increased energy use.

DESTRUCTION OF FORESTS

The most obvious environmental effect of coca and opium poppy cultivation is the deforestation of rain forests. The WWF estimates that an area one-fourth the size of Sweden disappears each year. Furthermore, 50 percent of this destruction is linked to illegal exploitation, the WWF suggests. Although it is difficult to find reliable information on how much deforestation is linked to illicit drug crops, some studies provided by the UNODC suggest that in Peru 2.5 million hectares of the Amazon forest have been destroyed to grow illicit coca crops,³ while Europol states that 25 percent of all deforestation in Peru is associated with coca cultivation. In the Andean region of Peru, Bolivia and Colombia, an estimated 1 million hectares of native forest have been eliminated in the past 20 years. This is roughly an area covered by El Salvador or Slovenia.

One hectare of coca field produces only 7.4 kilograms of cocaine per year, and one field suffices for only three or four crop cycles. When the fertility of the soil has decreased to a level where production is low, drug traffickers clear more forest for cultivation to supply the high global demand for drugs. A 2013 report by the Organization of American States titled “Drug Problem in the Americas” estimates that for each hectare of coca leaves, four hectares of forest are cut down.

The most common method is slash and burn farming,⁴ which is also a major source of air pollution in rain forests, resulting in high emissions of greenhouse gases (methane, carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide and nitrogen oxides). According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, as of 2004, deforestation accounted for 17.3 percent of all greenhouse gas emissions caused by human activity.² For comparison’s sake, that amount equals emissions from electrical plants to power 998 million homes yearly.

Drug cultivation also results in high soil-carbon losses. Soil is the main terrestrial carbon sink — that is, the amount of carbon contained in the soil is greater than in the living biomass and the atmosphere together. Soil carbon is composed of organic material from flora and fauna in various stages of decomposition. Carbon lost from the soil enters the atmosphere as CO₂. Activities such as deforestation speed the rate of decomposition of the organic forms of carbon, which causes CO₂ fluxes. The quantity of CO₂ released depends on the initial amount of carbon in the soil, which is difficult to estimate. In rainforests or good soils, organic carbon can exceed 10 percent.³ Thus, deforestation results in a carbon loss of approximately 250 tons per hectare, or 666 tons of CO₂ per hectare. This corresponds to electricity use for 83 homes for one year, according to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.⁵

Forests are also cleared to build landing strips to transport crops. In northern Guatemala, for instance, traffickers have built dozens of landing strips, including one nicknamed the “international airport” that hosted three runways and more than a dozen abandoned aircraft.⁶ The result was the loss of 40,000 hectares of forest, equal to 26 million tons of CO₂ in terms of soil-carbon loss. This corresponds to burning 55 million barrels of oil, roughly the amount used by 5 million cars in a year.

Forest exploitation for sassafras oil (a component of Ecstasy) in Southeast Asia pushes extremely rare trees toward extinction. Sassafras oil is extracted from the roots of the mreahprewphnom tree. While this oil is used to make cosmetics, it is also a major Ecstasy precursor — a reagent in the process of drug manufacturing. In 2013, the Cambodian Environment Ministry collaborated with an environmental organization, Fauna and Flora International (FFI), to destroy two illegal distilleries in Cambodia. The ministry welcomed FFI’s help because illegal production of the “Ecstasy oil” could have caused extinction of the mreahprewphnom tree in Cambodia within five years. The oil is produced by shredding and boiling the roots for 12 hours. Surrounding trees are also cut down to fuel fires, and rivers are polluted by effluent resulting from the oil production. The number of illegal factories is unknown, although an estimated 75 existed in 2006 at the peak of Ecstasy production in the region.⁹
Brazilian police and journalists inspect an illegal air strip cut from the rainforest in the Amazon basin near the border with Colombia by drug traffickers. Drug traffickers wreak environmental destruction by destroying forests to grow and transport drugs.

REUTERS
U.S. State Department studies indicate that 10 million liters of sulfuric acid, 16 million liters of ethyl ether, 8 million liters of acetone and between 40 million and 770 million liters of kerosene are poured directly into the soil annually by cocaine processors working in the Andean region, mainly Colombia. The consequences of this pollution are felt in the small rivers where aquatic life and biodiversity are devastated. The Caqueta river basin, which is the primary growing area in southern Colombia, is particularly affected.  

SYNTHETICS: BIG DUMPING

The production of ATS such as Ecstasy, amphetamine, methamphetamine and semisynthetics drugs such as cocaine and heroin require huge amounts of chemicals and precursors. The amount of chemical waste depends on the production method, the knowledge of the producer and the equipment used. The Leuckart reaction — the most popular method for synthesizing illicit amphetamine in the U.S, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands — requires the use of highly dangerous and carcinogenic products and results in 6 to 40 liters of chemical waste per manufactured kilogram.

According to UNODC, 51 tons of methamphetamine were seized worldwide in 2010. That amount rose to 88 tons in 2011, creating 440,000 to 2.11 million kilograms of toxic waste while producing methamphetamine. The illicit manufacture of methamphetamine has been detected in more than 60 countries, according to UNODC. Major production occurs in the U.S, Canada, Mexico, Europe and increasingly Central America.  

The Netherlands’ situation illustrates what is happening in Europe. In 2006, Dutch police seized 4 tons of ATS (10 percent of the Netherlands’ total), from which they estimated that 430,000 to 960,000 liters of chemicals had been released into the environment. In August and October 2013, Dutch police and Europol dismantled the largest facilities ever discovered in Europe, covering 1,000 square meters and containing high-volume, custom-made equipment. Police seized more than 40 tons of chemicals in the two raids. In 2013, the police discovered 130 dumping sites in the Netherlands, almost three times as much as in 2012, when 50 dumping sites were found. The chemicals are disposed of in the woods, rivers and seas, and are sometimes buried in the soil, where they keep burning for days. Trees in surrounding areas are contaminated by poison fumes and must be cut down.
Criminal organizations are using creative methods to get rid of chemical waste, such as equipping trucks with pipes to discharge chemicals on roads while traveling. In fact, new disposal methods are invented more quickly than police can discover them. The restoration of areas polluted by ATS chemical emissions is extremely expensive. One small contaminated area can cost 80,000 euros to clean up.

PESTICIDES AND FERTILIZERS

According to Roel Willekens, national program manager for Environmental Crime in the Netherlands, the legal and illegal use of pesticides takes a huge toll on the environment. For example, China has 2,600 factories producing 14 million tons of chemicals for agriculture each year. Fifty percent of world food production depends on those fertilizers and pesticides. To obtain authorization to export these products to Europe, manufacturers must go through a complex procedure, which takes years and costs up to 200,000 euros. To avoid those costs, and to meet the pressing demand for drugs, traffickers turn to illegal fertilizers and pesticides. Law enforcement is largely left in the dark.

Another unforeseen problem of legal pesticides linked to drug trafficking is that the “War on Drugs” includes spraying the herbicide glyphosate on crops. Governments and environmental organizations have started to fight this technique, which has proven to be ineffective and harmful. The International Relations and Security Network in Zurich states that the concentration of glyphosate used for fumigation in Colombia is 26 times higher than recommended.

Aerial herbicides are nonselective chemicals and affect all plants and the surrounding population. According to the Center for International Policy Plan Colombia, between 2000 and 2003, the fumigation program sprayed 380,000 hectares of coca, equivalent to more than 8 percent of Colombia’s arable land. One of the peculiarities of the coca plantation business is that it is very mobile. Intensive spraying led to the proliferation of areas where coca bushes were under cultivation (growing was observed in 22 provinces after the spraying, compared to 12 provinces three years before the spraying). According to U.S. government studies, land devoted to coca cultivation in Colombia has increased 23 percent since U.S.-backed fumigation began in 1990. This has also led to population displacement and rocketing health complaints. Dutch journalist Marjon van Royen revealed that 80 percent of the children of the Aponte Indian indigenous community fell sick with skin rashes, fever, diarrhea and eye infections. According to a survey conducted by the U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy, 157,200 hectares of cultivated areas were detected in 2006, 13,200 hectares more than in 2005, despite the most intensive fumigation campaign in the history of Colombia.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

More research is necessary to estimate the scale and impact of emissions more accurately. To date, it has been impossible to give a precise estimation of chemical waste worldwide. Further, the consequences of blending several types of chemicals and their release into nature must be subject to more analysis.

The Dutch police represent one of the more active authorities combating environmental crime linked to drug production. European countries, for which the issue is particularly pressing owing to high synthetic drug production in places such as the U.K., Germany, Poland and Lithuania, must cooperate urgently.

The public must be informed through the right channels to raise awareness of links between drug abuse and environmental harm. Information must be spread and provided to different age groups, especially the youth and young adults who are the main target of drug traffickers. University programs in sustainability must study the impact of crimes such as drug production and trafficking.

Politicians must show greater engagement and strengthen the laws against this type of criminality. Environmental crime is often treated as a second-class crime, despite its connection to global drug trafficking and other types of criminality. Environmental organizations with the networks and means to study the issue must analyze the consequences of drug trafficking on soil, air, waterways and biodiversity.

Finally, law enforcement must stay alert to health dangers from handling chemicals, study disposal methods and improve the effectiveness of investigations to combat environmental crime. Drug production is a crime with many victims, but no one should underestimate its effects on the environment.

13. E.g. Interview with the author, November 2013
SHARED BORDER MANAGEMENT IN THE WESTERN BALKANS HAS IMPROVED INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

ALBANIA

THE OPENING OF
NIKOLL NDOCI, director of Migration and Readmission, Albanian Ministry of the Interior

Through the years, not only have state borders separated countries geographically, politically and administratively, but they have also separated and isolated peoples, cultures and civilizations from one another. Albania is unique in Europe and the world for its 50 years of isolation — its population separated from ethnic Albanians living in neighboring countries by barbed wire and bunkers.

The London Peace Conference in 1913, followed by World War I, ensured that 30 to 40 percent of ethnic Albanians lived outside the country’s borders. After World War II, the totalitarian regime that took power in Albania imposed isolation on its population, a condition that wasn’t remedied until the democratic revolution in 1991. In a relatively short period since that changeover, Albania has transformed itself by completely opening its borders and integrating border control with its European partners.

Separation and Isolation

The 1945-1991 period marks one of the most notorious eras of the country’s history. Thousands of Albanian citizens were killed while attempting to cross the border illegally to escape political persecution and dictatorship. Thousands more were arrested and imprisoned. Archives reveal the extent of the oppression: From 1948 to 1990, security forces killed 5,157 people trying to cross the border and another 17,900 were imprisoned for political offenses, with 9,052 of them dying behind bars.

During these years, 500 kilometers of the country’s 627-kilometer land border were militarized and hemmed by barbed wire. Border crossing was forbidden, even at the few official crossing points that existed. In extreme cases, Albanian citizens could be punished just for expressing a desire to visit neighboring countries. Border services of adjacent countries were viewed as enemies.

Illegally crossing the border was classified in the criminal code as a serious offense punishable by death.

A New Era

The years of democratic transition changed everything. Among other things, opposition to the regime resulted in the exile of half a million Albanian citizens to foreign embassies and neighboring countries. In 1991, the border police were placed under the Ministry of Defence, but in 1993 they were transferred to the Ministry of Public Order.

Even though the criminal code was amended in the 1990s to decriminalize border crossing, uncontrolled movement of the population, mainly in the direction of the former Yugoslavia, resulted in deaths at the hands of border guards.

Between 1993 and 2000, the first attempts were made to establish contact and cooperation with neighboring countries, but this was done mostly to handle incidents at the border. Given the serious situation and incidents, the United Nations began monitoring Albania’s border with the former Yugoslavia. From 1999 to 2000, Western Balkan countries undertook several border police “twinning” programs to ease tensions between border guards of different nationalities.

The years 2000 to 2005 marked a major turning point in border control for Albania and the rest of the region. That’s when the region entered the European Union integration process. In 2003, initiated by partners that included the EU, NATO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the Stability Pact, Balkan nations adopted the first common platform for border management and security, the so-called Ohrid initiative. It established a regional and international exchange of information through regular meetings at the operational and headquarters levels.

Long-term goals of the initiative were
demilitarization of border controls, promotion of broad cooperation and coordination between international border services and engagement of militaries in specific surveillance tasks under the control of civil authorities. In the interim, nations were asked to define national policies and strategies for integrated border management (IBM) and set up procedures to make it happen.

THE EU’S ROLE
In 2004, the EU issued its first recommendations on IBM for the Western Balkan countries, which served as a basis for drafting IBM strategies and related action plans. The year 2005 was important for Albania with the start of negotiations for its EU Stabilisation and Association Agreement. A key factor in capacity building was financial support initiated by the EU through the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) program.

The years 2005-2008 were considered the most dynamic with efforts to entirely change border management based on IBM. The commitment of Albania to integrate into Euro-Atlantic structures and fulfill the criteria for membership has motivated the country to enhance the standards of the Border and Migration Police (BMP).

Since then, the BMP have focused on establishing Schengen standards for integrated border management. Such standards had already been imposed as Albania sought NATO membership and a liberalized visa regimen. Moreover, in the framework of fulfillment of standards for EU candidate status, European experts positively evaluated the country’s progress toward IBM.

FOCUS OF REFORMS
Reform of the BMP, especially between 2005 and 2013, was focused on legislation, organization and functioning, improvement of information technology, modernization of equipment and logistics, and education and training.

Albania has strived to harmonize its legislation with that of the EU, and starting in 2008, the BMP became an independent structure within the State Police with separate budget, logistics and human resources.

Information technology is the new weapon that the BMP uses to fight cross-border crime. This advanced technology includes the Total Information Management System (TIMS), the National Electronic Register for Aliens (integrated with TIMS), the Results and Impact Management System (integrated with TIMS), the MEMEX system and the Smardec surveillance system.

The Albanian State Police use TIMS for automatic processes and operational procedures, and it is installed in all border crossing points and BMP structures from basic to central levels. TIMS is integrated with several national and international systems to access national passport databases, vehicle databases, national driving license databases, the latest Automated System for Customs Data, the Interpol system, face recognition readers, license plate readers and others.

The BMP attach great importance to surveillance and control. The seas are monitored with a maritime control space system that transmits images to a multi-institutional operations center consisting of the Ministry of the Interior, the Coast Guard,

EU GUIDELINES FOR REGIONAL BORDER SECURITY

• Set up national contact points within the border police directorates.
• Organize and hold meetings between heads of border and migration police at local, regional and central levels.
• Set up joint border crossing points and common offices for immediate exchange of information.
• Organize joint border patrols and exchange risk-analysis data and other information.
• Set up a liaison officer network between countries.
• Conduct joint intelligence gathering and investigations at borders.
customs and fisheries. The police maintain a fleet of speedboats to control the coasts. With financing from the EU, the police have also stressed mobility on Albania’s land borders and have invested in such things as night-vision optics, upgraded radios, mobile phones, cameras and guard dogs.

Education and training get special attention. Without proper police training, even the most modern laws and technology achieve nothing. Therefore, Albania offers courses for border and migration officers that match those provided by Frontex, the EU’s border agency. In any year, 10 to 20 percent of BMP staff is involved in training. Priority is given to on-the-job training and joint training with other agencies and neighboring countries.

**BORDER COOPERATION**

IBM is based on three pillars: intra-service, intra-agency and international cooperation. This has proven to be the most secure way to control and monitor borders. Intra-service cooperation is based on 24-hour-a-day exchange of information within all the levels of the BMP using the latest IT systems. Intra-agency cooperation has been one of the most influential elements in improving the quality of service toward citizens and strengthening the fight against cross-border crime. Albania is the only country in the Western Balkans to apply the one-stop control principle at all border crossing points. In addition to running quick border checks, such cooperation has increased efficiency and reduced corruption. Intra-agency cooperation consists of joint use of work premises, support staff, equipment, investigations and training, as well as an IT system that integrates agencies such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the State Police, the State Intelligence Service and the General Prosecutor Office.

If intra-service and intra-agency cooperation mark an evolution in Albania and the Western Balkans, international cooperation represents a revolution. A little more than 20 years ago, Albania viewed borders as a dividing line with hostile neighbors; nowadays, the very same borders unite us in a shared sense of responsibility for border security. We no longer manage two sides of the border. Instead, in what has become an effective partnership, we manage common areas that extend up to 10 kilometers on both sides of the border.

**ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND FINDINGS**

Based on common interests and mutual trust, Albania has cooperated on border control with its neighbors Greece, Italy, Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro. Borders that were once isolated are now more open and integrated. Albanian officers, for example, jointly patrol borders and train together with their counterparts. Albania shares statistical data about illegal migration with most of those countries and holds regular meetings among border guards at the command level.

Albania’s cooperation with Italy and Greece includes joint maritime patrols involving the Italian Guardia di Finanza and the Greek Marines. The border of Greece and Albania benefits from joint patrols, and Italy and Albania maintain a network of liaison officers at airports and seaports.

IBM has proven to be the best form of border control and surveillance for Albania. It continues to require a commitment from the entire state, as well as political and financial support from respective governments and international partners. Signing cooperative agreements is critical, but successful implementation also requires training, command of multiple languages and shared use of equipment.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

Improving border security requires support and an orientation toward best practices and special recommendations on IBM. Border management agencies need to reorganize structures and re-dimension missions in the interest of IBM. Planning has to occur over a long enough horizon to make it a success.

Agencies, both domestic and multinational, must harmonize policies related to IBM and provide room in budgets to make it effective. On the other hand, sound border management demands a system of monitoring and accountability. Joint training — and the integrated use of communications and computer technology — should be a focus, as should the sharing of expertise and curricula.

The process of integration has room for improvement, but thanks to this initial cooperation, Western Balkan countries have evolved from merely providing national security to building international partnerships that help provide security for all. □
THE THREAT OF METHAMPHETAMINE
Methamphetamine, possibly “the most widely consumed synthetic stimulant in the world,”¹ is not new. It has existed for nearly a century and has been used for various purposes. The drug’s market has grown in the past 15 years and poses an increasing threat to international security. This is not only due to an increase in demand and cheap availability, but also because of the relative ease of production and the diversity of its format and consumption. This article outlines the shift in the growing methamphetamine market and explores why this poses a significant threat to the globe. It will outline the effects methamphetamine has on the consuming individual and on transnational organized crime, and it will examine the difficulty of countering this mutating threat.

SUBSTANCE AND EFFECTS
Methamphetamine belongs to the amphetamine-type stimulant (ATS) group of illicit drugs. It appears most commonly in powder or crystalline form, referred to as “crystal meth” or “ice.” It can be snorted, ingested, injected or smoked. Once a legal substance used as a medicine and performance enhancer, in the 1970s it was turned into “an illicitly used and produced drug that has gained dramatically in popularity.”² According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) “World Drug Report 2013,” methamphetamine seizures rose by 73 percent, from 51 tons in 2010 to 88 tons in 2011.³

Why is this expanding market a security threat and why should governments and agencies engage? Methamphetamine use can have severe and disastrous consequences, ranging from headaches to liver and kidney failure, malnourishment, weight loss and even death.⁴ The speed of addiction and the difficulty of withdrawal make it highly destructive. Its expansion poses an increasing and imminent threat to drug users. Chronic users can become psychotic and violent. Psychological effects can last up to a year after withdrawal and pose a potential long-term threat to not only the user, but to families and friends.⁵

On an international scale, the increased production, consumption and trafficking of the drug can threaten the sovereignty and security of a wide range of countries. It “has provided criminal organizations with unprecedented opportunities to generate enormous profits which are at times used to finance other crime or even political activities.”⁶ Given that different forms of transnational organized crime are often linked, the expansion of organized crime in the methamphetamine market will likely influence other areas of organized crime.

GLOBAL EXPANSION
The expansion of the drug has worldwide effects. Growth is strongest in East and Southeast Asia, particularly in the manufacturing, consumption and trafficking of the crystalline form. Moreover, crystal meth has spread to countries that had not previously reported it, “such as Cambodia, China, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam.”⁷

A TRANSNATIONAL DRUG TRAFFICKING NETWORK HAS SPREAD THE SCOURGE AROUND THE WORLD
In addition, countries already battling it have seen a significant increase in seizures by law enforcement. For example, in Indonesia, crystal meth seizures increased 79 percent in one year, from 649 kilograms in 2010 to 1,161 kilograms in 2011.8

The upsurge in the number of seizures in East and Southeast Asia, one of the more visible expansions in the illicit market, is largely a result of increased methamphetamine production in West Africa. The region is commonly seen as a trafficking hub for transnational organized crime and drug traffickers, but it was not particularly well-known for its association with methamphetamine. Increasingly, West Africa seems to be where much of the methamphetamine in East and Southeast Asia is originating from, according to a UNODC report on the ATS situation in West Africa: “Methamphetamine was shown to have been trafficked from Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo.”9

East and Southeast Asia are not the only destinations for traffickers from West Africa. Historically, the drug’s movement within Europe was associated with the Czech Republic and Slovakia, but is now hitting Western and Central Europe, particularly the Netherlands, France and Germany. In addition, methamphetamine lab seizures in the Baltic states, Poland and the Russian Federation have been reported.10

While the expansion of the methamphetamine market in Europe is significant, it is not comparable to the market in North America. The drug’s largest expansion has been reported in Mexico. According to the UNODC drug report, the amount of methamphetamine seizures in Mexico more than doubled from 13 tons in 2010 to 31 tons in 2011, surpassing the number of seizures in the United States, which also soared.11 The figures from Mexico and the U.S. indicate that North America remains the region most strongly exposed to the threat. It is an international issue and requires international cooperation and agendas for its alleviation.

COUNTERING METHAMPHETAMINE

Countering drug trafficking has been a law enforcement priority around the world for a long time, but its success is debatable. Why are methamphetamine production, consumption and trafficking so stubborn to counter? There are many different reasons.

First, methamphetamine labs can vary in format and can be erected and dismantled with relative ease. The drug does not require a permanent place for production, making it difficult for law enforcement to find methamphetamine producers. Small “kitchen labs” can be set up almost anywhere, as shown in the popular U.S. television series Breaking Bad, in which a lab is created in a recreational vehicle. Likewise, methamphetamine is typically produced in relatively small batches and can be produced close to its selling point, reducing risk for the manufacturers.

Although 90 percent of methamphetamine labs are small-scale kitchen labs, 80 percent of the world’s
methamphetamine production comes from industrial “super labs” that can produce up to 10 pounds per production cycle. In the past, these super labs were mainly concentrated in Southern California and Mexico, but more recently industrial-size labs have been seized in West Africa, especially in Nigeria, where five laboratories were seized in 2011.

A second key factor that makes transnational trafficking of methamphetamine difficult to counter is that the final product is usually trafficked in small quantities by air courier. Asia is the primary destination for methamphetamine out of West Africa, though Europol reports that the drug is passing through major European airports to European couriers who take it to its final destination. This indicates that the methamphetamine market is becoming increasingly transnational and transcontinental. Transnational drug trafficking groups have little respect for international borders.

Countering the precursors of methamphetamine has turned out to be no easier than stopping the drug itself. Methamphetamine has three main precursors: ephedrine, pseudoephedrine and benzyl methyl ketone, or BMK. All three substances in bulk form fall under international control and are listed in Table I of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988. However, the control regime applied to pharmaceutical preparations containing ephedrine and pseudoephedrine (e.g., cold remedies in tablet form) is not as strict. Trafficking routes are constantly being adapted to outsmart law enforcement. For example, before the mid-2000s, the main source of BMK was China. After 2004 there was a shift, with the majority of BMK coming from the Russian Federation. However, recent trends show the source is shifting back to China.

These precursors are not the only ones available. Precursors are adapted and alternatives are being developed. In North America, “producers have adapted by substituting controlled precursors with non-scheduled chemicals, such as N-acetyl pseudoephedrine acetate, natural ephedra plant extracts and above all pharmaceutical preparations containing ephedrine and especially pseudoephedrine.” This adaptability makes the methamphetamine market more diverse and flexible. The irregularity of trafficking routes and the changing of methamphetamine recipes make it difficult for authorities to counter the trafficking of precursors.

Law enforcement agencies are actively working to tackle this expanding threat. One example is Interpol’s Operation Icebreaker, conducted in February 2013 in partnership with the World Customs Organization and the International Narcotics Control Board. Three-hundred-sixty tons of chemicals and 200 kilos of methamphetamine were seized, along with four laboratories. Icebreaker aimed to tackle methamphetamine production and trafficking, disassemble illicit laboratories, stop shipments of precursor chemicals, and dismantle organized crime groups connected with illicit methamphetamine production and trafficking.

The operation is a good example of how illicit methamphetamine production and trafficking can be countered. Given that the methamphetamine market has become a distinctly global phenomenon, transnational cooperation is required to counter it. But not all regions view the drug as a major threat. In Africa, there is a lack of awareness of ATS drugs, “as law enforcement authorities tend to focus on the interception of ‘traditional’ drugs such as cannabis and cocaine.” Methamphetamine use, although on the rise in most of Europe, is not the drug that most threatens the region, so its suppression is given low priority. Given these regional variations, law enforcement needs to become more globally proactive and fully recognize the increasing threat of the expanding market. Cooperation from various agencies and nations is paramount to stay ahead of this ever-changing illicit product.

CONCLUSION

Methamphetamine comes in different forms and is concocted with different recipes. The creation of new formulas and the variation of ingredients make it difficult for law enforcement to intercept precursors. Trafficking routes of both methamphetamine and its precursors are regularly changed to avoid detection. North America remains the leader in methamphetamine use, but demand for the drug has also grown in West Africa and East and Southeast Asia. This scourge requires the cooperation of international law enforcement agencies. It is debatable whether methamphetamine can ever be eradicated, but there is no doubt that this growing threat needs to be taken seriously.

2. Ibid.
4. methamphetamine.net accessed 15/11/2013
10. Ibid, pp. xi.
11. Ibid, pp. 49.
16. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
Europe devises new strategies to confront violent extremists who lurk online

By per Concordiam Staff
The Internet is one of the extremist’s most valuable tools. Chat rooms, message boards, e-magazines, videos and social media are used by radicals to recruit and train new members, plan and coordinate attacks with cohorts across the world and raise money through donations and online fraud. The growth of radical material online poses a serious threat to the world, and the European Union and its partners are working together to find solutions. “This is a very serious issue,” then-United Kingdom Security and Counterterrorism Minister Pauline Neville-Jones warned at a 2011 counterradicalization symposium. “The Internet plays an ever more significant role in the sedulous promotion of terrorism.”

Just as the Internet is becoming tightly interwoven in our everyday lives, it is also assuming a larger role in criminal and extremist activities. The number of terrorist websites has soared during the past decade, and so has the volume of material they post online. In the time that it takes counterterror groups to discover and eradicate terrorist propaganda, the videos, photos and violent exhortations have already been anonymously copied and posted to other sites. In the UK, the Internet plays a role in nearly every national security investigation conducted by police and intelligence agencies, the United States think tank Rand Corp. said in a report published in November 2013. The U.S. government says it monitors about 5,000 jihadi websites and closely watches about a hundred it believes are most hostile.

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION
Merely removing malicious online material is not a silver bullet to end Internet radicalization. Counterterror experts derive valuable information from online activity and admit there are benefits to leaving the material up. “The inclination may be to shut down radical websites, filter contact, and control what the public can access; however, that approach is not only ineffective, but also counterproductive,” said Dr. Peter Neumann of the Bipartisan Policy Center in Washington, D.C.

Experts suggest that extremist online activity and propaganda provide intelligence such as who is talking to whom and what ideas they are discussing — all significant pieces of a puzzle that could lead to early intervention and prevent violence. German officials were able to issue early warnings about the Madrid train bombings in 2004 because they were monitoring online chat rooms, according to an April 2011 Council of Foreign Relations article.

Al-Qaida leader Anwar al-Awlaki, one of the biggest threats to U.S. homeland security before he was killed in 2011, routinely used emails, blogs, chat rooms, and al-Qaida’s online magazine Inspire to entice disgruntled Americans to attack their own country. Al-Awlaki and Maj. Nidal Hasan, a U.S. Army psychiatrist who killed 13 people in a shooting rampage on Fort Hood military base in 2009, exchanged lengthy emails.

Online extremists have grown inventive. They have found ways to communicate via email without actually sending the email. They use a single account, compose an email message and leave it in the drafts folder. The intended recipient can log into the same account and read the unsent.
message to avoid detection. Conversely, officials have fashioned phony websites and posted fictitious information to trap extremists and taint the reliability of information that violent radicals receive online. Osama bin Laden refused to use the Internet out of fear that his identity and location could be revealed.

SOCIAL MEDIA
Message boards and comment forums, once the extremist’s go-to means of communication, have lost popularity in favor of social media. Al-Qaida opened its official Twitter account in September 2013, according to The Washington Times. The members-only site attracted 1,532 “followers” on its first day. U.S. counterterror officials said some of the followers were high-profile digital jihadists. “We’ve seen terrorist groups make increasingly effective use of social media, particularly Twitter and Facebook,” counterterror expert Patrick Poole said in the same article. Officials expect social media to be a “major intelligence target for foreign governments tracking al Qaida through its online devotees.”

In the past, forum administrators were often quick to remove offensive and inflammatory messages, hindering communication among extremists. However, social media sites have been more lenient about what material is posted. Recently, the posting of a decapitation video prompted Facebook to issue more restrictive rules. After some back and forth, the site decided to prohibit any video that “improperly and irresponsibly glorifies violence.”

RADICALIZATION FAST TRACK
Because the Internet never closes, it can accelerate the path to radicalization. Chat rooms, social media sites, message boards and video-posting sites allow like-minded individuals to exchange information 24 hours a day. Al-Qaida fighters use chat rooms, and the Web provides a plethora of information on past terror plots and countless “how-to” videos and articles on homemade explosives. “It offers a ‘one stop shop’ for all the information that an extremist may seek out, or by which they may be influenced,” Rand cautions. Moreover, the Internet broadens the range of people extremists can reach. It can break down barriers such as ethnicity, gender and country of residence.

SOLUTIONS
The most effective way to counter terrorists’ use of the Internet is to counter their messages and collect intelligence on the information they post, the London-based Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) concluded in a 2011 report. The development of countermessaging can take three forms: dissecting the ideology, undermining credibility and mocking the extremist, and promoting a positive alternative. The ISD suggests that countering the message is most effective, but also challenging.

Religious edicts that counter jihadist narratives and point out inconsistencies between religion and violence are successful. The messenger can make all the difference. Former extremists hold much more credibility delivering the countermessage. Another method is to attack their effectiveness, explaining that terrorists are harming the very communities they claim they are protecting. When victims of terrorism come forward and tell their stories, they undermine the extremist agenda.

The public and private sector working cooperatively to defend against the malicious use of the Internet can serve as a powerful counterterror tool. Because the Web is largely operated by the private sector and intelligence services by governments, information sharing between the two is crucial.

Twelve European countries, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and numerous think tanks and law enforcement agencies sought to create a program to do just that. Clean IT, a
two-year project that ended in March 2013, issued a final report that recommended seven proactive and 12 reactive best practices. They include prominently displaying strict website terms and conditions prohibiting terrorist activities; expanding programs to warn children, teenagers and young adults of the dangers of terrorist groups online; and establishing flagging mechanisms to alert officials that terrorists are using their online service. Google, parent company of YouTube, has incorporated a flagging mechanism that provides users with a “flag” button located below every video to alert moderators around the clock of videos that violate guidelines.

Although the EU’s stance is that the bulk of counterradicalization should take place at the local and national level, it has implemented strategies to assist in this effort. The European Council’s “Check the Web” initiative focuses on cooperation among EU countries to share the task of monitoring open Internet sources. The Home Affairs office of the EU started the Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN), which aims to facilitate information sharing among people who work directly with at-risk individuals within the EU. RAN focused its May 2013 meeting on the role of the Internet in radicalization.

The UK’s Prevent strategy, part of its larger counterterrorism effort known as CONTEST, focuses on community awareness and relies on the public to report when it sees someone access violent extremist material online in places such as coffee shops and Internet cafes.

**AWARENESS AND EDUCATION**

Counterterrorism education for parents, teachers and the general public to recognize warning signs in youth are essential for prevention. “We know that in the UK, groups gather to view the preaching of violent men located many thousands of miles away and that this does have a powerful effect in young minds,” Neville-Jones said.

Employing effective deterrence strategies, working together to share information, implementing counternarratives and educating youth and communities are important steps to prevention. The UK government alone has removed 5,700 “items of terrorist material” from online in the past couple of years.

“But it is clear we need to do more,” UK Prime Minister David Cameron said in a June 2013 Telegraph article. “It is not simply enough to target and go after violent extremists after they’ve become violent. We have to drain the swamp in which they inhabit. It means going through all of these elements of the conveyor belt to radicalization and making sure we deal with them.”
Central Asia can benefit from increased Asia-Europe overland trade

By per Concordiam Staff
In June 2013, a freight train rolled out of Chongqing, in central China, loaded with a valuable cargo of Hewlett-Packard notebook computers and monitors — a modern day equivalent of the spices, silk and tea transported along roughly the same route on the fabled Silk Road hundreds of years earlier. When the train crossed the Alataw Pass from China into Dostyk, Kazakhstan, five days later, armed guards boarded to protect the high-tech cargo against the modern version of caravan raiders. The train sped across three more countries — Russia, Belarus and Poland — on its nearly 11,200-kilometer journey through Central Asia and Eastern Europe before delivering its cargo to Duisburg, Germany. Total transportation time was nineteen days, much faster than an equivalent journey by sea.

Central Asia’s location on overland trade routes to Europe and the Middle East makes it ideally situated to capitalize economically on China’s prolific exports. New and expanded trade routes are fanning out across the region carrying products such as electronics, tires and textiles. Meanwhile, Eurasian gas and oil flow in the opposite direction to fuel Chinese factories and transportation networks. This stream of exports and imports through Central Asia is an invaluable source of economic growth for these developing nations and helps to integrate the region into the world economy. And by lessening the appeal of illicit businesses such as drug trafficking, this type of trade helps build stability.

The amount of transcontinental commerce is huge and growing. Chinese trade in goods with Europe reached 433.6 billion euros in 2012. Europe is China’s biggest export market, and though only a fraction of China’s 289.7 billion euros in exports to Europe travel the overland route, it is increasingly important. Shipping goods by sea through the Indian Ocean and Suez Canal takes about five weeks, compared to as little as 15 days by rail, says the South China Morning Post.

Higher fuel prices, slower steaming speeds and hazards such as pirates off the Horn of Africa raise the cost of ocean-borne trade. In addition, Hewlett-Packard and others have shifted manufacturing to central China, where labor costs are lower, but these goods must be trucked to the coast before being loaded aboard ships, increasing time and cost. Sea routes are still about 25 percent cheaper than the transcontinental rail route, according to The New York Times, but the difference is increasingly made up by savings in inventory management costs. This is especially true for the electronics and automotive industries because the value lost during lengthy sea voyages is relatively high, Rüdiger Grube, chief executive officer of Deutsche Bahn AG, told Bloomberg News in August 2013 when his firm opened a new direct rail link with China.

Kazakhstan, where rail transport is relatively advanced, stands to benefit disproportionately from these market changes. The New York Times notes that Hewlett-Packard dispatches transcontinental trains at least once a week. Deutsche Bahn plans to expand to a daily service and, according to China’s CCTV News; the Chinese Yuxinou International Railway has transported more than $25 million in goods from China to Europe since 2011 and is starting to ship European goods to China. They include German vehicle components sent to the Changan...
Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdimukhamedov opens a refinery in Samandepe, starting the first gas flowing into the Central Asia-China gas pipeline in December 2009. AFP/GETTY IMAGES
Ford plant in Chongqing. At projected growth rates, overland trade between Europe and China could reach $4.5 billion annually by the end of the decade.

Kazakhstan is undertaking a massive upgrade in its rail system, building new lines to China and Turkmenistan with the goal of doubling transit volumes and making the country the transportation hub of Eurasia. In September 2013, Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev told a meeting of the Kazakh-Chinese Business Council that he envisioned a New Silk Road between Western Europe and Western China built upon “new roads, railways, marine terminals and logistics centers throughout the country.” Kazakh National Railways has also bid to repair and manage Afghanistan’s railways to help get that country’s crops and minerals to markets in China, India and elsewhere.

Turkmenistan is also expanding trade infrastructure. In August 2013, the country broke ground on a new Caspian Sea port in Turkmenbashi. The energy-rich country plans on using the new port to export oil products, liquefied gas and textiles to Europe and the Middle East. The port will be fed by a new gas pipeline and will reduce European dependence on Russian-controlled pipelines. Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdimukhamedov said the new port, built in cooperation with Turkey, would also make it easier for European exports to access markets in the Middle East and Central Asia and would boost capital investment in the region.

Turkmenistan has the world’s sixth largest natural gas reserves and is also a large oil producer. It now ships most of its gas — 52 percent in 2012 — to China through the Central Asia-China gas pipeline. The pipeline, which opened in 2009 and was expanded in 2010, was built by a Chinese company. It crosses Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, which also supply gas through it, before reaching China. At the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, in September 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping met with Central Asian counterparts and announced the acceleration of the construction of “Line D” of the pipeline through Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

China is the common thread in the fabric of Central Asian economic development. It trades and invests heavily throughout the region, including Afghanistan. According to Asia Times Online, “China is the biggest trading partner of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.” Xi pledged Chinese support to Central Asian countries of at least $48 billion in energy contracts, loans and infrastructure credits during his September tour of the region. Uzbekistan, which still trades more with former patron Russia, should soon join the others in rebalancing trade after signing agreements with China worth more than $15 billion.

Although energy acquisition is China’s main interest in Central Asia, China is also investing heavily in critical infrastructure necessary for the region’s development. Without development, there is no stability, and without stability, the supply of energy and other resources is not secure. “Beijing wants Central Asia states to be good neighbors — stable, predictable and not given to extremes,” says a March 2013 report from the International Crisis Group.

China has a “non-interference” policy, which Asia Times Online says Central Asian politicians seem to prefer to post-Soviet Russia’s political interference and the West’s linking of aid and investment to human rights and democratic reforms. It points out that Uzbek President Islam Karimov has praised China for showing “how to build cooperation and fruitful relations based on equality and mutual benefit.” Karimov said that China has never set any political demands in 22 years of bilateral relations.

But the International Crisis Group criticizes China for not doing enough, and emphasizes that spreading cash around does not solve problems caused by poor governance and corruption. Authoritarian states are fragile, and fragile states are unstable. China has developed good bilateral relations with all of the Central Asian states, despite the tensions that exist within the region, tensions that have the potential to erupt into a shooting war. These tensions include disputes over water rights between Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Islamist extremist movements in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and narcotics trafficking. Some argue that China is better positioned than Western powers to mediate these disputes and encourage peaceful cooperation.

Historically, trade has encouraged peaceful relations between countries, cultures and peoples. As noted by Valerie Hansen, an expert on Silk Road history at Yale University: “The Silk Road found a place in history because of its rich cultural legacy in written records and artifacts, and because trade and tolerance were so intertwined.” With the help of Europe, Russia, China and neighboring countries, renewed trade on the modern Silk Road, represented by the railroads and pipelines spreading across Central Asia, has the potential to bring peace and prosperity to the region. □
Examining Immigration Policy

Europe proposes a unified approach to dealing with an influx of refugees

By per Concordiam Staff
Photos by Getty Images

The postcard-worthy waters off the Italian island of Lampedusa serve as the paradoxical backdrop to the challenges of illegal immigration. The tiny island represents hope for many fleeing war-torn regions but has most recently symbolized tragedy. Nearly 400 migrants died there in October 2013 when their boats capsized off the coast.

Immigrants are detained at a temporary shelter in Lampedusa, Italy, in October 2013 following the deaths of nearly 400 African migrants who drowned trying to reach the island.
The catastrophe has forced the European Union to review immigration policies that have struggled to balance the needs of national security with the promise of peaceful migration. As European Commission President José Manuel Barroso said in pledging $30 million in aid to Italy: “The problem of one of our countries, Italy, must be perceived as a problem for all of us.”

At least 25,000 would-be migrants have perished in the Mediterranean Sea in the past two decades, according to the International Organization for Migration. Braving the perils of the Mediterranean is viewed by many as the only option to escape turmoil in their homelands. Because Lampedusa is closer to Africa than Europe — just 113 kilometers from the Tunisian coast — it has proven to be a popular route for Africans.

The number of asylum seekers arriving in Italy increased 70 percent between 2012 and 2013, from 4,500 to 7,800 refugees, according to United Nations data. Political strife and uncertainty in North Africa and Syria, as well as the effectiveness of the 12.5-kilometer barbed-wire border fence between Greece and Turkey, contributed to the spike. Greek border guards and officers from the EU border monitoring agency Frontex concur that the fence has reduced crossings by 95 percent, Agence France-Presse reported. But those destined for Europe find alternate routes. The breakdown of order in Libya and the civil war in Syria has displaced about 2 million people, many seeking refuge in Italy.

**EU REGULATIONS**

The application process can be lengthy and cumbersome. Immigrants to the EU must apply for asylum in the entry country and remain there until the application is reviewed. This process, adopted in 2003 as the Dublin Regulation, aims to prevent applicants from submitting asylum applications in multiple member states. Some argue, however, that this places too heavy a burden on border states and violates EU principles of free movement.

EU countries with long coastlines such as Italy, Malta, Greece and Spain absorb the brunt of the migration, and its sheer volume exceeds national resources. The countries complain that they’re left financially drained, and immigrants are forced to live in substandard housing for want of alternatives. Those four countries have lobbied other EU members to share the burden of this migration. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees reports that reception centers in places such as Lampedusa are overcrowded. UNHCR senior protection associate Maurizio Molina told the *Guardian* that Lampedusa is in “critical condition” and urged other regions to share the burden.

The EU’s lack of a coordinated response has forced Italy to deploy Navy vessels, helicopters and unmanned drones to ensure immigrants survive Mediterranean waters. Italian Prime Minister Enrico Letta said patrols have saved hundreds of lives. Similarly, Malta is planning to send ships to the Libyan coast to prevent migrants from leaving. Letta suggests Italy will push to overhaul EU migration policies when the country holds the rotating EU presidency in 2014.

After long months of waiting in Lampedusa, some migrants grow desperate to start a new life. They find illicit ways to reach other EU countries. “These persons [refugees and asylum seekers] are often forced to rely on the service of smugglers, exposing them to harassment and exploitation, beatings, the risk of trafficking, or even death,” UN High Commissioner for Refugees Antonio Guterres said in an International Business Times article.
African migrants try to cross the Mediterranean Sea in an overloaded boat.

Making the Mediterranean safer

The EU has introduced technology known as the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR). Planned since 2008, the system seeks to secure EU external borders and standardize and streamline communications among border guards. Illegal migration involves about 50 different EU offices, and EUROSUR will help link these agencies with joint surveillance that will cost about 340 million euros during the next decade, the Deutsche Welle reports.

EUROSUR shifts the security focus from patrol boats to satellites and drones, providing better and broader coverage in all types of weather. Even though the system was not created to aid boats in distress at sea, but to interdict drug smugglers and other criminals, EUROSUR should ease the plight of migrants. “I think it’s self-evident that if information comes into this system, that people are in distress,” those people will be helped, Marcus Ferber of the European Parliament told the Deutsche Welle.

Nevertheless, some question the legalities of Frontex’s involvement. Joanna Parkin, migrant specialist for European policy studies in Brussels, wonders how it would work without giving Frontex direct operational powers, which some countries have resisted. She inquires “whether Frontex should have this kind of enhanced role given the ongoing questions about whether Frontex can be held responsible for failures to protect migrants on the Mediterranean Sea or whether it can ensure that potential refugees are given proper protection when they reach Europe,” The New York Times reported Parkin saying at an October 2013 news conference.

Root of the Problem

The key to stopping immigration from Libya is resolving security problems at the source, said Dr. Christopher Chivvis, senior political scientist with the U.S. think-tank Rand. Two years after Moammar Gadhafi’s regime was overthrown by NATO coalition forces, rival militias continue to battle for power in Libya. The security situation worsened to the point that Libyan Prime Minister Ali Zeidan was kidnapped. “The EU can provide technical assistance, facilitate a national reconciliation process on the model of Northern Ireland” and supply police training and judicial assistance, Chivvis told the London-based newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat.

Immigrants helping Europe

Immigrants need not be viewed as a burden. By most accounts, as the average family size diminishes in Europe, the continent’s workforce will begin to shrink. Germany has more than 16,000 job openings for civil engineers. Meanwhile, Sina Alinia, a civil engineer and Iranian immigrant, sits in the German state of Saxony-Anhalt waiting word regarding his asylum application, Der Spiegel noted in a story on immigration policy. He has been waiting 2 1/2 years to appeal an initial denial of his asylum request. If Europe embraced would-be workers such as Alinia, the story suggested, it would alleviate EU workplace shortages.

At an EU summit in October 2013, immigration was at the top of the agenda. The European Council agreed to step up border security through Frontex in the Mediterranean and Southeastern Europe and moved swiftly to implement EUROSUR. The council has scheduled a thorough review of long-range EU immigration policy in June 2014.

News that the EU’s top leaders were wrestling with the continent’s border problems cheered residents of Lampedusa previously concerned about what they viewed as official inaction. As Lampedusa resident Ajad Miccoli told the Guardian: “Now, we hope, the politicians might finally be listening.”
Since the breakup of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, the countries of the Western Balkans have faced numerous challenges, from constitutional crises to building and reinforcing state institutions. As a result, they have been missing out on the economic momentum and benefits of the Euro-Atlantic partnership. The future of the Western Balkans depends on their successful use of the “smart power” approach to overcome challenges in cooperation with NATO and the European Union.
NATO and the EU have been involved in the region through crisis management in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia. The political, economic and military power of NATO and the EU gives them significant influence because most countries in the region seek membership. But the global security environment poses new challenges for NATO and its partners. U.S.-European security relations are evolving while the small Western Balkan states are looking to find their place in international relations. Euro-Atlantic integration should contribute to the stability and development of the whole region.

NATO and the EU work together — NATO contributes to security, and the EU facilitates constitutional solutions through political reform and economic development. NATO’s security role has meant an extended military presence in the region, while the EU uses the promise of future membership to assist in transforming the region.

In 2013, the Western Balkans saw positive movement toward integration into the European mainstream. Croatia became a member of the EU, and Montenegro is following its example in working toward EU accession. Serbia awaits the start of its association negotiations, and Albania and Kosovo look forward to improved status following successful elections and the Kosovo-Serbia agreement. However, Bosnia and Herzegovina struggles with the need to reshape its federal political structure, and the Republic of Macedonia faces a difficult compromise with Greece over the “name issue” as a precondition for NATO and EU membership.

GLOBAL SECURITY CHALLENGES
The global security environment poses new challenges for NATO and its partners. Perceptions of the propriety of and responsibility for intervening in any particular conflict have changed. NATO’s additional tasks include counterterrorism, cyber attacks, energy security, maritime counterpiracy and protection of the global commons. These global challenges require a new concept defining the sort of issues NATO will engage in and fight for. More efficient and flexible partnerships remain one of the priorities of the Alliance; however, the impact of deep financial constraints and the influence of emerging powers require regular strategic recalculation.

U.S.-European relations are changing, but the need to deal with mutual security challenges remains. The U.S. is shifting its attention to Asia, making Europe a lower priority. Within the global security environment, small states face even bigger challenges. Membership in international organizations, coalitions and alliances help small countries take an active role. Cooperative procurement using “smart defense” strategies are becoming more prevalent. Global trends demand that Europe think more strategically.

NATO’S ROLE
NATO-EU engagement in the Western Balkans included two dimensions—a short-term dimension with military deployment to stop war and establish a stable security environment, and a long-term dimension in which the EU stabilization and association process offers a road map to a possible EU membership and a more stable and prosperous future. These two mechanisms, acting together as an incubator, have provided a climate that enabled the region to move forward.

Aspirants to NATO membership sign a Membership Action Plan. The procedure was originally adopted to manage the accession of the seven Vilnius countries, but remains “a practical manifestation of the open door policy” and an instrument for evaluating the progress of the rest of the candidate countries on their way to NATO membership. However, the Alliance seems to be losing interest in the region after the integration of Croatia and Albania in 2009.

NATO has encouraged Partnership for Peace (PfP) activities in the Balkans as a means of building confidence and cooperation, including multinational military exercises and training and defense-oriented education. Regional cooperation in the Balkans has been one of the main areas of discussion within the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council since it was created. NATO also launched the South East European Initiative in 1999 to promote “regional cooperation and lasting security and stability in the region.” The objective of the initiative is “to ensure transparency in defense planning, crisis management and defense management.” And the South East Europe Security Coordination Group was established to coordinate regional projects.
Regional security involves a group of states whose primary security concerns are correlated closely enough that their security is intertwined. The Western Balkans, exhausted by a decade of conflict, are recovering stability and the capacity to cooperate. Countries from the region are repairing broken relationships. NATO is helping by establishing new relationships to help resolve issues, such as border and minority rights, which require a regional approach. The specific nature of the region's struggle to reconcile the apparently contradictory tasks of state building and Euro-Atlantic integration requires a regional smart power approach.

REGIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES

Poverty, unemployment, corruption and property transfers are only some of the economic security challenges in the Western Balkans. Foreign direct investment and interregional trade has declined as a result of institutional weakness, political instability, organized crime and corruption, slowing the integration process. A regional smart development network could lead to new trade zones and regional economic cooperation. Instead of each nation going it alone, economic integration, aided by good governance, transparency and accountability, would better attract regional investment and productive capacity building.

NATO/EU membership ambitions are waning in some countries. Ethnic divisions remain rife. Military-security cooperation would improve regional stabilization. Pooling, sharing and smart defense allow for acquisition of defense projects that are unaffordable for a single country. Interethnic tension may inhibit security cooperation, but financial limitations encourage broader regional cooperation to address common challenges. In divided societies, reconciliation is necessary for transformation and healing. There is no formula for building relations between neighbors locked into long-lasting hostile interactions with deep-rooted animosities.

REGIONAL COOPERATION MECHANISMS

Some countries of the Western Balkans face internal problems that are an obstacle to foreign support and Euro-Atlantic integration. That means each country relates to NATO and the EU differently. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia are members of the PfP and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, while Kosovo is not. Five countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia,) are part of the EU Stability and Association Process (SAP). Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia are EU candidate countries, and Croatia is an EU member. Kosovo lacks both SAP and candidate status. Consequently, there is a different approach toward each, resulting in differing levels of economic and military assistance from NATO and EU institutions.

The differences lie in the level of progress each country has made in human rights, economic reform, protecting minority rights and developing friendly relations with neighbors. However, it’s important to include even those countries
that have yet to progress sufficiently. Excluding countries suffering from instability and conflict will limit regional cooperation. NATO and the EU must maintain a delicate balance between a gradual approach and requiring these countries to meet criteria for inclusion in the PfP and SAP processes.

CONCLUSION
Despite the committed presence of European and international organizations in the Western Balkans, results have been less than impressive. NATO and EU enlargement policies are based on the premise that countries can be accepted in a group, but membership decisions are based on the individual readiness of each applicant country. This approach has not encouraged regional cooperation, but has sometimes increased competition in relation to developing closer relations with the West.

NATO needs to do more to improve cooperation in the region, but progress cannot be separated from wider political and security development. Cooperation cannot develop if the region is characterized by deterioration of international and inter-ethnic relations. In this context, the West has not succeeded in developing an effective strategy for resolving regional problems caused by defects in the democratization process and violent nationalism.

Resolution of these problems and an increase of stability throughout Southeastern Europe will depend on the development of democracies that will respect human and minority rights and agree to the principle of permanent international borders. To achieve this goal, key NATO member countries will need to remain deeply engaged in the Western Balkans for years to come.

This article has been adapted from a paper written for NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division that highlighted findings and policy recommendations resulting from the Regional Outreach Networking Event “NATO and the Regional Stability of the Western Balkans – Smart Power Approach” held from August 28 to September 1, 2013, in Struga, Macedonia. This regional workshop was initiated and executed by Marshall Center alumni from the Republic of Macedonia (Marshall Center Macedonian Alumni Association) and co-sponsored by the Marshall Center and NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division. Participants included Marshall Center alumni from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia.
EXPORTING
CASPIAN GAS

The Trans-Adriatic Pipeline will improve energy security and diversify European gas supplies

By per Concordiam Staff
In the 13th century, Venetian traveler Marco Polo visited what is now Baku, Azerbaijan, where he watched oil scooped in buckets from “a fountain from which oil springs in great abundance.” Centuries earlier, the Absheron Peninsula, on which Baku sits, was considered sacred by the ancient Zoroastrian religion whose believers worshiped in fire temples fed by the plentiful natural gas deposits seeping from below. Oil and gas have always been abundant in the region. At the beginning of the 20th century, Baku produced more than half the world’s oil.

Starting in 2019, Caspian basin natural gas will flow to Europe through a new pipeline. The Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) was selected in June 2013 by the international consortium of energy companies that operate Azerbaijan’s offshore Shah Deniz natural gas field. The approval came after sometimes intense competition among several potential pipeline proposals. By diversifying Europe’s natural gas sources and reducing dependence on Russian-controlled pipelines, TAP represents a meaningful improvement in European energy security.

At a cost of 4.4 billion euros, the 870-kilometer TAP will transport 16 billion cubic meters of gas per year from Kipoi, Greece, on the Turkish border, through Albania and across the Adriatic Sea to Italy. To access TAP, Azerbaijan will pump gas from Baku to Turkey via the South Caucasus Pipeline and then link up with the soon-to-be-built Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline (TANAP). TAP also complements the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, opened in 2006, in transporting Azeri energy to European markets through what energy experts call the “southern corridor.”

TAP’s selection may signal the end for the proposed Nabucco pipeline, a longer and more ambitious project that would have transported a greater volume of Caspian basin gas through Turkey and Central Europe to Vienna. Nabucco, which enjoyed strong political support from the European Union and United States, eventually lost its bid based on simple economics — it was...
too expensive. As originally conceived, at 3,900 kilometers, Nabucco would have cost 8.4 billion euros, more than three times the cost of the nearly 1,800 kilometer Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and twice the cost of TAP.

When Azerbaijan and Turkey announced the planned construction of TANAP, eliminating the need for another new pipeline across Turkey, the grand Nabucco proposal was scaled back to a 1,300-kilometer “Nabucco-West,” which would have carried gas from the Turkish-Bulgarian border though Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria. But even the more modest Nabucco-West would still have cost 6.6 billion euros, 50 percent more than TAP.

TAP also offered 11.5 percent cheaper transit fees. At the November 2012 Atlantic Council Energy and Economic Summit in Istanbul, Al Cook, BP vice president heading the Shah Deniz field development, emphasized the need to balance cost efficiency and scalability in choosing a pipeline option. Cook said that TAP is “seriously more efficient than Nabucco-West from the gas price and tariffs points of view.”

The EU has made developing a southern corridor gas pipeline a strategic priority since 2002. According to the BP Statistical Review of World Energy, Russia’s state-owned Gazprom provided 34 percent of the EU’s gas in 2012, a situation made ever more uncomfortable by Russia’s periodic use of its energy resources as a geopolitical pressure tactic. Gazprom limited its gas shipments to Europe in the winters of 2006 and 2009 in a dispute with Ukraine — a dispute that simmered again in November 2013 as Ukraine prepared to sign an association agreement with the EU. Diversification lessens the threat of geopolitical manipulation and reduces the risk of potential supply shocks caused by instability in energy producing countries in the Middle East and elsewhere.

TAP will also offer economic benefits to the countries it crosses. According to analytical website Global Risk Insights, Greece will receive 1.5 billion euros and create 2,700 jobs from construction and profit from billions in transit fees during the expected 50-year lifetime of the pipeline. The feasibility of a 50-million-cubic-meter gas storage complex in Albania is being examined. Turkey may benefit most. In addition to an estimated 6 billion euros invested in Turkish companies, Turkey’s share of the gas will help reduce dependence on Russian and Middle Eastern gas and link it more closely with the EU.

Although TAP’s energy diversification benefits are evident, some observers see its selection instead of Nabucco as a setback, especially for Central European and Balkans countries that are most dependent on Russian gas. “Because TAP avoids Central Europe and the Balkans, its selection over Nabucco constitutes a clear victory for Russia, which wants Central and Eastern Europe dependent on it and not on Azerbaijan for energy,” online energy newsletter Natural Gas Europe argued in November 2013.

Russia has been wary of Azerbaijan infringing on profitable European markets. It has aggressively defended market share by inhibiting independent pipeline routes as much as possible. Moscow pressured Central Asian energy producers Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to continue to transport their gas and oil through a Russian-controlled, Soviet-era pipeline network. In 2007, in a direct challenge to Nabucco, Russia proposed South Stream, its own southern corridor pipeline across the Black Sea to Bulgaria and on to Central Europe. By creating competition for Nabucco, Russia lent an advantage to TAP.
The selection of TAP has caused many observers to sound the death knell for Nabucco, but others think Nabucco has a future. Shah Deniz’s current production may be designated for TAP, but abundant unexploited gas remains in the Caspian basin. Estimates for future Azeri gas production are as high as 32 billion cubic meters, nearly twice TAP’s capacity. Reduced use of coal in Europe is expected to increase gas demand by 20 percent by 2020.

Other suppliers will also increasingly serve Europe in the future. Turkmenistan is one of the world’s most prolific gas producers, but neighboring Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan also have substantial reserves. Most Central Asian gas now goes east to China, but in November 2013, EU officials announced they were finalizing a deal with Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan to build the long-delayed Trans-Caspian pipeline to supply Europe.

Pipelines are not the only option. Technological innovations are raising the profile of domestically produced shale gas and North American liquid natural gas transported aboard ships. Europe will need to increase natural gas usage as it transitions toward a renewable energy future. Wind and solar power are insufficient to meet European energy needs, and gas is much cleaner than coal. Germany’s post-Fukushima decision to shutter its nuclear power plants has created more reliance on coal. That has increased carbon dioxide emissions at a time when the continent is trying to reduce them.

The European Commission forecasts that the EU will import more than 80 percent of its natural gas by 2030. Diversification is necessary for energy security. “The southern corridor is critical, not just from a commercial standpoint, but also from a strategic standpoint,” Richard Morningstar, U.S. ambassador to Azerbaijan, told the Atlantic Council energy summit in November 2012. ‘At the end of the day, what is most important is for Europe to have a competitive market and to have as many diverse sources of supply as possible.” □
OPEN SKIES

Thirty-four nations participate in a treaty that offers reciprocal aerial inspections of military installations

By per Concordiam Staff

In October 2013, an unarmed Russian military Tupolev aircraft lifted off from Travis Air Force Base in California on an inspections mission spanning 4,250 kilometers of the western United States. It was one of dozens of Russian observation flights over the U.S. and other NATO countries in 2013.

In return, NATO sponsored dozens of flights over Russian territory on similar missions. By late 2013, Americans, Finns, Germans, Estonians and Italians had all piloted aircraft through Russian airspace to verify nuclear arms control treaties and otherwise monitor military activity.

Such military transparency among nations that used to be Cold War rivals is a tribute to the Treaty on Open Skies, which took effect January 1, 2002, under the guidance of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The 34 signatories of the treaty celebrated their 1,000th unarmed aerial observation mission in August 2013.

“The 1,000 flights carried out over the past 11 years, the Open Skies Treaty is a true success story of the joint efforts of diplomats, civilian and military experts, and the on-site personnel who have been involved in the implementation of the treaty,” said Ambassador Dr. Miklós Boros of Hungary, chairman of the OSCE’s Open Skies Consultative Commission.

Though mutually beneficial aerial arms verification is a proposal dating back to the 1950s, international distrust left the idea dormant until the end of the Cold War. Almost all of the 34 treaty adherents are European, but the Caucasus is represented by Georgia, Asia by Turkey and North America by the U.S. and Canada.

Flights access the entirety of a country’s land mass and territorial waters. None can be denied for reasons of “national security,” and only 24 hours’ notice is necessary between submission of a mission plan to the host country and the start of the observation flight. Data and imagery collected by national observation teams must be shared at the request of any other treaty state.

“We think that the Treaty on Open Skies is a well-functioning tool in the system of confidence- and security-building measures from Vancouver to Vladivostok,” Anton Mazur, a member of the Russian Federation’s OSCE delegation, said in 2013.

The treaty has evolved from being a purely arms control regimen to include multinational cooperation not envisioned at its inception. For example, countries routinely pool aircraft and sensing equipment. The U.S. has leased observation planes from Ukraine, Sweden, Hungary and Bulgaria. Sometimes two nations conduct missions aboard the same aircraft, as was the case with Russia and the United Kingdom sharing flights over Georgia, and Turkey and Bosnia-Herzegovina over Ukraine.

Some have proposed broadening flights to help monitor “frozen conflicts” that have troubled countries such as Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), Moldova (Transnistria) and Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh). Monitoring the environment, including natural and man-made disasters, is another possible use for the regimen set up by the treaty.

In a 2012 article co-authored for The New York Times, former U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz proposed the treaty extend to track greenhouse gas emissions, deforestation and nuclear power accidents. “Cooperative aerial monitoring can play a key role in addressing these challenges,” Schultz wrote.

Supporters also hope to expand the number of countries covered by the treaty. The Kyrgyz Republic has signed the treaty but not yet ratified it. For countries without state-of-the-art satellite networks, Open Skies could be the only effective way to acquire up-to-date aerial data to ease international tensions.

Open Skies has provided a level of routine military verification unimaginable throughout most of last century, when monitoring rival forces usually fell under the preserve of spying. Said the OSCE: “Open Skies is the most wide-ranging international effort to date to promote openness and transparency of military forces and their activities.”
Global Crime Demands
Global Policing

Edited by: Melchor de Guzman, Aiedeo Mintie Das and Dilip K. Das
Reviewed by: Sam Mullins, Marshall Center

This book represents a collection of papers originally presented by police practitioners and academic researchers at the 13th annual meeting of the International Police Executive Symposium (IPES) in Ayvalik, Turkey, in 2006. The 2012 publication includes an update of the original papers as well as pertinent articles from outside the 2006 conference. The result is a book of 15 chapters divided into four thematic sections: 1) global innovations in policing; 2) responding to transnational crimes and emerging law enforcement issues; 3) knowledge management: capturing, sharing and sustaining; and 4) international police practices and cultures.

The book’s two overarching objectives are to present a combination of practitioner and academic perspectives on key issues in policing, and to offer a variety of viewpoints from around the world. Given the mixture of professional and scholarly contributors and the diversity of cultural backgrounds representing nine countries, that has been achieved. Moreover, the range of topics covered within this single volume is remarkable. Chapters discuss disparate subjects such as community policing, public perceptions of threat, police interactions with mentally ill suspects, combating online sexual exploitation of children, and human rights abuses by police. Not all of these issues are dealt with in equal measure or with equal academic rigor, but there are useful insights, empirical and theoretical, scattered throughout.

However, it is precisely the diversity of chapters that is the book’s primary downfall. Despite the effort to organize chapters in thematic sections, the topics do not amalgamate as a coherent whole. The editors suggest that “the reader might see an emerging trend of the internationalization and uniformity of police practices in this volume” and that the “body of literature … seems to converge,” yet there is no attempt to identify these areas of commonality or convergence. Furthermore, there is no concluding chapter that might highlight recurring challenges or best practices across international boundaries or different crime types.

Ultimately, Strategic Responses to Crime comes across as a smorgasbord of disconnected papers, many of which would be more appropriately included with articles on the same topic. Hence, the book is useful only to those with an extremely broad interest in policing or to those with a strong interest in a particular chapter.

As noted in the preface, “the aims and objectives of the IPES are to provide a forum to foster closer relationships among police researchers and practitioners on a global scale … and to publish research on challenging and contemporary problems facing the policing profession.” Although Strategic Responses to Crime advances these goals, a more focused and thematically coherent set of publications would better demonstrate the value of collaboration between practitioners and researchers.

This book represents a collection of papers originally presented by police practitioners and academic researchers at the 13th annual meeting of the International Police Executive Symposium (IPES) in Ayvalik, Turkey, in 2006. The 2012 publication includes an update of the original papers as well as pertinent articles from outside the 2006 conference. The result is a book of 15 chapters divided into four thematic sections: 1) global innovations in policing; 2) responding to transnational crimes and emerging law enforcement issues; 3) knowledge management: capturing, sharing and sustaining; and 4) international police practices and cultures.

The book’s two overarching objectives are to present a combination of practitioner and academic perspectives on key issues in policing, and to offer a variety of viewpoints from around the world. Given the mixture of professional and scholarly contributors and the diversity of cultural backgrounds representing nine countries, that has been achieved. Moreover, the range of topics covered within this single volume is remarkable. Chapters discuss disparate subjects such as community policing, public perceptions of threat, police interactions with mentally ill suspects, combating online sexual exploitation of children, and human rights abuses by police. Not all of these issues are dealt with in equal measure or with equal academic rigor, but there are useful insights, empirical and theoretical, scattered throughout.

However, it is precisely the diversity of chapters that is the book’s primary downfall. Despite the effort to organize chapters in thematic sections, the topics do not amalgamate as a coherent whole. The editors suggest that “the reader might see an emerging trend of the internationalization and uniformity of police practices in this volume” and that the “body of literature … seems to converge,” yet there is no attempt to identify these areas of commonality or convergence. Furthermore, there is no concluding chapter that might highlight recurring challenges or best practices across international boundaries or different crime types.

Ultimately, Strategic Responses to Crime comes across as a smorgasbord of disconnected papers, many of which would be more appropriately included with articles on the same topic. Hence, the book is useful only to those with an extremely broad interest in policing or to those with a strong interest in a particular chapter.

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*Adapting Our Strategies to Counter Evolving Transnational Terrorist Threats from Al-Qa’ida, its Affiliates and its Advocates

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PASS 14-9
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