Turkey's Emerging Role in the Region
ON THE COVER

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Welcome to the 15th issue of *per Concordiam*. This issue is focused on Turkey’s significance to the European-Black Sea, Eurasian and Central Asian regions. Most regional experts, including our own professors, have observed the rise in Turkey’s importance to the world. We believe several dynamic factors contribute to this, and these factors merit special commentary. Turkey’s defense and security matters are especially relevant in today’s global environment.

As regional challenges develop, it is important for Europe and the United States to continue to maintain mutually beneficial partnerships with Turkey. Turkey is a crossroads country that has shown the world a proactive foreign policy, effectively implemented over the years through a mix of diplomacy and mediation. These efforts are supported by strong cultural ties, making Turkey’s national strategy endeavors worth highlighting. An example of such flourishing political relationships is Turkey’s partnership with the Balkan states, the country’s natural allies in building and hosting transnational natural gas pipelines.

Such progress is advantageous, especially when reinforced with multilateral partnerships, such as Turkey’s membership in NATO. Turkey, an Alliance member since 1952, continues to grow with NATO. Turkey’s recent request for NATO augmentation highlights this growth and accentuates NATO’s relevance to address future challenges. Furthermore, NATO established the Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism in Ankara. This center acts as the expert agency with regard to NATO’s capabilities in training, doctrine development and interoperability in the fight against violent extremism.

Turkey has a long history with many European states and maintains strong bilateral ties. Strengthening relationships continues to be a common theme with Turkey as it works to become a member of the European Union. This association between Turkey and the EU continues to be tenuous, especially in light of Turkish domestic politics and the troubled European economies. Germany and other European states will play a vital role in Turkey’s future relationship with the EU.

Turkey continues to be a primary international player in Middle East politics, the peace process and the fight against violent extremism. An example is the Turkish National Police’s ongoing global cooperation effort against drugs and organized crime. The Turkish International Academy against Drugs and Organized Crime was established in 2000 under the Turkish National Police Counter-Narcotics and Organized Crime Department. Together, they counter drugs and organized crime in collaboration with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

The Marshall Center, too, has a growing relationship with Turkey, including several visits from leadership and faculty since 2004. Our most recent endeavors were in May 2013, when the Marshall Center co-sponsored an event with the Turkish National Police Academy during which an Alumni Outreach Networking Event also took place. These events brought together various leaders and ministry representatives and provided them forums to approach topics in an interministerial fashion. Furthermore, these events provided U.S. Embassy staff the opportunity to meet Turkey’s Marshall Center alumni. The Marshall Center boasts 174 graduates from Turkey, and the number is expected to rise.

Although we previously announced we will no longer provide printed copies of *per Concordiam*, due to your continued interest and to better serve the needs of our alumni, we will continue to print and distribute the magazine as before. We also invite you to continue to access the online version of *per Concordiam* on the Marshall Center’s public website at www.marshallcenter.org and additionally for our alumni on the GlobalNet Portal at https://members.marshallcenter.org

We welcome comments and perspectives on these topics and will include your responses in future editions of the journal. Feel free to contact us at editor@perconcordiam.org

Sincerely,

Keith W. Dayton
Director
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**LETTERS TO THE EDITOR**

*per Concordiam* magazine addresses security issues relevant to Europe and Eurasia and aims to elicit thoughts and feedback from readers. We hope our previous issues accomplished this and helped stimulate debate and an exchange of ideas. Please continue to share your thoughts with us in the form of letters to the editor that will be published in this section. Please keep letters as brief as possible and specifically note the article, author and magazine edition to which you are referring. We reserve the right to edit all letters for language, civility, accuracy, brevity and clarity.

**EDITOR’S NOTE:** In the English and Russian printed editions of *per Concordiam’s* Volume 4 Number 2 (Future of NATO), page 38 had a technical error. Colored shading was omitted on parts of the map. We sincerely apologize for the oversight. The online versions of *per Concordiam* Volume 4 Number 2 have been corrected and can be found at www.marshallcenter.org

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**Send feedback via email to:** editor@perconcordiam.org

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**ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS**

*per Concordiam* is a moderated journal with the best and brightest submitted articles and papers published each quarter. We welcome articles from readers on security and defense issues in Europe and Eurasia.

First, email your story idea to editor@perconcordiam.org in an outline form or as a short description. If we like the idea, we can offer feedback before you start writing. We accept articles as original contributions. If your article or similar version is under consideration by another publication or was published elsewhere, please tell us when submitting the article. If you have a manuscript to submit but are not sure it’s right for the quarterly, email us to see if we’re interested.

As you’re writing your article, please remember:

- **Offer fresh ideas.** We are looking for articles with a unique perspective from the region. We likely will not publish articles on topics already heavily covered in other security and foreign policy journals.
- **Connect the dots.** We’ll publish an article on a single country if the subject is relevant to the region or the world.
- **Do not assume a U.S. audience.** The vast majority of *per Concordiam* readers are from Europe and Eurasia. We’re less likely to publish articles that cater to a U.S. audience. Our mission is to generate candid discussion of relevant security and defense topics, not to strictly reiterate U.S. foreign policy.
- **Steer clear of technical language.** Not everyone is a specialist in a certain field. Ideas should be accessible to the widest audience.
- **Provide original research or reporting to support your ideas.** And be prepared to document statements. We fact check everything we publish.
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Email manuscripts as Microsoft Word attachments to: editor@perconcordiam.org
March 13, 2013, marked a historic occasion for the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. The Marshall Center and the Turkish National Police Academy (TNPA) entered into a memorandum of understanding to promote high quality research in the fields of regional security and criminal justice. The memorandum was signed during a meeting that included TNPA President Dr. Remzi Fındıklı, UTSAM Director Dr. Süleyman Özeren, Marshall Center Director Lt.Gen (Ret.) Keith W. Dayton and German Deputy Director Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Hermann Wachter.

The relationship between the Marshall Center and the TNPA is not new. Many Turkish participants who have attended Marshall Center courses have been sponsored by the TNPA. As a result of this exposure to the TNPA, the Marshall Center has become familiar with the high quality and professionalism of the organization and its international focus and reach. Restructured in 2001, the TNPA has academic autonomy and university status. The TNPA, which offers diplomas for undergraduate and postgraduate programs, trains close to 2,000 students, many of them from other countries.

The memorandum encourages collaboration in areas of mutual interest through the establishment of formal links between the Marshall Center and the TNPA. The arrangement is similar to the degree-granting master’s program the Marshall Center offers with the German Bundeswehr University. The TNPA is also an academic degree-granting institution and collaborates with national and international research centers to address global security issues. The TNPA has a number of faculties that are compatible with the focus of the Marshall Center, including the International Center for Terrorism and Transnational Crime, known as UTSAM. The UTSAM faculty conducts field research and develops policy recommendations in the field of terrorism, transnational crime and regional security.

This agreement is historic and timely because it represents purposeful collaboration with a foreign nondefense institution at a time when threats to collective security are changing significantly. In the past, the ability to compartmentalize military and nonmilitary threats and approach each independently allowed for specialization of institutions. Today we face a wide array of new security challenges often referred to as hybrid threats. These threats include terrorism, transnational crime, illicit trafficking, and corruption and money-laundering schemes that threaten the stability and national security of affected states. Many of the most affected states are newly developing democracies. These new hybrid threats often incorporate components of traditional conventional threats, but in asymmetrical ways that exploit current conditions. Hybrid threats can impact both military and civilian organizations and evolve at a pace faster than our traditional ability to recognize them and implement counter measures.

During the past several years, the United States has confronted international challenges using a whole of government approach. This memorandum between the Marshall Center and the TNPA embraces and promotes this concept. Over time, both institutions envision the agreement will create an environment that will stimulate high quality research and scholarship aimed at identifying new solutions to new threats.
The roots of the Turkish republic were based upon the frictions caused by modernization in the second half of the 19th century during the Ottoman period. While new technical schools, mainly for the military, were established by the sultan, the era witnessed early patterns of conflict between the conservative ulema and modern institutions. This rivalry continued until the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Before World War I, the capital of the empire was the arena of the struggle for political power between the modernist Young Turks and the conservative opposition. In 1923, after a victory for comprehensive independence under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the new Turkish republic was established. That year marked the end of the clash with modernization, a conflict that had even delayed adoption of printing for decades and contributed to low literacy rates in the empire.

The founder of modern Turkey focused on policies that nurtured basic social, physical and economic infrastructure and rehabilitated history and language, including the introduction of the Latin alphabet to inspire a literacy revolution. Women, who were not considered official members of society during the census registries of the empire, were given the right to elect and to be elected. Between 1923 and 1950, social restructuring slowed in terms of modern parliamentary democracy, partly because of the global economic crisis and World War II. “Peace at home and peace in the world” was Atatürk’s motto for the nation, and it was supported by bilateral and multilateral peace treaties with neighboring nations.

After 1950, single-party rule was abandoned, and Turkey actively took part in the Korean War with its allies of the Free World. NATO membership was another landmark of global political choice that cost Turkey a lot. It undertook vast military investments instead of fulfilling the country’s social and economic needs until the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The years 1960 to 1980 were a period of open military interventions in Turkey’s democracy.
After 1980, World Bank restructuring policies paved the way for liberalization in Turkey and there were drastic changes and progress in the economy. Efforts accelerated for full membership to the European Union (EU), while close ties were established with the new independent states of the former Soviet Union. Following the economic crisis of 2001, a three-party coalition was replaced in 2002 by Justice and Development Party (AKP) rule. This launched a new era with changes to state structure and tradition that has had international implications.

The unipolar world order has brought political changes to Turkey’s region. The country no longer has land borders with the former Soviet Union, but the energy potential of the Russian Federation has led to closer economic, commercial and political ties. Considering Turkey’s role as a consumer and transit country via the Black Sea, a new energy politics picture has emerged for Turkey and Europe. Other elements of the energy equation in the region include Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, and recently Israel and Cyprus. Within this framework, Turkey has done quite well with the countries of its region. Turkey did not get directly involved with the political changes taking place in Iraq, maintained good relations with Armenia, supported United Nations peace guidelines for Cyprus and served as a trustworthy mediator between Israel and Syria during peace negotiations. There has been a considerable progress on bilateral issues with Greece and accelerations in the EU accession process.

Expectations for more democracy, freedom of expression and social participation flourished internally as legal amendments formed parallel to the EU accession efforts. As demonstrations began in Tunisia, it was soon apparent that anti-democratic governance would no longer dominate the people of the Middle East and North Africa. While landmark changes were observed from Egypt to Libya, Turkey was closely affected by the process on its southeastern border in terms of security. A new strategy was announced by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs: “Zero conflict strategy with the neighbors in the region.”

But that strategy hasn’t always been fulfilled in practice. Relations with Armenia are not as promising as in the earlier days of détente. It is doubtful if Azerbaijan still sees Turkey as a “big brother.” The Iraqi administration often and openly complains about neglect from Turkey, though Turkey has direct contacts with northern Iraqi Kurds in many fields, especially energy. The Syrian opposition is openly backed and logistically supported by Turkey nowadays. The Russian Federation and Turkey follow contradictory policies related to intervention in Syria, and Turkey’s logistics support for the opposition in Syria is a matter of diplomatic questioning by Russia. Since the Israeli attack on a Turkish humanitarian support fleet in international waters of the Mediterranean Sea, diplomatic relations between the two countries have been at the lowest possible level. Turkish-Greek relations remain strained at times, including the issues of minority rights in western Thrace, the reopening of a Greek Orthodox theological school in Istanbul and the partition of Cyprus. Very recently, the EU and NATO have strongly criticized Turkey about the clear violations of basic rights regarding communal gatherings, political demonstrations and general freedom of expression related to the Gezi Park protests in Istanbul that started May 31, 2013.

The United States and Turkey have better diplomatic relations than they did a decade ago. Even a dispute in Erbil in the Kurdish section of Iraq didn’t create a lasting Turkish-American rift in 2003. The future is unclear about open violations of basic democratic principles, such as long lasting political court cases against academicians, journalists and a considerable number of military staffers. Dozens of journalists are still under arrest, and serious doubts exist about political interference in the courts and police forces. Many Turks follow evaluations from the U.S. secretary of state and the White House with great interest.

Existing imbalances within the region and conflicts of international power preclude a radical change of political order and boundaries around Turkey in the short run. But increasing conservatism and Islamic influence may have adverse impacts, starting with Turkey and spreading to the region. The EU is troubled with a slowing economy, aging population, energy and resource dependence, and harsh competition from rising Asian markets. The U.S. has already made the strategic decision to shift its center of gravity from the Atlantic region to the Asia-Pacific.

Turkey established reliable economic growth while Western economies faced an international financial crisis. In the past 10 years, Turkey’s economy grew more than 60 percent in real terms, and the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality’s annual budget alone exceeds the total budget of 17 European countries.

More than a dozen multibillion-dollar projects continue in sectors from transportation to defense. However, the overall unemployment rate is still around 10 percent, and for the younger generation it is about 20 percent. The military’s role in governance continues to weaken. Relations with the EU seem to have been hopeless from the beginning, owing to double standards applied to Turkey. But there are positive and promising signals of social awakening that seem to trigger the internal dynamics of the country for more real democracy. A strong, liberal and democratic Turkey will contribute more to reducing international political tension while contributing to comprehensive development by bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

Genuine democracy and unrestricted freedom of expression seem to be key issues. If government officials consider Twitter and social media to be evil elements, the effect could resemble the Ottoman attempts to ban print technology, a process that will surely end up nowhere in the information age. Economic development and youth employment will certainly contribute to a decline in social unrest in the Middle East, which seems to be a prerequisite for permanent social reforms. The West can maximize its interests by supporting peace, stability and energy security in the region centered on Turkey.
A BRIDGE TO CENTRAL ASIA

Turkey plays a vital role in trade and transport between Asia and Europe.

By Dr. Gregory Gleason, Marshall Center, and Dr. Oktay F. Tanrsever, Middle East Technical University
The Ottoman Empire, predecessor to the modern Turkish state and a western terminus of the legendary Silk Road trade routes, was for centuries a primary link to the trans-Atlantic world for Central Asia. Today, in accordance with the New Silk Road initiative, Turkey is renewing its role as a bridge between Central Asia and the West. Turkey’s strong economic growth and pursuit of European Union membership, together with its cultural links to Central Asia, leave it ideally placed for the task.

Changes in Turkey’s overall approach to Central Asia, as well as its own process of Europeanization and economic success, have created a more favorable and promising context for the development of relations that once were determined more by Central Asia’s relationship with Moscow.

Although Turkey had significant potential in the 1990s, its own limitations — conflicts with neighbors, its own imperfect democracy and economic problems — undermined its capacity as a “bridge.” Ankara’s foreign aid to Central Asia declined steadily throughout the 1990s, decreasing Turkey’s appeal to the region. In addition, Turkey’s own reluctance to implement Western-style liberal democracy hurt its credibility as a model for Central Asian countries. Domestic political instability also diverted attention in Turkey from foreign policy to domestic feuds.

Turkey’s negotiations for full EU membership started in 1999 after the Helsinki Summit enabled Ankara to develop a more Europeanized foreign policy toward the nations in its neighborhood, including the Central Asian region. Ankara’s implementation of the socio-political and economic reforms required for EU accession assisted in aligning Turkish foreign policy with the EU’s Copenhagen criteria and resulted in the adoption of European norms and values. In line with this new approach, Ankara began emphasizing a soft-power approach focused on cooperation in socio-economic areas.

Turkey’s economic growth in the 2000s, with annual growth rates above 5 percent, allowed it to renew its approach toward Central Asia. Ankara prioritized its more liberal economic attitude over a traditional foreign policy orientation that emphasized state-centric security. Turkey’s foreign policy became more reflective of the interests of Turkish companies and civil society actors.
and had the added benefit of attracting greater foreign direct investment into Turkey, as a centrally located country with strong trade links with regional neighbors.

Turkey, always a supporter of the Silk Road strategy, has actively supported the independence of the post-Soviet Central Asian states and was the first country to open diplomatic missions in all five countries. Ankara is determined to counter the hegemonic policies of Moscow. Turkey’s support for the renewal of the traditional Silk Road stems from its desire to facilitate the export of Central Asian energy to western markets via Turkey. For Ankara, the Silk Road strategy has the advantage of bypassing Russia and other rivals.

Borders are a definitional feature of the modern nation-state. They have two simultaneous functions: to separate and to connect. The modern state must achieve both, protect core values and interests and connect with other countries to stimulate commerce, science, industrial and cultural development. This is particularly important in today’s world, which is more interdependent than at any time in history. The technological and scientific forces that created the globalized world have created unprecedented new opportunities for advancement. However, the international community still faces urgent challenges: crime, violence, weapons proliferation, environmental degradation and poverty. The means to solve or vastly mitigate these problems has never been so close within human reach.

Partnerships and cooperation are required to address these problems, and Turkey is leading the way in forging new partnerships through Eurasia. Restoration of the spirit of the “Great Silk Road” transit corridors linking East and West re-establishes opportunities for development and averts conflict. Eurasia’s physical infrastructure — roads, bridges, airports, railroads, pipelines, waterways, seaports, electrical grids and telecommunication systems — continues to shape regional patterns of commerce and movement. When transit, trade and communications infrastructure is underdeveloped or nonoperational, the effects are isolating. However, when infrastructure is developed in sync with market-driven realities and needs, it acts as a bridge.

**BUILDING COOPERATION**

The New Silk Road initiative is a diplomatic undertaking. It envisions a network of greater regional connectivity and economic integration. The essence of diplomacy in relation to infrastructure is coordination that benefits all. Coordination is how states seek to organize and amplify resources normally outside their control and requires innovation, imagination and strategic foresight. The pursuit of national goals through policies that influence the development and management of physical infrastructure is growing in importance, thanks to the increasing interdependence of a globalized world. Today, economic and political cooperation depends on aspects of “soft” and “hard” infrastructure, which are firmly rooted in traditional theories of international relations and must be closely synced. “Soft” infrastructure refers to the legislative, regulatory and public policy measures, and “hard” infrastructure is composed of physical objects.

In traditional terms, national strategy is defined as a state’s application of available resources in pursuit of national interests. Available resources are finite, but also fungible insofar as, through skillful policymaking, the state can use them differently to achieve the fullest aggregate. There are many ways of doing this: Force, the threat of force, traditional diplomacy, covert influence and engagement in international organizations are among the most widely practiced methods.

In a globalized world, a state’s infrastructure policy is an extension of the national strategy. A general principle of economic institutional theory is that to improve the efficiency of a public infrastructure, either the (hard) physical structures or the (soft) institutional structures may be altered, but neither can be changed independently of the other. The New Silk Road initiative would help states build a mutually beneficial infrastructure network allowing for the most beneficial use of available resources. Each of the Central Asian states would play important roles. For instance, Turkmenistan, strategically located and rich in hydrocarbons, can contribute as a transit country and energy producer. As U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Robert Blake Jr. recently pointed out, “The economic potential of a more open and integrated region — home to over one-fifth of the world’s population — is virtually unlimited. By promoting such linkages between the countries of South and Central Asia, this potential can be unlocked and create the conditions for a secure and prosperous region, with Afghanistan at its center.”

**COMPETING DEVELOPMENT MODELS**

The economic development and modernization of virtually all advanced societies depend on the development of physical infrastructure to facilitate commerce and exchange. Without ports, rail, road, electric grids, telecommunications and other public utility structures, development is thwarted or delayed, regional disparities grow and intraregional conflict can be exacerbated. Accordingly, countries interested in encouraging internal or regional
development find that government investment in infrastructure projects is necessary.

There are numerous ways to spur the expansion of infrastructure projects. One of these is integration — an attractive way to coordinate actions, regarded as a set of policies that link states across borders in mutually advantageous and cooperative ways to achieve common objectives. There are two approaches to integration that, in many significant respects, are quite different. One form is state-directed, deliberate, rational and goal-oriented infrastructure development. This approach tends to move from design to practice. The other form emphasizes market-driven relations and brings various parties, such as international organizations, states, banks, commercial enterprises, nongovernmental organizations and other actors into a process of interests-driven development. The statist-design model is more illustrative of the Eurasian Union approach and the market-driven model exemplifies the New Silk Road approach. Both approaches have strengths and weaknesses.

In the Eurasian Union-statist model, states take the leading role in expressing will, creating the laws, rules and practices and positioning capital to spur banking sector investment in infrastructure upgrades and development. This form of integration establishes the structure and permits state and commercial enterprises to take advantage of the opportunities to build and maintain the infrastructure necessary for transborder trade and interaction. The state-directed model’s primary weakness is that political criteria often take precedence over commercial principles and lead to overdevelopment, unsustainable development or waste of taxpayers’ money.

The New Silk Road-market model uses government incentives to encourage private investment in infrastructure and results in increased trade, commerce and profits. This approach seeks to identify commercially viable infrastructure projects and spur intragovernmental coordination that allows international (multilateral) financial institutions to invest in sustainable, long-term projects. Bringing multiple partners together in coordinated development efforts is not easy, given the considerable political and market risk in new development projects. But risk is generally proportional to reward, and developing such projects while avoiding capture by special interests is a major challenge facing the international development community.

The cooperative-market model’s main weakness is that many ideas never get off the ground. Opportunities are lost while other regions in the fast-developing world quickly capture market share. The cooperative-market model requires sound practices in government, commerce and international cooperation and emphasizes fair play, equitable commercial dispute adjudication and participatory public decision-making institutions, especially in the case of natural monopolies or public utilities.

**COOPERATION, NOT CONFRONTATION**

Turkey has emerged in the past decade as an engine of Eurasian development, linking Asia and Europe. The European Council’s acceptance of Turkey as an EU candidate country was a major turning point, significantly contributing to Turkey’s emergence. The EU’s recognition that Turkey meets the Copenhagen criteria served as an endorsement of its democratic political system and functioning free market economy.

A dynamic foreign policy, as exemplified in its memberships in the G-20 and the United Nations Security Council (2009-2010), also marked Turkey’s emergence as a global actor. Turkey’s Western orientation and “Europeanization” has positively shaped its relationship with Russia. In this context, Moscow’s decision to improve relations with Ankara in the 2000s reflected its interest in increasing its influence with this emerging global player. It was clear that Russia could not afford to neglect Turkey and its emerging role in European and global affairs.
Turkey and Russia have developed a close economic partnership in the Black Sea region. In the 2000s, Russia became Turkey’s largest trading partner, and Turkey became the fifth-largest trading partner of Russia. Energy projects were the most visible dimension of Turkish-Russian cooperation, the origins of which go back to the Soviet era when Ankara agreed to import natural gas from the Soviet Union through a pipeline known as the “western route” that crossed Ukraine and Bulgaria. Energy cooperation intensified after the realization of the Blue Stream natural gas pipeline and provided Turkey with Russian natural gas passing under the Black Sea. Blue Stream, however, has increased dependence on Russian natural gas considerably. Gazprom, Russia’s natural gas monopoly and one of the biggest energy companies in the world, also showed interest in acquiring a considerable share of Turkey’s domestic natural gas distribution networks. Turkish energy imports have created a trade deficit with Russia, and it is unlikely that Turkish exports will increase enough to eliminate the deficit in the near future.

Other economic cooperation includes Turkish construction companies building in Russia and Turkish direct investment in the Russian economy. Likewise, Russian direct investment in Turkey, mainly in the energy and tourism sectors, increased considerably. Surprisingly, tourism has become a major component of Turkish-Russian economic cooperation. Millions of Russian tourists flock to Turkish beaches, and a growing number of Russian-Turkish marriages show that socio-cultural ties are also developing alongside growing economic relations.

Turkey’s relationship with Russia has succeeded in maintaining a mutually beneficial character that emphasizes cooperation and avoids confrontation. This is particularly important to the Central Asian states. Eurasian geographic realities and tension between Russia and the United States influence the foreign policies of Central Asian states. Russia is omnipresent and important, but the U.S. is far away and easily diverted by its many global obligations. For many Central Asian leaders, the U.S. is seen as an unreliable partner while Russia is seen as an unavoidable partner.

Russia’s economic resurgence and renewed political assertiveness have created anxiety that competition over Central Asian markets and resources could ignite a 21st-century version of the “Great Game,” the 19th-century geopolitical competition between Russia and Great Britain. This historical analogy inaccurately reflects contemporary reality. Competition for resources and advantageous market positions are present and suspicion and animosity remain, but integration rather than territorial competition is the theme of this century.

**U.S. STRATEGIC REALIGNMENT**

The U.S. is in the midst of a strategic, global realignment. Washington has announced a realignment to the Pacific Rim after more than a decade of intensive military and diplomatic involvement in Central Asia and 50 years of Europe-centric engagement during the Cold War and the post-Communist transition. This implies the transfer of resources from other regions of the world to the Far East. But the demands on the U.S. for engagement on a global level have not diminished, and realigning priorities will require compensatory adjustments.

Some in the U.S. argue for a policy of retrenchment, but others support continued U.S. global prominence. U.S. global dominance in numerous spheres — from diplomatic influence and military might to commerce, industry and science — largely resulted from imbalances in the world after World War II and endured throughout the Cold War. In more recent times, the international community has recognized the declining utility of military might as an instrument of durable political
change, at least when deeply rooted cultural and institutional underpinnings are absent.

U.S. foreign policy is in a crucial stage of reorientation. Perhaps most significant is the shift away from unilaterality toward multipolarism and, more important, an increasing commitment to multipartner relationships. As the U.S. decreases its presence in Central Asia, Turkey can increase its leadership role economically and diplomatically.

TURKEY, CENTRAL ASIA AND THE NEW SILK ROAD
As Turkey has grown economically, it has become increasingly influential in the international community. Its new foreign policy direction is characterized by increased interaction with neighbors, including facilitating new initiatives with countries to the East, particularly Central Asia, India and China. But although Turkey’s foreign policy has made significant strides, questions remain. First, Turkey has made only limited progress toward EU accession, though membership remains an explicit goal of successive Turkish governments. Second, Turkey has done much to build relations with its Arab neighbors, but these achievements have been tested by the Arab Spring. Ankara opted to break relations with existing regimes with which it had worked closely to form new alliances with emerging reformist governments. The policy was reasonably successful in Egypt and Tunisia but has led to confrontation with neighboring Syria.

Moscow’s and Ankara’s differences over issues in the Middle East have implications for their positions on issues in Central Asia. Ankara seeks to intensify its security cooperation with Central Asian countries to confront terrorism and organized crime. In this respect, Turkey emphasizes its NATO membership and uses its two NATO-affiliated centers: the Defence against Terrorism NATO Centre of Excellence and the Partnership for Peace Center, both in Ankara, to train Central Asian military and civilian security officers. Through joint military maneuvers, Ankara supports the modernization of Central Asian armed forces and capacity development to facilitate interoperability with NATO.

Turkey seeks to improve its own energy security by enhancing the energy security of the Central Asian states and the trans-Atlantic world. That would be done by allowing Central Asian oil and natural gas to reach European markets via Turkey. To this end, Ankara supports Central Asian efforts to decrease dependence on Russian-controlled oil and gas pipelines, including new pipeline projects linking Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to the existing Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum natural gas pipeline and the planned Trans-Anatolian Pipeline project that could further integrate energy markets with those of the EU.

Turkey’s soft power potential in Central Asia that stems mainly from socio-economic, educational and cultural relations is substantial. This includes the cultural activities of Yunus Emre cultural centers, Turkish schools and universities, and popular Turkish television programs. However, Ankara lacks a comprehensive strategy to enhance soft power in Central Asia. Regional elites also prefer to keep Turkey at arm’s length out of fear that it could support democratic movements against their authoritarian regimes.

CONCLUSION
The New Silk Road initiative has great potential to link Central Asia to the trans-Atlantic world, and Turkey could make significant contributions to realize its promise. Ankara’s policies toward the region have evolved since the 1990s to emphasize economic and socio-cultural soft power elements. More important, Turkey’s process of Europeanization motivates the Central Asian countries to enhance their cooperation with Europe and the trans-Atlantic world, using Turkey as an intermediary. By facilitating international cooperation, these elements of soft power have the added benefit of enhancing Ankara’s relations not only with Central Asia but also with the trans-Atlantic world.

To facilitate the success of the New Silk Road, Turkey should continue to follow these foreign policy principles: First, continue to treat the Central Asian countries as equal partners. Second, cooperation with the Central Asian countries should be enhanced to counterbalance Russia and China. Finally, continue to support the participation of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in a European southern energy corridor through Turkey. The renewed Silk Road strategy could cement growing relations among the Central Asian countries, Turkey and the trans-Atlantic world. This vision presents a win-win perspective for all partners involved.
FIGHTING TERRORISM AND ORGANIZED CRIME

Turkish academies increase professionalism in police forces around the world

By Süleyman Özeren, Ph.D. and Kamil Yılmaz, Ph.D., UTSAM

Turkey has a long history of combating terrorism and transnational crime. The Turkish National Police (TNP) Academy, the International Center for Terrorism and Transnational Crime (UTSAM), and Turkish International Academy against Drugs and Crime (TADOC) support the operational responses of various law enforcement agencies by conducting training and scientific research in those fields.
The Turkish National Police Academy

The TNP Academy started in 1937 with a mere one-year program for police managers. By 1984, it had developed into an official four-year bachelor’s degree institution of higher learning. In April 2001, the Police Academy expanded into a police university that provides the option for police officers and police managers to become Turkish National Police through the Security Sciences Faculty, the Security Sciences Institutes and 27 Police Vocational Schools of Higher Education located throughout the country. Police Vocational Schools of Higher Education train police officers toward an associate’s degree, the Security Sciences Faculty provides bachelor’s degrees, and the Security Sciences Institute offers opportunities for master’s degrees and doctorates.

The Institute of Security Sciences was founded under the TNP Academy in 2002 with nine departments: forensic science, criminal justice, security strategies and administration, intelligence studies, crime studies, transportation security and management, international security, international security (in English), and international terrorism and transnational crime. There are nine master’s degree and two doctoral programs available at the institute.

The TNP Academy’s goal is to provide the Turkish National Police with the human resources to run graduate and other training programs, carry out scientific research, create publications and consult with other agencies on security issues. In training future police managers, the academy places special emphasis on respect for human rights and strives to maintain the highest possible standards by observing the latest technological developments.

In addition, the TNP Academy is international. It has trained 1,085 police cadets from 20 countries since 1991, and 307 cadets from 12 countries are currently training at the Academy. In 2010, the academy proposed the formation of the International Association of Police Academies (INTERPA) to further improve its international outlook and cultivate fruitful relations among police academies around the world. INTERPA was established the next year with 24 police academies or equivalent institutions from 22 countries participating. TNP Academy professor Remzi Fındıklı has been the president of INTERPA since its inception.

The International Center for Terrorism and Transnational Crime

UTSAM was established in 2006 under the TNP Department of Research Centers. The TNP Academy, with its highly qualified and specialized team of researchers, merges theory with practice and generates information predominantly for policymakers, decision-makers and practitioners in fields such as terrorism, transnational crime, human trafficking, migrant smuggling, drug trafficking, organized crime and cyber crime. Within this framework, UTSAM has improved cooperation with national and international research centers and security actors and organized numerous seminars, workshops, conferences and symposia. The Journal of International Security and Terrorism and other UTSAM publications contribute to the academic world of security sector professionals.

Turkey co-chairs the Global Counter Terrorism Forum (GCTF), launched in New York in September 2011. The GCTF consists of a strategic-level coordinating committee with two thematic and three regional expert-driven working groups. Turkey and the European Union (EU) are co-chairing the “Horn of Africa Region Capacity Building” working group. A significant proportion of Turkey’s work for the GCTF is undertaken by UTSAM.

UTSAM holds its fourth International Symposium on Terrorism and Transnational Crime in December 2012 in Antalya, Turkey.
Turkey emphasizes the importance of a multisectoral approach to countering violent extremism and prepared a memorandum on “Good Practices for a Multi-Sectoral Approach to Counter Violent Extremism” that addresses the role of government institutions, agencies and civil society in countering violent extremism. Three studies follow to provide a better understanding of UTSAM.

Modem organized criminal groups employ complex and sophisticated methods. Therefore, the need for well-trained and well-equipped law enforcement agencies and agents is now greater than ever.

UTSAM Study #1
IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION WITHIN TERRORIST GROUPS AND MEMBER PROFILES: THE CASE OF THE KURDISTAN WORKERS’ PARTY (PKK) AND UNION OF COMMUNITIES IN KURDISTAN (KCK)

Many factors affect individual pathways toward involvement in terrorist organizations. Often, individuals are selected and recruited by organizations, and from an individual’s perspective, “triggering-accelerating factors” are important in the decision phase of recruitment. However, since terrorism is generally viewed on the macro-level, individual factors are often underappreciated because the identity construction processes of militants in terrorist organizations are shaped by individual life stories at the micro-level.

The issue of PKK/KCK terrorism and the Kurdish question are generally examined on a macro-scale and often conflated. The two issues should be separated. To grasp the issue of terrorism, the socio-psychological conditions of individuals in the recruitment phase must be analyzed carefully. Analyses at both macro- and micro-level are required to present a picture that fully reflects the issue.

The purpose of this study is to explore terrorism – generally debated through macro-level discourses and perceptions reinforced by such discourses – at the micro-level. The strategies and methods of exploiting individual factors in the recruitment process, with respect to PKK/KCK terrorist organization in particular, are elaborated.

A profile of a typical PKK/KCK terrorist organization member, derived through analyses of individual members, can be summarized as follows:

- As a proportion of the population, most PKK/KCK members originate from the provinces of Hakkari, Tunceli, Siirt, Şırnak, Muş, Mardin, Bingöl, Bitlis, Diyarbakır and Batman.
- Unmarried males are most likely to join the terrorist organization. Seventy-seven percent of members are male. Only 8 percent are married, and there are fewer married female members than married men. Married members are more likely to surrender.
- Young individuals more readily join terrorist organizations. More than 75 percent of members are 34 years old or younger. The average member joins the organization between 15 and 21, similar to the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka (when kidnapped children are taken into account). However, younger fighters, those under 24, are more likely to surrender.
- About 72 percent of members have received a primary school education or less, while only 16 percent are high school graduates.
• Approximately 80 percent of members did not have any job before joining the organization. Seventy-one percent have no employed family members.

Thirteen percent of members have relatives in the organization. When analyzing terrorist organizations, it is important to make evaluations based on scientific data rather than societal perceptions. Though only 13 percent of PKK/KCK members have family members within the organization, the perceptional rate is 58 percent.

Socio-psychological problems constitute both the primary influence on individuals’ decisions to join the PKK/KCK and the basic emotional source of feelings of marginalization. Trauma plays a crucial role in the construction of ethnic nationalism. Some individuals who experienced primary or firsthand trauma joined the organization as a direct result of the experience. Today, young people are being exposed to secondary or learned trauma, in which they experience events that happened to others as if they happened to themselves.

When an individual feels ethnicity is to blame for his problems in life, minor triggering events may ensure the individual joins a terrorist organization. Though motivations differ, an individual's ethnic sensitivity is significant in his/her decision to join the organization. For the very young, it is difficult to point to ethnic consciousness or a deliberate process of decision-making, but rather, these individuals see...
The Turkish International Academy against Drugs and Organized Crime provides basic and expert-level training to law enforcement agencies across the world.
friends, relatives or teachers as role models.

Socio-economic problems caused by misguided policies of the past, such as forced migration and village evacuations, have become today’s main source of recruitment for the organization. From this perspective, migration is among the most important parameters of the Kurdish issue.

UTSAM Study #2
GLOBAL MIGRATION AND CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS:
ILLEGAL MIGRANTS AND MIGRANT SMUGGLERS IN TURKEY
The global problem of migrant smuggling has always been on Turkey’s agenda, owing to its geographical and political position. Turkey’s neighbors across its eastern/southeastern borders are source countries. Political and economic turmoil and the proximity of prosperous Western countries make Turkey an ideal transit route for illegal migration from these countries. Moreover, Turkey has long, mountainous land borders that are difficult to control and provide opportunity for illegal migrants and human smugglers. Turkey serves as a bridge for illegal migrants to Europe, where they hope to start a new life.

Migrants, who begin their journeys with hopes for better futures and better living conditions, often resort to illegal organizations when they fail to reach their intended destinations through legal means. These human smuggling organizations, sometimes called “hope traders” or “opportunisters of global migration,” have emerged as alternatives to evade legal restrictions against global migration and function as intermediaries seeking material gain through illicit activity.

In this light, UTSAM conducted field research with the financial help of the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK) and technical support from the Department of Anti-Smuggling and Organized Crime and the Department of Foreigners, Borders and Asylum, both of the Turkish National Police. The research consisted of face-to-face interviews with 86 illegal migrants, 54 migrant smugglers and 75 experts. Additional qualitative information was gathered from 1,334 illegal migrants and 106 smugglers.

Illegal migration is a way out for people desperately struggling to survive economic and social turmoil and political instability. Economic expectations, facilitated by the similar experiences of others and eased by social bonds and networks, play a major role in illegal migration. Migration trends correlate with social, economic and political factors in societies. Migration generally increases after political and economic crises. There were 94,514 illegal immigrants apprehended in 2000, but the number declined in subsequent years and almost halved to 56,219 by 2003. The trend fluctuated downward for the remainder of the decade and reached a low of 34,345 immigrants in 2009. The decline continued in 2010, but jumped again in 2011 with 44,415 illegal immigrants apprehended.

Turkey has traditionally been a transit country for migrant smuggling, but has increasingly become a destination in recent years. Many illegal immigrants who stay in Turkey settle in densely populated and socially heterogeneous cities such as Istanbul and Izmir. Most illegal immigrants in Turkey are young males with low incomes and education who work as unskilled laborers. Even people who leave their countries mostly for economic reasons say that war and political conflicts also influence their decision to leave. Greece, as an eastern gateway into the EU, is the main goal of illegal migrants. After Greece, Italy, Germany, France, Canada, Switzerland, Austria, and the United Kingdom are among the most preferred countries among illegal migrants.

Migrant smuggling is primarily organized by crime syndicates that have international connections and operate for financial gain. Organizers exploit the desire of people to move to economically and socially beneficial countries. Migrant smugglers in Turkey are usually married and poorly educated male Turkish citizens in their 30s and 40s. Because of economic and social problems such as lack of education, security, and employment in the eastern and the southeastern provinces of Turkey, people living in those regions often resort to such illegal activities to make a living. Smuggling charges vary depending on distance, the border policies of the destination country, means of transportation and methods of migration. It is estimated that Turkish migrant smugglers earned at least $300 million in 2011.

Migrant smugglers primarily use land transport, but sometimes use sea and air routes as well. Smugglers constantly improve concealment and transport techniques and often use a variety of land and sea vehicles, including automobiles, trucks, buses, minibuses and boats.

The complex and transnational nature of migrant smuggling requires active cooperation at the national and international level to effectively counter it and the
associated problems of money laundering, organized crime and terror finance.

**UTSAM Study #3**

**WORKSHOP ON DEVELOPING PREVENTION STRATEGIES AND TACTICS TO COUNTER RADICALIZATION JOINTLY ORGANIZED BY NATO AND UTSAM**

The workshop was held as part of UTSAM’s second Symposium on International Terrorism and Transnational Crime in December 2010 in Antalya, Turkey. Thirty-seven papers were presented by 48 national and international experts during seven sessions, at the NATO-supported Science for Peace and Security Program.

In their presentations, security experts examined how NATO member states combat terrorism and explored potential future methods for counterterrorism success. Special emphasis was placed on the quality and nature of relations among NATO member and nonmembers.

**Turkish International Academy against Drugs and Organized Crime**

Modern organized criminal groups employ complex and sophisticated methods. Therefore, the need for well-trained and well-equipped law enforcement agencies and agents is now greater than ever.

Based on a strong belief in international cooperation, Turkey has supported every initiative aimed at combating international drug trafficking. Strong cooperation is vital in achieving success in the fight against organized crime. With this understanding, TADOC was established in Ankara in June 2000 under the Department of Anti-Smuggling and Organized Crime and within the
framework of Turkish-United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) collaboration.

TADOC is the leading training academy for the region and is referred to by the UNODC as a “Center of Excellence” while its programs and services are regarded as “best practices” around the world. TADOC provides training to the law enforcement personnel from countries with which Turkey signed bilateral cooperation agreements and treaties.

Professional and skilled law enforcement personnel play a pivotal role in combating drugs and other forms of transnational crime. The key to having qualified personnel is training, which is the main instrument for capacity building and sustained learning. Therefore, TADOC has devoted significant efforts and resources to train high-quality personnel in the region.

TADOC is one of the best training centers in the world, offering basic and expert level training in counternarcotics and fighting organized crime. As demand for TADOC training increases each year, TADOC successfully continues its mission to identify and meet the training needs of law enforcement agencies around the world. Reinforced by Turkey’s successful experience in the field, TADOC training reflects a harmonization of theory and practice. TADOC is also a significant contributor to training projects associated with the


TADOC mobile teams bring the training to the trainees. This is especially beneficial because most TADOC training needs to be implemented in an environment familiar to the trainee. TADOC training is based on student-centered and constructive learning principles, and students are encouraged to become actively involved in the learning process. Since its establishment, TADOC has implemented 380 international training events with the participation of 6,844 law enforcement personnel from 86 countries. At the national level, TADOC has held 721 training events with the participation of 22,892 law enforcement personnel.

Summary
Because of its geographical location and socio-political and economic conditions, Turkey has historically experienced high levels of transnational organized crime such as terrorism and drug smuggling. To fight these crimes, Turkey continuously strives to stay current on international practices and technological developments while maintaining a balance between security and individual rights and freedoms. At the center of these efforts, the country has placed special emphasis on international cooperation through the creation of these vital academies and research institutions.
ANKARA-BASED CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE DEFENCE AGAINST TERRORISM TRAINS ALLIANCE OFFICERS

BY COL. ANDREW BERNARD
NATO Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism
On April 15, 2013, the world stood shocked as it watched the aftermath of two bomb explosions at the finish line of the Boston Marathon. Unfortunately, the Boston bombing was not the only act of terrorism that day. Iraq was riddled by a string of attacks in anticipation of its elections, and there were other incidents around the globe. Terrorism is not going away any time soon.

Individual nations continue to place terrorism at the forefront of national security concerns. Fighting terrorism, though, does not stop at national borders. International organizations play a key role in creating a framework in which nations can operate. Like many other organizations, NATO placed combating terrorism at the top of its priority list since the September 11, 2001, attacks.

In addition to operational missions, such as Operation Active Endeavor, NATO has another tool at its disposal to help understand the threat posed by terrorism: the Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism (COE-DAT). This unique organization, tailored to study all facets of terrorism, is part of a broader network of centres that provides unique expertise for the Alliance. But before elaborating on COE-DAT’s efforts, it is necessary to understand just how these centres of excellence are positioned to develop their expertise.

**Putting COEs on the Map**

In 2002, NATO decided to create and promote a series of centres of excellence (COE). The goal was for the COEs to focus on a specific subject and develop critical expertise within the respective institution for the benefit of the entire Alliance. Using powers vested in the Paris Protocols of 1952, NATO authorized the establishment and accreditation of these centres as International Military Organizations (IMO). A unique aspect of NATO’s network of COEs is that they do not formally sit within the NATO Command Structure (NCS). Rather, they constitute a much larger network of affiliations that exchange information while maintaining independence from influence by any one nation or organization.

Since NATO-accredited COEs do not receive funding directly from the Alliance, they are financed by contributions directly from NATO members that voluntarily participate in the particular COE. This detail is important because only the consensus of the nations participating in the COE is necessary for the accomplishment of its mission. The COEs follow NATO protocol and work for the benefit of the Alliance, but their organizational structure allows them a certain freedom of movement not necessarily present in other NATO groupings. COEs are built around a framework nation that volunteers to host and lead the COE. Other nations that join a COE are called sponsoring nations. In both cases, NATO membership is a prerequisite. There are currently 18 fully accredited NATO COEs, with several others in the process of accreditation.

**The Mission of COE-DAT**

Soon after NATO’s decision to create a network of COEs, the Republic of Turkey volunteered to host a centre focused on the study of terrorism. Given its long-standing, multidimensional struggle against terrorism, Turkey declared its intention in 2003 to create the Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism in Ankara. Three years later, NATO accredited COE-DAT and granted it IMO status. Turkey, the framework nation, was joined by the following sponsoring nations: Bulgaria, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Romania, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Since its founding, COE-DAT’s mission has been to provide terrorism-related subject matter expertise, principally at the strategic and operational level. It takes a holistic approach to terrorism and breaks it down into individual facets such as legal, financial and cyber. The centre’s chief activities include education and training of NATO and partner personnel,
concept and doctrine development, and contributions to the NATO Lessons Learned process.

A Turkish Army colonel serves as COE-DAT's director, and a U.S. Air Force colonel is the deputy. The COE has four main departments: education and training, transformation, capabilities and support. As of May 2013, the COE-DAT had 56 full-time personnel, 47 from Turkey and the remainder from sponsoring nations. Not only is COE-DAT multinational, it is also joint and comprehensive, with all military services represented. There is a large civilian cadre at COE-DAT, as well as representation from the Turkish gendarmerie and the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee.

Since COE-DAT and all other COEs sit outside the NCS, it maintains a functional relationship with all NATO agencies including Allied Command Transformation, which coordinates activities between the COEs and acts as the agent of the accreditation process. The relationship between COE-DAT and NATO headquarters highlights another unique bond in NATO's counterterrorism efforts. NATO's lead agency for counterterrorism policy is the Counterterrorism Section of the Emerging Security Challenges Division (ESCD) within the International Staff. COE-DAT coordinates with the ESCD to ensure all activities are aligned with NATO objectives. Given the flexible nature of COEs, the centre also maintains strong relationships with other academic institutions, think tanks and government agencies that study or promote policies addressing terrorism and its impact on society.

Since 2005, COE-DAT has conducted more than 135 activities in the education and training domain. Classes typically last one week and are tailored toward major (OF-3) to colonel (OF-5) grade officers, or their civilian equivalents, who work in the DAT domain in their governments. Course participants come from NATO countries and partner nations through the Partnership for Peace, Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative programs. Examples of courses include "Defence Against Suicide Bombing," "Terrorism and the Media" and "Fighting the Financial Dimensions of Terrorism." NATO has fully accredited many courses and considers them valuable training for key Alliance positions.
The second most important activity at COE-DAT is the workshops. They provide the COE flexibility to focus on the needs and trends within the DAT field and serve as one of the principal venues for COE-DAT’s contribution to NATO’s transformation efforts. COE-DAT workshops typically last two to three days and bring world-renowned experts together in one room to discuss, debate and identify paths forward on the latest trends within a particular theme or subject. In 2012, for example, COE-DAT hosted workshops on “WMD Terrorism” and “Air Oriented Terrorism.” In 2013, this trend continues with topics such as “Recruitment and Root Causes of Terrorism” and “Challenges of Interagency Cooperation in the DAT.”

Not only does COE-DAT coordinate with NATO Headquarters’ ESCD on overall counterterrorism policy, they also partners with the section on specific training and advanced research initiatives. This partnership is administered through an activity known as NATO’s Science for Peace and Security (SPS) program. The agenda of SPS includes priorities set by the Alliance for specific research requirements, with the goal of integrating partner nation contributions into the process from the beginning.

COE-DAT often applies for SPS grants in areas of mutual interest in the counterterrorism domain. These typically take the form of “Advanced Training Courses” (ATC) and “Advanced Research Workshops” (ARW). ATCs are mobile training teams that focus on building specific capacities in NATO partner countries. To date, COE-DAT has conducted 14 ATCs since 2007 in Europe, North Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia. The ARWs are similar to COE-DAT workshops but meet the need of a specific high-priority research area for the Alliance. Unique to NATO ARWs is that they publish books that detail findings and results of the workshops.

In addition to courses, workshops and mobile training, COE-DAT periodically conducts symposia and conferences dealing with terrorism trends. Finally, COE-DAT contributes to NATO’s online education and training efforts by hosting three courses specific to the study of terrorism for all eligible users.

The centre is equally engaged in broader efforts within the Alliance. COE-DAT recently partnered in writing a new counterinsurgency doctrine for NATO that takes advantage of the wealth of information acquired during contingency operations of the past several years. In addition, COE-DAT is exploring the possibility of contributing to Allied Command Transformation’s recent Education & Training initiatives by assuming the “department head” role within the counterterrorism Education & Training domain. This potential new role will give COE-DAT the responsibility to translate established NATO Education & Training counterterrorism requirements into a coherent training plan for the entire Alliance.

Several other key activities round out COE-DAT’s mission. The centre serves as a coordination and administration agent for the Turkish Army-hosted course “NAto Tactical Operations in a High IED Threat Environment.” It is offered at the Turkish Army Engineering School in Izmir, Turkey, and is tailored for unit-level training for nations contributing to the International Security Assistance Force.

COE-DAT runs a small cell devoted to tracking global terrorism. Using open-source data, the team scours available sources to compile daily, monthly and yearly totals of terrorist activity and then distributes the data around the globe. The findings are published in COE-DAT’s quarterly newsletter. Finally, COE-DAT publishes its own journal on the study of terrorism called Defence Against Terrorism Review. The academic journal is published twice a year and includes articles from academic, military and policy circles. The newsletter and journal copies can be downloaded from the COE-DAT website (www.coedat.nato.int).

The Future of COE-DAT
As terrorism is sure to be part of the security environment in the near future, COE-DAT’s workload will continue to grow. The centre is currently shaping and refining its Program of Work for 2014, to be completed by November 2013. Current fiscal realities necessitate that all institutions find unique and efficient ways to allocate and spend their nations’ funds. To do its part, COE-DAT will continue to reach out and form relationships worldwide with like-minded institutions. This is done not only to expand networks but to avoid duplication of effort.

Finally, the COE-DAT leadership is keen to re-emphasize workshops offered at the centre. The staff will continue to scour the field to find innovative topics for future workshops. This helps ensure that COE-DAT stays on the cutting edge of the ever-adapting terrorist threat. However the terrorist threat evolves in the future, COE-DAT will be there to help Alliance members defend themselves against this menace.

An Enduring FRIENDSHIP

By Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mehmet Öcal

After more than a century of close and friendly relations, it would not be an exaggeration to say that Germany and Turkey share a uniquely long and mostly fruitful history. With 3.5 million ethnic Turks living in Germany for decades, and more than 4.8 million German tourists visiting Turkey in 2011, the two countries are also bound by a “human factor,” creating a bond of multifaceted, cultural, human interconnectedness and diversity. In addition to the long history of friendly relations, Berlin plays a crucial role in Ankara’s aspirations to become a member of the European Union. This long-standing tradition of friendship and cooperation is mirrored by a multitude of strong ties in the fields of economics and politics.

According to the Center for Studies on Turkey, more than 700 German companies have branches in Turkey and approximately 80,000 Turco-German companies are doing business in Germany. In 2010, they employed more than 400,000 workers and generated about 36 billion euros. Because of its strategic location, Turkey plays a prominent role in German foreign policy, especially related to the Middle East and Caucasus, with their substantial energy resources. In the cultural sphere, German-Turkish filmmakers, actors, entertainers and footballers such as Fatih Akın, Birol Ünel, Kaya Yaman and Mesut Özil enjoy great popularity in Germany. Currently, however, friendly relations have been overshadowed by the malicious

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, right, meets German Chancellor Angela Merkel in Berlin in October 2012. Erdoğan attended the opening of Turkey’s new embassy and underscored the need for Turkish integration in Germany.

GETTY IMAGES
arsons on Turkish-owned houses and the neo-Nazi killings of eight Turks in Germany.

Owing to this high level of interdependence, the domestic and external policies of Germany and Turkey have significant impact on the policies of the other. But this relationship is shaped by historical Turkish-German relations and by volatile and ambivalent current issues such as Turkey’s EU accession efforts, Turkey’s conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the integration of Turks living in Germany. These issues affect future relations and national priorities concerning their political, economic, and strategic preferences.

A LONG RELATIONSHIP

German-Turkish relations go back more than 800 years, and it is significant that for more than 300 years there have been no violent conflicts between the two peoples. Given the plethora of European wars in previous centuries, this history of peaceful cohabitation and good relations is quite noteworthy.

The first encounter of the Germans and Turks (if we exclude the relations of German and Hunnic tribes in the fourth century) occurred when the leader of the third crusade and emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, Friedrich I “Barbarossa,” went to Konya, Turkey, in 1190 to make peace with Sultan Kilicarslan. But the German emperor drowned in the Gökṣu River on his way south after defeating the Turkish Seljuks.

The disintegration of the Seljuk Empire in the ensuing centuries brought a new Turkish tribe, the Ottomans, to rule over the majority of Turkish nomadic princedoms spreading across Anatolia. They created a great empire that stretched over three continents and occupied the Balkans in Europe and wide parts of the Middle East and North Africa.

The expansionist policies of the Sublime Porte in Istanbul threatened the German states, whose foreign policy toward the Ottoman Empire was consequently largely shaped by military issues. Nevertheless, the Germans were always reluctant to join alliances against the Ottomans. The last time German armies fought Turkish armies was when the Ottoman troops of Kara Mustapha Pasha’s besieged Vienna in 1683.

PRUSSIA AND THE OTTOMANS

Following the founding of the Kingdom of Prussia in January 1701, Istanbul sent the first diplomatic endorsement and the first delegation of Ottoman diplomats to intensify bilateral relations. During the reign of Prussian King Friedrich Wilhelm I, a treaty of friendship was signed with the Ottoman Empire, and in 1721 the first Prussian liaison officer arrived in Istanbul. In 1751, the first permanent political diplomats were exchanged. After signing a treaty of peace and friendship with Prussia in 1790, the Ottoman Empire intensified military ties, especially during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II.

In the late 19th century, Ottoman-British relations deteriorated, and Istanbul renewed the treaty of friendship and reinforced bilateral relations with Germany. Impressed with sympathy shown for the Sublime Porte by Prussia at the signing of the 1829 Peace of Adrianople, the Ottoman sultan invited a Prussian delegation of military advisors to Istanbul in 1833. Helmuth von Moltke, later hero of the wars of German unification, led the group that arrived in November 1835. These Prussian military advisors were assigned to reorganize the increasingly outmoded Ottoman army. Reciprocally, Ottoman officers were sent to visit Prussian military academies in Berlin. In addition to military cooperation, political, economic and even cultural relations were established. The first generation of German settlers, the so-called Bosporus Germans, began immigrating to Istanbul not long after the arrival of the military advisors.

THE AMBITIONS OF WILHELM II

In the later decades of the 19th century, many Germans worked at German-run construction sites as craftsmen, industrialists and engineers. However, the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and ongoing French and British colonial expansion in the Middle East and North Africa could not be prevented by reinforced Turkish-German ties. The ambitious Emperor
Wilhelm II pursued a policy of colonial expansion, to which the Ottoman territories, and especially Anatolia, were of great importance. Economic cooperation resulted in the construction of the Berlin-Baghdad railway and the German Emperor was convinced the “Baghdad Bahn” would facilitate access to the natural resources of the Middle East and open up markets for the German arms industry. The railway was also part of the German strategy to break the British transportation monopoly in the Middle East.

The 19th century was a period of cultural discovery for Germans and Turks alike. The increased German presence at the Sublime Porte in the late 19th century did not signal the loss of Ottoman domestic control; instead, by supporting Ottoman renewal projects, the Germans made the Baghdad Railway a cornerstone of the emerging Turco-German cultural partnership. Kaiser Wilhelm’s several state visits in the Ottoman Empire, the construction of German schools and hospitals in Istanbul, and the presence in Berlin of 1,300 Turks — mainly students and workers — made it a harmonious time for German-Turkish relations. Two Turkish newspapers were printed in Berlin before World War I, and a German-Turkish Association was founded in 1914 to promote cultural and economic cooperation.

THE WORLD WAR I “WAFFENBRÜDERSCHAFT”

Military relations between the German and Ottoman empires culminated in the German-Turkish alliance during World War I. The very pro-German, though inexperienced, Young Turks overthrew Sultan Abdülhamid II and took control of the government in Istanbul in 1908. The Young Turks saw the German Empire as an enemy of their enemies, and therefore took an undisputed pro-German position. With the signing of the August 1914 Turco-German Alliance, the Ottoman Empire joined the German-led Central Powers to form the Triple Alliance. Turkey formally entered World War I on October 28, 1914, when the Ottoman Navy — composed mainly of two German warships, the Göben (Yavuz) and Breslau (Midilli), led by German Adm. Wilhelm Souchon and crewed by Germans — launched an unprovoked attack on the Russian Black Sea ports of Odessa and Sevastopol. The Triple Entente declared war on the Ottoman Empire on November 4.

Despite the friction with the Triple Entente, the Ottomans had no major stake in Great Power conflicts being waged in Europe. The Turkish decision to ally with Germany undoubtedly stemmed from a desire to preserve the empire, and Ottoman leaders hoped to use the war to restructure and protect it from further invasion. With social structures coming apart at the seams, they understood the empire might not emerge intact from the conflict. Turkish-German military relations in the prewar years had created a special bond, a “Waffenbruderschaft,” or “brotherhood of arms,” between the two empires’ armed forces. German generals commanded Turkish troops in the important battles. In 1917, Emperor Wilhelm II wore an Ottoman uniform when he visited Istanbul for the third time.

Germans and Turks fought together, but also lost together. Painfully defeated in the war, both had to cope with the trauma of harsh peace treaties imposed by the victors. The treaties of Versailles and Sèvres disrupted German-Turkish relations for some time. Berlin had to accept the Treaty of Versailles and suffered its consequences throughout interwar period. But the Turks, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, did not accept the Treaty of Sèvres and instead started a victorious war of independence that led to the founding of the Republic of Turkey on the ashes of the Ottoman Empire.

INTERWAR PERIOD AND WORLD WAR II

After the Turkish republic was founded in 1923, Ankara began to refresh ties with Germany. A new trade agreement was signed in 1929, and diplomatic relations were renewed but remained at a relatively negligible level until after World War II.

Following Adolf Hitler’s rise to power in Germany in 1933, Turkey provided refuge to Germans of Jewish descent, left-wing and liberal academics and engineers fleeing their homeland. These intellectuals played important roles in the reorganization of universities and the foundation of industrial plants and companies in Turkey. Among those emigrants were Ernst Hirsch, later president of the Free University of Berlin; Ernst Reuter, later mayor of Berlin; Dankwart Rustow, who later became an American political economist; and the famous poet Carl Zuckmayer.

The relatively young Turkish republic had learned from the experience of World War I, when it had fought and lost with Germany. Because it wanted to stay out of international wars, Turkish president İsmet İnönü remained neutral during most of World War II. Nevertheless, a non-aggression pact was signed June 18, 1941, between the two countries. Ankara maintained diplomatic relations with Berlin throughout most of the war until Turkey
declared war on Germany in August 1944 as a condition for membership in the United Nations.

**TURKISH MIGRATION TO GERMANY**

As World War II ended and Germany was divided, the Cold War period helped develop and intensify military, commercial, economic and cultural ties between the Republic of Turkey and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). Germany suffered an acute labor shortage after the war, and in 1961, Bonn officially invited Turkish workers to Germany to fill the void, particularly in factories that helped fuel Germany’s economic miracle. Turkey had a surplus labor force, and the cooperative labor force agreements benefited both countries and resulted in a great number of Turkish citizens immigrating to Germany. The German authorities named these people Gastarbeiter, or guest workers. Most Turks in Germany trace their ancestry to central and eastern Anatolia. Today, with an estimated population of 3.5 million, Turks constitute Germany’s largest ethnic minority and most of Germany’s Muslim community.

In the early 1970s, the status of most Turkish immigrants in Germany shifted from temporary to permanent. However, Germany’s need for foreign laborers declined in the 1970s and 1980s, while Turkey still had an excess labor supply. Germany and Turkey moved away from the cooperative model of labor exchange, making it difficult for Turkish citizens to obtain entry. Germany restricted labor force immigration and encouraged already admitted immigrants to either return home or reunite with their families and integrate into their communities.

**XENOPHOBIA, ISLAMOPHOBIA AND INTEGRATION**

As mentioned, Turkish immigrants were regarded as temporary settlers from the onset. Consequently, Germany did not put into place structures to facilitate integration of the immigrants into the new society, nor did the Turks work toward integrating themselves. For Turks in German society, patterns of discrimination maintain the disadvantages of low economic and social status and restrain social advancement. Despite their long-term residency, Turks continue to face hostility, which has intensified since the mid-1970s.

In Germany today, there is an undercurrent of xenophobia in public opinion and an open emphasis on xenophobia in right-wing and neo-Nazi organizations. A wave of xenophobic violence that saw offenses triple between 1991 and 1993 claimed several Turkish lives. After reunification, the number of violent acts by right-wing extremists in Germany increased dramatically. In the 1990s, at least eight Turkish residents were killed in neo-Nazi fire bombings in Mölln and Solingen. However, most Germans condemned these attacks on foreigners and marched in candlelight processions, and the killers were sentenced to many years in prison.

Deadly neo-Nazi attacks continued after 2000; members of the neo-Nazi National Socialist Underground (NSU) were allegedly responsible for 10 murders – eight Turks, one Greek and one German police officer – between 2000 and 2007. The still unsolved murders resulted in allegations of deliberate official inaction and strong demands for the identification and conviction of the perpetrators, and for implementation of strong, effective measures to prevent similar incidents from happening. It has raised suspicions and doubts about the German state among both Turks and Germans. Indeed, the loss of trust in German institutions will have a negative impact for the integration of all non-German communities.

Considering that one in five people living in Germany hails from an immigrant background, according to figures released in 2012 by the German Federal Statistical Office, Berlin has no alternative than to invest in the integration of immigrants to discourage segregation and radicalization among the population. According to Gökçe Yurdakul, a Humboldt University social scientist specializing in diversity and social conflicts, many politicians and policymakers see integration politics as a way of creating a homogenized society rather than encouraging equal
political and social participation for everyone in Germany. Integration is well-intentioned but ill-implemented.

This issue has also driven a wedge between Berlin and Ankara in recent years, most notably when former German President Christian Wulff was told by his Turkish counterpart, Abdullah Gül, during a visit to Turkey that Germany should do more to help Turkish residents integrate into German culture. This followed claims by the German Chancellor Angela Merkel that multiculturalism had failed.

On the other hand, many experts agree that integration is a slow-moving process and a two-way street; both sides have to make their own efforts to live together in peace and harmony in a diverse society. Therefore, it is important to fight discrimination, Islamophobia and work together to improve the culture of coexistence. On the local level, there are many projects that provide support for education, communication, counseling and language training. Nevertheless, Turkish migration will remain an important issue in relations between the two countries.

POLICY ISSUES

For decades, Turkey’s elites have sought membership in the EU. Germany’s political support of Turkish EU aspirations, however, has not been consistent. Former Chancellor Helmut Kohl openly expressed opposition to Turkish EU membership, while his successor, Gerhard Schröder, favored it. Chancellor Angela Merkel has opposed full membership, but advocates a vaguely defined cooperation, the so-called privileged partnership, between Turkey and the EU. She has not explained in detail the meaning of “privileged partnership.”

According to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdoğan, Ankara is already a privileged partner of the EU and anything less than full membership is unacceptable. It will be difficult to offer Turkey anything less than full membership that is also attractive enough to bind them permanently to the EU. Turkey already has a kind of privileged partnership with the customs union. In the ensuing elections for the German Bundestag (parliament) in September 2013, the debate on Turkish-EU membership will continue among Turkish migrants and German political parties.

The PKK and its practice of fundraising in Germany is another point of contention. Turkey complains that the PKK, considered a terror organization by both governments, has raised millions of euros in Germany over the years to support terrorist activities in Turkey and recruits militants there. Ankara has accused Germany of not doing enough to prevent it.

But Turkey and Germany have many more interests in common, including in regions with proximity to the EU such as the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus. These regions are very important to Germany because instability there affects the stability of Europe. Some countries are also rich in raw materials. It should be noted that Turkey is an important connector, not only between Europe and Asia, but also between the Occidental and Oriental cultures. Consequently, a good partnership between Western countries and Turkey should also improve relationships between European and the Asian states.

Political and economic stability in the Balkans is vital to the EU. And in the Middle East, Germany primarily focuses on stability and finding a peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Berlin and Ankara consider Iran’s nuclear ambitions to be a threat to stability in the region and a potential danger to the world, and both countries seek alternative solutions to the military option. Farther east, both countries are engaged in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, where they share a common interest in securing a stable Afghan state. And energy and raw materials, especially crude oil and natural gas, increase the importance of the South Caucasus region. Lying between the energy-rich Caspian Sea basin and the Black Sea, Turkey and Europe, the South Caucasian countries would like to move closer to the EU and view Turkey as a valuable bridge to the region.

ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Germany and Turkey have shared strong economic ties for more than 300 years, and Germany remains Turkey’s most important trading partner. Germany was Turkey’s largest market in 2011, with exports of goods valued at $13.9 billion (10.8 billion euros), an increase of 21.6 percent from 2010. Total trade volume between the two countries was $36.8 billion (28.5 billion euros). Turkey’s principal exports to Germany are apparel and clothing accessories, vehicles and automotive parts, textile yarn, fabrics, manufactured articles, fruits and vegetables and power-generating machinery and equipment.
Turkish imports of German goods also increased 30.4 percent in 2011, to $22.9 billion (17.7 billion euros). Machinery, electrical goods, motor vehicles and automotive parts account for a particularly large portion of German exports to Turkey. Germany is also a significant market for Turkish contractors, with Turkish firms working on 43 projects in Germany for a total value of $831.9 million (643.8 million euros). German foreign direct investment (FDI) in Turkey was substantial at nearly $605 million (468.2 million euros) in 2011 and Turkish FDI in Germany was about $91 million (70.4 million euros).

CONCLUSION

Turkish-German bilateral relations have had an important impact since the predecessor states of both countries first made contact during the Middle Ages. Despite eras of volatility and tense relations, Turkey and Germany nevertheless share much history and remain interconnected in many spheres of contemporary society. They currently maintain friendly, wide-ranging and robust relations. Furthermore, the two countries are bound together by the “human factor,” with Turks being Germany’s largest ethnic minority.

An environment of social, economic and human insecurity influenced Turkish migration to Germany during the last five decades, but shifts in Turkish society, economy and security are attracting a return migration. Since 2006, Turkish emigration from Germany has surpassed Turkish immigration. Improved human rights and implementation of many democratic reforms offered to the Turks, Kurds and other ethnic and religious groups, as well as sustained economic growth, now makes Turkey an attractive destination for immigrants.

Huge numbers of Turks and Kurds consider Germany their country and the country in which their children will grow up. The great popularity of filmmakers, actors and footballers of Turkish descent could help Germany overcome its negative reputation as a nation hostile to minorities. Unfortunately, especially after reunification, the number of neo-Nazi killings rapidly increased. To maintain its image as a democratic and friendly country, Germany must strive to protect innocent people against these cowardly attacks.

The number of Turks living in Germany, and German tourists visiting Turkey, shows that there is an extraordinary interconnectedness between the two countries and peoples, as well as great cultural and economic potential. Decades of human, intercultural and economic encounters make close and friendly relations the only rational option.

For Europe, Turkey has a very important role in spreading peace, stability and even wealth in Turkey’s region. Germany is among Turkey’s most significant partners in European security and political structures, including NATO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Council of Europe. High-level visits between Turkey and Germany are frequent. The Turkish and German foreign ministers recently signed a joint declaration to build a mechanism for strategic dialogue that should strengthen bilateral cooperation amid the stalemate in Turkey’s EU accession process. It aims to help bilateral relations flourish, solve current problems and come to a consensus on conflicting positions between the two countries. It also aims to improve cooperation on regional and global issues.

It would be ill-advised not to use this heritage to shape future relations between Germany and Turkey. And this kind of mutual strategic relationship would have wider positive implications for Trans-Atlantic relations. These developments show that Turkey should progress on a policy path friendly to Germany and the EU. Considering the ongoing economic crisis in Europe, Turkey—a country with a prospering economy and political stability, located in a strategic geographic region—can be considered a gain for the “old continent.”

The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author.

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COOPERATION
Central Asia Aids Afghanistan

The region shares a common interest in expanding trade and marginalizing violent extremism

By per Concordiam Staff

Ethnic Turkmen women in Balkh province, northern Afghanistan, weave rugs. The presence of Turkmen, Tajiks and Uzbeks on both sides of the border stimulates contacts between Afghanistan and its Central Asian neighbors.
With a throaty whistle and flash of fresh blue paint, a diesel locomotive tugging a train of box and tanker cars rolls through a railway station in northern Afghanistan’s Balkh province. The 75-kilometer stretch of track from the Uzbek border to Mazar-e Sharif that opened in 2012, the first international railway in the nation’s history, could be the start of a transportation revolution that helps solidify Afghanistan as a trade and communications hub. “This connects Afghanistan to the world,” an 18-year-old high school student named Shakrullah told CNN at a demonstration of the new railroad. “I want trains for all the provinces of Afghanistan, not just for Balkh province.”

The $165 million railroad, part of a 2,000-kilometer network proposed by the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program, could not have happened without the support of Uzbekistan. Stability in Afghanistan is something the Uzbeks view favorably, an attitude shared by the other nations of Central Asia, all of which are playing a role in their neighbor’s recovery from more than 30 years of conflict. Turkmenistan, for example, is sponsoring a transnational gas pipeline to supply much of Afghanistan’s energy needs. Kazakhstan has provided Afghanistan with thousands of tons of badly needed wheat and $50 million in university scholarships to train Afghan doctors and scientists. Police in Tajikistan have begun coordinating border security with their Afghan colleagues, and the Kyrgyz Republic is planning to transmit hydroelectric power to Kabul.

The challenge will be keeping that cooperative spirit alive. Central Asia watchers have laid out two scenarios regarding Afghanistan’s near future. The less-promising scenario is one in which the five republics of Central Asia resign themselves to militant isolationism in the hope that any instability emanating from the south won’t slither across the 2,000-kilometer border they share with Afghanistan. The more rational outlook for the region is one of productive engagement between Central Asia and Afghanistan that promotes economic integration, builds wealth and marginalizes violent extremism.

Although categorizing Afghanistan as an unofficial “sixth republic” of Central Asia rings hollow to most leaders of the region, few can deny that Afghans aspire to greater trade, security cooperation, educational exchanges and transportation links with their wealthier northern neighbors. Assistance from these neighbors, countries that share cultural affiliations dating back to the days of the medieval Silk Road trading network, would help sustain an Afghan society seeking assurances that the departure of foreign troops in 2014 won’t lead to turmoil.

“We have it in our collective power to prevent another nightmare scenario in Afghanistan,” then-Kazakh Foreign Minister Yerzhan Kazykhanov wrote in a 2012 article about Central Asia’s efforts to aid its southern neighbor. “To do so, we must look beyond 2014 and help Afghans help themselves.”

**BUILDING TRUST**

Attempts to institutionalize multilateral cooperation have been numerous. In 2012, regional leaders attended a Heart of Asia conference in Kabul that led to the adoption of confidence-building measures to benefit Afghanistan and its neighbors. The measures, which encompassed such fields as infrastructure development, counternarcotics, counterterrorism, disaster management and international commerce, attracted vast support from nations of the region, some traditional rivals with a meager record of mutual cooperation. With the exception of Uzbekistan, all the Central Asian republics signed onto one or more of the confidence-building measures. Afghanistan and its partners followed up the Kabul summit with another in Astana, Kazakhstan, in April 2013.

“In view of the fragility and uncertainty of the political and security environment in Afghanistan and the fear of regional rivalry over influence flaring up again in the aftermath of international exit, or drawdown, after 2014, the successful holding of the Kabul ‘Heart of Asia’ can certainly be hailed as a success story for the Afghan government,” the Afghanistan Analysts Network, an independent nonprofit policy research organization, concluded on its website.

Even when consensus is elusive on other topics, border management and combating narcotics have attracted widespread cooperation. NATO and Russia have played a productive role in encouraging those natural partnerships by jointly training more than 2,000 counternarcotics officers from Central Asia and Afghanistan in concert with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Turkish International Academy Against Drugs and Crime. The Central Asian Counternarcotics Initiative is building upon that training by setting up anti-drug task forces in the countries of Central
Stability in Afghanistan is something the Uzbeks view favorably, an attitude shared by the other nations of Central Asia, all of which are playing a role in their neighbor’s recovery from more than 30 years of conflict. Kazakhstan has provided Afghanistan with thousands of tons of badly needed wheat and $50 million in university scholarships to train Afghan doctors and scientists.
Asia to interdict opium and heroin passing mostly through Afghan, Tajik and Kyrgyz transit points. “The resulting counternarcotics network would link both the main narcotics source country, Afghanistan, with the key transit countries in Eurasia, many of which are also becoming large consumers of Afghan-based narcotics in their own right,” World Politics Review noted in a 2012 article.

When it comes to trade and investment, Central Asia, while pursuing its own financial interests, acts as a catalyst for Afghan revitalization. Uzbekistan followed up construction of the Mazar-e Sharif railway with a plan to extend tracks to Kabul and the Pakistani border, and Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan propose a Caspian Sea rail line that would provide landlocked Afghanistan with an alternate route to harbors and seaports. “We would be able to import and export to Russia, Turkey and even European countries,” Afghan Deputy Public Works Minister Noor Gul Mangal told reporters in 2012 as he contemplated rail projects in the works.

TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) is a prospective 1,681-kilometer pipeline that would run from Dauletabad, Turkmenistan, through Herat and Kandahar to Pakistan and India. It opens Turkmenistan’s vast deposits of natural gas to the energy-hungry economies of South Asia. Afghanistan, as a land bridge between suppliers and consumers, would collect royalties on the transmission. Uzbekistan’s state energy corporation distributes power to Afghanistan using electrical lines paid for by the Asian Development Bank’s Central Asia-South Asia Regional Electricity Market. Likewise, Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic want to sell electricity to their southern neighbor through a hydroelectric project financed by the World Bank and the Islamic Development Bank.

Cultural, social and education contacts between Afghanistan and the Central Asia republics have grown as well. Tajik engineers, doctors and nurses by the hundreds serve sections of
northern Afghanistan in which Tajik-speaking Afghans live. Kazakhstan’s education exchange program that will send 1,000 Afghan students to Al-Farabi Kazakh National University and Sanzhar Asfendiyarov Kazakh National Medical University in Almaty has earned praise from the international community. Such education exchange programs with highly regarded but lower cost Central Asian universities are being pursued more avidly. “Afghan students could be encouraged to go to Central Asian countries, in particular Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, as well as Tajikistan in the case of Tajik-speaking Afghans. The cultural similarities with Central Asian societies could help families feel more comfortable in sending young women abroad,” noted a February 2013 European Union report titled “The Afghanistan-Central Asia relationship: What role for the EU?”

**REMOVING BARRIERS**

If there’s one thing that prevents Central Asian nations from fully embracing closer relations with Afghanistan, it’s the recent history of conflict in the country and the misconception that defines Afghanistan as an appendage of the Indian subcontinent psychologically removed from formerly Russian-oriented Central Asia. Spats among the five governments of Central Asia, including borders disputes in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic, also contribute to disharmony. Some of the republics favor narrow bilateral deals with Afghanistan that frequently omit Central Asian neighbors. Although couched in the understated language of diplomacy, Central Asian officials tend to be dour about prospects of peace and stability in Afghanistan, partly reflecting their up-close knowledge of the Soviet occupation of the country that ended in 1989.

Western governments have inadvertently contributed to this sense of disunity. As the EU noted in a 2013 report on Central Asia: “The EU and its member states have differentiated between Central Asia and Afghanistan both at the level of policy planning and of programme implementation. Historically, the five Central Asian states have been viewed as one of the post-Soviet regions, while Afghanistan has either been aligned with South Asia or treated as a special case.”

In an attempt to breach these geopolitical and diplomatic barriers, the EU and its allies are recognizing Afghanistan’s significance as a territory that straddles South and Central Asia. The New Silk Road — a comprehensive plan to expand trade, transit and communications networks from the Indian Ocean to the Ural Mountains — is one such attempt to erase artificial boundaries. “The more Afghanistan is integrated economically into its regional neighborhood, the more it will be able to attract private investment, benefit from its vast mineral resources and provide economic opportunity for its citizens,” said Robert Blake, assistant U.S. secretary of state for South and Central Asian affairs.

The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has adopted a broad, inclusive vision that attempts to dispense with provincial squabbles that have hampered past Central Asian cooperation. In its Astana Commemorative Declaration — the name evocative of Kazakhstan’s chairmanship of the organization in 2010 — the OSCE envisioned a complete “security community” stretching east from Vancouver to Vladivostok, including Central Asia and Afghanistan.

As if channeling the “spirit of Astana,” Uzbek Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov, at a meeting in March 2013, reiterated his country’s plans to provide humanitarian and economic assistance to Afghanistan, suggesting the Mazar-e Sharif railroad won’t be the country’s last significant infrastructure project. “We will continue this kind of cooperation to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan and to the region of Central Asia,” Kamilov said. □
Nordic Pooling and Sharing

Sweden’s proposal for closer military integration with its neighbors could affect NATO

By per Concordiam Staff

If a new Swedish plan for Scandinavian defense cooperation is adopted, fighter squadrons with Norwegian and Finnish wingmen could patrol northern skies, and Swedish and Icelandic sailors could serve in the Baltic side by side on a ship captained by a Dane. This new twist on “pooling and sharing” would deepen already broad military cooperation among the five Nordic countries in all areas of foreign, security and defense policy and, in an era of defense budget austerity, hopefully save money.

International military cooperation to the point of intermingled units might seem unconventional, but the benefits of increasing defense cooperation have been touted as a way to maintain necessary capacities while spending less. NATO calls it “Smart Defence” and in 2012 made it a cornerstone of the Alliance’s New Strategic Concept. The new Swedish proposal embraces pooling and sharing at a new level, which Defense News said could result in the creation of a “Nordic Defense Force” of air, army and naval units. Swedish Defense Minister Karin Enström and Foreign Minister Carl Bildt introduced the idea in the newspaper Dagens Nyheter on January 13, 2013, and reiterated their support the next day at the Society and Defence Annual National Conference in Sälen, Sweden. Notably, the plan calls for “joint ownership and use of military capabilities and resources.” “We want to create more efficient resource use, higher quality, and stronger and wider military capabilities through enhanced cooperation,” Enström and Bildt wrote. They pointed out that the Nordic countries share values associated with a modern democratic society, including a belief in “human rights, freedom and the rule of law,” but emphasized that they could advance these values abroad more effectively when acting together.

NATO’s role

Implementation of Sweden’s ambitious proposal, however, raises important questions. First and foremost is how NATO members Norway, Denmark and Iceland can integrate so fully with nonmembers Sweden and Finland. Norway and Denmark consider NATO to be Europe’s primary security apparatus and will not leave the Alliance, but strong public opposition to NATO membership remains in Sweden and Finland. A 2012 opinion poll by the Finnish Ministry of Defence found only 18 percent of the

Female ISAF soldiers from Sweden and Finland train in Mazar-e Sharif, Afghanistan, in August 2012. Female Engagement Teams do body checks of Afghan women and speak to them about their needs. REUTERS
public supported joining NATO, compared with 71 percent opposed. A 2011 poll in Sweden yielded similar results: 23 percent in favor of NATO membership, 50 percent opposed.

Sweden and Finland already work together with NATO members Norway and Estonia, as well as nonmember Ireland, in the European Union's Nordic Battlegroup, which Sweden leads. The force is designed to carry out peace-support, peace-enforcement, evacuation and humanitarian operations at the direction of the European Council. But the battlegroup has never been called on and, according to the Brussels-based International Security Information Service's European Security Review, “fragmentation, lack of capabilities and political will, and lack of leadership” have led to disappointment. The battlegroup concept, which suffers from declining support from member states, is sometimes viewed as a rival for resources and redundant to the NATO Response Force.

Some believe the level of integration inherent in the Swedish proposal would require a formal defense treaty that draws Sweden and Finland closer to NATO, an idea that Finnish Prime Minister Jyrki Katainen rejected outright. “Discussion of a defense pact is currently not on the agenda, and I don’t know if it ever will be. Now is the time to concentrate on defense cooperation at a practical level,” he told Finnish broadcaster Yleisradio.

Finnish Air Force F-18 Hornets like these participate with other Nordic partners in air patrols over Iceland.

FINNISH DEFENCE FORCES
In Sweden and Finland, proponents and opponents of NATO membership consider the two countries to be virtually part of the Western alliance. At the Sälen conference, Estonian Foreign Minister Urmas Paet dubbed those countries NATO’s closest allies: “One could even say that Sweden and Finland are de facto members of NATO,” he said, praising them for close cooperation that occasionally draws protests from across both countries’ political spectrums. For example, a 2012 decision to participate in joint NATO air patrols over Iceland drew heavy criticism from some parties in the Finnish parliament. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – all of which eagerly joined NATO in 2004 to seal their break from the former Soviet Union – remain strong proponents of increased defense integration between the Nordic and Baltic countries. According to the Jamestown Foundation’s Eurasia Daily Monitor, they advocate for “full Nordic NATO membership, as it would deepen Nordic commitment to the defense of the Baltic states. Estonia in particular has energetically advocated for Finnish and Swedish NATO membership.”

Sweden and Finland’s historic reluctance to join the Alliance largely centered on fears of provoking the Soviet Union (or later Russia), according to a 2011 Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) report. Both nations have preferred to cooperate with NATO when national interests were at stake, assuming that any regional threat would draw NATO intervention regardless of formal membership status, the INSS report stated. However, as NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen stressed at the Sälen conference, no matter how close the security relationship, partner countries such as Sweden are not protected by NATO’s Article 5 collective security guarantee. “You cannot be outside NATO but want everything that NATO can give,” he said.

Changing security environment
Changes in the regional security environment contribute to the need for increased defense cooperation. In December 2012, Swedish armed forces chief Gen. Sverker Göransson announced that the Swedish military could only defend the country for about a week without outside help, sparking national controversy and denials from the government, which insisted Sweden’s capabilities were sufficient to handle current threats.
Conventional threats are few. The only plausible threat – and such a threat is considered extremely unlikely – is Russia. But defense planners must prepare for future contingencies. Russia’s defense spending and military modernization have been growing rapidly. Russian defense spending is expected to increase by 59 percent by 2015, Russian news agency RIA Novosti reported in October 2012. This growth concerns defense establishments in the Nordic and Baltic countries. Said the Eurasia Daily Monitor: “For Finland and Sweden, the interest in Nordic defense cooperation is heavily affected by changes in the balance of power in the Baltic region – the quickening pace of Russia’s military modernization, its increasingly assertive posture toward former Soviet satellite states in eastern Europe, and the United States’ phased restructuring of its military resources in Europe – as well as budgetary constraints facing Swedish and Finnish militaries.” Of particular concern are Russian naval upgrades in the Baltic Sea, whose shipping routes Sweden’s Enström views as increasingly important to regional trade.

Uneven levels of defense spending are another potential obstacle to enhanced cooperation. Norway, which benefits from energy revenues unavailable to the other Nordic nations, is increasing spending by 4.2 percent in 2013 to about 1.6 percent of GDP. Sweden, once the region’s foremost military power, has dropped defense spending to 1.2 percent of GDP – fourth among the five Nordic countries. The lowest is Iceland, which maintains only a Coast Guard. Sweden’s opposition parties have been critical of that level of defense spending. Center Party defense spokesman Staffan Danielsson told Defense News that Sweden must boost its own defense to improve credibility for greater integration with its neighbors. “This means taking responsibility and spending a lot more money on our military,” he said. “This is the best means of contributing to increased stability in the Nordic region.”

Shared values and history
Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark have a history of military cooperation since collaborating on United Nations peacekeeping operations in the 1950s. Sweden and Finland joined Partnership for Peace after the Cold War, through which they contributed to NATO-led peacekeeping operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo and have also jointly contributed to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan.

With a foundation in mutual democratic values, Nordic relations with NATO continue to strengthen, abetted by the Nordic NATO members. The new Swedish proposal would expand cooperation under the Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO) framework, which has managed joint Nordic military activity and cooperation with NATO, the EU and the UN since 2009, when it replaced previous agreements and shifted the focus of Nordic cooperation to international crisis management and peace support operations.

Though most observers believe NATO would welcome Sweden and Finland with open arms should they apply for membership, increased cooperation, even outside the Alliance, improves capabilities and regional security and allows NATO and its partners to work effectively together when necessary. Fiscal realities and an evolving international and regional security environment are making military cooperation the wave of the future. Nations that share the “values we associate with a modern democratic society,” as Enström and Bildt wrote, can achieve “more impact for our common values” through close cooperation. □
Registering a car in Afghanistan used to entail 51 steps lasting several months. At each stage of the process, corruption was rife, costing Afghan citizens bribes totaling hundreds of dollars. In response, the Afghan government’s High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption (HOOAC) adopted a simplified, cashless automobile registration system. Lasting only three days from start to finish, the new registration process greatly reduced the temptation for extracting payoffs to fulfill what should have been a simple public service.

Success on a single front does not a victory produce: Few believe that corruption in Afghanistan – endemic to the nation and exacerbated by decades of underdevelopment and conflict – will vanish overnight. A United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) survey of 6,700 Afghans in 2012 named corruption a top problem along with insecurity and unemployment. Afghan President Hamid Karzai summed up those feelings in a December 2012 televised speech to the nation: “Corruption in Afghanistan is a reality, a bitter reality.”

As the country prepares to assume full responsibility for its own security during the 2014 transition, curtailing corruption remains a vital task confronting not just Afghanistan’s leaders but international partners with a stake in the country’s success. Currency smuggling by high government officials, upper-level drug trafficking, the sale of commands in the Afghan police and Taliban infiltration attract many of the headlines. But it’s often the lower level administrative corruption that saps the population’s confidence in government, for example when misuse of aid money leads to shoddy construction of roads, schools or clinics.
“For the vast majority of the Afghan population, by limiting and distorting their right to access essential public services, hindering their chances of economic development and eroding their trust in government, justice and the rule of law, it is administrative corruption that is most keenly felt,” the 2012 UNODC survey report noted.

COMBATING CORRUPTION
The Afghan government hasn’t been negligent in setting up institutions meant to discourage and defeat corruption, even if progress in rooting out the problem has been painstaking and inconsistent. The country adopted the United Nations Convention Against Corruption in 2008, and the HOOAC was tasked with implementing and monitoring Afghanistan’s anti-corruption strategy. Investigative or prosecutorial powers reside with the anti-corruption unit of the Afghan Attorney General’s Office (AGO) and a Major Crimes Task Force trained by the U.S. FBI.

Reform has been sporadic. The Afghan National Police reduced by thousands the number of high-ranking officers in an attempt to introduce a system of merit-based pay and promotions and stem the practice of using positions for financial gain, the United States Institute for Peace noted. To reduce the allure of bribes, police pay was increased. Another accomplishment came in 2012, when the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan arrested, tried and imprisoned Haji Bakhtawar, a politically connected drug trafficker who in earlier times might have avoided prosecution thanks to powerful Afghan allies.

In March 2013, two former directors at Kabul Bank were sentenced to five years in prison for helping steal hundreds of millions of dollars of deposits. “For years, this was the perfect breeding ground for corruption, until the big bang came in 2010, when it was no longer possible to hide the fact that a lot of money — more than $900 million — was missing,” the Deutsche Welle reported. Foreign observers viewed the banker prosecutions as a crucial test of Afghanistan’s sincerity in overcoming corruption and restoring financial stability.

Nevertheless, abuse of power, bribe taking and nepotism remain widespread, and the country ranks 176 out of 178 on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index and 154 out of 183 on the World Bank’s 2012 Ease of Doing Business Index. HOOAC and the AGO “have minimal political support in encouraging and enforcing transparency and accountability measures within the Afghan government,” said the “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan” delivered to the U.S. Congress in December 2012.

“Weaknesses within both the formal and traditional Afghan justice systems, and the link between the two, ensure the Taliban system of dispute resolution remains a viable option for segments of the Afghan population.”

A “LONG WAR”
Even if Afghanistan weren’t among the poorest nations in the world, its central role in the worldwide drug trade and its reliance on billions of dollars of foreign aid would provide inducements to corruption. Anthony Cordesman, an Afghanistan expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, insists traditional anti-corruption programs won’t succeed in the multi-ethnic, tribal political environment of Afghanistan. Inasmuch as poorly disbursed foreign aid contributes to embezzlement and theft, he suggests that countries impose tighter controls on international aid and promote greater transparency on how the money is
spent. But ultimately it is the Afghans themselves who will need to lead the reforms.

“It means limiting graft and corruption to Afghan norms and removing the most egregious figures in the justice system. Again, progress will be erratic and evolutionary and will have to be internally driven on Afghan terms and in the Afghan way, but without such progress both transition and the rationale for continuing outside support will be gravely weakened,” Cordesman wrote in a 2012 report titled “Afghanistan: Meeting the real World Challenges of Transition.”

William Brownfield, assistant secretary for the U.S. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, suggests the use of “specialized units” to prosecute wrongdoers and cites successful examples from around the world. For Brownfield, such anti-corruption units would consist of a core of dedicated, carefully vetted professionals, largely immune to the siren song of tribal loyalty and personal gain, which could operate with minimal political interference.

Hong Kong conspicuously used such tactics to attack internal corruption in the 1970s. Reform-minded Eastern European governments, including those in Lithuania and Latvia, established such oversight after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. South American nations have made good use of specially screened prosecutors and judges to wrest control of tainted institutions from drug lords. The trick is tailoring the specialized units to Afghanistan’s unique political culture.

“That depends upon the country, the laws and traditions of that country, but at the end of the day, what you have created ideally is a unit of individuals who, despite the fact that they are part of an institution that is corrupted, nevertheless are able to operate independent of that institution and accomplish things,” Brownfield said at a news conference during a May 2012 visit to Kabul.

At the local and regional level, Integrity Watch Afghanistan, a nongovernmental organization financed by the Norwegian government, the World Bank and the UN, has formed watchdog groups of Afghan citizens to keep tabs on development projects in their districts to ensure theft and embezzlement are minimized. Considering the country’s potential mineral wealth, it also keeps tabs on extraction industries to help ensure integrity is maintained. “Corruption is so widespread and common in Afghanistan that, unless you include the population in the battle against it, you will not win,” Integrity Watch official Karolina Olofsson told The Washington Post in a story published in 2011.

Experts suggest that suppressing corruption is a long-term process of changing institutions and cultures used to operating through traditional forms of patronage no longer acceptable to the wider international community. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) supports focusing the greatest attention on addressing corruption in the upper tier of government. Independent-minded reformers are vitally important to the process. Success on that front would act as a foil to Afghanistan’s enemies, including an insurgency that appeals to popular frustration with corrupt officials.

“Prosecution of ‘street corruption’ … does not normally require an institution additionally shielded from undue outside political influence,” the OECD noted. “Tackling corruption of high-level officials … or systemic corruption in a country with deficits in good governance and comparatively weak law enforcement and financial control institutions is destined to fail if efforts are not backed by a sufficiently strong and independent anti-corruption institution.”
THE LEGACY OF Nunn-Lugar

Russia opts out of a program credited with eliminating thousands of nuclear and chemical weapons
Scholars believe the Chinese character for crisis contains symbols for both danger and opportunity. Such a juxtaposition of words, however, was an apt representation of the dangers inherent in the rapid disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. The military of that nuclear-armed superpower was in disarray, and many feared nuclear weapons and other military material could fall into the hands of terrorists and criminal organizations. Out of that disarray emerged opportunity. In June 1992, the United States, Russia and other post-Soviet states implemented the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program treaty to address this overriding threat and expand cooperation in security, energy, economics and other areas of mutual concern.

But in October 2012, after 20 years of Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program success, the Russian government announced it would not renew its participation in the program at its expiration in June 2013. The American proposal to renew CTR was “at odds with our ideas about the forms and basis for building further cooperation in that area,” a statement on the Russian Foreign Ministry website said. “To this end, we need a more modern legal framework.”

UNPRECEDENTED SUCCESS
The CTR program, widely known as Nunn-Lugar after the two U.S. senators (Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar) who introduced it, secured enormous stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and nuclear and chemical weapons materials and technologies. It also led to the destruction and decommissioning of warheads, missiles, launchers and submarines. Speaking for many in the West, Congressional Quarterly called Nunn-Lugar one of the “most effective non-proliferation initiatives.”

According to Congressional Quarterly, the U.S. has spent about $15 billion on the program in 20 years, a relatively small sum considering its successes and the original costs of the weapons being destroyed. As of January 2013, the program has deactivated an estimated 7,613 warheads, destroyed 1,605 ground-based and submarine-launched ballistic missiles and 3,794 metric tons of chemical weapons agent, and secured dozens of weapons storage sites and laboratories. Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus had joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty by 1994 and completely denuclearized by 1996, destroying or transferring to Russia their Soviet-era nuclear weapons. As recently as 2009, Russia opened the Shchuch’ye Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility in the Ural Mountains to destroy a stockpile of
chemical and nerve agents potentially large enough to kill everyone on Earth.

Despite these well-documented successes, Russia wants to change the program substantially. Russia is not the economically distressed country it was when it approved the CTR program, and Moscow emphasized that it no longer needs the financial assistance that was crucial to the program’s success. “Russia has significantly increased its own budget appropriations to honor its international disarmament obligations in the past years. For instance, the financing of the destruction of chemical weapons and disposal of nuclear submarines alone has exceeded $7 billion,” the Foreign Ministry statement said.

Russia’s primary concerns with the current structure of the CTR program are provisions that it considers “discriminatory,” a Russian Foreign Ministry official told the ITAR-TASS news agency. Russia dislikes legal provisions that protect the

MISSION INCOMPLETE

International nonproliferation experts expressed concern about Russia’s rejection of Nunn-Lugar, despite Moscow’s assertion that the program is no longer needed to secure its WMD arsenal. The program’s 2017 goals include the deactivation of another 1,600 nuclear warheads; the destruction of hundreds more missiles, launchers and silos; and the elimination of an additional 1,500 metric tons of chemical weapons agent. Concerns have also been raised about Moscow’s commitment to Nunn-Lugar’s nonproliferation targets. The Russian Foreign Ministry says it has increased the budget for disarmament, but some experts worry that Russia will not divert sufficient funds or qualified scientists and engineers to nonproliferation efforts, given the Kremlin’s recent push for expensive military modernization and upgrades.

“The danger is the same as it was right from the beginning – that these weapons and materials fall into the wrong hands,” Joseph Cirincione, of the nonproliferation advocacy foundation Ploughshares Fund told Congressional Quarterly. “The big difference today is that nuclear terrorism is a much more real threat than it was 20 years ago.” Kenneth Luongo of the Arms Control Association insists the break with Nunn-Lugar could have global consequences. “If the agreement is terminated, then it sends one of the worst signals to the international community about the importance of cooperation to secure loose nukes,” Luongo told Arms Control Today.

PERFECT STORM

When then-Senator Nunn visited the Soviet Union in 1991, immediately following the failed coup against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, he discovered through conversations with Soviet officials that there were serious problems with the security of nuclear and chemical weapons stockpiles and with weapons development research and materials. Strategic nuclear weapons were deployed only in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan and remained under fairly tight security, but there was also enough weapons-grade uranium and plutonium to make 50,000 more bombs, plus tactical nuclear weapons spread throughout the country and numerous chemical weapons depots. Nunn returned to the U.S. determined to address this newfound danger and teamed with Senator Lugar to sponsor the CTR program.

Deteriorating morale in the Russian military made the security situation worse, Nunn said in a 1997 radio interview. “The people who were guarding those weapons of mass destruction, and the people who were knowledgeable about how to
make them, in many cases were unemployed,” Nunn said, calling it “the perfect storm.” With that in mind, the CTR included provisions to finance science and technology centers to employ scientists and engineers with knowledge of WMD, lest they be hired by rogue regimes or terrorists.

**INVALUABLE TOOL**

According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), a nonproliferation organization co-founded by Nunn, the CTR program is increasingly relevant as it evolves to meet the changing security environment. Al-Qaeda and other terrorists groups have long sought WMD, including nuclear weapons or material. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, increased recognition of this threat and earned Nunn-Lugar additional financing and exposure. In 2003, the U.S. Congress passed the Nunn-Lugar Expansion Act, authorizing the program to operate outside the former Soviet Union, and by 2007 Albania’s substantial chemical weapons stockpile had been eliminated.

“The Nunn-Lugar program arose from the ability to see new dangers emerging in a changing world and to create new partnerships to fight the threats,” NTI said in its 2012 report “The Nunn-Lugar Vision.” “As the world continues to change, threats will take new forms, and partnerships will have to be even more creative and more agile.”

The CTR program has proven to be an invaluable tool to build trust between the former Cold War foes and could be a global model for nonproliferation programs. Weapons of mass destruction remain a security threat as long as the means to create and deploy them are within reach of states or nonstate actors that view them as an acceptable means to achieve political goals. Cooperation between the U.S. and Russia, which still have the two largest WMD arsenals in the world, is essential to nonproliferation efforts and for two decades the CTR has proven to be an effective vehicle for this cooperation.

“The program is crucial not only because it secured a breakthrough as far as the solution of issues that have been acute since the early 1990s are concerned, but because it allowed us to accumulate political capital that has now turned into a mechanism of cooperation and partnership,” Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told NTI.
Europe could advance energy security by extracting natural gas from shale deposits

In the winter of 2013, beside a highway near the city of Augsburg in Bavaria, solar panels blanketed in snow and ice extended to the horizon under leaden skies. Once-in-a-half-century cloud cover, combined with plentiful snow, reduced solar-power generation to a relative trickle in a country that has invested billions of euros in the renewable energy source.

Five hundred kilometers away in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, brown lignite coal, the soft smoky hydrocarbon that used to blacken shirt collars in the days of the Eastern Bloc, pours from conveyors into a Communist-era power plant owned by the Swedish company Vattenfall. The fuel is cheap, effective and unperturbed by lack of sunshine.

Germany – and by extension many of its European Union neighbors – is getting a lesson in energy reality: The “greenest” sources of power are often the most unreliable, and the dirtiest are widely and cheaply obtainable. But an increasing number of experts insist Europe’s greatest potential for energy security, a security that combines reliability and lower costs, lies with natural gas trapped in layers of shale under much of the Continent.

The United States has embarked upon its own “shale gas revolution” using a process called fracking. It involves pumping water, sand and chemicals underground with high pressure to release methane from the porous rock. Not only has the innovation created tens of thousands of jobs, it has reduced the country’s reliance on imported energy. “In the U.S., shale gas didn’t exist in 2004. Now it represents 30 percent of the market,” Dieter Helm, an energy expert at Oxford University, told the Guardian in November 2012.

Many Europeans are eager to exploit their own
prospective gas reserves but face stiff resistance from environmentalists fearful that the extraction process will contaminate the earth. France, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria have all placed moratoriums on exploring and drilling for shale gas. In Germany, Europe’s largest energy consumer, the moratorium story is mixed.

“Attempts to do the same in Germany were defeated in parliament in December. But North Rhine-Westphalia, the country’s most promising region for shale gas, suspended fracking last September pending research on the risks involved,” The Economist wrote in February 2013. “In Austria the cost of complying with environmental regulations makes shale gas uneconomic.”

Domestic European gas production offers many benefits. For one thing, compared to coal, burning it produces only half the amount of carbon dioxide, the gas blamed for helping warm the planet. European investments in wind turbines and solar panels suffer from a reliance on fickle weather: Absence of sun and wind can play havoc with power delivery if backup supplies of electricity are unavailable. Another relatively clean alternative, nuclear power, is dwindling in popularity, particularly in Germany, after the 2011 tsunami-instigated disaster in Fukushima, Japan.

Europe gets much of its gas from Russia’s state-controlled energy company Gazprom. Despite falling worldwide prices for gas, thanks in part to the shale gas streaming from the U.S., Europe remains locked into pricy purchase agreements with the Russian producer. Nevertheless, Der Spiegel reports that many countries have gained new leverage in bargaining with suppliers. “Europeans are reorienting themselves,” the magazine wrote in early 2013. “In the first three quarters of 2012, Gazprom sales fell by 43 percent in the Netherlands, 30 percent in Slovakia and 20 percent in France.”

The ability for fracking to change the world’s balance of economic power was a topic at the 2013 Munich Security Conference. EU Commissioner for Energy Günther Oettinger suggested Europe should produce enough domestic shale gas to reduce reliance on outside suppliers. He singled out Poland, Great Britain, Ukraine and the Baltic states for sponsoring “demonstration projects” that could prove the effectiveness of domestic fracking and urged the rest of Europe to remain open-minded about an extraction process the EU will pursue only to the highest environmental standards.

Such diversification of the European gas market is one way to ensure that international political disputes won’t upset the Continent’s energy supplies, Nicholas Redman, senior fellow at London’s International Institute for Strategic Studies, told the Guardian newspaper in a story from November 2012. “Europe doesn’t want to get into deeper reliance on Russia,” he said. “They are looking at other options.”

Yet at the moment, much of the Continent seems seized by environmental anxieties that are still being assessed in countries where shale gas extraction has become commonplace. For countries such as Germany that are wary about producing either shale gas or nuclear power, coal remains the likely fallback option, particularly when winters curtail solar power generation. More than a few commentators have pointed out the irony: Europe’s leader in renewable energy relies disproportionately on the dirtiest of fossil fuels.

“The amount of electricity generated from coal is rising at annualised rates of as much as 50% in some European countries,” The Economist wrote in January 2013. “Since coal is by far the most polluting source of electricity, with more greenhouse gas produced per kilowatt hour than any other fossil fuel, this is making a mockery of European environmental aspirations.”

A man walks past solar panels covered with snow in Germany in February 2013. Despite massive investments in renewable energy, the country gets only 5 to 6 percent of its electricity from solar generation, which has left officials exploring the possibility of drilling for domestic natural gas sources.
Maintaining **Alliances** and Homeland Defense

Poland’s security strategy includes a solid commitment to NATO and the EU and improves defense capabilities

By Col. Dr. Mariusz Fryc

*Polish National Security Bureau*
Poland wants to be an important and active regional player. Articulated security goals and plans for a substantial increase of defense capabilities show that Warsaw has the ambition, the strategy and the potential to shape the security environment in the region. Poland's standing as a major contributor to the NATO security network seems secure. With the perceived decline of military threats, including a reduction of likely large-scale external threats against Poland, the country has concluded its first National Security Strategic Review (NSSR) to prepare for possible security situations. However small the likelihood, Poland can't exclude the possibility of a violation of its sovereignty, an attempt at political-military blackmail or a crisis resulting in uncontrolled migration onto Polish territory. To mitigate those risks Warsaw has put a defense emphasis on development of preemptive threat capabilities.

**Systemic Approach to Security**

In September 2012, after almost two years of intensive work, the National Security Bureau finished the NSSR to create a comprehensive, integrated and systemic approach to evaluating the future national and international security environment. Poland's National Security Council welcomed the results of the NSSR and unanimously accepted its general conclusions and recommendations for addressing the security challenges of the next decade.¹

The main reason for this review were weaknesses in the Polish national security system, described as a lack of coherent thinking and the existence of a nonintegrated, “ministerial” attitude in the area of national and international security. The review outlined a strategic imperative for the next 20 years that combines sustainable security internationalization and gradual defense autonomization. The philosophy of this approach is essentially focused on preventive and integrative thinking as well as gradual and more independent initiative in national defense and security.²

Externally, the NSSR assumes proper exploitation of emerging opportunities and successful prevention of looming security threats through multilateral cooperation, but internally it recommends strengthening national security potential by gradually consolidating capacities. With this approach, Poland wants to build the credibility of external security pillars through multilateral and bilateral relations with key partners (NATO, EU, U.S.), but also reinforce internal pillars of defense and security by maintaining a state of readiness to act independently in situations when a full credible allied response cannot be guaranteed.³

Poland would raise its internal capacity by integrating the national security management subsystem, professionalizing operational services (military, diplomacy, law enforcement and other security agencies), providing social and economic security (developing security plans, programs, trainings, etc.) and enhancing security education to citizens.⁴

**Maintaining Alliances**

In the external security dimension, Poland would maintain its willingness and ability to contribute to international security, while working to consolidate NATO defense functions, improve the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the European Union and develop a strategic partnership with the United States. In the context of Polish security interests in Europe, the North Atlantic Alliance remains a prime, multilateral and external security guarantor. Therefore, it is especially important for Poland to foster the Alliance by equal security sharing among all its members, empowering NATO's multinational operational command and improving its threat responsiveness, readying air defenses, developing continental missile defense and strengthening rapid reaction forces.⁵

Poland's foreign policy will work for permanent confirmation of NATO's credibility and the Alliance's main mission of collective defense by participating in NATO military operations. Poland will also seek cyclical updates of contingency plans, conduct exercises with troop deployments based on Washington Treaty Article 5 scenarios, and push for equal distribution of the Alliance's military infrastructure among its members.⁶
After NATO, the EU’s CSDP is the main external guarantor of security. From the Polish point of view, it is essential to achieve CSDP growth in harmony with NATO without challenging NATO’s role in the European security system or the U.S. military’s position in Europe. Enabling the U.S. to maintain a significant presence in Europe and play an active and leading role in NATO is of particular importance to Poles. The U.S. is committed to maintaining the balance of power in the European theater and participates through NATO in safeguarding Polish security.

Therefore, Polish diplomacy actively acts in various forums (the Visegrad Group or V4, the Weimar Triangle) to bolster the CSDP. Through the Weimar Triangle, Poland is trying to enhance key EU defense capabilities, such as improving EU-NATO relations, establishing permanent civilian-military planning and command structures, and developing EU Battle Groups and their defense capabilities. Polish diplomacy seeks — at the European Council meeting on ESDP scheduled for December 2013 — a strategic debate that would lead to the identification of specific common strategic interests of EU member states and, in due course, to amendments to the EU Security Strategy (2003). Additionally, the V4 Battle Group will begin operations in 2016 and remains the most important common project in the field of defense.

**Maintaining Homeland Defence**

Despite the perceived decline of direct external danger of using military force on a large scale against Poland, the NSSR does not exclude the possibilities of blackmail or threats of using armed violence, including use of non-conventional weapons (nuclear). Threats to Poland’s security could specifically take the form of: military blackmail or a direct threat of use of nuclear weapons deployed in the vicinity of Poland’s territory with the intention of undermining Polish status in NATO and creating a low security zone; demonstration of power in the form of military exercises, as well as temporary or permanent deployment of military units near the Polish border, including the violation of territorial waters and air space; rapid expansion of the offensive capability near the Polish border, forcing the Polish side to react militarily, or military provocations and cross border incidents.

But one of the most likely challenges associated with the need to use military force seems is a humanitarian catastrophe caused by an escalating socio-economic, political or natural disaster at the eastern border resulting in uncontrolled mass migration onto the Polish territory.

In worst-case scenarios involving a large-scale conflict in which state sovereignty is threatened, the Polish strategic concept assumes the country will face that threat by conducting allied defense operations. In such a situation, the armed forces will enlist strategic forces, maintain key terrain positions and then, reinforced by NATO allied forces, begin to conduct a combined, joint operation aimed at creating resolution in accordance with Polish national interests. The Polish defense concept also takes into account strategic loneliness, meaning that despite having appropriate security consultation mechanisms, Poland could act alone in the first phase of a conflict until NATO support arrives.
Soldiers march in November 2012 during the opening ceremony for a U.S. Air Force aviation detachment at the Polish air base in Lask, Poland.
In the case of a conflict on a small local scale, the strategic concept assumes that the armed forces could employ its arsenal to protect people, territory and sovereignty. That arsenal includes modern reconnaissance, command and control systems that meet the requirements of a network-centric battlefield characterized by high mobility and fire power and strengthened by extensive ballistic missile defense capacities. In addition, Poland’s military should be prepared to take active part in Alliance defense operations in the event of an attack on another member in accordance with the principles of collective defense.

Developing Anticipatory Potential

In the context of developing military defense capabilities, Poland clearly desires to provide its forces with the potential to pre-empt threats. This means the ability to defend and protect people and critical infrastructure against military threats in politically ambiguous situations that are caused by unclear or hidden political motives. The sudden emergence of an unexpected, limited military threat inspired by unknown political motives could inhibit the Alliance, whether NATO or the EU, from responding immediately with adequate military force and from forming a common political and military understanding beneficial to Poland. Therefore, the NSSR recommends the country acquire tools and capabilities that would anticipate this type of situation and allow the country to respond immediately and adequately. To meet these objectives, the armed forces have been given three clearly defined strategic development priorities. The first is to implement a modern command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, Surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) system; the second to strengthen air defense capabilities, especially through the development of ballistic missile systems; and the third to increase the mobility of land forces through improved helicopter mobility.

This NSSR vision adheres to a plan of technical modernization of the Polish Armed Forces for 2013-2022. Poland’s air defense plans include the purchase of six medium-range missile batteries (range up to 100 kilometers) capable of targeting cruise missiles under the Wisła operational program, and 11 short-range missile batteries (range up to 25 kilometers) under the Narew operational program. Developing improved air defense capacity is supported by the Polish president, who asked Parliament to initiate legislation to finance these projects in 2014-2023.

To address force agility and helicopter mobility, the Polish Ministry of Defense intends to buy 70 combat support helicopters in four versions, along with a package of specialized logistics and training, and subsequently equip the Army with additional combat helicopters. The Army will also be equipped with 300 wheeled and armored personnel carriers.

To integrate intelligence, communication, command and control, providing actionable information to commanders, the Polish Armed Forces plan to equip themselves with a new C4ISR system, including unmanned aerial vehicles of different classes. The upcoming reform of armed forces command and control encompasses a formation of two commands: a general command responsible for armed forces management in time of peace and an operational command to operate in times of crisis, war and expeditionary missions. The reform aims to trim the military command structure at the central level while strengthening operational structures; create comprehensive, joint and combined command and training at the operational level; unify peace, crisis and war command structures; and deepen civilian control over the military.

To accomplish a strategic military modernization, the Polish defense ministry plans to spend about 140 billion zlotys (about $42 billion). Importantly, equipping the armed forces with new systems and weapons will also result in a significant transfer of new technology to the country, especially to the Polish defense industry.

Conclusions

Poland’s strategy shows that Warsaw intends to play a leading role in Europe and desires to shape the security and defense environment in the region. However, it may be difficult for Poland to achieve one of its external objectives: maintaining a significant U.S. presence in Europe and retaining U.S. participation, along with NATO, in safeguarding Polish security.

Last year the U.S. activated the first permanent air element (Aviation Detachment) on Polish soil at Łask and still declares that Poland is the intended site of medium-range ballistic missile interceptors (part of the U.S. missile defense system in Europe) to be deployed in 2018. But the financial crisis in the U.S. and significant cuts in the U.S. defense budget, as well as the U.S. willingness to reset relations with Russia and push for greater European participation in their own defense, might encourage the U.S. to
abandon existing plans. Poles realize that U.S. interests are no longer concentrated in Europe; that America sees Europe as a stable continent, and Poland is not considered a strategic partner to U.S. global interests. President Barack Obama’s administration supports a military presence in Europe but is particularly keen on maintaining its posture in the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East. These circumstances force the U.S. to undertake a strategic decision to reduce, or perhaps diversify, its military presence in Europe while maintaining the ability to project power in the event of threats to U.S. or Allied security and interests. Therefore, Poland’s long-term security policy must prepare for the possibility of revision or reversal of U.S. plans to deploy ballistic missile defense capabilities on Polish territory.

By implementing the new strategy and realizing planned activities, internally and externally, Poland can integrate national security management and control significantly improved defense capabilities, better suited to the demands of the future battlefield and with much greater operational value. With an emphasis on increased mobility, firepower, improved computerization and robotics on the battlefield, Poland wants to acquire tools and capabilities that will not only allow it to meet the state’s constitutional defense functions but also to develop farsighted capabilities capable of meeting national security threats in politically unclear situations (situations similar to Turkish-Syrian border incidents).

Importantly, the Polish modernization process, as well as the country’s planned defense spending, contrasts positively with current European military budget curtailments caused by the European financial crisis and subsequent restrictions in defense spending planned by key European countries such as the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands. Finally, modernization will help the Polish military, whose development was in some ways hampered by long and intense involvement in foreign missions, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan.

2. Ibid
3. Ibid
4. Ibid
6. Ibid, p. 44.
8. Ibid. 5, p. 46.
15. Ibid
Ukraine Looks West
Democratic reform would help the country qualify for closer integration with the European Union

By Per Concordiam Staff

In its pursuit of a closer relationship with the European Union, Ukraine has often demonstrated a deft diplomatic touch. It’s a country that sent forces to multinational peace missions in the Indian Ocean and Kosovo and demilitarized its post-Soviet nuclear stockpile. It successfully co-hosted the 2012 European Football Championships with Poland and assumed the 2013 chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

But such achievements have only made the recent chill in Ukrainian-EU relations all the more conspicuous. After years of negotiations, Ukraine has seen its hopes of a free trade agreement with the EU become unhinged; a standoff exacerbated by questions about the fairness of late 2012 parliamentary elections during which the country’s chief opposition leaders languished in prison.

For the EU, closer integration with its “eastern neighbors,” including Ukraine, isn’t just about coordinating markets but also about sharing democratic values. In that regard, Ukraine has yet to reassure a majority of EU member states that once seemed prepared to proclaim Europe’s geographically largest nation a natural bridge between democratic Western Europe and post-Soviet Eurasia.

“The EU’s policy of linking free trade with Ukraine’s domestic politics essentially defers Ukraine’s pathway to the common European market to the very long term, until Kiev lives up to its declared ‘European choice,’” Matthew Rojansky of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace noted in a 2012 article published in the newsweekly European Voice.

“But this policy raises a serious problem: what to do about the millions of Ukrainians already resolved to be part of Europe and eager to live up to Europe’s standards? Without tools for engaging and fostering this constituency, it may well disappear, together with Ukraine’s best hope for European integration in the long term.”

EU-Ukraine relations
After emerging from the Soviet era with leaders who made their name under communist rule, Ukraine took what looked to be a lurch to the West. The “Orange Revolution,” an anti-corruption movement that arose in late 2004/early 2005, brought President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko to power under a pro-democracy platform. Infighting
A Ukrainian girl looks at a billboard of jailed opposition leader Yulia Tymoshenko in Kiev in 2012. The EU has accused Ukraine’s leaders of seeking politically motivated convictions against Tymoshenko, the country’s former prime minister, putting a free trade and political association deal with Ukraine on hold.
between partisans of Yushchenko and Tymoshenko and resistance by authoritarian strains within the country helped weaken the pro-democratic movement. The election in 2010 of President Viktor Yanukovych – and the subsequent sentencing of Tymoshenko to seven years in prison on charges of corruption – has been viewed by many EU officials as a setback to greater integration.

As a key partner in the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy, Ukraine has negotiated for years to finalize an EU-Ukraine Association Agreement that guarantees privileges shy of full EU membership. A key part of that association agreement is approval of what the EU calls a “deep and comprehensive free trade area” with Ukraine that goes beyond lower tariffs to include closer coordination of legal, economic and energy policy. Also coveted by Ukraine is visa-free travel for its citizens to the rest of Europe.

In pursuit of these deals, Ukraine has stressed contributions in the realm of security. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the country removed nuclear weapons from its territory and as recently as 2010 agreed to dispose of the last of its highly enriched uranium by converting it into power plant fuel. It supplied naval personnel to the EU’s Operation Atalanta, the anti-piracy mission off the Horn of Africa, and joined with Poland in helping police a cease-fire in Kosovo. The EU has worked with Ukraine in policing its border with Moldova, considered to be a prime smuggling corridor.

“Kyiv works together with Warsaw and Vilnius to establish a joint multinational brigade of Ukraine, Poland and Lithuania. Together with our Polish friends, we work to ensure participation of Ukrainian Armed Forces units in one of the EU tactical battle groups,” proclaimed Oleksander Motsyk, Ukrainian ambassador to the U.S., in a late 2011 speech in Washington.

The greatest stumbling block to sealing trade and visa deals has been what many view as a politically influenced prosecution, not just
of Tymoshenko, but also of former Ukrainian Interior Minister Yuri Lutsenko. European representatives have uttered the words “selective justice.” Encapsulating a common EU view, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, in a November 2012 meeting with Polish President Donald Tusk, downplayed chances that EU member states would ratify the association agreement with Ukraine anytime soon. “The requirements for the treaty to be signed currently do not exist,” the chancellor announced. On the other hand, Tusk expressed guarded optimism that the EU-Ukraine agreement could be ratified by the end of 2013.

**Polish partnerships**

Poland has been among the bright spots in Ukrainian-European relations. In addition to military cooperation with its western neighbor, a member of NATO since 1999, Ukraine has advanced its case with greater economic cooperation. Although barred from visa-free travel in the EU, an agreement with Poland allows Ukrainians to cross the shared border to conduct business. Poland is among the leading western outlets for Ukrainian labor: “Over 100,000 Ukrainian citizens are usually reckoned to be working in Poland, mostly illegally,” The Economist wrote in 2012.

Poland hosts the greatest number of Ukrainian consulates and is that country’s fourth largest trading partner. The neighbors collaborated in staging Euro 2012, the continentwide football championships that attracted an estimated 1.4 million spectators and hundreds of millions of euros worth of revenue and investment. Along with Poland, Ukraine is investigating the potential of developing domestic sources of natural gas. It has invited energy companies to prospect for hydrocarbons in the Black Sea, a policy that could reduce reliance on fuel purchases from Russia and other former Soviet republics.

Despite such progress in trade and cooperation, the difficulties of doing business in Ukraine are reflected in its mediocre standing in the World Bank’s “Ease of Doing Business” rankings, in which it came in 152nd out of 183 economies in 2012. In fact, the country’s still-unsigned treaty with the EU includes clauses dedicated to commercial issues such as equal treatment under the law, corruption, judicial independence and protection of intellectual property.

“There are grounds for optimism about Ukraine’s long-range perspectives,” Zbigniew Brzezinski, the Polish-born former U.S. national security advisor, said in a speech in late 2011. “I think the bottom line is that even if Ukraine is not right now evolving towards a really constitutional democratic state, it is evolving into a state in which increasingly the majority of its people, and especially the young, think of Ukraine as their state. That, in itself, is important.”

**Future of integration**

Often seen as a source of discord, Ukraine’s geographical and ethnic divide – its western regions historically oriented mainly toward Poland and its eastern regions dominated by Russian speakers – raises the country’s stature as a potential bridge between East and West. That division was reflected in recent electoral results. The more EU-oriented Yushchenko triumphed in western Ukraine while the Russian-speaking Yanukovych won in the east.

Russia has tried to entice Ukraine to join a Eurasian customs union along with Kazakhstan and Belarus, but even Yanukovych, who maintains better relations with Russia than did his predecessor, appears eager to complete an agreement that would lower tariffs and travel barriers with the massive EU trading bloc.

In one of his first interviews as the EU’s new ambassador to Ukraine, Jan Tombinski struck an encouraging note in November 2012. But before doing so, he made an emphatic gesture by visiting Tymoshenko in a Kharkiv hospital where she was engaged in a hunger strike to protest her conviction. Observing how EU integration has been a “success story” for many countries, Tombinski held out hope that Ukraine could join the club. Said the ambassador: “Ukraine may also be a part of this story of European history.”
At first glance, the recent clashes in Turkey seem to render this book, with articles originally written in 2008 and 2009, outdated. The levels and persistence of violence and the seeming inability to reach a stable solution raise issues this book does not answer, which should be no surprise, since it was written before they were so dramatically raised by the events in Turkey since May 2013. Furthermore, the issue of the amendment of the Turkish constitution, the major focus of this compilation of articles, is no longer prominent today.

On closer examination, however, it could be argued that constitutional mechanisms accepted as legitimate and effective are precisely what is needed to break the cycle of violence and produce a peaceful way forward. Since the book does focus on the Turkish constitution, as well as on long-term historical trends and political issues in Turkey, there is still much that is relevant and useful, for the current crisis as well as for those with a deeper and longer-term interest in this vitally important country. Even though the constitution is not one of the current points of contention, it is almost certain to resurface as an issue since the struggle over constitutional content is central for societies undergoing profound change.

This is certainly the case for Turkey. During the past 100 years, Turkey has undergone considerable transformation. Rising from the multiethnic and religiously diverse Ottoman Empire and building on what essentially had been European concepts of nationalism, Turkey became a secular nation-state, greatly reduced in size and adopting a largely Turkish ethnic identity. Kemalism, inheriting its name from Turkish military hero and President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk became the prevailing national identity.

Kemalist national identity remained largely unchallenged for decades until dramatic societal changes since about the turn of the millennium elevated the question of a new constitution to the national agenda. The essays Ahmet Kuru and Alfred Stepan have assembled in *Democracy, Islam and Secularism in Turkey* provide background insights to these changes from the constitutional perspective in a way that academic and policymaking communities will find useful.

It is important to recall the groundbreaking societal-political developments since 2000 in Turkey. A socially conservative, economically neo-liberal party deeply imbued by Islamic values was democratically elected. That party is the Justice and Development Party, better known by its Turkish initials AKP. Since the 2002 election, Turkey has enjoyed substantial economic success and has pursued, albeit with diminishing enthusiasm, European Union accession. Turkey engaged in a vital and constructive role in regional cooperation, while large segments of society have reasserted Turkey’s Muslim identity in establishing a place in the global community.

These transformations were largely rooted in major internal power shifts. The end of the Cold War and neoliberal globalization allowed formerly marginalized export-oriented entrepreneurs from Anatolia, with culturally and socially conservative Islamic worldviews, to push aside the former Kemalist military-bureaucratic elite and to challenge the Kemalist Turkish national identity. These new societal forces are the backbone of the AKP, and its economic success has been influential in enlarging the party’s electorate, shaping its policy and remolding Turkish identities. It is also in these recent developments that we find roots of the current turbulence in Turkey.

Kuru and Stepan’s book lacks an article shedding light on these recent shifts in the relations among Turkey’s power elites and their impact on the social contract between government and society. Nonetheless, the essays provide important information crucial to understanding Turkey’s overall politics, particularly the confluence of democracy, Islam, and secularism reflected in the title.

Karen Barkey’s chapter on “Rethinking Ottoman Management of Diversity” reviews the Ottoman legacy of tolerance in a search for what she terms a “useable past” and concludes that the “Ottoman legacy of
pluralism, tolerance, and an inclusive state agenda has not yet been attained in contemporary ‘Turkey.’ Any resolution of current clashes appears to be conceivable only in a kind of modernized ‘Ottoman Management of Diversity.’ This chapter is ideally read together with M. Sükrü Hanioglu’s ‘The Historical Roots of Kemalism,’ which traces the development of this authoritarian ideology of transformation and concludes that attempts to revamp and reinterpret it have made limited headway. This might actually be on the agenda in the wake of the Gezi Park events, as many of the protesters insist on a Kemalist identity.

Ergun Özbudun’s article is interesting in this respect, as it discusses the relationship between Kemalism and moderate Islamism in his contribution, ‘Turkey – Plural Society and Monolithic State.’ He argues that the pluralistic nature of Turkish society is not reflected in the country’s monolithic political structure and that this can be traced to the exclusionary nature of Kemalism, which may be ripe for change in the near future. Again, the situation since the Gezi Park events in late May shows that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s version of ruling Islamism is as averse to pluralism as Kemalism has been. There certainly is an ironic similarity here, and if the competing forces can draw on the best of Ottoman diversity, which has probably been under-appreciated in most examinations of that era, the optimists may prove to be correct.

Kuru and Stepan’s article, ‘Laïcité as an Ideal Type and a Continuum: Comparing Turkey, France, and Senegal,’ provides more insights into the nature of Kemalist secularism. Comparing the Turkish variant to that of France and Senegal, they clearly show that secularism is implemented differently around the world. Furthermore, the Turkish variant is especially ‘separationist,’ fails to safeguard identities defined as non-Turkish, and impedes internal stability. Here again, one could argue, we find parallels to Erdoğan’s politics.

The article, ‘The ‘Turkish Model’ in the Matrix of Political Catholicism,’ adds another perspective that offers hope compromise over the long term, despite the currently entrenched lines of confrontation between the Erdoğan government and its opposition. For author Stathis N. Kalyvas, the AKP’s politics of modernization (until 2010, we would add) does not come as a surprise. He makes this point by describing how anti-modernist Catholic forces in mid-19th century Europe created parties that, despite roots in religiously conservative culture, fully subscribed to democracy. The secret lies in inclusion: Democracy allowed these anti-modernist forces to struggle for their goals within the system, and it is precisely this struggle that turned them into democrats. According to Kalyvas, the Turkish Islamists’ antagonism to the Kemalist state eventually led them to alter their stance from confrontation to cooperation.

EU accession requirements, in their turn, led to moderation on the Kemalist side. In one of the final chapters of this volume, ‘Turkey’s Accession to the European Union and the Role of the Justice and Development Party,’ Joost Lagendijk reviews the phases of Turkey’s accession process. He shows that a climate of EU openness and inclusion inspired the AKP to implement positive changes to state-society relationships. Exclusionary trends on the European side, however, led the AKP to postpone a positive reformulation of the roles of democracy, Islam and secularism in Turkey. Yet again, this pro-European trend has, and if only for the time being, come to an end.

On balance, then, this well-written book offers a great deal. As we read and enjoyed it, we wished the authors were preparing another edition that will take into account the current political, social and cultural changes in Turkey. Such a work could help inspire agreement on an effective, inclusive, and legitimate constitutional way forward for this dynamic country that continues to grow in importance for the region and the world. □
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