Migration brings many benefits to host countries, but Europeans are striving to reach consensus about what constitutes desirable immigration and what represents a potential security threat.

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Welcome to the 10th issue of *per Concordiam*. In this issue we focus on the topic of human migration and its impact on national security. In this age of globalization, migration can have a positive impact by providing migrants a pathway to relative prosperity and by meeting demands for labor across a wide variety of fields in the receiving countries. At the same time, a growing trend in irregular international migration – migration that takes place outside the norms and procedures established by states to manage the orderly flow of migrants – has become a serious security concern across the globe. Many people understandably leave countries mired in conflict to look for work and better living conditions. In many cases, people are motivated to migrate because of dire economic conditions in their home countries. Most often, these economic problems are caused or enhanced by severe deficiencies in the rule of law and good governance. The challenge for most countries is identifying security-minded but practical and humane responses to these mixed migration flows.

When we examine the impact of carefully managed legal migration, we can easily see opportunities in which a receiving state can absorb skills to augment its workforce and enrich cultural diversity. In the European Union, the concept of a receiving state is somewhat clouded by the passport-free Schengen Zone, since the country that admits a migrant may or may not be the migrant’s destination. Wherever the migrant ends up, however, irregular migration burdens state institutions by requiring increased expenditures on security, health care and social services. Irregular migrants lack legal status and are therefore particularly vulnerable to coercive pressures from criminals. Migration can become a politically sensitive topic with a country’s electorate during economic austerity and can inflame public opinion to a significant degree.

Over the past several years, Europe has experienced a flood of irregular migrants from North and Sub-Saharan Africa. This influx has stressed the infrastructure of a number of European countries and calls into question the adequacy of the EU’s migration policies. The reaction of several EU members exposed the tensions between national policies and collective policies to address migration. This experience further emphasizes the need for a common approach to migration that is flexible and compatible with the current economic and political atmosphere.

We invite your comments and perspectives on this subject. We will include your responses in our next two editions. The first will focus on the future of stability and reconstruction operations by exploring lessons from Afghanistan, while the second will address how energy policy shapes national decision-making. Please contact us at editor@perconcordiam.org

Sincerely,

Keith W. Dayton
Director
Rear Adm. Alberto Cervone retired in 2011 after 42 years of active duty service with the Italian Navy. He served on a wide variety of ships, at the headquarters of the Italian Naval Fleet, at the Italian Embassy in Washington, at the Italian Navy headquarters and at the Naval Procurement Agency, where he was program manager of several ship procurement programs, including the aircraft carrier Cavour. In 2005, he became deputy director of the Italian Institute for High Defense Studies in Rome. From 2008 to 2011, he was a professor at the Marshall Center, where he was a lecturer and seminar leader and created two elective courses on Mediterranean Security and International Migration and Security. Adm. Cervone earned a degree in marine engineering from the University of Naples in 1976 and received a Ph.D. in geo-politics and geo-strategy from the University of Trieste in 2010.

Filip Dragovic retired in March 2012 as director of the Directorate for European Integration and International Relations, Ministry of the Interior, Republic of Croatia. He previously worked in all segments of the border police, including as head of his country’s Border Police Directorate. He has more than 20 years of police experience and is an expert in border and migration issues and management of EU projects. He holds a master’s degree in international relations from the University of Zagreb and is currently preparing a doctoral thesis at the same institution. He recently began working for the United Nations Development Program as a regional international consultant for Southeast Europe in the field of rule of law in an EU accession context.

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As globalization accelerates, migration continues to have a significant impact on national security. It brings along opportunities and challenges that highlight the importance of a common European approach to migration. National and collective policies must strike a balance between protecting the rights of migrants and refugees and protecting nations from harm. This issue of *per Concordiam* focuses on migration and its implications for national security.

This issue starts with a viewpoint article by Italian Navy Rear Adm. (ret.) Alberto Cervone, a former Marshall Center professor. He explains that international migration is not solely a security concern but also an essential component for economic growth in this age of globalization. Governments must understand migration dynamics and develop comprehensive migration policies.

Our first feature article is written by Filip Dragović and Robert Mikac, who used their experience working at the Croatian Ministry of the Interior. They point out that the challenges of migration have never been so great and diverse. Afghans represent one of the largest groups of immigrants in Europe, and the European Union is confronted with an economic opportunity as well as a security challenge. The authors argue that the great majority of migrants, including those from Afghanistan, pose less of a security challenge to Europe than a social, financial and political quandary.

The next article is by Marshall Center alumna Sandra Dumitrescu, who describes how the Arab Spring has impacted border control in Europe. She argues that cooperation among European countries is crucial to ensure that social integration of these newcomers is fair.

Teresa Rodrigues, associate professor at the Universidade NOVA de Lisboa in Portugal, examines the Portuguese and EU approaches to migration. She explains how the need for immigrants is tempered by security fears. She advocates a new “culture of immigration” to ensure sustainable migration flows, evaluate the needs of economies, and promote human rights and security.

Finally, the magazine features a contribution from the German Ministry of the Interior that examines Germany’s policies on migration and immigration and why the EU needs a coordinated policy to enable fair treatment and integration of migrants.

The next issue of *per Concordiam* will focus on stability operations and transformation in Afghanistan, followed by an issue devoted to energy security. We invite you and your colleagues to submit articles on these themes to enhance discussion of the issues addressed in *per Concordiam*.

We encourage feedback and look forward to your emails in this ongoing dialogue on important security issues. Each issue is available online at the Marshall Center website: www.marshallcenter.org

— *per Concordiam* editorial staff
per Concordiam magazine addresses security issues relevant to Europe and Eurasia and aims to elicit thoughts and feedback from readers. We hope our previous issues accomplished this and helped stimulate debate and an exchange of ideas. Please continue to share your thoughts with us in the form of letters to the editor that will be published in this section. Please keep letters as brief as possible, and specifically note the article, author and magazine edition to which you are referring. We reserve the right to edit all letters for language, civility, accuracy, brevity and clarity.

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Seeking a Sensible Migration Policy

Governments should avoid treating immigration mainly as a security problem

By Rear Adm. (ret.) Alberto Cervone
Photos by The Associated Press

International migration is not new. The world has been populated through the transfer of people in search of better living conditions or to escape from troubles and threats. Human history has been shaped by migration, but this phenomenon has recently gained unprecedented relevance, for its size, extension to the entire world, and the intense interdependence between expatriates and home countries. It has huge consequences in many fields and has had a major impact on multiple sectors of security.
The importance of migration created a new area of academic research that is complex and multidisciplinary: migration studies. The aim of this discipline is to explain and predict migration patterns, investigate the impacts of migration movements and inspire policies. Initial theories focused on economic motivations to explain the reasons and dynamics of peoples’ flows. They adapted the neoclassical economic theory to the new science, establishing “push” and “pull” factors to suggest negative conditions “pushing” individuals to leave their countries or advantages “pulling” them to new lands. This theory has been and still is important, but it doesn’t explain all phenomena and has been recently complemented by others such as the migration systems theory or the theory of transnationalism. The most relevant push and pull factors are those connected to demographic aspects and in particular to the phenomenon of demographic transition, the evolution from preindustrial high fertility and mortality to post-industrial low fertility and mortality. This trend is now occurring in the poorest countries of the world, creating overpopulation and a formidable pressure to move toward developed countries, where population is decreasing and aging.

One of the main reasons for the relevance of modern migration is its size and rate of growth. In June 2010, the world counted 214 million international migrants (born in one country and living in another). Refugees, those fleeing abroad to avoid persecution, numbered 16.3 million. There has been an impressive increase in the number of migrants since 1990. Their numbers grew by 36 million, or 20 percent, from 2000 to 2010. Currently, 4 million people cross international borders every year, and 30 to 50 percent of them are illegal or irregular, creating a pool of clandestine immigrants estimated to be 12 million in the U.S. and 8 million in Europe.

Migration and Security
International migration is not solely a security concern. It is a major component of globalization, one of the essential factors of the current global political and economic evolution and a natural corollary of the free circulation of information, capital and goods. In developed countries, immigration is essential to sustain industrial and economic growth and indispensable to compensate for a shrinking and aging population. In developing countries, immigration reduces unemployment and generates remittances whose total recorded value is about $325 billion annually and whose share of the GDP is often very significant. Migration, furthermore, strengthens the power of receiving countries by increasing their populations, which is a major factor of economic, political and military power, and offers opportunities for improved international relations with their immigrants’ countries of origin.

Nevertheless, governments and people of the receiving countries often oppose the arrival of immigrant workers, even if they come alone for only a limited stay. Opposition grows as immigrant communities grow with family reunification and with transformation of immigration from temporary to permanent. The reasons are related to security, in its traditional definition of freedom from internal and external material threats and its newly recognized extension to economic, political and societal security. In addition to the security concerns of receiving countries, the security of the individual immigrant is also very important.

A boat in Lampedusa, Italy, filled with migrants sails past the covered bodies and coffins of 25 Africans who perished while attempting to flee Libya in August 2011. The migrants suffocated in the hold of a 50-foot rickety boat carrying 296 people.
Human Security
Human security of immigrants deserves to be mentioned first. It is affected by poverty, deprivation of human rights, persecution and violence. Lack of human security is often the reason for the decision to migrate, but migrants often continue to suffer insecurity during their migration. Crossing borders may be dangerous, as demonstrated by the almost 1,000 migrants who died in the last decade crossing the Mediterranean Sea to reach “Fortress Europe” by boat. The transfers are often managed by ruthless human smugglers, who help migrants to enter a state illegally for a fee, or by traffickers, who use violence and deception against the migrants or even enslave them. In destination countries, migrants may be forced to accept abusive labor conditions and face marginalization, discrimination or deportation.

National Security
Immigrants, under the name of “settlers,” in many historical cases occupied new territories and supplanted and marginalized the indigenous population, establishing a true invasion. Similar situations are less likely today, but the threat or at least the myth of invasion is still present in some areas. Out of these extreme situations, unauthorized immigrants regularly contend with the sovereignty of the receiving governments, challenging their authority over the territory and over the people living within its borders. They may also compromise the internal security of the receiving countries, resorting to crime or tampering with economic security by altering the labor market through the introduction of cheap labor and overloading social services.

Migrations are often caused by conflicts, but they may also fuel them. One of the historical reasons to migrate is to exit the jurisdiction of an oppressive state to avoid persecution. Political opponents of authoritarian regimes often made the decision to migrate, not only for self-protection, but also to be free to continue their anti-government campaign. The repressive apparatuses of states have limited or no power outside their borders, especially if the host country is sympathetic to the grievances or political agendas of the refugees, who can pursue their ideas without the obstacles that they would have faced at home.

The presence of exiles, opposed to their own nations’ governments, or even of rebels ready to use violence in transnational diasporas, may produce tensions and conflicts in a host country. Politicized and mobilized diasporas may support legitimate political movements, insurgencies and rebellions at home in many ways. They may lobby in the host country, provide resources, recruit fighters and even create armed groups against their home country, becoming transnational rebels or warrior refugees. Rebels who migrated to a neighboring country may create sanctuaries across the border, spreading and regionalizing conflicts. Weak or hostile receiving states and large refugee diasporas provide occasions for rebels to establish external bases useful to launch attacks against their country and make conflict resolution very hard. Diasporas may also pursue hostile interests of their countries of origin in the host countries, acting as a fifth column and striking targets designated by their authorities at home. A major concern in recent times is the ability of some migrant elements to spread extremism in receiving countries, as happened extensively and almost unnoticed in Europe before 2001, or to be involved in subversive activities inspired by adversarial ideologies.

One of the major perceived threats in recent years, especially after the attacks of 9/11, Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005, has been al-Qaeda-style terrorism. These events and many others perpetrated or attempted by immigrants or their descendants against targets in the host countries created a clear link between terrorism and migration.

Securitizing Migration
The association of terrorism with immigration has produced the “securitization” of the latter, which means the classification of immigration as a possible national security threat. Signs of this securitizing movement in the United States are the promulgation in October 2001 of Presidential Directive No. 2, titled “Combating Terrorism Through Immigration Policies” and the March 2003
inclusion of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service into the Department of Homeland Security. Thousands of immigrants were arrested or deported after 9/11, in application of the Patriot Act, and the new approach also affected the evaluation of requests for asylum: Those who had their refugee status recognized went from 85,006 in 1999 to 26,622 in 2002.

Similar reactions could be found in Europe even earlier, as in the early 1990s, when disorders in Algeria and related terrorist attacks in France caused fears that mass immigration was being infiltrated by terrorists and spreading violence on the continent. Many observers view the securitization of migration and adoption of counter-terrorism-driven migration policies as unjustified. These policies may offer clear disadvantages, and discrimination against immigrants in counterterrorism checks reduces cooperation with police, causes mistrust and may increase radicalization. While prevention, pursuit and disruption of terrorist networks are a must, there is the need to avoid a counterproductive criminalization of all immigrants based on the assumption that they are all suspect.

Illegal migration
The perception of threat associated with immigration is often linked to the concept of illegal migration, which is migration in violation of the laws of the destination countries. In addition to undermining the sovereignty of the governments of the receiving countries, illegal migration imposes on host countries unwanted quantities and typologies of newcomers, strengthens human traffickers and smugglers and fuels clandestine labor markets, which both prosper by eluding state control. Further considerations are required to assess the real causes of this growing and troubling phenomenon, but it is first necessary to point out why hostility toward immigrants is so prevalent in most destination countries.

The extent of the securitization of migration following the outbreak of terrorism is not explainable by terrorism alone. It is also a demonstration of the existence of unease and widespread anti-immigrant attitudes, commonly attributed to perceived threats to economic and internal security, but in reality generated by less evident and more pronounced fears. The most distressing factor for many is the cultural and ethnic diversity of the newcomers, often made visible by physical or behavioral characteristics, and the consequent perceived threat to national identity and the concept of nation-state based on ethnic homogeneity.

Societal Security
In the 1990s, scholars of the Copenhagen School of International Relations developed the concept of societal security, defined by Ole Wæver as “the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threat.” Immigrants are increasingly distinct from the local populations and, especially if they are numerous, threaten this ability and the very national identity of the receiving countries. Identity is a fundamental force in current politics and security matters. Homogeneous populations share a common identity, which may be based on ethnicity, culture, ideology or civic sense of belonging. It is not only a matter of social cohesion and good coexistence. Identity is what keeps a society together – it is the basis for the definition of national interest and consequently national policies. Countries where the population has contested identities may find it difficult to produce coherent policies, and internal conflicts may easily erupt. For this reason, the threats facing the societies of countries that are destinations of migration may be very severe, even existential.

Immigration Control
The evils attributed to immigrants, the unease induced by their diversity, the fears instilled in the populations of the destination countries about loss of “essential character,” and the perception that governments are unable or unwilling to preserve order create anxieties that result in a strong desire for state control. This trend is sometimes amplified by symbolic policies actuated by governments for self-interest and to strengthen their power. The obvious results are efforts to prevent or constrain immigration.

These are not new ideas. Even classic Western immigration countries once tried to keep out non-Europeans and some types of Europeans. The guest worker programs
adopted in Europe in the 1960s and 1970s were intended to prevent family reunification and permanent settlement. Immigrant workers, necessary to fuel the economic boom of the time, were supposed to be temporary and without impact on receiving societies. They moved in through government-to-government agreements and worked in factories, but their lives outside the workplace were expected to be invisible. Similar situations are present today in several parts of the world, with even more severe restrictions on immigrant rights, especially in less open societies. In any case, the history of migration suggests that exclusion and limitations don’t last forever because economic interests and libertarian approaches sooner or later bring countries to accept what initially appeared inconceivable.

With the recent increase of immigration pressures, and especially of illegal migration, there has been a growing effort in most receiving countries to contain it. This has produced an increase in border control, interdictions at sea, expulsions, pacts for readmissions with sending countries and exclusionary practices. Other available options consist of addressing the “push factors” through aid to try and exclusionary practices. Other available options consist of addressing the “push factors” through aid to development or military intervention. The former may deliver results only in the long term, while military intervention may be effective and produce quick results.

Limiting the pull factors is also possible. The easiest action is to provide potential immigrants accurate information on the availability of jobs and living conditions in destination countries, to discourage unrealistic expectations. But the most important remedy to prevent illegal immigration is enforcement of labor laws: Illegal immigrants mainly exist in developed countries where they can find black market jobs, as in the U.S. and southern Europe. This obvious remedy deserves the maximum possible commitment but is hard to apply because the economic interests of the illegal employers are strong and in some way tolerated by authorities.

The most visible component of the containment effort is border control. It is one of the oldest roles of the armed forces, for centuries limited to the prevention of border crossing by foreign militaries. This role is now mainly assigned to paramilitary and police forces, helped by expensive fortifications and technology. In some cases the armed forces are used in this function, in a context of militarization of the involved areas, which have become theaters of low intensity conflict.

A special case is control at sea, where immigrants crowded into rickety boats cannot just be sent back without causing almost certain death. They must be rescued, but their transfer to detention centers for identification and expulsion works as a deterrent against the illegal crossing of maritime borders. Sea patrolling is also important to deter smugglers by arresting them and seizing their boats.

Those efforts have produced some positive results, especially when exerted in close cooperation with sending countries, but also many failures. They have also generated unintended negative consequences such as increasing the number of asylum seekers and weak illegal border crossers (children and pregnant women), limiting refugees’ protection, pushing immigrants toward riskier routes, increasing their suffering and the number of deaths, and facilitating the development of an illegal “migration industry.” In addition, there has been a large increase of the main component of irregular immigrants: the overstayers.

**Incorporating Immigrants**

Considering that limiting immigration is largely ineffective, receiving countries need to incorporate the inevitable newcomers into their societies in the best possible way. There are three possible alternatives: assimilation, integration and multiculturalism. Assimilation is the immigrants’ assumption of the receiving country’s culture. This solution is now challenged by the desire of immigrants to retain their culture but it’s still pursued by countries such as France. Integration is a softer form of assimilation. It recognizes that a two-way adaptation is required and accepts a temporary maintenance of immigrant culture. The third option, multiculturalism, is the acceptance of the persistence of minorities’ culture, with the assumption that they should respect the rules and embrace the basic values of the receiving country. All of these approaches are now in crisis, as demonstrated by the recurrence of phenomena that are clear indicators of social tensions and potential conflicts: immigrant radicalization, ethnic riots, hate crimes, xenophobia and success of rightist or nationalist political parties and anti-immigrant extremism that could lead to terrorism.

**Asylum Seekers**

A critical component of migration flow consists of asylum seekers who claim to be refugees because they assert to have well-founded fears of being persecuted in their countries based on race, religion, nationality, social membership or political opinion. Refugees are protected by international law, the 1951 UN Convention on the status of refugees and the 1967 Protocol, even if they arrive in a country illegally, which they necessarily do most of the time. The signatory countries must not expel or return the refugees to their countries, after pertinent conditions are met, and should provide asylum. Asylum can only be refused if the concerned individuals are a danger to the receiving country, but the 1984 UN Convention Against Torture compels signatory countries not to return asylum seekers to a country where they would face torture, whatever their threat to the host country. The 1953 European Convention on Human Rights extends this prohibition to the return to countries where they would risk inhuman or degrading treatment.

The current refugee regime was created to solve problems originating in World War II and performed
satisfactorily during the Cold War, when few dissidents were able to flee from communist countries and were welcomed in the West. Now, with turmoil widespread in developing countries and mobility eased by modern transportation, the situation is drastically changed. The refugees’ regime is strongly criticized by both receiving and sending countries. The former would make it more restrictive and the latter more open. In recent years, almost 1 million claims per year have been submitted, but only one quarter of them have been recognized and produced some form of international protection. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees strongly supports a more liberal approach, but the trend in receiving countries is toward a restrictive regime.

Migration Policies
Government policies have a major impact on international migration, but their success is not granted, especially if governments don’t understand migration dynamics or try to deny the reality of the new ethnic groups in their countries. Credible governments have the power to control the flow and the status of immigrants and have full responsibilities with respect to their national interests, their populations and international law. A comprehensive migration policy should consist not only of border control and repatriation of illegal immigrants, but also provisions for regular immigration, encouragement of skilled and circular immigration, recognition of civil and political rights for immigrants, provisions for just labor rules, naturalization and incorporation of newcomers, development aid to sending countries and adoption of optimized asylum practices.

International cooperation is critical to success, especially between receiving and sending countries, which could range from mere readmission agreements and joint border control to a true mobility partnership. Three main mistakes concerning immigration should be avoided:

- the belief that immigration is inherently bad and should always be opposed;
- its excessive securitization, which only dramatizes border crossings and increases the illegality and danger for immigrants;
- rejectionist and exclusionary practices, which are hardly effective and hinder nations’ ability to incorporate the immigrants.

Conclusions
International migration is an unavoidable reality that brings important economic benefits to sending and receiving countries, but also creates severe burdens, high politicization and major security concerns, especially when it is irregular. There should be no illusions: Easy solutions do not exist. Some short-term remedies may be practicable and may deliver positive results, but they may also cause severe downsides and postpone conclusive solutions.

Immigrants’ human security is bleak, but societies of receiving countries are also severely challenged in their ability to preserve their national character, order and legality. They will therefore increasingly resist newcomers and press their governments for anti-immigrant policies. In any case, efforts to limit immigration will be hardly successful because “they contradict the powerful forces of globalization and the domestic economic interests,” and previously unwanted immigrants will sooner or later be accepted. Receiving societies should be more adaptive to cultural diversity and should be more ready to concede civil and political rights to immigrants, renouncing racism and exploitation, but they should also feel that their governments are effectively controlling immigration flows.

Only the spread of prosperity, stability and good governance to developing countries could solve the problems connected to international migration. But enlightened external and internal immigration policies that manage the phenomenon rather than succumb to it could alleviate such difficulties. The objective should be a shift from detrimental migration – illegal, uncontrolled, unwanted and managed by criminals – to beneficial mobility consistent with the economic interests of sending and receiving countries. Policies should be fairly regulated and facilitated, especially at the regional level, and supportive of harmonious coexistence between native and immigrant people in a culturally pluralistic environment. Failure to do so would bring huge social tensions and destructive conflicts.

7. Ibid. Salehyan, Idean.
9. It is also called “irregular,” to include the extremely relevant existence of overstayers: those who cross the border legally but don’t leave the country at the expiration of their visa.
10. Ibid. Castles, Stephen and Miller, Mark J.
12. Policies not intended to pursue the declared objective and to provide tangible results but just to appeal the public opinion.
13. In the short/medium term, economic development will provide more people with means to emigrate.
15. Ibid. Castles, Stephen and Miller, Mark J.
18. Not only financial aid, but also political dialogue and help to improve the governance, with the main objective to offer job opportunities to the increased workforce resulting from the demographic transition and facilitate to consequent reduction of the birth rate that is the most evident indicator of a successful orientation of such transition.
19. Ibid. Castles, Stephen and Miller, Mark J.
Afghan immigrants protest in Athens in February 2011. The immigrants, including women with babies a few months old, demanded official refugee status from Greece. Some engaged in hunger strikes, including six men who sewed their lips shut.
Migration Impacts Security

Afghanistan Supplies Hundreds of Thousands of Migrants to the EU

By Filip Dragoić and Robert Mikac, Ph.D., Croatia

Photos by the Associated Press
Until recently, migration from Afghanistan in the direction of Europe wasn’t considered a serious issue because of the large distances and small number of immigrants. Today, Afghans represent one of the largest groups of immigrants in Europe and, with more heading toward the continent, the situation needs closer scrutiny. Considering Afghanistan’s part in global security and the large numbers of Afghans trying to get into Europe, the related challenges need analysis. This is especially important if the situation in Afghanistan isn’t stabilizing, but rather is radicalizing, and when individuals and small groups represent a significant security risk.

**MEASUREMENT IS DIFFICULT**

Researchers studying migration and security issues find the fields to be highly subjective categories, dependent on the person defining them. Some researchers focus on areas that cover only a portion of the phenomenon. An additional problem is that precise quantity and quality data on immigrants aren’t available, and that includes asylum seekers, illegal immigrants and – those that represent the biggest security risk – unregistered immigrants.

To be more precise, the data is fragmented due to the inability to measure the phenomenon and the variety of methodologies used for gathering and processing data.

Although data gathering and processing is improving, we can see from the example of human trafficking data compiled by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development that the ‘lack of systematically collected and managed statistical data relevant to trafficking in human beings is one of the main obstacles to the successful and effective implementation of anti-trafficking policies and efforts.”¹ The organization states that the success of measures and operations for combating human trafficking are directly dependent on the relation between data collection, processing and analysis. The same dependency is also true for other phenomena in migration. That brings us to the conclusion that every analysis on the impact of migration on security is a matter of estimation and perception in which we can only discover trends and group certain risks together.

**EUROPE GRAPPLES WITH IMMIGRATION**

Migration is a global phenomenon with different historical, political, social, economic and security aspects. Migrations are growing because of population growth, demographic and class differences, changes in natural habitat, political and economic instability, technological advances and globalization. It is estimated that in 2000 there were about 150 million migrants in the world. Ten years later there were 214 million, and the assumed growth by 2050 is 405 million.² The main flows of migration are toward highly developed countries and areas. Western Europe has, in the last couple of years, become one of the most desired destinations. The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs estimated that in 2010, “Europe is expected to host almost 70 million international migrants, one-third of the global total.”³ That number represents 10 percent of Europe’s total population.

On the other hand, Europe is aware of its unquestioned demographic aging and the necessity of rejuvenating society by attracting targeted groups of immigrants to maintain current levels of development. Authors of the study, “Project Europe 2030: Challenges and Opportunities,” estimate that by the year 2050 the working population of Europe will have declined by 68 million people. To compensate, at least 100 million immigrants will be needed to fill the gap (including able-bodied workers and dependent families). According to the report, migrants are part of the solution but are also a challenge for development in the European Union.⁴

The mass immigration suggested in the report represents a major political, cultural, social, economic and security challenge for all of Europe because in the near future, every fifth citizen of the EU will have been born outside the EU. One of the problems of the European model for attracting targeted groups of migrants is that a large quota is set aside for highly educated individuals from developing countries. That means Europe, by building its own future, could be depleting human capital in weaker states and slowing development in those countries. In the long run, that situation represents a double-edged sword.

The EU is at a crossroads because, without delay, it has to harmonize a number of multidimensional platforms in the matter of migration, such as coherent migration policies acceptable to all member states; absorption capacities for accepting migrants while sustaining social cohesion within European countries; development and health care aspects of migration; the implications of multiculturalism; respect and protection of basic human rights; joint mechanisms that have been built between member states by hard work in the last couple of decades; the problem of illegal migration and related crime; and the threats of terrorism and radicalization. Special attention should be paid to regulating and controlling migration pressures and protecting human rights of threatened migrants while not disrupting internal security and institutions built by member states. A particular challenge is the need to integrate immigrants and their acceptance of the values of their hosts. That doesn’t necessarily mean conformity with central governments, but rather the integration and acceptance of the local community.

The frailty of the European migration model is demonstrated by a situation that occurred in the first half of 2011. On the southern rim of the Mediterranean, something that has been slowly boiling for years erupted into the Arab Spring: The masses
deprived of their rights stood up to authoritarian regimes. That created further waves of migration toward Mediterranean states to the north. One result of member states accepting the influx of people running from fighting and poverty was a political crisis of the highest level between Italy and France and a real institutional threat to the dissolution of the Schengen borders. France temporarily established border control with Italy, annulling the right of free movement between member states – a right enshrined in the Schengen Treaty.

It is important to mention that many EU residents consider the free movement of people inside the EU – along with the common currency – to be one of the most successful European projects of the last 50 years. The importance of this issue is confirmed by discussions being carried out in the EU about changing the system of controls at the outer borders. Globalization of the issue of border security during the last 20 years further points to the need of an international dimension to dealing with these issues.

Parallel to the events of the Arab Spring, leaders of the strongest and most heterogeneous states of the EU – Germany, France and Great Britain – used almost the same rhetoric in a short time span and said that the concept of multiculturalism failed in their countries. The message mostly concerned “foreigners” living in those countries and not belonging to native ethnic groups. In this way, a strong message was sent to anyone who wasn’t “sufficiently integrated” and whose cultural differences were too great, no matter how tolerant the accepting states or societies. That message was also sent to areas that are major sources of both legal and illegal immigrants to the highly developed states of the EU. This wasn’t a spur of the moment decision but rather a result of concerns about immigration that have been simmering for decades.

A further challenge for Europe is that certain parties and politicians place immigration at the center of political discourse, inciting xenophobia, radicalizing the political scene and raising security challenges for everybody around them. Their participation in governments and their message directed toward strengthening anti-immigration viewpoints result in a security deficit that determines the behavior of executive governments as well as local domestic populations that are growing more negative toward migrants.

Even though the EU has done much to discuss migration in the past couple of decades, discourse is still being conducted on the question of whether immigration is primarily an obligation of law enforcement. That approach is wrong since it is first and foremost a political issue, but also an economic one. One could even argue that migration becomes a security issue only when all other agencies have failed to deal with it.

This complex matrix now requires updating to reflect the needs and aspirations but also the threats of migration flows from Afghanistan. The European perspective is completely different from that on the Afghan side. For the Europeans, migration represents a security challenge and a potential threat; for Afghans, migration is a major “push” factor and represents a way out and eventual benefit.

**The Afghan Connection**

Migration toward Europe is constantly increasing because of push and pull factors that motivate departure. In correlation with incentives in a wider context of social changes, they can have various dimensions that affect the fates of millions of people and favor great migratory waves. One example is the 30 years of war that have ravaged Afghanistan. During this period, and especially during
the rigid Taliban rule, several million people not only fled primarily to Pakistan and Iran, but large numbers of people were internally displaced. Consequently, a one-way migratory flow from Afghanistan has lasted for decades.

Afghanistan and the Afghan people were always shaped by their geostrategic location. The land at the crossroads of regions: oil and ideologically rich Middle East; resource rich, but unstable and poor Central Asian countries; and the overpopulated and religiously divided Indian subcontinent. Afghanistan, with 34 million people and several million refugees living abroad (about 1.7 million in Pakistan and 1 million in Iran), is a heterogeneous nation rife with potential challenges: ethnic, linguistic and tribal division; religious, political and educational differences; the divide between rural and urban populations; and conflicts over who controls roads.

Contributing to the divisions are destroyed infrastructure, predominantly poor living conditions, short life spans (48 years on average for both males and females), more than 10 million unmarked land mines, lack of fertile soil and the “Pashtun belt” named for the country’s historically dominant ethnic group. In addition, Afghanistan is the poorest country in the world outside Sub-Saharan Africa. Its level of corruption is among the highest in the world, and it leads the world in opium and heroin production. It also has unresolved conflicts with Pakistan, where some state and society elements actively undermine the stability and security of Afghanistan.

In light of these issues, when the significant number of migrants start arriving from that part of the world, additional precautionary measures will be necessary.

The flow of migrants from Afghanistan toward Europe can be viewed through three challenging prisms: first, the large number of immigrants and especially those needing extra help; second, illegal immigrants, especially those connected with organized crime; third, migrations connected with terrorism and radicalization of certain Muslim circles in Europe.

Research and analysis suggest that in the last several years hundreds of thousands of Afghans, both from the home country and refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran, have sought out the EU, becoming one of the largest groups of immigrants to Europe. Events thousands of kilometers from Europe – happening in an area that doesn’t represent a natural source of migration to Europe – are producing a continuous influx of migrants and great legal and institutional difficulties for transit and destination countries alike.

It is important to keep in mind the religious, ethnic, linguistic, native, tribal and educational differences in this large group, and that those differences create administrative and technical problems in accommodating and processing migrants. Here it is important to demystify fears that migration is mostly a security issue and state that, in most cases, economics is the reason for migration. It is a cause for worry that, among the multitudes, there...
are groups or individuals trying to hide and pass covertly because their motives for entering Europe are different. Those are the challenges of mixed migratory flows.

Minors arriving without escort are an especially sensitive group of Afghan migrants. Estimates suggest they represent a much larger portion of Afghan migrants than they do of other ethnic or social groups. Many have lived through great personal tragedy and have often lost close family members. This creates special challenges for the national institutions and those of the EU. Additionally, it is necessary to mention that, after the start of the Enduring Freedom and International Security Assistance Force operations in Afghanistan, many Afghans realized the possibility of migrating to the countries from which the intervening forces came. While the intervening countries send their people to Afghanistan to work on the stabilization and reconstruction of the country, the Afghans are migrating to the donor countries. The question arises whether the architects of the intervention in Afghanistan reckoned with this phenomenon. This overall group of challenges, although the largest in number of migrants, represents the least expressed security threat for Europe but is certainly not negligible.

ILLEGAL MIGRATION

Another aspect is illegal migration, including unauthorized border crossings, stops or transit through certain countries or failure to leave countries after regular immigration status has expired. Anna Kicinger believes that “illegal migration is generally perceived as the most dangerous part of migratory flows due to its uncontrolled character.”14 There are a large number of crimes involved in illegal migration: theft and counterfeiting of personal and travel documents; various forms of fraud, coercion and molestation; customs infringement; human and organ trafficking; prostitution; and civil servant corruption. Involvement in these criminal activities, directly or indirectly, includes migrants and people in the countries through which migrants flow, from source countries, through transit countries to destination countries.

The migrant flow establishes an international network for these criminal activities and a kind of symbiosis of the criminal groups with the people who wish to migrate. From a security point of view, this shadow group of illegal, unregistered and unknown migrants especially stands out. Of the Afghans arriving in Europe, the majority do not have documents. Most deliberately throw away their documents to hide their identity. One interesting detail is that some Central Asians, who culturally and physically resemble Afghans, try to pass themselves off as Afghans, thinking they will receive preferential treatment and protection.

After arriving at their destinations, if they don’t request official protection, some migrants try to get involved in the underground economy. It is estimated that, in the second half of the past decade, between 4 million and 8 million illegal migrants worked in the construction, agriculture, hotel and other sectors of the EU.7 The question that arises is: Is their stay in Europe silently condoned because whole branches of certain industries would function much worse without the cheap workforce? Afghans take their place in that growing gray labor market. But, in cases where they haven’t secured a basic existence and haven’t upgraded their status, these people are subject to all sorts of influences, from entering the criminal milieu for purely financial reasons to radicalizing for protection and sense of belonging. The underground status causes a larger degree of ghettoization as well.

One segment of illegal migration is the one connected to organized crime. There are two main forms of organized crime related to illegal migration: human trafficking and human smuggling.8 The difference between trafficking and smuggling is that smuggling doesn’t include the element of exploitation, coercion or human rights abuses as is the case with trafficking.9 Estimates of criminal profits rise with every increase in the number of migrants being smuggled or trafficked. The “Guide to the New UN Trafficking Protocol” from 2000 estimates that such profits range from $5 billion to $7 billion annually.10 A large portion of that profit is generated on European territory, a fact that represents a huge security challenge for all in Europe. When some other categories are added to these numbers, profit estimates skyrocket. For example, the International Labour Office, in its report from a conference in 2005, estimated that more than $30 billion of annual profit is generated by forced labor, migration and human trafficking.11 Afghans add to that number.

Apart from being used for the flow of “regular” migrants, migration corridors are being used by gangs connected with human trafficking and smuggling, as well as heroin smuggling to Europe. Cocaine, synthetic drugs and precursor chemicals flow in the opposite direction. Drug groups in Afghanistan produce 93 percent of the annual level of opium in the world.12 It is being processed into heroin and the majority of it is shipped to Western Europe, the most profitable market. Migrants are sometimes used as cover for the drug business (drug couriers or “mules”).13

TACKLING TERRORISM

But the most specific challenge for law enforcement agencies is cooperation and collaboration of organized criminals and terrorist organizations. Organized crime groups may not normally assist terrorist organizations in direct execution of terrorist acts but, through their criminal infrastructure, enable them to counterfeit documents and travel papers; covertly buy goods and equipment; transport personnel and equipment, as well as provide them with safe houses and money to finance terrorism. Such collaboration allows terror organizations to protect the identities of their members.14
Europol warns: “The large and growing number of illegal immigrants from countries and regions in which Islamist terrorist groups are active – such as Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Somalia – raises the possibility that channels for illegal immigration will be used increasingly by those seeking to engage in terrorist activity in the EU.”15 With these most sensitive security challenges, we should be particularly careful in making cause and effect connections. As Khalid Koser explains, we should be wary of such simplifications as “migration can be a vehicle for importing terrorists and criminals.” That possibility is not excluded, but, as Koser continues: “These are dangerously misleading perceptions, but nonetheless widespread. First, there is very little evidence from any country in the world that there is a greater concentration of terrorists, potential terrorists or criminals among migrant populations than among local populations.”16

However, other authors suggest the influx of unknown and potentially dangerous migrants rightfully represents a huge security challenge, especially in their connection with those circles in Europe that were already radicalized. Bruce Hoffman points to a barely noticeable and unpredictably small base in the huge Muslim diaspora that represents an enormous security threat.17 Carlos Ortiz, adding to Hoffman’s viewpoint, believes that migratory flows established during the last century and enriched by a large influx of political refugees after the 1990s have become the medium for certain radical Muslim circles in Europe. These circles have provided jihadists for Middle East conflicts and have influenced the creation of terrorist cells in Europe. “The attacks in Madrid on March 11, 2004, and London on July 7, 2005, were fed from this terrorist pool.”18

Here it is necessary to mention again that it is essential to be careful to avoid the identification of the majority with the minority because in every society there are those who act against the system. Despite all the previously mentioned challenges, perhaps one of the biggest threats is radicalization of certain members of the Muslim community in Europe. Many travel to terrorist camps in the predominantly uncontrolled parts of Pakistan on the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan (but not only there), where they train and are indoctrinated and then return to Europe with extremist views and plans. This last phenomenon is distinctly disturbing and dangerous. Decision-makers in the highly developed countries must be especially careful not to contribute to radicalization with their decisions.

**CONCLUSION**

Under the influence of globalization, increased mobility and information availability, immigration is growing fast. The challenges of migration have never been so great and diverse, with so many subjects included in the migration flows. Europe finds itself at the forefront of the great challenge of immigration, both because it needs immigrants and because it must deal with various security challenges and threats. The great majority of migrants, including those from Afghanistan, do not represent hard security issues for Europe but create other social, financial and political challenges. Many refer to handling illegal immigration as a “battle,” but it is in fact an attempt to mitigate consequences when the causes of the migration have been unjustly ignored. It is important to deal with the causes in the source countries of migration. As long as there isn’t sincere cooperation on both sides, along with the will to solve issues of migration between source and destination countries, a major part of solving the problem will reside in the security sector, which cannot rise to these challenges because it is too diversified and lacks the ability to address such complex challenges. A whole of government approach could be more effective in addressing migration.

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5. For comparison and analysis, we used various agencies’ databases, such as European Migration Network, International Centre for Migration Policy Development and International Migration Organization to show the trends in the European Union; International Centre for Migration Policy Development for Middle and Eastern Europe; and certain South-East European transit countries in the “Balkan route.”
It’s a common misconception among Europeans that most of the world’s refugees flock to developed nations. While it’s true that countries such as Germany are major recipients of such displaced persons, developing nations such as Pakistan and Syria, most often bordering on conflict zones, absorb 80 percent of the world’s refugees.

Afghanistan is a case in point. Millions of Afghans have fled abroad during the past 30 years, but Europe, located thousands of kilometers away, is rarely the affordable choice for Afghans taking flight. Neighboring Pakistan hosts 1.9 million refugees, almost all of them from Afghanistan. Other Afghan neighbors also hold a sizeable share of its refugee population. By contrast, the United Kingdom, possessing the highest official total of Afghan refugees of any nation in Europe, reported only 22,500 such people living in the UK in 2007.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees said 3.7 million Afghans have returned home since 2002, aided by a UN program that offers small cash allowances to help families make the move. In many cases, returnees were born in their host countries and have never seen their “homeland.”

“Last year, just over 50,000 Afghan refugees returned home from Pakistan, down from nearly 110,000 in 2010. Despite the decline, the number of Afghan returns last year represented the largest refugee repatriation programme in the world,” the UN wrote in early 2012.

As of 2011, Europe hosted about 1.7 million refugees, spread over 36 states in the region. In raw numbers, Germany held the most refugees, trailed by the UK and France. Of the nearly 600,000 refugees residing in Germany, a large percentage left Turkey and the Balkans. Measured as a percentage of population, Montenegro, which has absorbed people fleeing former war zones such as Bosnia, take the top position in Europe with 2.5 percent of its population consisting of refugees. As of the end of 2010, 63,000 Bosnians still resided abroad as refugees, though many more had relocated as legal immigrants. Sweden and Norway are also notable for hosting large numbers of refugees relative to their populations.

While refugee numbers in Europe are low, asylum-seekers in the region grew by almost 20 percent in 2011, especially in Southern Europe. Much of the increase was due to political turmoil in North Africa that provoked a wave of migrants to cross the Mediterranean Sea (a wave that may subside with the ouster of the Gadhafi regime in Libya). Europe has struggled to come up with a common refugee and asylum policy to harmonize responses to such flows.

The UN noted that the eurozone crisis appears to have lessened the appetite for accepting refugees, some of whom are seeking work in a European Union already hard-pressed to secure jobs for its own citizens. The passport-free Schengen zone allows immigrants, once they’ve landed in a Schengen country like Greece, to cross relatively unchecked into larger countries like France.

“The worsening economic situation in some countries may aggravate already negative attitudes among host communities towards asylum-seekers and refugees,” the UN said.

Further information can be found at: www.unhcr.org, www.iom.int
The Arab Spring created cracks in European solidarity, but the EU is striving to rebuild consensus.
SECURING THE EU’S BORDERS

BY SANDRA DUMITRESCU, FRONTEX

The Arab Spring has significantly impacted the evolution of border control in Europe. Dissatisfaction with repressive regimes in places such as Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Syria, as well as a challenging labor market, has inspired a movement of people from the Middle East and North Africa. The exact dimension of this movement has yet to be assessed, as the Arab countries are still subject to the transition process toward democratic regimes and are far from being entirely stable.

However, one of the main outcomes of the Arab Spring is connected to the massive influx of migration touching Europe’s external borders. It has led to a progressive strengthening of border control, but has also made an impact at the political level, resulting in a shift in policy in the direction of what was often called “Fortress Europe.”
Taking a first look at the Arab uprisings, one could easily conclude the existence of a so-called “domino effect” that has spread the revolutionary spirit of Tunisia to neighboring countries. However, these social movements have had some common features that go beyond simple imitation, such as high unemployment, influence of social media, low economic levels and oppressive regimes.

The internal turmoil in the Arab countries had, as a main outcome, a progressive increase in illegal migration towards Europe, often having as its first destination Malta or the Italian island of Lampedusa.1 The uprising against the former Gadafi regime in Libya created a reorientation of the unskilled Sub-Saharan and North African migrants toward Europe, as the former Libyan authoritarian regime had acted to block migration based on the agreements signed with Italy (e.g., mass expulsions of irregular migrants found on Libyan territory, visa requirements to North African countries, enhanced border control, etc.).

The unusual effects of the financial crisis may have intensified the Arab Spring when European countries progressively discouraged legal migration and European citizens more often accepted jobs that were normally reserved for migrants. The increased migratory pressure faced by Italy led to the creation of a common front with France (one of the countries of destination, taking into account the linguistic environment shared with former French colonies in the Arab world). The two countries united to request the introduction of border controls within the Schengen area.

When faced with increased migratory pressure directed towards their national territory, Italy and France reiterated the principle of solidarity as one of the basic principles of the European construction (i.e., Italy asked the European Union to take charge of some of the immigrants that had reached its borders, and not to limit aid to the joint operations coordinated by Frontex). These two countries have rightfully pointed out that immigrants accepted on their territory have every right to move freely towards the capitals of the other European countries, under the umbrella of free movement guaranteed by the Schengen agreement.

However, as a perverse effect of these countries efforts to secure their borders, cracks in the European political construction and the lack of an authentic political consensus became more and more apparent. In order to tackle the divergent national responses to the increased migratory pressure, the European Commission (EC) has put forward a set of measures related to the governance of the Schengen area,2 thus moving toward a European Community-wide policy in exceptional circumstances.

What we are actually facing is a shift from national government-level decision making towards an EU approach,
based on evaluation visits led by the EC to assess the application of the Schengen acquis. According to the EC’s proposal, if member states fail to comply with the Schengen technical criteria recommended by the evaluation committee, a set of sanctions could be imposed, having as last resort the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders (for a limited duration of up to five days).

As an intermediate set of measures, between the negative report from the evaluation committee and the introduction of border control, member states may benefit from European support (such as operational assistance from Frontex, access to European money and technical assistance from the European Asylum Support Office and Europol). The EC endeavors to temporarily reintroduce border control only in cases of serious threats to the internal security of the Union, national security or public policies even though there is a clear lack of quantifiable indicators allowing the decision making bodies to define such cases properly. Thus, the impact of the Arab Spring on migration trends could be easily listed as an exceptional situation having an impact on the internal security of the EU.

However, in the absence of the previously mentioned indicators and thresholds, the decision to reintroduce border controls at internal borders would yet again remain at the political level without being closely linked to technical recommendations. The entire process is promoted as an entirely transparent one by means of biannual reporting obligations to the European Parliament and Council on the “status” of the Schengen area. This reporting obligation of the member states is closely linked to the new reporting obligations introduced by the revised Frontex Regulation, clearly stating the Agency’s obligation to report on the number of resources (human and technical) committed by member states to the operational pool of resources. We are still lacking a mechanism to integrate and merge the reports coming from various sources and monitor the follow-up of their results and the subsequent translation into practice.

Upon reviewing the proposal made by the EC, one could easily conclude that we are slowly moving towards supranational border control. European agencies, such as Frontex, are becoming more and more involved in Schengen governance, being given the possibility to play an active part in the evaluation visits leading to the reintroduction of border controls at internal borders. The newly revised Frontex Regulation mentions setting up European Border Guard Teams and introduces the concept of secondary border guards to be made available to the Agency by the member states and deployed according to the operational needs of the Agency. However, member states, when given the opportunity, claim the precedence of national sovereignty when it comes to border control.

One could conclude that the European orientation is preserved as long as there are clear advantages arising from it (e.g., economic incentives, free movement of persons and goods), while each and every small obstacle along the way reminds stakeholders of the actual benefits of national sovereignty. Thus, the European countries are keen on increasing their border security, but are not in favor of giving up their sovereign rights on exercising border control to a supranational authority, in this case the EC.

However, it seems that we have reached a decision-making dead end since the issue of securing the borders is highly debated at both the political and technical level, leaving a question mark on the strongly-promoted “common European ideology” while the structural causes of this massive influx of migrants seems to be disregarded. The European Neighbourhood Policy should be enhanced in order to offer proper solutions addressing the root cause of migration and provide efficient support in tackling the social issues at the heart of migrants’ decision to leave their home countries.

In terms of policy-making and strategic thinking, the newly emerging Arab democracies should find an authentic helping hand in the European Neighbourhood Policy; not just a theoretical and rhetorical approach of limited assistance. Cooperation among European countries should also be increased, under the principle of solidarity, to offer fair social integration opportunities to those immigrants who reached a particular territory and claimed asylum. However, a proper balance should be maintained between policy directed at integrating migrants under the increasing demands of the market for cheap labor and the increase in human trafficking.

Information current as of December 2011.

1. According to IOM reports, approximately 700,000 irregular migrants arrived in Italy and Malta having as origin Libya (30 September 2011).
2. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Schengen governance - strengthening the area without internal border control, Brussels, 16.09.2011.
An Indian band performs in Lisbon, Portugal, during a city-sponsored festival to promote integration of the neighborhood’s immigrant community.

THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
The New Face of Immigration

Portugal has a largely successful story to share with the EU regarding integration of newcomers

By Teresa Rodrigues, Universidade NOVA de Lisboa

The link between migration and security has become a matter of priority on the international political agenda. Migratory movements show us clearly that the Earth is shrinking concerning distances among people. For the last decade, every region well-placed in terms of welfare indicators and job opportunities attracts immigrants. Economic globalization and improvements in communication and transportation will inevitably lead to a rise in international migration. The 21st century will be the century of migration, raising concerns in particular about illegal immigration, transnational threats and loss of national identity in host societies. The coming decades will constitute a mix of challenge and opportunity. For most receiving countries, particularly in “Old Europe” with its increasingly high percentages of non-European residents, the impact of such migration flow is difficult to predict in the medium and long run. As far as Portugal is concerned, the consequences will also be significant on various levels.
This article considers two case studies: the European Union and Portugal. European countries and especially EU members face a complex situation. They need immigrants, but they fear them. Portugal, a small southern European state, is challenged by a new reality: It has one of the 10 most aged populations in the world and it became an attractive country for migration less than two decades ago. Its national history of emigration and colonization influences the way migration is linked to security issues and also the way its population sees it.

THE EUROPEAN CASE
Europe represents a case study of the relationship between migration and security, because it continues to be the main recipient of international immigrants (32 percent of the world’s total), which mitigates the effects of its aging population. Today, 9 percent of European residents are foreigners and 76 percent of European population growth is due to migration. The 27 nations of the EU present the highest migratory balances, and their population will continue to increase until 2025 thanks only to immigration.1 Although migration is part of the solution to ensure economic sustainability and development, the rise in the percentage of foreign residents sometimes negatively influences collective perceptions.

Since the Barcelona Declaration (1995), several initiatives have been taken to delineate a communal immigration policy. European countries are gradually changing from internally managed immigration policies to a common European one. Since September 11, 2001, migration issues have become top political issues. The adoption of the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum reflects this desire, even though the measures on asylum are the more cohesive ones.2 Europe’s immigration policies are structured under four topics:

- CONTROLLING MIGRATION FLOWS (in the sense of a progressive hardening of conditions for entry and stay);
- REDUCING ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION (strengthening external border controls, using joint teams to monitor internal borders, and performing regular labor inspections to deter illegal work providers);
- CONSOLIDATING INTEGRATION PRACTICES (promoting stability within the recent communities and helping to provide better social and economic opportunities);
- DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION POLICIES (standardizing procedures in receiving countries).

How is security threatened by migration? The way migration and security come together allows us to understand why immigrants can be seen as threats and explains the success of radical political speeches and the implementation of extraordinary security measures.

Efforts should be directed to a concerted political action focused on minimizing the perceptions of risk associated with migration. Securitization does not solve the challenge of migration, but only makes it harder to resolve. There is an urgent need to develop strategies maximizing the positive effects of migration and reducing the negative. That requires an integrated approach of cooperation to liberalize and streamline regular channels of migration and ensure respect for migrants in education, health, social protection and labor rights. It is also necessary to reduce transit costs, facilitate the process of integration into host societies and rethink immigration in the comprehensive context of development.3

We live in an era of uncertainty and re-evaluation concerning the future evolution of migration and the risks eventually associated with it. The consequences will be vast and multilayered.4 European immigration policy is at a crossroads. Europe has yet to adopt common values and attitudes toward immigration and citizenship,5 which adds complexity to the security question and heightens the perception of risk.6

To what extent can immigration stand as an answer to the challenges that Europe is facing? What roles can immigrants play in these future scenarios? How can relationships be established within the receiving societies? Are there security risks in these migratory movements? We will explore these issues by examining the case of Portugal.

MIGRATION AND SECURITY
Portugal is a small country with 10.7 million residents in 2011. But this number is expected to decline soon, because of the decreasing number of immigrants, the rise in emigration and the departure of legal immigrants. In spite of the country’s small dimensions, we can find six regionally differentiated migration profiles as the result of asymmetric forms and chronologies of economic and social development, each of them illustrating potential challenges, risks and opportunities for the future.

Like other southern European countries,7 Portugal has historically been a country of emigrants. Until the mid-1970s, immigration was very modest and consisted almost entirely of citizens from the former Portuguese African colonies. Major changes occurred after 1993, when the country became attractive for migration. Since then, immigrants’ origin experienced a big change. Today most of them are Brazilians, citizens of Eastern Europe (Ukraine, Moldova and Romania) and Asians (China, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh), countries with which Portugal signed bilateral agreements.

In 2010, legal immigrants living in Portugal numbered 451,742. To these we should add 65,000 to
100,000 illegals. Immigrants are on average four years younger than Portuguese nationals, have at least one more child, are relatively less educated and generally work low-skilled jobs that in some cases are beneath immigrants’ skills and educational level. They prefer larger urban centers and coastal regions (Lisbon, Algarve, Setubal and Porto) and this settlement pattern requires specific and targeted attention from authorities to guarantee inclusion and avoid social tensions.

The volume of African and European migrants has decreased, and there was a growing number of illegals, particularly women. Nevertheless, a large majority of immigrants have legal status and long-term visas for work purposes, revealing the success with which Portugal has curtailed illegal immigration and harmonized annual entries with labor market needs. Since 2005, owing to the economic crisis, the country has become less attractive and residence permit holders have been decreasing.

MIGRATORY REGIONALISM

In Portugal, immigration has been the subject of political reflection focused on the regulation of flows and the adoption of inclusive public policies. Both resolutions reflect national commitments undertaken at the EU level and with our historic partners in the Portuguese-speaking diaspora. We think that at the internal level solving inequalities is more urgent in areas with immigrants, since they suffer greater difficulties with integration owing to their short stay in the country, legal/illegal underage status, and linguistic, cultural and ethnic differences. The recent increase in cases of social exclusion and crime turned out to be related pressure from new migration flows. The country’s XIV Constitutional Government defined a more active policy in this area and created the position of High Commissioner for Immigration and Ethnic Minorities to promote knowledge and acceptance of Portuguese culture and implement laws and policies to fight discrimination and social exclusion.

In fact, there is no record of social conflicts, instability or violence that can be related to the increase of migratory entries after the 1990s. But the geographical situation and economic crisis might increase this risk and create new tension points, emphasizing the economic and social fragility of certain immigration communities.

Official reports from the interior ministry reject associations between crime and immigration, but recognize that the presence of illegal or irregular immigrants is linked to trafficking in human beings and weapons, forged and counterfeit documents, and money laundering. Document fraud has been growing, raising the risk that potential terrorists could use fake EU travel documents to move around the continent. A new kind of criminality relies on household thefts and has been associated with organized, and in most cases ethnic, groups from the Balkan nations of Albania, Kosovo, Serbia and Croatia. The rise of petty crime is attributed to Brazilian nationals, and the authorities fear that they will coalesce into organized crime networks.

The Spanish Coast Guard rescues would-be African immigrants 21 miles off the coast of Spain in 2011. Because of their long coastlines and former colonial connections, Spain and Portugal have been forced to deal with illegal maritime migration.
Recent investigations also confirmed that segments of the Muslim community are involved in criminal practices such as bogus marriages, a scheme often used to obtain EU residence or even Portuguese citizenship. Although the country is not considered a probable target of a terrorist attack, there is the possibility of it becoming a platform of logistical support for these activities, thanks to its location on routes between Africa, the Mediterranean and Europe, mainly through the Madeira Islands, the Algarve and the Vicentina Coast. Illegal immigration associated with trafficking of human beings remains a serious crime and a major problem for societies. Portugal is not especially affected by illegal maritime immigration, but the proportion of irregular or illegal entries is increasing through Guinea-Bissau, and on a smaller scale Cape Verde, as inbound platforms to the European continent. We can also identify five routes for illegal immigration and drug trafficking: Brazil, the Balkans, China, the Maghreb and the EU zone.14

In the next few years, Portugal can expect other nationalities to arrive, given the significant differences between those who are today legally in the country and those who are applying for residency. Citizens of the EU, Eastern Europe and Africa account for 77 percent of total foreign residents. But of the groups seeking authorization to live in Portugal, 38 percent are of African origin (Angola, Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau), 38 percent come from South America (Brazil and Venezuela) and 21 percent are Asian citizens (more than half from China). The difference between the two groups is particularly evident for Asia, which today accounts for only 5.5 percent of legal immigrants, but 21 percent of aspiring immigrants. These figures reflect the new routes of international migration and the transformation of the Portuguese immigrant profile, increasingly from Asia and South America.

Migrant communities represent about 5 percent of the country’s population, a number unlikely to change in the next decades or to endanger the stability and security of Portuguese society. Nevertheless, to guarantee sustainable immigration, the Portuguese government suggests the following policies:

- a greater commitment to preventive integration measures, taking into account different immigrant profiles and their asymmetric distribution;
- concerted action between central political power, security forces, local authorities, citizens’ associations and nongovernmental organizations;
- knowledge sharing and information exchange between migrants and non-migrants, which should take into account different levels of access and information understanding, given language skills and education levels;
- consolidation of second- and third-generation groups, mostly of African origin.

Although only 2 percent of Portuguese consider immigration a problem and Portugal ranks near the top in rankings of countries with the best integration practices, we recommend the adoption of measures guaranteeing real and visible security to all residents, sustained by public policies of citizenship and dedicated to fighting new types of crime. The country must devote itself to transnational security, supporting external cooperation agreements with particular emphasis on issues of illegal immigration,
trafficking of human beings and terrorism, which should embrace the participation of other national actors, including the Armed Forces. Portugal must make a distinction between short-term measures, which imply political decisions such as establishing entry quotas, and longer-term preventive measures seen as risk reducing.

Can evolving immigration flows into Portugal represent a security risk in the coming years? Discussion of risk must distinguish internally developing risks, although their assessment is more difficult today than in the recent past, from the external risk, more unpredictable and subject to the globalization process. In terms of internal assessment, we would highlight three aspects:

- risks for legal and illegal immigrants are not very different, except with respect to integration problems;
- the growing variety of ethnic, linguistic and religious profiles and the gap between qualifications/skills and professional performance can cause discrimination and resentment and lead to risk behaviors (miscellaneous crime);
- the emergence of geographical risk areas owing to greater demographic pressure, an asymmetrical social and economic welfare environment and structural weaknesses due to the multiplicity of intervention spheres of security forces.

At the external level, two aspects must be referenced:

- Portugal sits in a privileged geographic position linking Europe, the Mediterranean Sea and Africa. It has a wide coastal frontier accessible to residents of former African colonies using easily obtained forged identity and travel documents. International networks must be used to fight drug trafficking, terrorism and other crime;
- the country presents conditions more favorable to serving as a base of logistical support for terrorism rather than as a target of terrorist attack.

In the coming years, regulating immigration and defining its rights and its duties will continue to be the state’s responsibility. But what is truly important for the country’s future is its ability to respond to the inevitable change in migration profiles. Integrating immigrants must be a priority, given the positive implications for internal security. That’s even truer if immigration flows stabilize or decline.

In a country where the “migratory issue” does not lend itself to securitization, future security policies must bet on sustainable planning involving integrated actions between authorities and supported by new information technologies. Another integrative measure worth considering is opening the Armed Forces to immigrants (today only nationals can join their ranks), as is the case in the United States and Spain. In fact, even in a recession with increased levels of unemployment, volunteer enlistments still reach only 92 percent of desired numbers. Joining the Armed Forces or Security Forces could provide a path to citizenship.

The future requires a new “culture of immigration.” This will ensure sustainable migration flows of increasingly complex resident communities, evaluate the needs of economies (national, EU, global), and promote human rights and security. At the European level we are referring to complex interventions of varying degrees by national governments. In the short term, Europeans must respond quickly to problems such as crime and terrorism as they relate to immigrants. But ultimately the continent will be rated on how well it manages immigration, anticipates problems and improves integration. The results will be predictors of the future. Migration is more a challenge than a problem. 16 □

Statistical information provided in part by Paula da Velha, inspector, Portuguese Immigration and Borders Service, and a Marshall Center alumnus.

10. The XV and XVI Governments attempted to create a control system of immigrants annual entries, adjusted to the needs of the labour market, based on the quota system. Maria Iohannis Bagana et al, Imigração e Políticas. O caso Portugal (Immigration and Policies. The Portuguese Case) (Lisboa: Luso-American Foundation, 2001), 27.
In the 1990s, the number of people migrating to Germany was significantly higher than the number of those leaving. In recent years, however, the difference between these two figures has shrunk – and was even negative in 2008 and 2009. Population mobility will continue to rise in the future due to increasing globalization. As a result, migration is likely to affect more and more people in the coming decades. In view of expected demographic changes, migration policy in Germany and Europe as a whole must set the course for the future.

Migration movements must be viewed in a global context. European nations must be willing to help migrants’ countries of origin, so that their citizens can hope for a better future at home. The only way we can meet the challenges migration brings is by working together. At both European and national levels, we must pay attention to policy interactions and closely coordinate the various policy fields – justice, the interior, economics, development cooperation and foreign relations.

The Global Approach to Migration adopted by the European Council in December 2005, and regularly updated and expanded since then, provides an important orientation.¹ This document contains a concrete action plan for priority measures that are now being gradually implemented by the European Union and its member states. It calls for expanding the dialogue with other countries and for developing joint measures along the relevant migration routes to bring migration under control.

¹ The Global Approach to Migration adopted by the European Council in December 2005, and regularly updated and expanded since then, provides an important orientation.
EU immigration policy increasingly stresses integration of newcomers.
Migration must be managed and controlled because there are interests at stake: the interests of new arrivals and of those already here; personal, humanitarian, economic and national interests; and European and international security and integration interests. The ability to control and manage immigration depends to a significant degree on whether uncontrolled, illegal immigration can be successfully contained and reduced. Germany, Europe and the international community therefore face these four tasks:

- limiting illegal immigration;
- carefully and responsibly weighing the prospects for legal immigration;
- making integration the prerequisite and limit for further migration so that it contributes to peaceful coexistence; and
- ensuring the security of people living in Germany and Europe.

**Integration in Germany**

Germany has always attracted immigrants and will continue to do so in the future – perhaps to an even greater extent. With increasing globalization, immigrants today come from a wide variety of cultures, for many different reasons and with a broad range of educational and occupational qualifications and language skills.

This makes it all the more important to clearly define the requirements for long-term residence in Germany. The aim of integration should not be merely to organize the coexistence of people from different cultures. A society cannot long endure an internal divide based on cultural differences. Speaking the same language and accepting the basic values of the receiving society are fundamental for maintaining societal cohesion. At the same time, immigrants must have the chance to take part in all aspects of social, political and economic life on equal terms, thereby gaining a realistic hope of becoming part of German society.

Between 1997 and 2002, roughly 850,000 ethnic Germans and foreigners moved to Germany from other countries each year. By 2006, that number had fallen to 660,000, its lowest level since 1987, but by 2010 it had again climbed to 798,000. By contrast, the number of people moving out of the country remained fairly constant, ranging from 600,000 to 750,000 annually from 1997 to 2010. In 2010, about 671,000 people emigrated from Germany, resulting in net migration of about 125,000.

The German government’s integration policy is based on the principles of offering more support for integration efforts while making requirements stricter. Immigrants are required to learn German, through their own efforts and with government help, and to know and respect the basic values of German society. And German society is called on to recognize and remove existing barriers to provide immigrants equal treatment and equal access to all important areas of society, politics and the economy.

The Residence Act allows for and manages immigration with an eye to the country’s capacity for receiving and integrating foreigners. Integration is no longer simply social work, as in the past, but also migration management. The government offers basic integration measures – open to all new immigrants, long-term foreign residents of Germany, ethnic German resettlers and their families and EU citizens – to support their own efforts to become a part of our society. The most important federal measure for the integration of migrants is the integration course, which foreigners are obligated to take under the conditions listed in the Residence Act. Another federal measure to promote integration is migration advising.

**Dialogue on Integration**

In July 2006, Chancellor Angela Merkel hosted the first National Integration Summit, initiating a dialogue among all levels of government – federal, state and local – representatives of civil society and immigrants. At the summit, it was agreed to draw up a National Integration Plan. It was drafted by 10 working groups made up of government and civil society representatives and was presented at the second summit in July 2007; it included 400 voluntary obligations by government and nongovernment actors. At the third summit, in November 2008, the first progress report was presented. The Ministry of the Interior led the working groups on improving the integration courses and on integration through sport.

The topic of immigrants in the public administration is the subject of dialogue for the first time. The aim is to increase the share of federal administration staff with an immigrant background, not by setting a quota, but by using suitable measures to expand the pool of applicants with an immigrant background and to take adequate account of foreign language and intercultural skills during the recruitment process. Concrete targets and measures to promote integration are to be used to ensure that all...
applicants to every level of the federal administration start with the same chances.

With the launch of the German Islam Conference in September 2006, the Ministry of the Interior created a forum for long-term dialogue between the German state and Muslims in Germany. This dialogue aims to improve the institutional and social integration of Germany’s roughly 4 million Muslims and to ensure peaceful coexistence among all people in Germany, regardless of faith.

The conference completed its first phase when the 16th legislative term ended. In its new phase, the conference is more practically oriented and concentrates on increasing the concrete participation of Muslims in Germany. The conference has already achieved significant results, such as the Muslim declaration of allegiance to German law and constitutional values. It provided important impetus to the process of introducing instruction in Islam at German schools, drafted recommendations on the building of mosques and on school-related issues, drafted guidelines on language and provided regional and cultural training for imams at the local level. The conference also worked to establish Islamic theology courses at German universities, representing Muslims in the media in a more nuanced way and intensifying cooperation on security issues.

When the immigration act entered into force, the Ministry of the Interior assigned the Office for Migration and Refugees to develop a nationwide integration program identifying existing federal, state, local and private integration offerings for immigrants and to present recommendations for further developing these offerings (Section 45, Residence Act). This program was presented to the Federal Cabinet and the public in September 2010. It covers the fields of language, educational and societal integration. Its publication concluded the process of drawing up a nationwide integration program and fulfilled Section 45 of the Residence Act. The most important issues of the integration program will be incorporated into the process of the National Action Plan on Integration and implemented within this framework.

EU POLICY ON ILLEGAL MIGRATION

For various reasons, many people from all over the world wish to live in the EU. But migration also creates difficulties that may impact other EU member states and can therefore be resolved only by working together. This is why a policy of coordinated and selected immigration, depending on the member states’ labor market needs, is necessary to enable fair treatment of migrants and their integration into the receiving society whenever appropriate.

As in the past, combating illegal immigration remains a priority of European migration policy under the Stockholm Program. Council Directive 2004/81/EC of April 29, 2004, authorized residency permits to cooperative third-country nationals who are victims of human trafficking or have been the subject of action to facilitate illegal immigration. The directive’s aim is to fight human trafficking by granting temporary residence to victims of trafficking who cooperate with the authorities.

The EU Global Approach to Migration has been regularly updated and expanded. The European Council has acknowledged that successful and ongoing management of migration can succeed only in cooperation with countries of origin and transit. The Global Approach constitutes the strategic framework for the EU’s external migration policy. It rests on three pillars: preventing and combating illegal migration, taking advantage of opportunities for legal migration, and strengthening the synergies between migration and development. Also addressed was protection of refugees.

In addition, in May 2011, the European Commission presented concrete proposals for a dialogue with southern Mediterranean states on migration, mobility and security based on the Global Approach to Migration. In response, the Council initiated discussions with Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt aimed at entering deeper cooperation with these North African states, following the recent political upheaval, to root out the causes of migration and promote mobility between the southern Mediterranean
states and the EU. This dialogue is intended to lay the groundwork for concluding mobility partnerships with the EU’s southern neighbors as well.

Directive 2009/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council entered into force on July 20, 2009, and provides for minimum standards on sanctions and measures against employers of illegal residents. It includes a ban on employing third-country nationals residing illegally and requires all member states to take similar measures to implement this ban. The focus is on the employer rather than the illegal resident. The measures range from preventive, such as reporting and monitoring requirements, to administrative or penal sanctions.

European Integration Policy
Community law on entry and residence rights of third-country nationals includes integration requirements. Before an EU permanent resident permit is issued, community law allows for optional requirements of language tests in the countries of origin for subsequently immigrating family members and demonstration of having met integration requirements.

However, integration policy for immigrants remains the responsibility of member states. Member state ministers responsible for integration meet informally to share experiences. So far four meetings have occurred under various Council presidencies: Groningen (2004), Potsdam (2007), Vichy (2008) and Saragossa (2010).

Article 79 (4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (part of the Lisbon Treaty) for the first time explicitly provides for community measures while excluding harmonization. This provision allows incentives and support for member states to promote integration of third-country nationals residing legally in their territories, “excluding any harmonization of the laws and regulations of the Member States.”

Enhancing national integration policies and measuring them at the EU level are priorities of European cooperation. European policies concerning language courses, inclusion of the host society and participation of migrants are designed to be practical instruments to assist decision-makers and practitioners. EU level measurement is intended, above all, to improve comparability among the member states. Lastly, a European integration website was created as a public portal for sharing information and to serve as a bridge between decision-makers and practitioners. The website aims in particular at promoting integration policy measures and procedures and strengthening cooperation between government and civil-society organizations in the EU.

In the framework of cooperation among the National Contact Points on Integration – and at German initiative – a forum for sharing information and experience on intercultural dialogue is taking place at the European level for the first time. This also entails creating structures to allow rapid coordination at short notice in case of urgent problems.

Political Extremism and Islamism
The term “political extremism” covers a broad range of political attitudes and activities that, despite their sometimes significant differences, all reject the democratic state founded on constitutional values and rules. Based on notions of homogeneity and authoritarianism, political extremism is marked in particular by its opposition to pluralist politics and society.

For the authorities responsible for protecting the constitution, the working definition of political extremism covers all anti-constitutional activities regardless of their relevance for criminal prosecution. These authorities use the term “extremist activities” to define their core monitoring area.

Militant Islamists believe the use of force is legitimate to establish an “Islamic order” as they define it. They base their belief on the Quran’s call to jihad (meaning effort, inner
struggle or “holy war”), which they, unlike other Muslims, interpret as a holy obligation to wage constant war on all “enemies” of Islam in Muslim and non-Muslim countries.

Other Islamist organizations want to change society and government in their home countries violently (terrorism or guerrilla war). Members of these organizations often arrive in Germany as political refugees. They try to provide logistical and propaganda support from Germany to aid the struggle in the crisis region, constituting a latent threat to their home countries’ facilities and to German interests.

Yet other organizations exploit democratic means to establish Islamist conditions in German society, or at least try to find openings for organized Islamist activity in Germany, thus working against state integration by trying to set up a parallel Islamist society.

**COUNTERTERRORISM**

International terrorism takes many forms, which must be dealt with primarily using law enforcement. Residence law is especially important for counterterrorism because Islamist terrorists often turn out to have immigrant backgrounds. They are also often highly mobile, traveling across international borders.

New legislation has provided a decisive response to this new kind of threat. Germany’s Counter-Terrorism Act, which went into effect January 2002, responded to new threats by tightening existing provisions in the Foreigners Act on the entry, expulsion and deportation of foreigners, on obligations to provide information, on security interrogations, and on measures to establish and document the identity of individuals. The Residence Act, which entered into force with the Immigration Act on January 1, 2005, persists in this direction. Lastly, the Act to Implement Residence- and Asylum-Related Directives of the European Union, which went into force August 28, 2007, has taken further steps to optimize the Residence Act. These steps are the result of security policy insights gained from attempted bombings in Germany.

To ensure that people who commit or support terrorist or violent activities are not allowed to remain in Germany, a new basis for refusing a residence permit was introduced in January 2002 (Section 5 (4) in conjunction with Section 54 nos. 5 and 5a of the Residence Act). Under the provisions, if a foreigner “endangers the free and democratic basic order or the security of the Federal Republic of Germany, participates in acts of violence or publicly incites violence in pursuit of political objectives or threatens the use of violence, or if there is reason to believe that the person belongs to or has belonged to an organization which supports terrorism or supports or has supported such an organization,” the residence permit will be refused even if all other conditions for claiming one are fulfilled. This provision also applies to people who give financial support to international terrorism.

Relevant provisions are also contained in the Residence Act, which replaced the Foreigners Act when the Immigration Act entered into force. Some important amendments, which improve Germany’s security against terrorist attack, make the act consistent with the Counter-Terrorism Act. The Act to Implement Residence- and Asylum-Related Directives of the European Union created further security provisions intended above all to optimize cooperation between the security authorities and the agencies responsible for issuing residence titles.

The Residence Act stipulates that leaders of any organization banned because its purpose or activities oppose the constitutional order or the idea of international understanding will also, as a rule, be expelled (Section 54 no. 7 of the Residence Act). Under the Residence Act, people who incite hate and violence may also be expelled if they publicly endorse acts such as war crimes in a way that could disrupt public security and order (Section 55 no. 8 of the Residence Act). Further, expulsion is mandatory for foreigners sentenced to imprisonment on charges of human smuggling (Section 53 no. 3 of the Residence Act).

In addition to provisions introduced under the Counter-Terrorism Act, the Act to Implement Residence- and Asylum-Related Directives – in line with regulations at the European level for the Schengen area – allows the authorities to take and record fingerprints of all applicants for national (long-term) visas, regardless of their nationality, for the purpose of establishing and verifying their identity.

**CONCLUSION**

All in all, Germany has spent the past decade adjusting its migration policy to ensure not only that immigrants are welcomed and integrated into German society, but that violent extremists are excluded from the process. Ideally, coordination between EU members will ensure that best practices regarding migration are adopted across the continent and that one country’s problem doesn’t become a burden for all. □

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The Afghan government’s peace and reintegration program has persuaded thousands of low-level Taliban fighters to renounce the insurgency that has plagued Afghan society for years. Former militants have tossed aside grenade launchers and rifles and made the courageous choice to reintegrate into their communities and return to their families with the hope of reshaping Afghanistan for the better. As security improves and areas stabilize, more rebels are expected to defect. Although reconciliation remains a slow process fraught with roadblocks, the Afghan government is being urged to reconsider engaging the Taliban leadership with the prospect of a settlement that would end a decade of warfare. Considering Afghan security forces’ battlefield victories over the Taliban, with backing from its partners in the International Security Assistance Force, and the increasing momentum of the reintegration program, the conditions for reconciliation are ripe.

Reintegration and reconciliation may help end conflict in Afghanistan

By per Concordiam Staff

The Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) has enrolled nearly 3,000 former fighters and aims to integrate them peacefully back into Afghan society after they renounce violence, cut ties with extremists and agree to abide by the Afghan Constitution. “I cannot pull the trigger anymore. I am just tired of it,” a former fighter told The New York Times.

In late 2011, the APRP gained momentum after a slow start when 250 fighters switched sides in December alone, including wanted insurgent Hajji Mohammad Yusef. After the fighters turned over their weapons and signed a pledge to abandon the armed struggle, the governor of Badghis province, Gov. Delbar Jan Arman, congratulated the men on their brave decision. Hearing the governor welcome them back is a crucial part of acceptance.

Reintegration is taking place in 16 provinces and emerging in five to eight more. After only one year in operation, some security experts are saying that the APRP may be a hopeful sign for the government’s plan to reintegrate. These men “are no longer shooting at the coalition and Afghan soldiers, no longer laying roadside bombs that kill innocent
women and children," British Army Maj. Gen. Phil Jones told reporters in September 2011. Growth of the plan had once been uncertain; however, it looks as though the program is picking up steam.

The $140 million program funded by NATO seeks long-term peace by resolving fundamental complaints. "A cornerstone of this local approach is the resolution of grievances that led people to fight in the first place," British Royal Marine Maj. Gen. David Hook told reporters in December 2011. "If you accept the premise that 80 percent of the men fighting in the south are fighting for non-ideological reasons – and our analysis of why they have stopped fighting supports this – it becomes clear that if you can address their grievances, you can draw them back into society. You then make the other 20 percent less relevant."

As brave as the decision is, changing sides can bring risk. Maulawi Noor ul Aziz, a former senior rebel leader who turned convert in April 2011, told Radio Free Europe that 15 suicide bombers were pursuing him to make an example out of a person they considered a traitor. The militants try to strong-arm other fighters to prevent them from considering reintegration. The Afghan government does not hold back when protecting crossovers. Aziz is protected by six watchtowers surrounding his house, and when he travels, three armored vehicles full of guards accompany him – all paid for by the Afghan government. Moreover, he was granted amnesty in late 2011 for crimes committed in his earlier life as an insurgent commander. For the Afghan government, keeping former fighters safe is paramount.

Increases in reintegration program enrollment may indicate a prime time for reconciliation talks. Reconciliation with the Taliban was first attempted in 2011, but stumbled when former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani was assassinated later that year. Security experts say that a lasting solution to peace in Afghanistan requires involvement of all parties in the future security of Afghanistan. In November 2011, the traditional loya jirga, a grand council meeting of Afghans, recommended ways to establish a transparent process in which all parties in the conflict can trust, even if personal trust is lacking. The jirga is starting to piece together a process that Afghans can shape and a final deal they can own.

Security analysts speculate whether reconciliation or peace negotiations can be successful without Pakistan's involvement. In November 2011, Pakistan officials decided to boycott the Bonn Conference in Germany that had been scheduled to discuss the future of Afghanistan. "Pakistan has a crucial role to play in supporting a secure and stable and prosperous Afghanistan," U.S. State Department deputy spokesman Mark Toner told reporters in November 2011. "It's absolutely critical that Afghanistan's neighbors play a role in its future development."

Despite the challenges of reintegration and reconciliation, there is hope that these two programs can bring Afghanistan closer to the end of conflict. There is much work to be done, however, removing fighters from the battlefield and putting them to work toward rebuilding the country.
Rebuilding Afghanistan

The reduction in ISAF forces in Afghanistan must come with a renewed commitment to development

By per Concordiam Staff

At its 2006 summit in Riga, Latvia, NATO members committed to a “comprehensive approach” in Afghanistan: coordination of military, economic, political and diplomatic efforts to stabilize what had been an anarchic part of the world. Soldiers and nongovernmental organizations, diplomats and business people were to contribute not just to peacekeeping and democratic reform in Afghanistan, but also to reconstruction of the country’s roads, schools, economy and health care system.

More than five years after the strategy was invoked by the Alliance, European leaders, while recognizing the benefits of the comprehensive approach, have yet to declare the civilian-military model a total triumph. While the achievements of the Afghan mission are tangible, experts stress that stabilizing the country during the next few years will require further installments of aid totaling billions of euros.

The marriage of security building and civilian reconstruction has rarely been an easy one. Even though allied nations have spent hundreds of billions of dollars for counterinsurgency and peacekeeping in Afghanistan, development aid provided by Europe, as distinct from security operations, has amounted to little more than $1 billion. Germany, for example, has pledged 430 million euros (about $560 million) toward Afghan civil reconstruction through 2013, placing the country among the top three contributors.

And much of the aid has been distributed inefficiently and belatedly, said Bundestag deputy Ernst-Reinhard Beck, defense advisor for Germany’s governing coalition. The German government has followed a policy of “networked security” in Afghanistan, a term that encompasses most of the collaborative goals of the comprehensive approach. But at a security conference in Berlin in late 2011, Beck accused the European Union of providing too little money to fulfill tasks such as road building in Afghanistan, delaying the country’s stabilization efforts. In some cases, corruption has contributed to misallocation of aid.

“Despite a number of donor nations providing aid and over 800 multinational and private actors operating in the theater, their often competing agendas provide additional obstacles to coordination at all levels,” Croatian Defense Minister Davor Božinović wrote in the magazine The European-Security and Defence Union in 2011. “On its own, a comprehensive approach does not look likely to become a simple remedy for stabilizing Afghanistan or any other operation for that matter.”

For Dirk Niebel, Germany’s minister of Economic Cooperation and Development, security and development policies should complement one another, with an agreed-upon division of labor and resources. He called for a “development offensive” in the country, particularly as the coalition prepares to pull most of its military forces from the country by 2015. “A purely military strategy that takes no account of deeper-lying structural problems is not sustainable and is thus just as doomed to failure as an understanding of development policy that is too narrow and that basically ignores security issues,” Niebel wrote in The European in 2011.

Despite its shortcomings, the comprehensive approach has helped forge a strategic framework that has benefited Afghanistan, Božinović said. Croatia, for example, led efforts to establish a military police school in Kabul, part of the gradual relinquishment of security operations.
to Afghan nationals. Overall, hundreds of thousands of Afghans have joined the Afghan National Security Forces, trained by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The Afghan forces will provide security for the nation when the ISAF withdraws most of its units.

Germany has provided vocational training for 30,000 Afghans and distributed small business loans to 43,000, the country’s economic cooperation and development ministry reported. German-led provincial reconstruction teams have provided drinking and irrigation water for more than 100,000 families. About 80 percent of the Afghan population now has access to basic health care. A decade ago, it was 8 percent. Women and girls have attained voting rights and educational status denied them under the Taliban regime ousted by coalition forces.

Another proponent of urgent action in Afghanistan, Pjer Šimunović, state secretary of Croatia’s Ministry of Defense, urged Europeans to enmesh the country in a web of international commitments that “signal that our engagement in Afghanistan will never cease.” To assist reform internally in Afghanistan, he stressed the need for a culturally sensitive approach to financial aid that let Afghans do things “for themselves, by themselves.”

The World Bank estimates that 40 percent of countries that have ended conflicts resume fighting within 10 years. Underdevelopment gets much of the blame for that sorry state of affairs, according to the bank, and Afghanistan ranks among the poorest countries of the world. With those statistics in mind, NATO and its ISAF partners cannot terminate their Afghan efforts prematurely, said Douglas John Henderson, former British minister of Europe and minister of the Armed Forces. Speaking in Berlin in November 2011, Henderson urged the EU and NATO to prepare for a “long haul ahead” in Afghanistan, a show of fortitude that must be shared with a public grown weary of financing operations in Central Asia, be they civilian or military.

Europeans have come to the realization that neither reconstruction nor security on their own can accomplish the mission. Absent security, development is nearly impossible. But security remains fragile if a country is poor and undereducated. That has produced a post-Cold War paradox: As democracy has advanced across the globe, so have failed states. A recently published report by the World Bank said foreign donors would need to supply a minimum of $7 billion a year to Afghanistan so that the country doesn’t relinquish its recent gains. “This is a chunky, but not an impossible amount,” The Economist noted in a December 2011 article.

As one of the top donor nations to Afghanistan, Germany has reiterated its support for the country so that it doesn’t fall into the category of failed experiment. “We send a clear message to the people of Afghanistan,” German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle announced at the December 2011 Bonn conference called to discuss Afghanistan’s progress. “We will not leave you alone, you will not be abandoned.” □
A New Era in Energy

Germany vows to abandon nuclear power, but renewables are viewed as too expensive and unreliable

By per Concordiam Staff
Photos by Agence France-Presse

German Chancellor Angela Merkel spent four days in early March 2011, like many around the world, watching the nuclear disaster in Fukushima, Japan, unfold on television. These events caused Merkel, a reasoned supporter of nuclear energy, to make a radical change in direction. On March 15, Merkel announced that Germany was shutting down seven nuclear power plants immediately and would decommission the remainder by 2022. “We can’t simply continue as normal,” Merkel was quoted in Der Spiegel. “The events in Japan teach us that something that by all scientific benchmarks was considered impossible can actually occur.”
But Germany has more ambitious plans than simply ending the era of nuclear power. The Germans are also simultaneously committing to a transition to renewable energy to meet its goals of cutting “greenhouse” gas emissions. According to Yale Environment 360, an online journal from Yale University, the plan “makes Germany the world’s most important laboratory of green growth.”

The excitement surrounding the German plan and its promise of a new energy paradigm is attractive to Europeans, but is it realistic? Some in European industry and government have criticized the plan as being rash and potentially unworkable. They say the rush to shut down nuclear plants without sufficient energy substitutes in place could dramatically increase costs to consumers, lead to power blackouts, stunt economic growth, delay meeting emission goals and increase dependence on natural gas imports. And even if the transition is largely successful, nobody questions that it will be expensive. Cost estimates vary from 250 billion to 1.7 trillion euros in research, capital and subsidies, raising concerns that economic output from Europe’s industrial leader could be negatively impacted.

**Fukushima: Apocalyptic warning or lesson learned?**
The Fukushima disaster, the result of a magnitude-9 earthquake on March 11, 2011, followed quickly by a devastating tsunami, sent shock waves around the world. The New York Times reported that support for nuclear power in the United States dropped precipitously. There were anti-nuclear protests, not just in Germany but also in France and Spain. Other European countries are embracing Germany’s anti-nuclear power stance. Belgium announced plans to close its nuclear power plants by 2025, and Switzerland will phase out nuclear power by 2034. Italy, which abandoned nuclear power in 1987, voted overwhelmingly against a government plan to restart the industry, with 94 percent opposed. Almost every country where nuclear power plants operate ordered reviews of safety procedures and emergency inspections.

Before Fukushima, the image of nuclear power had been experiencing a renaissance of sorts as an attractive “climate friendly” option to fossil fuels. It had been 25 years since the infamous Chernobyl nuclear disaster in the Soviet Union caused widespread fear. The need for an effective, affordable, low-carbon source for an energy-hungry world, combined with safer new technologies, had raised the public profile of nuclear power. The disaster at Fukushima has unquestionably damaged that image. But does Fukushima demonstrate that nuclear power really is too dangerous? Or does the disaster represent a unique convergence of unprecedented natural disaster with human error and insufficient safety precautions? Should Europeans conclude that the risks are too high or that proper planning and safety will minimize the dangers? The answers to these questions depend on one’s point of view.

Visceral and widespread opposition to nuclear energy in Germany dates back to the 1970s. To those already opposed to, or suspicious of, nuclear energy, Fukushima...
represents clear evidence of its unmitigated dangers. German Environment Minister Norbert Röttgen told Der Spiegel that the Fukushima disaster “refuted basic assumptions about safety in Japan. It was an occurrence of so-called residual risk, which was practically ruled out.” On the other hand, Jean-Christophe Füeg, head of international energy affairs at the Swiss Federal Energy Office said that “Fukushima has had a certain impact on public attitude but only marginal – it hasn’t tipped basic opinions, whether for or against.” For Germany, the disaster was the breaking point for a conservative government that had been trying to extend the life of its nuclear plants.

Many don’t share Röttgen’s assessment and even those concerned about the inherent risks of nuclear power view the “clear and present danger” of climate change as a bigger threat. Former International Energy Agency Executive Director Nobuo Tanaka told Reuters after the disaster: “The cost of fighting against global warming will increase, that is sure. I think it is very difficult [to fight global warming], even impossible, without using nuclear power.”

In the July 2011 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, European nuclear expert Caroline Jorant argued that risk in the European Union is mitigated by the Euratom Treaty, which provides laws that govern the nuclear energy industry. She pointed to the post-Fukushima decision of the European Commission to conduct stress tests of nuclear power plants across Europe. “The EU’s desire to address the potential weaknesses of its reactors and to improve their capacity for crisis response shows that, in the aftermath of Fukushima, the right lessons are being learned,” Jorant wrote.

Europe not united
Despite Fukushima and the phase-out of nuclear energy in Germany, Switzerland, Belgium and Italy, not all of Europe is rushing to follow. There were 134 operational nuclear power plants in the EU in January 2012, with 53 more in Switzerland, Ukraine and Russia. EU countries Bulgaria, Slovakia, Finland and France have new plants under construction.

Fifteen of 17 nuclear countries are sticking with their programs. The United Kingdom still plans eight new plants to replace aging ones and Sweden will do likewise. France, which gets
about 75 percent of its electricity from nuclear power, will continue and expand its program. Russia already has 10 new plants under construction and plans to build more, both domestically and abroad. Poland, Belarus and Turkey, which currently have no nuclear plants, are following through with plans to build a total of 10 over the next two decades.

“Everybody, including the supporters of nuclear energy, agrees that the future belongs to renewable energy sources. At the same time everybody understands that nuclear energy is also necessary today.” Natalia Meden of the Russian Academy of Science wrote in March 2011 in the Russian policy journal International Affairs.

A rough road
It won’t be easy for Germany to reach its nuclear-free and low-carbon energy goals. Problems are already evident with both solar and wind power production, Der Spiegel reported. A new wind farm in the North Sea is complete but the lines to bring the electricity to the mainland grid are far behind schedule, causing potential losses in excess of 100 million euros. “Balancing the grid” is also a problem, as most of the wind power from the north must be transferred to replace nuclear power in the south, necessitating large-scale investment in new power lines and energy storage.

Solar energy is even more problematic. The industry has received the greatest share of clean energy subsidies, to the tune of 100 billion euros, but is the least efficient of all clean energy sources. Wind is five times more cost efficient and hydroelectric, six times. And according to Der Spiegel, investments in natural gas are 25 times more cost-effective in avoiding CO2 emissions. The Munich-based Ifo Institute for Economic Research called it “a waste of money at the expense of climate protection.” And in the cloudy German winter, solar panels produce almost no energy, which means the use of backup energy sources to avoid outages. In the winter of 2011-2012, Germany had to import large amounts of nuclear-generated power from France and the Czech Republic, and an old Austrian oil-fired plant was restarted as backup.

Additional factors
Germany’s rapid transition away from nuclear power threatens to increase its use of high CO2-emitting coal energy. Twenty-six coal power plants to offset energy losses from the already shuttered nuclear plants are in planning or construction, and energy analysts expect demand for more “clean coal” energy to increase. A report from the German Economic Ministry calls for the construction of 17 new large power plants, Der Spiegel reported. “Fossil fuel-fired power plants are essential for a secure energy supply,” the government report said and noted that the new plants are needed to compensate for lost nuclear energy by 2022 and for erratic wind and solar supplies.

Natural gas comes with its own concerns. While gas burns more cleanly than other fossil fuels, Europe is already heavily reliant on Russia for its supplies. Considering Russia has used gas exports as a geopolitical tool in the past, it’s not always viewed as a reliable supplier. The EU continues pushing for an alternative pipeline project to diversify gas supply routes from the Caspian basin and reduce reliance on Russia. New technology also allows Europe to exploit natural gas deposits at home. Hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking,” makes it possible to extract large amounts of gas from previously inaccessible shale rock formations. European environmental groups are challenging this process however, fearing that it would pollute water and, if successful, reduce incentives to develop renewable energy.

Nuclear-free fallout
Der Welt wrote: “The nuclear phase out marks a creeping rejection of the economic model which has transformed Germany into one of the richest countries in the world in recent decades.” German conglomerate Siemens, which built all 17 of Germany’s nuclear plants, announced in January 2012 it was pulling out of the nuclear business to focus on renewables and power transmission. Siemens estimated that the transition will cost as much as 1.7 trillion euros by 2030, much more than some others have calculated. Siemens board member Michael Süss told Reuters the cost will be borne by consumers and taxpayers. He believes that if Germany fails to make the transition as planned, the country’s credibility as an industrial nation will be undermined.

But Chancellor Merkel told Agence France-Presse: “We believe we as a country can be a trailblazer for a new age of renewable energy sources. We can be the first major industrialized country that achieves the transition to renewable energy with all the opportunities – for exports, development, technology, jobs – it carries with it.”

That Germany is willing to be the world’s laboratory for transitioning to a non-nuclear and low-carbon energy regime may be a good thing. But the rest of Europe still worries the plan may leave the EU’s industrial engine without the necessary fuel to run efficiently, thereby hurting economic growth and prosperity for the entire continent while undermining energy security by increasing dependence on imported natural gas.
Defending Europe

In a dangerous world, the EU can neglect neither military spending nor its relationship with NATO

By Cristian Iordan, Ph.D., Romania

As Hedley Bull expressed his skepticism in 1982, “‘Europe’ is not an actor in international affairs, and does not seem likely to become one.”1 Europe has – arguably – few or no means of projecting power. The EU is not a classical international power in a multipolar/multinodal world, but an economic power and a normative power – influencing the world by setting an example of democracy, rule of law and welfare. Europe decided to put in place mechanisms and policies that rendered armed conflict virtually impossible and brought peace, stability and prosperity on the continent during the last decades. But what if it was too much? Europe appears to be laying down weapons, and at the same time building a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). In this paper, I will attempt to argue that Europe is currently facing a security crisis based on its strategic shortsightedness, and explore the degree to which capabilities-based security and defense policies might be a solution.

Trans-Atlantic Views

It is useful to see how the perspectives are structured both at the political and public levels, as they appear, first, in a speech given by European Commission President José Manuel Barroso, in March 2010, and second, in the 2010 Transatlantic Trends survey.

First, the EU president supports a more dynamic trans-Atlantic partnership, sharing a vision of global order based on economic integration and common values and interests, in cooperation with other world powers:

“But the trans-Atlantic partnership is special. We do not pursue different visions of global order based on competing values. We are not geopolitical or strategic rivals. Ours is a win/win relationship. The level of economic integration combined with our shared values constitutes a strong foundation on which to build our partnerships. In order for us to play a role, we must acknowledge global interdependence as an underlying reality of our times while reinforcing our partnership. We need to think global and act trans-Atlantic.”2
The Charles de Gaulle, France’s only aircraft carrier, sails off the port of Toulon in 2011. Financial shortfalls have persuaded France and Great Britain to collaborate on building future carriers. Britain, once the world’s foremost sea power, currently operates no carriers.
Secondly, the 2010 Transatlantic Trends survey demonstrates that the overwhelming majority of EU (78 percent) and American (72 percent) respondents felt EU leadership in world affairs was desirable. The survey shows that, despite the public growing tired of the war in Afghanistan, majorities in all countries surveyed still supported NATO being prepared to act outside of Europe – EU (62 percent) and the United States (77 percent). A solid majority of American (60 percent) and EU (59 percent) respondents said NATO was essential for their country’s security, and these numbers increased by five points in Eastern Europe.

While Americans (77 percent) and EU respondents (71 percent) continued to feel they share enough common values to work together on international problems, one of the most deeply rooted trans-Atlantic differences can be found in general attitudes toward the use of military force: When asked whether they agree that war is necessary to obtain justice under some circumstances, three-quarters of Americans (77 percent) and only one-quarter of EU respondents (27 percent) agreed. On the other hand, the 2011 results show a convergence in European (86 percent) and American (78 percent) attitudes about the importance of economic power, vis-à-vis military power.

**Filling the gap**

At this point, a challenge for Europe is to turn the decline in funding into an opportunity for greater cooperation and strengthening the trans-Atlantic alliance. In “Let Europe be Europe,” Andrew Bacevich said in support of the “pull out” option: The U.S. should withdraw from NATO and allow Europe to grow, from a security and defense perspective.

Nevertheless, cutting the trans-Atlantic link would mean nothing less than breaking the backbone of European security and giving up on values, if we consider Barroso’s point of view. An inward looking Europe would be – putting it in poker terms – a losing hand.

The winning option, in my opinion, is the one based on further, constant integration and sharing responsibilities, acting more coherently. The current problem is not so much a technical one – even though there is an increasing gap between the American and European military efforts and capabilities – but political, concerning a common will to look upon things in a similar manner and, in these matters, to act together. The two bodies – EU and NATO – must act together and complement each other. As NATO’s New Strategic Concept states:

>An active and effective European Union contributes to the overall security of the Euro-Atlantic area. Therefore the EU is a unique and essential partner for NATO. The two organisations share a majority of members, and all members of both organisations share common values. NATO recognizes the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence. We welcome the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which provides a framework for strengthening the EU’s capacities to address common security challenges. NATO and the EU can and should play complementary and
mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international peace and security. We are determined to make our contribution to create more favourable circumstances.8

Shrinking defense budgets
Europe has not been keen on augmenting its military budgets. Today, things are even more delicate. The growing reluctance by decision-makers and the public, as well, to introduce or accept reforms in the security and defense sector may possibly have major consequences for Europe's security and defense. Bad strategic choices are a result.

Year after year, Europe's finance ministers have cut defense spending – NATO's European members' contribution declined to 197 billion euros in 2009, from 228 billion euros in 2001.9 These ever smaller budgets and reduced-force structures have negative impacts on military capabilities and missions. The Hungarian Ministry of Defense is just one example among others: The 2011 allocations dropped from an already low 1.3 percent of GDP, which may lead to international problems for Hungary, since it will no longer be able to fulfill its role in international missions.

In a letter to The Times of London in early November 2010, a group of retired British admirals attacked the decision of Prime Minister David Cameron's government to scrap Britain's only aircraft carrier and its entire fleet of 80 Harrier jets, saying the decisions would endanger British national security. And in fact, in Operation Ocean Shield off the Horn of Africa, NATO is patrolling an area roughly the size of Europe with 15 to 20 ships.

The fragmentation of Europe's defense efforts has proved inefficient. The numbers say it loud and clear: In 2007, Europe worked on four different tanks and had 23 different national programs for armored combat vehicles, with a total number of 89 armament programs, while the U.S., whose budget is more than twice the size of the EU's defense budgets combined, had 27 such programs.10

The European security and defense future is not looking good: The Headline Goal has not been achieved, nor have the EU battlegroups, nor is there significant improvement in coordination or coherence, despite improvements such as the European Defence Agency, the Berlin + Agreements or stability operations. Scary questions arise. Is Europe facing a security crisis at a strategic level? What if America can't intervene to support Europe? After all, you cannot expect all the people to be impressed with your rhetoric when substance is lacking, as the normative power Europe theory suggests:

“The concept of normative power is an attempt to suggest that not only is the EU constructed on a normative basis, but importantly that this predisposes it to act in a normative way in world politics. It is built on the crucial and usually overlooked observation that the most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or says, but what it is. …Rather than being a contradiction in terms, the ability to define what passes for ‘normal’ in world politics is, ultimately, the greatest power of all.”11

In fact, the European defense mindset has been spelled out by Slovak Prime Minister Iveta Radičová: Defense is “not a priority.”12 And we know it: In Kosovo, 83 percent of the bombs dropped came from U.S. planes; in Afghanistan, 100,000 of the 130,000 troops are from the U.S.; in Libya, “at least before it abandoned the battlefield, America’s strike aircraft were flying more than one half of the sorties.”13 Libya is a concrete example demonstrating the lack of political will and the EU's limited military capabilities. And yet, Sven Biscop, of the Belgian think tank EGMONT Institute, argues14 that the EU can still benefit from this crisis if it learns three key strategic lessons:

1. Stand up for your own vital interests. The U.S. has signaled that it is willing to contribute, politically and militarily, but not to take the lead. And rightfully so, for this concerns Brussels much more than Washington. EU capitals will hopefully realize that more leadership is expected from the EU, at the very least in what it has dubbed its Neighbourhood.

2. Think and act strategically. Defending our vital interests requires

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NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, center, encourages Allies to work together to meet security requirements, as Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, left, and U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta listen. The leaders were taking part in a media conference in October 2011 after a meeting of NATO defense ministers.
strategy. The first strategic choice is to prioritize the regions where those interests are most directly at stake, and act accordingly.

3. Get the right capabilities. Acting strategically requires capabilities. In the military realm, European capabilities remain deficient. The Libyan crisis hopefully can spur on EU member states to take action. European countries are in the lead, but Europe is not.”

France and the United Kingdom definitely have a role in the ESDP endeavor. Still, the Franco-British engine of European cooperation isn’t as revved up as it once was: “Their commitment to improving the collective capability of European Defence is questionable, since even the British Prime Minister, David Cameron, iterated that ‘Britain and France are, and will always remain, sovereign nations, able to deploy our armed forces independently and in our national interest when we choose to do so,’ ” wrote Oana Topala of the International Security Information Service in Brussels.15,16 This idea also emerges from Article 18 of NATO’s New Strategic Concept: “The independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies.”17

But even though it appears that the past still haunts Germany, and even if people tend to look at it as Europe’s wallet – an important role, I would say – the Alliance seems to be relying on Germany’s choices in the military domain. Saying ‘no’ to the Libyan no-fly zone had its political consequences:

A “categorical ‘no’ to the use of armed force is not an option for the largest economic power in Europe. Germany pays the third-largest contribution to the UN, and it has long asserted a claim to a permanent seat on the security council. If this ambition was not already a mirage, it was possibly ‘kicked into the can once and for all’ on March 17,” as former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer argued in the Süddeutsche Zeitung.18

Nearly all European countries are cutting defense budgets, cashing in – they say – the peace (or security) dividend, investing in health care, education or, lately, in economic reform. The problem is that the rest of the world is not doing so. There are some major “defense” spending countries, with numbers increasing every year,19 while Europe seems to be unaware that the world is a dangerous place. And Iran, North Korea, Yemen, Libya – to name only a few – stress this idea. And it seems that America is not (yet) tired of pointing this fact out:

“The 10 largest military spenders in 2009 accounted for 75 percent of world military spending, with the USA alone accounting for 43 percent. While the identities of the top spenders have not changed in recent years, their relative rankings have, with European countries falling down the ranking,” the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute said.20

At this point, the problem is: What if the U.S. is involved in major conflicts/wars and it is not able to sustain another one in Europe’s neighborhood? Who would “play defence?” Some would argue NATO. Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen recently gave this warning: European countries should “resist the temptation to use the economic crisis as an excuse for letting the trans-Atlantic defence-spending gap widen

Then U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates speaks at a Brussels defense conference in 2011 to persuade NATO members to finance the Alliance adequately or risk military decline.

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any further.” And you cannot have a proper defense with a majority of member states defense budgets at roughly 1.3 percent of GDP, with just a few exceptions.21

The numbers show that it shouldn’t be a question of funding – for the past few years, the EU’s GDP has been higher than that of the U.S. In 2009, we have the following GDP figures: the EU, 11.58 trillion euros and the U.S., 10.17 trillion euros.22 Even so, European armed forces spend too much on personnel and insufficiently on research and development (the EU, 8.4 billion euros; the U.S., 57.4 billion euros), investment (the EU, 21 percent; the U.S., 31 percent), and deployability.23 In Libya, it was the U.S. that provided the fuel, ammunition and surveillance. Europe should be able to do this itself. But it is impossible. It has reduced – as we can see – its military capabilities down to a dangerously low level.

Why defense matters
There are several threats that Europe could be forced to address, with scenarios ranging from serious organized crime issues, as in Mexico, to resource battles in the Arctic, and relations with the Middle East (threats to obliterate Europe by means of ballistic missiles or trade and energy blackmail).

But – arguably – no scenarios are closer than the ones involving Russia. Be it a future Russian nationalist movement acceding in power or Russia holding Europe for ransom over energy disputes, all of these imply the need for efficient military power, but equally for further coherence and unity.

As far as Russia is concerned, these are scenarios to which Central and Eastern Europeans are, according to history, more sensitive. Supporting this reasoning, the Visegrad Group countries (V4) – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Poland – agreed to form a battlegroup that would be led by Poland, based on a common perception that not all European states are equally concerned about Russian intentions and that regional security groupings are useful in that regard. The Nordic States are also cooperating with the Baltic States and the V4.24

"Central Europeans continue to see Moscow as a security threat and would prefer for NATO to treat Russia accordingly. Germany sees Russia as a business opportunity and an exporter of cheap and clean energy. The two views collided most recently during discussions for NATO’s New Strategic Concept, producing a largely incomprehensible mission statement for the alliance."25

As a further argument, Poland seems to have “grown frustrated in recent months with the alliance’s reluctance to make permanent security commitments to Warsaw on a range of issues.” Its options include a European battlegroup, an agreement for which was signed by Germany and France, the other two members of the Weimar Triangle. Poland might also push for the creation of “an EU-wide security framework,” to actively pursue a more intense strategic partnership with the U.S. or consider “the option of joining a Nordic security alliance, centered in particular on Sweden and the Baltic states.”26

Prospects for improvement
One way for Europe to narrow the capabilities/expectations gap could be to consider tightening its geographical scope, addressing its neighboring region.
Based on its working “small steps policy,”
the EU could start addressing the issue of ESDP at a “local” level, by engaging in the Mediterranean and the Balkans with economic support, diplomacy and stability operations. One example is a paramilitary presence, such as the Romanian Jandarmeria in Kosovo, to secure post-conflict reconstruction and provide local law enforcement training. Knowing that most Europeans are reluctant to engage in military action, it could provide a means of activating European interest for the area, securing its immediate neighborhood.

Another idea is pooling and sharing. And at the end of May 2011, EU defense ministers called for more military pooling and sharing. France and the UK started with their agreement in November 2010 to cooperate in such sensitive areas as nuclear research, force projection and aircraft carriers.

Yet, I would argue that Europe is in crisis at the strategic level, short of a common vision, and consequently lacks a common approach on a clear and present existential danger. Is there really nothing that can bring us all around the table? It looks like it is not terrorism, and it is not necessarily Russia. Nonetheless, Russian intervention in Georgia proved once again that armed forces do matter in the 21st century.

The issue of European disarmament and lack of real interest in research and development (R&D) matters is widely discussed, yet the moment is especially dangerous because the consequences of failure increase every day. The world we live in forces security experts and decision makers to consider constantly changing threats and challenges, permanently reconsidering priorities. Game-changing events occur rapidly, such as the Arab Spring or Osama bin Laden’s death. Europe could be faced with a security situation that it simply would not be able to handle on its own—short of vision and capabilities.

Even if European security and defense perspectives differ from one country to the next, a first move to improve European security and defense would be for the states to start writing checks. A more serious approach would include the development of a more profound relationship between the EU and NATO based on their existing partnership.

But the word of the day should be “change.” First of all, it would involve a shift in military spending and distribution, including more investment and R&D, implementing top technologies, and increasing deployability. Second, military structure would have to change toward small but quality-oriented and highly deployable forces “embracing connectivity in order to
coordinate global operations and swarming in order to achieve success. The structural changes would also include harmonizing and standardizing ranks and tasks (for instance, giving more authority to noncommissioned officers) and assembling the EU battlegroups. A third option is granting a greater role to the European Defence Agency, ensuring common research, common defense procurement and a truly European defense industry.

Conclusions

National identities and backgrounds, as well as a lack of political will, hinder European security and defense, undermining “the ability of Member States to acquiesce to ‘European’ principles as envisaged in the Lisbon Treaty – namely mutual defence and solidarity”. Libya is an eloquent example, where states acted on their own (the UK, France, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain) via NATO. This Alliance has focused on the “North-Atlantic” as a metaphor for the trans-Atlantic partnership, building a solid Alliance on the lasting concept of trans-Atlantic values.

European defense definitely has its own set of cultural and identity values, but does it lack security values? Some other major questions must be addressed in the future. After all these years will the U.S. still be in charge of all “the heavy lifting”? Is the U.S. military alone losing lives to protect the values we believe in on both sides of the Atlantic? And are we in danger of destroying the trans-Atlantic partnership? What if the biggest challenge for European security and defense comes, in fact, from within the EU?

Armies are not supposed to be charity organizations, offering jobs for the needy, nor an endless source for budget cuts. Giving a speech in Berlin in 2010, then U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates put it bluntly: “The demilitarization of Europe – where large swathes of the general public and political class are averse to military force and the risks that go with it – has gone from a blessing in the 20th century to an impediment to achieving real security and lasting peace in the 21st century.” And in 2011, Gates spoke about “the real possibility for a dim, if not dismal future for the trans-Atlantic alliance. Such a future is possible, but not inevitable. The good news is that the members of NATO – individually and collectively – have it well within their means to halt and reverse these trends, and instead produce a very different future.”

If NATO/Europe wants to be relevant, the situation should change. NATO must not become the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe with side arms. If that happens, Libya might just as well have served as the burial ground for European security and defense projections.
HOW SAFE is Our Cargo?

Bombs sent from Yemen prompt security review

By per Concordiam Staff

A shipping security gap was exposed when two printers containing the highly powerful explosive pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN) were shipped from Yemen for delivery to two Chicago synagogues in the United States in October 2010. Would-be bombers took advantage of a security loophole that permitted parcels on U.S.-bound international flights and cargo-only flights without a scan or inspection, thus illuminating a weak link in the counterterror fight. The Yemen printer bombs each contained 300 to 400 grams of PETN set to explode over the densely populated East Coast of the U.S., Scotland Yard said.

As a result of the bombing attempt, the United States, Germany, France and the United Kingdom banned air cargo from Yemen and Somalia. Checked or carry-on bags could no longer contain ink and toner cartridges equal to or larger than 16 ounces (nearly half a liter). But some security experts insist that nations must do more to ensure cargo is properly scanned, not just for aircraft-crippling explosives, but also radiological “dirty” bombs that could impact millions of people. The latest cargo scanning technology promises better results, but shippers complain that the upgrades would cost too much and harm international trade.

“The latest incidents may prompt the EU to deepen its cargo-screening procedures,” Brian Simpson, chairman of the European Parliament’s Transportation and Tourism Committee, told The Wall Street Journal. “We’ve concentrated so much on passenger security. You could argue that we have taken our eye off the ball on freight, which we now have to put right.”
Air freight sits at Leipzig-Halle Airport in 2010. After parcel bombs were found on a U.S.-bound cargo flight in late 2010, Germany announced it would no longer accept air freight from Yemen.
KNOWN SHIPPER PROGRAM
One solution tested by the U.S. Transportation Security Administration is the “known shipper” vetting program. It singles out packages from unknown senders for additional screenings and pays less attention to known shipper packages. The goal is to reduce anonymous shipments of documents, parcels and freight on passenger and cargo-only flights originating in the U.S.

Known shippers are preapproved after demonstrating two years of shipping history and undergoing security checks and site inspections. Versions of the known shipper program already exist in some countries, though the U.S. is discussing creating a global system with its allies, airlines and maritime groups, U.S. Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano said in January 2011.

Not all shippers have embraced the program, however. Confusion over paperwork, benefits and cost ambiguity among shippers are reasons for the lack of participation, Andrew Traill of the European Shippers’ Council said. Instead of seeing the benefits of the program, shippers are “more likely to stick to the status quo, and let their freight forwarders and logistics providers deal with any security requirements,” Traill said.

In the world of express shipping, where moving goods quickly and efficiently translates into profit, costs could rise dramatically if security checks slow service. Twenty-six million tons of goods travel by air each year, according to the International Air Transport Association (IATA). Most of this cargo consists of high value electronics, engineering and machine parts, pharmaceuticals, fruit and vegetables, and scrap metal.

Electronic screening of air freight would require unloading containers and unpacking palettes, procedures that could damage cargo. Security experts liken the delays and disruptions from cargo screening to the similar problems passengers experience at airport security checkpoints: The disruptions would become less severe as shippers learn what to expect from screeners.

At a meeting of EU interior ministers, then German Interior Minister Thomas de Maiziere said that it is essential to improve cargo security even if it means higher shipping rates. “There is no security for free,” The Telegraph reported de Maiziere saying.

ORIGINS OF THE CARGO BOMBS
The printer explosive plot that set off the debate over cargo security originated with al-Qaida of the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Reuters reported in November 2010. Terrorists made the bombs by replacing ink in toner cartridges with PETN and linking the cartridges to an electronic circuit board and ultimately to a mobile phone SIM card. The built-in remote control device would have enabled it to detonate in midair. The packages were intercepted at the UK’s East Midlands Airport and in Dubai.

The crucial tip-off came from a former al-Qaida member, the BBC reported. U.S. intelligence officials suspect that AQAP bomb maker Ibrahim Hassan al-Asiri made both this device and that of “underwear bomber” Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who tried to bring
down an Amsterdam-to-Detroit flight in December 2009 using explosives stitched into his clothing. Another plot was uncovered in May 2012. AQAP recruited a would-be suicide bomber to blow up a plane bound for the U.S. using a more sophisticated underwear bomb equipped with two detonators containing no metal parts. When it was disclosed that the would-be terrorist was a British undercover agent, the plot was foiled and the bomb seized. Similarly, U.S. officials revealed that AQAP has been trying to develop an explosive that could be surgically implanted. “AQAP is probably feeling pressure to conduct a successful attack to, from their perspective, avenge the deaths of bin Laden and Awlaki,” a May 2012 Reuters article reported a senior U.S. official saying.

The airplane bomb plots could reflect a change toward what some in al-Qaida have called a “strategy of a thousand cuts.” Scott Stewart, vice president at the global intelligence company Stratfor, told The Christian Science Monitor in November 2010 that the printer plot provided propaganda value for the terrorists, even though the bombs were discovered before detonation.

It has also raised concerns that terrorists could use shipping containers to move a nuclear weapon or “dirty” bomb, an explosive that disperses life threatening radiation. The consequences would be grave. If extremists shipped a weapon of mass destruction by sea and detonated it at a port, the impact on global trade and the global economy could be instantly crippling. Disruptions at ports in the aftermath could result in a backlog of shipments, spoilage, sales losses and manufacturing slowdowns, experts say.

INNOVATIONS IN SCREENING

Although international programs such as the Container Security Initiative and Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism have tried to protect cargo from tampering, physicists may have an attractive alternative in the form of a fast and highly sensitive screening device. A team in Israel proposes using a machine to detect explosives or nuclear materials at a rate of 20 crates an hour. Each machine, however, would cost about $5 million (about 3.4 million euros).

Security specialists warn that it is too expensive to try to establish a foolproof system of cargo scanning since criminals and terrorists are always changing tactics. Instead of trying to detect explosive material, security officials should “look for the detonator, which is easier to find than the explosives themselves,” as suggested in Scientific American magazine.

Even if new technology emerges, there is no guarantee shippers will use it. In 2008, South Korea’s busiest port installed a $3.5 million scanner to check U.S. bound shipping containers for nuclear weapons. The machine sits unused today because truckers won’t drive through it for fear of radiation exposure, reported Bloomberg Businessweek. Stephen Flynn, president of the Center for National Policy warned: “If I were an adversary who wants to cause mass destruction to the global economy, this is the system to target.”

The IATA says intelligence gathering, rather than screening of 100 percent of cargo, is the key. “Intelligence is the most effective tool to combat terrorism and it must support risk assessments,” according to a recent IATA press release.

Despite the shortage of security checks, terror plots involving cargo shipping have rarely succeeded. International intelligence sharing has been effective, and cooperation among the worldwide intelligence community assumes even greater importance in continuing to uncover terror plans.

“We have to come up with a proportionate response and close the potential loopholes,” EU Transport Commissioner Siim Kallas told air security experts in November 2010. “But security cannot be 100 percent.”

“We have to come up with a proportionate response and close the potential loopholes…”

~ SIIM KALLAS
EU Transport Commissioner
Reforming the Eurozone

The EU cannot ignore economic growth and population decline in tackling its long-term debt crisis

By per Concordiam Staff
Photos by Agence France-Presse

In the heat of the debt crisis, German Chancellor Angela Merkel made an admission that clarified for many the stark choices facing Europe: Rolling government debt too far into the future was no longer an option for Germany because there was no guarantee the country’s aging population could cover the bills once they came due. In a nutshell, Merkel illustrated the problems facing the European Union’s “social market economy.” Lavish retirement and welfare benefits begun during the vibrant years of the post-World War II boom may not be affordable in an era of declining population, slower economic growth and waning competitiveness.
“The new German problem is that the future of the eurozone and of Europe rests on the dominant German economy, but the long-term prospects of German demographics are daunting,” a United Press International article said in 2011. “After three decades of dwindling birth rates there will simply not be enough Germans of working age to sustain the burden.”

This analysis suggests that even if the eurozone emerges from the crisis that began in Greece and bled into countries such as Italy, the respite may only be temporary. To break the impasse, Europeans have floated possible longer-term solutions to the euro predicament, none of which will be easy to achieve in an EU built upon the principle of unanimous decision-making among its 27 members. Many EU leaders see the eurozone evolving into a fiscal union in which richer members such as Germany help pay the debts of other members, in some cases through “eurobonds” issued jointly by the EU. That would require structural reform to relatively unproductive EU economies that have used the euro to finance unsustainable spending. Once nations commit to spending discipline, economists view economic growth as the ideal way to shrink debt relative to the size of the economy. In Europe’s case, however, such growth could be stymied by low birthrates and growing intolerance for mass immigration.

“Growth is undoubtedly the best way to get out of the debt trap. After World War II, the American economy grew at a faster rate than the national debt. As a result, the debt ratio was automatically reduced,” Der Spiegel wrote in January 2012. “Nowadays, however, an aging and shrinking population makes it far more difficult to increase economic output. This means that slow-growing countries like Japan or Germany can hardly serve as the reliable borrowers of tomorrow. Rising economies like China, India, Indonesia, the Philippines or Vietnam offer more security.”

Hurdles to fiscal union

The origin of the European debt crisis was the 2008 revelation that Greece could no longer meet its bond payments, money it had borrowed from domestic and international investors to finance government spending. Greece has since benefited from an EU bailout fund strengthened with hundreds of billions of euros from donors such as Germany. Greek leaders have also negotiated with bondholders to cancel or refinance most of the country’s outstanding debt, which exceeds the country’s gross domestic product. Though Greece’s future as a member of the eurozone remains in doubt, a potentially greater danger is that the financial contagion could spread to the much larger economies of Italy and Spain. Even France, once perceived as an impeccable investment for creditors, had its bond rating downgraded in early 2012, suggesting the country will eventually have to pay higher interest rates to borrow money.

Many EU members have responded by calling for greater fiscal integration of a continent where national parliaments still control almost all budgeting. Despite pressure from France, Germany has rejected the concept of debt pooling until its taxpayers are assured they won’t be picking up the tab for prodigal spending in the countries of the Mediterranean. But the price of such reassurance may be too high: EU members would have to cede
budgetary control, a critical part of national sovereignty, to Brussels. Achieving unanimity on that point among 27 different national electorates (17 electorates if the changes were confined to countries using the euro) could be difficult.

“Shared liability is something we will only be able to contemplate once the EU has achieved much greater integration. It will not do as a means to resolve this crisis,” Merkel explained in an interview with the Guardian in January 2012. “That greater integration would involve the European court of justice enforcing controls for national budgets, for example, and much more besides. If we at some point have harmonized our financial and budgetary policy, that will be the time to try and find other forms of cooperation and shared liability.”

**Growth through reform**

When facing similar financial crunches in the past couple of decades, countries such as Sweden and Finland reacted by deregulating and restructuring their economies, which they believed had grown too rigid and uncompetitive. Sweden experimented successfully with deregulation of its retail sector that allowed companies such as furniture seller IKEA to thrive. It partially privatized its government-guaranteed pension system on a model provided by Chile. As a result, the country outperformed most of the continent in terms of productivity and investment, and has weathered the recent crisis better than most.

“Europe’s governments have been remarkably timid, compared with the Nordics, in exploiting another avenue to growth – structural reform,” The Economist noted in January 2012. “… it is in Europe where the potential gains from structural reforms are greatest and where the policy focus has nonetheless been overwhelmingly on austerity.”

As the recent crisis took hold, Spain and Italy have both promised to loosen labor rules that have locked older workers into jobs and deprived young aspirants of access to those same fields. Stories proliferate about trucking licenses in Greece passing from generation to generation like treasured inheritances unavailable to outsiders. Italian labor rules fill 2,700 pages and are so murky that businesses can’t fire incompetent workers without stiff penalties or labor strife, Bloomberg Businessweek wrote in late 2011. The country ranks near the bottom of the world in labor market efficiency.

“Italy’s economy can no longer afford the generous benefits it showered on its workers in the 1960s, when the country grew 5 percent to 6 percent a year,” the magazine noted. “Measures put in place years ago to protect workers aren’t just slowing down the economy now, they’re perversely hurting the very workers they’re meant to protect.”

**Stopping population decline**

Few doubt anymore that European infertility correlates to the euro crisis. In a January 2012 article, Der Spiegel suggested governments re-evaluate government debt in
light of demographic change. Sovereign debt was once deemed necessary for war fighting and investment in projects such as dams, bridges and airports. But these days almost every finance ministry piles debt upon debt simply to pay for ongoing expenses such as government salaries and pensions. Such a bargain is workable if a country’s working age population rises compared with the number of retirees. But that’s not the case in almost all of Europe. Fewer workers will be available to be taxed to finance the retirements of a growing pool of elderly pensioners. Long-term bondholders asked to wait 30 years to redeem their investments are worried about the EU’s financial viability by the time 2042 rolls around.

Many of the problems revealed during the euro crisis were outlined in “Project Europe 2030: Challenges and Opportunities,” a report produced for the European Commission in 2010. The 46-page document starkly laid out problems needing the coordinated attention of EU member states lest they slide into irrelevance on the world stage. At the current average birthrate of about 1.3 children per woman — the replacement rate is nearly 2.1 children per woman — the EU would face massive worker shortages requiring tens of millions of immigrants to fill.

“Too often immigration is perceived as a burden to be shouldered rather than an opportunity to be seized. Europe has much to learn in this regard from Australia, Canada and the United States, with which it is in direct competition for talented and skilled immigrants,” the report said. “Yet Europe will only become an attractive destination for skilled immigrants if the latter feel accepted, have full access to formal labour markets and the possibility to set up their own businesses.”

The opening of EU labor markets in 2011 to recently admitted member states such as Poland and the Czech Republic promises to help improve the situation. But EU officials believe the continent will need to look farther abroad to fill its need for scientists, researchers and doctors. A “blue card” program giving preferential immigration treatment to highly educated arrivals from Asia, Africa and North America would help. “Project Europe” says as much.

Attempts by governments such as Germany’s to encourage families to breed have largely failed, stymied by changing cultural attitudes that government bureaucrats struggle to recognize. Germany has already spent 15 billion euros ($21 billion) on Elterngeld to subsidize child rearing. “But no matter how much money the state throws at the problem, it won’t go away,” Der Spiegel concluded in August 2011.

Reasons for hope
The EU remains the world’s largest economic bloc packed with 500 million citizens living in democracy and freedom. The continent will eventually emerge from its debt crisis, either with a more compact eurozone or a recommitment to stronger fiscal union, but the bigger challenge will be declining European competitiveness and addiction to unaffordable government spending. What EU leader wants to preside over a shrinking, less influential Europe lacking even the means to defend itself? As Italian Prime Minister Mario Monti phrased it in January 2012: “Overcoming the economic, financial and social crisis that is gnawing at Europe depends on structural reforms that are in the hands of, and in the decision-making capacity of, the member states.”
The Open Government Partnership improves national accountability

In September 2011, the United Nations introduced the Open Government Partnership (OGP), an ambitious multinational initiative that aims to disclose government information to citizens. Such transparency can uncover and dissuade corruption, bolster accountability among government officials and empower citizens to team up with their government to promote honest administration. The partnership calls for governments to post budgets and financial documents online, as well as disclose the assets of public officials, and encourages citizen whistleblowers to report irregularities. Serving as a network of support, the initiative provides a framework for countries to start their own domestic open government policies—a task some states find too daunting to undertake alone. The partnership has already garnered commitments from 42 nations and many others are earmarked for membership. Supporters insist the OGP represents a significant step toward global transparency.

Openness is good for the economy

The program’s core function is to educate and inform citizens. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton says there is an “undeniable connection” between how governments function and whether their people flourish, a July 2011 Voice of America article reported. Additionally, open government is helpful to economic growth. Entrepreneurs are attracted to countries that fight corruption and promote transparent government. Openness is beneficial not only for “good government” but for sustained economic growth. As government budgets tighten, transparency can encourage trade and outside investment in a state.

How it works

Armenia, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Romania and Turkey are among the numerous countries participating in the OGP. The program starts with governments developing and implementing country-specific reform plans and communicates concrete commitments surrounding five “grand challenges”: improving government services, increasing public integrity, managing public resources more effectively, increasing corporate accountability and creating safer communities.

After a year of implementation, each government submits a progress report, and each country is evaluated by well-respected local governance experts that will independently assess each country’s progress. Brazilian Foreign Minister Antonio Patriota assured prospective OGP participants in June 2011 that reviews will not include “quality labels” or “rankings” and will be conducted in a “technical, neutral and nonadversarial manner.”

Nation eligibility list

Twenty-nine additional countries are eligible for membership. An independent group of experts have evaluated and chosen countries by scoring them on fiscal transparency, freedom of information, public figure asset disclosure and engagement of citizens. They must score at least 12 out of 16 to qualify. Italy, Norway, Romania, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States scored among the highest; Armenia, Israel, Panama and Paraguay scored among the lowest, but still made the list.

Some, however, have questioned the list and its accuracy. Notably, Russia and Pakistan, nations that don’t always have a reputation for transparency, are eligible, according to the OGP. And surprisingly, Georgia scored higher than the more developed democracies of Denmark, Estonia and Iceland. Placing countries on this list can provide an incentive to strive for openness and inspire reform. Georgia is a good example of this, as it is taking steps toward transparency, but organizers say the nation still has room to improve.
A May 2011 Transparency International (TI) assessment report suggests that countries in the South Caucasus need to strengthen anti-corruption policies. “They should take note that citizens are no longer willing to be passive spectators; they are increasingly showing that they are tired of mismanagement and corruption,” said Jana Mittermaier, head of TI’s Liaison Office to the European Union. The European nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland and Poland stand to benefit from joining as well, but had not as of early 2012.

A central part of the plan is collaboration with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). One country in particular is making headway on this front. The Slovakian organization Fair Play Alliance has teamed up with the Slovakian government to reveal the names of those doing business with the government, supplying citizens with information to probe deeper into those relationships. NGOs provide opportunities to complement ongoing reform and monitor implementation, while TI, a nonpartisan organization fighting corruption worldwide, publishes a well-regarded list on government openness that addresses the scale and challenges of government corruption.

Founding partners
The partnership is currently led by the U.S. and Brazil and is supported by six other founding partner nations: Indonesia, Mexico, Norway, the Philippines, South Africa and the UK. Leadership of the group will rotate annually among founding partners, with the UK co-chairing the OGP in 2012.

Brazil has used the leadership opportunity to establish a “transparency portal” that reports government spending information and fund transfers, and, despite challenges, established a Freedom of Information Act through which citizens can request previously hidden information. The U.S. has joined the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, a partnership that requires governments, and oil, gas and mining companies to disclose financial transactions among themselves. The U.S. also established an online petition platform offering Americans a vehicle for communicating with the government.

Some open government activists question whether Brazil deserves to be a co-leader. They criticize Brazil for failing to have a Freedom of Information Act at the time of admittance – a membership requirement some activists consider fundamental. Establishing the act was stalled by controversy over the opening of past military documents, but in late 2011 the process was completed. Speculation remains, however, how it will pan out.

“It now remains to see how the law will be actually implemented, and if access to public information will become an effective tangible right for most citizens,” said Brazilian scholar and commentator Ronaldo Lemos in late 2011 in a blog hosted by Princeton’s Center for Information Technology Policy. Additional objections include accusations of corruption among government officials. “Joining the U.S. in shepherding the partnership to fruition was Brazil, which has seen five cabinet-level officials leave government in the last nine months amid corruption scandals,” The Wall Street Journal reported in September 2011.

More transparency needed
Deeper reform is needed for transparency to have a more striking impact. “Publishing official statistics and general budget data online can be a first step, but one ought not declare ‘premature victory’ after tackling such generic ‘low hanging fruits,’ ” the U.S.-based Brookings Institute said. Brookings praised the benefits of “more politically difficult reforms, such as transparency in the drafting of laws and in policymaking, campaign finance, lobbying, the disclosure of officials’ assets, and fully disclosing which powerful private sector and media executives the leaders of government meet regularly with.”

The UK’s efforts, for example, encompass openness of data and statistics, including medical information. Publishing health care statistics is one example of how exposure to information can save lives. At the commencement of the partnership in 2011, a UK representative pointed out how publishing surgery mortality rates among surgeons exposed remarkable differences in physician quality. Some doctors were put out of business. By publishing data, bad practices were rejected and good practices multiplied. The UK government said transparency helped the country drop surgical mortality rates by as much as 22 percent.

Technological transformation
Citizens are increasingly demanding greater democracy through technology. Demonstrated by the North African revolutions, citizens using social media can heavily influence government. Technology played an invaluable role in empowering citizens to demand freedom against seemingly insurmountable odds and helped shame governments into addressing corruption. It is yet to be seen whether technology will prove equally as effective in constructing fully open societies.

“When a government hides its work from public view, hands out jobs and money to political cronies, administers unequal justice, looks away as corrupt bureaucrats and businessmen enrich themselves at the people’s expense, that government is failing its citizens,” Secretary of State Clinton said. Establishing government transparency “can be a lonely, sometimes even dangerous task. But through this partnership, we hope to change that,” she added. Multinational collaboration in the OGP strives to set standards for transparency and is a solid starting point in countering corruption and empowering citizens to hold governments accountable.
**BORDERLESS ECONOMICS**

Chinese Sea Turtles, Indian Fridges and the New Fruits of Global Capitalism

Review by per Concordiam Staff

*Borderless Economics* is about migration: why people migrate, how their migration impacts the countries they leave and the countries to which they move. But Robert Guest’s new book is mostly about the power of human beings and the networks they create. It’s about the power of these networks to share information, communicate, innovate and change the world. *Borderless Economics* shows how migrants, defined by entrepreneurism, determination and courage to take risks, “circulate like blood in a human body, spreading money and ideas like food and oxygen.”

Guest, business editor at *The Economist*, shows how migration benefits receiving and source countries, rich and poor alike. Guest has traveled to dozens of countries and compiled a litany of captivating migrant success stories, from China to Nigeria, India to California, and the United Kingdom to Indonesia. And as the world becomes increasingly connected, he describes how migrant networks have become invaluable fonts of innovation. For example, he believes that returning Chinese migrants, called “sea turtles” in China, are bringing back ideas that will eventually democratize China and that the ideas of Asian migrants could help America solve problems with its health care system.

To make his point, Guest begins the book looking at North Korea, a nation that has chosen isolation, shunning migration mostly because of the “subversive ideas” that newcomers may bring, but also rejecting knowledge that would help the country advance. As a result, North Korea is one of the poorest countries on Earth. Guest points out that South Koreans are 17 times richer than their northern cousins, despite the north being richer and more developed when Korea was partitioned in 1945. Guest also looks to ancient Tasmania and 15th century Spain as examples of how being cut off from the outside world leads to technological and cultural regression.

Migration spreads ideas. Guest calls it a “productivity multiplier.” Migration creates innovation and economic growth because it’s the most efficient way of allocating human capital, which is arguably the most important economic input. As Guest explains, migration allows for human capital – Indian scientists or Chinese engineers, for example – to move to the places where their talents are most in need and most profitable. As a powerful example, Guest cites a 2006 study that estimates the total economic gains of allowing the completely free movement of people around the world to be 40 times greater than the potential gains from removing all remaining trade barriers.

“It takes energy and courage to leave the place where you grew up, where everything is familiar. So migrants tend to be strivers, doers and risk-takers. Everywhere they go, they are disproportionately likely to start businesses and make new discoveries,” Guest writes. *Borderless Economics* is full of insightful stories about how individual migrants used their knowledge of two cultures to build successful businesses, acting as bridges of trade between their old and new countries.
Many know the stories of Andrew Carnegie, a poor Scottish immigrant to the United States who became one of the world’s richest men, or more recently, Russian immigrant Sergei Brin, who co-founded Google, and Taiwanese immigrant Jerry Yang, who started Yahoo! But few have heard of Cheung Yan or Mei Xu. Both have leveraged unique knowledge into fortunes, Cheung by exporting American wastepaper to China and Mei by importing Chinese candles into America.

The book also describes immigrant networks and their astounding successes. Chinese or Indian scientists educated in the West maintain contacts with their ethnic brethren who remained behind. They share new discoveries and spread new ideas. As good ideas are disseminated, they evolve and spark new ideas. As Guest says: “Progress consists of spreading good ideas to places where people have not yet heard them.”

The benefits of migration are often underestimated, and countries too often close borders to the very people they need for economic and societal growth. Rich countries fear newcomers depress wages and steal jobs, especially low-skilled jobs. Poor countries worry their best and brightest sons and daughters will be lured away by higher wages abroad, depriving their homelands of needed skills. Guest cites numerous economic studies that dispel both the “swamp our shores” and “brain drain” hypotheses. Some worry that low-skilled migrants are exploited by unscrupulous employers who pay them much lower wages. While problems with inequality exist, Guest cites evidence that wages on average are not substantially lower and standards of living rise when migrants resettle abroad.

Guest’s message comes at a time when the European Council has emphasized the need for greater immigration to stem economic decline. A 2010 report noted that the European Union would need to attract tens of millions of immigrant workers by 2050 to offset Europe’s shrinking population. Guest devotes the last two chapters of his book to discussing how immigration made the U.S. the richest country in the world and, barring a wave of anti-immigration isolationism, will maintain it as the world’s largest economy and most powerful country for decades to come.

In the end, Borderless Economics is a powerful argument for freedom, the freedom of individuals to move, think, create and innovate, allowing economist Adam Smith’s invisible hand to work its magic. Guest asserts in the first chapter that migration should be viewed from the perspective of people, rather than countries. He shows that people are most productive when they are free to use their talents for their own benefit, to live and work how and where they like, and to create the new technologies that benefit the world and advance civilization. ☀
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