How Terrorists Exploit New Information Technologies
ON THE COVER
Al-Qaida is taking advantage of new weapons in its arsenal: information technology. In a search for recruits, terrorists have turned to the mass media and the Internet to broadcast messages to Muslims worldwide. The international community must strive to counter this strategic threat with media messages of their own.

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Welcome to *per Concordiam*

I am excited to present the third issue of *per Concordiam*, the quarterly journal of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. This issue continues our tradition of providing readers with a quality journal that addresses the defense, policy and security issues that confront Europe and Eurasia.

Given the world we live and work in, few serious periodicals avoid the topics of terrorism and counterterrorism, and *per Concordiam* can be no different. Our initial two issues carried sketches of Spanish-Mexican bilateral cooperation and training, the European Union’s special fingerprint database, al-Qaida’s threat to Germany and other important concerns.

But this issue is dominated by terrorism and counterterrorism themes. We are offering brief reports and several in-depth articles that follow *per Concordiam*’s path of informing and challenging the reader. Features include the increasing phenomenon of suicide terrorism, terrorists’ use of strategic communications to expand membership and the long-developing nexus of terrorism and illegal narcotics dealing.

The problems of terrorism and counterterrorism are global, on the one hand, and, on the other, a challenge to the European and Eurasian regions, for Marshall Center graduates and others working in law enforcement, intelligence, defense and related fields. Our region is concerned, and properly so. We formally surveyed our students and graduates in 2009 and 2010, and followed the surveys with a conference of distinguished alumni serving in positions of leadership within their respective countries. Our results revealed that combating terrorism is one of the four leading future security challenges.

I expect this theme to generate a great deal of discussion within the magazine’s audience, and I encourage all who have personal knowledge or experience in dealing with terrorism issues to add to this discourse. As with every issue of *per Concordiam*, our editorial board welcomes your contributions, constructive suggestions and observations — in part so that the readership can be presented with opposing viewpoints in the next issue. I hope you enjoy this issue of *per Concordiam*, and I look forward to the ensuing discussion.

Sincerely,

John P. Rose, PhD
Director

Dr. John P. Rose
Director, George C. Marshall Center

John P. Rose is the director of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. A retired U.S. Army brigadier general, he has 34 years of international, operational, academic, business and strategic planning expertise. He holds master’s and doctorate degrees from the University of Southern California, Los Angeles, and attended the Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government in Cambridge, Mass.

His published works include *The Evolution of U.S. Army Nuclear Doctrine, 1945-1980* and 10 journal articles on nuclear strategy, military doctrine and long-range planning.
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Dr. Christopher C. Harmon is curricula director for the Marshall Center’s Program on Terrorism and Security Studies, or PTSS, in the College of International and Security Studies. An expert on terrorism and counterterrorism, insurgency and revolutionary warfare, counterinsurgency and international relations, he has taught courses at five graduate schools. In 2000, he published Terrorism Today, which the London Times Literary Supplement called “a masterly survey of the big picture of worldly violence.” He co-wrote the PTSS textbook Toward Grand Strategy Against Terrorism. He graduated summa cum laude from Seattle University and earned his doctorate in international relations and government from Claremont Graduate University, Calif.

Robert Wainwright is the director of Europol, the European Union’s law enforcement agency. Mr. Wainwright began his career in the United Kingdom’s Civil Service, where he held various managerial positions dealing with organized crime, counter-terrorism and intelligence analysis. Since 2000, he has worked for Europol in various capacities, starting with the agency’s U.K. Liaison Bureau in London. In his last job before becoming director, he was Chief of the International Department of the UK Serious Organized Crime Agency and oversaw 20,000 law enforcement cases each year. He earned a bachelor’s of science degree from the London School of Economics in 1989.
The first two issues of *per Concordiam* have generated tremendous feedback from you, the reader. We are excited by your responses and will continue to reach out to more defense, security and policy experts in Europe and Eurasia to provide thought-provoking articles for this and future issues.

The focus of this issue is combating terrorism and its impact on regional security. Each of the topics addressed has regional and international connections that challenge defense and security experts in Europe and Eurasia. Surveys of the students and alumni universally indicated that terrorism is a significant concern. The ideas put forth by our contributors present several facets of terrorism and examine possible ways to reduce the impact of terrorist activities in the region.

In the article “Suicide Terrorism,” Cmdr. Ioannis Chapsos of the Hellenic Navy writes about the history of suicide bombing and explores the characteristics of the bombers and the groups that recruit them. The author puts forth recommendations on how to deal with future challenges, since it is unlikely these groups will run out of “human bombs.”

Lt. Col. Carsten Bockstette, the German liaison officer at the Marshall Center’s Directors Action Group, discusses the propaganda efforts and highly effective messaging of terrorist groups in his article, “How Terrorists Exploit New Information Technologies.” He explains their communication techniques, objectives and tactics while presenting ways for a nation to develop a strategic countercommunication plan.

Marshall Center professor Dr. Christopher C. Harmon addresses the nexus between the illegal narcotics trade and terrorist activities in his article, “Narcotics and Terrorists.” He explains why the drug business is very significant for some of today’s terrorist groups and how narcoterrorism has become a serious transnational problem. He explains the links between state sponsors of terrorism and states known to facilitate narcotics trafficking.

The next issue of *per Concordiam* will focus on political-military partnerships. Submissions on this theme from Marshall Center alumni, the organizations and governments for whom they work, and academics and scholars with an interest in defense and security issues in Europe and Eurasia will greatly assist in ensuring relevant issues are addressed in *per Concordiam*. Also, look for the announcement and rules for the first annual per Concordiam Essay contest, which will pose an important question to readers: What must NATO do in the future to be successful? Your participation is encouraged!

We encourage your feedback and look forward to your e-mails in this ongoing dialog on important security issues. All articles in each issue are available online on the Marshall Center Web site: http://tinyurl.com/per-concordiam-magazine

— *per Concordiam* editorial staff
Letters to the Editor

The aim of *per Concordiam* magazine is to address security issues relevant to Europe and Eurasia and to elicit a response from readers. We hope that the publication of our first two issues did that and that it also helped stimulate debate and an exchange of ideas. We welcome your feedback. So please share your thoughts with us in the form of letters to the editor that we will publish in this section. Please keep your letters as brief as possible, and specifically note the article, author and magazine edition to which you are referring. We reserve the right to edit all letters for language, civility, accuracy, brevity and clarity.

*Send feedback via e-mail to: editor@perconcordiam.org*

ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS

The intent of *per Concordiam* is to be a moderated journal with the best and brightest submitted articles and papers published each quarter. We welcome articles from readers on security and defense issues in Europe and Eurasia.

Here’s how to submit an article:
First, e-mail your story idea to editor@perconcordiam.org in an outline form or as a short description. If we like the idea, we can offer feedback before you start writing.

We accept articles as original contributions. If your article or similar version is under consideration by another publication, or was published elsewhere, tell us when submitting the article to us.

If you have a manuscript to submit but are not sure it’s right for the quarterly, e-mail us to ask if we’re interested.

As you’re writing your article, please remember:

- **Offer fresh ideas.** We are looking for articles with a unique approach from the region. We probably won’t publish articles on topics already heavily covered in other security and foreign policy journals.

- **Connect the dots.** We’ll publish an article on a single country if the subject is relevant to the region or the world.

- **Do not assume a U.S. audience.** The vast majority of *per Concordiam* readers are from Europe and Eurasia. We’re less likely to publish articles that cater to a U.S. audience. Our mission is to generate candid discussion of relevant security and defense topics, not to serve as an echo chamber for U.S. foreign policy.

- **Steer clear of technical language.** Not everyone is a specialist in a certain field. Ideas should be accessible to the widest audience.

- **Provide original research or reporting to support your ideas.** And be prepared to document statements. We fact check everything we publish.

- **Copyrights.** Contributors will retain their copyrighted work. However, submitting an article or paper implies the author grants license to *per Concordiam* to publish the work.

- **Bio/photo.** When submitting your article, please include a short biography and a high-resolution digital photo of yourself of at least 300 dots per inch (DPI) resolution.

*E-mail manuscripts as Microsoft Word attachments to: editor@perconcordiam.org*
Terrorism declines in EU
Report by Europol highlights improvement in 2009

Robert Wainwright, Director of Europol

Europol is the European law enforcement agency. Its job is to make Europe safer by assisting the member states of the European Union in their fight against serious international crime and terrorism. This is a big task. Large-scale criminal and terrorist networks pose a significant threat to the internal security of the EU and to the safety and livelihood of its people. The biggest security threats come from terrorism, international drug trafficking and money laundering, organized fraud, counterfeiting of the euro and human smuggling. But new dangers are also accumulating in the form of cybercrime, human trafficking and other modern-day threats. This is a multibillion-euro business, quick to adapt to new opportunities and resilient in the face of traditional law enforcement measures.

Terrorism continues to impact the lives of member states’ citizens both inside and outside the EU. In 2009, seven people (five police officers and two soldiers) were killed and scores of individuals injured as a result of terrorist attacks in Greece, Northern Ireland and Spain.

The European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, or TE-SAT, contains basic facts and figures regarding terrorist attacks, arrests and activities in the EU. The TE-SAT is based mainly on information contributed by EU member states from criminal investigations into terrorist offenses. Terrorism and related phenomena in the EU are summarized in terms of quantity and quality, and trends are identified for the period of 2007 to 2009. The report aims to provide law enforcement officials, policymakers and the public with facts and figures regarding terrorism in the EU while also seeking to identify trends in the development of this phenomenon. It is a public document produced annually on the basis

Special police escort suspected members of the Greek terrorist group Epanastatikos Agonas, or Revolutionary Struggle, to the prosecutor’s office in Athens in April 2010.

Robert Wainwright
Director of Europol since April 2009

AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE
of information provided and verified by law enforcement authorities in the EU.

In 2009, the number of terrorist attacks and terrorism-related arrests in the EU continued to decrease. This welcome development, however, must not be understood as an invitation to lower the guard. The overall number of terrorist attacks in all member states in 2009, excluding the United Kingdom, decreased by 33 percent compared with 2008 and is almost half of the number of attacks reported in 2007. For 2009, six member states reported a total of 294 failed, foiled or successfully perpetrated terrorist attacks, while an additional 124 attacks in Northern Ireland were reported by the U.K. Thirteen member states, excluding the U.K., arrested a total of 587 individuals on suspicion of offenses related to terrorism, a figure that marks a decrease of 22 percent compared with 2008 and about 30 percent compared with 2007. The majority of arrests were carried out on people suspected of membership in terrorist organizations. Other arrests were made for attack-related offenses that included the preparation of attacks, propaganda, financing of terrorism and facilitation.

Islamist terrorism is still perceived as the biggest threat to most member states, despite the fact that only one Islamist terrorist attack — a bombing in Italy — took place in the EU in 2009. Islamist terrorists have threatened EU member states with attacks aimed at inflicting indiscriminate mass casualties. The threat emanating from Islamist terrorism inside the EU is influenced, to a certain extent, by developments in conflict zones around the world.

Separatist terrorism continues to affect the EU the most in terms of the number of attacks carried out. This type includes Basque separatist terrorism in Spain and Corsican separatist terrorism in France. In 2009, there were six fatalities in the EU from 237 separatist terrorist attacks. The Basque separatist terrorist organisation Euskadi ta Askatasuna, or ETA, killed three police officers. In the U.K., Irish Republican and Loyalist groups in Northern Ireland — principally the Real Irish Republican Army and the Continuity Irish Republican Army — killed two soldiers and one police officer.

In 2009, the total number of left-wing and anarchist terrorist attacks in the EU increased by 43 percent compared with 2008; they were responsible for 40 attacks. In Greece, Epanastatikos Agonas continued its violent actions and claimed responsibility for an attack on police officers, causing serious injuries to one officer. Sekta Epanastaton, a newly active organization in Greece, claimed another attack that killed a police officer.

Hungary reported four right-wing terrorist attacks in 2009. All other member states reported extremism in the form of right-wing criminal activities. Individuals motivated by extreme right-wing views who act alone continue to pose a threat.

Two single-issue terrorist attacks were reported in 2009. The illegal activities of single-issue extremism continue to be dominated by animal rights extremism, with some violent ARE attacks using modi operandi similar to those used by terrorists, such as improvised explosive devices and improvised incendiary devices.

In some cases, it is difficult to differentiate between criminality and acts of terrorism or extremism. Terrorism is not an ideology but a set of criminal tactics that ignore fundamental principles of democratic societies. EU member states have agreed to regard terrorist acts as those that aim to intimidate populations, compel states to comply with the perpetrators’ demands, and/or destabilize or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization. The TE-SAT respects the classifications made by EU member states.

The complete TE-SAT 2010 report is available for download from the publications section of Europol’s website: www.europol.europa.eu
In May 3, 2010, Faisal Shahzad, a 30-year-old Pakistani-American, was arrested and accused of planting a car bomb in New York City’s Times Square. This failed attack showed once more al-Qaida’s ability to recruit self-radicalized adherents. This self-radicalization is partially due to the effective use of strategic communication. For al-Qaida, strategic communication is a vital part of its asymmetrical warfighting campaign. Offsetting this threat requires knowledge of what motivates, feeds and sanctions radical Islamist terrorists and their followers. Research and analysis of the root causes and underlying conditions, motivators and enablers of terrorism — including the propaganda strategies of Islamist terrorists — are vital to shaping appropriate countermeasures to the threat. The mass media, especially the Internet, have become the key enablers and the main strategic communication assets for terrorists and have ensured them a favorable communication asymmetry. With these assets, terrorists are able to compensate for a significant part of their unfavorable asymmetry in military power. Al-Qaida networked terrorists place a great deal of emphasis on developing comprehensive communication strategies to reach their goals and desired ends. They create their strategies based on careful audience analysis and adapt their messages and delivery accordingly, adhering to the fundamental rules underlying any communication or public relations campaign. Their skillful use of the mass media, cell phones and the Internet to compensate for asymmetrical disadvantages has enabled them to keep creating new generations of radical Islamist terrorists.

The recent fusion of terrorist messages with the global mass media has allowed terrorism to take on a worldwide dimension. In this article, terrorism is defined as political violence in an asymmetrical conflict that is designed to induce terror and psychic fear (sometimes indiscriminate) through the violent victimization and destruction of noncombatant targets or iconic symbols. Such acts send a message to a local, national or global community from an illicit, clandestine organization. The purpose of terrorism is to exploit the media to achieve maximum publicity as a force multiplier to influence the targeted audience(s) in pursuit of short- and mid-term political goals and/or desired long-term ends.

Terrorists do not aim primarily at inflicting maximum physical damage with their attacks but rather strive for the greatest possible psychological effect. Terrorism uses a strategy that primarily relies on the symbolic strength...
of the act. Thus terror does not primarily serve the purposes of fighting, injuring or destroying the opponent; rather, its primary purpose lies in conveying messages to the target audience(s). Terrorists act without regard to the conventions of warfare. The symbolism originating from terrorist acts and the media marketing thereof are intended to address the public, to use them as a vehicle and a communication channel to influence political representatives, and other target audiences such as potential recruits. Al-Qaida offers a coherent worldview with a simplistic, unitary explanation of ostensibly disparate phenomena that neatly packages the potential recruit’s frustrations with the struggles of Muslims across the globe. In these messages, there are only two choices: continue to suffer or join the jihadists and fight.

In this context, I define strategic communication as the systematic planning and realization of information flow, communication, media development and image care with a long-term horizon. It conveys deliberate messages through the most suitable media to designated audiences at the appropriate time to contribute to and achieve the desired long-term effect. It has to bring three factors into balance: the messages, the media channels and the audiences.

This kind of terrorism is ostensibly motivated by an extreme interpretation of Islam. Its practitioners regard the use of violence as a divine duty or sacramental act. Al-Qaida’s self-proclaimed goal is to reinvigorate the Islamic ummah, or Muslim community, and to mobilize it in a revolutionary transformation of the Muslim world population in confrontation with the international order embodied by Western society. They strive toward the creation of a new global Islamic caliphate, which Islamist terrorists widely consider the ideal form of government representing the political unity and leadership of the Muslim world. Relying on successful agitation and, increasingly, self-radicalization, they strive to expand the ummah. In a 2006 interview, al-Qaida ideologue Abu Musab al-Zarqawi explained the jihadists’ goal:

“Our political agenda … is that of the saying of the Prophet (peace be upon him), I have been sent with the sword, between the hands of the hour, until Allah is worshipped alone … this is what determines our political goal. We fight in the way of Allah, until the law of Allah is implemented, and the first step is to expel the enemy, then establish the Islamic state, then we set forth to conquer the lands of Muslims to return them back to us, then after that, we fight the kuffar (disbelievers) until they accept one of the three. I have been sent with the sword, between the hands of the hour; this is our political agenda.

**Short-term goals**

In the short term, the terrorists’ aim is to enlarge the scope of their patronage. Therefore, the persuasion and self-radicalization of receptive global Muslim audiences via the heightened of an Islamic identity in confrontation with the West is one of their primary short-term goals. As Brian Michael Jenkins writes, “the recruiting vocabulary focuses on humiliation, shame and guilt, contrasted with dignity, duty and honor.” John Venhaus, a career psychological operations officer experienced in foreign media influence operations, adds: “The al-Qaida legend portrays the group as the acme of jihad, and this legend is its greatest asset. It is a glorious, wispy presence, just out of reach, which only the most dedicated, most committed, and purest of heart can hope to obtain.”

In addition, the terrorists exploit foreign troop presence and their military actions in the Muslim world to implement their media strategy. The presence of troops in places such as Afghanistan, Iraq and parts of the Caucasus produces the desired graphic footage of the “occupation of Islamic nations” that furthers the terrorists’ media-centered strategy. That strategy thrives on images of and words about innocent civilians killed by Western bombs transmitted via television and the Internet, producing intense antipathy toward the West. Building on this, terrorists can more effectively call for the end of foreign influence in Muslim countries. Therefore, even though it is an obvious contradiction, another of their stated short-term goals is to drive those so-called invaders from Muslim nations.

**Intermediate and long-term goals**

Al-Qaida’s midterm goals include the removal of all political leaders who currently govern secular Muslim states and the elimination of the state of Israel. The terrorists aim to install supportive Islamic regimes and transform the current fractious political landscape of the Muslim world from a decentralized network to a massive Islamic movement that strives toward
their desired end. As Abu-t-Tanvir Kavkazskii, a leading ideologist of the Caucasus Emirate Jihadist Network, stated in 2010: “In the near future we can assume that after the liberation of the Caucasus, jihad will begin in Idel-Ural and ... all these lands will again be a united state living only by the law of Allah – the Caliphate.”

Al-Qaida's primary long-term goal is to create a monolithic Islamic religious and social movement to restore a devout Islamic caliphate by politically uniting all countries with a Muslim majority. The desired end is the worldwide rule of the caliphate. Al-Qaida’s communication strategy is inseparable from its political strategy, as its terrorism and rhetoric work toward common goals. Consequently, its communication goals are based on its short-, mid- and long-term agenda. Its primary long-term strategic communication goal is the propagation and enlargement of its movement through the global dissemination of information among receptive Muslim audiences and potential converts to expand the ummah. The terrorist communication strategy aims ultimately at a fundamental restructuring of the political discourse and identity of the Islamic world.

The legitimization of al-Qaida’s movement and methods — establishing its social and religious viability while engaging in violence — requires continuous communication. Its violent methods and killing of innocents inevitably contradict some of the core tenets of Islam. This built-in drag on the organization’s legitimacy can, in the long run, only be circumvented through an unceasing communication effort in which, as Gabriel Weimann notes, “Violence is presented as a necessity foisted upon the weak as the only means with which to respond to an oppressive enemy.”

Therefore, legitimacy and the ostensible demonstration of compliance with Islamic law are prominent in al-Qaida’s communication strategy. Its utopian goals and Islamist-jihadist worldview fulfill a significant purpose: The utopia is not only the goal of its violence, but also its moral and religious justification. Al-Qaida members try to portray themselves as freedom fighters forced to use violence against a ruthless enemy that is crushing the rights and dignity of their community. They communicate messages to reinvigorate a pan-Muslim identity, using a vengeful, defiant underdog narrative in which Islam is under constant and global attack. This makes legitimatization of their terrorist deeds their second strategic communication goal.

The coercion and intimidation of opponents both at home and abroad is al-Qaida’s third main strategic communication goal. The enemy nearby is composed of apostates, or secular Muslim regimes, especially ones that receive Western (and in the case of the Caucasus, Russian) support. The distant enemy is, in its view, made up of Jews, unbelievers and Western society as a whole. Al-Qaida tries to manipulate the domestic enemy to reach its midterm political goal of removing that enemy from power. It also tries to intimidate the distant enemy to withdraw completely from the Muslim world and to remove support from secular Muslim regimes. That increases Western society’s psychological vulnerability and inspires potential recruits to join the movement. The accomplishment of the desired end — global rule by a devout Islamic caliphate — is the all-embracing, long-term communication goal.

**Communication infrastructure**

During the 1990s, al-Qaida communicated with its audience using more traditional means such as storytelling, journalist interviews, faxes, face-to-face propaganda, even news conferences. At the end of 1998, there was a shift in strategic communications due to technological advances and the rise of the Al-Jazeera television network. Al-Jazeera became a channel for broadcasting al-Qaida’s messages to the Muslim world and would provide the tapes to CNN and other international news organizations. To a certain extent, the media mutated from its role as critical observer to become active...
participants in the conflict. After September 11, 2001, al-Qaida expanded its communication infrastructure and methods considerably. That year saw the formation of the As-Sahab (The Cloud) Foundation for Islamic Media Publication. It is essentially the main media production division of al-Qaida, which relies heavily on the Internet. As of 2007, Mohamed Abayath, aka Abdul Rahman al Maghrebi, was steering As-Sahab as leader of the al-Qaida media committee. Today, al-Qaida communicates primarily through three media communication channels: Fajr (the first of the five daily prayers), the Global Islamic Media Front and As-Sahab. The organizational structure changed after the loss of Afghanistan as a physical base. The conversion from a clandestine organization to a decentralized, open network represented the Islamist terrorist movement's only possible means of survival. Its previous dependence on traditional broadcast mass media was replaced and its impact was multiplied by its adoption of the Internet as its medium of choice, supplemented by CDs, DVDs, cell phones and night letters.

After losing their base in Afghanistan, al-Qaida members decreased the number of targets in their attacks to about 50 to 200 casualties, illustrated by the bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad on September 20, 2008. The blast of 600 kilograms of RDX and TNT occurred hours after Pakistan's new president, Asif Ali Zardari, told the Pakistani parliament that the country would continue its fight against terrorism. Bigger and more complex operations with thousands of victims, such as the attacks on the U.S. September 11, 2001, are no longer the operational norm. The risk that operations of this scope could be detected and stopped by law enforcement and intelligence agencies is too great. According to a January 2010 report to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, intelligence and military officials agree that al-Qaida's capacity to carry out large-scale operations has been significantly degraded. Its financial and popular support is declining and allied operations have killed or captured much of al-Qaida's leadership. In April 2010, top al-Qaida leaders in Iraq were reported killed in a raid near Tikrit. Many terrorists have taken refuge across the Afghan border in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Authority. This largely remains a major safe haven. According to intelligence and counterterrorism officials, hundreds have relocated to Yemen and Somalia. Both nations have weak central governments that exercise little or no control over vast swaths of their own territory. According to Dennis C. Blair, then director of U.S. National Intelligence, al-Qaida "today is less capable and effective than it was a year ago." In June 2009, Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, al-Qaida's leader in Afghanistan, released an audio message begging for money: Al-Qaida members were short of food, weapons and other supplies.

Radical Islamist terrorists now resort to the tactic of "guideless resistance," in which responsibility for planning operations rests solely with the decentralized actor (Abu Musab al Suri wrote a lengthy essay on this scheme). These attacks are increasingly committed by self-radicalized Muslims and converts. Al-Qaida concentrates on producing abstract directives and motivational audio and video calls to steer the movement. Processes running in parallel and coordinated via the World Wide Web enable jihadist terrorists to survive as a loosely connected network. The fusion of cell phones and mass communication, connecting audience members who can be publishers and broadcasters simultaneously via the Web, enhances the echo chamber available to terrorists and greatly increases their audience.

Even though the mainstream media sticks mostly to official news sources, the terrorist message still receives abundant coverage. There is always the imminent danger that the mainstream media will become the outlet for state or terrorist "spin" if journalists' research and investigation does not provide context and depth. The intensive, sometimes obsessive, coverage the media gives to a terrorist act generates the desired psychological effect. Terrorist actions are planned and organized to cause a maximum communicative effect while requiring minimal resources. The symbiotic relationship between terror events and the media is apparent: The perpetrators would have far less impact without media publicity, and the media can hardly be expected to

The symbiotic relationship between terror events and the media is apparent: The perpetrators would have far less impact without media publicity, and the media can hardly be expected to
resist reporting on these events. Terrorists already make abundant use of the Internet for internal and external communication. They raise money, franchise their brand names, lay the basis for self-radicalization to recruit followers, find partners and suppliers, provide training materials through their online library and manage operations. Terrorists capture information about the users who browse their sites. Users who seem to be most interested in the cause or well suited to carry out its work are then contacted. But more often, they try to get in contact with al-Qaida itself. Recruits regularly followed a “bunch of guys,” according to a theory proposed by Marc Sageman. In Sageman’s view, the individual usually seeks information about al-Qaida through friends and associates.

**Al-Qaida’s media structure**
For years, terrorists could rely on an almost streamlined Islamic media that willingly conveyed desired messages and videotapes and helped terrorist groups build a “brand name.” Until the advent of the Internet, terrorists focused on television, radio or print media. However, these traditional media have “selection thresholds,” multiple stages of editorial selection over which terrorists have no control. In addition to this obstacle, by early 2003 the media in the Arab world had begun to fragment, becoming increasingly crowded and competitive. A growing array of satellite television stations began to ensure competition and therefore a diversity of opinion, which hampers the communication strategy of the terrorists on the TV front. The quantity and volume of anti-al-Qaida voices in the Arab media have dramatically increased since 2003, with many al-Qaida-linked terrorist attacks being met by a chorus of Arab criticism and condemnation. Public opinion polls have shown steep declines in support for al-Qaida, particularly in countries directly affected by its terrorist attacks. Arab satellite television has become one of the strongest forces pushing for change in the region and representing one of the biggest obstacles to al-Qaida’s agenda of imposing a monolithic Islamic identity through a streamlined Muslim media voice. It therefore poses the greatest challenge to the terrorists’ political vision and accelerates use of the Internet as an information-spreading platform to compensate for the loss of satellite TV as a friendly media outlet. This further entrenches the Internet as the main strategic communication asset for terrorists. As Abu Omar expressed it, “We are the energy behind the path to jihad. Just like the jihadis reached their target on September 11, we will reach ours through the Internet.”

**Target audiences and communication channels**
While some propaganda messages are intended for a broad audience, the majority are tailored to a particular target group. The messages, the channels by which these messages are communicated, and the languages they use are customized to suit the special needs of the target group. The terrorists select and segment the strategically desired target audience, the transmitting medium and the targets for destruction. They determine the location and timing of their actions to satisfy media criteria for newsworthiness that fit with the media’s deadlines and news cycles, thus reaching the desired audience. The actual violent operation is embedded within their strategic communication efforts. An example of this is the suicide bombing of Moscow’s subway system by the Caucasus Emirate jihadist network in March 2010. Radical Islamist terrorists have become extremely adept at exploiting the unique attributes of the Internet. It offers the possibility to communicate in almost real time. The Internet is also used extensively to educate and transfer knowledge to followers. Further, they use the medium for command and control, to gather intelligence and to distribute information among their sympathetic audience to stimulate self-radicalization. The Internet has fostered the rise of numerous loose and decentralized terrorist networks and enables terrorist groups to operate like decentralized franchises or freelancers. This revolutionary electronic medium enables the terrorists to operate as virtual transnational organizations and reach their audiences around the globe to maintain group identity, indoctrinate new members, and demonstrate its revolutionary ideology and principles. The Internet, as an uncensored medium, carries information regardless of its validity or potential impact. It allows even small groups to amplify their messages and exaggerate their importance and the threat they pose. The target audiences of radical Islamist terrorists can be divided into two groups: those who lie outside the ummah and those inside it.
The ummah

Ummah is an Arabic word used to describe the Muslim diaspora or “community of believers,” and thus the global community of Muslims. With regard to al-Qaida, this group can be segmented into insiders and outsiders. The outsiders include two groups: the sympathizers and the neutrals. They consist of the Muslims and converts who could be persuaded to become ummah insiders and follow up by becoming active al-Qaida terrorists. In the long run, major portions of this audience need to join the community of ummah insiders to realize the goal of a global, devout Islamic caliphate. This means the terrorists’ primary target audience is neither a minority of radicalized terrorists nor the public of the nations with Muslim minorities, but the vast majority of the Muslim public and potential converts. Terrorists do not possess a central recruiting organization, so their main channels for reaching this vast audience consist of face-to-face methods such as prayer, speeches, and sermons in mosques and madrasahs, or schools; the mass media; and, increasingly, the Internet. Especially for converts, the Internet plays a significant role. To stimulate transformation of Muslim and non-Muslim ummah outsiders to ummah insiders and jihadists, the terrorist network provides inspiration for homegrown self-radicalization. Social networks and local group dynamics, especially peer pressure, play a significant role in forging intimate emotional ties. Suffering identity crises, a majority of jihadists began as “unremarkable” individuals living ordinary lives, before they were “reborn” in their late teens and early twenties as ummah insiders. In one of several attempts to describe the process, the New York Police Department developed a compelling four-phased model in 2007 describing this multistep self-radicalization process:

1. PRE-RADICALIZATION PHASE
Receptive individuals initiate the first step, the so-called preradicalization phase. This step constitutes the period before radicalization in which the individual lives an ordinary life, not showing ambitions to become an ummah insider or to convert to Islam in the first place. In a two-year research project that investigated the difference between violent and nonviolent radicals, 58 in-depth profiles

of “homegrown” terrorists were analyzed. The study by Jamie Barlett et al. found that recruits usually have experienced some degree of societal exclusion and an identity crisis of sorts, hate Western foreign policy and are disconnected from their local community. This view is supported by Venhaus, who concluded that potential recruits have unfulfilled needs to define themselves. He divides them in four groups: revenge seekers needing an outlet for frustration, status seekers needing recognition, identity seekers needing a group to join and thrill seekers needing a sense of adventure. Al-Qaida presents itself as the best way to satisfy those needs.

2. SELF-IDENTIFICATION PHASE
Frequently, the occurrence of an unexpected event triggers the individual, if not already a Muslim, to convert to Islam, join the ummah and become an insider. Often, a crisis in a person’s political, social, personal or financial life shakes his certitude in previously held beliefs and catalyzes the individual to be “reborn” as an ummah insider. This occurrence marks the beginning of the self-identification phase. The jihad-Salafi ideology and derived communication messages provide simple answers to complex disputes. These messages resonate especially with certain politically naive Muslims and converts. In general, they have an inadequate understanding of their religion. That makes them vulnerable to misinterpretations of religious doctrines. The messages justify the use of violence against all

In Jakarta, a journalist viewing an Internet blog page points to the name of a person purportedly representing “al-Qaida Organization Indonesia,” which claimed responsibility for the July 17, 2009, bombings of the J.W. Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels in the center of the Indonesian capital.
kinds of kuffar. Stirring up a sense of moral outrage, al-Qaida propagates three key messages to receptive individuals that reverberate with personal experience in this phase:

• Individuals should withdraw from impure mainstream society and use violence to cleanse it.
• Jihad is the only way to resolve glaring problems of global injustice permanently.
• Muslims should be outraged about perceived attacks upon Islam.

After the individual self-radicalizes, he is now an ummah insider. Ummah insiders consist of two groups: the supporters and the followers. The supporters are committed Muslim radicals who provide operational, financial, administrative or potential “ultimate” support to the global al-Qaida movement as martyr. For this audience, the main communication channel is the Internet, with the mass broadcast media providing a secondary avenue. But reaching both elements of the ummah is crucially important to the jihadist movement. As Ayman al-Zawahiri stated in July 2004: “We are in a battle, and more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media ... We are in a media battle for the hearts and minds of our ummah.” Yet expanding the ummah is not sufficient. Al-Qaida needs indoctrinated terrorists to actively support its goals.

3. Indoctrination Phase
This development is followed by the indoctrination phase. Using strategic communication methods, ummah insiders are stimulated to be more receptive for jihad-Salafi messages and to seek information to reinforce their newfound spiritual commitment. At the same time, they are looking for like-minded ummah members to exchange beliefs and increase their commitment. Eager acolytes usually coalesce into autonomous cells in small like-minded groups (mini ummahs). These mini ummahs function as catalysts, creating a peer-pressured environment in which members compete to see who is the most radical. Converts seem to be the most zealous in trying to assert their new religious convictions. Within these mini ummahs, physically stimulating group activities such as soccer act as binding forces. This radicalization process makes little noise and is therefore hard to detect. At some point, many self-radicalized members contact a charismatic al-Qaida leader or radical Imam who functions as a communication channel, providing ideological background and moral justification.

4. Jihadization Phase
The final step is the jihadization phase, in which the ummah insider is indoctrinated to consider committing terrorist attacks and possibly sacrificing his life to prove the firmness of his beliefs by becoming a martyr. This phase is characterized by a readiness to perform as a terrorist.

The adversary outsiders
This audience includes apostate secular Muslim regimes, sometimes referred to as troublemakers, and all unbelievers: the so-called crusaders, Zionists, apostates, Jews and the West, of which the U.S. is considered the leader. These segments are further dissected into the “near enemy” (apostates, secular Muslim regimes) and the “far enemy” (Jews, non-Muslims and Western society). The preferred communication channel to reach these groups is the global mass media. The Internet plays a secondary role.

Findings and recommendations
It is certain that terrorists use strategic communication techniques, as this article has shown. They have defined their communication objectives, developed their communication tactics and established the media strategies necessary to reach these communication goals. Al-Qaida’s communication goals aim at legitimizing its methods, building its membership and intimidating its opponents. Terrorists customize their strategies based on thorough audience research and shape their messages and media choices accordingly, following the rules of any successful public relations campaign. Their skillful use of many forms of electronic media has enabled them to promote their message and continually win new adherents to their cause. Through strategic communication, al-Qaida inspires people, through homegrown radicalization, to become ummah insiders. Becoming an al-Qaida terrorist is a gradual, multistep process. It usually involves informal congregations and prayer groups in mosques, cafes, schools, prisons and the Internet.
groups in mosques, cafes, schools, prisons and the Internet. Eager acolytes often coalesce into autonomous mini ummahs. Their unremarkable record, background and appearance make it especially difficult for law enforcement agencies to expose a potential self-radicalized terrorist. There is no single psychological, sociological or ethnological profile. They usually do not match one distinct economic profile either. They often seem to be seeking adventure, esteem in the eyes of their peers, and a sense of brotherhood and purpose. Nevertheless, the overall recruiting process seems to be inefficient and its yield low. This information asymmetry must be further undermined to counter the threat of a growing radicalization of the Muslim community. This can best be accomplished by calling al-Qaida’s credibility into question. It is possible to counteract the three primary terrorist communication goals outlined in this essay: legitimization, propagation and intimidation. Next to eliminating the root causes and alleviating the underlying conditions, motivators and enablers of terrorism — for example, rooting out terrorists’ physical bases — developing an effective counterstrategic communication plan that exploits weaknesses and contradictions in al-Qaida’s message is a vital step in winning the asymmetrical conflict with terrorists. A successful counterstrategic communications plan must destroy the psychological appeal of the al-Qaida brand by destroying and displacing the feelings that attract young men. However, to reduce the likelihood of al-Qaida becoming the chosen path, options need to be presented that satisfy adolescent developmental needs. Being radical and rebelling against the received values of the status quo are important parts of being an adolescent. Ways must be found to ensure that young individuals can be radical, dissent and make a difference without serious or violent consequences. A good way to fight radical ideas is with a liberal attitude to dissent, radicalism and disagreement. Governments must focus on the things they can realistically change. However, the lead role rests with society at the local level. Individuals, groups, organizations and communities that understand and respond to these complexities at the individual level play a significant role. Radical ideas that do not break the law should be aired, but they should be debated and denounced. Governments, and more importantly independent Muslim voices, have to set out counter arguments as to why particular radical ideas are wrong. Local social workers, teachers and sports coaches with street credibility should play a central role.
Relatives and friends are usually more likely than authorities to know when an individual is radicalizing. But Jenkins warns there is an imminent danger of eroding the most effective barrier to radicalization: the cooperation of the community. If society concedes more power to the authorities to combat terrorism, it could discredit intelligence operations and provoke public anger.

The first phase in developing an effective countercommunication plan is research. The goal is to take a comprehensive look at all the variables that will have an impact. To attain a complete picture of the root causes driving the terrorists, it is crucial to research the causes at the individual, group, societal and governmental levels. Starting with political science, this research involves numerous additional academic fields such as computer science, comparative sociology and religion, psychology, and ethnology. Addressing the underlying root causes that facilitate self-radicalization, recruitment and support for terrorists is an elementary part of such an effort. Society must offer alternatives to appeal to those who seek revenge, status, identity or thrills and could fall for al-Qaida’s message. The fragmented strategic communications efforts in nations opposing the effective pervasiveness of al-Qaida need to be harmonized. To employ a strategic countercommunication plan successfully, it has to be woven into a comprehensive approach of coercive military and law enforcement measures and conciliatory political, diplomatic and socioeconomic measures. These measures and the countercommunication plan have to be synchronized at all levels of government (political, diplomatic, law enforcement, military and intelligence) and with our partners and allies in order to harmonize international efforts within a grand strategy. This grand strategy — a comprehensive approach as security philosophy — is an all-embracing approach and can be developed only within networked security structures based on a comprehensive international security rationale that effectively combines civilian and military. Data on terrorism research should be made public, as far as possible, and shared to reduce the “hidden knowledge” in disparate databases and disconnected researchers. We need to move from a “need to know” to a “need to share” mentality — that is, move away from risk aversion and information protection to more risk acceptance and information dissemination. By internationally democratizing data and integrating both qualitative and quantitative information utilizing different academic fields, we can dramatically increase our knowledge and bring greater empiricism to this research.

Al-Qaida’s capacity to carry out large-scale operations has been significantly degraded. Its financial and popular support is declining, and allied operations have killed or captured much of its leadership. The al-Qaida leadership has been reduced to making appeals for others to carry out small-scale attacks. Our society should not overreact to this terrorist phenomenon. As Jenkins puts it: Panic is the wrong message to send our terrorist foes. If David Rapoport’s four waves theory of international terrorism is applicable, the wave of recruits radicalizing in society might have passed its peak and is in decline. According to the Europol Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2010, the number of terrorist attacks in EU member states decreased 33 percent from 2008 to 2009 and has fallen by half since 2007.

The 14th-century ideology promoted by al-Qaida and the indifferent killing of innocent people, both Muslim and non-Muslim, hold little appeal for the majority of Muslims. According to Peter Waldmann, they have no wish to live under a repressive theocratic dictatorship in a new Islamic caliphate striving for global domination. If the terrorists’ effective strategic communication — and in particular their use of the Internet — can be curtailed by a countercommunication plan embedded in a grand international strategy, the basis of their favorable asymmetry can be eroded. If al-Qaida can be prevented from expanding the pool of ummah insiders and generating self-radicalized adolescents and young adults, finding new physical bases in safe havens or ungoverned areas, including those on the Internet, jihadism may ultimately prove to be yet another instance of fanatic ideology that eventually fades.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of the Marshall Center. Endnotes to this article were deleted to conserve space, but are available electronically by contacting the Per Concordiam editorial staff at editor@perconcordiam.org.
NARCOTICS & TERRORISM

LINKS BETWEEN DRUG TRAFFICKING AND VIOLENCE ARE PLENTIFUL AND INTRICATE
The Taliban is making some $100 million a year from drugs in Afghanistan while waging a war against the Afghans and their coalition partners. Afghanistan provides a new case in an old pattern: Insurgency and terrorism often go together with drug production and trafficking.

This nexus is not new but has been common in certain conflict zones. Also, the linkage is not universal: Many terrorists neither use nor deal in drugs. Some are quite puritanical; others have very different vices. This should be kept in mind because once a month, it seems, a commentator declares that the nexus between crime and terrorism is “growing” or “strengthening.” Most offer no evidence of growth or even attempt an argument about growth. Perhaps the problem is not new, but new to them.

What is demonstrable is that the nexus is real, and really important. These two phenomena — drugs and terrorism — have been responsible for wrecking certain societies and the emotional and physical laceration of many others. Peru’s drug-fueled insurgency of the 1980s cost that country 30,000 dead and perhaps $25 billion in damage. In Turkey, in the late 1970s and the early 1980s, the combination of drugs, smuggled weapons and terrorist groups of right and left caused regimes to fall — not just totter, but fall. The military twice staged coups d’état, although each time the military established order and backed out, returning political authority to civilian hands.

**CONTEMPORARY HISTORY**

At Turkey’s Ankara University in April 1984, academics and security experts addressed a conference on “International Terrorism and the Drug Connection.” A transcript of the proceedings was released with a colorful cover showing a bloody red liquid emitting from an icy gray handgun. The gun barrel was a hypodermic tube with a protruding needle. It was a catchy and garish way to connect the two phenomena of drugs and terror. But the academics’ papers made apparent some important developments: In 1984, there were international connections between terrorist groups and their sponsors. The connections included exchanging trading expertise, selling guns and dealing in drugs in some cases. What most concerned Turks on the panels was the evidence of drug dealing by Armenians and the prospective links of this to terrorism by Armenian organizations — a few witnesses mentioned the Justice Commandos, and many focused on ASALA, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia.

This conference in Ankara coincided with other indicators of a terrorism-drugs nexus, such as research and reporting by Rand Corporation’s Paul Henze, Turkish journalist Ugur Mumcu, Nathan Adams and others. Some described the narcotics business as a calculated part of the “strategy of tension” employed by certain state sponsors of terrorism against NATO states, especially Turkey. But of course, moneymaking was also a prime motive. In the early 1980s, evidence was building that the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or the FARC, was involved in narcotrafficking. And Italian arrests in 1984 yielded heroin and more than 30 Tamils, many part of a Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, or LTTE, network selling drugs worldwide. Swiss authorities began talking of “The Tamil Connection” to heroin trafficking, and a Canadian think tank began tracking this relationship between drug runners and international terrorists out of Sri Lanka.

**TERRORISTS’ ROLES IN NARCOTICS**

Consider the roles, actual and potential, in the nexus between terrorists and narcotics.

*Growing:* This is unusual, but some terrorists may grow illicit crops.

*Taxation* of growers: This is commonplace for drugs that are cultivated rather than manufactured. It brings insurgents and terrorist’s much money.

*Organization of growers, as in union making:* This has been done by the Sendero Luminoso, or Shining Path, group in Peru. Such methods underscore the control that insurgent “shadow governments” may have over a region’s farmers. Thus, the activity is political as well as financial.

*Refinement of cocaine or heroin:* There is evidence against the Taliban, and perhaps the FARC and Hezbollah, for refining product from base.

*Trafficking:* Here the evidence is clear; some terrorist groups have used their underground networks to move narcotics, which is lucrative. Examples include the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, and the Tamil Tigers.

*Taxing the traffickers:* This is common and the basis for FARC power over Colombians. This has been a staple of Sendero Luminoso’s control over certain
Peruvian traffickers — as when the known price for letting a small plane full of coca powder or paste fly away was 3,000 to 10,000 British pounds ($4,600 to $15,500).

Certain states — sovereign political entities with serious duties and membership in international organizations, but also liaisons to terrorist groups — have sometimes aided narcotrafficking by those terrorists. In such arrangements, the normal congruence of wielding power and protecting stability is in part set aside, and a capital (a government) deals directly with revolutionary terrorists financing political subversion elsewhere. On occasion, deal-making ensures that the transnational terrorists only attack elsewhere — which helps the patron state assure its own security. These narcotics linkages have been, in some cases, important to terrorists’ success and profiteering. The state gains by a powerful infusion of hard currency.

The Bulgarian communist government had several roles in helping certain narco-mafia figures and terrorists. Damascus, Syria, and its state architecture facilitated and benefited from narcotrafficking in Lebanon, parts of which it occupied for a quarter century; this may be less true now given Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon. Cuba’s work with the Colombian terrorist group M-19 began in 1979 and continued for a number of years with that and other sub-state actors, garnering the Castro regime as much as $200 million a year for a time, according to British journalist James Adams in 1986. And there is a massive evidence of illegal North Korean behavior. Pyongyang today manufactures and markets methamphetamine through a state agency called Bureau 39, which has offices near the party headquarters in the North Korean capital.

All four of these states — communist Bulgaria, Syria, Cuba, North Korea — also have been on the list of terrorism sponsors maintained by the United States, and with good reason. The authority with which states may protect trafficking, and the agencies of state that may facilitate it — diplomatic pouches, protections against search or seizure for official travelers, legitimate documents of transit, embassy storerooms — are of immense advantage in the black business of drug dealing. For a state to support such trade is akin to that state’s support for foreign terrorism. It is a high-risk strategy, but one with many potential payoffs.

LEVELS OF ENGAGEMENT

Considering levels of terrorist engagement in this illicit business, one might perceive four categories, beginning with no clear evidence of operational linkages up to a level where drugs are the main source benefitting the sub-state actor.

**Level One: no convincing connection**

Omitting the odd report, or occasional and minor purchase or sale, one may argue that there is no serious organizational connection to the drug business for many named terrorist groups. The newest research on the life of the Baader-Meinhof Gang, or Red Army Faction, makes it evident that members used drugs at times, especially hashish. But the organization made its money in other ways, such as bank robberies. It did not traffic. It was the same in Greece with its 17 November terrorist organization, which carried on for three decades, mainly in Athens. U.S. white power organizations also normally lack connection to drug profits — a characteristic only underscored by the fascination some white supremacists have shown in the killing power of ricin and chemical weapons. The Order and Aryan Nations was prosecuted for many kinds of crimes but not drug dealing.

**Level Two: one of many sources**

Drugs have been one of multiple money sources for terrorist groups of modern times. The LTTE trafficked during its 35-year lifespan. The group developed worldwide networks for logistics and was intimately connected within the global Tamil diaspora. LTTE even managed a shipping business. Its logistics genius, known as KP for Kumaran Pathmanathan, was finally caught in Malaysia in 2009, months after most other Tiger leaders were killed or captured within Sri Lanka by an effective armed forces offensive. Among the many charges he is likely to face now are those of worldwide smuggling.

Elements of the Palestine Liberation Organization, or PLO, have trafficked, buying weapons with money they made selling drugs and, on occasion, swapping the drugs for guns directly. When Yasser Arafat died in 2004, he and his organization were very wealthy. Arafat’s life was a testament to his skills at managing the influx of foreign money. The PLO had many sources, especially private donations and government gifts. Its company, SAMED, proved the utility of legitimate business: It made candy, furniture and many other things. But the same company, with its regional reach, agents and vessels, could move drugs, and some experts report that it did. PLO members did deal at times in hashish, opium, heroin and even cocaine. The evidence includes arrests by British and Australian authorities in 1984 and 1985 for hashish trafficking on a large scale.

The list of organizations enjoying narco profits as one of many funding sources is broad and includes ASALA; Hezbollah; Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, or ETA; the Ulster Freedom Fighters; some Irish “Republicans”; Abu Sayyaf; and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, or IMU. Aum Shinrikyo is not included; studies of this Japanese political cult responsible for the Tokyo sarin attacks indicate manufacture of a range of drugs, but these were for internal use, not commercial sale.

**Level Three: a main source**

The narcotics business has been a steady and major source of funding for many violent political groups in contemporary times. In the early 1970s there were the German anarchists of Michael “Bommi” Baumann’s band who chose the name “Rambling Hashish Rebels.” Their slogans included “If you put down the needle, replace it with a gun in your hand.” Wielding club, bomb, gun and needle, they supported themselves by selling drugs. But such clowns fade quickly in politics, and they cannot run a careful underground. Their effect was...
negligible compared with the terrorist impact of the Red Army Faction. Larger and more serious groups that organized and systematized narcotics dealing to pay operating expenses have included Colombia’s M-19 and National Liberation Army, or ELN, PKK, Sendero Luminoso and, according to Interpol, the Kosovo Liberation Army.

**Level Four: the main source**

The al-Qaida allies that staged the Casablanca attack of 2003 and the 2004 Madrid train bombings were funded by drugs, especially hashish out of Morocco. The Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group and others arranging devastation in Madrid made hundreds of thousands of euros in the hashish trade. Incredibly, when the cells’ possessions were accessed after the attack, they were found to contain no less than 1.3 million euros’ worth of drugs.

At least three much larger groups have flourished directly via the drug business: the Taliban, the FARC, and the United Self-Defense Forces, or AUC, which are militias reacting to the FARC. The two Colombian organizations are remarkable mirrors of each other in this commercial respect. Both begin with high political aspirations — the FARC to revolutionize society on Fidel Castro’s model and the AUC militias to preserve their country from the Castroites. The FARC has flourished for four and a half decades now, and its main money source is cocaine. As long ago as 1986, a devastating indictment of this business was laid out in print by Adams, the British journalist. Twenty years later, Jane’s intelligence consortium published research finding the FARC’s income from drugs alone to be as much as $600 million annually — a stupefying figure. Even the more common lower estimates are still stupefying.

Enter AUC. Founded by Carlos Castaño about 1997, it protected peasants and townspeople against the abuses of the leftist guerrillas. But for financing, AUC fell into trading locally produced drugs. Castaño is now presumed dead, but his published autobiography admits that 70 percent of the AUC’s income was from drugs. The irony is immense: A self-defense militia that begins in opposition to the FARC and ELN and their drug-fueled terrorism ended up in narcotrafficking and terrorism. Soon the U.S. Department of State issued a formal condemnation of the AUC militias.

There is no “level five.” That is, there is no known terrorist group that derives all of its funding from the business of drugs.

The FARC may make hundreds of millions each year, especially in cocaine, but it also makes much money by extortion of cattle ranchers and mines, bribes paid by oil pipeline companies for their security, highway robbery and kidnapping. The Kosovo Liberation Army is derided for its trafficking, but one new book examining these regional insurgents-turned-state-army claims to document broad and successful efforts at honest fundraising among donors and diaspora members in the United States, Canada and Switzerland. Terrorist groups always have more than one source of income.

**COMMUNIST BULGARIA AND ITS SUB-STATE PARTNERS**

Circa 1981, Bulgaria’s roles in the nexus of drug crime and violent sub-state actors included facilitating the smuggling of narcotics, especially from the Middle East into Western Europe and, to a lesser degree, making narcotics for illicit
sales to the West. It also facilitated other forms of contraband — including weapons, electronics and cigarettes — usually shipped from Europe into the Middle East. On the terrorism side of the ledger, Bulgaria ran a campaign with Syria to destabilize Turkey and ruin it with political violence and narcotics because Turkey was not merely a neighbor of Bulgaria but its rival and NATO enemy. Finally, the country hosted and, as necessary, moved key personnel in the international terrorist network — usually persons of the extreme left, but on occasion of the right — anything to advance the anarchy in a neighboring state.

A generation ago, documents smuggled into Greece from Bulgaria by a defector pointed to a decision made in Moscow, and another made in Sofia, to facilitate the narcotics business by creating the import-export firm Kintex. Bulgaria’s Council of Ministers created this entity by decrees of 1966 and 1967. Its bureaucratic home was in the Foreign Trade Ministry, and State Security helped staff the enterprise. Key to this commerce was the trucking firm TIR, which freely moved goods, including contraband such as weapons and narcotics, across international borders in sealed cargo spaces rarely subject to inspection. About 25,000 trucks owned by TIR crossed Bulgarian and Yugoslav borders every year. Bulgaria’s government-owned Balkan Airlines was also useful for moving personnel and illicit goods. A bold new book that explores archival research by two Bulgarians says that much of the contraband landed at Sofia airport — before being dispersed outward by many different means, including sea routes via Varna and Burgas, Bulgaria.

Although the controlling officials of Kintex were Bulgarians, they worked with smugglers who were usually not Bulgarians. These foreigners sheltered in spots such as Hotel Vitosha in Sofia. They were allowed to move about freely, conduct business without papers or with false ones, come and go among the West, East and Middle East as they pleased. They made great amounts of money, and by two accounts, the take by Bulgaria was 10 percent.

An insider described how authorities “smoothed the way” for illegal materials reaching Turkey. “You had to have a place to store your goods near Turkey before smuggling them into the country, and Bulgaria provided the ideal location. The Bulgarians helped us in return for 10 percent of the cargo’s value in hard currency. It was worth it because they not only provided storage facilities but many services, even sending gunboats to escort our ships out of Bulgarian waters and rescue vessels to bring them back if they ran into rough weather.”

The drugs that this network of state and sub-state agents were moving included Middle Eastern hashish and marijuana. There is limited evidence that morphine base was made in Bulgaria from imported opium; that Kintex moved heroin and helped make it for sale in Europe; and that some customers of Kintex used heroin as currency to pay for contraband. The terrorist movements this network helped and armed were frequently Turkish — Turks on the left and right. The damage was such that by 1980, a Turk somewhere in the republic was dying from political violence more than once every hour — 28 a day. Other Kintex beneficiaries included PLO elements and Armenians who were killing frequently in Europe and the United States.

All this came under Western scrutiny after a mysterious Turk, Mehmet Ali Agca, under handlers from Bulgaria, appeared in St. Peter’s Square in Rome on May 13, 1981. Pope John Paul II, perhaps the greatest living threat to the Soviet bloc, was making a scheduled public appearance. Agca shot him repeatedly. After capture, he admitted Bulgarian Embassy links; in his pocket were some of the embassy phone numbers. One of the handlers was photographed near the pope in the square that day.

Italian authorities did not doubt the source of their grief. In 1981, Rome expelled 26 foreign nationals, including Bulgarians, all linked to terrorism in Italy. The next year, 100 more people were arrested during a northern Italian
investigation into Bulgarian arms and drugs smuggling. In 1984, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, or DEA, declared: “In virtually every report available to DEA since 1970 containing information on trafficking in and through Bulgaria, the state trading organization Kintex is mentioned as a facilitator of transactions. In turn, sources consistently state that top-ranking members of the Bulgarian intelligence service and/or former heads of Bulgarian ministries comprise the directorate of Kintex.”

THE SHINING PATH
Sendero Luminoso is a revolutionary Maoist organization that disdains all state connections while aspiring to become a state. It was founded in Peru after 1970 by Abimael Guzman, an admirer of China’s “Gang of Four” authorities. Sendero began with political work and organization, very quietly, for a decade. In 1980, Sendero’s emergence into overt violence coincided with the movement of its first militants into the Upper Huallaga Valley, already a coca-growing region.

Coca culture was a part of Peruvian life. The revolutionaries were seeking the money in it, and they made great sums, as did others enjoying the export boom. By the estimate of two experts, Tom Marks and David Scott Palmer, Shining Path’s income totaled $10 million a year in the late 1980s. British authority Simon Strong pegged its take at more than twice that, only for drugs.

By degrees, in different times and places, the Sendero rebels played varied roles in the narcotics trade. A few initial militants were growers, which would have been unimaginable without their totalitarian organization’s clearance. Sendero guerrillas also protected growers, at least in some times and places. In a third role, ideological militants “taxed” growers. Sendero militants were often union organizers; they organized small growers and got them collectivized as bargainers, able to demand higher leaf prices from traffickers who bought this agricultural product. In a few places, the revolutionaries controlled land on which there were refining laboratories. They had a major role in taxing the traffickers, the “black businessmen” linked to the outside, consumers in the United States, Europe and elsewhere. This happened on the ground, and it happened systematically at covert airstrips where pilots landed to fly the leaf or paste away — usually to Colombia — for processing. Finally, Sendero murdered many government employees — and harassed others — charged with coca eradication or with creative economic aid projects that would improve peasants’ lives, such as the Upper Huallaga Area Development Project. Ruthless attacks nearly caused its collapse in the late 1980s. Sendero personnel have no role as drug users. They speak out against consumption and have no demonstrable problem in their rank and file with consumption of drugs. This is all about business, with the users living outside Peru.

Sendero is today a shadow of its old self, but the coca-guerrilla link still exists. Thirteen Peruvian troops died in two grenade and dynamite attacks by Sendero guerrillas in April 2009 in Ayacucho province, and their presence there is tied to the local drugs trade. There was a major arrest of a Sendero principal in August 2009 — some news accounts tie him to the coca trade.

The growing of coca plants by peasants has survived many government efforts: manpower-intensive eradication, gas-powered cutting tools, herbicides and U.S.-aided crop-substitution programs. Coca also survived one of the more effective anti-insurgent tools: peasant militias. Rondas, or self-defense militias, traditional in the Peruvian outback, formed in many additional places during the late 1980s and early 1990s, sometimes with government leadership but often without. Militias were a smart way to oppose communist insurgents: They marshaled the energies and drew upon the self-interests of farmers and other local residents — defense is chosen instead of imposed by the central government. But as militias formed and succeeded against Sendero, some took financing from the coca trade. As in Colombia with AUC, a fine counter-revolutionary concept was abused.
HEZBOLLAH

Hezbollah began in Lebanon in 1982 as a movement of “the dispossessed” but became wealthy and powerful. Hezbollah calls itself “The Party of God,” but not all that its members do is pious. Their organization, involved in the drug business, makes a third case study of distinctive character — a religious movement with real political power at sub-state and state levels. The group arose in territory with a reputation for narcotics cultivation and export. The Bekaa Valley’s marijuana and hashish were prized exports. And then opium growing came to Bekaa, just about the time Hezbollah began. Most Lebanese armed groups, including Hezbollah and Syrian troops there in occupation after 1975, furthered, protected and profited from trade in hashish, opium and opium’s derivative heroin. Some in the country were also refining opium raised in Asia, or coca imported from Latin America, so there were many laboratories, not merely growing fields, in Lebanon. Heroin is, of course, less bulky and more valuable by far than poppy or any other plant.

Today Hezbollah may manufacture — as well as help export — drugs, some created in labs, some grown in Lebanon’s fields. A criminal case in Israel shows Hezbollah members offering money, hashish and heroin to buy classified information from Israeli Arabs — one of many examples of sub-state actors using drugs for barter.

Americans might be surprised to learn that the DEA has reported pseudoephedrine smuggling (in a domestic case) linked to Hezbollah and Hamas. That chemical is an ingredient in “speed” — methamphetamine — a plague in some American Midwestern states. Several DEA and FBI investigations have led to the Middle East and to Hezbollah and Hamas bank accounts. “A significant portion” of the sales helps Middle East terrorism, according to past DEA chief Asa Hutchinson.

Hezbollah was found, in one case, to deal in stolen American autos. Another drama starring the group featured almost $8 million in cigarettes, transferred within the U.S. to take advantage of differences in state sales taxes. Hezbollah’s curious profile in the Western Hemisphere grew in 2008 with a New York federal court indictment of an international arms dealer. Based in Honduras, this man offered Hezbollah weapons hidden in Mexico to the Colombian FARC — one of the world’s best-known narcotrafficking groups. On offer were plastic explosives, surface-to-air missiles, rocket-propelled grenades and military rifles stolen from Iraq. Payment was to be in cocaine powder — nearly a ton of it. The conspiracy was interrupted. But the U.S. v. Jamal Yousef case shows that international terrorists, not just local drug traffickers, are active in Mexico. Nor may one forget this federal case’s indicators of direct links between Hezbollah and the FARC.

The year 2008 saw a separate conspiracy involving several dozen arrests, drug trafficking and money laundering. The ring had connections to both Lebanese Hezbollah and the FARC. Clearly, ideology and culture do not bar partnerships in the drugs-for-guns trade. There is at least one previous such case with Hezbollah, noted in 2005 U.S. congressional testimony.

Drawing attention to Latin America are Lebanese Shia who settled there during and after the Lebanese civil wars. Some are now on Margarita Island, Venezuela, now known for smuggling and narcotics deals as well as political activism for Hezbollah. Matthew Levitt, an analyst with a long background in specialized government work and the think tank world, has been tracking the emerging terrorist connections to this coastal zone. He reports finding political propaganda, smuggling, “dirty” travel agencies, one link to a Hezbollah money-raising cell in North Carolina, and a Venezuelan diplomat with former postings in Damascus and Beirut who counsels Hezbollah activists on raising money in Latin America. Collaboration between Latin America and the Levant moves not only money but

AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE

Colombian police display some of the 757 sticks of dynamite confiscated in late 2009 from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. Cocaine is a major source of financing for the insurgents.
also trainees for courses in Iran — Hezbollah’s primary sponsor and a state that just happens to be making major and successful incursions into Latin America.

Other Lebanese Shia settled into the now infamous Tri-Border area, an archetypal “gray area,” or ungoverned zone. This region — where Paraguay, Brazil and Argentina touch — has for 15 years been a favored destination of journalists and others studying gray and black markets, including drug trafficking. Bombings of Jewish and Israeli targets in Argentina in 1992 and 1994 spurred these inquiries, which discovered links to Hezbollah and its patron, Iran, and yielded criminal indictments of some Iranian officials.

Estimates of any underground group’s take in narcotics and illicit business are difficult. A controversial criminologist, Rachel Ehrenfeld, estimates that Hezbollah drug trading generates tens of millions of dollars in profits each year. Levitt believes some $10 million is raised each year in the Tri-Border area alone by Hezbollah, for all types of dealings, drugs and other commodities. One can at least be sure that, after gifts from Iran, smuggling is the second source of income for Hezbollah. The growing literature on terrorist financing makes it apparent that this smuggling includes masses of drugs and brings The Party of God into regular contact with international criminal organizations.

SEVEN LESSONS
The case studies of Bulgaria, Sendero terrorists in Peru and Hezbollah’s global diaspora — when combined with analysis of Colombian armed groups, the Taliban in Afghanistan and much other evidence — tend toward seven general conclusions:

* Narcoterrorism — and that precise name for the problem emerged in the mid-1980s — is a global problem. Absent evidence, one should not repeat the common assertion that it is a “growing” problem. Nor should one conclude too quickly that narcotrafficking groups “are no longer political” because of deep involvement in such crime. It is common for sub-state political entities also to be deeply engaged in crime. Setting aside those two unproven generalizations, what is clear? It is clear that the drug business is very significant for many of today’s terrorist groups and that narcoterrorism is a serious transnational problem.

* Terror groups rarely protect their “political purity,” and organized crime groups may be eager for partners. Despite the immense differences these two sides have, including politics, they come together at points: living in the underground; relying upon similar criminal behaviors; hiring or recruiting skilled white-collar experts in accounting and law; requiring good international connections; and mastering access to money. Sometimes they share reasons for attacking the extant government.

* The fact that a group deals in drugs is no predictor of its role in that business. The more one looks at three decades of evidence, the more variety one notices in the roles such groups had or play now.

* Because drugs are valuable, and some are highly portable, drugs can be currency, not only a commodity. Trafficker Jamal Yousef — the alleged Hezbollah member in the 2009 indictment — expected a mass of cocaine powder in exchange for weapons. Bulgaria’s Kintex occasionally did such deals. Salvadoran guerrillas training in Cuba sometimes paid their fare with drugs produced in Latin America. In at least one case, the Basque ETA contracted with the Genovese clan of the Italian Camorra mafia to pay with drugs for missile launchers and ammunition.

* No terrorist group has only one source of funding. They tend to favor diversity in money sources, perhaps as it offers independence from donors. The PLO used to get handsome checks from Soviet bloc countries, but it had just as many noncommunist donors and much real business on the side. Only one small part was dealing drugs from Lebanon. Today, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad group and Hezbollah each take millions in currency from Tehran annually, but they are also in the drug trade. This is one of many reasons it is unlikely that some “strangle” a terrorist organization by attacking the drugs nexus.

* A large number of violent political movements have dealt in drugs, at least sometimes. Nearly half of the better-known transnational groups have links to the business. For example, thousands of average Americans favoring certain political ideals of the Irish Republican Army Provos are unaware that the organization has, from time to time, been in the drug trade. This is credibly reported — although the Provos’ more usual sources are gaming tables, social clubs, diaspora donations, extortion, robbery and fraud.

* States — not only anti-state terrorists — may deal in drugs. Their large and elaborate networks, offices, resources and international connections make them potent players in such markets. Older communist states such as Cuba, Nicaragua and Bulgaria previously engaged in such trade. Syria has been in the business. North Korea is a leader in this narrow dimension of the black commercial world; innumerable diplomats, businessmen and state assets have been seized in trafficking scandals. Japan and Russia, especially, have seen their citizens targeted in this kind of moneymaking effort by Pyongyang. And we note a coincidence between lists of state sponsors of terrorism and states known to facilitate, or engage for profit in, narcotics trafficking.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of the Marshall Center. Endnotes to this article were omitted to conserve space, but are available electronically by contacting the per Concordiam editorial staff at editor@perconcordiam.org
The “war on terrorism” proves to be constantly changing, and every emerging terrorist action demands new techniques to counter it. Suicide terrorism has received a great deal of attention from scholars and analysts during the past decade, although terrorism is nothing new per se. The dramatically increased frequency and lethality of such incidents in the post-9/11 era have led academics and practitioners in a plethora of disciplines to try to identify what motivates, sustains and spreads terrorism.
What about “suicide terrorism”?  
Numbers usually tell the truth, and the global records are indicative: Suicide bombings represent a minority of the overall terrorist attacks but cause the majority of human casualties related to terrorism. Between 2000 and 2004 (Atran 2006, 127) nearly 7,000 people lost their lives in 472 suicide attacks in 22 countries; even more were wounded. These numbers become even more impressive when taking into account that almost 85 percent of the incidents during the past 25 years took place between 2004 and 2008 (Wright 2008), while attacks increased to unprecedented numbers. The reduced number of suicide attacks recorded globally in 2008 — 469 attacks, compared with 608 in 2007 — is mostly ascribed to a declining number of incidents in Iraq. On the other hand, there has been a remarkable increase in the number of countries where suicide attacks are perpetrated (Merari et al. 2010a, 89). Additionally, in the period from 1981 to 2008, only a few of the 2,937 suicide bombers around the globe acted individually and were not sent by organized groups (Merari et al. 2010b, 103).

Hoffman (2006, 132-133) and Speckhard (2006, 3) stressed the tactical advantages that make suicide bombing the preferred method of attack. The combination of high success in urban areas, inexpensive preparation and simple execution result in the creation of the “smart human bomb.” The cost is $150 and a person willing to die to create the “poor insurgent’s F-16.” The brutal outcome incorporates agility and flexibility to maximize the lethality of the detonation, resulting in an extreme sense of horror and intimidation in the targeted society. The perpetrator needs no escape plan because his death is a precondition for the operation’s success. This is a guarantee that there is no chance the bomber will be arrested and interrogated afterward. It also prevents authorities from tracking bombers back to their hideouts. These traits lead to the theory that suicide bombing could be considered a military innovation (Horowitz 201, 39). Media coverage of the incident is a “force multiplier” for the psychological impact on the local society. The global attention shows the strategic psychological impact of the suicide bomb.

How can we stop these atrocious tactics when military means are insufficient? How could we deter or even dissuade those willing to die as pious martyrs, given that the global strategy against them appears to be futile? The first step is to learn about and understand these “human bombs.”

Religious or social motivation?  
In detailed research from all the recorded suicide attacks worldwide between 1985 and 2001, Pape (2003, 345) said suicide terrorism is “the threat of punishment to coerce a target government to change policy, especially to cause democratic states to withdraw forces from territory terrorists view as their homeland.” He claims that it stems from a broader strategy aimed at political goals. Terrorism is used as a tool in vulnerable and weak democratic countries sustained by foreign military occupation. Weak authoritarian states are not usually targeted because it’s difficult to organize such operations there. Recently, he expanded on his thesis (Pape 2008, 275), stating that suicide terrorism is usually the outcome of a foreign democratic power’s military occupation of a society with different religious views. When other means are not effective in forcing this power to withdraw, suicide terrorism is used. This terrorism is not always motivated by religious extremism but often by political objectives such as self-determination, counteraction to colonization, opposition to foreign interference in internal issues and exploitation of natural resources. He clarifies that “occupation” is a broad term, referring not only to the military forces’ physical presence but also to the interaction in political terms and to financial and ideological cooperation between governments, such as the cooperation between Saudi Arabia and the United States.

Piven (2007/2008, 734) argues that suicide terrorism “is considered a reasoned response to political injustice and humiliation.” He recognizes the role of religion not in initiating but in amplifying the motivation caused by the feeling of oppression. The combination of oppressive circumstances and indoctrination makes demonization of the opponent easier. This contributes to the construction of a foe even if he doesn’t already exist. In his “cosmic war” theory, Juergensmeyer (2008, 421) proposes that there are no innocent people, only representatives of a collective enemy. The primary enemy is the political or religious
entity that threatens the terrorist group, and the secondary enemy could be any individual or entity supporting the primary. One must remember that radical Muslims don’t see the ongoing war as a global campaign against terrorism but as a war against Islam (Esposito and Mogahed 2007, 29).

Hence, religion has a role to play by uniting Islamic populations under the common sacred values and political demands to fight for, but it’s not the major incentive for suicide terrorism. Muslims are “attached” to their moral and spiritual values (Esposito and Mogahed 2007, 37) rising from their religion. They regard these values as critical for their cultural and social survival and progress. We have to bear in mind that Islam (Ali and Post 2008, 626. Palazzi 2008, 52-58) strictly forbids haram (committing suicide). Islam became a tool in the hands of radical Muslims, who tried to transform it from a religion to a political ideology. They misinterpreted terms such as jihad and martyrdom, exploiting the piety and the psychology of their co-religionists, recruiting and inculcating them with the will to die to achieve political objectives.

According to the Quran, the defensive jihad and even the qittal are terms irrelevant to the ascribed translation. The real istihad, which means martyrdom and self-sacrifice in the name of Allah, is ideologically far from suicide (Dunn 2010, 18). The word is even further from the “holy war” that Osama bin Laden waged against the foreign occupiers, since it doesn’t refer to taking other people’s lives. Hereof we’ll search even deeper for the fundamental traits of suicide terrorism.

The social and behavioral factors
Iraq became a contemporary case study of suicide terrorism because of the almost daily suicide attacks. From the perspective of jihadists this war is a broader, global resistance against Western culture and democracy. A potential victory is as vital for al-Qaida as it is for the coalition forces and U.S. The same aspects prevail in the Palestinians’ conflict with Israel.

On both of these fronts, another social factor vital for suicide terrorism is indoctrination. In Palestine, children learn from kindergarten to accept shahids (martyrs) as heroes who defy death (Ali and Post 2008,
The martyrs are honored to be chosen for such a mission and fight inequity by punishing their enemies according to God’s will. Hence, they are named “self-chosen martyrs,” perceived as honored soldiers in a great war, offering their lives for the sake of the community and religion. Palestinian males grow up dreaming of being the next potential chosen one for the “honor of martyrdom” so their names will be perpetually remembered with social approval. When children are radically nurtured and brainwashed against a hated adversary (Piven 2007/2008, 740), and their psyche is programmed through the everyday terror, reprogramming is infeasible.

The media and Internet are critical multifunctional tools for suicide terrorism (Ali and Post 2008, 630). The exploitation of videos and various communication networks provides a perfect option for recruitment (Townsend 2007, 44). It is also a very effective tool for propaganda and interaction between social groups or individuals with common beliefs. Technology offers local insurgents the potential of manipulating a global audience and building a network for close connection between the country of origin and the country where immigrants from the country of origin live.

The Information Age is empowering terrorist groups seeking political legitimacy. The groups are trying to convince the local and global societies that they are fighters and insurgents, not terrorists. They are fighting against oppressive foreign occupation and their cause is just. On terrorist websites, immigrants see pictures and videos of “martyrs” dying for that cause and hear stories describing the pain, humiliation and catastrophe that relatives suffer. These images and sounds travel around the world, awakening sympathy and support. Support abroad grows even if the descendents of immigrants have never visited their homeland.

People are deeply influenced by the “martyrdom” of known or unknown people who blow themselves up to protest the political and unjust conditions in their country. This amplifies the moral obligation among immigrants to contribute to the struggle and aids recruitment. The sentimental, societal and religious attachment to the terrorist cause draws volunteers for self-sacrifice. The social structures of the areas mostly affected by the phenomenon of suicide terrorism are a derivative of nomadic culture (Shay 2007, 177). When their community is threatened, the feeling of obligation to participate is generated so as not to let down the rest of the tribe. This fosters the “self-motivation” mechanism of foreign fighters, who are determined to sacrifice even before they approach terrorist networks (Argo 2006, 3). This feeling stems mostly from images on television and reading about tribal members on the Internet or the news.

Living under the conditions in Palestine and Iraq, the inhabitants exhibit behavior strongly determined by despair, victimization, helplessness and lack of optimistic prospects for amelioration (Ali and Post 2008, 640). From these components, suicide bombing is a desperate message to the global audience, an awful reaction to the hopelessness of their lives. But what is important is that their actions intend to take the lives of others as well as their own, a fact that distinguishes suicide from murder (Townsend 2007, 41).

Amid other behavioral factors, we can’t disregard the “mimetic desire” among peers to express violence (Juergensmeyer 2008, 419). Inside their organization, the would-be bombers see each other as competitors, so mimesis is more plausible as motivation than aggression or religious symbols.

From the standpoint of religious diversity and cultural and regional factors, terrorism is a reaction stemming from revenge and the belief that this is a way to redeem lost honor (Ali and Post 2008, 643/ Townsend 2007, 40). Because a family member, a sibling or a close
friend has been killed or abused by opposing forces, the would-be suicide bomber is strongly inspired by vengeance. In other cases, such as when faith or social beliefs stigmatize rape victims and prevent them from getting married and having children, ignominy is a motive and the characteristic paradigm of purification through martyrdom. These kinds of traumas, combined with a sense of injustice, misery and humiliation, prompt aggressive reactions amplified through group psychology, influence, amity and interaction (Piven 2007/2008, 739). This individual process, interacting with group mentality and indoctrination, produces the suicide attacker (Townsend 2007, 43). Simultaneously, there exists a charismatic leader who exploits the despair and manipulates the vulnerability of these people to transform them into “human bombs.” Perceiving suicide bombers as “brainwashed pawns” or mentally disabled is a mistake. Their own will to die is the primary precondition for the existence of the phenomenon.

Female suicide bombers
The increased participation of women in suicide attacks can’t be disregarded. The number of incidents in Iraq rose from eight in 2007 (Ghosh 2008) to 29 by September 2008 (Peter 2008) and drew the attention of many analysts. The deadliest attack in Iraq in 2010 occurred on February 12, when a female suicide bomber detonated herself south of Baghdad, killing more than 40 Shiite women and children (Arraf 2010), all pilgrims. While other kinds of attacks decreased in Iraq, suicide bombings by women — harder to detect than male bombers — rose dramatically in 2009.

After more than 20 years of multiple female suicide bomber waves, terrorist groups have leveraged the tactical advantages of using women in terrorist attacks (Burton and Stewart 2007). They hide the explosives under the women’s idiomorphic clothing (burqa or niqab), making the women appear pregnant. There is a cultural resistance to searching women, who are generally considered nonviolent. Female suicide bombers can move through security without arousing suspicion and bypass security checkpoints to reach their target untraced. The final outcome receives even greater media attention and coverage, since the perpetrator is a woman, and this constitutes a force multiplier for the terrorist group.

The motivation of the women is similar to that of their male counterparts. Again, religion isn’t the principal motive (McGirk 2007), since eternal life with 72 virgins in paradise can’t be an incentive. All the social and behavioral factors that motivate males are valid in the case of “female smart bombs.” Women are more likely to be seeking revenge for a personal loss or trying to regain lost honor from being a rape victim (Bloom 2007, 95). This was apparently evident in the testimony of a woman named Samira Jassim, whom Iraqi officials arrested in 2010. In a videotaped confession, she told interrogators she had recruited more than 28 women to blow themselves up. She was part of a plot in which young women were raped and persuaded to become suicide bombers as their only escape from shame and to reclaim their honor (Arraf 2010).

It’s also notable that “converts” are considered to be among the most dangerous groups and the principal future resource pool for terrorist entities. That’s not only because most of them have European passports, making it easier for them to travel around. The potential need to prove that they are more pious than their co-religionists born into the faith makes them even more radical in belief and deed.

Opportunities in responding to suicide terrorism
We should focus on preventive measures to reduce the factors that affect suicidal terrorism in Europe, perpetrated mostly by homegrown Muslim extremists or converts (The Economist 2008). Europe absorbs attacks aimed at the West, although the U.S. is seen as the primary target. That generates an internal European counterterrorism effort, seen mostly as a law enforcement assignment in homeland defense, to deal with the “grass-root cells.” The potential formation of special links between organized crime and these cells is of even greater concern to European police agencies. On the other
hand, the United States’ counterterrorism effort is mostly an external “war on terrorism” that it fights using military means, something that can’t be done in Europe.

Another challenge is the cooperation of counterterrorism agencies at the national and multinational level. Intelligence and the free flow of information are keys to success. Even companies that provide materials for bomb building could collaborate by informing the proper agencies about clients ordering unusual quantities. We should operate in an information channel such as al-Qaida’s, where a simple call across a global network triggers a specific reaction.

As Whitelaw (2008) reveals, the Combating Terrorism Center in the U.S. recently released personnel records captured in Iraq containing the biographical and personal details of terrorist recruits. The records could be very helpful for intelligence agencies around the globe and the paradigm of countering suicide terrorism by prevention through intelligence. In a similar way, we could also track and disrupt the organizations that sponsor and finance terrorism.

The community involvement perspective offers a very interesting alternative (Gaylord 2008). Police officers who receive counterterrorism training could transfer their knowledge to groups of citizens, involving them in an early warning social system, a neighborhood watch program. On the one hand, it’s impossible for law enforcement agencies to be everywhere; on the other hand, it’s very easy for a resident to recognize something unusual where they live or work.

A similar initiative has been undertaken with the foundation of the Daughters of Iraq program, under the guidance of U.S. officials. The aim is to train female police officers to search suspicious women at security checkpoints. As O’Rourke (2008) said, the program does not seem to be very successful since, because of social restrictions, only 30 women offered to participate. The point is the suicide attackers target first the “occupation forces,” not their countrymen. The fact that religious entities have shifted their tactics to recruiting women for suicide attacks suggests that they’ll also develop new techniques to bypass security checkpoints.

Governmental cooperation should also be extended to religions. The role of Islam in
suicide terrorism has already been analyzed. The false image that the radical Muslims created, concerning the oppression of their religion by Christians, and the clash between the two, raised skepticism and mistrust between Arab countries and the West. Antagonism between Sunnis and Shiites has also created another clash, an internal and bloody struggle with a vast number of Muslim victims.

The development of a cooperative program to help the Muslim population of a country face the real dimension and destructive results of suicide terrorism is critical to changing Muslim support. Religions have a new role to play, this time an educational one. An initiative by Uzbekistan’s Tashkent Islamic University is an excellent model (Palazzi 2008, 58). One of its objectives is to train moderate religious scholars whose task will be to defuse religious fundamentalism and promote dialogue among all religions, including, of course, Muslims, Christians and Jews. This will help emphasize Islam’s moderate message and build mutual trust and a common front in condemning suicide terrorism.

The media and Internet are powerful instruments and psychological weapons in the hands of the terrorists, but they can also be effective in counterterrorism. We could handle the media reports on suicide attacks in two ways. First — through required guidelines from experts — by limiting the quantity of news dedicated to terrorist attacks. Second, by attempting to discredit and de-romanticize their use of suicide tactics. If we carefully monitor jihadist websites and infiltrate their Internet chat rooms, we’ll deny them the ability to reconfigure, survive and function as a global network. These actions could change the way some youths think. They could also change public opinion and recruitment, in broader terms. There are many indications that terrorist groups are facing difficulties in recruitment.

The fact that they are recruiting children is not only a brutal shift in tactics — using people who don’t raise suspicion — but it’s also a sign that they are short of human resources (Ghazi 2007).

We have to focus on the psyche of would-be bombers to send the message that there is hope for a better solution and a peaceful way to settle disputes instead of killing themselves along with dozens of innocent people. We need to broadcast anti-suicide and anti-terrorism messages, promoting all the reasons that someone has to live for not to die for. We have to fight the radical indoctrination by explaining the risks of terrorism and by proving that the “atrocious enemy” is human. This demands a very thorough understanding of the society to focus on, but also a well-prepared and applied public diplomacy. The objective isn’t to undermine their sacred values but to convince them that the colonization era is over and that Western culture’s vision isn’t to exploit their natural resources or political and religious oppression. The goal is to promote human rights and equality in economical, political, educational and social terms.

The fortification and use of advanced security measures to guard sensitive infrastructure isn’t enough to prevent suicide terrorism. NATO has to leverage “soft power” operations. Experts should study the plausible interactions between terrorism networks and organized crime. Educational programs for countering suicide terrorist ideologies should be considered in countries where migrants could be radicalized or influenced. These programs could extend into conflict zones through peacekeeping operations and reconstruction teams. Simultaneously, the West should minimize military action and apply a political and psychological strategy to thwart terrorist activities, adopting the “responsibility-to-protect” concept.

The future
The military offensive Israel launched on January 3, 2009, in Gaza has generated the next wave of Palestinian recruits, which will bring into effect the “third intifada.” The revival of once-dormant suicide attacks in Russia and the Caucasus contradicts Vladimir Putin’s official declaration of the end of the Chechen War in April 2009.
The failed suicide bombing attempt in December 2009 of a Nigerian on a Northwest Airlines plane en route to the U.S. fosters the perception of further evolution of suicide terrorism in terrorist groups’ operational planning.

Terrorist groups are not willing to disavow such an acute, effective and cheap strategic weapon. But they are searching for innovative technology that will be less costly to mujahdeen and martyrs. Bergman (2008) expects a new insurgent strategy to emerge in two to five years, planned by “a new breed of highly educated al-Qaida terrorist.” Her words seem to be accurate, since the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism warned that a nuclear or biological attack is likely to occur in a major city within the next five years.

Umar Hamza bin Laden, one of Osama bin Laden’s sons, was assigned to recruit children between the ages of 13 and 16 from West Africa, especially Mauritania. On December 3, 2009, a Somali suicide bomber from Denmark killed more than 22 people, including four government ministers, at a graduation ceremony in Mogadishu. In December 2009, five Americans (three of Pakistani, one of Egyptian and one of Yemeni descent) were arrested in Pakistan, suspected of links to terrorist groups. All this points to Africa’s growing involvement in terrorism but also to the significant attrition of recruits. The recruitment of foreign would-be bombers is critical.

Alas, suicide terrorists might develop even more brutal and atrocious tactics. Therefore, the international community must remain alert. In our versatile struggle against terrorism, we have to be ready and must realize that we can’t confront it solely through military means. Maybe the aerial bombings of cities, or dogmas such as “shock and awe,” are not proper responses to the more (or even less) violent terrorist tactics (Asad 2009, 20). We have to understand our enemy and deter and dissuade him from acting through radical violence. We have to exploit all means of soft power to thwart all aspects of terrorism. □
Strong EU economy promotes strong security
Greek economic crisis sparks international cooperation

Greece’s financial crisis, coming after the 2009 global downturn, has Europeans asking whether the economic system that has served them for decades is sturdy enough to carry them prosperously into the future. Greek fiscal mismanagement has raised questions not only about the sustainability of cradle-to-grave welfare states in which healthy adults can retire in their early 60s, but also about the very survival of the eurozone among a smorgasbord of nations with radically different ideas about debt and spending.

Europe is not the only part of the world running deficits, but its shrinking native population, absent brisk immigration, affords it less flexibility. Free-market economists argue that lavish domestic programs crowd out spending on international aid and military modernization and stymie economic growth that could create jobs.

So what’s the answer? European Union economists and political leaders are considering three fundamental reforms they hope will prevent future crises that threaten the EU’s health and stability. Facing opposition at every turn, none of the reforms will come easy:

• Revise the social contract in EU member states so that pensions, unemployment insurance and taxation don’t undermine the very economic vitality on which the EU depends. Sweden, for example, has partly privatized its national retirement system using a Chilean free-market model that provides higher returns with less government involvement.
• Increase regulation of a banking system blamed for nearly collapsing Western economies in 2008 and 2009. Proposals have included a new international tax on banks and demands that lenders across Europe hold larger reserves to act as cushions against bad loans.
• Create a European Monetary Fund that would mimic the International Monetary Fund’s bailout capabilities. The IMF makes emergency loans aimed at stabilizing nations in financial trouble. An EMF could do the same for EU member states, building upon the 750 billion euro stabilization fund the EU created in May to address the Greek crisis.

An elderly man feeds seagulls in downtown Stockholm. Sweden’s pension system is seen as a sound economic model for other nations to follow.
When it comes to imposing fiscal discipline, Europe might not have the luxury of choice. Through much of 2010, the IMF has warned that investors who have propped up Greece and other EU countries by buying its bonds are losing patience. In a global economy, that means cash might flee to emerging economies such as those in India, China and Brazil, where up-and-coming markets can offer higher returns on investment. The IMF, for example, predicts economic growth in the EU in 2010 will be less than half the average of the other advanced nations and only one-quarter the world average. What’s new — and troubling for the EU — is that investors may view non-European economies as lower risk.

“The world is still a dangerous place, and I don’t like that many people have in mind that the crisis is over, that everything is behind us, and we can go back to business as usual,” IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn said in April 2010 during the release of the organization’s twice-annual World Economic Outlook.

With aging populations and declining birthrates, many EU nations do not collect the taxes needed to finance government spending. Economists often single out Portugal, Spain and Italy in that regard. Greece is a good example of how such a debt crisis can potentially tie a nation’s hands militarily. Before the debt crisis, Greece made the largest contribution to Europe’s defense relative to the size of its economy, NATO reported in February 2009. The nation spent 2.8 percent of its gross domestic product on defense in 2008, the last year for which data is reliable. That was much higher than the 1.7 percent of GDP average defense budget for NATO’s other European members.

“European economies face a classic free-rider problem. Domestic fiscal profligacy — public spending beyond the nation’s willingness to pay — generates short-term domestic benefits but also long-term costs that are shifted to all other eurozone members. The Greeks pushed the envelope in playing this game to the detriment of its European partners,” the free-market think tank the Cato Institute said. “But other major European countries also face prospects of rising budget deficits because of their generous social insurance programs and aging populations. Thus, Spain, France, Germany, Portugal, Italy and other EU nations must also introduce fiscal consolidations — mainly spending reductions in pension, health, welfare and other government programs because European tax rates are already very high. Without such adjustments rising budget deficits would signal higher inflation risks and erode international credibility in the newly created euro as a secure currency.”

Some Europeans are turning to Sweden as a model. Once the poster child for socially conscious welfare states, Sweden has mandated semiprivate individual retirement accounts based on an unlikely model: a Latin American private pension system first developed in 1980 by former Chilean Labor Minister José Piñera. While the Swedish pension system still subsidizes the poor and protects older workers, the free-market reform is expected to save the nation’s 9.2 million people billions of euros, the Swedish government estimates. Greece could learn a lesson from its EU partner to the far north.
Because of higher life-expectancy rates, Greek retirees collect pensions for twice as many years as they did in the 1960s. A Greek worker can expect to spend more than a third of his adult life living off the largesse of his fellow taxpayers. Some Hellenic retirees earned more after retirement than when they worked, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development noted. Nevertheless, change won’t come easy. Greek government workers have strongly protested, even rioted, against suggestions by Prime Minister George Papandreou to raise the nation’s average retirement age from 61 to 63, cut salaries and trim the government work force.

The historic downturn has also drawn attention to rash lending by banks that helped collapse home prices in the United States and much of Europe, most notably on Spain’s Costa del Sol. For international and European banks that relied on mortgages for much of their profits, the housing plunge has driven many to the edge of ruin. Deutsche Bank, for example, reported losing billions of euros after U.S. and European housing loans defaulted.

According to some EU members and the IMF, obvious reforms involve regulations, binding on both sides of the Atlantic, to boost banks’ capital requirements. The goal is to maintain sufficient reserves should borrowers default en masse. The IMF has also suggested internationally binding banking taxes, a plan backed by German Chancellor Angela Merkel. If the tax is limited to just a few countries, IMF officials fear banks will move offshore to avoid paying the tax. Aside from a proposed flat levee, they said a second tax would be
scaled to the riskiness of a bank’s lending. The more secure deposits a bank held, for example, the smaller the tax burden.

Policymakers must tread carefully, the British Bankers’ Association cautioned. European bankers loath the tax idea and argue over what size cash reserves should be. They complain the tax could reduce profits by 15 to 20 percent, a reduction they could pass on to consumers through higher lending rates and fees. Unlike in the U.S., where companies can tap a large corporate bond market, European businesses finance expansions mostly through bank loans. So bank reform could raise the cost of doing business in Europe.

“The effect of such schemes is to hold up bank lending. This is because such levies cut into the profits of banks and prevent them restoring their reserves. This is at a time when politicians are screaming at the banks to do the reverse,” said Miles Saltiel of the Adam Smith Institute, a London-based free-market think tank.

The Greek debt crisis exposed a flaw in the European monetary system. The European Central Bank, focused on its main role of suppressing inflation, lacks bailout power comparable to that of the U.S. Federal Reserve. This situation led some experts to suggest the creation of a European Monetary Fund modeled on the International Monetary Fund. The IMF controls hundreds of billions of dollars donated by member states, money that acts as emergency cash to financially strapped nations.

Free-market economists such as those at the Adam Smith Institute have been critical of most IMF interventions and have extended that criticism to the EMF proposal. Leniency can lead to laxness, they say. By bailing out spendthrift countries, the organization encourages more such free-spending behavior in the future. What’s more, economists point to cases where IMF support failed to lead to sustained improvement in recipient nations’ economies.

Another hurdle: The Maastricht Treaty, the 1992 accord that established the euro as common currency, includes a “no bail-out” provision critics contend an EMF would violate. Still, economists such as Deutsche Bank’s Thomas Mayer believe a well-crafted EMF could provide the needed stability without the “moral hazard” that comes with bailing out irresponsible spenders. “Without such an institution, a country like Germany would always find itself in a ‘lose-lose’ situation if a country like Greece is on the brink of collapse,” Mayer said in a February 2010 report for the Centre for European Policy. “If Germany agrees to a rescue package, it puts its public finances at risk. If it does not, its financial institutions would bear the brunt of the considerable losses that would arise from a disorderly failure and the ensuing contagion.”

A growing number of EU leaders are recognizing that underperforming economies often struggle to find money to provide for common defense, let alone generate enough jobs. The Greek crisis is making that clear. Changing established practices, including the lavish endowment of pensions for the EU’s rapidly aging populations, will take years.

The European defense establishment also recognizes the danger. In March 2010, NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, a Dane, warned member states against solving their debt problems at the expense of needed military modernization. “The Lisbon Treaty provides the EU with a stronger defense and security policy dimension,” Rasmussen announced in April 2010. “But this will remain a paper tiger if it is not followed up by concrete military contributions when we need military contributions.”

Many EU nations promised in January 2010 to continue supporting global military missions such as the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. The London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies reported in February 2010 that EU military spending rose through 2008. But the institute warned of “drastic” NATO defense cuts starting in 2010 if the global, and Greek, economic woes continue.
Joining forces to rebuild Afghanistan
ISAF reconstruction teams are key to counterinsurgency strategy

From their headquarters on the road from Kabul to Kandahar, in the heart of Pashtun-dominated Afghanistan, more than 100 Turkish civilians plan a more prosperous future for a province whose industrial base consists of little more than a neglected marble quarry.
The Turkish Provincial Reconstruction Team, or PRT, works out of Wardak province. As part of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF, the team has rebuilt a mosque, opened a maternity clinic and trained scores of Afghan police officers. Turkish investment in this region west of Kabul has totaled more than $20 million.

But Turkey’s ambitions are larger. Enlisting farmers who scratch out a meager living growing apples, maize and wheat on the province’s rocky soil, the Turkish team has opened an experimental farm to grow saffron. The spice, made up of delicate flower filaments laboriously collected by hand, has earned the name “red gold” for its lofty price — $500 to $5,000 per pound, based on the quality.

In a country that naysayers complain breeds little but fratricidal strife and opium poppies, saffron would provide a model crop for Afghans struggling with subsistence. The Turks have also introduced fruit dryers and refrigeration to preserve apple crops for sale abroad.

The PRT operates under the NATO premise that greater economic security means greater confidence in Afghanistan’s central government. “Developing the agricultural sector will improve food security; increase agricultural productivity and rural employment; improve family incomes and well-being; reduce pressures on the poor to grow illicit crops; and increase the export of agricultural products in Afghanistan. Therefore, a vibrant and growing agriculture sector is essential to ensure that the benefits of economic development are spread throughout the country and reach the bulk of the Afghan population,” said Cüneyt Yavuzcan, the head of the Turkish PRT.

Decades of civil war and unrest have taken their toll on the infrastructure of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, and NATO and ISAF leaders have granted 27 PRTs a central role in rebuilding and stabilizing them. Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, Italians, Spaniards and other coalition partners run the PRTs, dubbed the “softer side of counterinsurgency.” They collaborate to restore services — and confidence in the Afghan government — to nearly 30 million people.

At the March 2010 conference held in Kabul, ISAF commanders assigned the PRTs a leading strategic role in the country for the subsequent 18 months. Mark Sedwill, the United Kingdom’s ambassador to Afghanistan, flagged the Rs’ the teams should highlight during their multimillion-dollar missions. “The first, regain: We need to regain the initiative against the insurgents. Secondly, we need to rebuild and reinforce Afghan government institutions, military and civil, so they may take responsibility for governing their country,” he said. “And lastly, resolving the political grievances that fueled the insurgency.”

Since going operational in 2003, PRTs have finished paving projects in regions with impassable roads; opened schools in a country with high illiteracy; supplied clean hospital beds to places where medical care is primitive and provided reliable water to an agricultural sector with endemic drought and flooding. The effort is truly transnational, enlisting people from more than a dozen countries, including many European nations.

Among more than 50 projects it has sponsored in Ghazni province, Poland has donated 40 new beds and X-ray machines to a hospital in the provincial capital. Polish Soldiers and civilians have refurbished a street market in the town of Sangemasha, built playgrounds, bought books for a local law library and taught classes on the importance of women’s rights in the staunchly traditional country. Ghazni is a critical province south of Kabul with more than 900,000 residents and a mixed population of mostly Pashtuns, the dominant ethnic group, and Hazaras, a minority group that descends from Mongols and largely practices Shia Islam.

More than 200 Hungarian troops and advisors, running their PRT since 2006 in Baghlan province on the slopes of the Hindu Kush Mountains, have set up a bakery for flatbread, carpet...
weaving centers and a brick factory. The Hungarians have budgeted about 2 million euros (about $2.6 million) a year to support and equip their team, money that also paid for 14 full university scholarships allowing Afghans to study abroad in Hungary.

Czech Soldiers and civilians operating out of Logar province, immediately south of Kabul, built or renovated 77 classrooms for an estimated 12,000 children. Two new schools in the Khushi district will teach girls exclusively. The Czechs have invested heavily in bringing reliable water to the province. The team dredged and repaired Surkhab Dam, a vital source of irrigation neglected for nearly half a century, and updated the region’s ancient system of underground water tunnels. “We are happy that the PRT operates here and that the Czechs are helping us,” said local school Principal Wahab Ahmadzai, referring to some of the 11,000 farmers benefitting from the Surkhab renovation. “Without water, our local farmers couldn’t grow anything.”

Some of the best-known PRTs operate in the provinces ringing the capital of Kabul. Insurgents in those Pashtun-heavy provinces remain a threat, even if those anti-coalition forces remain dormant in many cases. So it is no surprise that soldiers play a pivotal security role in the Polish, Hungarian and Czech teams, as they do for most of the teams.

On the other hand, Turkey opted to run its team with civilians, relying on its Muslim connections to win hearts and minds. Turkey’s secular democratic government — frequently cited as a model for the Islamic world — invited 10 Wardak judges and prosecutors to Ankara, the Turkish capital, for training in human rights and the rule of law, the Pajhwok Afghan News reported in April 2010. “The Turkish programs are very much receptive and acceptable to Afghans because they work within the Afghan culture. They are sensitive to Afghan values,” Halim Fedai, the governor of Wardak province, told Turkey’s Cihan News Service in November 2009.
How effective have the PRTs been? A 53-page study published in March 2009 by the Strategic Studies Institute concluded that while insurgent attacks have not declined in many Afghan provinces during the reign of the PRTs, the projects, by impressing the locals, helped depress the number of possible recruits. The institute determined that PRTs, with their military component, were the most secure way to accomplish the “build” part of the counterinsurgency’s “clear, hold and build” strategy. Though about 46 countries are directly part of the Afghan mission, PRTs allow some nations that are constitutionally reluctant to commit troops — most prominently Japan — to supply money for reconstruction. Japan, for example, funded Hungarian PRT projects in Baghlan such as carpentry and carpet weaving classes.

And success could breed success. In the spring of 2010, Turkey began establishing another civilian-led PRT in the Jowzjan province in the far north of the country, where Turkic-speaking Uzbeks and Turkmen represent more than three-quarters of the population. The Turks will work with a Swedish-Finnish PRT operating out of the neighboring province of Mazar-e-Sharif, beefing up the Afghan Security Forces and repairing infrastructure.

“The decision to establish the Jowzjan PRT … is based on the request and consent of the Afghan government,” the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced in April 2010. “The PRT will enable Turkey to further enhance her contributions to Afghanistan and to the friendly and brotherly Afghan people.”
The nations of Central Asia have been in a state of flux since the fall of the Soviet Union and have worked independently to prosper. But their inclusion into Western organizations that can benefit them economically and attract international investors depends on their ability to resolve human rights, freedom of the press and corruption issues. To maintain internal and regional stability, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan must work together to help resolve regional issues and join the international effort to fight terrorism and transnational crime. Just as critical: They must help the international community resolve the war in Afghanistan.

But regional issues and political unrest sometimes hinder progress. The nations in the area suffer from ongoing, and sometimes longstanding, disputes over a host of issues. As they continue to build their economic muscle, Central Asian nations must also find ways to deal with those problems. The European Union has a strategic plan to help those nations accomplish this important goal. The union is not alone, and has United Nations support. “The United Nations is ready to assist in holding a dialogue between leaders of Central Asian countries for solution of common problems of the region,” U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon said during a visit to Kyrgyzstan in April 2010, as reported by the nation’s 24.kg news agency. “They include deterioration of ecology, water resources utilization issues, toxic metal utilization, climate change and others. Mutual efforts are required for their solution.”

Regional leaders are stepping up cross-border dialogue. In March 2010, for example, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan agreed to discuss matters of mutual interest and to resolve their dispute over the building of hydroelectric power plants. After a long holdout, Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev agreed to endorse Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov’s bid to stop the building of hydroelectric plants in so-called upstream countries until feasibility studies are completed. “Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, being countries downstream of the Syr Darya and Amu Darya rivers, need such guarantees” offered by international feasibility studies, Nazarbayev told the official Kazakhstanskaya Pravda newspaper. In return, Karimov agreed to endorse Nazarbayev’s bid to host the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or OSCE, summit in 2010. Kazakhstan is leading the OSCE in 2010.

The Kazakh-Uzbek accord received international endorsement. The World Bank agreed to “underwrite the environmental feasibility [and safety] study for the Rogun Power Station on the Vakhsh River in Tajikistan, and to provide financial support for construction, depending on the study’s findings,” the online EurasiaNet newspaper reported in March 2010. “If studies prove that development plans could proceed without a detrimental impact on neighboring states, Astana and Tashkent would be willing to participate in construction,” Nazarbayev said.

Realizing that cooperation is the key to mutual prosperity, the nations — some outright regional rivals — are reaching out to each other to resolve common issues that will help them attain the regional security and stability that attract further international aid and investment. The Kazakhs realize their neighbors have key roles to play in the region, and none has as vital a role as the Uzbeks. “Uzbekistan is the most important strategic country in Central Asia,” a high-ranking Kazakh Foreign Ministry official told The Washington Times newspaper in April 2010.

However, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the region’s most economically stable nations, are still trying to resolve a long-standing border dispute. “The demarcation process is likely to drag on for an indefinite period of
time while frequent shooting incidents along the 2,300-kilometer border are poisoning relations within communities in border areas with a mixed population,” Marat Yermukanov wrote in the bi-weekly journal Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst. “Since 2001, border guard agencies have registered more than 20 border incidents in which local Uzbeks and Kazakhs were involved.”

Other disputes abound in the region. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are feuding over rail transportation between the two nations. All the Central Asian nations, not just Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, have unresolved conflicts over water and hydroelectric power. And the April 2010 unrest in Kyrgyzstan is proof that the corruption still affecting each of the nations threatens national and regional stability and security.

During its leadership of the OSCE, the world’s largest regional security organization, Kazakhstan hopes to implement changes that benefit the region and Europe. It wants to prove it is up to the task. Kanat Saudabayev, Kazakhstan’s secretary of state and foreign minister, hopes to accomplish two goals as head of the OSCE: lessen the drug trade through Kazakhstan to slow terrorist funding, and stabilize the region, particularly with regard to Afghanistan. The war in Afghanistan is a direct threat to regional stability in several ways. Northern migration by terrorists, refugees and drug traffickers — some who finance jihad — has brought the issue of instability into focus.

The Washington Times quoted Claude Salhani, editor of its affiliate Middle East Times, who said Kazakhstan hopes to convene a summit involving the 56 OSCE member nations and put Afghanistan on the OSCE agenda. “Many of those countries will want to offer nonmilitary assistance, such as helping the country establish a good education program, a working health care system and so on.”

Any agreement between neighbors such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, no matter how small, will help foster regional stability. The countries are putting into operation two accords they signed: the Economic Cooperation Program for 2006 to 2010 and the Economic Cooperation Strategy for 2007 to 2016. Both “outline prospective directions of bilateral cooperation in trade, water and energy complex, investments and finance, transport and communications, and customs and innovations,” Uzbekistan’s government website states. Their implementation will increase bilateral trade.

“Kazakhstan secures one of the leading positions in Uzbekistan’s foreign trade,” Ambassador Boribay Jeksembin of Kazakhstan said to the Uzbek president. “Our countries develop not only the trade, but also undertake mutual investments,” the ambassador said in a Journal of Turkish Weekly online report in March 2010. Additionally, the production, supply and transit of energy are areas where there is cooperation between the nations in the region. Apart from the economic gains, pipelines — such as the one that stretches between Turkmenistan and China, and transits Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan — are “bright examples of successful multilateral cooperation,” Uzbekistan’s official website stated in March 2010.

Central Asian nations know that a prolonged war in Afghanistan will continue to destabilize the region. Working together to counter terrorism, extremism, and illegal drug and arms smuggling will help maintain stability and add regional support to the NATO mission in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan has vowed to work with Kazakhstan to counter these threats. “Our countries have a large potential for expansion of mutual cooperation,” Nazarbayev stated on his government’s official website.
Muslim Scholars Criticize Terrorism

Bin Laden’s interpretation directly challenged

It was the Islamic fatwa that echoed around Europe: Jihadists who resort to terrorism are not earning the blessings of paradise, but an eternity in hellfire.

What was unique about the ruling was that this anti-terrorist firebrand wasn’t an ex-Muslim with a grievance or a secular Western scholar, but the face of traditional Islam: gray-bearded, robed Anglo-Pakistani cleric Muhammad Tahir ul-Qadri.

“Terrorism is terrorism, violence is violence, and it has no place in Islamic teaching and no justification can be provided for it, or any kind of excuses or ifs or buts,” ul-Qadri said in his fatwa pronounced in March 2010 in London and beamed to the world.

Ul-Qadri is part of an elite group of reformists competing against extremists in the battle to define Islam. And they’re not shy about turning to ancient Islamic texts to support their anti-terrorism outlook. Ul-Qadri has strong links to the United Kingdom, but his philosophy has followers throughout Europe. They include Muslim leaders such as Bosnian Grand Mufti Mustafa Ceric, who spread the message that a political Islam that preaches death to dissidents has no place in society.

A March 2010 summit — at Mardin Artuklu University in Mardin, Turkey, attended by 15 religious scholars from the Islamic world — set the tone. Ceric and theologians from Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran and other countries converged in the eastern Turkish town near the Syrian border to challenge the radical interpretation of a 14th century religious text used to incite violence among modern Muslims. Osama bin Laden has regularly used the 14th century fatwa, penned by medieval soldier and scholar Ibn Taymiyya, to justify war against “in-authentic” Middle Eastern governments and their Western allies.

“Ancient who seeks support from this fatwa for killing Muslims or non-Muslims has erred in his interpretation,” conference organizers declared at the end of the two-day gathering. “It is not for a Muslim individual or group to declare war or engage in combative jihad … on their own.”

The clerics hope that repeating moderate edicts will erode the spiritual, intellectual and psychological underpinnings of the radical militant creed that has spread to Muslim communities in some of Europe’s largest cities. Their message is that current and future terrorists can no longer assume their actions guarantee martyrdom and reward in the next life: In fact, condemnation in this life, and damnation in the next, is the likely outcome of killing in the name of religion.

The Quilliam Foundation, a British anti-terrorism think tank founded by three young Muslims who repudiated violent radicalism, has been pouring out conciliatory articles and interviews since 2008 from its headquarters in a leafy section of central London. Even the foundation’s name is loaded with symbolism bespeaking tolerance: It refers to Sheik William Henry Abdullah Quilliam. He was a wealthy 19th century Liverpool solicitor who converted to Islam and built Great Britain’s first mosque.

Then there is Turkey’s Fethullah Gülen. In a country in which Islamist parties, including the now-banned Refah (Welfare) Party, have gained many adherents, the 69-year-old theologian has staked out moderate ground, most conspicuously on the issues of terrorism and collaboration with Christians and Jews.
Muhammad Tahir ul-Qadri issued a fatwa — an Islamic religious ruling — condemning terrorism and warning suicide bombers that they are “destined for hell.”
Gülen’s movement has gained popularity among thousands of doctors, lawyers and professionals in the cities, in contrast to the rural recruiting grounds of militant Islamists, the Turkish press reported. Though he has lived mostly in the United States since 1998, he controls a large Turkish network of schools and media outlets in which nearly each Gülen utterance and action is treated with reverence. That has made him suspect in the eyes of some secular Turks, who fear he is trying to spread a politicized version of Islam by stealth.

Secular academics, many expatriates from the Middle East, have also filled the ranks of the anti-extremist movement. Unfortunately, these academics attract criticism from more conservative Muslims. They contend that secular Muslims are too far removed from their home countries, both geographically and philosophically. That raises questions of authenticity among the rank and file back home. The audience from which terrorist leaders most recruit tends to place a high premium on purity, piety and ritual sometimes lacking in the Westernized

professor who lectures them. Case in point: Some reformist Muslims considered it a public relations failure when British-Indian novelist Salman Rushdie was knighted. While they abhorred the infamous Iranian migration apostates and traditional Muslims the wrong way. his book’s alleged sacrilege could rub even nonviolent religious leader in Sunni Islam. His wife wears a hijab, seen without the robe and hat of a grand mufti, a senior religious people still weighing their options.

Whenever the persuasive powers of so-called Islamic clerics and laypersons aren’t traditionalists. For all his “progressive” credentials, Ceric is visibly conservative. He is rarely seen without the robe and hat of a grand mufti, a senior religious leader in Sunni Islam. His wife wears a hijab, the traditional Islamic head scarf. On matters of morals he remains conventional, including adherence to the Islamic injunction to spread the faith among “unbelievers.”

The organizers of the Quilliam Foundation also balance their renunciation of violence with a desire to create a “native” British Islam, one free of the Old World hatreds and doctrinal conflicts afflicting the Middle East and South Asia.

One of Quilliam’s founders is Maajid Nawaz, a former student radical who liberalized his views during Egyptian imprisonment in 2002. He considers his main adversary “Islamism,” which he defines as a political brand of Islam that preaches violence to achieve a religious utopia and which scorns Westerners and Muslim moderates. Nawaz and others admit their statements might not persuade terrorists to give up violence, but they can certainly sway religious people still weighing their options.

“So what we do is say, ‘Look, a conservative Muslim who grows his beard and dresses in a certain way and prays five times a day isn’t necessarily an Islamist.’ That’s what we want to do — recast the debate to say you can have a very religious conservative Muslim but he’s not an Islamist,” Nawaz told the British magazine The National in March 2010.

Of course, even these anti-terrorism counterrevolutionaries haven’t escape criticism. The Mardin conference organizers and the Quilliam Foundation occasionally enjoy subsidies from their host governments. This has led critics to accuse them of serving a master other than Islam. But despite disparagement from some of their co-religionists, these opponents of violent extremism continue to preach to what they hope is a growing audience in Europe and beyond. Here’s a summary of the views of some of the leaders of the anti-terror movement within Islam:

Ceric:
The mufti maintains that the famous 14th century fatwa used to advocate violence has been misinterpreted. He points out that the fatwa was written specifically to spark resistance against nominally Muslim Mongol marauders who were devastating the Middle East at the time. Unfortunately, the Mardin fatwa, as the 14th century declaration is called, became a main scriptural foundation of bin Laden’s al-Qaida. The “New Mardin Declaration” urges Muslims to live up to their most peaceful traditions and foist a new kind of Islamism on the world. Ceric criticizes scholars who maintain a medieval view of religion and politics. “Most ulema [Islamic scholars] have a problem. They know the classical texts very well, but they don’t know the contemporary world that much,” he told the Turkish newspaper Hürriyet in March 2010.

ul-Qadri:
The cleric’s 600-page fatwa isn’t everyday reading, but it has clearly drawn the ire of militants who made him a marked man. The Quilliam Foundation called ul-Qadri’s fatwa one of the most comprehensive theological refutations of extremism. Ul-Qadri founded his Minhaj-ul-Quran movement in Pakistan in 1980 to promote inter-faith dialogue, tolerance and moderation. Fears that university-educated British Muslims were becoming radicalized motivated ul-Qadri to issue his 2010 fatwa.
“They can’t claim that their suicide bombings are martyrdom operations and that they become the heroes of the Muslim Umma [Muslim community]. No. They become heroes of hellfire, and they are leading towards hellfire,” he said at the release of the fatwa in March. “There is no place for any martyrdom, and their act is never, ever to be considered jihad.”

Gülèn:
He insists that Shariah, or Islamic law, is a matter of personal morals, not state coercion. For all his millions of supporters, he has made enemies on both sides of the political spectrum. Some Islamists criticize his ties to the Turkish military and his outreach to non-Muslim leaders such as Pope John Paul II. Some secularists, including military officers who have been the protectors of secularism since Turkish President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk disbanded the Ottoman caliphate in 1924, fear he wants to impose an Islamic Republic on the country. In his schools, some in former Turkic-speaking Soviet republics, Gülèn preaches a form of “Enlightenment Islam” in which panic about modernity has no place. His argument is simply drawn: Terrorists are monsters who stain Islam. As he said on his website in 2009: “Bin Laden is among the persons in this world that I hate most. Because he has defaced the beautiful face of Islam. He has produced a dirty image. Even if we work on repairing the terrible damage he has caused with all our power, it will take years. We shall speak on every platform everywhere. We shall write books. We shall declare ‘This is not Islam.’ ”

Key sources for this story include the Muhammad Tahir ul-Qadri fatwa, the Quilliam Foundation, the Turkish newspaper Hürriyet and the Fethullah Gülèn’s official website.
“Maras” ride immigration wave into Spain
EU, other countries collaborate to fight gang threat

The unprecedented wave of Latin American immigrants entering Spain since 2000 has swept in hundreds of thousands of newcomers willing to do work Spaniards spurn. Riding the wave of these Spanish-speaking immigrants are Latin American gangs eager to strengthen their toehold in Europe.
Colombian and Mexican drug cartels have stalked Europe’s underworld for decades. But new blood has arrived in the form of Central American “maras,” or Spanish slang for gangs. One notable addition is La Mara Salvatrucha, or MS-13, El Salvador’s notoriously violent criminal gang that Spanish and Salvadoran officials say has reached into southwestern Europe. Known for their garish tattoos and deftness with knives, the Salvadoreans have made their debut in cities such as Madrid and Barcelona, recruiting not just disaffected Latin American youth but young Spaniards and Moroccans.

Though this particular gang problem in Europe is embryonic, it has already drawn the scrutiny of the Spanish Civil Guard, Europol, the United Nations, El Salvador’s Transnational Anti-Gang Center and other agencies. Since 2009, Spanish authorities have attributed at least one murder and several assaults to MS-13 members. In the case of a Bolivian teen stabbed in Barcelona in November 2009, police said they detained a suspect who declared his MS-13 affiliations.

“The time when the maras were just a Central American problem is over. Now they also threaten Europe,” José Manuel Martínez said in a January 2010 story on the news website elsalvador.com. Martinez runs the Panama operation of the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, or UNODC. The office opened in September 2009 and will partner with other Central American, Caribbean and European Union law enforcement agencies to combat the spread of the gangs.

**Partners in crime**

Spanish authorities have grappled with immigrant gangs for years. In and around Madrid, Spanish police estimate gang strength at more than 1,000 members, though only a fraction of those are considered violent. An example of a violent gang is Spain’s Latin Kings. Formed around 2000 mostly from immigrants, it drew attention when its leader, an Ecuadorian named Eric Javier Velastegui, was jailed for rape in 2006. Kidnappings, killings and robberies fill the roster of crimes committed by the gangs.

The newcomers are finding lucrative avenues among established criminal networks. Well-entrenched criminal syndicates such as southern Italy’s Camorra and ‘Ndrangheta mafias have established affiliations with some of the Latin American gangs, Spanish, Europol and U.N. officials said. The ‘Ndrangheta, based in relatively poor and isolated Calabria, acts as middleman for a reported 80 percent of the cocaine smuggled into Europe. The Naples-based Camorra mafia also runs Spanish subsidiaries dedicated to selling the narcotic.

News reports have highlighted the arrests in Spain of several high-profile Camorra chiefs with established links to Latin American gangs. In 2009, the Italian Carabinieri and Spanish Civil Guard arrested Salvatore Zazo, a fugitive said to be acting as liaison between Latin American drug gangs and the Camorra.

“The Camorra has a large network of Latin American and Spanish collaborators in Spain,” Madrid’s daily newspaper, El País, quoted Italian police as saying.

**Spain’s allure**

Immigration lies at the heart of the recent gang infiltration. During Spain’s most recent economic boom, which had ended by 2008, the country accounted for roughly half of the new jobs created in the EU, more than its own work force could fill. To gain more workers, Spain loosened its immigration policy.

In less than a decade, immigration has rewritten the demography of Spain. Prime Minister José Luis Zapatero’s 2005 amnesty for an estimated 800,000 illegal immigrants encour-
aged even more arrivals. In 2007, an additional 749,000 foreigners poured into the country, according to Spanish government figures. From 2000 to 2008, the population jumped from 40 million to 46 million. Today, more than one in 10 residents of Spain is foreign born, including more than 1 million Latin Americans, according to Spain’s National Statistics Institute. More than half a million of those came from Ecuador, the top source for Latin American immigrants.

But that immigration-fueled prosperity looks shakier today. Spanish economic growth, based largely on an easy-credit construction binge, has stalled. EU reports show the country has an unemployment rate of more than 20 percent, the highest in the eurozone. Unemployment among youths is approaching 50 percent. Gangs that offer pride, protection and the enticement of easy money threaten to lure new members from the ranks of the unemployed in working-class and immigrant neighborhoods.

Policing the problem
Members from an assortment of New World gangs such as the Latin Kings, the Netas, the Forty Twos and the Chicagoans have emerged as small-time criminals and street brawlers in places such as Barcelona and its suburbs. Spanish authorities in Madrid and Barcelona have different approaches to the gang issue. Madrid treats the gang presence as a criminal matter. Barcelona, capital of the autonomous region of Catalonia, has adopted a softer approach. It legalized gangs such as the Latin Kings in 2006, more or less labeling them immigrant social clubs, according to Spanish news reports. Barcelona police assume that Ecuadorian teens, even if they call themselves Latin Kings or members of MS-13, are mostly wayward youth looking for acceptance. As the Spanish economy has soured, Catalonia has been the source of much anti-immigrant sentiment. Skeptics such as the Civil Guard, Spain’s national police force, accuse Barcelona of mislabeling the problem.

“This is no ‘West Side Story,’ ” Francisco Pérez Abellán, a Madrid author who has researched Spain’s gangs, said in a Chicago Tribune report. “The Latin Kings mean juvenile violence, machismo and violence against women. This group cannot simply remake itself. … It would be like a neo-Nazi group wanting to form some kind of recognized association.”

Criminal enterprise
Police in Spain and the EU fear the recently arrived gangsters will enter into the continent’s already problematic drug trade. Spain’s long coast has made it a popular drug smuggling point for South American cocaine and North African hashish. Europol, the EU law enforcement agency, warned as early as 2007 that “increasingly heterogeneous criminal groups,” including Latin gangs, have gathered around these Iberian gateways.

Interdiction successes by Spanish and other European police and military agencies have interrupted that direct
drug route, forcing traffickers to ship through West Africa. The drug trade in Europe is lucrative as demand for cocaine continues to grow. A kilogram of cocaine that sells for about €22,000 in the U.S. sells for close to €45,000 in Europe, analyst Ashley-Louise Bybee wrote in a 2009 report, “The Narco-Curse in West Africa.”

Illegal drugs are not the sole source of income for Latin American gangs. According to the U.N., extortion, counterfeit medicine, pirated designer clothing, prostitution, and human and organ trafficking are also mainstays. Criminals even play a role in deciding who can settle in Europe and who cannot, said Göran Görtzen, head of the Crimes Against Persons unit at Europol. “Ninety percent of the immigrants coming to the EU today have been helped, and that help is to a big extent coming from organized criminal groups,” he said.

**Mareros adapt**

EU nations have tried to counter such threats. However, if the centuries-long history of Italy’s Neapolitan and Calabrian gangs is any indication, eradicating such secretive and profitable organizations could take years. Even the formerly communist nations of Central Europe are not immune. In a January 2010 crime assessment by the nonprofit World Security Network Foundation, Czech authorities reported a “definite presence” of “various groups from Latin America.”

The UNODC has been sounding the alarm about the new “marero,” or gang member, arriving in Europe from Latin America looking for moneymaking opportunities. Spain, which shares a common tongue, is the logical stepping-stone to the continent. For a group such as MS-13, flamboyantly violent in its old United States and Central American hunting grounds, blending in is vital.

“The leaders will arrive without tattoos and wearing ties,” said Amado Philip de Andrés, an official with the U.N.’s anti-drug operation, said in an elsalvador.com report. “Their interest in Europe is not to take over the state by force, like they do in Central America. Instead, they will find new niches for criminal activity already exhausted on the American continent.”

**Maintaining vigilance**

Police have had some success fighting organized crime in Spain. In February 2010, Madrid police arrested 54 suspected Latin Kings members, including some alleged to be leaders, El País reported. Spanish police have cooperated with European police agencies to break up Spanish, Georgian, Russian, Ukrainian and Italian gangs since 2005.

Police are watching and waiting for MS-13 to reveal itself. Latin American immigrants claiming allegiance to MS-13 have brawled with other gangs on the streets of Madrid. Spanish police are bracing themselves for violence should MS-13 try to muscle in on the territory of established gangs.

“The mareros would have to overthrow the people already distributing the drugs,” an unnamed Spanish police inspector told elsalvador.com in January 2010. “This would provoke stages of violence. And then we would know they were here.”
The European Union’s decision to issue biometric passports to its more than 500 million citizens makes travel between the 27 member states easier. The high-tech “ePassport,” or Passport 10, includes a microchip that can store the bearer’s passport number, photograph, fingerprint, digital signature and retinal scan, if collected. The EU said its “one-person, one-passport” policy will also help combat terrorism, illegal immigration and human trafficking.

People age 12 and older began receiving the new passports in late June 2009. Under a January 2009 EU mandate, all member nations must implement the new passport by 2012.

Although the passport has suffered technical problems and criticism that it is not secure enough from counterfeiters, the goal is to increase passport and travel document security while establishing a more reliable link between the holder and the passport. This will ensure better protection against fraudulent use of the passport, the EU stated on its website.

Each passport also has intricately designed pages and a complex watermark that make it hard to forge. The chip stores key information about its holder, validating the document. Each country is responsible for issuing its own passports.

“I’m happy to let the citizens of this country know that their passport will open wider the doors of Europe and the world to them,” Bulgaria’s then-Interior Minister Mihail Mikov said in a Radio Bulgaria report. He received the country’s first biometric passport. Bulgaria is one of five nations working with neighbor countries to find ways to combat organized crime and illegal migration. Like other EU nations, Bulgaria wants to enhance its border security and border-crossing stations to help deter illegal migration into the country and the union. A better passport is part of the solution to those problems. Collaborative efforts with neighbor countries to better control common borders are leading to an exchange of ideas, methods and technology. The efforts are strengthening relationships between countries and helping build closer ties with European police, justice and border-control agencies. Together, these actions help the EU step up the fight against terrorism, corruption and crime.

Non-EU nations in the region are also complying with the new requirements so their citizens can travel within Europe without visas. This brings them one step closer to full inclusion in the union and helps them with border and immigration controls. The European Commission even proposed ending in 2010 the need for visas for entry into non-EU nations Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro.

Turkey, which is seeking EU membership, is planning to introduce biometric passports in June 2010, the country’s Hurriyet Daily News reported in March 2010. “Prototype passports are ready. The physical preparations are under way in all consulates and police departments, and the required machines will be put into service in May,” Foreign Ministry spokesman Burak Özüergin said.

In March 2010, non-EU member Switzerland started issuing biometric passports with the bearer’s photograph and fingerprints. This brings the nation in line with its neighbors. “Switzerland is part of the Schengen area and is obliged to follow Schengen rules. It had until March 1 to issue biometric passports,” Markus Waldner, project leader
for biometric passports at the Federal Police Office, said in a story on the news website swissinfo.ch. The country is one of the last to issue the ePassports. France and Germany, for example, also members of the Schengen European single-border treaty, have employed the documents since 2006.

However, there are still questions about the security of biometric passports. Millions of passports are stolen or missing, Interpol reports, and investigators testify to a lucrative worldwide network of passport forgers, including an Algerian organization that has supplied suspect passports to al-Qaida sympathizers. In one notorious case, Ahmed Ressam, imprisoned in a plot to bomb Los Angeles International Airport, was arrested in 1999 trying to cross from Canada to the United States with a forged passport. The EU acknowledges there will be glitches in its attempt to create a fake-proof system.

“We did our best to produce the perfect passport,” Anton Donev, of the Bulgarian Identity Documents Directorate, said on Radio Bulgaria. The country’s biometric passports will have some safeguards “that are practically insurmountable,” he said. Croatia has taken the passport issue a step further by including fingerprints from both hands and the bearer’s citizen identification number.

EU countries have invested much time, effort and money in producing secure passports. “It is extremely expensive and difficult to forge, although not impossible,” said Magnus Svenningson, the CEO of Speed Identity, the company that provides the biometric data capture platform to the Swedish, Luxembourg and Lithuanian governments, in a March 2010 interview with the online EUObserver. What makes the document hard to counterfeit is that forgers would have to clone the certified chip of the passport-issuing country. This requires machine-supported verification of the documents.

The new passports continue to raise privacy concerns. The EU sees the new passports as a step to strengthen the union and combat illegal activities. Some civil rights activists and nations are skeptical about whether the data in the biometric passports will be secure enough and fear government misuse of the information. To help ease fears with technology privacy issues, the EU launched its Privacy and Emerging Sciences and Technologies, or PRESCIENT, project in March 2010. The three-year study aims to use new computing and electronic-related technologies to create a framework for privacy and ethical considerations arising from the use of emerging technologies, the online magazine InfoSecurity reported in March 2010.

The biometric passport trend is catching on in non-EU nations desiring to join the union because they will ultimately be required to issue the passports. Union countries have also started issuing biometric identification cards. In April 2010, the EU sped up and standardized visa procedures applicable to 25 Schengen nations — allowing citizens to cross borders without visas. This zone includes 22 EU nations, plus Norway, Iceland and Switzerland.

The decision to introduce biometric passports will provide increased protection against crime and terrorism while allowing “unparalleled freedom to travel, work and live anywhere” within its borders — safely, the EU states on its official website. It will enable the union to standardize and integrate common security procedures among its member states. Just as important, ePassports will allow the EU to comply with International Civil Aviation Organization guidelines. □
Shattered Dreams

Destitute are easy prey for human traffickers

Each year, more than 1.2 million people worldwide become victims of human trafficking, UNICEF reported. Traffickers lure people with promises of legitimate work, good wages and the hope of starting a new life, and then exploit them. Some of these victims, including thousands of children, end up in forced labor camps or in the shadowy world of sexual slavery.

Moldova is one of Europe’s poorest countries. It has one of the continent’s worst human trafficking problems, Inter Press Service reported in 2009. About one-quarter of the nation’s young workers work abroad, the Epoch Times reported in April 2009, citing Moldova’s government records. According to the International Organization for Migration, or IOM, most of these people leave to escape poverty and the lack of support by government agencies in the nation; most of the victims of human trafficking fall prey to sexual exploitation and forced labor, mainly in Turkey and Russia.

Driving the Moldovan exodus was the people’s discontent with the government. Many became disillusioned when the government failed to deliver promised democratic reform. They also left because of the economic crisis, decreased wages and lower pensions. But the worsening worldwide economic crisis actually helped curb some of the illegal migration, especially into Europe, the Paris-based Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development reported. As the continent shed jobs, less work was available to undocumented migrants. That helped make trafficking less lucrative.

“The first thing that affects migration is the fact employers do not want as many workers,” Georges Lemaitre, an immigration specialist with the organization, said in a January 2010 Voice of America report. “They are not looking to hire as many immigrants. So this is the first thing that reduces the level of migration. The second is the fact immigrants themselves do not see many opportunities. So they themselves tend to come less often.”

Still, many people choose to migrate, hoping to beat the odds, even if there are fewer job prospects. They enter countries where border control officials, stretched to the limit, cannot contain the illegal migration problem. A porous border is one reason human trafficking also affects Bulgaria, a source and transit country. Out of its 7.5 million citizens, more than 1 million have migrated abroad for work since the early 1990s. More than 10,000 of them become trafficking victims each year, UNICEF reported.

The situation is similar in Romania, Serbia and Hungary. But few former Soviet Bloc nations are equipped to deal with the problem. Many of the countries are struggling with overtaxed police and immigration agencies and poorly protected borders. And they have transitional economies hard hit by the global economic crisis. Human trafficking woes receive a lower priority than other issues, the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees reported.

Sexual exploitation is only one prong of the trafficking problem. As former New York Times foreign correspondent David Binder pointed out, sex traffickers often branch into narcotics and customs fraud. “Some criminals have found common interest with terrorist groups,” Binder announced at a conference on Eastern European transnational crime held at the University of California, Los Angeles.

The IOM is dedicated to helping nations stem the rising tide of human trafficking. Founded in 1951 to address migration after World War II, the agency is an intergovernmental organization representing 127 nations.
A border guard checks the passports of Moldovans trying to enter Romania. One quarter of all Moldovans have left their country since 1991 to seek work elsewhere.
As stated on its website, IOM is “committed to the principle that humane and orderly migration benefits migrants and society.” It works with national, international and nongovernmental partners to find “practical solutions to migration problems and to provide humanitarian assistance to migrants in need, including refugees and internally displaced people.”

But the agency cannot do it alone. Stemming human trafficking requires a multi-pronged approach that goes after the root causes and the key players. Prevention is the crucial starting point. “We know through our daily work with victims that almost all of them were victims of socio-economic misery and abuse before their trafficking ordeal. By adopting a more proactive prevention strategy aimed at high-risk groups, we feel we can tackle human trafficking in Moldova more effectively,” said Martin Wyss, IOM chief of mission in Moldova. “This means providing assistance such as counseling to those who might otherwise fall through the social net, vocational training and placement in other programs that can help unemployed potential victims find a job or temporary shelter if they are escaping domestic violence.”

IOM’s Moldova mission team identifies human trafficking victims and arranges their return home, where the mission’s assistance and protection center is a temporary refuge. The center offers medical, psychological, legal, social and reintegration services. More than 2,500 victims received help at the center between 2001 and 2009. The center has also helped more than 170 trafficked children and prevented more than 1,300 at-risk Moldovans from becoming victims, the IOM reported.

Poverty, domestic violence, lack of education opportunities and poor prospects are usually the reasons people fall prey to traffickers. Addressing these issues at the national and international level is challenging, especially against the backdrop of the global economic downturn. But facing the issues is essential to putting an end to human trafficking.

An important component of preventing human trafficking is raising awareness — especially among the at-risk groups — by informing them of the constantly changing tactics used by traffickers as well the consequences for victims, the IOM reported. Moldova, Romania and Bulgaria are using awareness campaigns in their fight against trafficking. In addition, the countries run telephone-counseling services for domestic abuse. The hope is that helping victims of domestic abuse will lower the number of women vulnerable to trafficking.

The countries most affected by human trafficking are often not in a position to address the problem on their own. Since
the crime is an issue affecting nations far beyond the source countries’ borders, the IOM said it is in the best interest of the international community to work together to fight human trafficking. The European Union acknowledged that human trafficking is a problem within its borders. EU elections in July 2009 led to an alliance of pro-EU politicians who believe in market reform and who also think that supporting human rights can advance that cause.

Comprehensive initiatives by organizations such as the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, or UNODC, the IOM and EU aim to strengthen international ties between judicial, police, border security, legal and social services agencies in the source, transit and destination countries. On its website, the UNODC stated that it also “offers practical help to states, not only by helping to draft laws and create comprehensive national anti-trafficking strategies, but also by assisting with resources to implement them.” The group helps nations develop local capacity, expertise and tools that encourage cross-border collaboration during investigations and prosecutions.

“Various forms of human exploitation and conventional crimes, including participating in and the exploitation of various illicit markets, become the prerequisites to the conduct of successful terrorist operations,” Canada’s International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy reported to the UNODC.

Collaboration is the key to success in helping to stop human trafficking, said Dora Bakoyannis, then Greek minister of foreign affairs, in a June 2009 Reuters report. “One thing is clear: Genuine solidarity and fair burden sharing between member states is urgently needed in order to effectively tackle this common European challenge,” she said.

Tougher laws also are important tools in the fight against human trafficking. Hungary adopted a national strategy of community crime prevention in 2003 that makes the fight against human trafficking an international priority. Romania and Bulgaria passed laws against human trafficking in 2004 before becoming EU members in 2007, and both have since set up national anti-trafficking agencies. Moldova passed its first law to prevent and combat human trafficking in 2005. Across Europe, the plight of exploited migrants has become as important as stopping the traffickers who prey on them. International organizations and Moldova’s people and government are working together to find solutions to human trafficking, illegal migration and the organized crime behind much of the problem.

“We want to build an EU that is truly able to protect the most vulnerable citizens against the most terrible crimes,” said Jacques Barrot, the European Community’s vice president for justice, freedom and security, in a statement on the community’s website. “Our message is clear,” he said. “These crimes which know no boundaries are unacceptable. Europe will continue to set the highest and most ambitious standards in fighting them.”
As globalization makes the world grow smaller, Central Asia draws closer to Europe. Security, energy and human rights issues in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are now affecting the European Union.

The union’s 2010 report, “Into EurAsia — Monitoring the EU’s Central Asia Strategy,” states that problems such as terrorism and arms smuggling cannot be managed purely by military means. The report analyzes the Council of the European Union’s 2007 “Strategy for a New Partnership.”

“Into EurAsia,” published by the EU Central Asia Monitoring office, or EU-CAM, outlines European desires for closer ties and more integration with Central Asia. In the 2010 update, the authors concluded that “concretely Central Asia
presents no direct security threats to the EU. The reports cite indirect threats to Europe, such as insecurity of energy supplies, al-Qaida, radicalization and drug trafficking. Equally important to security are law enforcement, democratization, poverty reduction and respect for the rule of law.

Accordingly, in 2007, the EU Council, working in conjunction with the United Nations, began a program of engagement and assistance for Central Asia, adding a regional strategy for aid. European leaders ordered a review of existing programs, convening experts to monitor progress and make recommendations.

“The EU is working actively to promote our values in Central Asia,” said Pierre Morel, the EU’s special representative for Central Asia. “For that purpose, we have launched regular human rights dialogues with all Central Asian countries. At the same time, we have embarked on new spheres of cooperation, addressing security and stability issues in multilateral format.” The EU’s presence in Central Asia is gradually getting stronger, he said. EU nations and the European Commission are opening new embassies and sending in delegations.

Security reform

For the EU, security is a paramount concern and the foundation for reform. Many criminals and terrorists enter Europe through Central Asia, which makes border control assistance the key to stopping problems at the source. Poor border control has opened the door to drugs, illegal immigration and human trafficking. Corruption makes things worse.

While EU aid to Central Asia is varied, two programs specifically target drug trafficking and crime. The Border Management Programme for Central Asia, or BOMCA, launched in early 2004, is one of the largest EU assistance programs in the region. BOMCA works toward the gradual adoption of modern border management methods in Central Asia, including enhanced border security and the encouragement of legal trade and transit.

The Central Asia Drug Action Programme, or CADAP, provides countries with policy, legal and technical expertise and knowledge of European and international standards and practices in drug prevention, control and trafficking. CADAP works closely with BOMCA, focusing on both supply and demand reduction in line with the recommendations in the European Union drugs strategy endorsed in 2004. Since 2003, the EU has spent more than 25 million euros on these programs. BOMCA paid for new technology such as X-ray machines and passport readers at border-crossing stations, training for border control officers and the construction of three new border outposts in Tajikistan. CADAP paid for drug rehabilitation for inmates, drug profiling at airports and train stations and anti-drug and HIV media campaigns.

Good governance

Good governance and the rule of law are sometimes taken for granted in the West, where corruption and graft are considered outside the norm and unacceptable. EU assistance to Central Asia in targeting corruption and emphasizing the rule of law is expected, over time, to change the perception of corruption and to allow Central Asian nations to deal with the West on an equal
footing. For example, the doors to trade might widen if Western businesses think they can conduct business openly and with less corruption. Business expenses are often unpredictable in countries where bribery and protection rackets are common.

The World Bank defines good governance as “predictable, open and enlightened policymaking; a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos; an executive arm of government accountable for its actions; and a strong civil society participating in public affairs; and all behaving under the rule of law.”

EUCAM and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, or OSCE, are assisting Central Asia with good governance and security issues. The OSCE has a longstanding presence in Central Asian countries, with offices in all but Uzbekistan. The offices focus on border security and management, rule of law, good governance, legislation, environmental protection and regional cooperation.

“Security Sector Reform, or SSR, is the ideal link between ... human rights, democracy, good governance and rule of law,” Jos Boonstra, co-chairman of the EUCAM Expert Working Group, said in the November 2009 report, Security Sector Reform in Central Asia.

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee defines SSR as “seeking to increase partner countries’ ability to meet the range of security needs within their societies in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of governance, transparency and the rule of law. SSR includes, but extends well beyond, the narrower focus of more traditional security assistance on defense, intelligence and policing.”

The Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform, a British think tank, said there is a link between corruption, human rights and security. “Violence and security are a priority concern of those suffering from poverty and other vulnerable groups, especially women and children, who are often subject to bad policing, weak justice and corrupt militaries,” the group stated in its 2007 report, A Beginner’s Guide to Security Sector Reform. “Security is also intrinsic to personal and state safety, access to government services and participation in political processes. SSR contributes to the development of appropriate structures to help prevent instability and violent conflict.”

**EU-Central Asia strategy**

The EU Central Asia monitoring office’s February 2010 report, “Into EurAsia: Monitoring the EU’s Central Asia Strategy,” summarizes EU-Central Asia relations since 2007. The report recommends ways the two regions can better evaluate issues, increase diplomatic relations, improve human rights and create a stronger standard for evaluating the rule of law.

The report was an 18-month research and awareness-raising initiative launched in October 2008 by two European think tanks, Spain’s Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior and Belgium’s Centre for European Policy Studies.

For the full report, visit www.fride.org and click on More FRIDE books at the bottom of the page, then click on “Into EurAsia.”
Human rights

The international community wants Central Asia to promote human rights. Organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International monitor Central Asia. But the EU’s European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, or EIDHR, which supports democracy and human rights in non-EU countries, is not yet deeply involved in the region. The United Nations has a Central Asia Regional Office and country teams in all these nations. The goal is to bring the countries into alignment with international norms.

“I have a broad responsibility — mandate — to protect and promote human rights,” U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon told Euronews in April 2010. “Human rights are universally valued. I have urged, in unambiguous terms, all the leaders of Central Asia to protect human rights, to protect vulnerable people and to implement all the conventions and the international agreements to which they have signed.” He said leaders have a moral obligation to recognize universal human rights.

The U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, or OHCHR, focuses on ending torture, stopping violence against women and promoting human rights. Its Central Asia office is raising awareness of economic, cultural and social rights and showing people how to file human rights protests at the U.N. All of the Central Asian countries except Uzbekistan have ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention that defines a refugee, their rights and the obligation of host nations.

Compliance has been sporadic, if not lacking, in Central Asia. But recent developments in the region have been positive. Uzbekistan has granted citizenship to Tajik refugees, and Turkmenistan has revised refugee and citizenship laws. Bringing their laws in line with international standards will benefit their citizens and their economies, the EU reports. Adopting standard international business practices will make it easier for Central Asian and European nations to connect. Europe’s need for Central Asian energy is a case in point. The building of oil and natural gas pipelines skirting Russia will ease Europe’s dependency on Russian fossil fuels.

However, until Central Asian countries meet international standards for government accountability and human rights they will remain unequal partners in the international community. The EU and the U.N. are working to strengthen ties between Central Asia and the West. Doing so will make Europe more secure and Central Asia more appealing as an international business partner.

Turkmen officials learn how to identify forged documents in Dashoguz, Turkmenistan, in April 2009.
This book provides the interested layman with an informative guide to an increasingly important global phenomenon that has arisen as a result of the Islamic revival since the 1970s. It is a concise volume, just 98 pages excluding endnotes, and therefore more of a monograph than a book. Nevertheless, it is scholarly, detailed and clearly written, although he divides the book into a series of very short chapters and appendices that give it a somewhat disjointed and unfinished feel. The appendices, which make up half of the book, provide useful information about the instruments and principles of Shari’a finance, the degree of penetration of the banking systems in Muslim and Western states, and the implications of this development.

The timeliness and significance of the topic are made starkly clear in the introduction to the book. The author points out that the global market for Islamic financial products was worth up to $800 billion in 2008, with demand anticipated to grow at an annual rate of 15 to 20 percent. Of course, he wrote the book before the global financial crisis. Because Shari’a-compliant institutions fund from their own deposits rather than borrow from wholesale markets, they are arguably better placed to survive the economic downturn than Western banks and finance houses even allowing for a dramatic drop in oil revenues. Islamic finance is indivisible from Shari’a law and must therefore follow different rules from those governing conventional financial products.

Sookhdeo makes clear from the outset that his book is as much about politics and religion as economics. His central argument is that the growth in Shari’a finance is inseparable from the overall Islamist political aim of creating theocracies ruled in accordance with the dictates of Shari’a law. The threat posed by radical political Islam to Western values and institutions is a central theme of Sookhdeo’s published works, presentations and interviews, and this short book is no exception. Sookhdeo is an outspoken critic of those in the establishment who have sought an accommodation with the Islamists and cautions that even ostensibly nonviolent groups, such as Hizb ut Tahrir and the Muslim Brotherhood, have a political agenda that is fundamentally antithetical to liberal democracy. This viewpoint provides the intellectual context of the book. Therefore, the book is didactic in the sense that, while it informs the reader about the characteristics of Islamic finance, it also serves as a morality tale to warn against the trend by Western institutions and governments to embrace Shari’a finance for short-term gain.

Sookhdeo briefly outlines the growth of Islamic finance since the time of Muhammad and argues that a distinct form of Muslim economics is largely an inven-
tion of the modern Islamist movement, being a tool to promote Muslim independence and undermine the West’s economic and political power. He points out that a permissive policy regarding the payment of interest was the norm in Muslim societies up until recently. Historically, riba, or interest, was widely interpreted as referring to repressive usury, not necessarily all forms of interest. As the concept of riba is the key characteristic of Shari’a finance, the chapter on its meaning and interpretation is particularly interesting. As the Islamists have interpreted riba as any form of interest and not just usury (extortionate or exploitative interest), it has stimulated the creation of a separate Muslim economic and finance system.

The chapter titled “Shari’a Finance as Jihad” is central to Sookhdeo’s theme. He argues that Shari’a finance is a modern extension of the directives contained in the Quran and hadith (sayings or actions of Muhammad or his companions) for Muslims to use their wealth in the service of jihad against infidels and polytheists. For Sookhdeo, Shari’a compliant finance is nothing less than a means by which Muslims not yet ready for violent jihad can be mobilized in its service. He quotes a number of Quranic scholars who confirm that the prohibition against all forms of riba justifies savage punishments against those who practice it—in effect a declaration of war against the entire Western financial system.

As the growth of Islamic banking has outstripped regulatory frameworks, Sookhdeo maintains that the system is vulnerable to money laundering by criminal and terrorist elements. He notes that dealers in traditional hawala (informal money brokering system) transfers are now using Islamic banks as an integral part of their networks. He is also skeptical about the efforts of regulatory bodies, such as the Islamic Financial Services Board, to establish international best practices and standards for supervision and regulation to prevent potential corruption and criminal exploitation, as well as financial support for extremism.

Sookhdeo’s conclusions are stark. He believes that Islamic scholars are exploiting the desires of pious Muslims and Western financial institutions and governments to create a growing alternative financial system based on religious dictates. The design is to further the Islamists’ goals of dividing Muslims from non-Muslims, creating mutual hostility and—Sookhdeo’s own words—“empowering their own drive for world domination.”

Understanding Shari’a Finance: The Muslim Challenge to Western Economics is a worthwhile read. It contains a lot of thought-provoking information and argument. While Sookhdeo’s constant restatement of the Islamist threat throughout the book can be somewhat tiresome, he undoubt-edly has a point that the full implications of the ideology have not been fully understood by Western governments and publics. From Sookhdeo’s perspective, the growth of Shari’a finance is far from benign, and the book provides a timely and necessary counterargument to those who believe that Islamic finance is somehow detached from the broader Islamist agenda.

This is an edited version of the full review that appeared in the British academic journal Democracy and Security.
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PASS 11-5
March 25-June 17, 2011
(Nominations due Jan. 28, 2011)

PASS 11-10
Sept. 23-Dec. 16, 2011
(Nominations due July 29, 2011)
PROGRAM ON TERRORISM AND SECURITY STUDIES (PTSS)
The five-week, twice yearly program addresses the different aspects of threats to nations and is for mid- and upper-level management, military, government and police officials in counterterrorism organizations. The focus is on combating terrorism while adhering to the basic values of a democratic society. The five-module course provides a historical and theoretical overview of terrorism, the vulnerabilities of terrorist groups, the role of law, the financing of terrorism and security cooperation.

**PTSS 11-3** Feb. 11-March 18, 2011
(Nominations due Dec. 17, 2010)

**PTSS 11-7** June 24-July 29, 2011
(Nominations due April 29, 2011)

THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE SEMINAR (SES)
The seminar is a forum that allows for the in-depth exploration of international security issues. Participants in winter and fall sessions include high-level government officials, general officers, senior diplomats, ambassadors, ministers and parliamentarians. The SES format includes presentations by senior officials and recognized experts followed by discussions in seminar groups.

**SES 11-1** Jan. 19-27, 2011
(Nominations due Nov. 23, 2010)
"Managing Relations with Russia"

**SES 11-9** Sept. 7-15, 2011
(Nominations due July 15, 2011)
"Meeting the Threat of Cyberwar"

THE STABILITY, SECURITY, TRANSITION, & RECONSTRUCTION (SSTaR)
The program is a three-week, twice a year course that addresses why and when stability, security, transition and reconstruction operations are required in the global security environment and how a nation can participate productively. Its four modules focus on the challenges inherent to SSTR, the basic organizational and operational requirements of such operations and the capacity-building resources available to participant nations.

**SSTaR 11-4** March 1-18, 2011
(Nominations due Jan. 17, 2011)

**SSTaR 11-8** June 21-July 9, 2011
(Nominations due May 13, 2011)

SEMINAR ON TRANSATLANTIC CIVIL SECURITY (STACS)
The seminar is a three-week, twice a year class that provides civil security professionals from Europe, Eurasia and North America an in-depth look at how nations can effectively address domestic security issues with regional and international impact. Organized into four modules — threats and hazards, prepare and protect, response and recover and a field study — it focuses on the development of core knowledge and skills.

**STACS 11-2** Feb. 1-18, 2011
(Nominations due Dec. 10, 2010)

**STACS 11-6** July 12-29, 2011
(Nominations due April 15, 2011)
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