RESOLVING 'FROZEN CONFLICTS'
The Challenges of Reconciliation
ON THE COVER

Protracted, or “frozen,” conflicts present a challenge to stability and security. Moving away from the status quo while protecting against the potential of renewed violence is not a simple endeavor. Finding common ground upon which all parties can agree has proven a nearly impossible task.

Cover illustration: Per Concordiam staff

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Welcome to per Concordiam

On behalf of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, I am pleased to present the second issue of our quarterly journal, per Concordiam. We at the Marshall Center take great pride in presenting our readers with a quality journal that addresses defense, policy and security issues confronting Europe and Eurasia.

Marshall Center alumni are critical in contributing unique regional perspective to the ongoing dialogue of relevant security and defense themes. In the first issue of per Concordiam, we asked you to consider providing your thoughts and opinions to our editors. Your input has been incredible, and the response to the first issue has been overwhelmingly positive. We are confident that future issues will be no different.

The theme of this issue focuses on domestic security concerns and frozen conflicts that have regional and international implications. When examining the European and Eurasian security landscape, one need not look far to find an example of a domestic security issue that is of concern at a regional level. This issue of per Concordiam is devoted to such topics, and it is my hope that the ideas captured in these pages will generate constructive dialogue among those in a position to effect change. The Marshall Center has the privilege to bring this important issue to the forefront of discussion for security practitioners in Europe and Eurasia. We have every confidence that those able and willing to resolve these security issues will strive to do so.

Those of you who have participated in Marshall Center resident programs and outreach events have a unique perspective of the dilemma that frozen conflicts and domestic security problems create at the regional level, and you may be able to provide insight not previously considered. With this in mind, we encourage each of you to reach out to one another, and to our editorial board, to ensure your voice is heard so that decision-makers are presented with your novel ideas.

It is our hope that you find the ideas in these pages thought-provoking, interesting and relevant to your work. Now, more than ever, it is vital that we work together to promote democratic institutions, build enduring partnerships and promote an environment of peaceful security cooperation to resolve the significant security issues that face Europe and Eurasia. Please enjoy this issue of per Concordiam and continue your contributions to this important discussion.

Sincerely,

John P Rose, PhD
Director

Dr. John P. Rose
Director, George C. Marshall Center

John P. Rose is the director of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. A retired U.S. Army brigadier general, he has 34 years of international, operational, academic, business and strategic planning expertise. He holds master’s and doctorate degrees from the University of Southern California, Los Angeles, and attended the Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government in Cambridge, Mass. His published works include The Evolution of U.S. Army Nuclear Doctrine, 1945-1980 and 10 journal articles on nuclear strategy, military doctrine and long-range planning.
Suren Grigoryan is a senior specialist on international military cooperation at the Armenian Ministry of Defense. He also advises on legal aspects of international military cooperation. Since 2001, he has held several security positions at the Defense Ministry. He earned a master’s degree in comparative politics in 2009 at the London School of Economics and Political Science and a bachelor’s degree in law and military command. He is a graduate of the Marshall Center’s 2010 Security, Stability, Transition and Reconstruction course, and the 2004 Program on Advanced Security Studies.

Dr. Vardan Grigoryan is deputy director of the Institute of Armenian Studies, a research center at Yerevan State University, Armenia. He served as Armenia’s deputy minister of education and science from 2000 to 2002, as a diplomat at the Armenian Embassy in Moscow from 1997 to 1998 and as chief editor of the weekly magazine Epoch from 1989 to 1997. He earned a doctorate in philological sciences from the V. Brusov Linguistic University at Yerevan, where he taught from 1980 to 1983.

Dr. Dragan Lozancic is a Marshall Center professor of security studies. He is on leave from the Croatian Ministry of Defense, where he has held several senior civil service posts in international cooperation and defense policy and planning. He has extensive interagency experience in Croatia’s EU accession process, relations with NATO and development of key national security strategy and policy documents. He was a defense diplomacy scholar at Cranfield University, United Kingdom, and earned a master’s degree in global security studies. He also earned a bachelor’s degree from the New York Institute of Technology, and earned master’s and doctoral degrees from Columbia University in New York City.

Col. Viktor V. Sapon is head of the Sevastopol City Public Assistance and Information Service in Ukraine. He has served in a variety of military and civilian positions in an emergency management capacity, including the Ministry of Emergency Situations as an expert on the consequences of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster. He has commanded at the battalion and company levels, and served as the chief of service for chemical, biological and radiological protection in the Ukrainian armed forces. He is a graduate of the Military Academy of Chemical Defense of the Soviet Armed Forces and a 2000 graduate of the Marshall Center’s Senior Executive Seminar.

Dr. Filan Morar is a diplomatic counselor at the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs now serving on an EU electoral assessment mission in Iraq. He specializes in transition to democracy studies and worked on electoral technical assistance and post-conflict stabilization missions in Iraq, Algeria and Georgia with the United Nations and EU. He was a deputy chief of Field Office Tbilisi with the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia. He was an assistant professor at the University of Bucharest political science department and has published four books and several articles on political science and international relations. He has a doctorate in political philosophy and a master’s degree in political science. He is a 2001 graduate of the Marshall Center Program on Advanced Security Studies.

Dr. Mykola Kapitonenko is an associate professor at the Institute of International Relations at Kyiv National Taras Shevchenko University, Ukraine, and executive director of the Centre for International Studies.

Dr. Matthew Rhodes is a professor of national security studies at the Marshall Center. He has written numerous articles and book chapters on U.S. foreign policy and security dynamics in Central and Southeast Europe. He earned a doctorate in political science from the University of Wisconsin.

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George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies

Dr. John F. Rose
Director

Hermann Wachter
German Deputy Director

Dr. James C. MacDougall
U.S. Deputy Director

MARSHALL CENTER
The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies is a German-American partnership founded in 1993. The staff of this security studies institute furthers the vision of the post-World War II Marshall Plan into the 21st century. The center promotes dialogue and understanding between European, Eurasian, North American and other nations. The theme of its resident courses and outreach events: Most 21st century security challenges require international, interagency and interdisciplinary response and cooperation.

CONTACT US
Per Concordiam editors
George C. Marshall Center
Gernackerstrasse 2
82467 Garmisch-Partenkirchen
Germany

Per Concordiam is a professional journal published quarterly by the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies that addresses defense and security issues in Europe and Eurasia for military and security practitioners and experts. Opinions expressed in this journal do not necessarily represent the policies or points of view of this institution or of any other agency of the German or United States governments. All articles are written by per Concordiam staff unless otherwise noted. Opinions expressed in articles written by contributors represent those of the author only. The secretary of defense determined that publication of this journal is necessary for conducting public business as required of the U.S. Department of Defense by law.
The March 2010 publication of the inaugural issue of *per Concordiam* was an extremely rewarding process for our editorial staff. The feedback we have received from readers, and their expressed desire to contribute to future editions of the magazine, is extremely gratifying. As we work and plan for future issues, we are confident that the excitement seen thus far will continue.

The focus of this edition is domestic security issues with broad regional security implications. Our contributors address important security questions about so-called frozen or protracted conflicts, examining challenges faced by nations engaged in seemingly irreconcilable conflicts.

In the cover story, “The Myth of ‘Frozen Conflicts’: Transcending Illusive Dilemmas,” Dr. Filon Morar examines protracted conflicts. He argues that failure to address them in a strategic and concerted way simply supports the status quo and will ensure that reconciliation and resolution do not occur.

Marshall Center professors Dr. Matthew Rhodes and Dr. Dragan Lozancic address the contemporary situation in the Balkans in their article, “A Balanced View of the Balkans.” The authors discuss conditions that contributed to success in resolving conflicts in the Balkans and provide analysis about some of the obstacles to resolving contentious issues in this region.

In the article “Russia and the Post-Soviet Space,” Varzan Grigoryan and Suren Grigoryan discuss some of the circumstances that have contributed to current interstate relations in the post-Soviet space.

In “Resolving Post-Soviet ‘Frozen Conflicts’: Is Regional Integration Helpful?” Dr. Mykola Kapitonenko examines frozen conflicts in terms of challenges unique to the former Soviet Union and offers suggestions on how to address these issues effectively.

Consequence management in the aftermath of natural and man-made disasters is of great importance in the current period. Victor Sapon, in “Answering the Distress Call,” concludes that, given the increasing complexity and severity of such disasters, there is a much greater need to work cooperatively at a regional level to ensure that disasters and emergencies can be effectively confronted and managed without risk of a domestic security issue growing to one that is regional in nature.

The next issue of *per Concordiam* will focus on terrorism. We are hopeful that we will continue to receive the same level of quality submissions from Marshall Center alumni, the organizations and governments for whom they work, and academics and scholars with an interest in security and defense issues in Europe and Eurasia. Your contributions will ensure that *per Concordiam* remains a relevant and quality journal.


We welcome and encourage your feedback. We look forward to hearing from you.

— *per Concordiam* editorial staff
The aim of *per Concordiam* magazine is to address security issues relevant to Europe and Eurasia and to elicit a response from readers. We hope that the publication of our first issue did that and that it also helped stimulate debate and an exchange of ideas. We welcome your feedback. So please share your thoughts with us in the form of letters to the editor that we will publish in this section. Please keep your letters as brief as possible, and specifically note the article, author and magazine edition to which you are referring. We reserve the right to edit all letters for language, civility, accuracy, brevity and clarity.

**Send feedback via e-mail to:**

editor@perconcordiam.org

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**ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS**

The intent of *per Concordiam* is to be a moderated journal with the best and brightest submitted articles and papers published each quarter. We welcome articles from readers on security and defense issues in Europe and Eurasia.

Here’s how to submit an article:

First, e-mail your story idea to editor@perconcordiam.org in an outline form or as a short description. If we like the idea, we can offer feedback before you start writing.

We accept articles as original contributions. If your article or similar version is under consideration by another publication, or was published elsewhere, tell us when submitting the article to us.

If you have a manuscript to submit but are not sure it’s right for the quarterly, e-mail us to ask if we’re interested.

As you’re writing your article, please remember:

- **Offer fresh ideas.** We are looking for articles with a unique approach from the region. We probably won’t publish articles on topics already heavily covered in other security and foreign policy journals.

- **Connect the dots.** We’ll publish an article on a single country if the subject is relevant to the region or the world.

- **Do not assume a U.S. audience.** The vast majority of *per Concordiam* readers are from Europe and Eurasia. We’re less likely to publish articles that cater to a U.S. audience. Our mission is to generate candid discussion of relevant security and defense topics, not to serve as an echo chamber for U.S. foreign policy.

- **Steer clear of technical language.** Not everyone is a specialist in a certain field. Ideas should be accessible to the widest audience.

- **Provide original research or reporting to support your ideas.** And be prepared to document statements. We fact check everything we publish.

- **Copyrights.** Contributors will retain their copyrighted work. However, submitting an article or paper implies the author grants license to *per Concordiam* to publish the work.

- **Bio/photo.** When submitting your article, please include a short biography and a high-resolution digital photo of yourself of at least 300 dots per inch (DPI) resolution.

E-mail manuscripts as Microsoft Word attachments to: editor@perconcordiam.org
Why the OSCE's Approach to Conflict Prevention and Conflict Management Remains Important

Ambassador Herbert Salber
Director, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe's Conflict Prevention Centre

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, or OSCE, is first and foremost a regional security organization, an inclusive forum with 56 participating states spanning the Eurasian and transatlantic divides. A bridge-builder, the OSCE has linked a diverse geographic space, a varied group of states and their societies, as well as different cultures, religions and national identities.

The OSCE foundation was laid down 30 to 35 years ago — an ambitious endeavor that continues to be a work in progress, reflecting the changing security needs of its participating states as well as the evolving context of European and international affairs. During the Cold War, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the OSCE's forerunner, conceived and adopted a concept of common, comprehensive, cooperative and indivisible security with three complementary parts: politico-military, economic-environmental and human dimensions. The OSCE continues to be an organization based on principles and commitments that its participating states agreed upon as early as 1975 with the accord known as the Helsinki Final Act.

Although it did not develop into a pre-eminent pan-European security organization in the aftermath of the Cold War, as so many had envisioned, the OSCE emerged as one of the leading European organizations in advancing new thinking and active engagement on conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. Taking a broad approach to conflict prevention, OSCE activities, particularly through the organization's field operations, have included early warning and preventive action in the emerging phases of a conflict as well as crisis management and preventing the re-emergence of conflicts. Among the OSCE's post-conflict rehabilitation efforts, honed in the aftermath of the wars in the former Yugoslavia, are capacity and institution building such as democracy building and good governance, the training of a multi-ethnic police force, educational reforms or guaranteeing and safeguarding national minority rights.

The OSCE can rely on an extensive toolbox of conflict resolution instruments: regular political dialogue and exchange of views among its participating states in the Permanent Council; the network of OSCE field operations; permanent institutions like the Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities; the Office for Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights, or ODIHR; the Office of the Representative on Freedom of the Media and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. These tools are complemented by various ad hoc mechanisms applied whenever needed: special/personal representatives of the chairman-in-office, fact-finding missions, task forces or steering groups.

Also, the OSCE has a number of mechanisms and procedures related to early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management. These include a series of confidence-building and security measures that can be used in situations of interstate conflicts but also in the case of conflicts within states to foster confidence and cooperation among different political, ethnic and religious communities.

When it comes to some of the best practices in conflict prevention and resolution from the OSCE perspective, there are several things to emphasize. First, from a historical perspective, the OSCE itself is a model of conflict prevention and peace building in practice. Second, many of the OSCE’s best practices in conflict prevention and conflict resolution are well-tested: the creation of specialized field presences as a response to crisis and conflict situations, including preventing spillover of armed conflicts; the deployment of monitoring missions, as in the case of the Border Monitoring Mission to Georgia in the late 1990s and the Military Monitoring Officers after the war in Georgia in August 2008; the Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities for purposes of early warning and prevention in the area of national minority rights; the ODIHR for monitoring human rights violations; or specific mechanisms and procedures, including confidence and security building measures, such as those contained in the 1999 Vienna Document.

The search for constructive and meaningful ways to enhance the OSCE’s mandate for conflict prevention and conflict management in a new European security environment continues into the 21st century — a positive sign there is still room for innovative and policy relevant approaches. This is evident in the ongoing dialogue on the future of European security and with it, Russia’s proposal for a European security treaty, known as the Corfu Process after the meeting of OSCE participating states’ foreign ministers in 2009 on the Greek island of Corfu.

It is a crucial dialogue, coming at a time when there is a need to consider our way forward on how to prevent and resolve long-standing conflicts. □
The Myth of 'FROZEN CONFLICTS'

Transcending Illusive Dilemmas
Dr. Filon Morar

The pernicious character of the term “frozen conflicts” is striking. Yet it is still largely employed even if manifestly inappropriate. Embracing the term frozen conflicts could amount to a *hypocritical approach* that claims the situation is frozen while the post-conflict effects are visible and evolving, an *ostrich approach* that pretends we cannot see the imminent danger, or a *cynical approach* that assumes that insofar as the conflict is not imminently re-erupting, this is someone else’s problem.
The term frozen conflicts is deceiving; it erroneously suggests that a conflict could be put on hold as one could press the pause button of a remote control. Nothing remains unaltered ad infinitum in either the physical world or in the political world, either in a home refrigerator or in the Black Sea-South Caucasus area. The very existence of any form of life inescapably involves alteration and is manifestly placed under the sign of change. Territorial conflicts without lasting solutions could not escape the alterability of a lingering situation in which almost all sides, far from idly waiting, are attempting to differently affect a status quo that all directly involved parties equally find unattractive and distant to their ultimate goals. This profound discontent seems not to have a natural tendency to act as stimuli for negotiation and compromise as some players find this blurred situation to their interest.

Entities with ambiguous legal, regional and international status describe rather a protracted conflict with a high likelihood to be abruptly “de-frozen” without effectively transcending the “grey zone” condition, as has been the case with South Ossetia in 2008. In fact, since all directly involved parties feel disappointingly served by the status quo, the so-called frozen conflicts are just postponed conflicts. There is a high probability of reigniting the conflict after years of time lost by dragging feet. Starting from this standpoint, the paper aims at addressing four points:

1. What do protracted conflicts share as core elements? What features essentially distinguish them?
2. What are the implicit propositions of the illusive dilemmas regarding protracted conflicts?
3. What are the main impediments and obstructive factors? Who are the spoilers?
4. What solutions could be imagined?

TERMINOLOGY AND DEFINING TRAITS
Alternative language has been put forward to describe the phenomenon: unsolved, protracted, stagnant, enduring, gridlocked or prolonged conflicts. Terminology will not lead to solutions through semantics, as taxonomies alone will not advance us much in interpretation. Then what is the benefit of a debate about the term frozen conflicts? The utility of questioning the term is that the expression frozen conflicts encapsulates the very essence of the unfortunate stereotypical approach to unsolved conflicts: The conflict remains on ice until a solution emerges. Two powerful interdependent myths foster this unrealistic approach: (1) solutions appear by themselves while (2) the motionless actors await the miracle. What could really help is acknowledging that frozen conflicts are not anodyne in their apparently polar stationary appearance. Time does not necessarily positively contribute to conflict resolution and protracted conflicts are constantly germinating new outcomes and realities, which foments new instances for discontent and conflict.

The term protracted conflicts is often used to describe the disputes in the extended Black Sea area: Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh. There are other territorial disputes that haven’t been resolved, such as the Western Sahara issue in the decolonization context, the Palestinian issue or Cyprus. Nonetheless, these cases have their own historically, geographically, demographically and politically distinctive traits. The Black Sea-South Caucasus protracted conflicts, while having their own peculiarities, share a number of common denominators. The most important are that the four entities declared their independence after violent wars at the beginning of post-Soviet era; all share a Soviet past; all experience the current reality of the paramount regional influence of Moscow in overtly or indirectly supporting the secessionists; and all find themselves at a confluence point between different regional and international actors’ interests. The conflicts that arose in newly recognized states after the dismantling of the Soviet Union pitted inevitably fragile states against separatist entities supported by Russia (and Armenia in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh). Whereas as parallels with other cases could be inapt, nonetheless it is not enough that some countries declare a case like Kosovo sui generis when there were signs that others will consider it rather a relevant precedent.2

DECODING PERVERSIVE MYTHS ON FROZEN CONFLICTS
There are striking discrepancies as one compares the conflict moments and the post-conflict times. Usually, external actors, states and nonstate, international and regional organizations rush to stop the violence or limit the escalation of the conflict in the first stage (Rwanda and other cases notwithstanding). Subsequently, there is a certain complacency that annihilates further enthusiasm for decisive actions toward a durable solution. Resolution is delayed for another, more hopeful time under the pressure to put an end to the immediate political turmoil and the humanitarian urgency. Far from being resolved, the conflict becomes more pervasive and insidious. It carries on below the radars of the international media or international relations and will never cease to generate outcomes and new realities even if classified as a frozen conflict. The first false dilemma is how to transcend the post-conflict external actors’ paralysis when faced with parties having such conflicting aims and strong resentments. How do you explain this lethargy beyond the facile justification of international fatigue or scarcity of resources easily perceived in similar cases in Africa or Asia?
First, protracted conflicts are complex conflicts. This implies they are not easy to resolve and require time to address all intricacies of the case. This raises the question of how to overcome a frozen framework when conflicting parties are reluctant to bridge their differences. Moreover, how do you achieve reconciliation and confidence building when there is no trust or will to engage?

Second, all these protracted conflicts share the inescapable influence of a protector state enjoying overwhelming regional clout and diverse and historical leverage on various local actors. The corollary of the second trait, and equally the traditional reasoning, is that no solution could circumvent the will and the interest of the protector regional power, i.e., the Russian Federation.

The first argument on complexity is generally valid. However, it tends to ignore that time could work in the sense of augmenting the complexity, not necessarily easing it in a natural, quasi-mechanical way. In the absence of adequate actions, trust and reconciliation do not present themselves unprovoked. On the contrary, propaganda on both sides could deepen the cleavages. The external actors commonly tend to limit official contacts with entities, while the parent states usually have pursued an isolation policy regarding separatists. Azerbaijan, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova hope that isolation will engender the failure of the separatist regimes and prompt the collapse of the de facto states. Quite the opposite, it inevitably turned the separatists toward illegal ways to get resources, undermining the parent state consolidation. It also strengthens the indispensability argument of the protector state and its control of the situation. The expectative and the reserved attitude of the international community with respect to official or unofficial contacts with separatists further strengthened the reality of a dilemmatic impasse. Hence, a better approach for external actors and parent states regarding separatists would be finding ways to engage with the population and the political actors in the entities, thus creating the capacity of leverage and multiple dependencies more likely to lead to a mediated, largely accepted cohabitation formula or compromise.

The second argument is a misleading approach to a false dilemma. Sensibly, Russia cannot be eluded in finding a durable, mutually acceptable solution to many regional protracted conflicts. Yet, it has to be encouraged to participate in finding one. It would be self-delusionary to expect that the protector state that guarantees the very existence of the separatist entity will not act in a conservative manner toward its own and the protected entity’s interests. The patron state seems to have strong reasons in maintaining the status quo as it finds the current situation maximizing its capacity to keep control on the unfolding of the protracted conflicts’ narratives and on what it perceives as expansionist tendencies of other organizations or states in its “legitimate sphere of influence.” Moscow’s strategic policy paradigm concerning the protracted conflicts has been described as a “controlled instability.”

Consequently, other actors, mainly the EU, U.N., Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or OSCE, Council of Europe and individual states should strive to create an environment conducive to stimulate not only the conflicting parties, but also the protector power to generate multifaceted solutions originated from several centers, not only from a unilateral stand. To that end, the regional and international actors genuinely interested in conflict resolution should multiply contacts, condition economic assistance, and apply political pressure instead of shielding themselves in an illusory protective retractile mood, hoping that parties or the protector power will find the solution.

In fact, it is very unlikely that directly involved parties will reach a solution as they have divergent aims, often with irreconcilable perspectives. Here the difficulty comes from the fact that the protector state argues that it is not officially involved on the side of one party, and pretends a neutral status. For example, once the Russian peacekeeping forces in South Ossetia and Abkhazia were relabeled after August 2008 as Russian military and border police forces, the international community faced a new paradigm: The protector state was acting at the request of the separatist regimes, which are now officially recognized by it. The protector state claims to be temporarily assisting the separatists to protect themselves. Even if one cannot simultaneously be judge and party, Russia is the only accepted security guarantor in South Ossetia and Abkhazia because the two separatist entities mistrust intervening organizations such as the EU Monitoring Mission, or EUMM, and the U.N. Observer Mission in Georgia, and thus limit their roles. EUMM, the only international actor remaining in Georgia, does not monitor the ceasefire agreement beyond the administrative separation line between the two separatist provinces and has a limited role through the Incidents Prevention Mechanism as it is confined to Georgia-controlled territory. Simply, de facto governments and Russia are interpreting EUMM’s mandate as covering only Georgia proper. The expression “throughout Georgia” from the ceasefire agreement is interpreted by Russia and separatists through the prism of South Ossetia and Abkhazia now being recognized states with security guarantees provided by Russia.

**DETERRING FACTORS FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION**

1. *The prestige inhibition*

One dissuasive argument for dealing with protracted
conflicts is the no glory expectation. For external actors, who could play a role in obtaining a settlement, the intricate protracted conflicts pose the challenge of investing time and resources without high likelihood of extracting international credit easily convertible in domestic political capital. Leaders of states or organizations could find appreciation if they end a conflict or successfully mediate a crisis. Dealing with protracted conflicts is less likely a glorious path as it does not guarantee immediate success. Moreover, the potential accord will likely take place behind the scenes, far from media coverage, and be the result of several actors’ endeavors over an extended period of time. As preventing a crisis from erupting into violent conflict is less spectacular, ending a protracted conflict seems to be less heroic than ending an active conflict that could be displayed as a major accomplishment to the national constituency or to the member states.

Nevertheless, manifest dividends can be grasped by state actors’ bureaucracies, or international or regional organizations less placed than politicians under the sign of ephemeral gains, and more concerned about the symbolic geopolitical display of capacity to persuade and exert power pressure. Because these organizations are also under the inescapable weight of the member states’ collective decision-making process, the EU, U.N., NATO and OSCE could assume greater roles. At the same time, neighboring countries are concerned less with prestige bonuses and primarily preoccupied by the security in their proximity areas — therefore, directly and strongly attached to the idea of conflict resolution through a lasting mutually agreeable solution to protracted conflicts.

2. Influence of and relationships with the protector power

The separatist entities in the Black Sea and Caucasus area play a front-line role in the geopolitical grand design in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Moscow’s once-undisputed hegemony in the region is now challenged by international and regional actors (United States, NATO and EU) and by regional powers (Turkey and Iran). The post-1989 clash of interests and projection of influence in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union between Russia and the West have been manifest in both antagonistic expressions (Russia reaffirming its strategic “near abroad” interests and denouncing Western interferences) and in terms of mutual interests (co-operation against terrorism and trafficking). Against the backdrop of a declining regional power, whose place is claimed by another established or emergent power, a peaceful transition of power in international relations is less likely to occur across “security communities” (those sharing different political and social organizational paradigms) but is more probable within “clubs sharing similar values and institutions” (inducing collective identities and trust). As Russia attempts to recreate its own “security community” and the separatist entities break away from Western-oriented parent states, it seems that the secessionist disputes are in the core of the new competitive geopolitics in Eurasia. Nevertheless, there is no reason to believe in an inescapable conflict between the West and Russia over separatist entities. On one hand, the ideological divide is not dramatic: Russia, despite the alleged recent democratic regress, is far from being a totalitarian state and its reassertion of past glamour is a way to overcome domestic economic problems as
Sida Gazaryan visits her husband’s tomb in Nagorno-Karabakh’s main city of Stepanakert in October 2009. Her husband, Ararat, died in fighting between forces from Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1993. Since the end of the war in 1994, peace has been elusive in the region.

well as its own separatist issues in the North Caucasus. On the other hand, the EU is not yet a global or regional political and military power matching its own economic strength. From this perspective, further democratic developments inside Russia and an engaging strategy by the Euro-Atlantic community could generate acceptance of a shared influence in the area based on common interests, as has happened in the Asia-Pacific region. That could set up a more promising prospect for protracted conflicts’ resolution but will not automatically bring a solution.

Both the secessionist regimes and political and economic segments of the parent states entertain a complex network of ties with the former hegemon. One can notice a certain ambiguity and duplicity of former communists and special services in Moldova when it comes to the management of relationships with the West and Russia, and with separatist Transnistria. It seems unavoidable that some leaders in the parent state have double allegiances marked by close ties to the legacy Soviet apparatus and contemporary business interests. However, after the Rose revolution in 2003, a more trenchant (yet less effective) attitude has been adopted by the Georgian government toward Russia and the secessionist claims. Azerbaijan opened toward the West, but preserved political and oil ties with Russia, which can influence Armenia on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue.

Russia’s support of separatist regimes thus far allows them to subsist, but not to flourish. The kleptocratic regimes benefiting from the unclear international status of the enclaves they run sometimes despotically are not in a rush for a definitive solution as they think time plays in their favor. The opposition in Transnistria states that the non-recognition is a “golden paradise” for separatist leaders who control industry revenues and own lucrative businesses. After the war in South Ossetia, there were allegations that its leader, Eduard Kokoity, and his acolytes diverted money from Moscow into private pockets instead of investing in reconstruction. Although Russian-led investigations were launched, Moscow seems to have accepted the fact that there is no other alternative to the loyalty of the former wrestler turned president.

The EU also has an ambiguous stand on protracted conflicts as various member states adopt different attitudes toward the protector state. Post-Lisbon Treaty common foreign policy should bring more action-oriented strategies on the Eastern Neighborhood policy. One important step EU leaders Catherine Ashton and Herman van Rompuy should embark upon is to extend and enforce the EU delegations in the countries in the region. A passive European Union merely acknowledging the Russian capacity to influence the protracted conflicts is in fact
deceiving itself as it awaits a conflict settlement from existing Russian-dominated negotiation mechanisms, despite the fact that it recognizes that the protector state has little interest in finding solutions.9

3. New realities, old problems
The separatist entities’ resemblance of statehood, with governments, constitutions, elections, armies, etc., creates new realities that are strong impediments for conflict resolution. The time legitimacy created by such actions is a predictable corollary.10

The post-2008, five-day war in South Ossetia created a new reality, but did not profoundly change the situation in its essence: The frozen war was refrozen after five hot-war days. The new reality features Georgia controlling less territory than before, Russia recognizing the two separatist entities and overtly being involved in supporting their regimes and enforcing its footprint in their territories. These are only the recent effects.

South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh are simulating quasi-independence and statehood by creating new realities and pushing into derision the false impression suggested by the term frozen conflicts. The Transnistrian separatist government accumulated a $1.8 billion debt to Gazprom,11 which will likely have some effect in the event of reunification with Moldova. Russia has more than 7,000 troops stationed in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and 1,500 in Transnistria. Moscow will build or extend military bases in Ochamchire and Gudauta in Abkhazia and in Kanchaveti in South Ossetia.

Abkhazia conceded its railway system to Russia for 10 years. The separatist de facto governments allegedly allowed properties of the displaced to be transferred to other people, making return problematic, if not impossible. The demographics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia changed radically. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that there are 230,000 displaced persons currently in Georgia.12 More than 800,000 Azerbaijanis were displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh and the other six districts occupied by Armenia after the war; 230,000 Armenians who lived in Azerbaijan are trying to rebuild new lives. Moreover, hundreds of incidents are reported each year, such as shelling, shootings, kidnappings, explosions and mines placed along the administrative separation lines. Concerning Nagorno-Karabakh, in March 2009 alone, cross-boundary incidents claimed the lives of 16 people.13 According to EUMM records, there were 173 security related occurrences in December 2009 on the administrative separation lines between Georgia and the separatist regions. In addition, Russia issued passports to a large number of people living in the separatist territories, thus self-imposing the duty to protect its citizens.

Hence, the protracted conflicts produce various effects. The political effects range from legitimization a contrario of the separatist regime that opposes the parent state and uses time in its favor in order to consolidate de facto authority. This impedes the parent state from fulfilling its democratic responsibilities and may result in the government yielding to the temptation to use state resources to undermine the opposition in the name of the fight against the separatists, thereby hindering achievement of its political cooperation agenda. In addition, the economic effects of protracted conflict include economic regress and redirection of resources committed to security.

4. Inconsistency and hesitations
Hesitation by external actors and parent states to engage in extended dialogue with separatists and the protector power is justified by reservations for a de facto recognition. Faced with the dilemma of balancing the involvement and engagement of separatists with the political considerations of legitimacy and de facto recognitions of separatists, parent states and external actors have generally opted for isolation strategies.

Separatist governments have been in place for almost 20 years. To overcome this apparent dilemma, one has to admit that frozen conflicts cannot be solved through an approach based on the belief of a convenient self-fulfilling prophecy. Therefore, it would be productive to acknowledge their existence. While not amounting to recognition, admitting their existence and increasing assistance and contacts with civil society and certain political entities in the secessionist entities seems the most reasonable way to overcome the current stalemate.

The apprehensions and reservations of parent states are justified. Yet they have to acknowledge that neither force, nor political intransigence and isolation could bring about a viable and lasting solution. It makes acrimonies bitter and enroots the feeling that the separation is the unique solution, while legitimizing the protector state’s influence. Isolation proves also to be counterproductive as it pushes the separatist entities further in the direction of the protector state. Isolation strengthens the status quo as both sides are further inescapably entrenched into their “fortified” clashing positions. The role of international actors in this context is also sensitive. International stabilization missions have only operated on Georgian territory, thus providing arguments to the de facto governments in Sukhumi and Tskhinvali that the EU and other Western entities are biased in favor of Georgia.

ENDING PROTRACTED CONFLICTS
Compared to the reforms and transformations it induced in Eastern Europe and the Balkans with the prospect of EU and NATO integration, the EU has a more limited maneuverability in its new Eastern neighborhood. The EU still has the option of increasing its political mediation efforts and economic assistance. As the first instrument has not proven
itself to be effective, the EU should consider focusing on supporting further economic development in Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus and South Caucasus in exchange for extended democratic reforms in these countries. In return, this could become attractive for separatist entities and generate benign models to resolve protracted conflicts in the eastern EU’s neighborhood.

In addition to political mediation, economic assistance, human rights and humanitarian assistance, the EU should continue to push to be a part of the peacekeeping missions or extended civilian monitoring missions. It should thus assume a greater security role within a consistent conflict resolution strategy in its eastern neighborhood. EUMM is not the best example to follow since it has no access to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The EU Neighborhood Policy could be seen as a mechanism through which risks are diminished by promoting and supporting wide reforms that would transform the neighboring countries according to a normative EU framework. To that end, allotted resources should match promises.

A solution that is not mutually agreed upon is worse than delaying resolution as it is not sustainable, yet the indefinite postponement consolidates a non-agreed solution. Both options are perilous and unlikely to bring stability. The risk of a confrontational approach toward the regional major power and protector state is to engage in a zero-sum game, from a position of inferiority, not having the prospect to match its capacity for obstructionist moves. Consequently, the EU should gradually consolidate its capacity of influence, which requires greater involvement, including separatist entities.

A viable and enduring solution seems less likely to surface from a coercive approach than to emerge from two interlinked agendas. First, the parent state should be able to exert an irresistible attraction in terms of respect for individual liberties, rights, and living standards that can diminish the separatist appetite. The parent state has to focus on developing economically and strengthening democratic institutions and practices to marginalize propaganda used by separatists to discredit the parent state. Citizens in the separatist entity will then wield impressive pressure on the separatist leaders for a rapprochement that eventually could lead to a lasting solution. The underlying dilemma surrounds effectively navigating between not officially endorsing the secessionist regime or de facto recognizing it, while simultaneously creating opportunities to attract separatists by allowing a certain level of mutual trade, travel and property rights that will create a mutual-interest network. The alternative is that the secessionists will increasingly rely on a protector state and increase alienation in relation to the parent state. A prosperous and democratic parent state would alleviate the concerns of the people in the separatist entities to such an alternative. Furthermore, parent states must resist the temptation to respond to nondemocratic de facto entities by transforming themselves into such regimes by using the “unity against separatists” rhetoric to justify deviations from democracy.

Second, the support of the international community should not be limited to refusing to recognize the separatists, but also to extend the support for democratization and institutional development of the parent state in order to create the premises for a rayonnement in the region, and to be attractive to separatists. At the same time, together with the parent state, it should try to encourage democracy and genuine pluralism in the separatist entities. This approach of winning hearts and minds is preferable to unofficially doing business with separatists without gaining any political leverage on the democratic path and undermining the possibility for the parent state to create benign interdependencies with separatists. The precondition then would be for the parent state to adopt a constructive approach, not to try to isolate and cut all contacts with people in separatists’ controlled territory.

The separatist leaders should not be presumed irrational actors susceptible to irresponsible actions: They have much at stake, particularly those that came to power in the recent past. They may feel they have not been offered enough incentives to negotiate, or that they still feel threatened in their vital interests of survival and privilege. The vast majority of the population did not benefit from the de facto quasi-independence, and could be attracted by good examples from the parent state. The international community should also consistently support the parent state by marginalizing the patron state’s intervention in separatist entities. The end result should be a power-sharing formula and inclusivity that would alleviate the apprehensions of persecution and guarantee secessionists participation or large autonomy rather than sovereignty.

CONCERTED STRATEGY

South Ossetia provides an illustrative and tragic example that contradicts the hypothesis that solutions to frozen conflicts could be postponed sine die, operating with the presumption that time will naturally fix the issue.

Unresolved conflicts are not socially or politically neutral. They constantly create new effects, consolidating a new situation. The term frozen conflicts per se is a preposterous oxymoron because the association it proposes between “conflicts,” by their nature dynamic, and “frozen,” a physical state suggesting immobility. An entire new generation of voters in breakaway regions knows only the reality of separation.
Cryogenics cannot be considered a viable response to protracted conflicts, which are perpetuated through a deceptive ember fire. The volcanic pressure of a protracted conflict could erupt anytime; a dormant volcano is not necessarily extinct. Contrary to the natural phenomena, the social and political spheres could escape implacability. Not acting to find a mutually agreeable solution to prolonged conflicts amounts to irresponsibly waiting for the inevitable to happen. There was nothing inevitable in the flare-up of the August 2008 conflict in Georgia that killed hundreds and displaced 160,000.

Thus, the international community is not really facing a dilemma concerning the protracted conflicts. The myth of frozen conflicts, conflicts that in fact tend to thaw and perpetuate, is an illusion. Reconciliation and mutually acceptable compromise settlements are not emerging by themselves. In fact, not seeking to solve the conflict means supporting the status quo. Nevertheless, a concerted strategy combining sustained regional and international support for further stabilization and democratization of the parent states, pressure on the protector state and engaging separatists could work.

5. See for example http://www.rferl.org/content/Moldova_Rebel_Region_Says_Belongs_With_Russia/18118668.html about Moldovan situation with Transnistria.
7. International Crisis Group, Moldova: Regional Tensions Over Transnistria, Report no. 157, June 2004, notes that a complex web of businessmen from Transnistria, Ukraine, Russia and Moldova “constitute a well financed lobby that wishes to uphold the status quo.”
8. Gregory Feller, No End of Frozen Conflict in Moldova’s Transdniestra, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty (August 18, 2009); http://www.rferl.org/content/No_End_Of_Frozen_Conflict_In_Moldova’s_Tirasnister/1902579.html.
10. Reuters news service, Moldova Rebel Region Says Belongs With Russia, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty (September 1, 2009); http://www.rferl.org/content/Moldova_Rebel_Region_Says_Belongs_With_Russia/18118668.html.
11. Socor, Moscow, Tiraspol Sidelining the West.
Soviet special military units decontaminate trees near the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in Ukraine. The plant’s reactor exploded in April 1986, destroying the reactor core and setting off one of the biggest man-made disasters of the 20th century.
On April 26, 1986, at 1:23 a.m., an accident occurred at unit #4 of Ukraine’s Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant during a routine shutdown for repairs after two years of operation. The reactor exploded, destroying the reactor core. This was one of the biggest disasters of the 20th century, and hundreds of thousands of people suffered as a result; 100,202 people were evacuated from the disaster area. The cleanup following the catastrophe continues to this day.

Throughout the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st centuries, the world has seen a series of both natural and man-made disasters and emergencies.

- June 1997 and November 1999: Massive flooding in Europe, with loss of human life and major material damage.
- June 1998: A cyclone in India claimed more than 10,000 lives.
- June 1998: Catastrophic flooding of China’s Yangtze River killed 3,000 and caused an estimated $30 billion in damage.
- Dec. 26, 2003: A magnitude 6.35 earthquake struck Bam, Iran, killing around 40,000 people and injuring another 30,000.
- April 22, 2004: Two goods trains carrying liquid fuel and gas collided in Ryongchon, North Korea, and the resultant explosion destroyed a nearby passenger train, the station itself and the surrounding village, killing 157 and wounding more than 1,300.
- Dec. 26, 2004: An earthquake struck Southeast Asia, killing more than 230,000 people, while hundreds of thousands went missing and millions were left homeless.
- August 27, 2005: Hurricane Katrina destroyed thousands of buildings and homes, killed an estimated 790 people, injured hundreds of thousands, caused massive flooding, and forced the evacuation of more than 500,000 residents from New Orleans.
- August 2009: An accident at Russia’s Sayano-Shushenskaya power station caused the deaths of 75 people and the partial destruction of the station, with damage running into the billions.
- There is also a new factor causing disasters — international terrorism. These horrific acts of terror are but a few examples of events that required significant emergency management:
  - Sept. 11, 2001: Terrorist attacks in the United States killed more than 2,800 people.
  - March 11, 2004: Terrorist attack in Madrid, Spain, killed 200 people and injured more than 1,500.
  - Sept. 1-3, 2004: Terrorist attack in Beslan, North Ossetia, Russia, where more than 1,200 children and adults were held hostage, killed 331 people, including 186 children; more than 500 people were injured.

The probability of disasters and emergencies is greatly increased by phenomena such as rapid technical progress, industrial development, a swelling planetary population, discontent, ethnic conflicts, ultranationalism and intrastate feuding, the world financial and economic crisis of 2008-2009, and acts of terrorism. This article proposes a review of the approaches to civil-military relations in the management of disasters and emergencies.

National disasters and emergencies

Civil-military relations are of great importance in the management of disasters and emergencies. State legislation often provides for a variety of approaches to engage the armed forces and other militarized units in emergency management. National disasters, those that occur within the borders of a state, and other emergencies pose a number of problematic issues for a nation’s government in organizing a response and cleanup, such as:
• Is it necessary to engage the armed forces in a rescue operation?
• Which specific armed forces units should be engaged, and in what numbers?
• What tasks should they be given?
• Who will be in command of these armed forces units, and to whom will they report during the rescue operation?
• Who will organize measures for the material and technical support of troops, and how?
• What social guarantees will be provided by the state for those participating in a rescue (or reconstruction) operation: military servicemen and their families?

Though this list is by no means exhaustive, world experience and practice in the management of both natural and man-made disasters and emergencies allow us to offer generalized answers to most of these questions. By reviewing specific examples from various countries, where the management of man-made and natural disasters and emergencies was organized with the engagement of armed forces units, an attempt to systematize responses to the questions posed above can be made.

For the cleanup of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, or NPP, accident in 1986, the largest radiation catastrophe of the 20th century, the government of the former USSR deployed not only individual units of the Soviet armed forces, but entire formations. Under a special order of the USSR Council of Ministers, army aviation units (helicopters) were deployed in the days immediately following the accident. Mobilization of radiation, chemical and biological protection, and civil defense units began, mainly consisting of reservists. Subsequently, all of these units were concentrated in a 30-kilometer zone around the accident site. In order to organize, lead and manage the execution of measures and tasks to clean up the accident, a special government commission was created, which coordinated the activities of all organizations engaged in the accident cleanup. The immediate management and command of troops deployed was effected via the USSR Operational Civil Defense Group, placed under the command of a general and subordinate to a special government.
committee. The main tasks and measures performed by the troops were:

- Performing radiation monitoring, with the identification and demarcation of districts and local areas, as well as premises, contaminated with radioactivity.
- Removing radioactive graphite and other radioactive materials from the roofs of buildings and installations of the third unit and territory of the NPP.
- Decontamination operations across the NPP territory, including contaminated areas, roads, buildings, installations and residential buildings.
- Performing dosimetric monitoring of people and equipment.
- Guarding restricted areas in contaminated areas.

Units of the armed forces deployed for cleanup operations at the Chernobyl NPP used standard-issue arms and equipment to perform the tasks delegated to them. Material and technical stocks, fuel and lubricants, and food for personnel were provided from state sources.

The government used calculations provided by civilian specialists in the field of nuclear energy to establish the maximum period of radiation exposure for personnel, the maximum radiation levels and the degree of radioactive contamination of food, as well as uniforms, special protective clothing, equipment, technical equipment, etc. Subsequently, as the situation stabilized and the level of radiation fell, the government established the maximum time for personnel to be present in the cleanup zone. In order to provide social protection for people who participated in the cleanup of the Chernobyl NPP accident, on February 28, 1991, Ukraine passed a law “On the Status and Social Protection of Citizens who Suffered as a Result of the Chernobyl Disaster,” which also stipulates concessions and other social protection measures for military servicemen who participated in the cleanup.

Based on the experience of the Chernobyl cleanup, a special order of the USSR Council of Ministers in 1988 confirmed the decision to create several new units, the main purpose of which was to be management of accidents at nuclear power plants and other facilities posing radiation hazards. One such unit, a self-standing mobile radiation, chemical and biological protection brigade, was deployed in an area of Ukraine where there are five nuclear power plants. The personnel in this formation received special training. The activities of units are regulated by a specially-developed manual. During the period of their existence, from 1988 to 2003, the units of this formation participated in the practical cleanup of the Chernobyl NPP, an accident involving the spillage of hazardous chemicals at the Lisichansk railroad station (Lugansk region, Ukraine) in 1991, extinguishing fires on multiple occasions in Lugansk region, and in a number of other rescue and reconstruction operations. In connection with reforms of the Ukraine Armed Forces, this unit was disbanded in 2003.

During the summer of 1997, there was heavy flooding in the Vistula and Odra river basins in Poland. The flooding was caused by three waves of torrential rain. The first flood reports appeared on July 6, 1987. Two days later, the Polish government established a crisis committee that issued a resolution to mobilize army, police and fire units. A total of 75,000 men and women serving in the military, police and fire services supported rescue operations, utilizing a large number of river-borne equipment, boats, road vehicles, helicopters, winged aircraft and other special equipment. The disaster zone covered more than 30 percent of Poland’s total landmass, a zone from which 160,000 people were evacuated. Fifty-four people died during the initial days of the disaster, and the material damage amounted to around $5 billion. In a period of six hours, the water level rose 6 meters. According to experts, this was the largest military-civilian operation since World War II. The command and management of the forces deployed, including military units, were performed by the Crisis Committee.

On August 27, 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck the southern U.S. states of Louisiana, Alabama and Mississippi, bringing widespread destruction and flooding. Louisiana suffered most, with approximately 30 percent of New Orleans under water three days later. Power supply, communications, water and sewer systems had failed; a large number of buildings, installations and homes had been destroyed or heavily damaged; and more than 500,000 residents remained in the city. Chaos reigned in New Orleans: convicts who had not been evacuated managed to escape from the local jails, and there were cases of looting and a threat of infectious diseases. Rescue efforts, as well as the distribution of drinking water and food to victims, were hampered by flooding over large areas as the water depths reached 6-8 meters in some places. From the first days of the catastrophe, the government resolved to involve the National Guard and the U.S. Coast Guard in the rescue operation. In the initial stage of the operation, the main task of the military units was to perform rescues and organize the evacuation of affected city residents. As the situation worsened and cases of looting became more frequent, the government resolved to introduce martial law in New Orleans. In addition to the tasks of rescuing people and organizing the evacuation of flood victims, the military was also tasked with maintaining public order, fighting looters, and providing security and escorts for shipments of humanitarian aid for the
victims. Once the main evacuation of residents was complete, between 10,000 and 15,000 residents remained in the city — people who were either unable to evacuate in time, or who consciously chose to remain in the city. In order to prevent the spread of infectious disease among the remaining residents, and to prevent fires and rioting, the government decided to begin a forced evacuation of the remaining population. The execution of this task was also delegated to special groups of the U.S. National Guard and the police. The execution of rescue and reconstruction operations required tens of thousands of troops, drawn from the National Guard, the Coast Guard and the U.S. Army. The government declared that this operation was the largest federal rescue operation ever.

On July 15, 2007, a man-made disaster occurred as 15 railroad tankers on transit through Ukraine were derailed in Lvov Region, resulting in spillage of the train’s cargo: yellow phosphor, an extremely hazardous chemical. Special accident and rescue units of the Ukraine Ministry for Emergencies were engaged in the cleanup, alongside military engineering units attached to the Ministry of Transport and Communications, and radiation, chemical and biological protection units of the Ministry of Defense, using special equipment.

In the second half of August 2007, almost the entire territory of Greece was covered in massive forest fires. Operations to rescue people and extinguish the fires were hampered by the complex terrain in mountainous, forested areas. The Greek government, due to the insufficient number of local accident and rescue units, was forced to call for assistance from the international community, in the form of both material and human resources. Accident, rescue and specialized units from 20 different countries participated in this operation, including units from Russia, France, Germany and the U.S., as well as troops attached to the armed services of NATO.

Based on the above examples of cleanup of national disasters and emergencies, the following general conclusions can be drawn:

1. Given major disasters and emergencies, both natural and man-made, there is almost always a need to engage units of the armed forces in rescue and cleanup operations.
2. Command over the activities of deployed troops is performed by national committees managing disaster and emergency cleanup operations, via specially-created military command agencies.
3. The tasks set are executed by units of the armed forces, usually using standard-issue arms and equipment.
4. Material and technical resources in support of troop activity are provided, as a rule, from state material and other resources.
5. The procedure for engaging military units for the cleanup of disasters and emergencies is regulated by law or government decree.

**COMPLEX EMERGENCIES**

Civil-military relations are more complicated in the event of cross-border disasters. Analysis of crisis situations encountered in recent decades by the U.N. Security Council show that the root causes of such situations were nonmilitary problems. In the materials of the Princeton Conference, these are described as “complex emergencies” — a term that has become a feature of the language of international aid, with the following definition:

“A humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where the power structure is fully or to a significant degree disrupted as a result of internal conflict, and which demands international regulation that exceeds the authorities of any one agency or program of the U.N. in the given country.”

Not all situations fit this definition, which roughly defines the situation in Cambodia, Afghanistan, the countries of the Balkans, the Caucasus and some others.

In recent decades, multinational armed forces in various regions of the world have been engaged in numerous humanitarian aid operations. Such cases may be observed in the wake of natural disasters, major acts of terrorism, as a result of the collapse of civil administration or following various conflicts. The tasks and order for engaging national armed forces following major disasters and emergencies within states have been reviewed above. What tasks may be set for armed forces given a complex emergency? The first may be participation in a humanitarian aid operation. The tasks of multinational troops during such operations may include:

- Cleanup of complex emergencies and the reconstruction of the local infrastructure.
- Distribution of aid.
- Transportation of aid and civilians.
- Rendering medical assistance.
- Supporting the operation of critical services.
- The return of displaced civilians.
- Transfer of personal property.

There have been cases where the provision of humanitarian aid has been hindered by one or several armed groups in the operations zone. In such cases, troops may be engaged to protect people providing aid, and to protect the actual goods subject to distribution.

Troops may themselves perform these aid functions, or may provide protection to other organizations that render aid and assistance. Frequently, such assistance is rendered by nongovernmental organizations, or NGOs. In many cases these organizations have little experience of working with the armed forces.

Under certain circumstances, these operations have to be run from the territory of third countries, or from the sea. However, the operations base is usually created in the operations zone itself.

In order to perform such operations, battle and auxiliary troops may be required in cases where efforts to distribute aid meet resistance. Such forces must
be equipped with weapons systems that are suitable for such operations. These situations require the creation of base zones (which usually include air and sea terminals), protected roads and corridors for the delivery of aid, and reliable distribution points for the final delivery of aid to the intended recipients.

Complex emergencies have frequently arisen in states where there have either been no governments or where there are conflicting centers of power. When state structures are heavily disrupted, the government is likely to lose control over large areas of its territory. Complex emergencies, as a rule, are typified by the presence of large groups of displaced persons, fundamentally altering the social structure of the population, increasing the general sense of vulnerability and triggering lawlessness and riots. In addition to their immediate functions, agencies active in the country encounter certain difficulties in the face of deep social changes.

Civil crisis situations have attracted the attention of various civilian organizations, and the representatives of many of these organizations have arrived at the scene prior to military troops; they have sometimes exceeded the latter in numbers and brought greater knowledge of the locality. In each complex emergency, the military component has almost always had to work shoulder-to-shoulder with at least five major agencies of the U.N. responsible for issues related to refugees, children, food, health and development; civilian groups protecting human rights, organizing elections and restoring government structures; and various NGOs.

Obviously, operations to protect humanitarian aid missions during complex emergencies are far from simple and rarely short-lived. In this connection, serious questions arise about troop training, equipment and mobility. The political, social and economic realities of today’s world demand new approaches to civil-military relations during complex emergency management.

ORGANIZING AND EXECUTING DISASTER PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT IN NATO PLANNING

Protecting populations and territories from disasters and emergencies has recently attracted increasing attention from various international organizations, including NATO. As early as 1953, NATO developed a mechanism for Allies to render assistance to one another, given natural disasters and catastrophes of a certain scale. However, this was restricted to signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Further expansion of the NATO mechanism occurred in 1992, when an innovative conference was held at NATO headquarters on rendering aid during natural disasters. More than 40 countries and 20 international organizations took part in this event, organized by the U.N. and the International Federation of the Red Cross, and the result was a new project to allocate military troops and resources to manage natural disasters. Thus, a new agency appeared in NATO: the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center, or EADRCC.

The mission of the EADRCC is to coordinate the deployment of response troops and resources of the 44 countries in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, or EAPC, to ensure that disaster management assistance is offered to the U.N. rapidly and effectively. The EAPC expands the capacities of the international community to respond to large-scale disasters across the expansive territory of the Euro-Atlantic region, which stretches from Vancouver, Canada, to Sakhalin Island, Russia. This region, which includes six of the seven most industrially-developed nations of the world, is most prone to serious natural disasters and man-made catastrophes, while at the same time possessing strong potential to respond to them.

In May of 1995, an important decision was taken by NATO: to extend to partner countries the same principles of mutual assistance that apply to members of the alliance. This decision became a reality in Ukraine in 1995 and again in 1997 during heavy flooding in Central Europe. In accordance with the July 1997 decisions of NATO leadership to further expand practical cooperation with partner countries, the NATO Senior Civil Emergency
Planning Committee, with participation from EAPC, proposed the idea of bringing current policies in the field of responses to natural disasters into line with the current situation.

The new mechanism for responding to natural disasters consists of two main components:

- **Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Units (EADRU)**: Ad hoc sets of national elements, including rescue, medical, transportation and other resources, are provided on a voluntary basis by EAPC countries. EADRU can be deployed in the vicinity of a large-scale natural disaster at the request of an afflicted EAPC country. EAPC members who make a contribution to EADRU in the form of their national elements will take the decision to deploy and will cover the associated running costs.

- **Euro-Atlantic Disaster Coordination Center (EADRC)**: The EADRC, at NATO headquarters, consists of employees of the NATO International Secretariat and a limited staff representing interested NATO member countries and partner countries. Given a natural disaster, the EADRC is capable of providing a core group to assess the impact of the disaster. This group works closely with the local emergencies agency of the afflicted country, and the resident U.N. coordinator ascertains the need for international assistance to clean up the natural disaster. EADRC assumes the task of coordinating any offers of international aid made by EAPC countries with the U.N. During the process of preparing an intervention following a natural disaster, the center develops plans and procedures for the use of EADRU, taking into account the national risk assessment, as well as existing multilateral and bilateral agreements, and response potential. The EADRC also compiles a list of national civilian and military elements available, and it facilitates and promotes operational interoperability by holding joint training and exercises.

**PROTECTING THE PEOPLE**

Disasters and emergencies can cause death, degrade quality of life and provoke massive losses, including the cost of cleanup operations. They do not take account of nationality and do not observe national borders. Therefore, the provision of protections for the population and territories during a disaster or emergency, or given the threat of one, is one of the most important state functions. Ensuring the safety and protection of the public, as well as economic assets and the national heritage from the adverse impact of disasters and emergencies, is seen by the governments of many countries across the world as an integral part of state national security policy and state construction. With this in mind, the international aid community must do everything possible to:

- Coordinate investment in disaster response capacities.
- Enhance coordination and mobilization.
- Improve links in regional aid coordination networks.
- Determine specific projects that will systematically improve processes for delivering aid work together to mobilize the resources necessary to perform these tasks.

It is clear that much can and must be done to find new ways to expand our common efforts to effectively deploy resources to manage the impact of disasters and emergencies. Of significance here is the combination of common, international efforts to develop cooperation and expand the potential to manage disasters and emergencies.

Editor’s note: Sapon is a 2002 graduate of the George C. Marshall Center for European Security Studies senior executive seminar.
The European Union has promised to help Haiti rebuild and Chile recover in the aftermath of the earthquakes that devastated the two nations. The EU is part of a global coalition that has a massive undertaking on its hands: rebuild Haiti and help Chile recover.

More than 215,000 people died in Haiti because of the magnitude 7.0 quake Jan. 12, 2010. A magnitude 8.8 quake — one of the strongest ever recorded — killed about 800 people in Chile on Feb. 27.

Haiti’s earthquake left 300,000 injured, leveled most of Port-au-Prince’s government institutions and infrastructure, destroyed more than 250,000 homes and 30,000 businesses, and left almost 1 million people homeless, Haitian Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive told Agence France-Presse in February 2010. To put the scale of this disaster in perspective, the December 2004 tsunami in Southeast Asia killed about the same number of people but throughout 14 nations.

Strong aftershocks followed the massive Chilean quake that struck near the city of Concepcion, north of the capital Santiago. The quake — 500 times stronger than the Haiti quake — caused a tsunami felt as far away as New Zealand.

Just days after the quake, the EU pledged 440 million euros to help Haitian survivors and rebuild the country. Of that sum, 229 million euros was for immediate humanitarian aid and restoration. The remaining funds were set aside for medium- and long-term rebuilding. Non-EU nations and private donors have pledged more than 945 million euros to help Haiti.

“Haiti starts from scratch, but not alone,” said Kristalina Georgieva, EU commissioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response. At a Feb. 3, 2010 hearing before the European Parliament, she said, “It will be my immediate duty to make sure we Europeans bring to Haiti the best our union has to offer.”

The EU promised 3 million euros in aid to Chile. But Chile did not ask for immediate help from other world organizations, opting to wait until its own disaster response agencies could assess what was needed, Agence France-Presse reported in February 2010. “We are very grateful for people’s good intentions, but let’s let the [Chilean] emergency office get its very specific report on needs done,” Foreign Minister Mariano Fernandez said. Chile did not want “aid from anywhere to be a distraction” from disaster relief, he said. “Any aid that arrives without having been determined to be needed really helps very little.”

Chile’s infrastructure did not sustain as much damage as Haiti’s, though the quake and aftershocks destroyed or damaged an estimated 1.5 million structures. European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso said in a news release that Europe is willing to “do anything necessary to assist the Chilean authorities in this difficult moment.”

More than 90 percent of Europeans want a larger role in global crisis response, Georgieva said. That should benefit Haitians, who live in one of the world’s most impoverished countries. International agencies estimate it will cost up to 8 billion euros to rebuild the nation.

The EU response to Haiti’s crisis has been decisive. The union sent a mission to help the Haitian government re-establish order and help with rescue operations. Initial responses came from: Austria, Belgium, Britain, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. The EU also promised to mount a military operation to bring shelters to Haiti before the rainy season starts in August.

Civil action teams quickly started to coordinate operations and work with each other and teams from around the world. First on the scene were urban search and rescue squads from seven EU nations. With their search dogs, they joined groups from other nations looking for survivors. Then, scores of medical professionals started arriving, followed by advanced and robust medical teams. Clinics and field hospitals then set up health care operations. European nations also sent assessment groups, water sanitation units and tents to house some of the homeless. EU naval ships anchored offshore to provide medical airlift and other assistance. Civilian and military police also arrived to help Haitian police restore order.

European nations have contributed medical supplies, food, water, shelter and technical support in a host of fields. They have also provided search and rescue, police, medical and civic action expertise.

The EU’s actions demonstrate its commitment to help Haiti recover. “It is important to tell the people of Haiti that we stand ready to help them as much as we can in this tragedy,” said Catherine Ashton, the EU’s high representative for foreign affairs and security and the European Commission vice president. “They can count on Europe.”

Earthquake survivor Hotline Lozama, 26, smiles as members of the French aid group Secouristes Sans Frontieres pull her from the rubble of a building in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, Jan. 19, 2010.
Serb nationalists protest the closure of a checkpoint by Polish forces on the border between Serbia and Kosovo in February 2008. Serbian leaders continue to reject Kosovo’s statehood.
a Balanced View of the Balkans

Despite successes, pillars of progress seem to be eroding

Dr. Matthew Rhodes and Dr. Dragan Lozancic
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies

Throughout the 1990s, interethnic violence placed Southeast Europe at the center of the Euro-Atlantic security agenda. Today, perceptions of the region gravitate toward one of two extremes. Many current policymakers, pressed with greater immediate challenges elsewhere, dismiss the Balkan conflict as a problem resolved. Meanwhile, prominent former officials and area specialists warn that the region once again stands on the brink of explosion.

More balanced assessments seem lost in between. Despite the end of armed conflict, and steps toward recovery and transformation, remaining problems should not be underestimated. Still, “crying wolf” alarmism risks reinforcing the very complacency it seeks to overcome. What is required is more sober examination of the factors producing qualified success as well as those blocking further advancement. Progressively addressing the Balkans’ unfinished business is vital in the first place for the people of the region themselves. It would also offer hope and lessons for resolving conflicts elsewhere.

One key element that helped end large-scale fighting and open the way for political and economic renewal has been the scope of international effort. The initial NATO peacekeeping forces in Bosnia and Kosovo numbered 60,000 and 45,000 troops, respectively. Relative to local population, these levels were roughly 50 times higher than in post-2001 Afghanistan and four times the surge peak in Iraq. The $14 billion in foreign aid assistance to Bosnia through 2007 translated into a similar edge of $300 per person per year versus $65 in Afghanistan.

A second factor has been the pull of Euro-Atlantic integration. In a world where geography still matters, the region’s proximity to the established Euro-Atlantic community has accelerated flows of trade, investment and ideas. Unlike for Turkey or most post-Soviet states, it has also meant uncontested eligibility for membership in both NATO and the European Union, as explicitly expressed by the EU’s 2003 Thessaloniki Declaration and confirmed since 2004 by the organizations’ Big Bang and Aftershock enlargements.
Cases such as Switzerland show security and prosperity are achievable outside these institutions. However, for less wealthy countries emerging from authoritarianism and conflict, accession processes offer the advantages of detailed road maps, financial and technical assistance, and (given high public support for joining the EU in particular) political stimulus for comprehensive reforms of general benefit in their own right. As a common platform for all the countries in the region, they also promote improved relations among neighbors and signal international maturity.

Unfortunately, these foundations of progress seem to be eroding. External peacekeeping forces in the region have decreased to 12,000 troops. International civilian organizations retain an extensive presence, but with sometimes confused competences, as in the case of the U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo and/or diminished de facto authority (as with the office of the high representative in Bosnia). U.S. Vice President Joe Biden’s high-profile visits in May 2009 at best partially dispelled perceptions of American disengagement.

Moreover, the near-term outlook for new integration breakthroughs has dimmed. Recent advances such as adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, relaxation of EU visa requirements and NATO’s Membership Action Plan status for Montenegro have been overshadowed by Greek and Slovene disputes with their respective neighbors Macedonia and Croatia, skepticism of anti-corruption efforts by the most recent EU entries Romania and Bulgaria (newly reinforced by the failed European Commission candidacy of the latter’s former Foreign Minister Rumiana Jelева), significant anti-NATO sentiment in remaining nonmembers, and general “enlargement fatigue.” The longer such factors retard further progress, the greater the void opened for the spread of Islamist radicalism, nontransparent Russian business influence and extreme nationalist sentiment reminiscent of the war years.

Some of these developments can be viewed as temporary setbacks or even signs of maturation. What makes them potentially worrisome, though, is their coincidence with other internal issues undercutting consolidation of stability in the region.

**STATEHOOD TENSIONS PERSIST**

Unresolved political status questions lead the list. Given the role of irredentism in Yugoslavia’s breakup, reaching “a ‘finalité politique’ in terms of borders is the sine qua non of the region’s durable stabilization.” The schism between Belgrade and Pristina over Kosovo is the most evident case in point. Despite Kosovo’s recognition by 65 other countries, Serbian leaders continue vehemently to reject its separate statehood. They call instead for renewed status negotiations, an option Kosovo’s ethnic Albanian leadership refuses out of hand. Moreover, political elites in Belgrade and Pristina have also failed to establish a modus operandi on a practical level, limiting cooperation in dealing with common challenges in areas such as justice, customs and cultural heritage.

An advisory opinion on the legality of Kosovo’s declaration of independence is expected this year from the International Court of Justice, but its likely impact is unclear. Its probably mixed conclusions may provide one or both sides with some sense of catharsis. However, in conjunction with resistance to new efforts backed by the International Civilian Office to extend Pristina’s writ north of the Ibar River, the ethnically Serbian area where Belgrade has maintained de facto control over local institutions, the announcement could plausibly also revive controversial proposals for Kosovo’s formal partition.

Such a result could encourage similar moves in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is experiencing its worst political crisis since 1995. Intended as a short-term compromise, the country’s Dayton Accords-based constitutional system has proven dysfunctional over the longer run. International High Representative Valentin Inzko recently complained “not a single new reform has been adopted” the last four years. Inaction has left Bosnia at the back of the line for successive stages of
Euro-Atlantic advancement in areas from NATO’s Membership Action Plan to the EU’s Stability and Association Process, or SAP, and visa liberalization.

Perhaps more important, consensus is lacking on even the most fundamental elements of constitutional reform. Despite briefly raising hopes, neither the Prud Process launched by key local leaders in late 2008 nor the EU-U.S.-sponsored Butmir talks of fall 2009 managed to forge agreement on a way ahead. Compromise will be even more difficult prior to statewide elections in fall 2010, as Bosnia’s political elites harden their positions in appeal to their respective constituents.8

In the interim, Republika Srpska Prime Minister Milorad Dodik has threatened to meet any internationally imposed constitutional change with a referendum on secession. Although many dismiss such a move as an unlikely violation of Dayton, its very discussion has not only provoked harsh responses from the office of the high representative and Bosniak political leaders but also sparked a sharp exchange of words over possible military reaction between the presidents of Croatia and Serbia.

A negative regional domino effect could also hit Macedonia. While fairly considered a success story,9 the country has faced numerous challenges to its cohesion and national identity since its emergence as a state. External contestation of the latter has come in the forms of jurisdictional claims by the Serbian Orthodox Church, denial of ethno-linguistic distinctness by many Bulgarians and the long-standing name dispute with Greece. The last has proven most serious, blocking Macedonia from opening formal accession talks with the EU as well as from receiving an invitation to join NATO along with Croatia and Albania at the alliance’s 2008 Bucharest summit.

These stalled membership prospects may revive internal mistrust between the country’s majority Slavs and sizable Albanian minority. Interethnic relations have slowly improved
since adoption of the Ohrid Agreement, which ended several months of armed conflict between Albanian insurgents and the government’s security forces in 2001. Now, however, ethnic Albanian politicians are slowly losing patience with the government’s unsuccessful efforts to find a compromise with Greece as well as its accompanying “antiquization” campaign embracing the heritage of ancient Macedonia. Localized violence in the 2008 elections demonstrated some of these parties’ supporters’ susceptibility to radicalization.

ETHNIC STRIFE AND CORRUPTION

Beyond status questions, broader legacy issues stemming from Yugoslavia’s violent breakup as well as the Cold War socialist past also present formidable challenges. Overcoming them has been rendered even more daunting by the global financial crisis, which has reversed several years of strong growth in the region.

To begin with, national and interethnic reconciliation remains a distant goal. Neither the Hague Tribunal process nor political expressions of regret have displaced entrenched rationalization or denial over war crimes. Serbia’s new countersuit before the International Court of Justice charging Croatia with genocide demonstrates the durability of such issues. On a practical level, the underreported phenomena of refugees and internally displaced persons, including 340,000 in Serbia and 194,000 in Bosnia,10 exert persistent pressure on countries’ politics and social programs. In addition, as many as 1.75 million citizens of Bosnia, nearly half the population, may suffer from symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder.11

Meanwhile, pervasive corruption and organized crime activity, which thrived under conflict conditions, continue to undermine the rule of law, development and confidence in public institutions. Opinion surveys consistently indicate that most people throughout the region view business transactions, judiciary proceedings and their governments as corrupt.12 The October 2008 murder of prominent Croatian journalist Ivo Pukancic by a syndicate of ethnic Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks and Montenegrins illustrated how cross-national cooperation has flourished more easily among criminals than state law enforcement agencies.

Finally, as the European Commission highlighted in its October 2009 enlargement progress report, the Balkan countries still need substantial effort to solidify legitimate democratic institutions and political culture.13 Recurring parliamentary boycotts and complaints of electoral fraud in several countries, presently including Albania, exemplify such concerns.

Anyone versed in the complex history of Southeast Europe should have anticipated its transition would not be easy. U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s recent description of Kosovo as “relatively calm, but potentially fragile”14 could equally apply to the whole region.

However, highlighting the latter side of that equation should not trigger conflict voyeurism, hopelessness or self-fulfilling prophecies. While serious, conditions in the region are not dire. Indeed, the countries of the region now routinely contribute to peace operations outside their territory. Accordingly, purposeful reinforcement of countervailing forces for stability can forestall the various nightmare scenarios.

ENSURING PROGRESS

Many government and think-tank reports have presented detailed proposals for policy action in the region. At the level of general principle, though, three mutually supportive points stand out.

First is the need for continued international engagement. While simple status quo preservation cannot be an indefinite aim, some challenges will require patient management rather than forced quick solutions. Progressive reduction of direct external roles in governance and security in places like Bosnia and Kosovo should remain tied to conditions on the ground. For the next few years at least, visible presence and targeted assistance will offer invaluable reassurance against sudden escalation of tensions.

Second, viable Euro-Atlantic perspectives must be maintained. This entails more than ritualistic invocation of open-door policies. In line with the preceding point, NATO and EU members and officials should offer tangible support for Balkan states’ integration aspirations. This includes post-accession assistance to new members as they assume full roles and responsibilities within these organizations. It should also entail stronger discouragement of existing members’ blockage of progress toward accession over narrow bilateral issues, a practice now threatening to spread to Bulgaria regarding Turkey. Finally, it will also require defining relations with
Kosovo, which five NATO or EU states have not recognized. While this situation has entailed some silver linings such as displaying policy independence and preserving links to Serbia, some commonly accepted understanding will soon be needed not only for Kosovo to participate in programs such as Partnership for Peace and SAP, but also for Serbia to receive serious consideration of its EU candidacy.

Third, and arguably most important, the Euro-Atlantic community must uphold not only accessibility but also its credibility and attractiveness as a destination. Alongside its effects on the region, the global financial crisis has crystallized a broader drop in confidence in Western-style liberal democracy. In the face of an alternative “Beijing consensus,” the community must show it can effectively meet the challenges of the new century. Along with individual domestic efforts, this will require solidarity in such contexts as carrying out the multinational Security Assistance Force mission in Afghanistan, preserving the European monetary union, adopting a new NATO Strategic Concept and implementing the Lisbon Treaty.

Together, these approaches will best provide space for moderate, effective leadership from within the region itself. This equals neither picking favorites nor waiting for idealized Jeffersons, Havels or Mandelas. Nonetheless, notwithstanding the European Commission’s governance concerns, possible signs of leaders approaching this type present final grounds for cautious optimism that the Balkans can move forward.

6. See the comments of court President Hisashi Owada in “ICJ Decision on Kosovo to be Vague.” Balkan Insight. November 20, 2009.
7. “Insko Calls on EU to Maintain Focus on Bosnia.” Balkan Insight, January 27, 2010
11. “Study: PTSD Haunts Bosnian War Survivors,” Balkan Insight, February 3, 2010. Equally concerning is recent research showing that PTSD is sometimes socially transmitted to younger generations not directly exposed to the original events.
15. These are Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain.

People in Skopje, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, rejoice after the European Union announced in December 2009 that Macedonians can travel visa-free to the EU. The nation seeks EU integration.
Children walk through a heavily damaged section of Shusha, Nagorno-Karabakh. A large part of the town hard-hit by the Nagorno-Karabakh War remains in ruins.
The so-called “frozen conflicts” are among the toughest challenges to Black Sea regional security, as well as to the national interests of several post-Soviet states. They include the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the conflicts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia and the Transnistrian conflict in Moldova.

The conflicts vary in scope, history and management options, but are structurally similar. Contributing factors, such as weakness of states, economic depression and external support are in place in each of the conflicts. Moreover, they create similar threats for the national security of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova. Artificially “frozen,” or de-escalated, none of the conflicts have been fully resolved. Along with traditional geopolitical challenges, they are also sources of transnational threats.

Common wisdom holds that regional integration is one of the best possible responses to this sort of problem under given circumstances. But, despite numerous attempts to put frozen conflicts into the framework of different integration projects, they are still far from being resolved. Arguably, they are even further from resolution than ever before.

That poses a dilemma. Is regional integration ineffective in dealing with the conflicts of identity or separatism? That would mean that the liberal approach to conflict management, in a broader sense, is losing its attraction. Or is there something special about either the conflicts themselves or the environment they are developing in?

Managing Problems of Identity: Theory
Modern internal conflicts result from differences in identity within societies. This pluralism can be of any nature, but mostly it is either ethnic or ideological.

Most current theories of ethnic conflict assume that managing ethnic/ideological differences is better than eliminating them. With 285 politically active minority groups inhabiting just about 200 states, ethnic problems are inevitable. Combined with ideological, religious and internal political differences, they provide a broad basis for various types of internal political conflicts. Given the effects of globalization and growing interdependence on a global scale, it is not possible to solve the problems of identity by eliminating ethnic, religious and ideological diversities either through genocide or ethnic cleansing or by artificially constructing an isolated homogeneous society. This leaves policymakers with the only option of managing, not eliminating, the differences. The strategies may vary. Usually they target different causes for internal conflicts, trying to ameliorate ethnic security dilemmas, minimize levels of discrimination and provide effective power sharing.

All that is important for internal post-Soviet conflicts. They result from an interaction of factors, among which...
structural and political factors are the most important. The combination of a weak state and aggressive local elites produces an ethnic security dilemma under which state norms and regularities can no longer limit mutual mistrust, suspicion and violence between ethnic groups. This combination is strengthened by economic disruptions, political instability and rising cultural discrimination. With some minor variations, those factors could be observed in the initiation stage of the frozen conflicts.  

They also possess another common feature. With the exception of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the role of the Russian-speaking minority is huge. It opens up an opportunity for continuous Russian support of the Transnistrian, Abkhazian and South Ossetian self-proclaimed states. The Russian involvement in those conflicts not only raises doubts about the objectivity of Russian mediation but also transforms their structures, increasing asymmetry and diminishing chances for a mediated settlement.

Both ameliorating the security dilemma and providing effective power-sharing mechanisms are problematic under these circumstances. Theoretically, conflicts like those in Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan are best solved through strategic liberalization. This approach entails a long-term transformation of a societal structure with the view to erase any forms of discrimination and provide equal access to power for various ethnic groups, thus minimizing the rationale for violent uprisings. Unlike rapid democratization, it does not provoke a quick rise in nationalistic ideology and rhetoric since it puts higher value on aggression-limitation tools and discourages "win-or-lose" approaches in dealing with other ethnic groups. Strategic liberalization is targeted at a stage-by-stage construction of a democratic society in which both strengthening of a state and power sharing are achieved through implementation of democratic norms and institutions.

Post-Soviet internal conflicts exemplified this conflict management model. A transition from totalitarianism to democracy was under way; ethnic minorities were engaged into the security dilemma, while the states were weak. Improvement of democratic institutions, protection of the rights of minorities and enhancement of mutual trust were seen as landmarks for conflict transformation and subsequent conflict settlement in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova.

The strategy failed in all cases. Backed by Russia, separatist leaderships in Transnistria, South Ossetia and Abkhazia opted to continue the struggle, while the respective parent states proved too slow in implementing effective power sharing and building confidence among all ethnic groups. As a result, the conflicts became frozen with an equilibrium established between the state power and the leadership of the self-proclaimed states in each case.

The strategic liberalization approach failed for many reasons, among which a lack of democratization would be the most significant. External factors and a tough economic situation made success even less likely.

The best alternative to strategic liberalization is regional integration. Theoretically, it helps to overcome internal difficulties by providing a broader context for resolving all sorts of contradictions. Common institutions compensate for state weaknesses, helping to cope with the security dilemma. In the long run, elements of a common identity are created and shared. All that minimizes the destructiveness of internal conflicts, opens up opportunities for cooperation and makes violence obsolete.

Neofunctionalism tells us that, due to the spillover effects, integration can convert economic interdependence between states into political harmony. It is a slow process with no guarantees, which requires “political will” to be employed. When employed, it can use an increased interdependence to maximize the economic costs of violence and thus minimize incentives for aggression. Unlike strategic liberalization, this approach is a regional-level one and assumes that regional integration can both be economically beneficial and politically stabilizing.

Keeping these theoretical assumptions in mind, this paper will now assess how a regional integration strategy was put into action in dealing with the problem of post-Soviet frozen conflicts.

**Black Sea Economic Cooperation**

The Black Sea Economic Cooperation was established in 1992 (since 1998 it has been officially named the Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation, or OBSEC) to unite 12 countries with a view to strengthen economic cooperation in the Black Sea region. This went in line with the general tendency of regionalization and also helped in resolving specific problems that appeared on the regional agenda after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

But it did not prevent violent conflicts in several member states. Regional cooperation did not make any impact on the dynamics of the conflicts, including the escalation stages. Why did it happen?
There are two principal problems. First, the OBSEC concentrates almost all of its activities on economic issues, particularly on the problems of production cycles. Since most of the member states are integrated into alternative highly developed integration structures (such as NATO and the Commonwealth of Independent States), no political or security issues can be effectively solved within the organization. Thus, when faced with internal violence, Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan — all members of the OBSEC — could not rely on this multilateral format for mediating and conflict settlement.

Second, economic cooperation within the OBSEC is not an integration process. There are no spillover effects, no supranational institutions and no common norms of legislation. The depth of cooperation rarely goes further than joint economic projects.

Political context is also problematic. Political interests, if any, are too diverse and often contradictory. Some OBSEC members are NATO countries. That means Russia will certainly not allow political issues to be resolved within the format of the organization. Three states — Russia, Ukraine and Turkey — are competing for regional leadership, relying on military, oil, transition potential and organizational strength as primary resources. This competition is far from providing positive effects for stabilizing frozen conflicts.

This makes any peace building or mediating activity sporadic and ineffective. As an organization, OBSEC does not interfere into any of the conflicts, and only attempts by individual member states rarely take place. Concepts for more fruitful intervention are vague. The security issues are at best secondary in OBSEC activities and are closely connected to the economic dimension of security. Taking this into account, we might assume that a closer interconnection of political stability and economic development will lead to a greater involvement of the organization into political issues, although this involvement will surely remain limited. Mostly these perspectives are in one way or another linked to energy production and the transportation potential of the region. The more developed, interdependent and integrated into the European energy market the region is, the more chances for political stability at regional and national levels it gets. However, due to organizational and functional peculiarities, OBSEC is unlikely to provide this sort of a spillover. GUAM could do that.

**Targeting Energy Security**

Unlike OBSEC, GUAM was established as a framework for solving the problems of regional security along with developing economic cooperation in the Black Sea and Caspian region. In 1997, Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova founded the forum, with Uzbekistan joining in 1999 and leaving in 2005. Throughout its history, GUAM has given the highest priority to energy security issues, promoting development of the Caspian oil and gas fields and securing diverse energy supply routes to Europe. Security issues threatening these routes demanded a greater institutionalization than in the case of OBSEC, thus leading to the establishment of an annual summit and the Committee of National Coordinators.

That seemed to open up additional options for conflict management. Aiming to enhance regional security, the member states elaborated a more or less coherent view on how this security should be achieved. They agreed to strengthen cooperation within various international organizations, to reinforce the cooperation with NATO, to provide mutual assistance in conflict settlement and crisis management, and last but not least — to fight against separatism, terrorism and extremism. A framework for managing frozen conflicts seemed to be set.

Following the “color revolutions” in Georgia and Ukraine, GUAM’s activity received an additional democratic flavor with the official name transformed into the GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development. Democratization was seen as an effective tool for both settling internal conflicts and developing into a geopolitical opposition to Russia. Both aims were problematic, and both influenced further developments of internal conflicts in Moldova and Georgia. Moreover, both seem to be failures.

The key problem with an effective conflict management is a lack of interdependence and democracy. Member states are still minor trade partners for each other (e.g., Ukraine’s major trade partners are the EU, Russia and Turkey), with their economies primarily dependent on European and Russian markets. Under these circumstances the very concept of a region could be doubted, since opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation are smaller than those for development of trade with third countries. Interstate cooperation remains highly sensitive to energy markets and political instability.

As in the case of OBSEC, GUAM can be boiled down to several joint projects, mainly in energy. That is absolutely insufficient for a regional free trade area, which once was an aim of the member states. Ukraine’s accession to the World Trade Organization makes this goal obsolete. It looks like each of the members will join the global economy individually.

GUAM aimed at another important achievement. Its members were and still are willing to form a regional cooperation framework to facilitate negotiations over possible EU and NATO membership and strengthen their negotiation positions. This provides impetus for more active political and security cooperation, given the fact that both the EU and NATO are strategically interested in regional stability in the Black Sea-Caspian area. But quite surprisingly, this sort of integration effort has had an opposite impact on regional conflict development.

By connecting their efforts to enhance regional security to a broader NATO-EU context, GUAM countries challenged the regional balance of interests, first and foremost with regard to Russia. Putting more emphasis on political issues such as democracy resulted in a shifted perception of GUAM in Moscow. Before 2004 it was mainly seen as a competitor on the European energy markets. Following the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine, geopolitical and foreign policy orientations in the region have changed. Ukraine’s declared
active pro-Western strategy was unacceptable for Russia. Part of this strategy was strengthening GUAM and its closer cooperation with the EU and NATO. Thus, in Moscow’s view, it quickly turned into a geopolitical contender.

That was risky, given the fact that all member states had frozen, delayed or potential internal conflicts on their territories with a strong Russian influence in all cases. Joint regulation mechanisms in GUAM were still absent, and security cooperation remained weak. In short, the separate balance of forces in each conflict was more decisive than common mediation procedures. As a result, GUAM member states remained vulnerable to Russian attempts to use its influence in contested regions to undermine the credibility of local political leadership.

Russian strategy in the frozen conflicts has gradually changed from mediation to a direct support of separatists. Ukraine’s initiative to resolve the Transnistria conflict — the Yuschenko plan, initiated at the GUAM summit in April 2005 — was later blocked by the Russian-backed leadership of the self-proclaimed Transnistrian Republic. Russia also intervened in the conflict in 2006, when a crisis broke out over Transnistria’s illegal export system. Ukraine introduced more strict documentation rules for export from the territory of Transnistria, thus endangering income collected by the leadership of the separatist republic. Russia responded with significant diplomatic pressure in favor of Transnistria.

In 2006 an exotic “Community for Democracy and Peoples’ Rights” was founded in Sukhumi, the capital of the separatist Georgian territory of Abkhazia. It united Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria — the three self-proclaimed unrecognized states — in an effort to legitimize their political activities. The joint memorandum of the community, dated Nov. 27, 2006, was a sharp criticism of GUAM’s initiatives to regulate frozen conflicts through the U.N. General Assembly. It also completely supported the Russian strategy in all three conflicts. Finally, Russia directly supported separatist South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the recent war in Georgia.

The bottom line of these developments was that joint but unsystematic efforts taken by GUAM member states turned out to be ineffective due to a lack of institutional power and resources. Efforts to create an area of regional integration failed due to an inability to build up economic ties not only among states, but also within the state boundaries with a view to include the separatist regions into an interdependent economic interaction. GUAM does have a significant political “pillar” for its activity, but it is not based upon economic cooperation. In any case, Russian counteractions make conflict settlement through this organization problematic.

**NATO and the EU**

Concerning NATO and the EU, the question is simple: Will joining both or either of these organizations help solve the frozen conflicts? Since joining the EU looks a very distant opportunity for any of the GUAM states, we’ll mostly speak of NATO as a system of collective security and, thus, a tool for resolving internal conflicts.

By far, the sequential chain of events looks quite challenges. The alliance remains predominantly a system of interstate security, with very few opportunities to regulate internal conflicts. Examples of such conflicts in NATO member states (such as Turkey) are enough to see this lack of opportunities. Founded like a traditional interstate coalition, NATO has not changed so much as to meet challenges from an internal state level. It is even less suited for managing transnational or civil risks. At the same time, separatism in the frozen conflicts is kept alive by weaknesses of the states, lack of legitimacy, economic instability and historical/cultural peculiarities.

NATO involvement in any of the frozen conflicts may, in fact, worsen the situation by transforming frozen internal conflicts into escalating and, possibly, interstate conflicts. This is particularly the case in Georgia.

The EU could provide a much broader way to conflict settlement. Being a common market and a common political space, it could help resolve the ethnic security dilemma, build effective power-sharing mechanisms and guarantee cultural autonomy. But there are also obstacles, which make this scenario unrealistic in the short and midterm perspective.

The level of democratization in the states concerned is insufficient for creating a framework for managing the conflicts. The separatist areas are governed by local elites, isolated from the society, who benefit from the existing status quo. Thus either strategic liberalization or rapid democratization would require a long transition period.

The aforementioned states are just too far from joining the
EU. Taking all that into account, one might say that the EU and NATO mechanisms will not be used to resolve the frozen conflicts in a direct manner. It looks more like they can serve as a model of creating a framework for conflict settlement. The very ideology and values behind Euro-Atlantic integration could help in building more democratic societies, which in turn will bring about more chances for solving internal conflicts.

**Security Challenge**

Managing frozen conflicts is problematic. Structural factors are too strong, ethnic divisions are too complicated and economic interdependence is too low. Combined with a set of Russian interests in the region, the conflicts pose a serious challenge for regional security.

Attempts to solve the problem through strategic liberalization have, by and large, failed. Democratization is too slow, and civil society remains underdeveloped. This prevents effective power sharing, creates discrimination and enables aggressive rhetoric of local elites.

Turning to some form of regional integration seems reasonable. Regional integration helps establish mutual benefits, provides economic gains and facilitates the activities of international organizations and regimes. In the long run it creates common political regulation procedures and norms, and establishes elements of a common identity.

It did not work in the cases of frozen conflicts. But this failure is more due to specific features of the conflicts than to the approach itself. For various reasons, regional integration projects failed. There is some economic cooperation, but this cannot substitute for integration processes when it comes to dealing with internal conflicts. Levels of economic interdependence among the countries of the region remain comparatively low, while no spillover effects take place.

Regional integration could be effective, but it should be meaningful. Implementation of democratic procedures, legislating for protecting minority rights, encouraging of “win-win” approaches in conflict management — all could be strengthened by integration. However, an institutional and normative basis is to be created in the societies first. Until that is accomplished, integration would rather help to preserve problems and difficulties.

Integrative processes, effective for conflict management, should be economically based and follow the logic of a gradual increase of interdependence. In this regard, the example of the EU could play an important role. Integration will be a success if it creates benefits for ethnic minorities and lessens the ethnic security dilemma. But it will become a failure if it substitutes interdependence and practical cooperation with slogans and political rhetoric.

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5. For more details see Ernst B. Haas, “The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory” (Berkeley: University of California Institute of International Studies, 1975).

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RUSSIA
and the Post-Soviet Space

Dr. Vardan Grigoryan and Suren Grigoryan
Though firmly established in the latest political lexicon, the phrase "post-Soviet space" nonetheless remains somewhat undefined. Difficulties arise when one attempts to establish the boundaries of that "space" on factual and, specifically, historical and geographical levels.

To begin with, the circumstance that prompted researchers in post-Soviet issues to unanimously refrain from including the Baltic states in that nebulous space seems incomprehensible, even though, with the exception of the period of 1918 to 1940, they were part of the Russian Tsarist and Soviet empires for approximately 300 years. Given that, it bears special mention that, strangely enough, it was Russian authors who established and continue to maintain this "tradition." Thus the "post-Soviet space" is narrowed to within the borders of the Commonwealth of Independent States, or CIS, and this approach is unassailable. It would be logical to explain it as an adherence to realpolitik — an acknowledgment that the CIS has certain functionality consistent with the geopolitical, economic, defense and cultural interests of the countries that make up that entity.

The paradox, however, is that the CIS does not possess that functionality today and indeed was not endowed with it from the outset. The very functional aspects of interstate integration in the CIS structure (from time to time it has declared itself a supranational body), which once served to attract 11 former Soviet republics (not counting Russia), and were accordingly rejected by the three Baltic republics in light of certain vital national interests, do not stand up to criticism.

The CIS was and remains a strictly declarative, amorphous and nonfunctioning body. This conclusion is directly supported by Vladimir Putin’s recent acknowledgement that the CIS was created as an instrument of civilized divorce. However, we might note that Russia initiated the "divorce." From the start, Russia probably had an interest in the CIS being nonfunctional and, by extension, nonindependent and largely dependent on Russia, particularly in light of the fact that Russia was the most self-sufficient in economic, military and political terms.

What reasons might Russia have for championing the creation of such a nonfunctional entity? The CIS allowed Russia to fully realize its geopolitical ambitions within the borders of the collapsed Soviet Union (we reiterate: except for the Baltic states) and at the same time avoiding the prospect of imposing upon itself the burden of responsibility for the economy, defense, social welfare, medical care, culture and
education of the former national outskirts of the Soviet empire. At the same time, the voluntary nature of post-Soviet states’ membership in the CIS has allowed Russia to deny accusations — current and quite unpleasant from the standpoint of its international image — that Russia seeks to pursue a post-imperialist (and moreover, neo-imperialist) policy with respect to the other members of the CIS.

In fact, such a policy was being pursued in the early 1990s, although Russia used political, economic, military and energy leverage that allowed it to keep CIS members within its sphere of influence on a strictly bilateral basis and very selectively. It employed the façade of the CIS solely as a cover for its strategic aspirations.

Thus, the CIS was indeed created as an instrument, although not for a civilized divorce, but rather to realize Russia’s geopolitical designs. It was the immediate perception of this fact that scared the Baltic countries away from joining the CIS. However, the non-Baltic former Soviet republics found this deal completely palatable. Almost all of them (with the exception of Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan) were in dire need of Russian energy resources, particularly when delivered at prices far below world market. Additionally, Russia provided all of them (except perhaps Belarus) an immense labor market, and all of them, without exception, were extremely interested in the political support that Russia offered the regimes ruling the young republics on an international level. Some countries, especially Armenia and Tajikistan, relied solely on Russia to defend them from outside aggression. In Central Asia, Russia’s active assistance provided the vital means to counter Islamic radicalism for two decades.

However, Russia’s policies in the post-Soviet space were predominantly on the basis of bilateral agreements and not within the CIS structure. Since the late 1990s, CIS members have found a desire to create within the post-Soviet space more local and, as expected, more robust defense structures, such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization, or CSTO, and the Customs Union. These organizations would not necessarily have to include Russia (such as the GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development). However, with the possible exception of the CSTO, these organizations thus far exist only on paper.

As the CIS has shown, Russia has occasionally demanded its members show political loyalty and refrain from strategic partnerships with other power centers, most notably the West. Moreover, according to some researchers (Aleksandrov, Olcott, Naumkin, Skakov), the United States and European powers in fact acknowledged Russia’s geopolitical priorities in the post-Soviet space until the beginning of the 21st century. The “rules of the game” were allegedly violated unilaterally by the West in 2003 to 2004.
In Armenia, a new gas pipeline near the border with Iran reduces Armenia’s dependence on Russian energy sources.

when the “color revolutions” occurred with direct Western support — first in Georgia and then in Ukraine — resulting in anti-Russian leaders coming to power in those countries.

This approach would appear more propaganda than science, since it explains precisely nothing. As a matter of fact, the policy of confrontation with Russia pursued for some time by Ukraine and Georgia, and before them by Azerbaijan and, to a certain extent, Moldova, is driven by important internal and external factors. For Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova, these factors have been and continue to be the unresolved interethnic conflicts in which Russia openly calls to maintain the status quo. This is dictated by Russia’s interests, and no re-evaluation of its position is in sight.

The situation with Ukraine is entirely different and more complex. It has no direct territorial conflict with Russia. But there is potential for such conflict, not only over Crimea but a number of other southern and eastern regions where most of the population has historically identified with Russians and openly sympathizes with Russia. This commonly known fact is a source of serious concern for the nationally oriented political elite of Ukraine. On the one hand, these elite are searching for a common Ukrainian identity aimed at preventing the probable division of the society and, quite possibly, the country. On the other hand, they seek to secure independence from Moscow for Ukraine — if not in global affairs, then at least in European politics — and to make it into an independent geopolitical player.

This explains Kiev’s language policy, its aspirations to join NATO, the ongoing conflicts over gas with Russia, the demarches over the Russian Black Sea Fleet, attempts to cause a schism in the Orthodox Church and other things that Russia finds so irritating.

However, other young states whose economic and political interests conflict with Russia’s regularly create problems for Russia in the post-Soviet space. In the late 1990s, former Turkmenistan President for Life Saparmurat Niyazov (Turkmenbash) refused a demand to sell Russia all the gas produced in his country and began to independently allocate this national wealth. His successor, Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov, followed suit and in the spring of 2008 refused to receive the head of Gazprom, Aleksey Miller, who had come to Ashkhabad with the explicit purpose of returning Turkmenistan gas to Russian pipelines. Moreover, relations between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are currently warming, which may be evidence of Turkmenistan’s intent to transport its gas to Turkey and onward to Europe via Azerbaijan and Georgia.

Russia’s position is weakening in other Central Asian countries as well. The reason is its inability,
as in past years, to settle border disputes and water distribution problems by bringing harsh pressure to bear against the ruling regimes in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Even the effective help that Russian special services allegedly gave President Islam Karimov’s regime in 2006 in Andijan did not stop the cooling of Russia’s relations with Uzbekistan, which began in the early 1990s.

Even President Emomali Rakhmonov of Tajikistan, whom Moscow had brought to power in 1993 and had supported economically and politically ever since, undertook an anti-Russian demarche in early 2009, declaring his willingness to create a staging area within Tajikistan for NATO forces deployed to Afghanistan.

The loyalty of Kyrgyzstan, which threatened to close the American air base near Bishkek in the spring of 2009, may be considered Russia’s sole political success in Central Asia in recent years. However, it came at a high price: The total value of free economic aid, preferential loans, and investments that Russia provided to Kyrgyzstan in February 2009 exceeds $2 billion.5

Russia seems to be losing favor with one of its closest allies as well. Under the guise of providing economic aid during the world financial crisis, Russia also provided Belarus with additional credits in the amount of $3.3 billion,6 but the political motivation behind this move was obvious. From late 2008 to early 2009, a trend toward reconciliation between the European Union and Belarus began to take shape. The former realized it would not be able to bring down President Alexander Lukashenko’s regime and decided to resort to cooperation with it.7 The latter realized that it was losing out economically due to its single-vector foreign policy — despite the fact that according to Russian sources, the value of Russia’s infusion of finances and resources into the Belarusian economy between 1995 and 2008 totaled $52 billion.8

The prospect of losing its only geopolitical ally in the post-Soviet space (except for Armenia) could not but alarm the Russian political elite, who operate to this day under such Cold-War era constructs as “us or the West.”9

Russia has also had increasing problems in recent years in its relations with Armenia. Just two years ago, Russian political leaders (in particular Speaker of the State Duma Boris Gryzlov) were unwaveringly calling Armenia a Russian “outpost” and a strategic partner. And for good reason: Armenia has a high degree of dependence in its economic and defense sectors (mostly related to the Karabakh problem) on Russia, as well as a large Russian military base on its territory.

On top of this, Armenian leaders have more frequently resisted Russia’s “recommendations.” Instead, Armenia is focusing on its geopolitical interests. Since 2006 Armenia has regularly sent peacekeepers to Iraq; refused, in the summer of 2008, to condemn Tbilisi’s so-called aggression against South Ossetia; and delayed as long as possible a withdrawal from NATO exercises in Georgia in May 2009. Armenia is also deepening cooperation with Iran in the energy sphere and has declared a willingness to normalize relations with Turkey. All this is evidence of Yerevan’s wish to go forward with a more balanced foreign policy that is consistent with its own economic and political interests.
Serious geopolitical and economic variance between Russia and other CIS members has emerged in the post-Soviet space since 2002. The result has been a clear weakening of Russia’s influence on its neighbors to the west, east and south. In addition, the largest members of the CIS, such as Kazakhstan, Ukraine and, to some extent, Belarus, have increasingly challenged Russia’s geopolitical dictates, striving to achieve full independence of actions in their relations with Europe and the United States. Others — Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova — openly endeavor to refuse Russia’s peacekeeping “services” (or have already refused them, as in the case of Georgia). In doing so they are consistently shaping a new strategy on interethnic conflicts to replace the old one based on the principle of maintaining the status quo of the mid-90s, which was advantageous to Russia. In the case of Azerbaijan, its lack of trust in Russia has been aggravated by economic differences over routes for transporting Caspian oil and gas to the West.

However, this problem is most daunting for Turkmenistan, which has not hidden a desire to become the sole supplier of natural gas for Europe under the Nabucco gas pipeline project. Russia has attempted to counteract Turkmenistan’s efforts, but in this case, Russia again “seems to be suffering a strategic defeat” as it did with the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. In the words of European Commission President José Manuel Barroso, Europe firmly intends to “connect Turkmenistan with the European Union market via the South Caucasus.”

Another serious cause for dissatisfaction with Russia’s actions in the post-Soviet space is its aspiration to control domestic politics in CIS countries. On the one hand, Moscow has shown no hesitation in supporting ruling regimes in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, while turning a blind eye to flagrant violations of democracy and human rights that are alleged by the West of occurring in those countries. And by operating under the slogan “we don’t need any new color revolutions,” Russia absolutely ignores the local opposition. This cannot fail to cause public indignation in those countries. Even in Armenia, whose populace has traditionally been loyal to Russia, 62 percent of respondents in a 2008 Gallup Organization poll gave Russian foreign policy a negative rating.

On the other hand, Russia is trying to exert significant political, economic and ideological pressure on those former Soviet states where power is held by political forces and leaders who seek to pursue independent domestic and foreign policy — often equated as being “anti-Russian” in Moscow. Meanwhile, as analyst Aleksandr Skakov rightly commented, what made the color revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine so unexpected for Russia was Moscow’s inability to follow political developments in either country and foresee their consequences, as well as Russia’s unwillingness to have contact with the opposition. As a result, these events led to considerable weakening in Russia’s position in those countries and, in the case of Georgia, to a complete failure of its policy.

Many analysts believe Russia’s loss of influence is attributable to its attitude toward the post-Soviet space as a playing field for a geopolitical struggle between it and the West. Such an approach naturally goes beyond the realpolitik that has supplanted nostalgia and paternalism in the post-Soviet space. Russia will be able to realize its claims to leadership in the post-Soviet space only if it agrees that its partners’ interests do not always coincide with its own geopolitical interests, and that these differences cannot be allowed to develop into deep clashes. In other words, “Russia can effectively assert its national interests if it takes others’ interests into account.”

6. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
On Corruption's Front Lines
Reforms help Tajikistan look to the future

The Central Asian republics are looking for foreign investors to help boost their ailing economies. As a result, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are reaching out to Russia, China and the West for that help.

Historically, endemic corruption has plagued the region and dissuaded foreign investors in Central Asia, and while some countries are taking steps to fight corruption, it has not been a quick process.

It is widely accepted that curbing corruption will not only improve each nation’s economic status but will contribute to good governance and stability in the affected countries. “Globally and nationally, institutions of oversight and legal frameworks that are actually enforced, coupled with smarter, more effective regulation, will ensure lower levels of corruption,” said Huguette Labelle, chair of Transparency International, or TI, a nongovernmental organization fighting to end corruption worldwide. “This will lead to a much needed increase of trust in public institutions, sustained economic growth and more effective development assistance.”

The most impoverished of the Central Asian nations, Tajikistan’s economy depends on cotton and aluminum exports, as well as remittances sent from Tajik workers abroad, roughly 1 million of whom work outside the country. But the global economic downturn has caused cotton revenues and remittances to fall.

The economic situation set in motion a chain reaction that lends itself to increased corruption. According to the World Bank, meager government salaries, complex economic regulations that make compliance practically impossible and low legal awareness among the general public are main factors that contribute to corruption. A joint study by the U.N. Development Program, or UNDP, and the Strategic Research Center of the President of Tajikistan, found corruption tends to institutionalize over time. “Most of the respondents recognized corruption as a key problem in the Tajik society, and viewed corruption as an obstacle delaying economic and political reforms,” the Tajik research center’s A. Shamalov said in the report, posted on the UNDP Web site. “The research sadly shows that corruption is widespread in crucial sectors such as health, education, law enforcement, courts and security.”

The study concluded that corruption is rife at all levels of these sectors, and the higher up it is, the larger the bribes involved. “Bureaucrats are chronically underpaid, making them highly susceptible to corruption,” the European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity, a political outreach organization, stated on its Web site. “High government positions are said to be bought and sold.” The forum found people in these nations pay to pass exams, to secure a hospital bed and even to avoid standing trial.

However, the government of Tajikistan is beginning to take measures to eliminate such problems. In the 2006 Global Integrity report by Nargiz Zokirova, the author noted that there are examples of President Emomali Rahmonov’s emphasis on legislative means to control corruption. Zokirova cited specific laws such as “President’s Decree about Additional Steps to Strengthen the Fight against Economic Crimes and Corruption,” “Law about Fighting Corruption” and “Law about State Service.” The report went on to note that the president also established a governmental arm called the “Office for Fighting Corruption” in 2004 to manage corruption in Tajikistan. In fact, the joint UNDP-government of Tajikistan “Country Program
Action Plan 2010-2015” notes that “The issue of corruption, which historically was rarely discussed among society, has now become a hotly contested issue.”

These legislative means are strong first steps in fighting corruption in Tajikistan. In the Global Integrity report, the former U.S. ambassador to Tajikistan, Richard Hoagland, said, “Investors are sure to succeed, if equal conditions are available to them. Transparency and law enforcement give confidence to the American investors. But corruption and official circumlocution can frighten them away.”

Tajikistan cannot afford to scare away investors, and it is working to resolve its corruption problems, something country leaders know they cannot do alone. A Centre for European Policy Studies report said, “The new approach to Central Asia developed by the EU offers the opportunity to re-engage with Tajikistan at a vital stage in its post-independence history and, in particular, to introduce new policies that can assist the development of the country and avert the drift into authoritarianism.”

In response, the country has enacted anti-corruption reforms, and there are more to come. New Tajik legislation passed in July 2009 streamlined the business registration process—which is rife with corruption—a David Trilling article on eurasianet.org reported. The legislation has greatly reduced graft, because now business owners deal only with the State Tax Committee when registering. Although widespread corruption still abounds in Tajikistan, the new legislation has created a “one-stop shop” for business registration. This cut the number of people “reaching for handouts,” Trilling said.

“Corruption exists when there is a person coming to another person with some problem. Either the applicant has some flaws in his documents, or some procedures need to be done quickly and there is the chance for bribes,” Temur Rakhimov, executive director of the American Chamber of Commerce in Tajikistan, said in Trilling’s report. “In the past, the law was not very clear. You had to go through 13 steps to get your business registered, at five or six offices.” The more steps needed to register a business, the more chances for bribery.

But Trilling said the situation in Tajikistan
continues to improve, though maybe not fast enough. He quoted an anonymous, Dushanbe-based Western businessman, who said, “You can pass a law, but if you’ve got some guy at customs who doesn’t know what he’s doing, it doesn’t mean anything. But the changes give hope.”

Thanks to the country’s new laws, there is less corruption and an improved investment climate that has allowed Tajikistan to climb the rankings in the World Bank’s “Doing Business 2010: Reforming Through Difficult Times” report. It is now a “top 10 reformer,” which makes it easier for the country to attract business and do business worldwide. Tajik officials know it is time for change. Corruption cost Tajikistan about 8.9 million euros in the first nine months of 2009, much of which the government recovered through inspections and investigations. The nation’s Agency for State Financial Control and Combating Corruption conducted 892 inspections and started 742 criminal prosecutions, online news agency Asia Plus reported in November 2009. The National Bank of Tajikistan created a direct hot line to help prevent corruption and abuse, Asia Plus reported in December 2009. Tajikistan’s efforts to curb corruption have allowed the government to begin to overcome the legacy of corruption that resulted in the country earning a ranking of 158 on TI’s 2009 Corruption Perceptions Index of the 180 countries most affected by corruption.

Tajikistan is also looking to other nations for examples in fighting the corruption that so stifles economic growth. Poland, for example, has helped curb corruption by establishing an anti-corruption ministry and conducting more investigations. Bangladesh is fighting widespread corruption by introducing institutional and legal reforms during a nationwide crackdown from 2007 to 2008, which The Associated Press reports has improved conditions. Tajikistan has welcomed several organizations into the country to assist in instituting measures that can, over time, improve the institutions in Tajikistan.

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe created the Border Management Staff College in Dushanbe to help the Central Asian republics facilitate cross-border dialogue and cooperation through information sharing and lessons learned. It also provides access to the latest thinking, methodologies, techniques and technologies. In addition, the European Union is helping by providing programs to fight corruption and help develop small- and medium-sized businesses; the World Bank is helping the country establish basic processes for efficient and transparent management of public expenditures; and UNDP is helping to develop legitimate trade while stemming the transit of narcotics and other illicit material through the region. As corruption lessens, more investors will be interested in doing business there, which bodes well for Tajikistan’s ongoing negotiations for entry into the World Trade Organization.

TI’s Labelle said the solution to stemming corruption “requires strong oversight by parliaments, a well-performing judiciary, independent and properly resourced audit and anti-corruption agencies, vigorous law enforcement, transparency in public budgets, revenue and aid flows.” She said the international community has an obligation to “find efficient ways to help … countries to develop and sustain their own institutions.”

Given the importance placed on this issue by Tajikistan, and the bilateral and multilateral support offered by international organizations in the country, Tajikistan is postured to do just that. □
Friends Mark Mutual Victory

NATO troops march in Red Square during V-E Day parade

May 9, 2010, marked the 65th anniversary of the end of World War II in Europe as Nazism was finally defeated. To commemorate the end of the war, a Victory Day has been celebrated annually since 1945. However, the 2010 edition of the Victory Day parade was not the parade local residents are accustomed to seeing in Moscow’s Red Square.

Nearly 1,000 troops from four NATO countries – France, Great Britain, Poland and the United States – took part in the ceremony to mark the end of the combined effort to end Nazi aggression, marking the first time that countries of the Second World War’s alliance gathered to mark the auspicious occasion. According to an April 2010 poll by Russia’s independent Levada Center, 55% of respondents held a “wholly or partly positive view” about participation by NATO troops in the Victory Day parade, according to a Reuters article on the subject.

In Russia, World War II is known as “The Great Patriotic War” – a phrase that carries great reverence and resonance. The phrase is one of only a handful capitalized in Russian, and it serves as a solemn reminder of the defeat of the Nazi assault on the Eastern Front. The descendants of those who repelled the Nazi assault continue to be united by the efforts of their elders. As part of the ceremonies, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev encouraged the parade’s spectators to show solidarity, while noting the fragility of peace. United Press International quotes President Medvedev as saying that, “it is our duty to remember that wars do not start in an instant,” and it is “only together that we shall be able to counter modern threats.” This was the first time that troops from, as President Medvedev notes, the “anti-Hitler coalition” were invited to participate in Victory Day celebrations. Joining NATO and Russian troops in the parade were troops from the former Soviet republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Turkmenistan and Ukraine.

The presence of NATO troops marching with Russian troops in such a mutually auspicious celebration points to a promising atmosphere of collaboration in the future European and Eurasian security environment. In a 2009 poll of the Marshall Center’s distinguished alumni – those serving in senior positions in their respective governments – respondents agreed that relationships between Western countries and Russia were critical in confronting security issues during the next decade. According to the distinguished alumni, Russia has great influence in security matters that are of mutual concern to the majority of countries represented. This makes Russia a key partner in the collective effort to provide, in the words of NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “an umbrella of security from Vancouver to Vladivostok.” □
NATO’s New Momentum
EU support key to success in Afghanistan

As the war in Afghanistan entered its ninth year, NATO promised a new push to deliver control of the nation to its people sooner. Spurring the new momentum is an influx of thousands of troops that will help the Alliance’s International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF, increase security in the country and give it the added clout to fight insurgents.

NATO expects 2010 to be a decisive year in Afghanistan. The coalition will follow a wider political, and more people-centric, strategy to “lay the groundwork for greater Afghan leadership in its own affairs,” NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen told Alliance foreign ministers in December 2009.

That will be a challenge. Insurgents in Afghanistan increased strikes on coalition troops and ramped up suicide bomber attacks. Insurgents killed more civilians in 2009 than in previous years, NATO reported.

On Jan. 29, 2010, representatives from 70 nations met in London for a summit on Afghanistan hosted by British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and Afghan President Hamid Karzai. The summit aimed to refocus on what the coalition must do to secure the nation to allow Afghan forces to begin taking control of some security this year.

Brown told delegates that mid-2011 should be the deadline for “turning the tide” in Afghanistan, the BBC reported.

An announcement after the one-day summit stated Afghanistan would assume the “majority of operations in the insecure areas of Afghanistan within three years” and take control of all physical security within five years.

Karzai told the BBC that his country is willing to reintegrate some Taliban fighters into Afghan society. He also said his nation’s security forces would need support for at least 15 years.

An appeal should be made to insurgents in Afghanistan to “lay down their arms in exchange for recognition as a legitimate opposition group,” Fabrice Pothier, director of the Carnegie Europe policy institute, wrote on the group’s Web site.

The United States promised an additional 30,000 troops in December 2009, which will increase the total U.S. troop strength in the nation to more than 90,000. Rasmussen praised the U.S. commitment, and said the increase is proof of U.S. resolve for the mission in Afghanistan.

“But this is not a U.S. mission alone: America’s allies in NATO have shared the risks, costs and burdens of this mission from the beginning,” he said. “As the U.S. increases its commitment, I am confident that the other allies, as well as our partners in the mission, will also make a substantial increase in their contribution.”

The initial reaction to the troop increase announcement was positive. Response in Europe was quick, and Brown urged the coalition to follow suit. Britain, which has 9,500 troops in Afghanistan, pledged 500 more.

In January 2010, Germany announced it would send an additional 850 troops to train Afghan security forces and help in other noncombat roles. At the same time, the government said the number of troops would not exceed 5,340. In addition to their resolve to stand firm in Afghanistan, the Germans plan to gradually reduce troop strength and turn over their duties to Afghan forces in 2014, according to the German Foreign Office.
France announced in January 2010 that it would not send more troops to Afghanistan, but would instead offer 80 more military trainers.

European nations have been quick to promise support, but they have been slow to follow through on committing more troops to the assistance force. However, Brown told Reuters news agency in December 2009 that his country will “play its full part in persuading other countries to offer troops to the Afghanistan campaign.”

The reinforcements are necessary to speed up the battle against insurgents, secure key towns and train Afghan security forces. That will also clear the way for the coalition to begin reducing forces in the country.

What is not in doubt is the importance of the coalition effort. Addressing the summit, Rasmussen tried to alleviate Afghan fears that the international force will leave without finishing its job. He told summit delegates that NATO’s ultimate goal is to hand over lead responsibility for Afghan security to its own forces. He said it was too early to know when that process would take place, but it will start in 2010. The transition will take place based on “conditions, not calendars.”

“Let me put it very clearly. Transition is not a code word for exit,” he said. “The Afghan people should have no fear that we will leave too early. The enemies of Afghanistan should have no hope that we will leave too early. We will not.”

Winning the war in Afghanistan is the NATO-led security force’s top priority, Rasmussen said. “It matters to us all, to prevent Afghanistan from becoming, once again, a breeding ground for international terrorism.”

Success in Afghanistan is important to the European Union because it proves the union is a “reliable and unified transatlantic partner,” Pothier, an expert on Afghanistan Union because it proves the union is a “reliable and unified transatlantic partner,” Pothier, an expert on Afghanistan

Across Afghanistan, the need for troops is apparent, especially in the southern Helmand province. The police training academy there continues to graduate new policemen. But the insurgents have a stronghold in the province.

“We all recognize that the key to success in Afghanistan is the situation in southern Afghanistan,” Dutch Army Maj. Gen. Mart de Kruif said in December at a Pentagon press briefing. He is a former commander of ISAF’s Regional Command South, which oversees operations in extremist strongholds such as Helmand and Kandahar provinces.

The general said the U.S. decision to increase troops was “spot on.” He said, “You can’t do just a little bit of counterinsurgency. You do counterinsurgency and protect 90 to 95 percent of the population, or you don’t do counterinsurgency at all.”

The bottom line is that winning in Afghanistan depends on resolving a host of issues. And it depends on European nations sending the additional troops they promised.

NATO is in Afghanistan “out of necessity,” British parliamentarian Liam Fox said in a September lecture The Heritage Foundation posted on its Web site.

“It is sometimes difficult for us to express what we mean by winning in Afghanistan, but it is easy to describe what we mean by losing,” he said. “Were we to lose and be forced out of Afghanistan against our will, it would be a shot in the arm for every jihadist globally.”

Fox said that would signal NATO’s lack of “moral fortitude to see through what we believe to be a national security emergency. It would suggest that NATO, in its first great challenge since the end of the Cold War, did not have what it takes to see a difficult challenge through.”

### Since November 2009, European nations and the United States have pledged to send more troops to assist the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Some of the increases include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Current Troops</th>
<th>Pledged Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>50,590</td>
<td>30,000+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>9,500</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>4,335</td>
<td>850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Poland</td>
<td>2,140</td>
<td>600</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>175</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NATO, as of March 2010
Numbers fluctuate with troop movements.
Jackal Stone ’09
Counterterrorism training event is a milestone for Croatia

Croatia hosted its first-ever NATO exercise — Jackal Stone — in September 2009, just five months after joining the now 28-member alliance.

The counterterrorism training was a big step for Croatia, which joined NATO in April 2009. The multinational event, held Sept. 10 to 27, allowed Croatia to showcase the skills of its special operations forces. It was also an opportunity for the country to prove it could work with its new military partners.

It was the “most important international exercise for Croatia” in 2009, said Brig. Gen. Dražen Šćuri, deputy commander of the Croatian Air Force and Air Defense. He said it was also an “opportunity to improve our capabilities for the host nation support concept.”

Šćuri, the exercise deputy commander, said Croatian Special Operations Battalion units and Ministry of Interior special police joined counterparts from the other nations in the exercise. More than 1,500 special operations and police forces from 10 nations conducted joint air, land and sea counterinsurgency operations. Participants came from Albania, Hungary, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Ukraine and the United States.

Classroom and robust field events took place at various locations in Croatia and off its Adriatic coast. A multinational team comprised the Jackal Stone Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force. Direction for task force actions came from the combined and joint special operations center, which played a crucial role in the operation. The center placed special focus on the information and communication elements needed to conduct successful counterinsurgency operations.

A major exercise goal was to increase the cooperation needed to fight terrorism. Hosting Europe’s biggest special forces drill of 2009 demonstrated the value Croatia places on special operations forces to do that job, Croatian Minister of Defense Branko Vukelić said. He was satisfied with the drill, and said it helped standardize NATO
counterinsurgency efforts. “This exercise contributes to strengthening regional security and cooperation,” he said.

Another key exercise goal was to improve interoperability. Though participants regularly practice with other countries, this exercise was another opportunity for nations to improve their readiness and build the capacities that will enable NATO to present a more effective joint response to future security challenges, the Croatian Ministry of Defense stated on its Web site.

Other exercise objectives included building mutual respect between participants and the sharing of doctrine and training concepts, tactics, techniques and procedures. And there was emphasis on helping members address risks before they become crises.

The exercise also showed the importance Croatia places on improving international military partnerships. It reinforced the nation’s belief that special forces, although small, play a crucial role in fighting terrorism.

Organizing the exercise was a joint Croatian-United States effort. But putting on such a large event was no easy task. Much effort went into planning the minor details before the exercise took place, said Rear Adm. Zdenko Simićić, the Croatian Armed Forces deputy chief of general staff and exercise director.

A demonstration for distinguished visitors Sept. 15, 2009, “showed how much effort it took” to organize the multinational force, Simićić said. During the demonstration, special forces and police units rescued hostages held by terrorists. Teams from various nations used helicopters and airlift aircraft during rescue missions. It showed “good cooperation and coordination of actions” by both military and civilian forces, he said.

The training provided opportunities for land, sea and air special operations units. Some of the training included fast-rope insertion/extraction system training; ship visits; offshore board, search and seizure training; helicopter aerial refueling; water drop and free-fall parachute training.

This kind of training will help build a more cohesive NATO counterinsurgency response, Romanian Army Maj. Tocila Doru said. Classes held before the field exercises allowed participants to “harmonize and establish standard procedures” before taking action on the field, he said. The Jackal Stone liaison officer said improvements were evident from the first day, and that led to the success of the exercise.

For Polish 1st Special Forces Regiment Soldiers, the exercise provided the opportunity to operate within a multinational force. More significant was that, for the first time, Poles planned the activities of a special operations task group, said Lt. Col. Pawel Wiktorowicz, chief of training for Poland’s Special Operations Command. This constitutes another stage that readies Poland to command NATO special operations forces, he said.

“Due to this fact, Polish SOF Soldiers will not only perform tasks given by their allies but they will also be on the decision-making staff,” Wiktorowicz said.

Though Croatia is new to NATO, the success of Jackal Stone — and working with an international team — comes as no surprise. Croatia has contributed troops to the NATO-led Kosovo Force, both directly and indirectly. And since 2003, it has sent troops to serve with the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.

Gen. Josip Lucić, Croatian Armed Forces chief of general staff, said his nation’s forces gained more with each passing day of the exercise. He said the Croatian military, particularly its special forces, had “implemented all the necessary reforms and proven the ability to work with our allies and partners.”

Information from the Croatian Ministry of Defense, Polish Special Forces Command and other military Web sites was used in this report.
Olympic Effort
Lessons learned help secure sporting events

The images of the carnage caused by four bombs detonated by homegrown terrorists in July 2005 are still fresh in the minds of most Londoners. The suicide bombers, all British citizens, attacked unprotected targets to protest British involvement in the Iraq war. They killed 52 people and injured more than 770. As London prepares to host the 2012 Summer Olympics, there are concerns that another attack may occur.

International sporting events such as the Olympics and the FIFA World Cup are magnets for athletes and sports fans across the globe. With extensive media coverage of the events, they are also attractive targets for violent extremists determined to inflict damage and make strong statements to a worldwide audience. Ensuring the safety of participants and visitors at these huge sporting events is a growing challenge.

"The London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games promise to be the greatest sporting event in U.K. history, and quite possibly the greatest security challenge that the U.K. has faced since the Second World War."

— Alan West
British Security Minister

Attacks against “soft targets” — unprotected, mostly civilian sites — are not new. The Olympics, with large numbers of fans and easy access, have been a target for violence since 1972, when Palestinian gunmen held hostage and killed 11 Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics. The 1996 Atlanta Olympics were the target of a U.S. terrorist who detonated a bomb that killed one person and injured 111. More recently, terrorist attacks in New York and Washington in 2001; Madrid in 2004; London and Bali, Indonesia, in 2005; Mumbai, India, in 2008; and Jakarta, Indonesia, in 2009, underscored the threat extremists pose to soft targets.

The committee organizing the London games is particularly sensitive to the threat of terrorism because of the July 2005 bombings, which took place the day after the International Olympic Committee, or IOC, awarded the games to the city.

"Since that tragic event, the U.K. has continued to face a high level of threat from terrorism," West told Euronews. "We expect this threat to remain come the summer of 2012."

Keeping Up
The security aspects of organizing international sporting events present a growing challenge because of the constantly changing landscape of violent extremism. Since it is common for extremists to experiment with new and improved tactics, security organizations
must continually adapt technologies and training to anticipate and prevent attacks. Consequently, the costs of securing sporting events have increased dramatically. It was an issue Canada faced while preparing for the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver, British Columbia.

“Security will not be compromised for financial reasons,” read an e-mail statement from the Canada Public Safety Ministry to the Ontario newspaper *Brockville Recorder and Times* in January 2009. The cost of security for the Vancouver games escalated from a starting budget of 122 million euros to nearly 700 million euros. The Vancouver security budget paid for deployment of about 15,000 police, private security and military personnel; airspace restrictions covering 30 miles around the city and competition venues; border security; surveillance cameras; hand-held equipment for screening people entering venues; nuclear and biological threat scanning devices; and H1N1 vaccinations for security officers, according to public records.

The London games organizers have set aside about 700 million euros for security. Experts say Britain should be spending at least twice that amount, according to Euronews. The British say they are making every effort to stage secure games, while at the same time being fiscally responsible in light of the international economic downturn.

There is a close link between the London games’ security planning and Great Britain’s counterterrorism strategy. During security planning, officials are assessing a wide range of risks that will undergo constant review through the start of the 2012 games. Organizers recognize the need to strike a balance between effective and visible security and providing a welcoming and friendly atmosphere for all involved in the games.

“The U.K. police service has a well-deserved reputation for ensuring that major sporting events pass off safely. Staging the Olympics is a tremendous honor, and the police will be playing their part in ensuring that the games are safe and secure so that spectators and participants can really enjoy this unique event,” said Chris Allison, assistant commissioner of the Greater London’s Metropolitan Police Service. Allison is head of the force’s central operations and is working with the upcoming games.

Police officers and security advisors are working with the Olympic Delivery Authority to build security into the design of Olympic and Paralympic venues, according to the
U.K. Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism. Builders are applying standards from Secured by Design, an initiative by the country’s Association of Chief Police Officers to help minimize crime and security risks. As an added protection from extremist threats, the design scheme provides for using hand and iris recognition technology. This allows entry only to authorized personnel at the construction sites of the Olympic venues and especially the Olympic Park, currently the largest construction site in Europe. In addition, organizers are considering using unmanned aircraft over Olympic venues for surveillance, road and railway monitoring, search and rescue support, harbor security, event security, communication relays, major incident assessment and frontier security, according to the Guardian.

**Collaboration a Must**

A positive trend in the organization of international sporting events, and one that helps host countries better manage the complexity and cost of security, is the ongoing collaboration between past and future host countries. This partnership helps organizers streamline their processes and apply best security practices from past events.

While preparing to host the 2008 games, for example, China worked with the Greek Center for Security Studies, the organization solely responsible for security at the 2004 Athens Olympics, according to the Chinese news site People’s Daily Online. The British police, in turn, are studying how the Chinese handled security with the intention of using some of the information to prepare for the 2012 London Olympics, according to the Homeland Security News Wire. “Some” is a key word here because the British deem some of the Chinese tactics too intrusive and, therefore, off limits. A Scotland Yard report related to the use of Chinese-style security tactics in London stated that a “balance must be maintained between the use of technology to support security requirements and individual rights to privacy.”

Chinese security practices in 2008 included installation of miniature microphones in thousands of taxis, Homeland Security News Wire reported. Passengers’ conversations were transmitted to a police control room, where officers could stop the cabs if they suspected criminal activity. Another practice was the use of microchips on tickets and passes, allowing security officers to track athletes, visitors and journalists. In addition, Beijing’s 300,000 closed-circuit TV cameras were linked to software capable of recognizing the faces of known criminals and terror suspects.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of China’s security tactics was the use of its people. Beijing enlisted its 15 million residents as antiterrorism eyes and ears. Security officials used an antiterrorism manual covering 39 different potential terrorist threats — such as bombs, arson, shootings, hijacking, chemical, biological and nuclear attacks — to educate Beijing citizens about possible threats and to prepare them to respond appropriately, according to the Chinese Xinhua News Agency.

Organizers of the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa sent their security forces to train at the World Cup in Germany in 2006, the Union of European Football Associations Euro 2008 tournament in Austria and the Beijing Olympics, said Danny Jordaan, chief executive of the 2010 South African World Cup Organizing Committee. The FBI, Germany’s Federal Criminal Police Office and Scotland Yard will also help keep the World Cup safe, FIFA President Joseph Blatter told dpa, the German news agency, in October 2009. In addition, a group of police officers from each of the 32 participating countries will serve as liaisons between the host-country police and the teams. South African security forces also intend to use “spotters” to help identify suspicious social behaviors.

Another trend is a movement to allow more countries outside Western Europe and North America to host international sporting events, which has proven successful for China, Russia, India, South Africa and Brazil. Some experts note that providing opportunities to more countries is noble and fair, but it puts those events close to the most volatile parts of the world — the Caucasus, Afghanistan and Pakistan, ungoverned parts of Africa, even crime-infested Brazilian favelas, or slums — which some experts say unnecessarily increases the risks for everyone involved.

**High Stakes**

Flawless execution of an international sporting event is a matter of prestige and the goal of every host country. But the stakes are particularly high for countries hosting...
international events for the first time. China, India, South Africa, Brazil and Russia want to prove they, too, can stage a world-class event without serious incidents.

In Russia’s case, for example, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin is working closely with the organizing committee to make sure preparations for the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics stay on track and on budget. In November 2008, Georgia voiced concerns about security at Sochi because of its proximity to the Georgian border (50 km) and the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, backdrop of the August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia.

IOC chief Jacques Rogge, who has been inspecting Russia’s preparations, told Agence France-Presse in December 2009 that he was confident Russia could prevent any terrorist threat and stage a completely safe event.

“The Russian authorities are fully aware of the need to have a secure games environment,” Rogge said at a ceremony unveiling the Sochi games logo. “They are doing all that is needed, and we trust them completely.”

South Africa faces similar scrutiny as it prepares to host Africa’s first-ever World Cup. Organizers are pulling out all the stops to organize a safe event amid concerns related to the high crime rates that have plagued the country, and threats by al-Qaida and its Somali franchise, al-Shabab, according to defenceWeb.

“Our security plan, which has been approved by FIFA and which we have been implementing in phases, is fully prepared for any occurrence,” Sally de Beer, director of the South African Police Service, told The Voice of the Cape Web site.

Temporary aviation restrictions over South African venues are already in place. Security will be beefed up at all points of entry, including airports, harbors, hotels and event sites. The 41,000 police officers deploying to protect the World Cup will rely on helicopters, unmanned aircraft, water cannons, 100 new BMW police cars for highway patrol, mobile command vehicles, body armor and high-tech bomb disposal equipment. Mobile command centers will receive video feeds from closed-circuit cameras and aircraft.

Brazil is preparing to host the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Rio de Janeiro Olympics, the first in South America. Both events are a source of great pride for the country. But just weeks after learning it would host the Olympics, Rio rode a deadly wave of drug-related violence that left 40 people dead, including three policemen killed when drug gangs shot down their helicopter in October 2009.

The Brazilian government has budgeted 360 million euros for security leading up to the Olympics. The money will go to police training, patrolling, upgrading technology and establishing “peacemaking police units” intended to maintain order in high-risk areas, particularly in Rio’s slums, the IOC reported. Brazil also brought in former New York City mayor Rudolph Giuliani to serve as a security advisor for the games and to help Rio tackle its crime problem. During Giuliani’s 1994 to 2002 tenure as mayor, New York City saw a 57 percent drop in overall crime and a 65 percent decrease in murders. Credited with the improvement was Giuliani’s zero-tolerance stance on crime, which he intends to apply to Rio’s favelas.

Security research conducted by Stratfor, an American intelligence company, also suggests that to effectively fight terrorism, security forces must adopt a proactive and protective intelligence approach to the problem — one that focuses on “the how” of violent attacks instead of just “the who.”

**Prevention Strategy**

In the traditional, reactive approach, in which authorities respond to a crime scene after a violent attack to find and arrest those responsible, it is necessary to focus on “the who” — the person or group behind the attack. And while prosecuting those who commit violent crimes is necessary, preventing attacks is more important. Thus, prevention requires a proactive approach, in which “the how” becomes crucial.

Prevention is based on the fact that successful terrorist attacks don’t just happen out of the blue. Terrorist attacks follow a discernable planning cycle. There are critical points in that cycle when an outside observer is most likely to detect a plot. By studying the tactics, tradecraft and behaviors associated with violent extremists, security experts can identify those behaviors before an attack takes place.

NATO reported that officials in various European countries have stopped at least 19 major terrorist attacks since 9/11. One was in London, where two policemen stopped an Algerian man who was acting suspiciously as he filmed with his cell phone, Britain’s Times Online reported. After examining the man’s telephone, police found it contained 90 minutes of footage of train stations, security cameras and shopping centers.

No matter how complete efforts to secure sporting events may be, security experts warn to always expect the unexpected. That is not to say security plans at international sporting events are useless, but organizers must also consider unforeseen problems. They must establish and maintain clear channels of communications so they can learn from the experiences of partner security organizations.
Transnistria: A Black Hole?
EU seeks thaw in ‘frozen conflict’

The European Union needs to resolve the long-standing issue of Transnistria with a solid policy that clearly addresses the breakaway territory. That is the view expressed by Cristian Preda, a Romanian member of the European Parliament. He made his comments in January at a public hearing on the EU’s role in “frozen conflicts” hosted by the parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs.

“There is need for a firm hand, because this direction must be understood,” Preda said in a story posted on the Romanian Financiarul.ro Web site. “The ‘we will see about that later, let us be creative’ attitude and other similar ones are an assertion of weakness, of the inability to formulate the problem. We cannot ignore this reality, which is in our immediate neighborhood.” The EU’s high representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy must take a more active role in helping to thaw out this frozen conflict, Preda said.

Transnistria is a sliver of land bordering Ukraine and separated from the rest of Moldova by the Dniester...
River. Inhabitants consider themselves more ethnically Russian than Moldovan. The region broke away from Moldova when it split from the crumbling Soviet Union in 1990. A civil war followed and ended in 1992 with no real solution. The issue remained mostly dormant until fighting broke out in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008, which sparked renewed interest in Transnistria’s static situation.

The EU and other European institutions have provided aid, expertise and peacekeepers to stabilize the region to prevent it from erupting into another conflict.

Transnistria is five percent of Moldova’s land mass. It is slightly more prosperous than the rest of Moldova — which is mostly agrarian — because it has some steel manufacturing. Transnistria has its own currency, postage and military, holds elections, issues passports and behaves as an independent government. Transnistria uses the Cyrillic alphabet, while Moldova uses the Latin alphabet. In fact, Transnistria closed schools that did not comply with a government edict to use only the Cyrillic alphabet.

Apart from those issues, government corruption, black markets, drug smuggling, human trafficking and ethnic politics complicate matters in the territory.

Moldova wants a reincorporated Transnistria, and the United Nations and EU support that goal. Transnistria is a small buffer zone between Moldova and Ukraine, two countries that are increasing their ties with Europe and aspire to EU membership.

But the region’s lawlessness deters Europe from allowing Moldova full membership in European institutions. Countries aspiring to become members of the EU must meet the standards outlined in the acquis – a legislative framework with 35 chapters, each with a large number of acts – as part of the negotiation process.

Transnistrian leader Igor Smirnov, and those who profit from the situation, do not support reunification. Multilateral talks on the issue in April 2008 ended without results.

To further complicate matters, Russia has a stake in keeping the status quo. This conflict of interest was addressed in a December 2006 Central Asia-Caucasus Institute study titled “The Wider Black Sea Region: An Emerging Hub in European Security.” In it, the authors contend that Russia continues to dominate the “negotiation processes and peacekeeping formats, increasingly identifiable as a party to these conflicts rather than a neutral mediator.”

Transnistria is less than 100 kilometers from the EU’s new borders, and Abkhazia and the North Caucasus are just across the Black Sea. The report states that continued instability in these conflict zones will affect Europe. “Should these conflicts erupt to large-scale violence — an eventuality whose likelihood is growing, not receding — Europe will be affected significantly.” On the one hand, the report states, the flow of refugees would reach Europe, along with drugs, arms and migrants. On the other, since the EU is so close to the region, it would force the union to play a leading role in conflict resolution and peacekeeping. “Indeed, this is made...
all the more pressing by Russia’s partial role in the conflicts, making it unviable as a peacekeeper and honest broker. Building stability in this environment is hence an increasingly important priority for the EU. This, in turn, can only be achieved through the resolution of the conflicts of the region,” the report stated.

Russia supports Transnistria without recognizing the state as independent. There were Russian forces and weapons in Transnistria before the fall of the Soviet Union. In the Agreement on the Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, signed at the OSCE Summit in Istanbul in November 1999, Russia agreed to remove all its troops and arms from Moldova by December 2002. However, 1,200 unauthorized Russian peacekeepers remain in the territory, as well as 20,000 to 40,000 tons of Russian weapons stored in Transnistria because of a lack of funds to ship the stores back to Russia.

In an April 2009 report titled “Synergies vs. Spheres of Influence in the Pan-European Space,” the Centre for European Policy Studies, or CEPS, states that Russian support would help resolve frozen conflicts.

“The EU should push forcefully for the 5+2 format (Moldova, Transnistria, Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE, plus the EU and United States) to be the principal negotiating forum,” the CEPS report stated.

A mediation process involving the OSCE, Russia and Ukraine has been ongoing since 1992, the EU Web site reported. “The key principles of EU support for the settlement process are: support to the OSCE mediation efforts aimed at establishing a viable and democratic Moldovan state; withdrawal of Russian ammunition without further delay; readiness for a greater EU involvement.” The last 5+2 meeting took place in February 2006.

The mediation process continues with the EU and other mediators and observers “urging Moldova and Transnistria to resume the 5+2 talks.”

Europe has been assisting Moldova with reforms since 1993, when the OSCE established a mission there to support efforts to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. Since then, the mission has expanded and has as its main objective “to assist in negotiating a lasting political settlement of the Transnistrian conflict, to consolidate the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova and to reach an understanding on a special status for the Transnistria region,” the OSCE states.

The mission also covers a broad spectrum of human-dimension issues, including human and minority rights, democratization, media freedom and combating human trafficking. Since 1999, the mission’s task has been to help with the removal and destruction of Russian ammunition and armament from the region and to ensure the transparency of the process, the OSCE stated.

OSCE and EU advisors are at the borders with Ukraine and Moldova. The EU Border Assistance Mission has had 200 of its agents on the borders since 2005. Additionally, the
The European Neighborhood Policy program sends money and personnel to the region to help build political relationships and assist in economic integration to the rest of Europe.

Transnistria is what some diplomats call a “black hole,” Stephen Castle wrote in the British newspaper The Independent. The territory is suspected of organized drug and human trafficking and of supplying mortar tubes, small arms and sniper rifles to Africa, Abkhazia and Chechnya, he stated.

“In December 2003, reports surfaced that Alazan [nuclear] rockets ... had disappeared from the sprawling weapons stockpiles of [Transnistria],” said Alex Kliment, a Eurasian analyst who has written for Britain’s Financial Times newspaper. He called Transnistria “a major source of legal and illegal weapons for conflict zones in the former Communist bloc and the Middle East and a key transit point for narcotics.”

“The [border] mission is important for the overall situation for Europe and the world. There is said to be smuggling of drugs, trafficking of people and arms, possibly nuclear material,” said Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the EU’s external relations commissioner.

All the statements and posturing over the small region do little to alleviate the problems of the people living in Moldova and Transnistria. Moldovans have sought work abroad, but with the economic downturn, are less able to send enough money home to support their families. This may contribute to forced labor and human trafficking problems. More than 25,000 Moldovans were likely victims of trafficking for forced labor in 2008, according to the U.S. Department of State’s 2009 Trafficking in Persons Report. “Moldovan women are trafficked primarily to Turkey, Russia, Cyprus and United Arab Emirates and to other Middle Eastern and Western European countries. Men are trafficked to work in the construction, agriculture and service sectors of Russia and other countries,” the report stated. “There have also been some cases of children trafficked for begging to neighboring countries. Girls and young women are trafficked within the country from rural areas to Chisinau, and there is evidence that men from neighboring countries are trafficked to Moldova for forced labor.”

Ferrero-Waldner told the Moldovan parliament in November 2009 that the country “faces formidable challenges on many fronts — economic, financial, social and political. But it does not stand alone, as long as it acts in its own interest through continued, determined efforts to stabilize its internal situation. I have every confidence that you will tackle the difficult reforms ahead, because you know they are crucial to your future success.

“Let me share my vision with you,” she said. “I see a prosperous Moldova, its society reconciled and its territorial integrity restored. Europe’s history of reconciliation and unification in the last half century has a lesson to offer. It has brought prosperity and stability to us, and in sharing our experience with you, we hope to see you fully reap the same benefits.”

To reach the goal of full EU inclusion, Moldovans are making necessary changes, cooperating with EU institutions and working toward the future. Transnistria and its related issues are a stumbling block. But the international community’s ongoing willingness and ability to mediate and provide resources for regional and local development help to stabilize the region until an agreement can be reached.
Kazakhstan Faces OSCE Hurdles
Nation confident it will make a difference

Kazakhstan is leading the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, or OSCE, this year, making it the first Asian nation to hold the post. Kanat Saudabayev, Kazakhstan’s secretary of state and foreign minister, replaced Greek Prime Minister and Foreign Minister George Papandreou on January 1, 2010.

Choosing the first former Soviet state to chair the 56-nation alliance raised a few eyebrows. Kazakhstan has been criticized for its poor record on democracy and human rights — both fundamental OSCE goals — the BBC reported in January 2010.

But Central Asia’s largest nation has a “commitment to uphold the fundamental principles and values of the organization,” read a statement on the OSCE Web page. “This is evidence that the principle of equality among the participating states remains valid, as well as recognition of the increasing role of Kazakhstan in a strategically important region and in the OSCE generally,” Saudabayev said.

Saudabayev knows oil-rich Kazakhstan, the world’s largest land-locked country, will face tough issues during its one-year OSCE term. But he is optimistic his country’s tenure will bear fruit.

“We want to contribute to strengthening peace and security … improving confidence within the OSCE,” he said in a May 2009 interview for the New Europe Web site. To do that will require “strengthening the European security architecture, developing transit and transport potential, stabilizing OSCE regional partners — Afghanistan — and promoting tolerance and peaceful coexistence in diverse societies, a very timely subject for Europe.”

Roughly the size of Western Europe, Kazakhstan is in the right place to influence the Afghan deadlock and other conflicts that run along Central Asia’s borders, euronews.com reported.

“Accordingly, we intend to focus particular attention on Afghanistan,” Saudabayev said in story posted on Central Asia Online in January 2010. The country is instrumental in the effort to stabilize Afghanistan, providing ground and air transit routes for non-lethal cargo destined for coalition forces as part of the Northern Distribution Network. And the country’s military provides support to the Afghan Army. He also said that for many years Kazakhstan has been providing humanitarian aid to Afghanistan and Afghan refugees.

But resolving the Afghanistan war is a tall order, as is fixing other ongoing regional conflicts. To have any influence over these events, Kazakhstan will have to use its “mediating potential to support existing frameworks of negotiations to settle protracted conflicts in Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia,” Saudabayev said.

“Assisting in resolution of protracted conflicts remains a priority for any chairmanship,” Saudabayev told Radio Free Europe in January 2010. “We shall endeavor to do all we can to make a contribution to this difficult process. At the same time, our organization must try to find a way of preventing the emergence of similar
conflicts which result in human tragedy and humanitarian disasters.”

Many world organizations acknowledge there is a definite link between the drug trade and terrorist funding. Saudabayev said he will put fighting the illicit drug trade and counterterrorism high on the OSCE priorities list. But the cleanup must start in his own country, which is a highway for illegal drugs bound from Afghanistan to Russia.

Additionally, events in the country have led many to believe the Kazakhs are not moving fast enough to resolve their own human rights and other issues. The nation’s promises to liberalize its media, political parties and election laws have yet to materialize. Its internal issues might make it harder for Kazakhstan to lead the OSCE by example.

But the nation has “done much right since independence,” William Courtney, the first U.S. ambassador to an independent Kazakhstan, wrote in a January 2010 opinion piece for The New York Times. “Whether it has the moral authority and diplomatic gravitas to shepherd the OSCE to a fruitful year, however, depends on how it leads and the support it obtains.”

Though it faces challenges, Saudabayev is confident of Kazakhstan’s OSCE leadership role. “We believe the unanimous decision by the OSCE’s 56 member states to elect Kazakhstan as chairman of the organization … marks Kazakhstan’s recognition as an independent state,” Saudabayev said during the New Europe Web site interview.

Kazakhstan’s OSCE leadership is an “opportunity for us to contribute to security and cooperation in Europe,” he said. “From that, everybody will benefit.”

ABOUT THE OSCE

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe is the world’s largest regional security group. Its 56 member states are from Europe, Central Asia and North America. Started as a series of conferences in August 1975, the group gained permanent status in 1990. In 1994 it changed from the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe to its current name.

A primary instrument for early warning, the group effects conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. It does that with 19 missions or field operations in Eastern and Southeastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia.

OSCE deals with the three dimensions of security: politico-military, economic-environmental and human. It addresses a wide range of security-related concerns, including arms control, confidence and security building, human rights, national minorities, democratization, policing strategies, counterterrorism, and economic and environmental activities.

All members enjoy equal status, and decisions are made by consensus on a politically but not legally binding basis.

Melange, a toxic rocket fuel component, is pumped into a special railway tank car from a Soviet-era storage depot in Kalynivka, Ukraine, in November 2009. The chemicals had posed an environmental and security threat to states — including Kazakhstan — within the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.
The European Union now has a new president, which gives the union one voice. Belgian Prime Minister Herman Van Rompuy became the first EU president. He took office Dec. 1, 2009, and will serve a 2 1/2-year term. Catherine Ashton, Britain’s EU trade commissioner, is the union’s new high representative for foreign affairs and security policy. She is also vice president of the European Commission.

Creation of the two posts took place after the Czech Republic completed and registered its national ratification in November 2009. As these key leaders take on their roles and responsibilities, the transition has reportedly gone more smoothly than originally anticipated.

Van Rompuy will be responsible for chairing council meetings and representing the EU on the global stage. He will also represent the council in relations with other EU institutions. His goals include helping Europe recover from the financial crisis and addressing climate change. He believes the Copenhagen climate talks failed to meet expectations but were a good foundation for further work.

“It’s very important to show that everyone has a say, that this is the Europe of 27, that everyone was actually in on this decision,” Swedish Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt said on Germany’s Deutsche Welle international broadcasting service online. He chaired the selection committee.

With the two new posts, the Lisbon Treaty — which also took effect Dec. 1, 2009 — aims to enhance the EU’s role in world affairs and streamline its decision making, the EU reported on its Web site.

The treaty redistributes voting weights between member countries, removing national vetoes in a number of areas. It expands the commission’s powers and greatly increases Parliament’s involvement in the legislative process. A new petition process will give citizens the opportunity to directly influence EU policy.

The human rights charter becomes legally binding.

Van Rompuy has been president of the Belgian coalition government. His tenure has seen a calming of the often turmoil-stricken Belgian government, and he is a consensus builder, the Deutsche Welle article added.
During the late 1990s, Van Rompuy was Belgium’s budget minister. Some consider him a budgetary hardliner, and he has been critical of governments spending their way out of recession. Before entering politics, he was with the Belgian central bank. He has authored six books on economics and politics.

Van Rompuy accepted the post with “enthusiasm and conviction” and promised a two-track approach, prize unity as the EU’s strength but also promoting diversity as its wealth, he said in a report by Britain’s The Guardian newspaper in November 2009.

Once in office, Van Rompuy immediately started a European tour, highlighting the great effort countries will have to make to achieve a lasting recovery from the economic crisis. “One thing is already clear: We need economic growth which is sustainable and which is at least 2 percent instead of the projected structural growth of 1 percent in order to preserve our social model as well as to keep up with the other major economies in the world,” Van Rompuy said in a statement reported by EurActiv, an independent media Web site for EU affairs. He added that he would not implement his political agenda without agreement from London, Rome, Paris, Warsaw and Berlin.

Ashton’s post merges two existing positions: high representative for common foreign and security policy and commissioner for external relations, the European Commission Web site states. She has authority to propose defense and security measures. She must also set up a network of diplomats around the world to support the new office.

“She will be the first permanent chair of the European Union foreign affairs council; she will represent Europe on the world stage in negotiations with the United States, China, India, Russia and other countries,” British Prime Minister Gordon Brown told Britain’s The Independent newspaper in November 2009. “And she will be a vice president of the European Commission, giving her a leading voice on all the commission’s proposals.”

The foreign policy chief will have a budget worth billions of euros and a new diplomatic service of up to 5,000 people, the BBC reported in November 2009.

Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair requested that Ashton receive baroness status in 1999, enabling her to work in the House of Lords, where she served as undersecretary of state for several departments, including the Department for Education and Skills and the Ministry of Justice. She was leader of the House of Lords and lord president of the council, where she oversaw the approval of the Lisbon Treaty.

“Ashton replaced Lord [Peter] Mandelson as the European trade commissioner last October and has impressed her peers in Brussels ever since through quiet diligence on a difficult brief,” The Guardian reported in November 2009. Ashton has never held elected office, but insists that will not be a disadvantage. The EU’s 27 elected heads of state all had a say in the appointment, “and they all decided on me.”

Van Rompuy and Ashton have new duties and must lead while addressing new issues. They will also assume some of the duties of the EU’s rotating presidency, now held by Spain, to make the union more efficient and cost effective. Some of those general duties include justice and home affairs, economic policies, the environment, agriculture and fisheries.

Deutsche Welle reported in January that the EU’s rotating presidency still exists because national governments are unwilling to give up the position. EU member states want to maintain their influence in Brussels. Even so, Spanish Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos insists he will not try to dominate.

“The Lisbon Treaty is the beginning of a new Europe. This Europe will be led by the president of the permanent council, Mr. Van Rompuy, and by the high representative and vice president of the European Commission [Ashton],” Moratinos said. “Therefore, it will be up to them, to these two people, to manage, to boost, to represent the EU in the first half of 2010.”

Van Rompuy and Ashton have assumed their posts at the beginning of a new stage of European politics. They will influence the new institutions by how well they manage the short term and how the rest of Europe perceives their management of European affairs.

“I intend to develop ongoing work on some thematic issues: nonproliferation, counterterrorism, human rights, energy and climate change,” Ashton told the European Parliament in January 2010. “These are not ‘stand alone issues,’ but part of our broader agenda. And our strategies for dealing with them need to be joined up and comprehensive.”

EU President Herman Van Rompuy and Catherine Ashton, high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, are seen in Brussels.
This contemporary sounding issue is the basis for the recent release by Richard Bessel, the renowned British historian of modern Germany: *Germany 1945: From War to Peace*. Bessel addresses a historical topic quite familiar to those with an interest in security studies, modern Europe and World War II. Thoroughly researched and fluidly written, this important work fills a gap that has, until now, largely gone unrecognized. Although clearly a work of history, the book provides valuable insight into the background of one of the most successful cases of nation-building of modern times.

While scholarly and popular books on World War II and Germany’s role in it are legion, very few bridge the gap between wartime and postwar Germany. Normally, the two periods receive distinct treatment, and “Stunde Null”—zero hour—forms a convenient dividing line between a nation at total war and a defeated country hobbled by widespread destruction and an occupation force of millions of foreign soldiers. Yet, for tens of millions of Germans—not to mention the rest of the world—time obviously did not stop on May 8, 1945. The survivors of the war continued with their lives, despite dreadful conditions, and eventually rebuilt Germany into the model democracy that it is today.

Bessel acknowledges this and demonstrates convincingly, but with depressing detail, how the final months of the war and the subsequent occupation of Germany and former German territory in Eastern Europe set the conditions for this astonishing transformation. Only the experience of 12 years of Nazi dictatorship, and a previously unimaginable level of suffering and degradation of a population that had recently imposed the same on its neighbors, allowed a dramatic turn in Germany’s political and social structure. Bessel also explains why the Germans’ own suffering during and after the war became the most remembered aspect of it for the typical German, rather than war crimes or ravages inflicted upon other nations.

The great strength of this book is that it demonstrates repeatedly that preceding Germany’s postwar transformation was a wave of death and destruction for German civilians and soldiers within Germany and its occupied territories that is difficult for the modern reader to comprehend. It is worth pointing out that 50 percent of all Wehrmacht (German armed forces in World War II) casualties—perhaps 11 million, including more than 3.5 million deaths—occurred in the final 10 months of the war. German military deaths at the hands of the Red Army in the single month of January 1945 exceeded the total number of deaths for either the United States or Great Britain for the entire war. Similarly, the vast majority of civilian deaths occurred during the final months
of the war or just after its end. Bessel observes that exact numbers are still debated, but somewhere between 1 million and 2 million ethnic Germans died in Poland, eastern Germany and Czechoslovakia after May 8, 1945, due to forced expulsion, exposure and murder. In addition to the physical destruction of all major German cities by strategic bombing and urban fighting — rendering tens of millions of Germans homeless — came the rape of millions of German women and girls, the looting of vast amounts of private property and the forced displacement of millions of people.

Clearly, the Soviet occupation was horrendous for the German civilians who experienced it. But the book also reveals that French occupation troops behaved nearly as badly as the Russians and that occupation anyway represented a dramatic change in circumstances. The details are not easy to examine, and Bessel does not spare the reader. But his documentation is extensive and balanced in an area that is exceedingly difficult to navigate due to the enormity of the crimes committed in the name of Nazi Germany.

Specialists in the field might find a few small discrepancies, but they will have to look very closely. For example, Nazi Party Secretary Martin Bormann is listed as having died from poisoning, but Bessel does not cite a source, and most historical accounts depict Bormann as disappearing in actual fighting in Berlin on May 2, 1945. His remains were identified in 1972 and confirmed through DNA testing of his son in 1998, but the exact cause of his death will never be proved conclusively.

However, such oversights are minor and very rare. This book is truly an important work for both the general reader and the serious scholar of German and European history. Equally important for practitioners and students of security studies, the book reveals the difficulties, and awful preconditions, required to transform and “nation-build” modern Germany. By extension, this study also raises provocative questions about current efforts to do so elsewhere.
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