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A Polish Army soldier sits in a tank during NATO’s Noble Jump military exercise conducted by the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force in Zagan, Poland.
GETTY IMAGES
Welcome to the 29th issue of *per Concordiam*. In this issue, we look at developing strategies to address contemporary security challenges in Europe. We have gathered articles that consider different perspectives on a security environment that is evolving in Europe and Eurasia and provide what we hope are appropriate responses to regional security challenges. The European security order that evolved after the Cold War now faces a world of new conflicts, vulnerabilities and (dis)order challenges. Although much has been accomplished, clearly more must be done — a task made particularly difficult in this very dynamic period in history. We look forward to dialogue with our readers as we address the challenges to security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond.

The focus on hybrid warfare, on Europe’s eastern flank in particular, provides an opportunity to highlight challenges to Euro-Atlantic states, institutions, identity and values and to better understand how aggressive hybrid actions challenge the eastern partners and how Euro-Atlantic security structures might mitigate the unintended consequences for these neighbors.

To that end, our authors present current Euro-Atlantic vulnerabilities and how they can be exploited. These include: hard-power tools, protracted conflicts, transnational organized crime, political corruption and the undermining of political institutions, economic integration and disintegration tendencies, energy security and the logic of interdependence and independence.

In addition, we look at issues that shed light on the conflict dynamics on Europe’s southern flank, with a particular focus on foreign fighters and refugees as instruments of war and, over the longer term, the issue of youth radicalization and how the Iraq/Syria crisis has increasingly spilled over into neighboring states and begun a metastasis that impacts the stability of states, institutions and identities in the Middle East and North Africa.

The Marshall Center’s objective is to share effective methods, learn from each other and discuss emerging trends in a way that captures insights as to how the European Union and NATO can formulate new southern flank strategies while minimizing negative spillovers and “collateral damage” to NATO and EU neighbors and partners. I hope the ideas in this issue increase dialogue on this complicated but important topic and help inform EU and NATO strategic thinking.

As always, we at the Marshall Center welcome your comments and perspectives on these topics and will include your responses in future editions. Please feel free to contact us at editor@perconcordiam.org

Sincerely,

Keith W. Dayton
Director
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A DOUBLE DOSE ONLINE

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June 23, 2016, will be remembered as a defining moment for European integration. For the first time, a member country decided to leave the European Union. A shock wave swept through Europe and perhaps the United Kingdom, too. Is this the beginning of the end for the European project? Will Brexit encourage other countries to follow the U.K.’s example? Or will Brexit encourage the remaining member countries to show more unity and solidarity and push the EU toward an ever closer union? What are the EU’s prospects?

After the British referendum, paradoxically, discussions about further integration gained new momentum in the EU. Will those discussions provide a new vision for the EU with a catalytic dynamic, as the single market and monetary union projects did in the 1980s and 1990s? Is “more Europe” the right answer to growing Euro-skepticism and Euro-populism in all member countries?

The answer is “yes” and “no” and “it depends.” It depends on what “more Europe” really means. The EU is a complex and differentiated political system that follows at least three tenets: integration, interdependence and balance of power. This is the inherent system of checks and balances. Efficiency, cohesion and credibility among all 28 — and maybe soon 27 — members relies on the well-orchestrated management of this complex system.

Brexit is certainly a huge challenge for the EU because it affects all three tenets. Brexit will make integration much easier because the U.K. often served as a staunch veto to the further deepening of European integration. In fact, the U.K. is perhaps the least integrated EU member. It is neither a part of the eurozone, nor of the Schengen area, the banking union or the monetary union. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union is not considered applicable to the U.K. Without the U.K. in the
EU, progress in deepening European integration will be much easier.

But the tenets of interdependence and balance of power are certainly suffering from the U.K.’s planned departure. Containing Germany’s leading role within the EU will become more difficult. Finding a new internal balance will become a key task for the remaining countries. How Germany and France organize their cooperation and how they manage to keep Germany as the leading country of the EU, within a working system of checks and balances, will be of utmost importance for the EU’s future.

In September 2015, in his first State of the European Union address to the European Parliament in Strasbourg, France, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker complained about the lack of two fundamentals in the EU: the lack of deeper integration and the lack of solidarity among the member states. “Our European Union is not in a good state,” he said. “There is not enough Europe in this Union. And there is not enough union in this Union.”

At first glance, this double deficiency seems to be the result of a lack of political will among member states and, therefore, Juncker’s message is quite simple: With more political will by all member states to show solidarity and deepen European integration, the current multiple crises facing the EU can be tackled. The issue is more difficult and complex. It is not just a lack of political will, but rather the more serious fundamental problem of the current construction of the EU after the Lisbon Treaty.

Both deficiencies — the lack of deeper integration and the lack of solidarity — are the result of a historical compromise that dates
back to the Maastricht Treaty and the end of the Cold War. The decision to deepen the EU and enlarge it led to a multispeed integration with several layers, several requirements for participation, different memberships in different layers, different interests in integration and, therefore, several degrees of solidarity among the member states.

Differentiated integration has led to differentiated solidarity among member states, putting in jeopardy the overall solidarity of the EU. The main problem for the EU, now challenged with multiple crises, seems to be how to transfer differentiated integration and solidarity into a real, working integration system. Differentiated integration and differentiated solidarity have undermined the EU’s coherence and cohesion. It is important to find a new internal balance, a balance among member states and among EU institutions and member states. In other words, a new horizontal and vertical balance needs to be arranged.

The call for a security union is a well-chosen project because it brings to bear the EU’s internal and external capacities and capabilities, as well as the member states’ particular roles. It doesn’t matter whether it starts as an avant-garde project outside the EU’s legal framework, or if it evolves into “Security Schengen,” a project of permanent, structured cooperation within the legal framework, or if it becomes a comprehensive approach that covers the external and internal dimensions of security. What matters is that it creates a new dynamic and that it stimulates a positive discussion within the EU and within its member states.

If the EU can prove its capacity to successfully manage these security questions, European integration will gain new momentum and legitimacy. It will mean redefining the European project in the age of globalization, regionalization and renationalization.

Solidarity is important, but it is certainly not the only key to effective European policy. Reducing the discussion to one on solidarity misses the point dramatically. Indeed, solidarity matters a lot, but checks and balances and internal balancing matter, too, within the political architecture of the EU and the construction of the treaties. Differentiated integration and the shift toward differentiated solidarity are important and very ambiguous developments.

A kind of solidarity in parts has emerged, and it has the inherent potential to spoil the entire EU project by eroding its common values and interests. The EU is not an international organization relying mainly on solidarity or, in other words, on consensus. It is a supranational political system that has purposely tamed the national aspirations of its member states. The EU is designed to tame nationalism and unilateralism by a common method. A certain degree of solidarity is required, because national interest as such (whatever it means and whoever defines it) is not producing European solutions. Solidarity is fundamental for the EU, and differentiated solidarity is a reality for the time being.

Solidarity is a basic EU principle, as are checks and balances and internal balancing. When we understand the nexus of these principles, the EU will survive and grow despite the current storm of crises, and nationalist and populist attacks. That’s the true meaning of Jean-Claude Juncker’s call for more union and more Europe in the European Union. The EU is too important for peace, security, democracy, freedom and prosperity in Europe and beyond to let it fall apart due to simplified perspectives. Differentiated solidarity can lead to more Europe and more union if we understand its limits and its underlying tenets.

The creation of a security union has the potential to take differentiated integration and differentiated solidarity into account, opening a new dynamic for more unity and more Europe — in the end, not a bad prospect for European security after Brexit.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is one of the most — if not the most — successful military alliances in history, having helped ensure nearly 70 years of peace in Europe. It was central to ending the Cold War, an event that brought freedom to tens of millions of people in Eastern Europe. The Alliance contributed to preventing further conflict in the Balkans and led a 50-nation coalition in Afghanistan that helped stabilize the country for over a decade. NATO accomplished this by adapting its enormous strengths to the circumstances of each crisis.

As NATO’s campaign in Afghanistan came to an end and its heads of state discussed the future security environment at their summit meetings in 2010 and 2012, they envisaged a strategic partnership with Russia. However, in early 2014, after the Winter Olympics in Sochi, Russia’s aggressive actions in Crimea and Ukraine revealed a disturbing new evolution in its behavior and narrative.

As a result of Russia’s actions, NATO heads of state at the Wales Summit established the Readiness Action Plan (RAP), including the enhanced NATO Response Force (NRF), to adapt NATO forces to deal with the threat posed by Russian aggression. This action included the creation of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force.

The RAP is composed of two main elements: assurance measures and adaptation measures. The assurance measures include, on a rotational basis, “continuous air, land, and maritime presence and meaningful military activity in the eastern part of the Alliance,” while adaptation measures are designed to increase the capability and capacity of the Alliance to meet security challenges. Since adopting the RAP, NATO has maintained a continuous presence in eastern member states by conducting exercises and training among allied forces. Adaptation measures include increasing the size and capability of the NRF and the establishment of NATO Force Integration Units. Six are now in eastern NATO states and are designed to facilitate the planning and deployment of the NRF and additional NATO forces. NATO has increased the size and readiness of Multinational Corps Northeast in Szczecin, Poland, to maintain constant oversight of the northeastern border.

It has also established the Multinational Division Southeast, which is tasked with maintaining constant oversight of the southeastern region of NATO’s border nations. In addition, NATO is prepositioning military equipment for training in the territory of eastern Alliance members; improving its ability to reinforce eastern allies through the improvement of infrastructure throughout the Alliance; and improving its defense plans through the introduction of the Graduated Response Plans. Each of these adaptation measures was designed to ensure that, as the RAP states, NATO has the right forces in the right places.
place and with the right equipment, and that members are ready to move at very short notice to defend any ally against any threat.

The resulting adaptation of NATO’s land forces over the last year has resulted in strong, fast land forces that can generate options short of war. Should deterrence fail, these same measures will enable NATO to prevail decisively. Military planners analyze the correlation of forces (COF) at the strategic and tactical levels to determine relative strengths between potential adversaries. At the strategic level, this calculation evaluates factors such as the size of a country’s armed forces and its composition, military budgets, population, gross domestic product (GDP), and political legitimacy. A comparison of these strategic factors illustrates NATO’s strategic strength.

The strategic advantages of the Alliance vis-à-vis Russia are telling: armed forces that are more than four times larger, a combined population more than six times greater, defense budgets that are 18 times larger, and a combined GDP that is 20 times greater. Furthermore, Russia’s downward demographic and economic trends suggest that these ratios will remain for the foreseeable future, irrespective of the current planned modernization of Russia’s Armed Forces, which does not appear sustainable.

The one area of strategic parity is in nuclear weapons, which poses an existential threat to Alliance members. The mere possession of these weapons, however, does not translate into strategic leverage unless one believes they might be used.

While a detailed discussion of nuclear policy is beyond the scope of this article, a willingness to leverage these capabilities as a form of escalation dominance is relevant to the discussion of how best to prevent conflict. Regardless of whether Russian leaders are bluffing, as some may believe, Alliance military leaders must assess their capabilities and stated intent at face value when planning how to deter and prevent conflict. Based on these statements and more, the risk of the Russians escalating a land war to the use of nuclear weapons is not zero. And if the risk is not zero, it becomes even more critical that we deter conventional conflict to prevent escalation to nuclear conflict. While hybrid operations with ambiguous aggression and plausible deniability are the most likely forms of conflict, it is also important for us to deter or deal with the threat or actuality of a conventional attack. To determine how to deter conventional conflict, we must examine the tactical correlation of forces, which is limited in time, scale and scope. While an adversary may be inferior at the strategic level, as Russia is, it may still be able to generate a positive tactical correlation of forces at a specific place and time for a limited duration.

If contemplating an attack with less than a 3-to-1 ratio, a prudent military planner cannot guarantee success. Hence the desirability of NATO’s capability to deliver to any eastern ally a robust defensive force that achieves a 1-to-3 ratio against potential Russian aggression.

Along NATO’s northeastern border with Russia, under the existing set of conditions, the Russians enjoy certain advantages that enable them to generate a favorable force ratio for offensive action. If they were to successfully exploit a temporary tactical advantage to secure a gain and then threaten nuclear escalation to check an Alliance response, they could parlay an area of strategic parity — nuclear weapons — and a limited tactical advantage into an enduring strategic outcome: the fracturing of Alliance cohesion.

RUSSIAN TACTICAL ADVANTAGES

- **Interior Lines:** In the analysis of tactical correlation of forces, we first look at the interior lines that enhance Russia’s ability to mass troops faster than the Alliance at certain points on its borders with NATO countries, i.e., the Baltics and Poland. The Russians have three armies positioned in the Western Military District that can deploy 13-16 battle groups, totaling approximately 35,000 troops, within 48 hours to the border of the Alliance, and another 90,000 troops within 30 days.

- **Speed of Decision-making:** Russia’s unitary chain of command enables expeditious action across the whole of government. Conversely, while NATO’s decisions possess the legitimacy of 28 nations acting in unison, they require consensus among all 28, which inevitably takes time.

- **Tanks in Europe:** Russia’s Armed Forces, although four times smaller than the combined Armed Forces of NATO, contain sufficient quantities of armor, air defense, long-range fires and conscript soldiers to generate numerical advantage at certain points along our common borders before a large-scale NATO response could be launched.

A comparison of Russian and Alliance armor forces is instructive. While the Alliance has reduced its tank forces since the end of the Cold War, Russia has kept much of its force in storage and modernized
parts of its active force. Because of improved relations with Russia, the U.S. removed its armored forces from Europe by 2013. Therefore, even though the Alliance possesses more active armor forces than the Russians, these tanks are dispersed among the Alliance member states, meaning the Russians can generate a local advantage in armor, in certain areas, for a finite period. If they chose (and could afford) to do so, the Russians could restore significant quantities of older model tanks, which could approach parity or even a numerical advantage against allied forces.

- **Snap Exercises**: Through the use of ambiguity and “snap exercises” (large drills without advance notice), Russia repeatedly desensitizes and tests for weaknesses along NATO’s boundaries. These exercises enable the Russians to learn and improve their ability to conduct large-scale mobilizations and operational maneuvers to generate a tactical correlation of force advantage at key points.

- **Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD)**: This military doctrinal term describes how Russian forces seek to deny allied access and freedom of action in key areas bordering the NATO-Russian interface, such as the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea, the Far North, and now the eastern Mediterranean, through the establishment of integrated air defense and missile zones. Russia is attempting to recreate the defensive depth it lost with the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

**NATO MILITARY FOCUS AND CAPABILITIES**

Despite an overall strategic inferiority to NATO, Russia has the capability to generate local advantage in terms of the tactical correlation of forces and to leverage its nuclear capabilities in a form of escalation dominance. Given that, how should Alliance military forces contribute to deterrence?

Deterrence is ultimately a political outcome achieved in the mind of a potential adversary by convincing it that the costs of an action outweigh the benefits. The assurance measures in place contribute to deterrence through the presence of small Alliance forces conducting training and exercises with our eastern allies. The downside of this “tripwire” approach is that these forces are not of sufficient strength to defend against a short-notice Russian offensive, therefore necessitating a campaign to retake Alliance territory if it were to be seized.

An alternative to tripwire deterrence is deterrence through a forward defense. Positioning strong forces to achieve a favorable tactical correlation of forces for defense (1-to-3 ratio) would raise serious doubts in the minds of Russian leadership that they could achieve their objectives.

This leads us to a hybrid option in which we sustain tripwire deterrence while simultaneously improving our ability to rapidly reinforce and establish an effective defensive posture as conditions warrant. Deterrence can be achieved in this option by demonstrating the Alliance’s ability to quickly move strong forces to defend any threatened state within the Alliance. In short, we deter through a combination of strength and speed.
Russia is attempting to recreate the defensive depth it lost with the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

The Alliance possesses the forces and capabilities to deter in a hybrid manner, but they must be used in different ways than they have been since the end of the Cold War. NATO must start with an understanding of collective defense within the Alliance.

• **Indicators and Warnings (I&W):** First and foremost, the Alliance’s intelligence enterprise must provide adequate indicators and warnings of possible aggression that would result in the potential for an “armed attack” as per Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. I&W are not solely a covert intelligence function. They also involve the use of open source and diplomatic assessments.

• **High Readiness Forces (HRF):** Next, gaps in the current NATO rapid response timetables must be addressed. The NRF can respond to a unanimous resolution of the North Atlantic Council, the Alliance’s principal political decision-making body, by commencing the deployment of the Spearhead Force, the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force of 8,000 troops, within five to seven days. The remainder of the NRF would begin to move in 30-45 days. The main bodies of NATO militaries would follow afterward.

In addition to the NRF, most nations of the Alliance maintain national high readiness forces. These forces are retained as national reserves and are not offered to NATO on a standing basis, but could be offered in the case of a potential Article 5 scenario. Additionally, they could deploy based on determination by a member nation that an Article 5 obligation has occurred. In either case, these HRF can deploy in a matter of days or weeks. The rapid deployment of these forces to threatened areas would achieve the correlation of forces required to defend (1-to-3 ratio) within days or weeks and thus counter any Russian tactical advantage. The speed with which these forces can deploy enables the Alliance to counter, in part, Russian interior lines and its streamlined political decision-making system.

These are also “forcible entry capable” units in the event certain airports or seaports are unavailable. This forcible entry capability enables the Alliance to respond to multiple threats simultaneously, such as Russia attempting horizontal escalation across multiple areas.
• **Prepositioned Forces and Equipment**: Heavier forces have a greater defensive capability against heavy Russian forces. Their longer deployment times (30-90 days), lessens their deterrent effect early in a crisis. However, by prepositioning tanks and other armored forces, the Alliance can counter Russian interior lines, more rapidly deploy heavy deterrent forces to threatened allies in Europe, and buy time for diplomatic resolution of a crisis. The decision to preposition a U.S. set of heavy equipment in Europe significantly enhances the deterrent capability of Alliance land forces by enabling a more rapid reinforcement of early-arriving light forces with heavy combat capability.

• **Neutralizing Anti Access/Area Denial**: To retain freedom of action within Alliance territory and the surrounding air and sea space, the Alliance must develop effective counter to evolving Russian A2/AD capabilities. These allied capabilities exist but have not yet been arrayed against Russian A2/AD sites. Continued Russian expansion and the deepening of these systems require that the Alliance develop plans should it become necessary to defend ourselves. For example, the recent establishment of SA21 radars and missile infrastructure in eastern Syria extends Russia’s air defense coverage over sovereign Turkish (NATO) airspace, including Incirlik Air Base, from which U.S. aircraft operate against terrorists in Syria.

• **Filling Gaps and Equipment Shortfalls**: The end of the Cold War and the conduct of a 10-year campaign in Afghanistan understandably led to the optimization of Alliance armies for the prosecution of counterinsurgency operations, not for interstate, high-intensity conflict against a symmetrical opponent. As a result, despite NATO’s overall strategic advantage in the size of armed forces and defense budgets, certain gaps and shortfalls exist in some Alliance conventional capabilities. These need to be considered in the context of the latest Alliance defensive planning, the Graduated Response Plans. To enable rapid reinforcement and deterrence, these capabilities include: strategic lift; anti-armor systems for light forces; armor; air defense; long-range artillery; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; and electronic warfare, among others. The secretary-general’s encouragement of the 2 percent spending goal, if met, would go a long way toward filling these gaps and shortfalls.

• **Training and Doctrine**: Readiness for a high-intensity collective defense against a symmetrical opponent necessitates an ongoing re-examination of existing doctrine and training. For example, hybrid warfare is the subject of intense study on how military forces best support the responses of Alliance governments to hybrid threats; it encompasses border control, law enforcement, intelligence and strategic communications challenges, to name a few. These considerations are being integrated into NATO exercises at all levels.

For the rapid deployment of light forces to successfully deter against hybrid threats, the creation of reconnaissance and security zones in support of national home defense forces is key. If those light forces must deter against an armored threat, they must transition to a light anti-armor defense with local air superiority, which necessitates neutralization of any A2/AD threat and sufficient fires and anti-armor capability within the light force. Additionally, to ensure they are able to integrate with heavy forces deployed to conduct a forward defense of Alliance territory, those forces must be trained in combined arms defensive operations.

**THE BALTIC SCENARIO**

One hypothetical scenario that combines Russian use of a tactical COF advantage with escalation dominance is the defense of the Baltic states. In this scenario, the speed of Alliance response in the first critical days and weeks would be vital to deterrence and conflict prevention. The introduction of high readiness forces early in a crisis enables the Alliance to achieve a 1-to-3 COF within two weeks and a 1-to-2.5 COF ratio soon thereafter. Russian forces would thus be incapable of achieving a fait accompli. This is critical to preserving the time and space needed to resolve any crisis through diplomatic means.

In addition to military speed, we must also consider the speed of political decision-making. Political speed is required to preserve options short of war. Expedient political decisions therefore help preserve political options at a smaller military cost. Detailed planning informs the dialogue between military and civilian leadership regarding options, and enables interoperability between military forces, which likewise creates options for political leaders. Thus, NATO’s strength and speed generate political options short of war. If deterrence fails, however, strength and speed enable us to prevail in conflict.

The cohesion and competence of NATO’s land forces have never been higher. This high level of professionalism and combat experience is unprecedented and far exceeds that of any other alliance or individual army on the planet, including Russia’s.

**CONCLUSION**

NATO’s first goal is conflict prevention. Military forces contribute to this by deterring conventional conflict. Conflict prevention is ultimately a political or diplomatic endeavor that is supported by the military’s readiness to defend our vital interests. We deter through our strength and our speed, which are delivered through readiness.

Ultimately, we hope for a time when we can work together with the Russians in our areas of common interest. If deterrence fails, the strategic advantages that NATO enjoys mean that we would prevail.

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If a major driver of integration evolution is the pressure coming from the internal and external environments, then today’s security environment presumably guarantees the further development of the European security community. International terrorism, the massive flow of refugees, an armed conflict on Europe’s frontier and the lack of internal coherence within the European Union should theoretically pose no new problems in terms of quality, since the community has already encountered them in one way or another. Still, the terrorist attacks by the Islamic State and its supporters within Europe, the migration predicament, the crisis in Ukraine and Brexit, above all else, have created a new dynamic with security as its core issue. At the same time, these problems call for self-reflection and for drawing conclusions about EU policies and the actions of member states. That includes the countries of the Visegrád Group, an alliance of four Eastern European countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. In this regard, the EU’s internal and external problems highlight shortcomings in the sphere of geopolitics, institutions and principles.
National Guard members protect a presidential administration building in Ukraine in December 2016 as nationalist groups demand the release of jailed supporters.
In the wake of Brexit, the geopolitical outlook for Europe seems dim. First, Britain’s departure from the EU represents the loss of a member with considerable capabilities in world politics, finance and security. While the breakup will have its consequences for Britain, without a doubt Brexit has diminished the EU as a global player. Second, the struggle for Ukraine’s future is painful for Europe because of its political and ethical importance. In fact, although the main source of conflict was the country’s decision to have closer ties with the EU, this crisis on Europe’s eastern frontier has emerged as an opposition between the West and Russia in which United States-Russian and NATO-Russian relations tend to have a greater echo than the EU’s role.

Meanwhile, despite continual efforts to create an efficient and effective operation, in certain areas, the EU is overdeveloped and underdeveloped at the same time. Border management is one of these areas: On the one hand, the EU has established freedom of movement in its territory along with the necessary mechanisms. On the other hand, external border management was left to members on the outer rim whose capabilities crumbled under the pressure of mass migrations. Because of the migrations, a wavering in member state solidarity and trust can be sensed in Central and Eastern Europe related to certain EU actions. The European public, for example, is deeply divided — on the overall European and national levels — about welcoming a large number of refugees. For many, this raises questions about protecting national sovereignty, which — from an institutional perspective — is related to an intergovernmentalist critique primarily aimed at the European Commission’s political role and a lack of trust among member states.

THE HISTORICAL FACTOR
To understand the increasing unease, one needs to grasp the East-Central European view of current developments in European security. First, the perspective of these countries is determined by their geographical positions and their historical experiences. The Central and Eastern European region is on a fault line between the West and East. Therefore, geopolitics has always been a noteworthy factor in these nations’ foreign and security policies. Although these countries — due to their similar paths throughout history — are usually regarded as a single group, their respective geopolitical thinking is diverse. This is revealed in their stances on the true threat sources. In other words, history taught them different lessons on how Russia should be dealt with and on how much they should rely on their partners in Western Europe or in the U.S.

Second, and as a consequence of the geopolitical aspect, it should be noted that despite critiques aimed at Brussels, the countries in the region have a firm devotion to Euro-Atlantic integration. Having regained their freedom and independence after the Cold War, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe began to pursue a foreign policy aimed at a “return to Europe.” And even though the road toward EU accession — and EU membership — was not free from disappointments, keeping the EU together and strong is not a question for them. This was visible in the case of Brexit as well. The Hungarian government, for example, indicated during the referendum campaigns that — in addition to the other Visegrád countries — it prefers the United Kingdom to remain in the EU and regarded the other member states’ decision to stay in the EU as a “positive answer to the most important question.” In fact, the four Visegrád countries formulated a decisively pro-EU stance for the post-Brexit period, emphasizing that the future relationship between the U.K. and the EU should be set in a way that protects and strengthens the EU.

Accordingly, the Central and Eastern European countries do not seek division, especially with their Western European partners. The continent’s separation into Old Europe and New Europe, in relation to the 2003 Iraq intervention, was an awkward experience for countries in
the region because they came into confrontation with their Western EU partners — particularly French and German ones. In addition to stark differences in foreign policy, this division represented a gloomy period for these nations because it also suggested a ranking of European countries. People in Central and Eastern Europe are highly sensitive about this. One of the defining historical experiences for these nations has been their history of subordination to greater powers; they are uncomfortable being second-class members of the community. A reminder of this was Poland’s argument in favor of expanding NATO infrastructure to its territory — a position formulated years before the current crisis in Ukraine. Transcending their stormy past, the EU accession of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe — their “return to Europe” — has made the term New Europe historically and culturally inaccurate and unacceptable. This is even more understandable when considering another historical experience of these nations, namely their role as a potential buffer due to geography. The late Oskar Halecki, an expert on the region’s history, pointed out that in certain periods the countries of Central and Eastern Europe were bulwarks of Christianity and Western culture, something often forgotten.

‘NEW EUROPE’ AND SECURITY
In light of the current challenges from the East and the South, the Visegrád countries set security at the forefront. Their more realist, security-oriented view has been revealed in the Ukraine crisis. First, again due to geographical and historical reasons, they are more involved and experienced in dealing with Russia and thus are able to more distinctly formulate their respective opinions on increasing the allied military presence, their support for Ukraine and on the sanctions against Russia. The Visegrád nations’ threat perceptions vary. This was initially obvious with the enhancement of NATO’s military presence in the region, albeit within the unanimously
agreed upon policy of reassuring Eastern allies and increasing defense budgets. What’s more, defense cooperation has become an outstanding pillar of joint Visegrád activities, symbolized by various military exercises and the formation of the Visegrád Battlegroup. While there is room for development, the members have shown proactive intentions, as demonstrated by their signing of the Long Term Vision of the Visegrád Countries on Deepening Defence Cooperation in 2014, as well as their joint will to preserve the trans-Atlantic bond, for example, through the Visegrád countries’ participation in organized reassurance rotations in the Baltics. In the broader sense of trans-Atlantic security, defining the Ukraine crisis in a geopolitical context first emerged among the Visegrád countries. The EU receives sharp criticism since, despite its efforts, it is not viewed as a key player in managing the conflict. In fact, even though Kyiv’s dramatic pivot from Moscow was spontaneous and unexpected, the EU played an important role by offering the possibility of closer EU-Ukraine cooperation. As mentioned earlier, the Central and Eastern European members of the EU, including the Visegrád countries, have chosen to “return to Europe,” thus sharing their neighbors’ enthusiasm for European integration. Nevertheless, in addition to their definite support, they expect the EU to be a much more decisive actor in helping Ukraine.

From the Visegrád perspective, the EU has proven to be quite weak in the geopolitical sense, not only in Ukraine, but in Syria as well. Regarding the latter, the Visegrád countries would prefer to tackle the problem at its roots — that is, to end the war in Syria — though they are aware that the EU is incapable of performing such a task. Its geopolitical weight is further decreased by the pending withdrawal of the U.K. This development provides additional evidence that continental Europe needs a joint European army. This idea is not new; however, its topicality is underlined by the uncertainties of U.S. foreign and security policy. How will the presidency of Donald J. Trump — whose positions on certain issues during his campaign showed either similarities or stark differences to that of Visegrád statesmen — affect U.S. relations with Central and Eastern Europe (if at all), and what implications would this have on European security and on the EU in general? While it is too early to adequately answer these questions, it should be noted that the trans-Atlantic relationship will evolve and that both discord and solidarity could create incentives for deeper regional and European security cooperation.

Such cooperation is currently tested by the refugee crisis, which Central and Eastern European countries view primarily as a security issue, setting them on a separate path from some of their Western European partners. In this regard, the Old and New Europe division lives on: From the latter’s perspective, the first group represents countries politically stalled and incapable of adaptation, whereas the second group consists of countries with a more realistic view of the challenges facing Europe. Consequently, the Visegrád countries strongly emphasize the protection of external borders, which is crucial for
two reasons. First, it serves to halt irregular migration and thus reduces the costs of maintaining internal security, and second — in relation to the latter point — it provides assurance for the preservation of the Schengen Agreement. Hence, the issue of migration unifies the Visegrád countries, which view the European Commission’s crisis management initiative as overstepping its original mandate and prefer the role of political guidance be given to the European Council (and the national parliaments). The Visegrád countries have protested against the commission’s previous migration policy — which in their view made the problem worse by creating a pull factor for further irregular migration — and have proposed the alternative joint Migration Crisis Response Mechanism. The Visegrád option would be based on the principle of “flexible solidarity,” whose purpose is to provide more leeway for member states in determining the form and extent of their participation. Although the feasibility of these proposals remains to be seen, they indicate a more assertive role for the Visegrád countries in security policy.

Still, the Central and Eastern European countries’ restraint from division and subordination prevails. A striking example is the EU’s relationship with Russia in light of the Ukraine crisis. More than one Visegrád country raised concerns about the potential for the economic sanctions imposed on Russia to turn counterproductive. Moreover, there are fears that these sanctions will put Central and Eastern European countries at a disadvantage because their Western European partners will be better positioned to reopen economic relations with Russia once the situation normalizes. These are just worrisome thoughts, as in practical terms no Visegrád country ever intended to breach unity in the sanctions policy. Nevertheless, it does raise the trust issue, which is also evident in energy security. Debates over the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project are yet to be settled, and the potential negative effects of the pipeline connecting Russia and Germany are perceived differently by members of the Visegrád Group. That said, economic sanctions and energy security issues both raise questions of trust on economic security between Western and Eastern EU members. In a broader sense — and, specifically, regarding management of the refugee crisis — the Visegrád countries put special emphasis on the importance of trust as the foundation of cooperation and joint action within the EU. In other words, in the eyes of newer EU member states, the cornerstone of European unity is the principle of equal partnership.

RECOMMENDATIONS

For Visegrád countries, preserving unity in Europe should start with enhancing their regional cohesion. Keeping in mind that even though they identify the same set of challenges (e.g., migration, terrorism, the disintegration of the EU and a deteriorated relationship with Russia), their threat perceptions in these areas vary. Accordingly, they should continue to be cautious when formulating their slightly different respective national positions so they do not become distant from one another or from partners in the wider region. Moreover, intensified bilateral and multilateral cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe should help the Visegrád countries and their partners make their voices heard in Western European capitals, Brussels and the world.

Secondly, learning from previous lessons, old dividing lines should be avoided. Several security issues — ranging from migration to energy policy — set the Visegrád countries apart from some EU members. The Visegrád countries have rightfully identified trust as a fundamental starting point in taking action on these matters. While there is a chance that the scenario of Old and New Europe repeats itself regarding other issues, it would be counterproductive: With the U.K. leaving the EU, the Visegrád countries lost an important ally within the EU on several security-related issues.

At the same time, countries with different security viewpoints than those of the Visegrád Group should remind themselves that the Visegrád countries — and the nations in Central and Eastern Europe in general — have a great historical experience in the challenges of geopolitics, and the lack of European unity and equality. Their firm commitment to the West did not change their history, nor has it gained them full acceptance by Old Europe. Accordingly, challenges from both the East and the South first affect the newer member states, and their arguments are not exclusively aimed at pursuing their respective national interests, but are pertinent to the overall interests of the wider European security community as well. 

Concordiam
EU policies must be consistent, coherent

By Teodor Lucian Moga, assistant professor at the Centre for European Studies, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University
The European Union has always approached challenges from neighboring countries by externalizing and spreading its core values, norms and principles. Enlargement has been the EU’s finest tool. Because the EU could not expand indefinitely, it crafted the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004 with the goal of fostering stability, security and prosperity in countries beyond the EU’s frontiers. Nevertheless, the EU has been unable to substantially alleviate the problems faced by countries close to its borders. On the contrary, countries in the EU’s vicinity have become less stable and less secure. To the south, along the Mediterranean basin, the 2011 Arab Spring triggered an unprecedented wave of political, economic and societal upheaval, culminated by Syria’s civil war, the rise of ISIL, also known as Daesh, and complete disarray in Libya after the central state’s collapse. To the east, in the aftermath of the Eastern Partnership Vilnius Summit in November 2013, the crisis in Ukraine sparked regional turmoil in post-Soviet Eastern Europe with menacing effects on European security. Since then, numerous voices have raised misgivings about the ENP and called for a reshuffling of the political framework. “Miscalculation,” “lack of preassessment,” “incomplete understanding of the region(s)” and “need for better tailored policies toward partner countries,” are among the phrases used in political discourses and policy recommendations.* Critics questioned Europe’s “transformative power” in the neighborhood and, ultimately, the European Commission was asked to shape a response. To this aim, the publication of an ENP review in November 2015 reiterated “the need for a new approach, a re-prioritization and an introduction of new ways of working.”

**ENP 2.0: What is actually new?**

But the revised ENP, just as the previous version, is unable to live up to these challenges and, in particular, is not capable of building resilience against hybrid threats. The new neighborhood policy is insufficiently equipped to deploy efficient answers to the regional turmoil. This is linked to the conceptualization phase of the ENP, from 2003 to 2004. The ENP was largely modeled on the EU’s own enlargement blueprint (minus the accession “carrot”) which ultimately appeared to be inadequate, given the complexities and uncertainties of the neighborhood. The central assumption was that stronger economic engagement and integration of the ENP countries into the EU economy, together with a diffusion of European normative ideas (such as democracy, human rights, economic growth and social welfare) would foster a “community identity” and, in turn, regional stability and security. Thus, by creating solid ties with ENP states, the EU has sought to embrace the neighborhood within a broader security community. However, the initial positive assessment of the ENP appeared to be overrated since the limited appeal of the ENP could not sufficiently motivate neighboring states to take on approximation costs and in-depth reforms. For the past couple of years, the EU has also been confronted with a radically different context marked by a revival of security concerns and geopolitical rivalries, which ran counter to the EU’s efforts to stabilize the region. Convulsions from its perilous vicinity have strained the EU’s actions since the ENP was molded according to a soft, normative logic unlikely to succeed in a volatile environment lacking the necessary prerequisites for the “community approach” to function.

Hence, it appears from the ENP Review 2015 and the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) 2016 that the EU must forge a new approach aimed at including more realist considerations in its traditional community mechanisms. Nevertheless, the simultaneous employment of two logics — “interest-based” and “value-based” — at the heart of the ENP could only diminish its credentials and deem it ineffective. So far, the difficulty in reconciling these two contrary approaches (interests vs. values) has been evident since 2004. The lack of conceptual clarity translated, in turn, into a neighborhood policy marked by intrinsic incoherence and inconsistency. Moreover, the projection of an image combining normative and geopolitical dimensions has resulted in failure by the EU to portray itself either as a value-based transformation project or as an interest-laden geopolitical strategist. The constructive ambiguity displayed by the EU has been particularly puzzling to neighboring nations trying to understand the EU’s actions. Even today, the EU has yet to clearly explain the finalité politique of its engagement in the neighborhood, instead vacillating in its discourse between exclusion and inclusion, between limited and full integration. Additionally, the pressing security concerns of the region remain unanswered since an actual European road map to tackle the ongoing conflicts remains elusive.

What the EU has recently provided, instead, is the new concept of “resilience,” the hallmark of both the 2015 ENP review and the EUGS. The resilience of neighboring states appears to be not only the bedrock of long-term...
engagement with the EU’s neighbors, but also the leitmotif in both documents since it was used — together with the adjectival form “resilient” — no less than 50 times (nine entries in the ENP review and 41 entries in the EUGS). If we add the number of entries (29) from another important document published by the European Commission, the 2016 “Joint framework on countering hybrid threats — a European Union response,” the salience of the resilience concept for the EU policymakers becomes even more evident.

By creating solid ties with ENP states, the EU has sought to embrace the neighborhood within a broader security community.

Whereas the ENP review was one of the first documents to include resilience-building as a foreign policy goal, resilience was later defined in the EUGS as “the ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crises.” More specifically, building “state and societal resilience to our East and South” is identified as one of five priorities for the EU’s external action (alongside building the EU’s own security; crafting an integrated approach to conflicts and crises; fostering cooperative regional orders; and redefining and adapting the EU’s global governance in line with the 21st century). Thus, resilience-building marks a clear move in the conceptualization of the EU’s foreign affairs, one that is underpinned by “principled pragmatism” as the new operating instrument at the EU’s disposal.

This novel principle, in fact, does not depart much from the previous EU foreign policy outlook. According to the EUGS, it intertwines in a pragmatic way “a realistic assessment of the current strategic environment” with “an idealistic aspiration to advance a better world.” Such a dual approach might again raise more theoretical and practical challenges than it solves since it retains that contradiction in terms. From a conceptual point of view, an idealistic international player can only perform actions that strongly abide by moral, universally accepted values. Undertaking actions selectively,
on a case-by-case basis, guided by pragmatic cost-benefit assessments, could only risk damaging the EU’s idealistic mantra. The EU cannot act in an idealistic and realistic fashion at the same time. It is a matter of “either/or.” Otherwise, the EU’s external actions are doomed to be castigated as incoherent and inconsistent, with potentially negative effects. “Idealistic ambitions also have a price for political actors when they fail to live up to their ideals, or deliberately violate them through action or inaction; such actors lose credibility/legitimacy at best and can be accused of hypocrisy at worst,” notes Michael E. Smith in the journal Contemporary Security Policy. For instance, a discordant mixture of intentions can be observed when assessing the EU’s approach to Russia. While acknowledging the deterioration of relations as a result of the illegal annexation of Crimea and the destabilization of eastern Ukraine, the EU also admits that constructive cooperation with the Russian Federation would be helpful in addressing common challenges, according to both the ENP review and the EUGS. Similarly, in the South, the EU is further committed to the democratic transformation of the countries in the region and in this regard appears adamant about strengthening cooperation and partnerships, despite the fact that authoritarian tendencies are increasingly regaining ground (for instance, in Egypt).

‘Resilience’ as a counterweight
A pressing issue the EU appears compelled to act upon is the menacing effect on European security posed by “hybrid threats.” The concept of hybrid threats refers to “the mixture of coercive and subversive activity, conventional and unconventional methods (i.e., diplomatic, military, economic, technological), which can be used in a coordinated manner by state or nonstate actors to achieve specific objectives while remaining below the threshold of formally declared warfare,” according to a European Commission assessment. The concept is most recently associated with Russia’s covert military actions in Ukraine and with the aggressive tactics of ISIL in the Middle East and North Africa. For instance, apart from the heavy confrontation in the Donbas region, the conflict in Ukraine appears to have all the ingredients of a cyber war since high levels of disinformation and propaganda (especially via social networks) are being employed. To achieve strategic gains, ISIL often makes use of massive information campaigns to recruit radicals or to appeal to proxy actors to conduct certain terrorist acts.

In spite of its increasing salience, hybrid threats were not directly addressed by the ENP review. The review insists on the stabilization of the neighborhood and on the need “to work on conflict prevention through early warning,” yet there was no mention of the word “hybrid.” Nevertheless, the document identifies some of the hybrid threat characteristics (terrorism, propaganda and information warfare, cyber crime, etc.) and provides ways of countering them. Only later, in April 2016, after a year of intense consultation, did the European Commission produce the document “Joint framework on countering hybrid threats — a European Union response.” It acknowledged the need for the EU to adapt and enhance its capacities as a security provider. Likewise, it identified that many of the current challenges to the EU’s stability and security stem from the neighborhood of nations close to the EU. Considering the multilayered and multifaceted nature of the concept, the document sought also to clarify for the EU’s defense lexicon the meaning of hybrid threats and to distinguish them from conventional ones. It further aimed to provide a set of guidelines on how to deter the potential use of hybrid tactics. These guidelines recommended improved awareness, building resilience, a stronger response to crisis by EU member states, as well as by ENP partners, an increased role for the Common Security and Defense Policy and solid EU-NATO ties. This comprehensive approach was
subsequently introduced in the EUGS 2016 because the EU’s internal security is seen as inextricably linked to its external action and to the security of its neighbors. It remains to be seen if the implementation of the recommendations from the “Joint framework” document can generate stronger synergies among EU/ENP countries in tackling hybrid threats.

**Conclusion**
Whereas it appears that for the near future resilience will be the strategic priority across the EU’s East and South, it is still not clear how resilience building will actually succeed in the neighborhood, especially when faced with an increase in hybrid threats. In general, the EU’s revised external policy toolkit maintains a level of abstraction, to the potential disillusionment of those expecting more concrete action and much more hawkish behavior. Likewise, those hoping to see a morally liberal agenda might be equally dissatisfied with the EU’s new pragmatic approach to world affairs. Against this backdrop, the confusion purposely created by hybrid tactics is likely to further complicate the EU’s ability to craft a truly coherent response, which would give preference to individual member state actions. To respond effectively, the EU needs to coalesce all member states’ interests into a single comprehensive approach, potentially doubled by a “rapid reaction force” to include military staff and intelligence from neighboring countries.

This short analysis appeals to moderate expectations with regard to the ENP 2.0, which should not be surprising considering the usually slow, consensus-building reaction of the EU in the realm of foreign policy. Although the EU aims for a much more ambitious stance, both in the neighborhood and in the wider international arena, it is still tributary to its inherent soft power nature, which causes the EU to refrain from undertaking bolder actions. As such, soft power remains the EU’s biggest strength — and greatest weakness. ☐

A man with a Ukrainian flag walks past riot police during an anti-war rally in Moscow in September 2014.

**Reuters**
EU-WIDE
INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES

MEMBER STATES SHOULD EXPLORE USING ‘CITIZEN SOLDIERS’ TO DEAL WITH THREATS INSIDE EUROPE

By Alfred C. Lugert, in cooperation with Władysław Bartoszewski, Tuomas Forsberg, Maria Grazia Galantino, Alain Lamballe, Alain Pellegrini, Alexãandra Richie and Walter Tancsits
Politicians, the media and academic political experts welcomed the presentation of the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) on Foreign and Security Policy to the European Council by EU Commission Vice President and High Representative Federica Mogherini on June 28, 2016. The EU needs the policy as much as ever, pointed out Professor Sven Biscop of the Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations in his paper, “The EU Global Strategy: Realpolitik with European Characteristics.”

“First of all, the EUGS introduces a new overall approach to foreign and security policy, which can be read as a correction on the 2003 ‘European Security Strategy (ESS)’ that preceded it,” Biscop said. “The vital interests that the EUGS defines are vital to all Member States: the security of EU citizens and territory. … The EUGS identifies five priorities: (1) the security of the EU itself; (2) the neighborhood; (3) how to deal with war and crisis; (4) stable regional orders across the globe; and (5) effective global governance. … First, there is a strong focus on Europe’s own security (which was much less present in the ESS) and on the neighborhood: We will take responsibility foremost in Europe and its surrounding regions, while pursuing targeted engagement further afield.”

What’s at stake is the credibility of these common internal security efforts with European citizens and the governments of EU member states. A comprehensive study is needed to develop a political concept regarding an EU internal territorial military security and defense system, to be implemented by EU member states, to enhance the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and the Internal Security Strategy for the European Union. This would establish a more efficient EU-wide internal “zone of equal security” for EU citizens as an essential contribution and insurance for a safe and peaceful Europe.

INTERNAL EU DEFENSE SYSTEMS
The Council of the EU, in its 2014 Justice and Home Affairs Council Meeting, identifies a number of foreseeable main threats in the field of internal security: serious and organized crime, illegal immigration, trafficking in human beings, drug trafficking, organized property crime, cybercrime and subsequent security challenges, trafficking in arms, terrorism in all its forms (special attention given to the issue of foreign fighters), radicalization leading to violent extremism, crises, and natural and man-made disasters.

It is a list of threats to the internal security of Europe that must be augmented to include risks concerning nuclear infrastructure, water-related infrastructure, dramatic aftereffects and serious collateral damages from terrorists and insurgents, and hybrid threats to homeland security.

The threat from insurgents can be particularly devastating because security forces have to deal with people who fight as if they’re engaged in war, and their numbers and firepower can be comparable or even superior to the capabilities of security forces. Finally, a “hybrid threat” can turn into a challenge to the very existence of a state and will need to be faced by a coordinated national defense effort involving all parts of society.

This could include threats to interfere, block or even destroy complex infrastructure and the daily life of European citizens beyond the limits of expected probability. In short, one must recognize that a worst-case scenario could happen.

Even an optimistic approach has to be realistic and include pragmatic and efficient internal security measures to meet a variety of medium and major threats to the well-being and security of EU citizens. It is a primary and inherent obligation of the EU and its member states to provide efficient, future-oriented and specific preparatory internal security measures, including deployments to counter unexpected threats, according to the December 2014 European Union Council Conclusions.

To counter these threats to EU internal territory, especially in cases where the threats are larger and longer lasting, civilian organizations such as the police, gendarmerie, fire departments, the Red Cross and disaster relief organizations will need substantial support and the assistance of organized and well-structured military reserve forces. The army and civilian security forces of a state can be quickly saturated and overstretched when confronted with an intensified terrorist, insurgent or hybrid threat.

What is required is a malleable, elastic force structure to allow quick expansion and reduction of personnel based on the intensity of the threat. The force must be efficient and financially affordable. These strategic reserve forces for internal/territorial tasks (defensive purposes only) should be structured as well-trained reserve units providing the necessary large manpower of “citizen soldiers.”

In addition to their military training, these reservists
can provide their professional civilian expertise and territorial knowledge. The EU can contribute usefully and cost-effectively to the setup and maintenance of an efficient territorial defense organization.

These strategic reserve forces, as an essential part of a comprehensive CSDP and Internal Security Strategy, might be called the EU home guards, territorial defense units or EU national guards. They would be a military force organized at the national and provincial level, tasked with homeland security and defense against major threats to the state.

THE ROLE OF MEMBER STATES
It is very important that the formation of such internal territorial military defense units/national guards be decided and implemented by all EU member states under EU guidelines to ensure a top-down approach, high-level political engagement and basic coordination. It must be coordinated with the CSDP and the Internal Security Strategy, not individually and separately with divergent national goals.

“Common Threats, Common Answers?” is an important question pointed out by the European Commission in the June 15, 2015, document “In Defence of Europe.” The commission continues: “With violent conflicts at the EU’s doorstep, Europe’s growing exposure to hybrid warfare, cyber terrorism, ‘foreign fighters’ and the blurring distinction between external and internal threats, the European security landscape is increasingly complex to navigate.”

Without a strong EU-coordinated internal security and civil-military defense concept, the EU and its member states can’t provide the necessary comprehensive and efficient “common answer.”

EU ‘NATIONAL GUARD’ SYSTEM
The EU engages military aspects of external security issues by discussing, researching, formulating and shaping a coordinated defense system of national military forces. This coordination could lead to further defense integration, ultimately creating an
EU army. European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker expressed such a wish during a news interview in March 2015.

EU defense concepts focus mainly on preparation and military deployment for external crisis management and/or control of the EU’s external border. Consequently, the need for internal territorial military security and defense was set aside, but not forgotten.

After moving from the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to the CSDP in 1993, the additional need for an internal, territorial and passive aspect of defense was raised in security and defense studies. They pointed out that dealing with asymmetrical threat scenarios requires coordinated EU homeland security, together with public relations and popular support.

In 2001, the Royal Military Academy of Belgium published the study, “Public Opinion and European Defense.” It was a large comparative survey conducted in 15 EU countries. With the consent of the European Commission, questions on this subject were inserted into the Eurobarometer survey of autumn 2000. It also surveyed European opinion on the role of the army. As it turned out, the answers were clear and straightforward: “Defending the country/territory” ranked first with 94 percent, followed by “Helping out the country in case of disaster” at 91 percent.

In 2004, a task force of the Institute for Security Studies of the European Union, chaired by Nicole Gnesotto, published a proposal about European defense. Among the strategic scenarios and respective capacities and EU deficiencies, the task force also focused on homeland defense and suggested creating an EU-style national guard or territorial army.

In 2015, the EU, facing a rapid development of dangerous crises that blurred the distinctions between military and nonmilitary threats and internal and external security, sought to reformulate and reidentify EU interests, objectives and evolving threats.

Parallel to mainstream political
discussions, research and planning regarding the external projection of European military forces, an interest in internal, territorial and purely passive defense emerged. On January 21, 2015, the European Parliament moved to adopt the annual report from Mogherini, the EU high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, that reflected this changed political and security environment.

The motion also pointed out that EU security policy has to include protection of European values and enforcement of the political and legal order in Europe, thereby restoring and safeguarding peace and stability. Furthermore the motion prioritizes the “EU’s contribution to the territorial defence of its Member States and the security of its citizens by strengthening its ability to defend itself against the threats facing it.”

Point 18 of the motion “urges the Member States, as a matter of urgency, to step up their ability to contribute to territorial defence” and “stresses that all the Member States must enjoy the same level of security.” Point 21 takes the view “that it is increasingly difficult to separate internal from external security.”

The European Commission Special Eurobarometer for 2015 asked about challenges in Europe and the expected role of various bodies in ensuring internal/national security. The police, the judicial system and the army ranked highest.

**DISCUSSION AND RESEARCH**

It seems that a comprehensive approach to a CSDP, together with the Internal Security Strategy, should include an adequate internal/territorial defense aspect in addition to the main external concerns of European military defense. Based on various civilian defense efforts such as the establishment of a European Civil Protection Force (for external but possibly also for internal use), in addition to civilian instruments like the police, an EU-coordinated national guard could be established as a strategic reserve in all EU states. It has to be emphasized that such units, staffed by reservist citizen soldiers, provide the necessary professional civilian/military capabilities with close civilian-military cooperation.

In a widely publicized address to the two chambers of the French Parliament in November 2015, President François Hollande referred to terrorist attacks and threats in Europe and spoke about the external, out-of-area role of the armed forces, and also of the need to establish a national guard manned by reservists in addition to existing armed forces. He also pointed out that “reservists form a strong link between the nation and the army … a National Guard that is trained and available.”

The strategic reserve concept would enable the EU to establish a more efficient, EU-wide internal zone of equal security and should be set up under common EU guidelines that include partnership and solidarity principles. It would enhance structured cooperation as foreseen by EU declarations regarding security and defense. National participation in establishing the zone is also important for countries that are already part of NATO. A great number of possible threats to internal security can be identified. To counter these threats on EU territory, we need earmarked, organized military reserve forces within this territory.

An EU territorial reserve force staffed by citizen soldiers should be activated only in case of need and would not contradict the establishment of coordinated, integrated EU forces for mainly out-of-area conflict management and peace operations under the EU or NATO. On the contrary, these internal/territorial reserve forces would assist EU member states in handling threats and crises.

Recruitment and training should either be voluntary or based on short but intensive compulsory basic training and refresher training obligations. Part-time EU citizen soldiers, handling internal missions at relatively low cost, provide added civilian and military value for the comprehensive defense of the EU.

**FURTHER STUDY**

Creation of an EU-wide territorial defense force will require further study. In addition to ongoing and/or planned EU research ventures in the field of “mainstream/external” military issues of the EU CSDP, an in-depth project should be initiated to develop a comprehensive political concept regarding an EU internal defense system.

The development of a comprehensive political concept will require professional expertise in the field of politico-military defense issues, covering a wide spectrum of social sciences (including political science, international relations, economics and social psychology). In conclusion, here are...
some preliminary topics that such a project should cover:

- The search for peace, civilian-military security concepts and major armed conflicts in Europe since 1990.
- The transition from the ESDP to the CSDP in 1993, and then to the EUGS in 2016.
- Present and future needs for a civil-military homeland defense.
- The enduring questions of citizens’ rights and obligations for homeland defense and the sociological, political and ideological implications.
- The roles and responsibilities of Europe’s political leadership in looking for policy options for a new European security strategy.
- The internal-external security nexus and the need for comprehensive and integrated defense strategies.
- Linking external and internal security dimensions (CSDP and Internal Security Policy).
- The concept of armed forces on demand and future preparedness.
- The status of present day national guard/territorial reserve/militias/coastal defense operations in Europe.
- A detailed model for political discussion, decision-making and legal issues regarding the national guard concept.
- Recruitment and provisioning of individual citizen soldiers — including his or her legal and social status as a part-time soldier — civilian employer support, time of service, training, equipment, armament and pay.
- Interface between regular forces, reserve forces and internal territorial forces, including where these citizen soldiers would be stationed and the areas they would protect.
- Full use of professional civilian expertise, in addition to recruitment of former full-time/professional soldiers or from the general reserve component.
- Public awareness, public relations and public opinion. □
WHY REGIONAL COOPERATION IN AFGHANISTAN FAILS TO DELIVER

FARID OSMANOV
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Cooperation platforms such as the Istanbul Process, the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework and the International Contact Group on Afghanistan were viewed by the international community as mechanisms for complementing military- and security-related tasks and contributing to building stability and prosperity in an Afghanistan saddled by decades of violence.

Yet such platforms have failed to produce meaningful outcomes. The “Great Game,” a term coined by Rudyard Kipling in the 19th century to describe the scramble for control of Central Asia among the great powers, has retained its meaning into the modern age and is reflected in the work of regional cooperation frameworks. Since then, international systems have been substantially modified, major powers have shifted their positions, and the number of regional players able to influence events has increased, unsettling alliances and the overall situation in the region. Although common ground for cooperation exists among some powers, it is still outweighed by the deep divergence of major players’ individual interests.

The United States

The U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, beginning in 2001, turned out to be costly and exhausting. The Obama administration made withdrawing troops from Iraq and Afghanistan one of its foreign policy priorities. However, the U.S. also expected to see the fruits of 15 years of prodigal spending. Afghanistan is crucial for ensuring American interests in greater Eurasia, yet the U.S. is not willing to continue spending vast sums. Therefore, regional cooperation mechanisms present a good tool for the U.S. to further its interests in a nondirect manner and at a lesser cost.

According to The Diplomat online magazine, Hillary Clinton, then-U.S. secretary of state, introduced the New Silk Road initiative in 2011. It was aimed at connecting Central and South Asian markets with Afghanistan and reinvigorating the regional economy. In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping initiated the Silk Road Economic Belt, a project aimed at tying Asia to Europe via a network of multimodal corridors. It was immediately deemed a competitor to the New Silk Road project. Although the project was largely considered a challenge to U.S. interests in the region, in March 2015, a U.S. deputy secretary of state said about the Silk Road Economic Belt: “We don’t see China’s involvement in Central Asia in zero-sum terms. Its development of infrastructure in Central Asia can be fully complementary to our own efforts.” This is an indication that the U.S., after spending many years in the region, has learned that unilateral actions with no concessions to other stakeholders require immense resources and bear little fruit.

That the U.S. does not regard China’s Silk Road Economic Belt as a competitor project reflects its current vision for the region — to create transregional transportation links to facilitate trade and forge economic empowerment. Since the basic rationale of both projects embraces this vision, the U.S. can support China’s initiative. This flexibility also demonstrates U.S. willingness to share responsibility for Afghanistan with others, especially when important strategic goals coincide. Cooperation with China does not substantially threaten U.S. interests and may lead to the attainment of strategic long-term objectives.

China

Cooperation also emboldens China to carry out its own agenda. China’s interests in Afghanistan are largely determined by the necessities of securing its western borders and preventing the province of Xinjiang from becoming a safe haven for Islamic extremists. Beijing is working to eventually root out the East Turkestan Islamic movement, which has connections to the Taliban. Stability in Xinjiang is important to Beijing’s economic structure and development vision. As
markets in traditionally superior coastal China become more saturated and labor costs increase, more significance is placed on its inner and western regions. A shift of manufacturers farther inland, where there is an abundance of cheap labor, is unavoidable if China is to maintain its economic surge. It will also help with the problem of internal migration. In addition, the China-Kazakhstan oil and China-Turkmenistan gas pipelines pass through Xinjiang, attaching greater strategic importance to this region and making it critical to strengthen security. Thus a stable and secure Afghanistan is important for maintaining China’s security and for creating auspicious conditions for expanding its economic geography.

China has become distinctly proactive in regional affairs through greater engagement in regional cooperation mechanisms, such as the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) and the Istanbul Process. In May 2014, it hosted the CICA Summit in Shanghai and is chair of the organization. China also hosted a ministerial conference on the Istanbul Process in October 2014 in Beijing. In addition, along with Russia, China heads the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Recently, China began promoting its New Asian Security Concept, which is based on the principles of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security. This concept reflects China’s security vision in the region and underlines its readiness and capacity to be a leading party in designing the regional security cooperation infrastructure.

China has also noticeably broadened its bilateral relations and cooperation with Pakistan, an essential country for resolving issues in Afghanistan. The greatest enterprise among them is the China-Pakistan economic corridor megaproject, at an estimated cost of $46 billion, as reported by Al Jazeera. It is aimed at connecting Gwadar Port in southwestern Pakistan to Xinjiang province through a network of railroads, highways and pipelines, giving China access to the Indian Ocean and further expanding its economic influence.

**Russia**

Russia’s goals in Afghanistan and the regional cooperation framework in place are manifold and sometimes contradictory. First, given its current focus on Syria and economic woes at home, Moscow cannot afford to devote resources to Afghanistan. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia no longer has a border with Afghanistan, but aims to maintain its historic strategic position in the region and exert influence through the former Soviet republics of Central Asia. Yet, not all of them are tractable allies of Russia. It takes a sufficient level of sophistication to deal with countries like Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the former growing more and more unyielding toward Russia and the latter pursuing neutrality as its official foreign policy course.

Russia purports to strengthen the positions of the regional security institutions to which it belongs, such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the SCO, and hence has greater say on regional issues. Its strategic aim is to ensure that these institutions have more leverage in constructing the Eurasian regional security environment. Russia also plans to broaden the geography of the Customs Union and Eurasian Economic Union and engage more broadly in regional economic affairs. This holds particular significance for Russia
in light of its strained relations with the West and pivot to Eurasia. Therefore, Russia is suspicious of the progress of regional initiatives in which other players have an advantage in putting forth their own agenda. Implementation of projects such as the New Silk Road and the Silk Road Economic Belt are not in Russia’s interest, because they seek to create alternative infrastructure and facilitate shipments of goods via routes circumventing Russia. The success of these initiatives would empower Central Asian countries along the new transportation routes, turning them into transit countries and thereby loosening Moscow’s grip on them.

Yet Russia has a record of openly supporting some projects initiated by other stakeholders, not corresponding to its strategic goals in the region. For instance, in 2011 President Vladimir Putin, then prime minister of Russia, pledged to contribute $500 million to the CASA-1000 project, aimed at providing an electricity network among the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Pakistan via Afghanistan, according to Eco-Business.com. Conventional logic suggests that successful implementation of this initiative is not in Russia’s interest, for it will lessen these post-Soviet countries’ energy dependence on Russia. Thus, the willingness to financially support this sort of project might be explained by Russia’s overriding interest in not being excluded from regional projects of high importance and a desire to exercise greater control over them.

Moscow’s desire to foster Sino-Russian cooperation should be viewed through the lens of its strained relations with the West and the need to have a role in regional projects led by China. Russia needs to offset the influence of China in Central Asia to preserve its historical position in the region, yet it lacks the economic leverage to achieve this goal. China has much to offer and is exponentially expanding cooperation with Central Asian countries via a number of economic projects, thereby winning more influence among these countries and diminishing Moscow’s influence. On May 8, 2015, Russia and China signed a joint declaration “on cooperation in coordinating the development of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) project and the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB)” with a goal of combining these two projects. This demonstrates that Russia has no choice but to concede to Chinese influence in the region, while striving to remain a part of China-led initiatives.

On the other hand, Russia needs to counter narcotics trafficking and, above all, the spread of terrorism and extremism emanating from Afghanistan and Central Asia that threatens to transcend borders and cause serious headaches for Russia on its own soil. Russia’s dilemma is that it is necessary to have a stable and secure Afghanistan to avert the diffusion of these menaces, while Moscow is reluctant to spend on the maintenance of this security. Thus Russia paradoxically needs greater involvement from other powers capable of upholding peace and stability in the region so that Russia can pursue its agenda in a safe environment, while at the same time, it seeks to offset the influence of these very powers.

Pakistan and India
The policies of Pakistan and India toward Afghanistan stem from the nature of their relationships. Pakistan’s strategic interests are of great importance in defining the fate of Afghanistan. Conventional thought holds that the key to stability in Afghanistan lies anywhere other than Islamabad. The porous and largely unmonitored border creates favorable conditions for infiltration and regrouping of extremist fighters from both sides. Pakistan wants to retain its excessive leverage over Afghanistan and fill the security vacuum
after the withdrawal of NATO-led forces, similar to what happened after the retreat of Soviet troops from the region more than two decades ago and the subsequent curtailment of U.S. engagement.

Another widely articulated notion — frequently pronounced even on an official level — is that Pakistan supports Taliban fighters and encourages the division of Afghan society along ethnic lines. As Al Jazeera reported, beginning in 2015 the leadership of Afghanistan has repeatedly accused Pakistan of supporting the Taliban. One must also consider discrepancies within the power structure of Pakistan, when the views and official rhetoric of civilian leadership do not coincide with the actions of military leadership. Pakistan’s importance in Afghan affairs is further supported by Pakistan being one of the only countries, along with Saudi Arabia, capable of brokering negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government.

Pakistan seeks to maintain its ability to unilaterally influence the course of events in Afghanistan, and enhancement of India-Afghanistan relations does not serve this end. Pakistan is utterly against the perception in Afghanistan of a friendly India and dreads an improvement of relations between the two states. Pakistan is apprehensive about India increasing its economic influence over Afghanistan and strives to prevent this from happening. For instance, it does not give any transit rights to India for exports to the Afghan market.

A stable and prosperous Afghanistan is in India’s best interest. India’s prime objective is to mitigate terrorism and extremism threats coming from Afghanistan and Pakistan. India continues to invest in Afghanistan despite high security risks. India takes an active part in economic and trade initiatives within the format of regional cooperation. India also signed a preferential trade agreement with Afghanistan and lifted tariffs on imported Afghan goods.

The strategic postures of India and Pakistan toward Afghanistan align India with Iran, while Pakistan is aligned with China on one side and Saudi Arabia on the other. Cooperation between Iran and India became particularly
noteworthy due to India’s heightened interest in and financial contributions to the Chabahar Port project in Iran, which will facilitate faster shipment of goods from India to Iran, bypassing Pakistan. This is an essential project for India, considering Pakistan does not allow India to use Pakistani territory for economic purposes and thus prevents its economic expansion in the region. This project is also widely seen as aimed to balance the China-Pakistan economic corridor project. The Iran-India, China-Pakistan and Saudi Arabia-Pakistan alignments, and cooperation on large-scale projects, demonstrate that the deep divergence of interests between Pakistan and India necessitates that each seek favorable partners and pursue certain projects to attain their objectives.

Iran

Iran is an important player in regional affairs with a capacity to exert influence over Afghanistan, particularly in the western province of Herat. A linguistic affinity, the fact that 20 percent of Afghanistan’s population belongs to the Shia branch of Islam, and the estimated 3 million Afghan refugees residing in Iran are among the important factors Iran may leverage. Iran’s recent nuclear deal with the international community, resulting in the lifting of sanctions, further contributes to its more assertive policy in Afghanistan and the region.

An ever-increasing number of sources claim that Iran gives material and arms support to the Taliban, its implacable foe, to curb the spread of ISIS, a claim Tehran resolutely denies, according to a June 2015 article in Foreign Affairs. Such possibilities must be considered in the context of the broader animosity between Iran and Saudi Arabia. It may further escalate the situation and threatens to turn Afghanistan into a new theater of Shia-Sunni sectarian violence, similar to that observed in the Middle East.

Afghanistan faces a serious dilemma as it aims to deepen cooperation with Iran, particularly for economic reasons, while retaining close relations with the Saudis, who have considerable influence over the Taliban. Saudi Arabia, in return, expects Afghanistan to join a broad Sunni coalition, which undoubtedly will cause a backlash from Iran. Thus the government of Afghanistan must be vigilant and balanced in its dealings with both, as overt inclinations toward one may trigger external support to sectarianism and deteriorate the already fragile security environment in the country.

Conclusion

This imbroglio of divergent interests and strategic goals of global and regional powers, and their alignments with other like-minded stakeholders, leads to the degradation of security in Afghanistan and dampens the prospects for stability and prosperity. It also makes the regional cooperation platforms created to reinvigorate Afghanistan superfluous and inefficient. The increased focus of the international community on the Middle East and problems emanating from there diverts attention from Afghanistan. The situation is further strained by the ongoing Iran-Saudi Arabia enmity, the resurgence of the Taliban, the emergence of ISIS and potential external support for these radical groups.

The likelihood of these militant groups filling the security gap and challenging the authority of the central government is extremely high. The decrease in NATO-led troops has already resulted in a vacuum in the country’s security and put its security institutions to a serious test. The complete withdrawal of coalition forces will only deteriorate the situation, setting a propitious ground for a wider resurgence of radicalism and militancy, undercutting the positive results achieved during the past decade. Hence, greater attention from the international community and, foremost, greater coordination of projects and crafting of a unified approach among global and regional players in Afghanistan is essential to keeping the country off the path to violence and instability.
Since 1995, NATO, the European Union and other international partners have been engaged in the Balkans — politically, diplomatically, economically and militarily — in varying degrees of intensity. The international community initiated its intervention to end a devastating conflict that accelerated the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. That conflict, lasting from mid-1992 through the end of 1995, was merely the most recent chapter in a long history of conflict that has plagued the Balkan region, a product of its enduring position as an economic, religious and cultural crossroads.

By the end of the 15th century, the Ottoman Turks had gained control of a significant portion of the Balkans. From that point forward, the Balkan map was sporadically redrawn as one rising power after another seized control of territory and resources. Major powers such as the Ottoman, Habsburg and Austro-Hungarian empires, as well as regional forces, continually redefined Balkan borders for the next 500 years. In the wake of World War II, Marshal Josip Broz Tito, the son of a Croatian father and Slovenian mother, held together much of the Western Balkans in the form of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Regarded by many as a “benevolent dictator,” Tito was a popular figure at home and abroad because of his economic and diplomatic policies. He fostered a program of brotherhood and unity and suppressed nationalistic sentiments among the six Yugoslav “nations.” These policies and initiatives silenced nationalistic rhetoric and led to four decades of peaceful coexistence on the Balkan Peninsula. Tito died in 1980, and the brotherhood and unity he cultivated — or imposed, depending on one’s perspective — began to unravel almost immediately. His death created a leadership vacuum at the state level, setting in motion a chain of events that would result in the fracturing of the Yugoslav state, a political and diplomatic impasse, brutal armed conflict and horrific interethnic atrocities. In November and December of 1995, after 3 1/2 years of violence, the warring parties and members of the international community came together in Dayton, Ohio, in the United States to craft an agreement that would end the open hostilities. The General Framework Agreement for Peace, also known as the Dayton Agreement, required the introduction of international political control and the deployment of a robust NATO peacekeeping force.
Today, after 20 years of international involvement in the Balkans, the independent nations that once comprised the former Yugoslavia are experiencing varying levels of success in accomplishing their Euro-Atlantic integration goals. Most impressively, Croatia and Slovenia achieved membership in NATO and the EU. Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), Macedonia and Montenegro all aspire to NATO and EU membership but have made vastly different levels of progress in reaching those aspirations — Montenegro completed the NATO accession process and should attain full Alliance membership, pending ratification by member nations. Serbia wants to join the EU, but does not — at least for now — want to join NATO, although it does participate in NATO partnership programs and is deepening its political dialogue and cooperation with the Alliance.

For the past 70 years, NATO has contributed significantly to its members’ security and stability and, by extension, to security and stability throughout Europe. The Western Balkan nations that aspire to NATO and EU membership state very clearly that they do so, in large part, to achieve the military, political and economic security that Euro-Atlantic integration provides. That integration, including advancement toward NATO membership, has progressed in fits and starts for a wide array of reasons, ranging from widespread government corruption to varying levels of public support for NATO to EU and/or NATO readiness to accept them as members.

For most of the past two decades, NATO has accepted intermittent success in the integration of Western Balkan aspirants. However, given the current security dynamics in Europe, it can no longer afford to do so. Stalled Euro-Atlantic integration in the Balkans opens the door to a multitude of threats that could once again unravel the relative stability of the past two decades. For example, the spread of Islamist extremism, Russian adventurism, renewed ‘ethnic’ conflict, persistent weapons proliferation, widespread poverty, and the growth of transnational organized crime are all possible if the alliance fails to continue to invest its efforts in the region and to improve the return on that investment.

**A brief history**

On December 20, 1995, NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR) deployed 60,000 troops to BiH to implement the military aspects of the Dayton Agreement. After one year on the ground, IFOR transitioned to the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR). Over the next eight years, the Alliance would establish headquarters elements or deploy forces of varied strengths and with various missions to several former Yugoslav republics. Most of those elements were established to enforce the military aspects of the Dayton Agreement in BiH, or United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 in Kosovo, or to provide support to IFOR/SFOR and NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR). Eventually, with the exception of KFOR, they would all modify their missions to serve solely as NATO advisory and liaison offices in cooperation with their newly independent host nations. While not a complete shift from its original peacekeeping tasks, KFOR now also provides advice and assistance to the Kosovo Security Forces (KSF) — originally through a military-civil assistance division that merged with a NATO team that advises the Ministry of Defense and reports directly to NATO headquarters.

As NATO deployed to the former Yugoslavia for the first crisis response operation in its history, the Alliance’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program was taking root in a number of former Soviet and former Yugoslav republics. According to NATO, “PfP is a program of practical bilateral cooperation between individual partner countries and NATO. It allows partners to build an individual relationship with NATO, choosing their own priorities for cooperation. Based

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on a commitment to the democratic principles that underpin the Alliance itself, the purpose of PfP is to increase stability, diminish threats to peace and build strengthened security relationships between individual partners and NATO, as well as among partner countries.” Several PfP nations would deploy peacekeepers to the Balkans alongside their NATO partners while a few of the newly independent Western Balkan nations began the process of joining PfP. Ultimately, 31 nations, including traditionally neutral ones, would participate in the program and 12 of those nations would progress from partner to member status within the Alliance.

While NATO engaged with its partners in its bilateral program, a number of member nations initiated enhanced bilateral military-to-military programs with select nations. The most robust of these was the United States European Command’s (EUCOM) Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP), hailed as EUCOM’s premier peacetime engagement program. At its peak, the program placed liaison teams in 17 partner countries to coordinate activities according to a work plan jointly crafted by the U.S. liaison team and host nation leaders. Eleven of those 17 JCTP partners would ultimately accede into the Alliance and would credit JCTP with helping to achieve their defense reform, military professionalism and NATO interoperability objectives.

With the success of these multilateral and bilateral programs and the stability and security they fostered, specifically in the former Yugoslavia, the need for NATO forces to enforce the peace was diminished significantly. By December 2004, NATO determined that implementation of the military aspects of the Dayton Agreement had progressed sufficiently that remaining tasks could be handed over to a European Union Force (EUFOR). Up to that point, SFOR had been gradually reduced from the original IFOR strength of 60,000 to a troop number of 7,000, a result of the security and stability that it had helped to take root, and the requirement for NATO to deploy forces to Afghanistan and Iraq. The SFOR mission was closed, and NATO turned over to EUFOR the task of continuing stabilization efforts and the accomplishment of residual (Dayton Agreement) tasks in BiH. This tactical role is distinct from the strategic advisory role that NATO now fulfills.

**Advisory and liaison elements**

With the reduced staffing and mission change, NATO established Headquarters Sarajevo (NHQSa) to advise BiH on defense and security sector reform and PfP matters. While it shares a legal mandate with EUFOR as joint successors to IFOR and SFOR, NHQSa has taken a supporting role to EUFOR in the execution of all residual military tasks. In addition to the traditional stabilization tasks, EUFOR has the lead for capacity building and training the Armed Forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Additionally, NATO has elements working day to day in two other former Yugoslav nations. Along with NHQSa, the Alliance has a NATO liaison office (NLO) in Skopje, Macedonia, and a military liaison office (MLO) in Belgrade, Serbia. Prior to Albania’s accession into the Alliance in 2009, NATO also had a headquarters in Tirana. That headquarters closed in June 2010. Finally, outside of the military chain of command and reporting directly to NATO Headquarters in Kosovo, a NATO advisory and liaison team provides support to the KSF and its responsible ministry.

While EUFOR took the lead in BiH on the operational and tactical tasks of stabilization, capacity building and training, the establishment of NHQSa signaled a shift in NATO’s focus to the strategic task of defense and security sector reform, while assisting the Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces with NATO PfP activities. In the wake of SFOR’s deactivation, NATO’s staffing levels in BiH were steadily reduced. NHQSa currently maintains a staff of 65.
NATO alliances and partnerships in Europe

NATO has worked to build relationships with neighboring nonmembers through programs such as Joined Partnership for Peace and Individual Partnership Action Plans.

Military and civilian personnel, which is sufficient to achieve strategic-level objectives and requirements to provide personnel, finance, contracting and communications support to EUFOR headquarters.

MLO Belgrade, established in December 2006, maintains a staff of 13 military and civilian personnel. According to the Joint Force Command, its primary mission is “to serve as a link with the military authorities of Serbia on the practical aspects of the implementation of the Transit Agreement between NATO and Serbia, which was signed in July 2005. The purpose of this Transit Agreement is to improve the logistical flow to and between NATO’s operations in the Western Balkans.” For the purposes of this examination, it is equally, if not more, important to consider the added missions that MLO Belgrade now executes:

1. Facilitating the implementation of Serbia’s PIP program with NATO and providing assistance to NATO’s public diplomacy activities in the region.
2. Supporting the Serbia/NATO Defense Reform Group, which was established to assist the Serbian authorities in reforming and modernizing Serbia’s Armed Forces and in building a modern, affordable and democratically controlled defense structure in Serbia.

So, as in the case of NHQSa’s replacement of IFOR/SFOR, a NATO presence fielded to perform operational-level tasks is now working, to a great extent, at the strategic level with its host nation partners. NLO Skopje (originally named NATO HQ Skopje) was established in April 2002 when NATO combined HQ, KFOR (Rear) and the HQ of NATO Operation Amber Fox, an alliance operation that protected international monitors representing the EU and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. NLO Skopje maintains a staff of 14 military and civilian personnel. The primary NLO Skopje mission, according to the Joint Force Command, is “to advise the Host Nation governmental authorities on defense aspects of Security Sector Reforms and NATO membership, in order to contribute to the country’s further Euro-Atlantic integration, and to provide support to NATO-led operations within the Balkans Joint Area of Operations.”

As outlined on the NLO’s home page, “NLO Skopje is a non-tactical mission and consists of military and civilian personnel, located in the host nation MoD. Generally speaking, we are involved in all levels of the national transformation processes. We have regular contact with the government leadership and other agencies (Ministries of Defense, Interior, Foreign Affairs, etc.), but mostly with the defense and military authorities. We have regular meetings with the heads of EU, USA and OSCE missions.” NLO Skopje is yet another NATO element created for a tactical/operational purpose but whose mission has evolved to one sitting firmly and indisputably in the strategic arena.
Command and control

NHQSa, MLO Belgrade and NLO Skopje are all subordinate elements of NATO’s Joint Force Command, Naples (JFCNP). It is one of two standing operational joint force commands that are part of Allied Command Operations (ACO), one of NATO’s two strategic commands. JFCNP’s stated mission is “to prepare for, plan and conduct military operations in order to preserve the peace, security and territorial integrity of alliance member states and freedom of the seas and economic lifelines throughout SACEUR’s [Supreme Allied Commander Europe’s] Area of Responsibility (AOR) and beyond.”

Its role as an operational-level headquarters does not provide JFCNP with appropriate staffing, expertise or mission focus to offer effective oversight of subordinate headquarters and staffs that conduct defense reform and PfP activities at the strategic level. Although the three elements examined here have all been operating for a decade or more, JFCNP has only recently initiated collaboration and coordination among them. To its credit, JFCNP has created the Balkans Liaison Working Group with the stated purpose of sharing information and coordinating activities. Unfortunately, after several periodic one-day meetings, the group has produced no concrete results in terms of coordinated activities. This observation should not be viewed as a criticism of the JFCNP staff, but rather an indicator of the mismatch between the missions and areas of expertise of these liaison elements and their higher headquarters.

When NATO established its presence in Sarajevo, Belgrade and Skopje in the mid-1990s, each agency executed missions and performed tasks that were largely operational and/or tactical. It made sense, at that point, for them to be subordinate to an operational headquarters. It was also convenient because the NATO military operational structure had procedures in place to deploy them. Given their current missions, that command and control arrangement no longer makes sense. Commanders and liaison office chiefs who work with host nation counterparts at the strategic level should report to, and receive their guidance from, a strategic level headquarters.

Alternative approach

Given their evolution from tactical/operational missions to strategic ones, NHQSa, MLO Belgrade and NLO Skopje should be extracted from the JFCNP chain of command and placed within a bi-strategic command (Bi-SC) construct, reporting to both of NATO’s strategic commands, ACO and Allied Command Transformation (ACT). Such a command relationship is exactly the one that is in place for the Alliance’s Military Partnership Directorate (MPD).

“The MPD provides direction, control, coordination, support and assessment of military cooperation activities across the Alliance,” according to NATO. “It directs and oversees all non-NATO country involvement in military partnership programs, events and activities, and coordinates and implements NATO plans and programs in the area of partnership. The MPD is shared with ACO and is located at SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe] in Mons, Belgium, with a staff element at HQ Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) in Norfolk, Virginia.”

A Bi-SC construct for the NATO liaison elements would enable direct access to one strategic command (ACO) responsible for alliance activities throughout Europe; access to a second strategic command (ACT) with objectives that include leading NATO military transformation and improving relationships, interaction and practical cooperation with partners, nations and international organizations; and access to a Bi-SC organization (MPD) with a mission that is tailor-made to support their work in the Western Balkans. More important, it would place oversight of the NATO liaison elements where it rightfully belongs — at the strategic level.

In addition to modifying command and control (C2) relationships for NHQSa, MLO Belgrade and NLO Skopje, NATO should establish a C2 headquarters in the Western Balkans to supervise, coordinate and integrate the activities of those three liaison elements and any new ones that might be created. Further, the Alliance should place key leaders at that C2 headquarters on full, two- or three-year assignments, just as members of the military attaché corps in those countries are placed. Today, those leaders are assigned for relatively short deployment-like tours, lending to diminished continuity and continually interrupted momentum. A NATO C2 headquarters on the ground, with key leaders on stabilized tours of duty, would send...
a strong message about NATO’s commitment to security and stability in the Western Balkans. It would also highlight the value the Alliance places in developing our partners’ — and potential future members’ — defense institutions. That C2 headquarters would serve as a focal point for oversight, coordination and collaboration under the supervision of a leader and staff who execute those responsibilities as their sole, full-time duty.

The EUCOM JCTP model can be useful in exploring options for these proposals. The program had a C2 element at EUCOM HQ in Stuttgart that was staffed by a combination of active-duty service members on three-year assignments and reservists on renewable one-year tours, many of whom remained in place for three years or more. That C2 element supervised, coordinated and supported the activities of in-country Military Liaison Teams (MLT) comprised of four to six members each and augmented by host nation personnel. The MLTs worked in host nation facilities (typically within the Ministry of Defense or general staff) in the same way as the NATO Advisory Team in Sarajevo and the offices in Belgrade and Skopje.

Each MLT worked with its host nation counterparts to write a country work plan (CWP) that listed the goals and objectives for host nation transformation, development, professionalism and NATO interoperability. Partner nations and MLTs revised CWPs continually, reflecting progress toward goals and objectives and adding emerging ones. Each goal was crafted to be achievable in three to five years and included supporting objectives that could be achieved in one to two years. Many of the JCTP goals and objectives were designed to contribute directly to the host nation’s PfP goals. When external assistance or expertise was required to help meet an objective, the MLT coordinated with the JCTP HQ for support by a USEUCOM staff element, a U.S. service component command in theater, an appropriate active component military unit or agency in the U.S., or the host nation’s partner state command in theater, an appropriate active component military unit or agency in the U.S., or the host nation’s partner state. The MLTs in the Balkans were charged with coordinating civil-military operations for the Wide Array of Governmental and Nongovernmental bodies that provided humanitarian relief and reconstruction resources in the wake of the brutal armed conflict that had devastated the country and its people. The timing of my deployment gave me an up-close view of the phenomenon called “donor fatigue.” Those organizations had successfully provided for the most urgent needs, but were growing impatient in areas in which providing assistance was more difficult due to corruption, political in-fighting or lack of local leadership. As a result, resources for our work in BiH had begun to shrink as international donors focused their efforts elsewhere.

Ten years later, I experienced a kind of deja-vu as commander of NATO HQ Sarajevo. NATO had been on the ground in the Balkans for nearly two decades with a mission that evolved from mostly peace enforcement to mostly defense and security sector reform. The most important aspects of our work, specifically in Bosnia-Herzegovina, had stalled, mostly due to internal political impasse. As a result, members of the international community had displayed very clear signs of what I will call “engagement fatigue.” Some had begun to express open frustration at Bosnian political leaders’ inability to make progress on key Euro-Atlantic integration objectives. Meanwhile, despite the obstacles that their elected and appointed civilian leaders continually thrust into their paths, the Armed Forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina had progressed and improved admirably, culminating in multiple NATO deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan.

NATO and the broader international community cannot afford to allow engagement fatigue to take us down the same path on which donor fatigue took us in the Western Balkans. We cannot simply congratulate ourselves for whatever level of success we’ve been able to muster, to surrender our higher goals and those of our partners in the region, to fold our tents and go home. Doing so will undoubtedly open the door to renewed instability and diminished security. We must re-evaluate, reorganize and refocus our engagement efforts to continue to improve security and stability in the region.
Cooperative SECURITY within NATO
In November 2010, at the Lisbon Summit, NATO published a new Strategic Concept that introduced cooperative security as an additional core task. “The Alliance will engage actively to enhance international security,” the document says, “through partnership with relevant countries and other international organizations; by contributing actively to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament; and by keeping the door to membership in the Alliance open to all European democracies that meet NATO’s standards.” Cooperative security is a long-standing tradition called upon throughout history to institute security measures to protect sovereignty and national interests in the name of stability. In his article “Managing Change: The Reform and Democratic Control of the Security Sector and International Order,” geostrategist Theodore H. Winkler noted: “Every country has, in the security realm, some basic, clearly defined interests, most notably: the ability to protect and, if necessary, defend its territory, air space, sea frontiers, critical infrastructure, and national interests; to guard its borders against illegal and clandestine entry or exit of persons and goods; to safeguard the security, physical safety and the property of its citizens and inhabitants; to protect the country against organized crime, terrorist attack or acts by any sort of group that aims to overthrow through violent means the constitutional order of the existing state structures or to gain control over at least parts of the state territory.” Cooperative security is the best alternative for regional territorial defense in an environment where a potential adversary’s war machine is superior to those of bordering countries. This imbalance was present during Russia’s
military intervention in Georgia in 2008 and its annexation of Ukrainian Crimea in 2014. Moreover, when an adversary wields its dominant power both overtly and covertly, nations with fleet- ing self-defense tools must rely upon assistance from others.

In addition, the emergence of transregional and transnational threats that affect the stability of a state, its neighbors and states connected by lines of communication, makes cooperation across various security domains paramount. The global commons are held captive today by growing concerns about international terrorism that challenge the dictum of “safe spaces.” Societies face threats that no nation can hope to master acting alone, and opportunities can be more effectively exploited if nations work together. It is necessary to revive, nurture and maintain cooperative security to reassure smaller states and deter larger provocative states. The idea is to demonstrate that inadequate military expenditures create self-defense capability gaps and thus encourage collaboration for NATO’s cooperative security, which is aligned per Article 3.

Cooperative security concept

Cooperative security is a complex NATO core task that stresses the importance of synchronizing efforts, operating with common standards and sharing critical information pertaining to threat domains. As NATO noted in a communique at its 2016 Warsaw summit: “The complexity and volatility of the security environment underscores the need for a more tailor-made, individual, and flexible approach to make our partnership cooperation more strategic, coherent, and effective.” Extensive writings on cooperative security have tried to codify the term and create dialogue to shape organizational and governmental approaches to the concept. At a time in history when nearly every domain converges in both space and geography, cooperative security must focus on safeguarding civilian populations and preventing territorial instability.

Military expenditures

Acknowledging the disparity in countries’ defense systems, is it sensible to assume that pooling and sharing military resources is feasible to meet the demands of cooperative security? The raw data — only four NATO countries are allocating the requisite 2 percent of their gross domestic products (GDPs) to defense spending — is concerning. Moreover, according to the NATO charter, 20 percent of that 2 percent is supposed to finance major military equipment purchases. As several states struggle to reach the 2 percent threshold and a similar number fail to meet the 20 percent expenditure rate, an even greater concern is that some countries are reducing their overall spending. This decline in defense expenditures was a specific agenda item at NATO’s Wales Summit in 2014, where the Alliance agreed that “allies whose current proportion of GDP spent on defence is below the percent levels will halt any decline in defence expenditure.”

This tells us a number of things. First, if wealthier member states fail to meet the essential minimum, how much harder will it be for countries with weaker economies? Second, achieving cooperative security goals can financially strain — or even break — countries asked to support NATO global operations. This cautionary lesson appears in Azerbaijan’s defense reform review, which notes that “permanent external security must not be established at the cost of damaging the state economy.” Third, and maybe most important, is the reality that many countries’ economic outputs do not allow them to finance military research and development and simultaneously pay decent wages to soldiers being asked to defend their countries and fight abroad. This is especially evident in Central, Southern and Eastern Europe, where many countries are going through security sector reform after the collapse of the Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia, while others are dealing with pockets of regional instability.

Of course, security is the foundation of state stability and the growth of many vital sectors such as public services and economic investment. Even then, it is not quite that simple, because economic development provides the means to finance the security sector and enables a state to allocate that 2 percent. Furthermore, many countries simply do not possess the military industrial base for high-quality research and development, not to mention the mass production capability for technologically advanced military hardware. For these countries, the United States needs to offer cost-efficient options that provide a basic capacity. This inequality of means suggests pooling and sharing is a sound option for NATO.

From left: Lt. Gen. Riho Terras, chief of defence of Estonia; Hannes Hanso, minister of defence of Estonia; and Jussi Niinisto, minister of defence of Finland, talk at the defense ministers meeting on interoperability at the NATO Summit in Warsaw, Poland, in July 2016.  

NATO
While pooling and sharing invokes concerns about equitable contributions, the concept is mostly a positive one. For instance, it allows a country to contribute whatever resources it has available to multinational missions. Underwriting peacekeeping and global war on terror missions by deploying personnel serves to help shape the development and execution of NATO action plans.

**Article 3**

In many respects, cooperative security nests well within the intent of NATO Article 3: “In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.” The spirit of cooperative security is for countries to employ their self-defense capabilities in a joint (combined) environment to enhance NATO’s mutual defense against armed aggression. Article 3 outlines what member states and partners should do to mitigate the potential for conflict, whereas when armed aggression happens or is presumed imminent, Article 5 would be invoked, owing to its linkage to collective defense. However, in NATO’s 67-year history, it has only invoked Article 5 once, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the U.S. As such, Article 5 has its limitations, because each member state has the right to determine its own response. The essence of Article 5 has always been ambiguity — the word “consultation” in Article 5 acts as an escape hatch for countries.

That is why Article 3’s focus on evolving individual capacity for territorial defense is probably more important for trans-Atlantic defense and security. Though each country sees security through its own lens based on adjacent threats and their threshold for acceptable insecurity, in reality, the security problem can’t be left to individual nations. In this context, states must cooperate either regionally or globally to minimize threats or curtail aggression. “Divide and conquer” is the strategic aim of state and nonstate actors who want to stop the expansion of Western values and norms. Regarding the Baltic states, author Michael Clemmesen notes in his book, *Bordering Russia: Theory and Prospects for Europe’s Baltic Rim*, that “in the inter-war period, and both before and after the three states regained independence, the Soviet and Russian leadership used the fact that the three states found it difficult to co-ordinate policies to divide and control them.”

In the meantime, the Baltics have worked through many differences and economic competition to gain membership in the European Union and NATO. As noted by German Chancellor Angela Merkel at the end of a Council of the Baltic Sea States meeting: “In times of global competition, regional cooperation can liberate many forces, generating jobs and improving people’s quality of life.” Although each state has internal national interests, partnership demands equal footing with competition for cooperative security to thrive. However, Russia still uses the idea of Russian heritage to keep states such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine off balance. On the other end of the spectrum, nonstate actors are using religious radicalism to nurture a sense of separateness within local communities.

The NATO Warsaw Summit Communique states: “We are continuing to draw on our cooperative security network to enhance political dialogue, to foster constructive relationships in the region, and to increase our support for partners through practical cooperation, as well as defence capacity building and crisis management.” This statement anchors and gives credence to Article 3 being an appropriate impetus for cooperative security. Moreover, political cooperation and productive relations are essential for countries to create self-defense capabilities that overlap and form a mesh-like shield, making the coalition a hard target that discourages armed hostility and thwarts an array of other threats.

Establishing a durable shield entails the creation of structures and associated doctrine for military operations that support cooperative security. In the post-Cold War world, U.S. Armed Forces are being used as an instrument of American diplomacy to build cooperative relationships with countries that might otherwise be hostile to the U.S. and its interests. Due to the U.S. global contribution to cooperative security and knowing that its forces participate disproportionately in all NATO operations, other NATO members stay attuned to U.S. views. In 2008, the U.S. Department of Defense published an official doctrine that defines and outlines military contributions to cooperative security for execution by geographic combatant commanders and other joint forces commands. It defined cooperative security this way: “The set of continuous, long-term, integrated, comprehensive actions among a broad spectrum of U.S. and international governmental and nongovernment partners that maintains or enhances stability, prevents or mitigates crises, and enables other operations when crises occur.”

The U.S. military approach to cooperative security includes five objectives. They crosscut all threat spectrums, but require collaboration with allies and partners. Further, through constant cooperative exchanges with allies and partners, this
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The security environment is an intricate and unpredictable strategic space due to the convergence of multiple threat domains that require an array of collaborative functions and systems supported by individual states.

MILITARY EXPENDITURES
Anchor the security environment and indicate state capacity to fund self-defense apparatuses in accordance with their interpretation of the threats.

CENTERS OF EXCELLENCE
Allow subject matter experts to collaborate on ways to integrate near-compatible structures and analyze inhibitors to securing an environment.

POLITICAL AGREEMENTS
Enable the allocation and execution of national resources.

Joint Missions
Comprise bilateral and multilateral coalition activities that include training exercises, peacekeeping missions and combat operations.
concept can serve as a solid framework for other nations to build upon and modify according to national interests.

In short, NATO centers of excellence are a fundamental necessity for the progression of interoperability, integration and interdependence; as such, they function equally as pillars of Article 3. By becoming more interoperable through the procurement of NATO standard equipment and implementing principles as detailed in each country’s Membership Action Plan, any member of the Alliance or partner nation can provide continuous and effective mutual aid. Likewise, NATO’s ability to integrate myriad individual state capabilities and advanced technologies will boost collective capacity to enable cooperative security. As for interdependence, it already exists on some levels, since NATO members and partner states rely upon their neighbors in the economic environment for secure lines of communication and shared critical infrastructure. However, the process of operationalizing interdependence to support NATO’s cooperative security concept requires the development of a framework that focuses on future opportunities for operational purposes, opposed to simple near-term requirements.

Much is made of the 2 percent and 20 percent requirements, but output is more important than input. Case in point is that NATO only stipulates what Alliance members should do with 20 percent of their defense allocation; the other 80 percent is spent at the discretion of the state. As pointed out in a 2014 article titled “NATO’s Rebirth: NATO’s New Trajectories after the Wales Summit,” Greece is one of the four countries that contribute 2 and 20 percent, but is not capable and/or is unwilling to project combat power for a sustained period. On the other hand, Denmark, a country that contributes less than the NATO standard, demonstrates regularly that it can and will disproportionately support NATO missions. The best way forward may be a contribution of 10 percent to a NATO research and development fund that takes advantage of collective talent and innovation within the Alliance to yield a projectable and sustainable interoperable NATO warfighting platform.

The aim is to prevent an issue highlighted during the Kosovo campaign, as recognized at the time by then-American Commander Gen. Wesley Clark. “It is sobering to note that over the last decade we witnessed a growing technological gradient rather than a convergence of national capabilities.” This is not to say that NATO as a whole is not better off than it was in 1999. But technology has advanced nearly another two decades, and with NATO expansion, the capability gap remains an inhibitor to seamless operations (real-world and training). As described in an article in The Three Swords magazine: “The difficult task involved with achieving military interoperability is the implementation of a multitude of national policies, procedures, and restrictions designed over years to protect national systems that simply shut the door on interoperability.”

The Way Forward
First, national interests and local priorities require alignment with NATO concepts, since these are the unifying instruments of both soft and hard security. States must recognize that even soft power requires a hard power element to be effective. As such, contributing to territorial defense systems is a crucial aspect of national security. Even if improving the military is a long-term project often sidetracked by other national needs, the act of boosting one self-defense capability reinforces national self-confidence. Expanding regional security cooperation helps identify and share data on potential threats to limit transregional crime.

Second, countries should maintain centers of excellence as conduits for interoperability, integration, interdependence, and information and intelligence sharing. Third, NATO should continue funding reassurance programs for emerging economies; equally, coalition training exercises must remain a priority for stakeholders, even when the countries are not geographically proximate. Lastly, states must recalibrate internal security and defense frameworks to move closer to the spirit of Article 3, since it underpins self-defense and cooperative security. This is not to minimize Article 5, but to accept that states with the capacity and capability to defend themselves help deter aggressive state and nonstate actors. The trans-Atlantic community relies on trust to assure success within security and economic environments, so sharing data, even when it’s not in a state’s best interest, may result in reciprocal assistance that is in the nation’s interest. By sustaining this approach, NATO can continue consolidating the dynamic value of the Alliance and assure the security of Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus.

Conclusion
In the wake of converging threats, states must re-examine internal security to protect their populations. In an operating environment where the fight with the enemy becomes physical today, buying hard security tools tomorrow is too late. Because the world is constantly evolving, rapid advancements in technology and the metamorphosis of threat vectors will not allow NATO to rest on past successes achieved through outdated frameworks.

From an ends, ways and means perspective, the synchronization of the three focal points in this paper can enable full-spectrum cooperative security operations. The “ends” are members’ and partners’ political and security apparatuses aligning with Article 3. The “ways” in which NATO accomplishes this is the exploitation of dynamically innovative centers of excellence. The decisive “means” of warfighting interdependence is the bedrock for cooperative security, which exists through smart military expenditures on the “right” interoperable tools that allow for ease of integration.

NATO’s cooperative security places the Alliance on the right path for continued success moving into 2020 and beyond, but the convergence of transregional and transnational threats requires full adherence by member and partner states to this concept’s principles. Ultimate success in protecting NATO against aggression and an array of threats will depend to a significant extent on how various governments organize to meet this threat.

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Developing and Improving Ukraine’s Military Education Process

By Maj. Gen. Igor Tolok, Ukrainian Ministry of Defense

A BMP-2 provides supporting fire to Ukrainian infantry during training in June 2016 at the International Peacekeeping and Security Center near Yavoriv, Ukraine, where soldiers learned defensive combat skills needed to increase Ukraine’s capacity for self-defense. CAPT. SCOTT KUHN/U.S. ARMY
The Revolution of Dignity opened a new chapter in the history of Ukraine, paving the way for a new open society, free of corruption and the vestiges of the past and encouraging a new level of national patriotism. The Ukrainian people opted for European development, reform and peaceful coexistence. But Russia’s aggressive geopolitical position, its struggle to dominate the region and even the world, and its disregard of international law and the laws of war led to the annexation of Crimea and armed conflict in the eastern part of Ukraine.

Using new hybrid war methods and means, Russia has been able to deceive the population, build up separatist sentiment and create illegal separatist groups that are armed, trained and financially motivated.

In addition, neglect of potential threats and modern challenges by the nation’s previous leadership, together with the “residual principle” of funding the Armed Forces, meant that national security forces were not prepared to repulse Russian aggression—not only in terms of arms and military equipment, but also in terms of professional and psychological readiness to use them in hybrid war scenarios, especially in urban areas and when the enemy uses civilians as cover for armed operations.

In these conditions, one priority in building Ukraine’s defense potential was to implement a series of measures to improve the content and quality of training for military specialists, enhance their psychological and moral preparedness for the new kind of warfare, and facilitate the acquisition of practical professional military skills. This was done under the supervision of the Department of Military Education and Science of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence in coordination with the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and Armed Forces commands.

The new training program (conferences, seminars, roundtables, instructional and methodological classes, demonstrations and participation of teaching staff in anti-terrorist operations) has resulted in the higher military education system moving gradually from a traditional, classical and static educational process to a dynamic system of rapid changes to training standards, programs, and forms and methods based on ongoing analysis of how forces have been used in anti-terrorist operations and lessons from local wars and modern-day conflicts.

The qualifications required of specialists have been amended. Priority is given to the practical component of training, while the approaches to general military, psychological and physical training, tactical medicine, and the acquisition of practical command skills and leadership qualities have undergone drastic changes. The comprehensive nature of the types and methods of training, in cooperation with experts in various specializations, forms the basis of professional troop training, along with the broad involvement of students and teaching staff.

Higher military training institutions have begun to introduce up-to-date approaches to the training of specialists, ensuring that the graduate’s skill level is as close as possible to force requirements. For example, a three-phase flight training system has been developed and implemented for the first time at Kharkiv Air Force University, providing training on combat planes and helicopters prior to graduation, and graduates are awarded a master’s degree upon completion. Flight practice on combat planes and helicopters is given directly in the combat units in which they will subsequently serve. The pilot-instructors are officers who have experienced combat in the anti-terrorist operations area and have received state awards. The first class of master pilots graduated in June 2016.

Russia’s unconcealed aggression in eastern Ukraine and lessons from other local conflicts have clearly shown that, in an environment of modern hybrid war, Ukraine’s security is based on involvement in collective security organizations. Although Russia’s main reason for instigating conflict in eastern Ukraine was to obstruct our country’s aspiration to associate with the European Union, Ukraine has unambiguously chosen the path of further integration with the EU and membership in NATO.

Accordingly, one of the priorities in developing the military education system is to improve European and Euro-Atlantic integration and to enhance and expand relations with the higher military training institutions of EU and NATO countries.

Ukrainian higher military training institutions play an active part in NATO’s Defence Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP), which is intended to help NATO partner nations develop and reform their national military education systems.

The Department of Military Education and Science, in cooperation with NATO, organized a set of events to involve higher military training institution staff—first and foremost
teaching staff — in exchanges with similar foreign institutions about the military education process, and in discussions with foreign specialists about developing training plans and programs.

DEEP has a great deal to offer in improving the national military education system.

- For teachers: Understanding the methods used to train military specialists abroad; studying modern, active education technology and introducing it to the training process; learning NATO’s English terminology to work with primary sources of NATO documents and standards; and creating the conditions for implementing NATO standards in the training process.
- For students: Helping them cultivate European values and acquire leadership and professional qualities in accordance with NATO standards; and preparing them to perform tasks in international military units.
- For higher military training institutions: Making the national military specialist training system compatible with European training standards; and establishing cooperation regarding the rapid exchange of experience with the military training institutions of NATO nations.

DEEP not only offers a unique opportunity to learn about worldwide experiences in military specialist training, but also provides a catalyst for the teachers’ self-improvement and the implementation of new approaches to training under specific conditions.

Thanks to the results-oriented work of the Department of Military Education and Science, the general staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and Armed Forces commands, higher military training institutions successfully implemented a network of skills enhancement courses providing short-term programs for reserve officers called up during the mobilization of 2014-2015. With the modular principle of program building, the strong general military section and intensive specialized practical training, it has been possible, in just a short time, to recover lost professional and tactical medical skills, ensure psychological readiness for action in modern conditions and meet the requirements of troop mobilization.

As a result of studying foreign experiences and military specialist training programs, especially in the field of leadership building, it has been possible to develop a legal mechanism, introduce a new training system and give noncommissioned officers a unique higher education opportunity: If they have displayed leadership qualities and shown courage and heroism in combat conditions, they may gain the rank of lieutenant after three months of specialized training and also gain career development opportunities.

A series of DEEP seminars on the organization of training activities, active teaching methods, and development of educational plans and programs — given by leading lecturers from higher military training institutions in NATO nations — provided the impetus for a review of traditional approaches to organizing training and educational activities and an exploration of ways to intensify cooperation among those involved in the education process. Based on the results of these seminars, preparatory work was carried out in all faculties of Kharkiv Air Force University. During training and methodical sessions before the beginning of the 2015-2016 academic year, a pedagogical technology fair with a competition was held. Each faculty presented its implementation of an active teaching method (such as case studies and role playing) to enhance cognitive activity during study. The value of each innovation, and ultimately the winners of the competition, were determined on the basis of lecturers’ votes. The competitive nature of the event significantly increased the lecturers’ motivation to improve.

Systemic improvements have been made to language training. Despite the resources required by the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) to conduct the anti-terrorist operation in eastern Ukraine, the Department of Military Education and Science was able to resume language training courses in September 2015 at specific higher military training institutions. Under DEEP, enhanced foreign language training for UAF officers was organized at higher military training institutions in NATO nations. Students attained a foreign language competence at the level of NATO Standardization Agreement 6001.

The fact that teaching staff and students have greater foreign language proficiency means that some courses can be taught in a foreign language, and new approaches to teaching are possible. It is good to see that students understand the importance of language training and wish to develop their language skills for use during peacekeeping activities and official cooperation with foreign partners.
CONCLUSION

The Ukrainian military education system is undergoing systematic improvements, taking account of the best traditions of international experience, and is focused on providing the Armed Forces with officers with high-level combat capacities who are able to work together with NATO Armed Forces.

The implementation of the conceptual principles to further develop military education must guarantee the transition to a new type of humanistic and innovative military education, one that will increase the professional, intellectual, scientific, cultural, spiritual and moral potential of military specialists. This will lead to positive changes in the military education system, military schools, and departments and units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in terms of the quality of military specialist training, strengthening defense capabilities and developing the theory and practice of military art and modern force principles.

The independence, self-sufficiency and creative activities of military specialists will be increased, and this will help them perform their tasks, regardless of the complexity or conditions. This will boost the national self-identity processes of military specialists, their authority in society and the status of Ukrainian officers at the international level.

For several years, Kharkiv Air Force University has offered the option of preparing and defending work submitted for bachelor’s and master’s degrees in a foreign language. In 2016, 12 students successfully defended their work in English and, in accordance with state certification, received a diploma with distinction.

An important achievement is the introduction of aviation English for university students in accordance with International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards. Student pilots and air traffic control experts can improve their practical language skills both in the university and in Ukraerorukh, a public enterprise working closely with the university to improve the training system for flight experts in accordance with ICAO and Eurocontrol standards.

In just a short time, DEEP has proven effective in improving the higher military education system in Ukraine and ensuring that approaches to education and the content of training are compatible.

Another indisputable achievement is overcoming the psychological barrier between teachers from higher military training institutions in NATO nations and those from countries of the former Soviet Union, and also establishing friendly relations between higher military training institutions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and partners abroad.

Ukrainian soldiers with the 1st Battalion, 93rd Mechanized Brigade, maneuver a BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicle as part of Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine at the International Peacekeeping and Security Center in Ukraine in August 2016. STAFF SGT. ELIZABETH TARR, U.S. ARMY
Women across the world face challenges to their status every day, but their underrepresentation is especially obvious in the security sector. According to the Inter-Parliamentary Union, an international organization of parliaments, women made up 22 percent of parliaments worldwide in 2015, just 6.6 percent of the heads of state were women and only 7.3 percent were the heads of government. In ministerial positions, which are often sent to participate in peace negotiations, women represent just 17 percent of the total, with the vast majority representing social affairs ministries focusing on education and family affairs. As a result, women are rarely present in state affairs, delegations, peace negotiations or post-conflict reconstruction efforts. This phenomenon is rooted in centuries of gender inequality and in an uneven progression of women’s rights under patriarchal societies that has greatly restricted opportunities for women to lead independent and proactive social, economic and political lives.

Few women can be found in state delegations, international negotiations or conference settings because women seldom reach governmental positions worthy of such appointments. Therefore, the likelihood of female representation at such events is marginal from the beginning. At peace conferences, this becomes problematic when considering that the fate of all women within the conflict area is determined without a balanced female representation.
RESOLUTION 1325
This is not a new debate, and past efforts to promote women’s participation in the security sector are worth considering. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, adopted in 2000, seemed like a groundbreaking antidote. Also referred to as the first resolution on “Women, Peace, and Security,” it was seen as officially recognizing the need “to address the disproportionate and unique impact of armed conflict on women.” Resolution 1325 and its seven successors brought light to the challenges women face in armed conflict and the different security needs they have.

It commits U.N. member nations to four basic principles: prevention of conflict and violence against women and girls; equal participation and gender equality in decision-making processes on state and international levels; the need to protect women and girls in conflict areas; and the recognition and fulfillment of the relief and recovery needs of women and girls during and after a conflict. The participation of women is especially lacking, but much needed, in these four areas. To accomplish that, it is imperative to look at the roles women play in conflicts and the roles they should play in conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction.

GENDER ROLES IN CONFLICT
Throughout history, armed conflict has traditionally been primarily a male occupation, while women have filled more passive and victimized roles. This resonates in literature, with women and children being the only groups referred to exclusively as civilians. Men are more likely to die as a result of violent conflict than women, while women are more likely to die from post-conflict consequences, such as starvation and disease. Women are especially vulnerable to sexual exploitation because pre-existing institutional and social barriers of protection break down during conflict.

In reality, however, women have the same capacity as men for violence and evil and can play diverse roles in conflict. They can be actively involved in the war apparatus through planning, execution and organization, as well as supporting their male counterparts. They can be soldiers, instigators, murderers, or torturers. Sanam N. Anderlini, a U.N. consultant and Georgetown professor, wrote in her book, Women Building Peace, that “from Kashmir to Colombia, El Salvador to Sri Lanka, particularly where identity, freedom, or self-determination fuels warfare, women have been involved in prewar propaganda, inciting violence, encouraging revenge, and taking up arms themselves.” Women can perform the traditional role of combatant that in most cases is occupied by men, a fact often overlooked post-conflict when justice is sought for perpetrators, or combatants need to be incorporated into disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs. Studies show women who participate in conflict, especially in countries with more traditional views of gender roles, are less likely to enroll in rehabilitation programs because it lessens their chances to be accepted in their community.

It is difficult to determine the extent of direct female participation in conflict because of the immense difficulty of data collection during armed conflict and the diversity of case examples. Therefore, attention is usually drawn to flashy examples, such as female suicide bombers or the female fighting units of the Kurdish peshmerga. But these are highly contextual examples that do not establish a norm by which to judge the female combatant phenomenon. In return, we can also argue that men are falsely stigmatized as being primarily combatants, not taking into consideration that they can be victims or that they are sometimes forced into the combatant role at gunpoint.

WOMEN AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION
We must recognize that the participation and involvement of women in the security sector, and particularly in peace processes, is not a panacea in the fight to end all conflict on Earth. Women are also not the only interest group wrongly excluded from peace processes, with participants mostly limited to belligerents and mediators. Yet, there is ample evidence suggesting that women, especially when organized in civil society groups, can have an immensely positive effect on implementing peace in conflict settings. Women are the other half of the equation. Simply put, it is not logical to leave their potential unused. The effective influence of women’s groups contributes to reaching peace agreements, implementing them more often and having them last longer, according to “Broaderening Participation in Political Negotiations and Implementation,” an examination of 40 case studies at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, Switzerland.

Women also improve access to conflict’s most vulnerable populations and an understanding of their needs. Precisely because men are the predominant participants at the peace conference table, they determine the outcome of peace processes and post-conflict reconstruction, while the needs of
women, youth, elderly and minorities are often neglected. Resolution 1325 was implemented because women, in particular, along with children and the elderly, have different needs from the combatants typically represented in security and peace operations.

The insecurity of women, children and the elderly is magnified by conflict, because institutions break down and any structures that previously protected these groups are no longer in effect. Women who are widowed must provide for entire families without their husbands, often with scarce resources. It is particularly relevant that health services for women and children are among those most neglected, according to the United Nations Population Fund, and that can lead to increased deaths, especially for pregnant women and infants.

In short, women bring light to important issues that otherwise are pushed under the table. Many argue, including a U.N. assessment on the implementation of Resolution 1325, that “when women are placed at the center of security, justice, economic recovery, and good governance, they will be more direct recipients of a range of peace dividends including job creation and public services. This means that the payoffs of peace will be delivered more rapidly to communities.” Women tend to focus more on investing in food security, education and especially the welfare of their families. Additionally, enabling women as mediators, peacekeepers or state builders can ensure that in societies where contact between women and men is unusual outside familial ties, the female population can be reached and taken care of.

As Anderlini wrote in her book, “it is not that women are necessarily more selfless than men, yet the anecdotal evidence suggests that women are, at the very least, perceived to be more trustworthy, sometimes because women are less often implicated in war. Other times, it is a result of the tactics women themselves use. They come forward as representatives of the people, with no agenda of personal gain.” For instance, in Somalia where tribal warfare was the primary catalyst for conflict, women who were not allowed at the negotiation table. They decided to create the “Sixth Clan” in 2002 to gain access to a peace process dominated by male clan elders. The Sixth Clan was created across tribal structures, ignoring the different tribal backgrounds of the women and banding them together as one. They didn’t necessarily advocate for the end of the conflict or a better cut for their own clans — they simply wanted to create safe conditions to cover basic human needs, like being able to buy food at the market.

CONCLUSION
Changing attitudes, systems and practices has never been a one-day process. Accelerating the participation of women in the security sector will require institutional changes in governments and political parties. Emancipated states and international organizations must be role models for others and, most important, practice what they preach. In addition, there need to be cultural changes in countries restricting the rights of women, changes in how gender roles are perceived, and behavioral changes in men in positions of power. In particular, there needs to be passionate engagement from women for women. A good example is that of Christine Lagarde, managing director of the International Monetary Fund, who, as finance minister in France, carried a list of 20 women to give to the male leaders of companies who complained they could not find capable women to hire. As both the qualitative and quantitative evidence suggests, giving more women a seat at the table seems to be a no-brainer.
With global uncertainty and regional insecurity on the rise, a marked reduction in the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) budget, and insufficient resources to advance United States national security interests, how can the DOD maintain its competitive edge? How can it best position itself to effectively protect and engage across the full spectrum — horizontally and vertically, as well as through time and space?

Defense diplomacy is one way to effectively address these questions. According to Juan Emilio Cheyre’s chapter in The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy, defense diplomacy is best defined as the pursuit of foreign policy goals through the deliberate employment or denial of defense resources and capabilities. Employed since the age of antiquity, defense diplomacy is best applied through measured international defense relations, negotiations and activities. In an age shrouded by unending global conflict and regional strife, clearly defined and professionally executed defense diplomacy is more vital than ever to effectively promote United States foreign policy goals through the deliberate employment or denial of defense resources and capabilities.

America’s ‘Force of the Future’

While serving as chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff in 2012, Gen. Martin Dempsey remarked, “We’re at a strategic inflection point, where we find a different geopolitical challenge, different economic challenges, shifting of economic and military power. And what we’re trying to do is to challenge ourselves to respond to that shift and to react to that strategic inflection point and adapt ourselves.” When former Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter took office in 2015, he expressed his intent to define, build and develop a “Force of the Future” as one of his major policy initiatives. It was described as an effort to shape U.S. forces to be best postured to anticipate and respond to a future operating environment that is likely to be defined more by an ambiguous time and space dimension, rather than by a more concrete physical dimension.

The aim was to identify, develop and enhance the DOD’s ways and means to advance defense capacity, capabilities and response mechanisms. While much of the Force of the Future initiative has focused on force readiness, including improved personnel management, human resources, recruitment, retention, and talent management practices and procedures, the DOD has emphasized that the overall strategic intent and vision of building and improving the defense sector in these domains is to
Col. Brendan McAloon, left, the senior defense official and defense attache at the U.S. Embassy in Paris, arrives in Lesquin, France, in August 2015 to visit an American serviceman wounded while subduing an armed terrorist aboard a train from Amsterdam to Paris. REUTERS
develop an overall force that is more innovative, well-rounded and best postured to advance U.S. defense initiatives across the full spectrum. This includes a Force of the Future that is proactive, innovative, resilient and diplomatically savvy.

To effectively create the Force of the Future — a globally revered, superior, universal, combined and joint force — one must also consider the necessity of refining the nation’s ability to exercise strategic patience, identify U.S. equities and strategic intent, and engage in sound defense resilience throughout the defense diplomatic arena and beyond. America’s Force of the Future requires defense professionals to not only advance the nation’s defense priorities and initiatives, but to simultaneously merge and integrate these priorities and initiatives within a continuum of other key domestic interagency enterprises. Additionally, the DOD must consider how to best nest and complement our national interests with allied multinational defense partner priorities and objectives. It would be remiss, said Mac Thornberry and Andrew Krepinevich in their 2016 article in *Foreign Affairs*, if second- and third-order implementation effects were not considered, as they relate to nongovernmental organizations, research and development actors, corporate associates and private-sector partners.

The Force of the Future must be postured to anticipate strategic inflection points well in advance, instead of merely reacting and responding to current and emerging global threats, as has become the norm over the past decade. To further refine national defense resilience at the strategic level, we must be more proactive. We must engage in prevailing, strategically minded, perceptive and well-strategized defense diplomacy as we continue to acclimate to an ever-evolving and shifting threat environment. We must be more adaptive, while remaining situationally astute and internationally-minded. We must further refine and revise defense engagement to cover an infinite continuum of time and space that spans and converges across multiple dimensions, as outlined by retired U.S. Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal in his 2015 book *Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World*. Prioritizing the importance of sound defense diplomacy as a critical component of the Force of the Future will enable the DOD and other agencies to best align and posture our defense forces to successfully engage fluctuating universal norms and realities along with future realities not yet envisioned. Progressive defense diplomacy resides at the core of effective strategic defense policy, strategy, representation, negotiation, development, coordination and engagement. According to the U.S. National Intelligence Council’s report, “Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds,” innovative defense diplomacy is a critical component of a force that is built, developed, and refined to remain globally responsive and regionally engaged.
A rich history

The use of military force has long been considered and utilized by nations, alliances and coalitions as a last resort when diplomacy fails and national, bilateral and/or multinational allied interests are at stake, as Cheyre articulates so well. As the use of military force is not generally the most economically sound of policy options, he attests, the decision to employ it is traditionally reserved for the most severe situations — for example, instances when diplomacy, development, sanctions, diplomatic persuasion and negotiation have failed to attain a desired end state. There are also occasions when a nation’s or international organization’s security interests are threatened so greatly that there remains only one option to defend sovereignty and interests.

While Napoleon Bonaparte formalized the concept of appointing military officers to observe, collect and report on the full spectrum of issues that might be of interest to France’s political leaders, defense diplomacy may be traced back even further to the remarkable military commanders and representatives of the Peloponnesian wars and Roman Empire. The Duke of Richelieu also deployed senior military officers to serve as defense diplomats. According to Cheyre, these officers were charged with coordinating and deconflicting defense initiatives with allies. They also noted and reported back to the duke concerning key allied military defense technological advances spanning the full spectrum of tactical, operational and strategic developments. Subsequently, defense diplomacy was formally recognized in 1857 when military officers were officially accredited as military attachés and presented full diplomatic status while serving abroad in overseas missions and delegations.

Since the late 19th century, American military officers have been formally integrated and incorporated to serve as key interlocutors within the diplomatic arena. Appointed as senior defense officials and defense attachés, these officers serve as defense diplomats and representatives on behalf of the president and the DOD. In Career Diplomacy: Life and Work in the U.S. Foreign Service, Harry Kopp and Charles Gillespie described how these soldier-statesmen — foreign area officers and defense attaches — represent the nation’s senior defense leaders to their host nation defense ministry counterparts while serving within U.S. embassies and missions abroad.

Whether supporting U.S. interagency efforts or serving forward-deployed, enveloped in host nation political, cultural, economic and societal medians, DOD foreign area officers remain best postured, both strategically and geographically, to engage in host nation-related issues. As a result, foreign area officers remain an integral part of the DOD as it strives to shape and further define the Force of the Future initiative and engage in an ever-evolving and fluctuating global threat arena across an increasingly complex time-space continuum.
Soldiers and statesmen

Aristotle remarks in Book IV of *Politics* that “the true legislator and statesman ought to be acquainted, not only with that which is best in the abstract, but also with that which is best relatively to circumstances.” Today’s innovative, globally responsive and regionally engaged defense diplomats serve as the U.S.’s first line of defense. These officers are charged with providing senior military and civilian decision-makers with sound political-military advice and options, formulated on a wide array of personal engagement, regional exposure and international experience, coupled with a baseline of practical wisdom, intuitive reasoning, rational principle and moral virtue. They work, live and continuously engage with host nation defense and security personnel to anticipate and respond to myriad strategic conjectures and inflection points. Foreign area officers coordinate and deconflict with U.S. interagency national security staff, allied partners, combatant commands, joint forces commands, international governmental and non-governmental partners, and even serve as conduits to negotiate cease-fires and other diplomatic, defense-related activities and efforts.

Conclusion

Although it may appear to be somewhat of a paradox, Cheyre maintains that the emergence of well-stratified and effectively coordinated defense diplomacy is one of the key diplomatic instruments that nations can call upon to deter war and promote peace. If properly managed and implemented, defense diplomacy can serve as an extremely powerful and influential tool and, as Cheyre articulates with such aplomb, an “instrument of statecraft, by bringing to bear the manifold dimensions of both soft and hard power on any given issue.” As we continue to further shape, refine and posture ourselves to define, build, and sustain the Force of the Future, it is critical that defense diplomacy serve as an integral part in this process to further advance and promote strategic security and defense interests worldwide. Innovative, persuasive, globally responsive and regionally engaged, defense diplomacy lies at the heart of the Force of the Future as we work collectively with domestic interagency partners, as well as with bilateral, multinational and international allies, to deter and counter the most severe disputes and prevent escalations of violence throughout the 21st century and beyond. □

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